The European Union as a Global Counter-Terrorism Actor
EUROPEAN SECURITY AND JUSTICE CRITIQUES

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The European Union as a Global Counter-Terrorism Actor
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To my daughter Sophia and my son Max. May they grow up in a better world than ours.

Alex MacKenzie

To Elisabeth and Raphael, whom we love so very much.

Christian Kaunert and Sarah Léonard
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Preface

This book is about European Union (EU) counter-terrorism cooperation, both conceptually and empirically. It is based on many vivid exchanges that the authors of this book have had over the years. We are grateful to a great number of people – family members, friends, and colleagues – who have helped through the various stages of the writing of this book. Without these very special people, it would not have been possible to complete this project.

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Introduction to *The European Union as a Global Counter-Terrorism Actor*

One of the founding fathers of the European Union (EU) highlighted the importance of crises as catalysts for change. This book illustrates this principle by analysing the development of the EU’s role as a global counter-terrorism actor, which was prompted by the deadly terrorist attacks that took place on 11 September 2001 (also often referred to as ‘9/11’). These attacks led the EU to join in the so-called ‘war on terror’, whereby it collectively securitized the terrorist threat to become European, rather than national. This is the first book-length treatment of the EU as a global counter-terrorism actor. Europe has been the site of much and heterogeneous terrorist activity in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, from the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) through the German Red Army Faction (RAF) and the Croatian Ustasha movement to al-Qaeda- and Daesh-inspired and affiliated individuals and groups. These experiences have provided European states with considerable experience in combating terrorism. Jihadist terrorism has been the main focus of counter-terrorism efforts in many Western states since 2001, although there has been growing concern about right-wing terrorism, whilst separatist terrorist groups have continued to be active in a number of European states (Europol, 2018). Europe has seen significant attacks from jihadist terrorists since 2001, including the Madrid train bombings in March 2004, which killed over 190 people and injured a further 1,841 victims (BBC, 2011).

Despite the threat that it poses to European states, the issue of terrorism needs to be placed into perspective. As pointed out by Mueller (2005), citizens of the USA and other Western states are not likely to be directly affected by terrorism and it may be dangerous to over-react. Injudicious action might marginalise ethnic minorities, polarise societies, and erode democratic norms. Having said this, most terrorist activity occurs outside of Europe and is concentrated in a small number of states. For instance, more than half of the deaths from terrorism in 2017 took place in just three countries, namely Iraq (24 per cent), Afghanistan (23 per cent), and Syria (8 per cent) (Global Terrorism Database, 2018). States such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Syria have experienced high levels of terrorist activity for a number of years since the attacks of 11 September 2001 and the subsequent response of the USA and its partners.
The European Union as a global counter-terrorism actor

What is known in the West as al-Qaeda, the group responsible for the attacks on the World Trade Center in September 2001, was subsequently overshadowed by Daesh as the leading jihadist group (Byman, 2017: 1106). There has been a debate over conceptualising the precise nature of Daesh. Cronin (2016) has argued that it has been more than a terrorist group, whilst Walt (2015) has likened it to a revolutionary state akin to revolutionary France in the late eighteenth century. What is certain is that it has inspired terrorist attacks around the world, including the coordinated attacks on Paris in November 2015, and has counted over 5,000 European citizens in its numbers (Coolsaet and Renard, 2018). It experienced a level of success in gaining a significant amount of territory in Iraq and Syria, which led other groups to pledge allegiance to it. Eventually, it was pushed back and its main stronghold Raqqa taken in October 2017, although fighting has continued in the region. According to Rapoport’s (2012: 41) ‘wave theory’ of modern international terrorism, the religious wave, which started in 1979, probably does not have long to run, with his rough prediction being that it will end sometime round about 2025 – about 40 years, or the length of a generation. Others have agreed that the fourth wave appears to be coming to an end (Weinberg and Eubank, 2010), and perhaps, in hindsight, the destruction of the central body of Daesh will come to be seen as a crucial event in that respect. Usually, a wave of terrorism ends as individuals consider that the objectives are impossible to achieve or as a result of a failure to hand over to the next generation.

There has already been speculation about the emergence of a fifth wave of international terrorism (Honig and Yahel, 2017; Kaplan, 2007). Indeed, terrorism as a method is unlikely to completely end. One can argue that the very belief that this was possible was actually one of the many errors underpinning the American ill-fated ‘war on terror’. In that respect, Byman (2018) has suggested that, after its defeat in the Middle East, Daesh might go underground, disrupt politics and encourage sectarianism, continue with an insurgency, and then return, while also continuing to attack Europe. In that regard, European governments have expressed concerns about the return of foreign fighters and the decentralisation of the jihadist movement. This is a rather complex situation since about a third of foreign fighters have returned to Europe, whilst many others have been killed or imprisoned in the Middle East (European Parliament, 2018).

WHAT ROLE FOR THE EU?

This book focuses on the growth of the EU as a global counter-terrorism actor since the start of the twenty-first century, as it has gone from having almost no role in counter-terrorism in 2001 to being a significant actor 20 years later. If indeed the fourth wave of international terrorism is coming to an end, then
Introduction

this book will have covered much of the arc of the EU’s development so far. A further wave of terrorism may be different to the current one in terms of focus, methods used, and geographical presence. Far-right terrorism has been on the rise and has grown faster than other types of terrorism. In Western states, the far-right accounted for 17.2 per cent of attacks in 2018 and had risen by 320 per cent in the five previous years (Global Terrorism Index, 2019). Today’s political environment is likely contributing to this increase, which has led respected scholars to speculate that the ‘fifth wave’ of terrorism might come from the right (Weinberg, 2011).

European states have cooperated on terrorism for a few years. Bures (2006: 58) traces the origins of EU counter-terrorism cooperation back to European Political Cooperation (EPC) and the Trevi Group in the 1970s – a time when many European states, such as the United Kingdom (UK), Germany, France, and Italy were experiencing significant problems with terrorism. In the early 1990s, such cooperation efforts were formally brought into the EU’s framework in the form of the then new intergovernmental ‘Justice and Home Affairs’ (JHA) third pillar, which was introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. However, as the 1990s progressed, terrorism declined in Europe. Many leftist groups wound down after the end of the Cold War, whilst decreasing violence in Northern Ireland led to the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. This meant that there was little urgency to improve counter-terrorism cooperation in Europe in this decade. Even so, some incremental changes did occur, such as the inclusion of terrorism as an issue for the EU in the Treaty of Maastricht, the promise of the development of an Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice (AFSJ), and the ability for the EU to negotiate and to conclude some types of security agreements with third states in the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 (Monar, 2007b: 272). Moreover, the European Council meeting at Tampere in 1999 provided a wish list of measures that only became possible after the attacks of 9/11 due to, among other things, entrepreneurship by EU institutions (Kaunert, 2007). The 9/11 attacks on the USA caused a major change in the EU’s role in combating terrorism.

More precisely, 9/11 led to what has been referred to as the ‘month of transformation’ of the EU, in which the EU rushed to respond to the attacks in a somewhat hectic manner (Zimmermann, 2006). Although these activities overloaded the EU, a lack of coherence was present, and there have been some implementation problems, much has also been achieved at the EU level (Argomaniz, 2010; Bures, 2011; Bossong, 2013; De Londras and Doody, 2017). The list of achievements has grown over time, but those have often come as a response to terrorist attacks (Argomaniz, 2009a; Davis Cross, 2017). In 2008, Edwards and Meyer (2008: 1) pointed out that ‘[t]he governance of the European Union has been changed through its responses to international terrorism’, which highlights the profound effect of terrorism on the EU after
only seven years. Indeed, international terrorism has really pushed European integration forward. A list of some important achievements is worth providing. In 2002, the EU agreed on a common definition of terrorism. This definition has both an objective and a subjective dimension. The objective dimension refers to the adoption of a list of nine categories of serious criminal conduct, such as hostage-taking, extortion, murder, and bodily injuries. In contrast, the subjective dimension concerns the aim of these acts – the specific acts that are listed are deemed to be terrorist acts when committed with a specific aim, namely (1) ‘seriously intimidating a population’, (2) ‘unduly compelling a Government or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act’, or (3) ‘seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation’ (Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA). Following the adoption of this definition – which will be used throughout this book – all EU member states were required to incorporate it into their legal systems. Furthermore, the EU appointed an EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator (CTC) after the Madrid bombings in 2004, and despite problems with the role, the importance attached to the CTC has grown over time (MacKenzie et al., 2013b). The EU also introduced its first European Security Strategy in 2003, a Counter-Terrorism Strategy in 2005, and an Internal Security Strategy in 2010, with some subsequent updates. With regard to externally combating terrorism, the Union has engaged heavily with the USA and announced long-term strategies for areas of the world where terrorism poses a challenge, such as the Middle East, North Africa, and Afghanistan. These are, of course, rhetorical commitments, but concrete action has followed in a number of these cases, as this book shows in its many case studies.

The initial perception of the EU’s external counter-terrorism role was overall not promising. For instance, the EU was presented as an ‘absent friend’ by Keohane (2008). However, this piece had several limitations. First, it focused on only three counter-terrorism tools – promoting UN Conventions, dialogues on counter-terrorism, and counter-terrorism assistance – and it would certainly be difficult to identify the importance of any actor in relation to the first two components at least. Second, the paper did not consider the different roles of the EU and neglected much of an area that later became known as the ‘external dimension of JHA’, including EU–USA cooperation (Wolff et al., 2009). Third, the article also appeared to compare the EU to the USA. For the foreseeable future, the EU will only seriously be able to compete with the USA in the economic sphere. Comparisons with the USA are difficult to make given that the EU is not a unified state and it does not have the resources of the USA. It is certainly the case that the ‘war on terror’ has been problematic and something of an obstacle for the EU’s alternative ‘fight against terrorism’ because the EU could have been ‘drowned out’. Also, the EU’s role has been
and will remain largely supplementary to that of the member states, although
it does have a range of its own instruments and some issues are now governed
at the supranational level. Nonetheless, some literature has identified the EU’s
growing role in counter-terrorism, highlighting EU cooperation with, for
example, the USA (Argomaniz, 2009b; Kaunert, 2010a; Occhipinti, 2010) and
North Africa (Eder, 2011; Joffe, 2008; MacKenzie et al., 2013a; Wolff, 2009),
and the EU as a counter-terrorism actor in the making, while also demonstrat-
ing EU activity in areas beyond its established relationships and outside states
in its vicinity (Beyer, 2008; MacKenzie, 2010; Monar, 2015; Spence, 2007).
Sandler (2015: 12) has stated that counter-terrorism ‘corresponds to actions
to ameliorate the threat and consequences of terrorism’. This is a broad defi-
nition, which could encompass a very wide range of activities ranging from
countering the financing of terrorism through strengthening borders all the
way to education for preventing radicalisation or health measures strength-
ening preparedness for an attack. The EU has resolutely viewed terrorism
as a crime and has therefore focused on a ‘law enforcement’ approach to
counter-terrorism, which refers to prioritising international legal instruments
and building up law enforcement agencies to deal with a security challenge
(Monar, 2015: 337). As well as being the result of hard lessons learnt by
European states when deploying force against terrorism and therefore perhaps
developed as part of strategic culture (Rees and Aldrich, 2005), this approach
is also something of a default option for the EU given its capabilities. Indeed,
much EU action against terrorism – in addition to building up law enforcement
– seems to be predicated theoretically on a structural approach focusing on
the root causes of terrorism. This is perhaps not surprising given EU strengths
in aid, but this has posed a serious question relating to the ‘securitization’ of
such instruments. Nevertheless, there is no reason why small-scale EU military
missions could not be deployed against terrorist threats or at least play a role
in enhancing the law enforcement capabilities of partner states. Although the
role of the EU has rarely been significant enough to defeat a terrorist group
or even to play a decisive role, Hoffman (1999: 63), even prior to 9/11, stated
that ‘there is reason to believe that the European way of doing things might
yield more effective results in the long term’. The evidence against a military
approach is now significant. Studies focusing on the end of terrorist groups
have shown that few terrorist campaigns have been brought to an end through
military action, while many more have ended through politics and police action
(Cronin, 2009; Weinberg, 2011). Even if the EU may not be the most signif-
ificant actor in counter-terrorism, it is capable of diffusing European methods
around the world, which may prove effective in helping other states deal with
terrorism in the long term. This book examines a range of areas that can be
considered relevant to counter-terrorism, as explained in greater detail later.
The Internal Dimension of EU Counter-Terrorism

The internal dimension of EU counter-terrorism was the focus of much of the early literature on EU counter-terrorism cooperation. This is unsurprising because the EU has been much more developed internally, including as a market, than externally in terms of security. In fact, internal developments often had to occur in order to make external actions possible. Den Boer and Monar (2002: 11), in one of the first important and also wide-ranging contributions to the literature that examined internal and external dimensions, discussed the challenges that international terrorism has posed to modern states, the EU’s struggles to develop as a security actor and to respond appropriately alongside the USA, as well as the internal/external nexus and cross-pillar tests. They concluded that the EU’s response to 9/11 had been ‘at least respectable’ (Den Boer and Monar, 2002: 26).

Although there has been a significant growth in studies focusing on EU counter-terrorism cooperation, the idea that the EU’s counter-terrorism policy is mainly a ‘paper tiger’ has been rather dominant (Bures, 2006, 2011). In short, Bures (2011: 2) has argued that, in many areas, ‘the EU’s counter-terrorism policy is more of a paper tiger than it is an effective counter-terrorism device’, although ‘in some aspects and areas, the EU counter-terrorism policy is, albeit slowly and inconsistently, becoming a real tiger’. In other words, overall, the EU’s counter-terrorism policy has looked better on paper than it has worked in practice, although some progress has been made. At the same time, it is important to recognise how challenging it is to measure the effectiveness of counter-terrorism measures in general. For instance, the absence of terrorist attacks cannot necessarily be equated with an effective and successful counter-terrorism policy. Keohane (2005) has formulated similar criticisms. He has discussed how the EU has put together lists about action, but how there have been implementation problems, among other challenges. Bossong (2008a) has also contributed to the debate on primarily internal issues in EU counter-terrorism cooperation, arguing that the EU’s action plan on combating terrorism has been a flawed tool of governance.

Following on from Bures and Keohane and perhaps even more critically, Zimmermann (2006: 123) has asked a more fundamental question, namely whether the EU is even an appropriate forum in Europe for combating terrorism or whether this should be left to the member states or an alternative organisation. The problem with this perspective is that the EU is a major regional organisation that holds many supranational powers. Therefore, attempting to confront terrorism by another route in Europe might lead to two organisations working in different directions or to the duplication of tasks. Underpinning Zimmermann’s article is a belief that past experience of combating terrorism has prevented Europe from adapting to the threat of jihadist terrorism. This
would seem to suggest that al-Qaeda is a completely new phenomenon. However, Duyvesteyn (2004) has argued that there is actually little new about the supposedly ‘new terrorism’ and that it is precisely by assuming a break with the past and not drawing on previous experiences that mistakes have been made. Indeed, leading terrorism scholars, such as English (2009), have argued that it is necessary to learn the lessons of the past in order to successfully deal with new threats.

Furthermore, scholars have drawn attention to a further problem, which is that EU member states have not all seen the threat of terrorism in the same way (Bures, 2010a; Monar, 2007a). In general, the older member states that have experienced terrorism have tended to be more concerned than the newer member states, which have not shared their experiences. Such a lack of a common threat perception has posed challenges to the development of an EU common counter-terrorism policy at times. In addition, an increasing range of scholars have argued that the AFSJ has focused too much on the issue of security and not enough on freedom and justice (den Boer and Monar, 2002; Guild, 2008, 2010; Ripoll Servent and MacKenzie, 2011, 2012). With counter-terrorism, this has been clear in the controversial cases of, among other things, data retention measures that have been introduced following terrorist attacks, such as the Data Retention Directive (DRD) and EU Passenger Name Records (EU PNR) (Ripoll Servent, 2013; Ripoll Servent and MacKenzie, 2017). Although it is not its main focus, this book makes a contribution to these debates. In that respect, the book is based on an understanding that the erosion of democratic norms and the idea that terrorism justifies exceptional and unorthodox means of action are extremely concerning.

Nevertheless, others have taken a more positive view of the EU’s internal role in counter-terrorism. For instance, Kaunert (2007) has shown that European integration could find its way into ‘high politics’ through the entrepreneurship of the European Commission in the introduction of the European Arrest Warrant (EAW), one of the EU’s flagship responses to 9/11. Also, as previously observed, Edwards and Meyer (2008) have highlighted how the EU has been influenced by terrorism. More specifically, they have shown how coordination and information-sharing have become of greater importance, but that integration has not followed. Spence (2007a: 168) has also pointed out how “[the EU’s] response since 2001 has brought a new dynamic to EU domestic and foreign policy making and thus to the process of European integration itself”. Finally, Monar (2014: 195) has offered the optimistic view that, in the case of counter-terrorism, the EU has played an important role, looking at how ‘common threat assessments guide governance responses, and specific institutional structures, cooperation mechanisms, legal instruments, and forms of external action have been put into place to respond to the cross-border nature of the terrorist challenges’. He has characterised internal
EU security governance ‘as an advanced institutionalized system of cooperation and coordination between national governance frameworks constructed around a core of common instruments and procedures with a cross-border reach’ (Monar, 2014: 195). For their part, in their assessment of a decade of EU counter-terrorism, Argomaniz et al. (2015: 196) have stated that ‘[t]he consensus view in this volume is that the European Union has accomplished a surprising amount in the past decade’. They have argued that a combination of political and institutional factors can explain the development of the EU as a player in counter-terrorism when compared to 9/11, but they have also confirmed that much more action by the EU has occurred within compared to outside Europe’s borders (Argomaniz et al., 2015: 198–9).

Thus, several problems have been highlighted in the EU’s internal approach to counter-terrorism, including an emphasis over quantity rather than quality of action at times, implementation problems, policy overload, the erosion of democratic norms, and heterogeneous perceptions of terrorism. More optimistically, other scholars have spoken of an increasing role for the EU in counter-terrorism despite some challenges. Ultimately, this book shows the EU as having now acquired a significantly enhanced role compared to the situation in 2001, whilst fully acknowledging some of the problems having affected EU counter-terrorism action, many of which still face the EU. It is important to keep in mind that the EU is a supranational organisation, not a state. This means that specific competences need to be granted to the EU, as it does not automatically possess them in the same way as a state. As Monar (2007a: 293) has shown:

There is no other example in the world of a group of countries agreeing on a comprehensive common strategy and action plan similar to that of the EU. As security – both in its internal and external dimension – remains arguably the area in which the European integration process has made least progress, this must be regarded as a major achievement in itself.

Thus, although various criticisms can be levelled at the EU in its efforts to combat terrorism, it is crucial to always remain clear on what it is and what it can do. The next section turns to the external dimension of EU counter-terrorism.

The External Dimension of EU Counter-Terrorism

If internal measures to combat terrorism may be controversial from a sovereignty perspective, this may be even more so when it comes to the external dimension of EU counter-terrorism cooperation. States protect their ability to pursue independent foreign policies and external action in general perhaps
more than anything else, especially the large member states with the broadest range of global concerns. As previously noted, Keohane (2008) wrote one of the first articles of note on the subject of EU foreign policy counter-terrorism, in which he characterised the EU as an ‘absent friend’. He largely viewed the EU as playing a minimal role in combating terrorism abroad. There were limitations to this contribution, however. In particular, he adopted a restricted conception of foreign policy counter-terrorism, focusing on areas where the EU – and any other actor assessed on the basis of such criteria – could only be seen as weak. Looking at EU external counter-terrorism in this way could only lead to the conclusion that action is often minimal. Furthermore, Keohane’s contribution was at odds with a developing strand of the EU literature on the external dimension of JHA, for which EU counter-terrorism in North Africa was one among several considerations (Wolff, 2009; Wolff et al., 2009). The gradual identification and development of an external dimension to what were initially considered and intended to be internal policies of the EU (namely, JHA) have demonstrated the existence of an internal–external nexus in security policies (Weiss and Dalferth, 2009). In addition to the former Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (second) and JHA (third) pillars, certain aspects of EU counter-terrorism took place in the former first pillar (the European Community), such as combating terrorist financing (Bures, 2010b). Cross-pillar challenges posed significant problems to the EU. Not only this, but scholars began to look at individual relationships between the EU and the USA (Argomaniz, 2009b; Kaunert, 2010a; Occhipinti, 2010), the EU and North Africa (Eder, 2011; Joffe, 2008; Kaunert and Léonard, 2011a; Wolff, 2009), as well as the EU as a counter-terrorism actor more generally (Beyer, 2008; Brattberg and Rhinard, 2012; MacKenzie, 2010; Monar, 2015). In the end, these contributions have shown how the EU’s ‘fight against terrorism’ has been considerably broader than early literature suggested and that the EU has developed as a significant player in global counter-terrorism efforts. Nevertheless, what has remained largely missing has been a joined-up assessment to evaluate the EU as a global counter-terrorism actor overall.

Over time, the literature on the external dimension of EU counter-terrorism has grown. Interest in the external dimension of EU counter-terrorism has increased to the point where a special issue on the subject was published in 2012 in the European Security journal (Ferreira-Pereira and Oliveira Martins, 2012; Kaunert, 2012; Oliveira Martins and Ferreira-Pereira, 2012). This has highlighted not only the increasing interest in the external dimension of EU counter-terrorism, but also, more importantly, the growing scope and geographical range of the EU’s activities. Monar (2015: 333) has followed this up with an article on the external dimension of EU counter-terrorism, stating that: “during the first decade after the 9/11 attacks, the European Union (EU) has developed into an international counter-terrorism actor in its own right,
a role increasingly accepted by third countries [...] At the same time, the EU’s counter-terrorism role has remained subsidiary, both legally and politically, to that of its [member states].’ He has offered important evidence showing ‘that the use of external relations instruments, such as political dialogues, counter-terrorism clauses, capacity building, economic assistance and others, has been a substantial part of the EU’s response to the post-9/11 terrorist challenges’ (Argomaniz et al., 2015: 198–9), whilst also arguing that the EU has increasingly become accepted by third states as a counter-terrorism player in its own right. Davis Cross (2017: 609) has also shown how the EU has made ‘significant strides’ in building up information-sharing, diplomacy, and the internal–external nexus and how the terrorist attacks of 2015–16 were ‘critical junctures’ that drove these developments. This book acknowledges that the idea that terrorist attacks have acted as critical junctures that have driven EU counter-terrorism has generally been convincing. Nevertheless, it also shows that such progress was built on the back of previous historical developments. Moreover, it demonstrates that, despite a number of challenges, the EU is now of much greater significance in counter-terrorism than it was in the early 2010s.

Recent work on the external dimension of EU counter-terrorism includes general approaches to the EU as an actor in counter-terrorism, but there have also been more specific studies carried out, focusing on the EU’s relationship with the USA and North African countries, among others. Beyer (2008) and Brattberg and Rhinard (2012) have examined the ‘actorness’ of the EU in the case of counter-terrorism and have both come to similar conclusions – that the EU has been overall a modest actor in external counter-terrorism with potential for becoming more important in future. While this may be the case, it is worth examining these arguments and the EU’s actorness in greater depth. These general studies necessarily gloss over much empirical data because the EU plays a variety of roles, which depend on the area of the world in question, the extent of the threat of terrorism in each region, the construction of the threat in each area, the receptivity of the interlocutor, as well as the will of the EU and of its member states. Terrorist threats have also changed and moved over time. Some places may have been important locations for terrorist activity for a time, before decreasing in importance when considering terrorism globally. Mali might be seen as such an example. Also, while the EU has cooperated on a range of issues with the USA, it has not done so with Japan, for example, because international terrorism has been overall less of a concern in Japanese foreign policy than in US foreign policy. In addition, the actions of the EU have significantly been governed by the types of cooperation that the EU has been able to offer, how strongly other states have wanted to cooperate with the EU, and whether such states have retained links with the former colonial powers (e.g. France and North Africa). Therefore, it is important to examine
EU actorness in different parts of the world in order to comprehensively assess it.

In terms of relationships, the EU–US relationship has been the most studied (Bossong, 2008a). It has been explored by various scholars, but most work has focused on EU–US agreements from different angles. In that respect, the PNR and the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) Agreements have been closely scrutinised (Argomaniz, 2009b; Kaunert, 2010a, 2012; Monar, 2010; Occhipinti, 2010; Pawlak, 2009a; Ripoll Servent and MacKenzie, 2011, 2012). These agreements have been significant because they have formed the basis for the EU–US relationship. In addition, although agreements could tackle a number of security challenges, cooperation has emanated from the initial intention to combat terrorism following 9/11, mostly stemming from the strong willingness of the US administration to protect its borders from terrorist infiltration after 9/11. The EU has often been seen as a ‘norm-taker’ and a re-producer of US security policies (Argomaniz, 2009a; Ripoll Servent and MacKenzie, 2012). To an extent, the relationship has been mutually beneficial. The USA has received the information and apparent security that it has aimed for, whilst the EU has gained recognition from the most powerful actor on the world stage and the member states have received analysed data from the USA. However, the relationship has been asymmetrical by favouring the USA. The EU – US relationship has become very significant because of the range of agreements that exist between the partners, from trade security in the form of the Container Security Initiative (CSI) to combating terrorism financing through the SWIFT Agreement. The relationship has been underpinned by a comprehensive list of agreements that are not only relevant to counter-terrorism, but can also be considered to combat organised crime. However, it is noteworthy that it is often member states or private companies that are required to meet the requirements of the agreements.

Furthermore, some literature has also considered the EU’s counter-terrorism relations with North Africa. Criticisms have ranged from the suggestion that the EU has prioritised its own security concerns in its relations with North Africa to the argument that this has not been the case as EU counter-terrorism cooperation with North African countries has remained modest at best. In line with the latter argument, some have pointed out that European relations with North Africa have largely remained in the hands of the member states, especially those with a historical legacy and particular interests in the region, such as France and Italy (Eder, 2011; Joffè, 2008; Kaunert and Léonard, 2011a; Wolff, 2009). While the EU may have rhetorically emphasised the importance of security concerns in its relations with North Africa, this has not been supported in practice. There has only been a limited level of cooperation between the Union and North African countries, especially because Morocco and Algeria have preferred to cooperate on counter-terrorism issues with
member states rather than the EU institutions. For this reason, North Africa has not been selected as one of the case studies investigated in detail in this book.

Another region of the world in which the EU has been active in the field of counter-terrorism has been South Asia, in particular Pakistan and Afghanistan. There has been very limited literature on this aspect of EU counter-terrorism (see Monar, 2015; Wennerholm et al., 2010). This is rather surprising given the scale of the EU’s commitment in terms of monetary and personnel resources, as well as the importance of the region in the US ‘war on terror’. Much literature – as well as the media – has focused on the military campaign in Afghanistan and terrorist attacks in Pakistan. Counter-terrorism, however, is much more than military operations. This is precisely the difficulty; counter-terrorism is not a well-defined policy area and a range of actions can be considered relevant to counter-terrorism, from education through countering radicalisation to economic measures and financial sanctions against suspected terrorists (Keohane, 2005: 2–3). Because there have been many deadly terrorist attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan, activities by the EU in these states have been mainly designed to assist in their ability to manage their own security in the face of the terrorist threat, whether in the long or short term. These activities have included capacity-building. Some scholarly literature has recently focused on the EU police mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan) (Larive, 2012; Moore, 2014; Oliveira Martins and Ferreira-Pereira, 2012). This reflects an emphasis on Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions, but does not fully take into account other less visible activities and contributions from other parts of the EU. Feeding into this is the fact that the EU is partially hamstrung in its ability to combat terrorism by its lack of access to certain instruments. For instance, it has little access to hard power. The EU is not a national government, it has a limited number of resources when compared to many of its member states, and the challenge of terrorism requires a response in most policy areas – a comprehensive approach (Keohane, 2005: 2–3). On the basis of the range of cases examined, this book challenges scholars to look beyond the near abroad or the USA in order to truly appreciate the scope of the EU’s counter-terrorism activities.

In addition to these regions of the world, it has been suggested for some time that the EU would negotiate and sign PNR agreements with several other states, including Brazil, Russia, and Mexico (Association of European Airlines, 2014). PNR agreements are already in place with the USA and Australia, whilst an EU–Canada PNR Agreement was also signed before the Court of Justice of the EU decided that it could not be concluded in its current form in 2017. Furthermore, the EU has been active in the Sahel region of Africa, notably on the basis of a ‘Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel’, which has been a high-priority concern given the activities of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (aQIM) and the recent civil war in Mali. Moreover,
the EU has taken internal and external action in response to Daesh. Indeed, most of the policy developments mentioned by Davis Cross (2017) and the critical junctures that she has identified have been related to attacks organised or inspired by Daesh. Also, other scholars have argued that certain policy measures have become acceptable after attacks by Daesh (Ripoll Servent and MacKenzie, 2017). However, it is peculiar that this has not been a more prominent feature of the extant literature given the level of concern about Daesh among European states. Likewise, EU action related to counter-terrorism in Syria and Iraq has gone largely unnoticed.

Thus, one can question whether the global counter-terrorism role of the EU has been fully established and assessed until now. First of all, there has not been any geographically wide-ranging and comprehensive assessment of the EU’s global role in counter-terrorism. The EU’s counter-terrorism activities in some parts of the world have hitherto remained largely under-researched. Furthermore, overall, there has been only limited reflection on the different roles of the EU in counter-terrorism and on the range of functions that it can now perform. The EU is a more significant actor than it was 20 years ago. In that respect, the possible end of Daesh and of the fourth wave of terrorism offers a timely opportunity to reflect on how far the EU has come in the development of its counter-terrorism role. This book therefore contributes to an understanding of the importance of the EU on the contemporary world stage through an analysis of its reaction to one of the main global challenges that it faces – terrorism.

THE ARGUMENT IN BRIEF

This book contributes to two strands of the academic literature, namely that on EU counter-terrorism and that on EU integration and actorness. As outlined above, the threat of international terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11 acted as a catalyst for European integration internally and externally, including the development of EU cooperation with a growing number of third countries. First, the EU collectively ‘securitized’ this transnational threat, which this book analyses through an application of the ‘collective securitization’ model originally developed by Sperling and Webber (2019). Security, in this conceptualization, is about ‘the processes of constructing a shared understanding of what is to be considered and collectively responded to as a threat’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 26). It is a process for a given actor to frame a specific issue as an ‘existential threat’, presented to a target audience for approval in order to employ extraordinary means and measures to tackle it (Léonard and Kaunert, 2011: 57). Haacke and Williams coined the concept of ‘collective securitization’, which was defined as ‘securitization within a regional arrangement as involving one or more securitizing actors within that arrangement identifying
a particular development or issue as an existential threat to a security referent, making relevant validity claims, and finding a receptive audience among other regional actors’ (Haacke and Williams, 2008: 785). Sperling and Webber subsequently argued that a regional security organisation could also constitute an agent of collective securitization, especially ‘when an international organisation is possessed of legal and political authority, has agenda-setting powers, is the framework for formulating and implementing common policies, and is the repository of a common security narrative’ (Sperling and Webber, 2016: 29). This book adapts the collective securitization framework originally developed by Sperling and Webber (2019) and applies it in Chapter 2, analysing the collective securitization of terrorism in the EU in the wake of 9/11. Second, this book applies the concept of ‘actorness’ in order to analyse the evolution of the EU as a counter-terrorism actor in different case studies. Overall, this book highlights that the EU has become a counter-terrorism actor of growing importance, which possesses an ever-diversifying number of policy options available. For this purpose, the book applies an adapted version of the set of actorness criteria identified by Brattberg and Rhinard (2012), namely context, coherence, and capability. The justification for choosing these specific criteria and their operationalisation are thoroughly discussed in the conceptual chapter. It suffices to say here that it is believed that the framework offers a tried and tested method for examining the EU as a global counter-terrorism actor, while also being flexible enough to manage an examination of each of the selected cases. The book focuses on the variety of roles that the EU has played in different parts of the world. It suggests that the extant literature has not offered a joined-up approach to EU counter-terrorism and therefore has not been able to offer a truly comprehensive and thorough assessment of the EU’s actions in global counter-terrorism. This framework and the case studies allow for such an evaluation.

With regard to its empirical contributions, the book shows how the EU has been active in a number of parts of the world that are rarely written about from the perspective of the Union. These include Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Sahel region of Africa – areas of the world that are not proximate to the EU, which is interesting because EU scholars often see the Union as primarily active in nearby states (with the important exception of trade, where the EU is one of the key actors on the global stage). After presenting a significant amount of new empirical material, this book is able to offer a comprehensive evaluation of the EU’s counter-terrorism role with relevance more broadly to the literature on security and that on global politics. On the conceptual front, this book applies the concept of actorness to counter-terrorism. While this has been applied to counter-terrorism in a narrower sense and other policy areas in the past (Beyer, 2008; Brattberg and Rhinard, 2012; Kaunert, 2010a, 2010b; Kaunert et al., 2015), it has not been used to analyse EU action in
Introduction

various states around the world as done here. The remainder of this book offers a detailed, thorough, and comprehensive analysis of the EU’s global role in counter-terrorism. As a result, several arguments are developed. First, the EU has become a significant counter-terrorism actor in its own right, even if its abilities have been more circumscribed than those of its constituent member states and it has kept a largely supporting role to them. Second, terrorism has played a major role in pushing European integration forward into the realm of high politics and external relations. Third, internal and external players have been influential in constructing the EU’s approach to counter-terrorism. Finally, a framework centred on actorness can help capture not only whether the EU is an actor in counter-terrorism, but also to what extent, in which ways and how its actorness may differ in various parts of the world. Thus, it allows for capturing the multifaceted and geographical range of the EU’s role in counter-terrorism.

This book brings together a range of different projects on which the authors have worked in order to comprehensively assess the EU as a global counter-terrorism actor. It has been built through an engagement with various strands of literature, documentary evidence spanning several decades, and over thirty interviews that took place in the EU institutions, several member state representations, and member state ministries between 2008 and 2019. The interviews were conducted separately by each of the three authors and were semi-structured. Most participants agreed to take part only if they were not to be identified by name. Therefore, this book uses an appropriate designation, such as ‘Commission official A’ or ‘MEP A’ to reference them. This project would not have been possible without these interviewees, to whom the authors express their gratitude for being so generous with their time and insights.

The various case studies were chosen in order to allow for an examination of the full range of EU counter-terrorism activity. The cases are therefore the main actors and regions involved in the ‘war on terror’. As a result, the book considers the EU–US relationship because the USA is the EU’s closest partner, the only superpower, and the state that led the ‘war on terror’. It also analyses the EU’s role in South Asia, more precisely in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This has been largely overlooked in the extant literature, which is somewhat intriguing given that this region was the starting point and one of the main theatres of the ‘war on terror’. Finally, the book examines the EU’s counter-terrorism activities in the Middle East, in particular Syria and Iraq. It is of course impossible to ignore Daesh, which may have been synonymous with the culmination of the fourth of the waves of terrorism identified by Rapoport (2001, 2012).
STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK

This book is concerned with evaluating the global role of the EU in combating terrorism around the world. It mainly aims to examine the expansion of the EU’s efforts to combat terrorism since 2001, especially in the main regions of the planet where the EU has been active, which have tended to be characterised by significant terrorist activity. It seeks to explore the reasons behind this growth and to account for the differing levels of activity in different parts of the world. For these purposes, the book is located within the broader scholarly debates about the significance of the EU as an actor in global politics and security.

Chapter 1 explains how the analysis of the role of the EU as a global counter-terrorism actor in this book proceeds in two main stages. The first aims to analyse how and why the EU became involved in the area of counter-terrorism, which had long been dominated by the individual member states. It does so using a five-stage ‘collective securitization’ framework adapted from Sperling and Webber (2019). The second stage of the analysis presented in this book aims to establish and to assess the role of the EU as a counter-terrorism actor on the global stage. For this purpose, an ‘actorness’ analytical framework is applied to three cases, which involve the USA, South Asia, and Iraq and Syria. The remainder of this chapter introduces the two analytical frameworks subsequently used and locates them in the context of the relevant scholarly debates, notably that on European integration.

Chapter 2 explores how terrorism has come to be perceived as a European security threat and how this change has led to the development of EU counter-terrorism cooperation. It analyses the collective construction of terrorism as a security threat within the EU using a five-stage ‘collective securitization’ framework. In so doing, the chapter establishes the beginnings of EU action in counter-terrorism.

Chapter 3 analyses the role of the EU institutions, namely the European Commission, the European Parliament, the Council Secretariat and the EU CTC, as well as the European External Action Service. It shows that EU institutional actors have played a crucial role in shaping the development of EU counter-terrorism by pushing for the EU as the best vehicle for countering terrorism. Seizing on 9/11, they developed ‘European’ rather than ‘national’ solutions, which is suggestive of increased supranational security governance in EU counter-terrorism. Institutional change followed exogenous shocks like 9/11, as well as the terrorist attacks on Madrid and London, and was facilitated by policy entrepreneurship.

Chapter 4 examines the EU’s most important counter-terrorism relationship, namely that with the USA. This relationship is of historical importance given
the role played by the USA in the process of European integration and its willingness to cooperate directly with the EU rather than its constituent units. The transatlantic relationship, being the most developed, can also act as a yardstick for assessing the importance of cooperation with other states. Concern about American actions to combat terrorism rose in Europe after 9/11, especially with regard to calling it a ‘war on terror’. George W. Bush’s State of the Union address in 2002, in which he identified several states as belonging to an ‘axis of evil’, was coolly received in Europe. Transatlantic relations arguably reached their lowest point in 2002–03 in the run-up to the US-led invasion of Iraq, but ties were subsequently repaired. Despite the rhetoric, the mid-2000s was actually a very productive time in transatlantic relations, which improved even further under Barack Obama. More recently, under the Trump administration, the USA became a more unpredictable actor. President Trump made no secret of his hostility towards the EU and notably championed Brexit. It is not clear how much EU–US cooperation will grow during Joe Biden’s presidency and beyond, as there may not be much impetus for significant development in the years to come.

Chapter 5 examines the EU’s role in South Asia, particularly Afghanistan and Pakistan, as the starting point of the ‘war on terror’. Afghanistan has received significant attention in the twenty-first century after the US-led invasion of the country. However, the country has proven much more difficult to pacify than expected, whilst the Taliban and other insurgent groups have remained active and have contributed to the destabilisation of north-west Pakistan. In all this, the EU’s role in Afghanistan has gone virtually unnoticed, despite sending vast sums of money to the region, amounting to several billion euros over the past decade. This chapter considers the EU’s role in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Such an assessment is crucial because it shows how the EU has developed as a global counter-terrorism actor and what it has achieved.

Chapter 6 examines the development of the EU’s counter-terrorism activities in relation to Iraq and Syria, with a specific focus on how it has sought to address the threat of Daesh. The EU began to play a role in the region during the US occupation, which lasted until 2011. While it may have been expected that the EU would play only a limited role, EU action has actually grown over the past few years and will likely remain important in the reconstruction of the region. Furthermore, European states have assisted the USA and other military forces with airstrikes and Special Forces. Thus, this chapter allows for an examination of the role of the EU at its most developed point. The book will have followed the whole arc of the EU’s development as a counter-terrorism actor if the defeat of Daesh in Syria and Iraq actually marks the end of the fourth wave of terrorism. Having said this, the end of fighting is far from meaning the end of terrorism, especially because of the very serious sectarian divides in both states.
The concluding chapter sums up this comprehensive examination of the EU as a global counter-terrorism actor. It reflects on the development of the EU as a global counter-terrorism actor and looks ahead in order to consider what the future may hold.
Terrorism is one of the main security threats in Europe today. Several European states have been victims of terrorism in the past and many remain possible targets nowadays. Between them, European countries have diverse experiences of terrorism, ranging from left-wing and right-wing terrorism in Germany and Italy, respectively, through British and Spanish experiences of separatist terrorism and the forms of Islamist terrorism encountered by France in the 1990s, to Islamist terrorism today. The latter is generally considered to be the greatest terrorist threat currently facing many European countries as highlighted by the UK’s ‘CONTEST’ strategy and the EU’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy (Council of the European Union, 2005a; HM Government, 2011). Many lessons can be taken from past experiences of terrorism to help combat current threats (Duyvesteyn, 2004; Spence, 2007b). Although the jihadist terrorist threat is generally considered to be the most significant of all terrorist threats in Europe at this time, other terrorist threats – be they international or domestic – cannot be neglected (Europol, 2021). For example, the case of Anders Behring Breivik in Norway has raised fears of a form of terrorism based upon right-wing militancy and Islamophobia (Guardian, 2011). This could be a one-off case, a precursor to further attacks, or an inspiration to others who hold similar beliefs, but it does serve as evidence that Islamist terrorism is not the only – nor always the most pressing – threat to European countries.

Until 9/11, the EU was largely excluded from counter-terrorism activities, which remained almost the sole preserve of its member states. However, the attacks on the USA proved to be a turning point for the EU as it reacted with impressive speed and decisiveness, including emergency meetings between the member states and the EU institutions, opening itself up to counter-terrorism cooperation with the USA, the adoption of a plan of action for combating terrorism outlining a number of areas where the EU could act and a ‘month of transformation’ where the EU prioritised efforts to combat terrorism (Bossong, 2008; Zimmermann, 2006). Hence, international terrorism has acted as a major catalyst for the development of measures agreed before 9/11 and has transformed the governance of the EU (Edwards and Meyer, 2008a; Zimmermann, 2006). Counter-terrorism has increasingly become a policy issue for the EU, whilst the Union has come to be recognised as a significant counter-terrorism
actor by others. This has been evidenced by the growing number of countries that have expressed an interest in cooperating directly with the EU, starting with the USA (Kaunert, 2010c). The list of countries now directly conducting counter-terrorism cooperation with the EU is remarkable, whilst such cooperation now encompasses a growing number of policy areas. Nowadays, the EU is active in the field of counter-terrorism across most continents and in many regions threatened by terrorism. This highlights the extent to which the EU has prioritised terrorism and has acted to combat it after 9/11. Without this major event, internal and external counter-terrorism action at the EU level would not have progressed so significantly.

Consequently, the EU is of much greater significance as a counter-terrorism actor nowadays than it was in 2001. This evolution is of great interest and importance (MacKenzie, 2010), notably in its external dimension. However, the external aspects of EU counter-terrorism cooperation have not received the attention that they deserve in the current scholarship. This is surprising for two main reasons: first, because the threat of terrorism to Europe remains significant; and, second, because the EU now cooperates with a large number of third countries and performs a range of counter-terrorism functions. Overall, the number of EU projects relevant to counter-terrorism has significantly grown since 9/11. This means that the EU has now fully entered the arena of 'high politics’, which comprises matters of security and foreign policy (Kaunert, 2007). The fact that the EU is now involved in the previously unreachable areas of security policy and foreign policy highlights the major impact of international terrorism on the progress of European integration.

The existing literature on EU counter-terrorism has overwhelmingly focused on the internal dimension of EU counter-terrorism and how the necessity to address the terrorist threat has also fostered cooperation on a range of related issues, such as aviation security (Argomaniz, 2009a, 2010, 2011; Bossong, 2008a, 2013; Bures, 2006, 2011; Kaunert, 2007; Spence, 2007b; Brown, 2010; De Londras and Doody, 2017; Kaunert et al., 2021). This is perhaps unsurprising given the major strides forward that the Union has made internally, including the adoption of the EAW, amongst other measures. However, these internal developments have also led to external developments. The EU is now able to negotiate and sign agreements on behalf of its member states and has attempted to export its standards to partner countries through a process of cooperation and norm transfer. As these developments have occurred, there has been a slow recognition of the EU’s external counter-terrorism role. For instance, the PNR and SWIFT Agreements between the EU and the USA have received significant attention, both in academia and in the media (Argomaniz, 2009b; Brouwer, 2009; Guild and Brouwer, 2006; Pawlak, 2009a, 2009b). This is because of the great importance attached to data protection in Europe and because the EU–US relationship has evidently been of great importance
to both sides of the Atlantic. Even so, the PNR and SWIFT Agreements specifically, and the EU–US relationship more generally, have only been small elements of the EU’s efforts to combat terrorism, which have stretched far beyond cooperation with North America. A significant amount of EU activity has actually gone largely unnoticed.

This book therefore examines the role of the EU as a global counter-terrorism actor. This analysis proceeds in two main stages. The first aims to analyse how and why the EU became involved in the area of counter-terrorism, which had long been dominated by the individual member states. It does so using a five-stage ‘collective securitization’ framework adapted from Sperling and Webber (2019). Chapter 2, which applies this framework, highlights how 9/11 led to the redefinition of terrorism away from an individual (in the sense of national) security threat to a collective, European security threat. The second stage of the analysis presented in this book aims to establish and to assess the role of the EU as a counter-terrorism actor on the global stage. For this purpose, an ‘actorness’ analytical framework is applied to three cases, which involve the USA (Chapter 4), South Asia (Chapter 5), and Iraq and Syria (Chapter 6), respectively. The remainder of this chapter introduces the two analytical frameworks subsequently used and locates them in the context of the relevant scholarly debates, notably that on European integration.

UNDERSTANDING THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE EU IN COUNTER-TERRORISM: COLLECTIVE SECURITIZATION

As previously mentioned, before being able to map out the scope and the contents of the EU’s activities in the external dimension of counter-terrorism, it is important to establish why the EU has become involved in counter-terrorism. This book does so using a ‘collective securitization’ framework based on previous work by Sperling and Webber (2019). However, prior to introducing this framework, it is necessary to first discuss the concept of ‘securitization’ on which ‘collective securitization’ builds.

Securitization

The concept of ‘securitization’ was initially developed by Ole Wæver to make a major contribution to the so-called ‘widening–deepening’ debate in security studies, which had begun in the 1980s and intensified with the end of the Cold War. The ‘widening’ dimension was defined as the extension of security to issues or sectors other than the military, such as the environment or the economy, whereas the ‘deepening’ dimension addressed the question of whether entities other than the state, such as society or individual human
beings, should be able to claim security threats (Krause and Williams, 1996: 230). Together with the concept of ‘security sectors’ previously developed by Buzan (1991), ‘securitization’ is at the heart of a new theoretical framework that, according to Wæver and Buzan, enables researchers to simultaneously widen and deepen the concept of security without rendering it too broad or meaningless. The key idea underpinning the securitization framework is that security is not about objective threats that ‘really’ exist out there. Rather, still for Wæver and Buzan, it is about ‘the processes of constructing a shared understanding of what is to be considered and collectively responded to as a threat’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 26). More precisely,

[security] is about survival. It is when an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object (traditionally, but not necessarily, the state, incorporating government, territory, and society). The special nature of security threats justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle them. (Buzan et al., 1998: 21)

In other words, according to Buzan and Wæver (also known as the ‘Copenhagen school’), security is a ‘speech act’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 26) (see also Wæver, 1995: 54–5; Roe, 2008: 617; Stritzel, 2007: 358; Balzacq, 2005: 174–9). It is an intersubjective and socially constructed phenomenon. Key concepts in the securitization framework are the ‘securitizing actor’, who socially constructs a specific issue as a threat to the survival of a given entity, known as the ‘referent object’, which therefore requires urgent protection through the use of extraordinary measures. Another important concept is that of the ‘audience’. According to the Copenhagen school, ‘[a] discourse that takes the form of presenting something as an existential threat to a referent object does not by itself create securitization – this is a securitizing move, but the issue is securitized only if and when the audience accepts it as such’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 25). To sum up, securitization is understood as a process whereby a given actor frames a specific issue as an ‘existential threat’, which is then presented to a target audience for approval in order to employ extraordinary means and measures to tackle it (Léonard and Kaunert, 2011: 57).

In its original formulation by the Copenhagen school and in subsequent studies by other scholars, securitization theory has overwhelmingly been applied to states, as well as nations to a lesser extent. According to Buzan and Wæver (2009: 255), ‘the middle-scale “limited collectivities” have proved the most amenable to securitization as durable referent objects [because] such limited collectivities (states, nations, and as anticipated by Huntington, civilisations) engage in self-reinforcing rivalries with other limited collectivities and that such interaction strengthens their we-feeling’. This in turn facilitates securitization. In contrast, collectivities at the system level lack the mass
identity that is necessary for securitization to take place (Buzan and Wæver, 2009: 255). In other words, the level of analysis in the study of securitization processes has generally been the middle level of world politics, with a specific focus on states. This is not to say that the work of the Copenhagen school has exclusively focused on states. Their other concept of ‘security constellation’ ‘[links] across all of the levels and sectors in which securitizations occur’, whilst that of ‘macrosecuritization’ concerns ‘referent objects higher than those at the middle level’ and ‘[aims] to incorporate and coordinate multiple lower level securitizations’ (Buzan and Wæver, 2009: 257). In addition, some of Wæver and Buzan’s writings also went beyond the national level to consider regions. In particular, they have developed Regional Security Complex Theory, which has centred on the concept of ‘regional security complex’. This concept refers to ‘a set of units whose major processes of securitization and de-securitization or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 201; Buzan and Wæver, 2003).

Towards Collective Securitization

Overall, Buzan’s and Wæver’s collective work has remained focused on states, their patterns of amity and enmity, as well as the distribution of power amongst them and the role of global powers (Buzan et al., 1998; Buzan and Wæver, 2003, 2009). In particular, they did not consider how securitization processes may take place within regional arrangements. The first scholars to address this gap in the literature were Haacke and Williams (2008). They coined the concept of ‘collective securitization’, which they defined as ‘securitization within a regional arrangement as involving one or more securitizing actors within that arrangement identifying a particular development or issue as an existential threat to a security referent, making relevant validity claims, and finding a receptive audience among other regional actors’ (Haacke and Williams, 2008: 785). They also noted that one could expect securitizing moves within a regional arrangement to entail claims that a specific development ‘constituted a threat either to regional security or to the respective national security of participants, and required a collective response’ (Haacke and Williams, 2008: 785). Nevertheless, as highlighted by Sperling and Webber (2016: 29), Haacke and Williams’s approach ‘[assumed] that a state [would] initiate a [securitizing] move that [would] then be generalised within a regional arrangement or organisation’. They did not consider cases where a regional organisation itself could initiate a securitizing move. This is to a significant extent linked to their case selection, as they focused on the African Union (AU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Those may indeed be considered ‘the primary multilateral arrangements in their
The European Union as a global counter-terrorism actor

respective region’ (Haacke and Williams, 2008: 777). However, compared to a regional organization like the EU, the AU and ASEAN have been characterized by a considerably lower degree of integration when it comes to the institutional set-up, the decision-making processes, the degree of legal integration, and the extent of political integration, amongst others. In contrast, Sperling and Webber have argued that the role of regional security organizations should not necessarily be reduced to that of a site for bargaining amongst their member states. In their view, a regional security organization can also be an agent of collective securitization, especially ‘when an international organisation is possessed of legal and political authority, has agenda-setting powers, is the framework for formulating and implementing common policies, and is the repository of a common security narrative’ (Sperling and Webber, 2016: 29).

In order to study this process of collective securitization, Sperling and Webber (2019) have outlined a six-stage model, which comprises (1) the status quo security discourse and policies; (2) a single precipitating event or a cascade of events; (3) the securitizing move; (4) the response of the audience; (5) the formulation and execution of policies to address the securitized threat; and (6) routinization and the emergence of a new status quo. Although it may be analytically possible to distinguish the securitizing move from the audience response, these two stages are actually ‘co-dependent through [a] process of recursive interaction’ (Sperling and Webber, 2019: 232). These two stages are therefore combined into one single stage in the collective securitization framework applied in this book, which therefore comprises five stages.

ASSESSING THE ROLE OF THE EU IN GLOBAL COUNTER-TERRORISM: EU ACTORNESS

Having introduced the framework that will help explain how the EU became involved in counter-terrorism, this section now turns to the ‘actorness’ framework that will be applied in order to establish and to assess the role of the EU in global counter-terrorism.

The Emergence of the Concept of ‘Actorness’

According to Sjöstedt (cited in Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 17), actorness or ‘actor capacity’ is the ‘capacity to behave actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system’. It can be assessed using specific criteria. Different scholars have elaborated distinct sets of criteria (see Drieskens, 2017). It has previously been acknowledged that the EU is not a traditional actor in the international system (i.e. a state) or an international organization, but rather a sui generis actor (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006; Carlsnaes, 2006; Ginsberg, 2001; White, 2006). Traditional state-centric approaches to
international relations, such as Realism, have often ignored what is distinctive and interesting about the EU (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 12). This has led to the somewhat misleading conclusion that the EU either is not an actor or is a weak actor on the global stage because state-centric theories prioritise state interactions and primarily military action over other types of activities (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 12). Although military power will always be an important factor on the international stage, it is not the only, or always the most effective, type of international action. Nevertheless, it is true that the EU has been limited – to some extent at least – by its lack of military capability. Furthermore, relations between actors in non-military spheres are also of great importance. Dissatisfied with state-centric approaches because of their analytical focus, scholars of the EU started experimenting with a number of approaches that deviated from those of the past and came to different conclusions, with the EU being seen as actually an important actor on the world stage in several contexts and policy areas (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006; Ginsberg, 1999, 2001; Smith, 2002). The overall difficulty of conceptualizing the EU has had significant implications for researchers because the theories chosen shape academic research. In line with this, research on the external dimension of EU counter-terrorism has generally not conceptualized the EU as an actor, which has led to the arguably premature conclusion that the EU is not important in the area of counter-terrorism (Keohane, 2008). As a result, EU actorness in counter-terrorism has remained largely under-researched.

This book applies the concept of actorness in order to gauge the extent of the EU’s role and to capture the variety of its activities in global counter-terrorism. Not being a traditional type of actor (i.e. a state), there have always been challenges when conceptualizing and analyzing the EU and its role in the world. Traditional theories of international relations (e.g. realist theories) have often privileged states over other types of actors, but the very fact that the EU has external effects and conducts a range of external relations means that it cannot be ignored, despite the fact that it is not a state. Furthermore, there are many states in the world that are sovereign, but have less influence on global politics than the EU. As Dryburgh (2008: 255) has argued, the EU has often been compared to an idealized state. Although the EU’s foreign policy apparatus is not as developed as that of some of its member states, there are some states whose actorness is not in question, but whose foreign policy apparatus is in some ways less significant than the EU’s. She cites the example of Portugal, which in 2012 had only 52 embassies, compared to the EU’s 128 delegations around the world (Dryburgh, 2008: 255; Keukeleire and Delreux, 2014: 123). In addition, traditional theories of international relations have privileged traditional foreign and security policy as a special activity of the state. As it is arguably where the EU is the least integrated, it makes the EU appear weaker on the international stage, overall.
It is important to bear in mind that the EU is more of an international actor in some areas, particularly in external trade, than in others (Ginsberg, 1999). When it comes to military matters, the EU appears to be a more modest actor. However, this lack of a military component does not make the EU or its foreign policy apparatus an international irrelevance. Bretherton and Vogler (2006: 9), when conducting interviews with representatives of EU interlocutors, found that ‘[w]hile a number of interviewees commented upon the lack of overall political direction and impetus to external policy, the absence of military capability was not identified as an issue by any of the third party representatives interviewed – all of whom nevertheless considered the EU to be a significant actor’. Much influence also derives from the EU’s role as a major economic power, which can be used to pressure other actors. Gehring et al. (2017: 728) have even gone as far as stating that ‘the EU’s ample action capabilities based upon its communitarised policies can make it a great power in its own right’. This book does not necessarily subscribe to the perception of the EU as a great power, but it is underpinned by the belief that traditional perspectives have tended to underplay the role of the EU in the world. For this study, it is worth pointing out that EU actorness in counter-terrorism has generally been under-researched, particularly in certain parts of the world.

Thus, actorness is used here to establish, gauge, and highlight the variety and significance of the EU’s counter-terrorism activities in each geographical region that this book examines. The concept of actorness emerged in the 1970s because groups of states, such as the EU, and transnational actors were beginning to become important in their own right. 9/11 itself has demonstrated the increasing harm that non-state entities with relatively limited resources are capable of causing. At the same time, traditional theories of international relations proved to be inadequate for analysing the role of non-state actors in global politics, such as transnational corporations, regional organizations, and international organizations. Thus, with the struggles over how to conceptualize the EU, actorness has been one of the few approaches that has allowed for an examination of the international role of the EU. It has helped establish the EU’s role in world politics and its identification as an actor on the world stage. A number of contributions have convincingly demonstrated that the EU can – although it does not always do so – play an important role in world politics.

The dominant theory in international relations during much of the post-Second World War period was Realism and its many variants. Realism focuses on states (most importantly, great powers) and power as military power, in its classical, structural, and neoclassical variants. Historically, states have been by far the most important actors in international relations, but the twentieth century has seen a greater plurality of actors emerge and play an important role in global politics, including transnational corporations, international and regional organizations, as well as terrorist groups. In fact, al-Qaeda’s attack
on the USA on 9/11 was arguably one of the most significant attacks ever by a non-state actor, and one that helped produce a fierce response by the USA. In contrast to Realists, Liberals attempted to put forward that states were not the only actors in world politics and that a pluralist system had emerged, allowing space for actors such as the EU to be discussed. Typically, Realists have overlooked the EU because of its non-state status. Waltz (1979: 180) viewed the EU as a potential third great power in the system (other than the USSR and the USA during the Cold War), but this was related to Europe uniting and roughly resembling a state, which he deemed unlikely. Because the EU does not have significant access to military power and is not a state, it has not been deemed important enough in these policy areas to be studied by Realists. Mearsheimer (1990: 45) even expected that European integration would break down at the end of the Cold War. In his assessment, European rivalry was muted by the threat of the USSR; with this superpower gone, suspicions amongst member states would be revived and lead to the end of European integration. This has not come to pass. The opposite has in fact occurred – European integration was relaunched towards the end of the Cold War and proceeded further following its conclusion, noticeably with the Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice, and Lisbon. In contrast, Joseph Grieco has attempted to tackle the European integration process head-on, admitting that ‘the interest displayed by the European countries in the EU creates a problem for realist theory’ (Andreatta, 2011; Grieco, 1997: 184). Others have brushed over the EU because it is an anomaly in a world where states, power, and suspicion are likely to prevail. To assume that the EU is unimportant simply because it is not a state and does not have real access to military power misses precisely the influence of the EU in the world. This book takes as its starting point that the world is characterized by a plurality of actors.

Thus, as previously mentioned, in the 1970s, interest grew in examining international actors other than states. Cosgrove and Twitchett (1970) looked at ‘new actors’, specifically the United Nations (UN) and the European Economic Community (EEC), as the EU was known at the time. Then, later in the 1970s, Sjöstedt (1977) discussed ‘actor capacity’, which he defined as the ‘capacity to behave actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system’ (Sjostedt, cited in Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 17). However, it was not until the 1990s that the concept of ‘actorness’ was added to the EU lexicon. In an important edited book, Jupille and Caporaso (1998) developed a set of criteria for actorness, including recognition, authority, autonomy, and cohesion. This was closely followed by another important contribution by Bretherton and Vogler (1999, 2006), who discussed three criteria for actorness: opportunity, presence, and capability. The difference between these two sets of criteria can be summarised as follows: while the conceptualization by Jupille and Caporaso was more formal and rationalistic, Bretherton
The concept of actorness has been examined and applied by a few scholars, often when analyzing international negotiations (Groenleer and van Schaik, 2007; Jupille and Caporaso, 1998). Dryburgh (2008) used Larsen’s (2005: 59) criteria, which in turn were adapted from Bretherton and Vogler’s work, to examine how the EU was an actor because of the CFSP, rather than despite it, in the case of the policy towards Iran. With regard to counter-terrorism, the EU has been examined as a global counter-terrorism actor by Beyer (2008) and Brattberg and Rhinard (2012). Actorness has also been applied to actors within the EU, such as Europol (Kaunert, 2010b) and the CTC (MacKenzie et al., 2013a). However, even in 2013, Niemann and Bretherton (2013: 262) argued that: ‘[w]hile several publications offer valuable conceptualisations of EU actorness, the literature contains relatively few systematic explorations of the actual extent of EU actorness’. Furthermore, Kaunert (2010a: 49) has pointed out that EU actorness in counter-terrorism has been under-researched. Although some scholars have considered the EU as a global counter-terrorism actor in general, they have not examined the various relationships that the EU has forged with a range of third countries in particular. Because the EU has performed various functions and has displayed different levels of actorness in these relationships, it is only by examining each relationship and aggregating the results that it becomes possible to gain thorough knowledge of the extent to which the EU has become a global counter-terrorism actor.

Even so, Bretherton and Vogler (2013: 375) have argued that ‘[t]hat achievement of the increased capability envisaged by the Treaty of Lisbon, together with resolution of the Eurozone crisis, with its deleterious effect upon the Union’s presence, would not fully compensate for the loss of opportunity provided by the changing international structure’. In short, they believe that internal problems, including the financial crisis that has engulfed Europe, and the external environment, with the rapid rise of new powers, means that the EU has declined as an actor in global politics. This argument is worth engaging with – while not disputing the central contention that the EU has declined as an actor (this is somewhat inevitable with the global recession and the rise of new powers), it is possible to examine whether the EU has become a more important global actor in one policy area: counter-terrorism.

**EU Actorness in Global Counter-Terrorism**

This book draws upon and adapts Brattberg and Rhinard’s (2012) four criteria for actorness, which they identified as follows: context, capacity, coherence, and consistency. This specific set of criteria was chosen because it synthesises the criteria elaborated by other scholars for a comprehensive examination of
actorness and it was developed specifically with examining the EU’s role in counter-terrorism in mind. Moreover, these criteria are flexible enough to take into account all actors that are examined in this book. Nevertheless, this book slightly adapts their set of criteria as it subsumes ‘consistency’ (which refers to the idea of ‘sticking to the line’ over time) under ‘coherence’, as the analysis of coherence is carried out over a certain period of time – about 20 years – in each of the empirical chapters.

As a result, the ‘actorness’ framework applied in this book comprises the three following criteria:

- **Context**: whether circumstances enable or constrain EU action and its recognition by partners;
- **Coherence**: the presence or absence of shared values, the ability to form and pursue preferences, established procedures, along both vertical and horizontal dimensions;
- **Capability**: the authority to act, available instruments, and the deployment of instruments in the state or region in question.

**Context**

‘Context’ relates to whether circumstances have enabled or constrained EU action – notably the extent to which an issue, such as counter-terrorism, has been securitized collectively. In this sense, the EU was evidently not much of a player in counter-terrorism prior to the attacks of 9/11. This was undoubtedly the singular most important event in thrusting the EU into this policy area. It led to the member states recognizing that greater cooperation amongst European states was needed to combat international terrorism, especially given the specific circumstances and opportunities – including the arrangements governing the Schengen zone – provided for criminals and terrorists in EU states. Simultaneously, actors within the EU have seen and used events such as 9/11, as well as subsequent attacks, to push forward their agendas (Argomaniz, 2009b; Davis Cross, 2017). Without 9/11, for example, the EAW may not have been adopted for many years because these terrorist attacks gave the European Commission a significant opportunity to play a leading role (Kaunert, 2007). Similarly, without the Madrid attacks of 2004 and the London attacks of 2005 and the British presidency that year, perhaps there would not have been any EU CTC or EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, respectively. On the external front, the need to show solidarity with the USA and to build the EU into a partner for the USA to work with was important for actors within the EU (Bossong, 2008a). Also, the Bali bombings of 2002, which led to the death of a number of Europeans, but also escalating violence around the world, some of which could also be harmful to Europe and Europeans, motivated the EU to play a greater role in global counter-terrorism action. Continuing attacks and violence have
led to an evolving EU role, noticeably with the emergence and global activities of Daesh, which committed terrorist attacks in several European states. Thus, EU counter-terrorist action could be split up into two phases: concern about al-Qaeda following attacks between 2001 and 2013 and then the focus largely on Daesh from 2013 until now. This is not to say that other terrorist threats do not matter. Nevertheless, jihadist terrorism has done more than other types of terrorism to facilitate cooperation amongst EU member states.

The announcements of a ‘war on terror’ and of the existence of an ‘axis of evil’ were received coolly in the EU and perhaps contributed to the announcement of an alternative and lower key ‘fight against terrorism’. In this way, the EU was putting forward an alternative model mainly based on law enforcement and tackling the root causes of terrorism. None of this would have been possible without 9/11 and the USA then proceeding to respond in the way it did. The US invasion of Afghanistan led to the EU playing a significant role in the country. Also, while the EU was initially not very active in Iraq after the US-led invasion and was divided because of the decision of some member states to support it, the EU eventually became involved, not least because of the rise of Daesh years later. The USA has set the path and the EU has responded to US activities over the past 20 years. Without such circumstances and the actions of others, EU action in this area would not have been possible.

Second, context also refers to external recognition by the partners cooperating with the EU. While an actor can still act without recognition, entities are probably unlikely to respond to others that are not relevant, do not grant their actions legitimacy or do not have useful capabilities. Greater recognition, especially by powerful actors, can enhance the reputation of actors and lead to a phenomenon akin to a snowball effect, where agreements with one state can lead to agreements with another once it is recognized that an actor plays a role in a given policy area. Thus, in practice, recognition of the EU by the USA for its role in counter-terrorism has been important because it has led to the EU having a certain status or reputation in the area. Thus, recognition that the USA had signed agreements related to counter-terrorism with the EU led to the adoption of other agreements. For example, US global influence on PNR data opened the door for such data to be requested by other states. The EU–US agreements led to the negotiation of similar agreements between the EU and other states, such as Australia and Canada.

To summarise, context will be operationalized by examining the global context, but also the situation in each state and whether this has enabled or constrained EU action. In addition, under context, the quality of the relationship between the EU and its interlocutor will also be considered.
Coherence
In the actorness framework, ‘coherence’ refers first of all to shared values and preferences (Brattberg and Rhinard, 2012: 561–2). One cannot say that all member states are similarly concerned about the threat of terrorism. They face a range of threats, with some Eastern European states often focused on Russia’s intentions in Eastern Europe, for instance. The older member states that have experienced protracted terrorist campaigns have typically seen terrorism as more of a threat than the newer member states (Bures, 2010a; Monar, 2007a). However, it can be observed that these positions are now closer than they were in the past.

In addition, not all member states have to be highly concerned about terrorism for action to occur. Often, there has been solidarity with other member states or external actors, which was evident in Afghanistan, for example. Few member states had reason to have a strong interest in the region. Nevertheless, they followed the USA into Afghanistan because they wanted to support and show solidarity with Washington. Some did the same in Iraq, although the EU member states were more divided on that occasion. The fact that the EU adopted a European Security Strategy in 2003, a Counter-terrorism Strategy in 2005, an Internal Security Strategy in 2010, and a Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy in 2016 shows that there has been at least a reasonable amount of similarities in the preferences of the EU and its member states. The adoption of common strategies – which could also be regional strategies – reflects some level of unity amongst member states.

The second component of coherence concerns procedures. The European Commission is able to use certain tools itself, but there have been occasions on which this has been contested by the European Parliament. For instance, Wennerholm et al. (2010: 20–21) have discussed how the European Commission originally attempted to fund a border-management project in the Philippines, but the European Parliament argued that this exceeded the Commission’s powers and the Court of Justice of the EU eventually annulled the decision. Also, procedures have been important sites for contestation, as different institutions and member states have pulled in different directions over specific issues. For example, turf wars have occurred amongst institutions for power advantages, as has happened on a few occasions in relation to counter-terrorism issues. For example, data retention measures have been hotly contested, with the European Parliament often seen as a protector of civil liberties, while the European Commission and the Council have had their own motives for pursuing data retention measures. This has been seen in the Parliament’s resistance to the DRD, the EU–US PNR Agreements, and the EU–US SWIFT Agreement (Monar, 2010; Ripoll Servent and MacKenzie, 2011). Furthermore, there have been some cultural differences amongst member states. For example, the UK – when it was still an EU member
state – often called for stronger cooperation between the EU and third states and strong counter-terrorism measures, whereas Germany has typically been more resistant (Monar, 2010; Rees, 2008; Ripoll Servent and MacKenzie, 2017). This is an over-simplification to some extent, as states may alter their position over time, notably as a result of changes to the composition of their government.

One can also distinguish between the horizontal and vertical dimensions of coherence. The horizontal dimension of coherence refers to cohesion among the institutions or among member states, while vertical coherence deals with cohesion between member states and EU institutions. Coherence, therefore, deals with values and preferences, policies, procedures, and vertical and horizontal issues. The analysis presented in this book also spans a number of years, which highlights whether the EU is able to ‘stick to the line’ (Brattberg and Rhinard, 2012: 563) over time (or not). In that way, ‘coherence’ also subsumes ‘consistency’, which was a separate criterion in Brattberg and Rhinard’s (2012) set of criteria.

**Capability**

‘Capability’ starts with the authority that the EU has to act. At the highest level, this means that counter-terrorism is one of the responsibilities of the EU in the treaties, which is the case. Following on from this, it is worth pointing out that the EU’s role in counter-terrorism could mostly be seen as that of a coordinator, with a focus on law enforcement and the root causes of terrorism. This is related to a large extent to the methods that European states have developed over time. This has also been where the EU possesses tools that it can use (Hoffman, 1999; Monar, 2015; Rees and Aldrich, 2005). To delimit counter-terrorism and ensure that not everything is defined as such, it can be considered to have three main components: (1) instruments specifically focused on the ‘fight against terrorism’, (2) instruments dealing with complex threats and disasters, and (3) capacities within EU institutions to help member states (Rhinard et al., 2007: 89).

Terrorism is an extremely complex threat to address, which requires finance, education, health, and many other types of combined policy action. Therefore, counter-terrorism cannot be limited to military or traditional foreign policy tools as a result.

To offer further specifics of the EU’s efforts to combat terrorism, it is important to consider the counter-terrorism tools that are funded by the EU and deployed under its flag – which will be considered in greater detail in each of the case studies in Chapters 4–6:

1. Agreements with third states: the EU has signed a number of agreements with third states, most importantly the USA, which have been motivated
by the terrorist threat and/or have had counter-terrorism as one of their purposes.

2. Europol and Eurojust: these two EU agencies – the former to facilitate police cooperation and the latter for judicial cooperation – have grown in importance over the past few decades and have increasingly developed their counter-terrorism activities, including in cooperation with third states and organisations.

3. Capacity-building programmes related to counter-terrorism: the EU has funded a range of programmes intended to build up the counter-terrorism capabilities of recipient states.

4. Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP): this instrument succeeded the Instrument for Stability (IfS) and the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM).

5. Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI): while primarily concerned with development issues, the ability to provide money for institutional reform and some of the thematic programmes being directly related to counter-terrorism mean that this instrument is relevant to this analysis.

6. European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR): this instrument can also be seen as making an important contribution to counter-terrorism, given the links between political grievances and terrorism.

7. European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument (ENPI): this instrument focuses on neighbouring states, which are part of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).

8. Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions: while these EU missions might not include terrorism in their mandate, they can have a direct bearing on a state’s capabilities for combating terrorism, including the capabilities of the army and the police (see Wennerholm et al., 2010).

This book is underpinned by an understanding that these eight components all contribute to the EU’s counter-terrorism capabilities. The EU does not make use of all of these capabilities in every case, which is why each case study focuses on the most relevant instruments. Capability is therefore concerned with the EU’s legal authority in the area and the instruments that could help combat terrorism. This framework helps gauge the extent of EU actorness in each area of the world.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has introduced the analytical frameworks that will be applied in the remainder of this book. ‘Collective securitization’ will be applied in Chapter 2 in order to analyse how the EU originally became involved in the
field of counter-terrorism. ‘Actorness’ will be applied in Chapters 4–6 in order to establish and to evaluate the exact role of the EU in counter-terrorism in various regions of the world. Indeed, this book provides a comprehensive discussion of the development of the EU as a global counter-terrorism actor in order to gauge how far the EU has come since 9/11. The following chapters will show that the EU has made huge strides forward as a counter-terrorism actor since these devastating terrorist attacks. While it may lack all the capabilities of its member states, it has become a global counter-terrorism actor in its own right. The EU can fulfil a number of important functions. It can be used by individual member states to gather support for individual objectives; it can act on behalf of member states that are unable to act in some parts of the world; and it can help all member states speak with one voice.
2. The collective securitization of terrorism in the EU

This chapter examines how terrorism has come to be perceived as a European security threat and how this change has led to the development of EU counter-terrorism cooperation. It is necessary to first understand how and why the EU became involved in the field of counter-terrorism before being able to establish and assess what exact role it has played as a terrorism actor on the global stage.

A month after the terrorist attacks in Brussels in March 2016, a debate on existing tools and possible future measures to combat terrorism took place in the European Parliament and notably featured interventions by Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker and the Dutch Minister of Defence Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert who represented the Council Presidency. A few months earlier, Europol, the European Union (EU)’s law enforcement agency, had launched the European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC) as a hub of expertise and an operational centre aiming to strengthen the EU’s response to the threat of terrorism. A year later, the EU adopted Directive (EU) 2017/541 on combating terrorism, which further harmonized the definition of terrorist offences in all EU member states, in particular in relation to foreign terrorist fighters and terrorist financing. Nowadays, any significant terrorist attack in Europe tends to lead to questions about possible failures of the EU and calls for strengthened counter-terrorism cooperation amongst member states. This strongly suggests that, although some have remained sceptical about the effectiveness of its policies (e.g. Bures, 2011), the EU has acquired an increasingly significant role in the efforts to combat terrorism across Europe.

This was not always the case. For years, several European countries, including Spain, Italy, the UK, and West Germany, tackled the terrorist threat that each of them was facing largely on their own. The general perception was that each state was confronted with a distinct threat, namely ETA (‘Basque Fatherland and Liberty’) in Spain, the Red Brigades in Italy, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in the UK, and the Red Army Faction in Germany (Chalk, 1996a). Cooperation amongst European states remained extremely limited. Some European governments even accused others of actually enabling
the growth of terrorism. For example, as explained by Heiberg (2007: 42), after 1982,

to the intense irritation of the Spanish socialists, the French government insisted on
continuing its policy of offering ETA a safe haven in southern France, viewing the
militants as freedom fighters and political refugees. This safe haven offered ETA
the opportunity to train its recruits, plan its operations, headquarter its leadership,
and maintain its weapon supplies. After operations in Spain ETA militants would
withdraw to the impunity of France.

Thus, compared to the lack of a shared perception of the terrorist threat and
the virtual absence of counter-terrorism cooperation amongst European states
in the 1970s and 1980s, the existence of EU-wide debates, legislative instru-
ments, and practical cooperation nowadays is particularly remarkable. This
chapter explores this change and seeks to explain it using the framework of
‘collective securitization’ introduced in the previous chapter. There are five
sections in this chapter, each of which focuses on a specific stage of the collec-
tive securitization process.

STATUS QUO SECURITY DISCOURSE AND POLICIES

Although one may consider that there have been various terrorist events
affecting European countries throughout history, it is generally agreed that
modern terrorism in Europe can be traced back to the 1970s (Bossong, 2013:
25). Several European states saw attacks committed by various ethnon-
ationalist-separatist groups, including ETA in Spain and the IRA in the UK.
Others were hit by left-wing terrorist groups, such as the Red Brigades in Italy
and the Red Army Faction in West Germany. In addition, various Middle
Eastern groups, including Black September, committed terrorist attacks in
Europe in an attempt to influence the foreign policies of Western European
states (Bossong, 2013: 25).

However, these terrorist attacks did not lead to the collective securitization
of terrorism within the predecessors of the EU, the EEC and the European
Community (EC). Each state confronted with a terrorist threat tended to con-
sider it a domestic issue that had to be dealt with ‘at home’. Terrorism was
not collectively securitized in Europe and counter-terrorism cooperation was
therefore severely limited. This was due to several reasons (Chalk, 1996a). The
first was the lack of a shared perception of terrorism as a significant threat.
Although some European states were hit by terrorist attacks, others were not,
which also meant that the latter did not see any need for counter-terrorism
cooperation. The second factor was the existence of differences amongst the
various terrorist threats affecting European states. Those were not under attack
from the same terrorist groups. In some cases, they were not even facing the
same type of terrorist threat. For example, the UK was mainly preoccupied with the IRA, whereas Spain’s counter-terrorism efforts focused on ETA. Other European countries were also hit by terrorist groups, but those were not ethnonationalist-separatist in nature, but rather inspired by a violent left-wing ideology. Examples in that respect included the Red Brigades in Italy and the Red Army Faction in West Germany. A third factor explaining the initial lack of collective securitization of terrorism in Europe was the persistence of concerns for national sovereignty, which went hand in hand with the existence of different historical, political, and legal traditions amongst various European states. For example, the French authorities were willing to negotiate openly with terrorists and accommodate their demands, which stood in stark contrast to the approach favoured by other governments, such as the British government. Such differences made cooperation across Europe more difficult for a long time.

Nevertheless, the terrorist attacks that took place in the 1970s, in particular the 1972 Munich massacre during the summer Olympic Games, led to the start of some limited cooperation on counter-terrorism amongst European states. First of all, counter-terrorism officers began to develop bilateral contacts, which led to a growth in mutual trust (Chalk, 1996a: 121–2). In addition, some first attempts at multilateral counter-terrorism cooperation took place, but outside the framework of the EU’s predecessors, the EEC and the EC, since they did not possess any competence in the field of counter-terrorism or even security more broadly. In particular, one can identify five venues in which European states began to cooperate on counter-terrorism from the 1970s onwards. First of all, European states started coordinating their counter-terrorism strategies within Interpol. This organization has a global membership, but has developed a regional infrastructure to specifically address European challenges, including a European regional assembly, a European committee, and a European bureau (Chalk, 1996a: 125). Second, counter-terrorism cooperation also developed within the framework of the Council of Europe, where the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, which entered into force in 1978, was drawn up. It mainly aimed to facilitate the extradition of persons having committed acts of terrorism by attempting to limit the use of the ‘political offence’ exception, which had hitherto been a major obstacle to the extradition of terrorists. However, it was not ratified by several of its early signatories, including Belgium, France, Greece, and Italy for a considerable number of years, which limited its impact in practice (Bossong, 2013: 26). Third, some counter-terrorism cooperation at the practical level also developed amongst European states within the Trevi Group, which was an intergovernmental forum independent of the EEC, from the mid-1970s onwards (Argomaniz, 2009a: 152–3). In particular, two operational working groups (WGs) dealing with terrorism matters were established. WG1 focused on information exchange
and mutual assistance regarding terrorist activities, whereas the remit of WG2 was mainly training matters and the exchange of technical and scientific information to facilitate the fight against terrorism. Although the achievements of Trevi cooperation were rather modest in practice, the existence of this group helped develop trust amongst individual police and intelligence officers across the EEC. Fourth, the Police Working Group on Terrorism (PWGOT) was a semi-permanent working group independent of Trevi, which promoted closer working relationships amongst police officers across Europe – in contrast with Trevi, which was a ministry-level initiative. Fifth, counter-terrorism was also part of the nascent Schengen cooperation. This is because terrorism was identified as one of the illicit activities that might benefit from the lifting of the internal border controls within the Schengen zone, which therefore called for it to be addressed by Schengen compensatory measures. Although Schengen cooperation did not specifically focus on counter-terrorism, it contributed to the development of counter-terrorism cooperation amongst EEC/EC member states by facilitating cross-border law enforcement and police cooperation (Chalk, 1996a: 127).

Thus, counter-terrorism cooperation amongst European states remained severely limited for a long time, actually up to 2001, as will be explained in the next section. One can identify three main explanations for this lack of progress, namely the intergovernmental nature of counter-terrorism cooperation attempts, the lack of a common perception of the terrorist threat, and the concomitant absence of a shared definition of terrorism, as well as the wide range of institutional venues, both inside and outside the EEC/EC, in which member states had begun to cooperate in a somewhat haphazard manner in the 1970s (den Boer, 2000).

**PRECIPITATING EVENT**

The single precipitating event that was so serious that it disrupted the status quo in the field of counter-terrorism in Europe was the 9/11 attacks. On 11 September 2001, four airplanes were hijacked in the USA by 19 terrorists associated with al-Qaeda. Two aircraft were flown into the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City, whilst the third plane hit the Pentagon and the fourth one crashed in a field in Pennsylvania. In total, almost 3,000 people lost their life in these terrorist attacks. With reference to the collective securitization framework, the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 were very serious due to their large scale, the high number of victims, as well as the original modus operandi of the attackers, which made them unique. Another key factor was the fact that these attacks received extensive media coverage, including the live broadcast of the plane slamming into the second of the twin towers and their subsequent collapse, and were watched by millions of people.
around the world (Gonçalves, 2016: 1). These terrorist attacks also disrupted the status quo in the field of counter-terrorism by confirming what a growing number of experts had been claiming in recent years, namely that the character of the terrorist threat was changing. In 1999, Laqueur (1999) had argued in *The New Terrorism* that the nature of terrorism was evolving as it was moving away from the calculated use of violence for political gain towards fanaticism and the pursuit of catastrophic destruction. Other experts had warned against the threat of what had been variously described as ‘super-terrorism’, ‘mega-terrorism’ or ‘hyper-terrorism’ in order to denote that the world was now facing a new type of terrorist threat, which was thought to be more lethal, more dangerous, and less predictable than it had ever been before (Neumann, 2009: 3). In other words, the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 reinforced the growing perception that Western governments now faced a new terrorist threat, namely that of Islamist terrorism, which was seen as being of far more concern than the threat that had been posed by left-wing or ethnonationalist terrorist groups in some European countries. Even in the European states that continued to experience terrorist acts by ethnonationalist groups, such as France and Spain, the threat of Islamist terrorism was perceived to be more serious because of the characteristics that have just been discussed.

Thus, this chapter argues that 9/11 was the single precipitating event for the collective securitization of terrorism in the EU. As demonstrated earlier, the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 were so grave and unique in character that they were sufficient on their own for the collective securitization of terrorism to take place in the EU in their aftermath. This is not to say that the numerous Islamist terrorist attacks that happened later in Europe, including in Madrid, London, Paris, Brussels, and Nice, did not have any impact on the EU counter-terrorism policy, for they certainly did. However, from an analytical viewpoint, they can be seen as belonging to the final stage of the collective securitization framework, which concerns routinization and the emergence of a new status quo, rather than playing a role in the initial collective securitization process.

**THE SECURITIZING MOVES AND THE RESPONSE OF THE AUDIENCE**

Very shortly after the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, President Bush made a key speech, which some called the ‘act of war speech’, which constituted a platform for the emerging norm to join the ‘war on terrorism’ (BBC, 2001a). He declared the following:

> The deliberate and deadly attacks, which were carried out yesterday against our country, were more than acts of terror. They were acts of war […] This enemy
attacked not just our people but all freedom-loving people everywhere in the world [...] We will rally the world [...] This will be a monumental struggle of good versus evil, but good will prevail.

These statements show that the US administration considered these acts to be acts of war, even though, conventionally, they would have been defined as terrorist attacks. However, the definitions and norms were about to change. The acts were perceived as an act of war, against which the USA needed to take necessary military action. Also, the USA needed other countries to join in the fight against terrorism in order to legitimate the war and to combat the terrorists.

One should note the enormous pressure for other countries to adopt this norm. Bush defined appropriate action in terms of fighting in the ‘war against terrorism’ and made an even stronger case by distinguishing between ‘good and evil’. Since nobody would want to be associated with ‘evil’, it was imperative to join the war in order to count as a ‘force of good’. Later, Bush enforced this emerging norm by stating that ‘you are either for us or against us’ (BBC, 2001a). In this presentation, there was no grey area. The countries supporting terrorism would later be called the ‘axis of evil’. It was therefore appropriate and even imperative to support the USA, in whichever way needed. NATO ambassadors also invoked the mutual defence clause in the organization’s founding treaty for the first time ever in its history (NATO, 2001), even though, subsequently, the organization was to be largely side-lined throughout the military campaign against Afghanistan.

After NATO, the international community decided to join in. Broadly speaking, it would have been considered inappropriate to oppose this, or even to be lukewarm about it. The UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan said that the international organisation’s host country and its host city had just been subjected to a terrorist attack of a kind one hardly dared imagine ‘even in our worst nightmares’ (United Nations, 2001c). He also asserted the fact that the UN Assembly had continuously condemned terrorism on numerous occasions and had called on all states to adopt measures to prevent it and strengthen international cooperation against it. ‘All nations of the world must be united in their solidarity with the victims of terrorism, and in their determination to take action – both against the terrorists themselves and against all those who give them any kind of shelter, assistance or encouragement (United Nations, 2001c). The importance of these statements becomes apparent when one considers the speed and timeframe in which they were made. In the space of one day, almost the entire world had already rallied behind the USA. Even more importantly, there was a widely shared view that there was an obligation for the international community to join the ‘war on terror’ as these terrorist attacks had been attacks on the ‘civilized world’.
Several European political leaders also reacted shortly after the terrorist attacks against the USA and rallied behind President Bush and his administration. In addition to extending their sympathy to American citizens, they also securitized terrorism, notably by presenting it as an act of war. For example, the then German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder described the attacks as ‘a declaration of war against the entire civilized world’, whilst the then EU External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten called 9/11 ‘an act of war by madmen’ (Bossong, 2013: 39). The German Chancellor also called on European nations to come together within the framework of the EU to combat global terrorism: ‘Only if we put in place common policing and judicial resources can we ensure that there will be no hideouts for terrorists and other criminals in the European Union.’ Interestingly, he also noted that, in the aftermath of 9/11, ‘[we] are ready to make Europe into an international player with global influence’ (BBC, 2001b). What is particularly noticeable here is that the referent object in the securitizing discourse of these European leaders was not Europe or the EU. This is understandable since, although some of the perpetrators had links to Europe, the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 did not target Europe. Rather, the referent object was broader and encompassed ‘the civilized world’, of which the USA and European states are part. The securitization of terrorism also played an agenda-setting role. This was notably evidenced by Jacques Chirac’s statement in New York on 19 September 2001 – in the context of a meeting with President Bush – that ‘the fight against terrorism had evidently become an absolute priority in today’s world’.

FORMULATION AND EXECUTION OF POLICIES

The EU rapidly moved beyond statements of sympathy and solidarity with the USA to discussing the development of an EU counter-terrorism policy. As early as 12 September 2001, the Council requested the Presidency, the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and the Commission to submit, as soon as possible, a report on concrete measures that may be recommended to ‘[increase] the capacity of the European Union to effectively fight, together with the United States and other partners, international terrorism’ (Council of the European Union, 2001: 4; italics added). On 14 September, in a Joint Declaration issued by the Heads of State and Government of the European Union, the President of the European Parliament, the President of the European Commission, and the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the EU emphasised two specific policy objectives in the fight against terrorism, namely ‘[strengthening the] intelligence efforts against terrorism’ and ‘[accelerating] the implementation of a genuine European judicial area, which will entail, among other things, the creation of a European warrant for arrest and extradition, in accordance with
the Tampere conclusions, and the mutual recognition of legal decisions and verdicts’ (European Union, 2001: 2).

The JHA Council met on 20 September 2001, agreeing on a package of measures to combat terrorism. Those were endorsed by an extraordinary European Council meeting on the next day. At the extraordinary Council Meeting on 21 September 2001, the European Council launched an ambitious ‘Action Plan to Combat Terrorism’. Its cornerstones were ‘close cooperation between all the Member States of the EU’ and the adoption of a ‘coordinated and interdisciplinary approach embracing all Union’s policies’ (European Council, 2001a). The European Council called for the use of all the tools at the EU’s disposal, amongst which are legislative and operational, repressive and preventive, internal and external measures. This made the European collective response as comprehensive as possible and essentially multidimensional.

It was now rather clear that the EU would take part in the ‘war on terror’, although the exact modalities of this engagement still had to be established. Speaking before the European Parliament, the Commissioner responsible for the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, Antonio Vitorino, declared the following (Financial Times, 2001):

Terrorist acts are committed by international groups with bases in several countries, exploiting loopholes in the law created by the geographical limits on investigators and often enjoying substantial financial and logistical resources. Terrorists take advantage of differences in legal treatment between States, in particular where the offence is not treated as such by national law, and that is where we have to begin.

Thus, Vitorino highlighted the crucial character of legal harmonization to tackle terrorism.

One of the key policy achievements during that phase was the adoption of the EAW. In that respect, the Commission followed the above-mentioned rhetoric with a very timely proposal (Kaunert, 2007, 2010c), which had already been under preparation for about two years by the time it was tabled. Vitorino initially intended to launch it under the Spanish presidency in the first half of 2002 due to Spain’s strong support of the issue in order to solve its own problems with the ETA terrorists. Yet, with the emerging norm of the ‘war on terror’, it became apparent that fast action was required. Ministers in the AFSJ would be under intense pressure to behave appropriately and settle their differences rapidly. Vitorino remarked: ‘If we do not get agreement, and it should be a substantial agreement to cope with the global threat, it will be difficult to explain to the public why we failed’ (Financial Times, 2001). Therefore, the European Commission’s strategy was for the EAW to be presented as a counter-terrorism measure and to be amalgamated with other such measures,
such as the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, which established the EU’s definition of terrorism (Kaunert, 2007, 2010c).

The EAW is exemplary for the scope of integration achieved in EU counter-terrorism after 9/11, as it abolishes extradition amongst EU member states. Vogel describes the importance of the introduction of the principle of mutual recognition in the EAW as a ‘revolution in extradition law’ (Vogel, 2001: 937). Until the adoption of the EAW, extradition between EU member states was based on several intergovernmental measures in the realm of international law (Peers, 2001). The EAW has not created international law, but rather transnational or ‘European’ law (Wagner, 2003). It replaces all previous international legal instruments amongst the different member states with an EU legal instrument. In effect, this is a form of European extradition law, which is revolutionary in many ways. For example, it abolishes the term ‘extradition’ and replaces it with the term ‘surrender’ (Douglas-Scott, 2004). The legal effect of this measure is subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the EU (Peers, 2001) if member states sign a declaration approving this. The EAW – which applies to 32 categories of crimes – abolishes the principle of double criminality for serious offences (Douglas-Scott, 2004), which means that an EAW may not be contested on the basis that it concerns an activity not criminalized in a surrendering member state.

In addition to the EAW, a key legislative development in EU counter-terrorism cooperation during that phase was the adoption of Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism. This was a crucial advance in the development of EU counter-terrorism cooperation, because it meant that, for the first time, there was a common definition of what constitutes terrorism at the EU level. This was particularly remarkable given that a number of member states did not even have a legal definition of terrorism until then (Douglas-Scott, 2004). The EU’s Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, agreed politically in December 2001, first defined what was meant by terrorist acts in three parts: (1) the context of an action; (2) the aim of the action; and (3) the specific acts being committed. Terrorist acts must be intentional acts […] which given their nature or context, may serve to damage a country or an international organisation. These acts must be committed with the aim of either seriously intimidating a population or unduly compelling a Government or international organisation to act or fail to act, or seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional economic or social structures of a country or international organisation.

In addition, a list identified eight specific acts. The definition also covered behaviours which may contribute to terrorist acts in third countries. Thus, the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism ensured that terrorist offences were to be punished by heavier sentences than common criminal offences.
would have been in all EU member states. Furthermore, it approximated the level of sanctions amongst member states according to the principle that sentences have to be both proportional and dissuasive. Member states were made legally responsible for acting in cases of terrorist incidents taking place on their own territory or committed against their own people. Thus, this Framework Decision was also favourable for EU–US cooperation in the fight against terrorism, because it ensured that terrorism was now recognized as a criminal offence on both sides of the Atlantic.

Thus, the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 became a normative defining point – for European integration and for the European Commission’s role in this process. The European Commission played a significant role in leading the EU into this emerging ‘war on terror’. It managed to construct an important role for the EU in this policy area by being a ‘strategic first mover’ in order to shape the debate, as indicated above. It also allied with the USA to put pressure on reluctant member states. However, the European Commission had to use a ‘carrot and stick’ approach in its relations with the USA, as symbolized by the fact that the former US Homeland Security Secretary Thomas Ridge stated that his greatest regret was to have not worked more closely with the EU from the start (Lebl, 2006: 125). The European Commission managed to contribute to the construction of a role for the EU in the ‘war on terror’, and thereby rhetorically and practically ‘securitized terrorism’. Furthermore, it used security reasons to move the negotiations faster, in order to secure the adoption of the EAW and an increase in EU–US cooperation. This underlines the argument that securitizing actors use securitization as a political strategy and have clearly defined political objectives.

However, it is important to underline that these significant policy developments at the EU level were not immediately followed by changes at the domestic level. As argued by Argomaniz (2009a: 157), ‘[t]he reality […] is that the implementation record during this period [was] poor’. This became particularly evident in the wake of the terrorist attacks in Madrid in March 2004. On that occasion, the European Council (2004a: 3) adopted a ‘Declaration on Combating Terrorism’, which notably emphasized that ‘the effective combating of terrorism requires that measures adopted by the Council be effectively and comprehensively implemented by Member States’. The Declaration listed six key legislative measures that had to be adopted by all member states by June 2004. Even then, as highlighted by Monar (2005: 142), ‘nine Member States had, by [December 2004], still not fully implemented the framework decision on combating terrorism. In addition, nine (partly different) EU countries had not implemented the legislation on joint investigation teams and one Member State (Italy) had still parliamentary ratification problems with the European arrest warrant.’
THE ROUTINIZATION OF EU COUNTER-TERRORISM COOPERATION AND THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW STATUS QUO

After this intense phase of collectivization of the terrorist threat in the EU, a period of relative inertia followed until the terrorist attacks against Madrid in March 2004. This is actually a pattern that has tended to repeat itself over the years (Argomaniz, 2009a, 2010). Terrorist attacks tend to lead to a spike in the number of EU counter-terrorism policy initiatives, which is then followed by a period of deceleration until a new terrorist attack pushes terrorism to the top of the policy agenda again. In so doing, the new terrorist attack sheds light on the remaining challenges and possible problems of implementation, which may then be addressed by new initiatives. For that reason, the implementation of EU measures at the domestic level often lags one terrorist attack behind. Nevertheless, despite what some may perceive as the slow growth of EU counter-terrorism cooperation (Argomaniz, 2011; Bures, 2011), policy developments clearly point towards the gradual strengthening of the EU’s role in counter-terrorism governance in Europe. Institutional innovations reinforce and solidify this trend, as explained in the remainder of this section.

Following the 11 March 2004 attacks on Madrid, which killed almost 200 people, the EU stepped up again its efforts against terrorism, with a particular emphasis on the international dimension. The ‘solidarity’ Declaration on Combating Terrorism of 29 March 2004, agreed upon by the European Heads of State and Government (European Council, 2004a), strongly emphasized the need ‘to reduce the access of terrorists to financial and other economic resources’ and ‘to address the factors contributing to the support for and recruitment into terrorism’. The EU also made counter-terrorist clauses an important element of the agreements concluded with third countries, which it described as ‘a basis for political dialogue and a tool for EU external action’ (European Council, 2004a: 7). Further to the adoption of the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, other significant EU counter-terrorism measures were adopted during that phase, such as the EU–US Container Security Initiative (CSI) in 2004, which was negotiated to ensure greater protection for containers being transported from Europe (and a number of other important ports around the world) to the USA (MacKenzie, 2012). Furthermore, the European Commission negotiated the first EU–US PNR Agreement in 2003–04 on the basis that data was dealt with under the then first pillar, but the Court of Justice of the EU ruled this to be an incorrect legal basis and invalidated the agreement, thereby pushing the responsibility to negotiate the next agreement to the member states on the basis of the then second and third pillars. The Commission used the momentum of these nego-
tations to later push for an EU PNR system. A greater role for the European Commission did not really emerge until 2009, when the Treaty of Lisbon came into force (Kaunert, 2010c). Through this treaty, the European Commission gained greater powers to negotiate agreements with third states and from then on was able to negotiate agreements in the former third pillar, starting with the re-negotiation of the SWIFT Agreement between February and July 2010 after its rejection by the European Parliament in February of that year (Ripoll Servent and MacKenzie, 2012). Further agreements that have been negotiated by the European Commission include the EU’s PNR Agreements with the USA (2012), Australia (2012), and Canada (2014). Since the early 2010s, the European Commission has played a more significant role in counter-terrorism, notably in the external dimension.

This section also considers in greater detail the role of an underestimated body – the office of the EU CTC. In 2004, following the Madrid bombings, the EU decided to appoint a CTC, the first incumbent being Gijs de Vries. This was no easy position given that the EU is an organization of more than 25 member states, all of which have had different experiences with terrorism, making it inevitable that some member states will be more concerned about terrorism than others (Bures, 2011; Monar, 2005). The weakness of the position appeared to be confirmed on the grounds that de Vries resigned in March 2007, with the post being left vacant for six months and rumours abounding that the post itself might thereafter be discontinued (Bossong, 2013). Nevertheless, Gilles de Kerchove – an EU insider – took up the position in September 2007 and held it until 2021. A committed transatlanticist, he made significant efforts to improve counter-terrorism cooperation with certain key partners, particularly the USA, making the CTC active not only within Europe, but around the world. There is no specific legislation establishing the post and setting out the Coordinator’s powers. Formally, the post was established by the European Council in its Declaration on Combating Terrorism that was adopted shortly after the Madrid bombings (Council of the European Union, 2004d). As a consequence, although quickly nicknamed the EU’s ‘Mr Terrorism’ or the ‘European terrorism czar’ by the media, the actual formal mandate of the EU CTC is rather general and his precise tasks and powers are not entirely clear.

In practice, the EU CTC has audited the progress of the 200+ measures from the EU Counterterrorism Action Plan. For this purpose, he publishes regular reports on the implementation of the Strategy and Action Plan to Combat Terrorism, as well as other occasional and more specialised reports and discussion papers on various aspects of the EU counter-terrorism policy. Although these reports have sometimes been rather critical of both the deficiencies of the EU member states and the EU agencies involved in the fight against terrorism, at least in the latter case, the content of the report is generally
an outcome of prior consultations. The Coordinator should also coordinate a plethora of other institutions and committees that have a role in different aspects of the EU counter-terrorism policy, and encourage greater cooperation between the Commission (which drafts legislation) and the Council (where national Interior and Foreign Affairs ministers meet to decide EU policies). However, the problem has been that the Coordinator formally lacks both powers and resources to coordinate the work of the Commission, the Council, and the other EU agencies involved in the fight against terrorism. With a very small office, one can hardly expect a hands-on coordination of the complex area of counter-terrorism that is overcrowded with diverse EU and non-EU structures and agencies. Another and arguably even more important role of the EU CTC is to cajole the member states into timely implementation of EU-level counter-terrorism agreements and initiatives. The ability of the EU CTC to do so in practice has, nevertheless, been significantly circumscribed because they cannot force national governments to act, have no independent budget, and cannot propose legislation.

Europol has also become an important player in EU counter-terrorism. Its role was reinforced in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and has steadily increased since then. Given the importance of the threat of Islamist terrorism, compared to other forms of terrorism, Europol’s counter-terrorist efforts have been mainly directed towards tackling this form of terrorism. Its activities in the field of counter-terrorism have been as follows: (a) analyzing gathered information from strategic, tactical, and operational perspectives; (b) undertaking threat and risk assessments, and, based on their results, crafting and implementing awareness activities; (c) on request, supporting operational investigations in the member states through various means; (d) monitoring, tracking and preventing all forms of illicit trafficking of nuclear material, strong radiological sources, arms, ammunition, explosives, and weapons of mass destruction; (e) establishing regular contacts and a sound relationship with experts in coping with terrorism and counter-proliferation.

In order to strengthen Europol’s counter-terrorist efforts, the European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC) was created within Europol in January 2016. The official website of Europol and serving officers have presented the ECTC as an operations centre and hub of expertise that reflects the growing need for the EU to strengthen its response to terrorism. The ECTC focuses on (a) tackling foreign fighters; (b) sharing intelligence and expertise on terrorism financing amongst member states (through the Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme and the Financial Intelligence Unit); (c) monitoring and suggesting preventive measures against online terrorist propaganda and extremism (through the EU Internet Referral Unit); (d) illegal arms trafficking; and (e) international cooperation among counter-terrorism authorities. Thus, over the years since 2001, counter-terrorism cooperation has become increasingly insti-
tionalyzed in the EU, as epitomized by the creation of the post of CTC and of the ECTC within Europol. This institutionalization has greatly contributed to the routinization of EU counter-terrorism practices.

CONCLUSION

This chapter set out to explore the significant growth in EU cooperation on counter-terrorism, which includes various important legislative instruments that have had a significant impact on the EU member states. It did so by drawing upon the concept of ‘collective securitization’ introduced in Chapter 1. The analysis highlighted how 9/11 was a precipitating event, which led some EU leaders to call for the governments of the EU member states to agree on developing an EU counter-terrorism policy and step up their counter-terrorism cooperation with the USA. Various counter-terrorism legislative instruments have been adopted, such as that defining terrorist acts, some of which have had a significant impact on national counter-terrorism policies. The 9/11 attacks were therefore used by some actors to convince the EU member states that, although some of them might continue to face threats from ethnonationalist-separatist terrorist groups, they now all faced one major, collective terrorist threat, embodied at the time by al-Qaeda, rather than each of them facing a distinctive threat as had hitherto been a common view across Europe. This was a crucial development as it paved the way for the development of EU counter-terrorism cooperation for the first time. The subsequent, growing institutionalization of this cooperation, in particular through the establishment of the post of CTC and the creation of the ECTC within Europol, has significantly contributed to the routinization of counter-terrorism practices in the EU.

However, there are limitations to the argument developed in this chapter. Given its focus on the EU itself, it has been unable to do justice to the richness and complexity of the EU–member state relationship on terrorism. While on some occasions the EU led member states in the fight against terrorism and those then enacted national legislation, it is important to acknowledge that counter-terrorism largely remains the preserve of member states, as has been particularly noticeable when it comes to its policing and intelligence dimensions. The EU mainly aims to add value in counter-terrorism above the national efforts of the EU member states. Nevertheless, more than 20 years after 9/11 and the initial collective securitization of terrorism, the idea that the EU has a significant role in combating terrorism alongside its member states is no longer in question.
NOTE

1. Most sections of this chapter have previously appeared in the following article: C. Kaunert and S. Léonard (2019a), ‘The Collective Securitization of Terrorism in the EU’, *West European Politics*, 41(2): 261–77 (https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2018.1510194). The authors thank the publishers for allowing them to use this material in this book.
This chapter analyzes the role of the EU institutions in counter-terrorism, namely the European Commission, the European Parliament, the Council Secretariat and the EU CTC, as well as the European External Action Service. This chapter suggests that EU institutional actors have played a crucial role in shaping the development of EU counter-terrorism in particular ways. Traditionally, member states tended to see security threats as calling for national solutions. However, as previously discussed, 9/11 led member states to acknowledge that greater cooperation was needed on counter-terrorism and chose the EU as the best vehicle for such endeavours. Some EU institutions also seized on 9/11 and managed to channel member states towards developing ‘European’ – rather than ‘national’ – solutions. This chapter shows an increase in supranational security governance in counter-terrorism since the early 2000s. This can be mainly explained as follows: cross-border security issues led to a greater demand for EU legislation and supranational organizations had considerable influence on the supply of this legislation (Stone Sweet et al., 2001: 11). Institutional change has been facilitated by exogenous shocks like 11 September, as well as the terrorist attacks on Madrid and London, and policy entrepreneurship. As observed by Stone Sweet et al. (2001), ‘[p]olicy entrepreneurs generate and attempt to propagate ideas that will define problems and solutions in ways that other actors find convincing and useful’.

More precisely, this chapter analyzes the respective roles of the EU institutions in the EU’s global counter-terrorism efforts. It shows how they have developed over the years. By way of structure, this chapter examines the four main institutions involved in EU counter-terrorism. It starts by examining the European Commission, which has traditionally sought to enhance its powers and those of the EU, both internally and externally. It has not always been successful in doing so, but it has sometimes been able to use ‘windows of opportunity’ to strengthen EU powers. The chapter then turns to the European Parliament. It shows how its role in counter-terrorism has evolved, from emphasizing the protection of civil liberties initially to becoming a more consensual – and, some would argue, responsible – actor following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon (Ripoll Servent, 2015). The chapter then considers the Council Secretariat, which also has a range of instruments at its disposal relevant to counter-terrorism. The Secretariat has played an influential role in EU counter-terrorism on occasions. This has been most evident when in alli-
Institutions in EU counter-terrorism

Institutions in EU counter-terrorism. Of particular importance here is also the role of the EU CTC, who is based in the Council Secretariat. Thus, this section also considers the role of the CTC who has, over time, become an important player in EU counter-terrorism. While the post has few formal powers, it has been able to exert some pressure on member states regarding the importance of implementing the measures agreed at the EU level through its monitoring activities (Argomaniz, 2009a). In addition, the CTC has emerged as the face of EU counter-terrorism and has regularly engaged in discussions with third states, as well as being able to set a number of priorities for the EU. In short, despite a lack of formal powers, the EU’s CTC has been a largely underestimated actor in EU counter-terrorism who has increasingly been seen as one of the faces of EU counter-terrorism to external actors. Finally, this chapter examines the role of the European External Action Service, which has, since the Treaty of Lisbon, become a very significant player in EU counter-terrorism, despite certain overlaps with the EU CTC.

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION AND EU COUNTER-TERRORISM

The formal responsibilities of the European Commission include proposing legislation, enforcing EU law, setting objectives and priorities for action, managing and implementing EU policies, and representing the EU in negotiations with third parties. However, the European Commission has also been well known for its policy entrepreneurship, notably with regard to the single market (Sandholtz, 1993), but also some aspects of internal security, including more recently the EAW (Kaunert, 2007). Since 9/11, the European Commission has developed a range of tools that have been relevant to counter-terrorism (Wennerholm et al., 2010). In addition, the Treaty of Lisbon has helped the European Commission extend its role beyond the former first pillar (i.e. primarily economic activities) into policy matters that were previously included within the third JHA pillar – an area that was primarily intergovernmental in nature. From 2009 onwards, the European Commission has also been able to negotiate agreements on security matters with third states.

The European Commission’s Financial Instruments

The European Commission now has a number of instruments at its disposal to support counter-terrorism activities in external relations, including the IcSP, the EIDHR, the DCI, and the ENPI (Wennerholm et al., 2010: 11–12). All of these are relevant to counter-terrorism, although none of them has combating terrorism as its sole purpose.
First, the IcSP is a Commission-based instrument created in 2014 in order to succeed the IfS, which had itself replaced the RRM in 2007. The IcSP can be mobilised in two main ways, namely providing a crisis response or assisting with emerging crises (short-term component) or longer-term capacity-building (long-term component) (European Commission, 2015a). Counter-terrorism efforts can be supported by the IcSP, which had a budget of €2.3 billion for the period 2014–20 (European Commission, n.d.c).

Second, the EIDHR, which was established in 2007, focuses on supporting and promoting human rights in third states through technical assistance (European Commission, n.d.a; Wennerholm et al., 2010). The key objectives of the EIDHR are ‘supporting, developing, and consolidating democracy’, as well as ‘enhancing respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms’ (European Commission, n.d.a). In the 2007–10 and 2011–13 strategy papers, the EIDHR could be seen as helping combat what could be considered the root causes of terrorism by seeking to spread human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as combating problems like poverty and inequality (European Commission, 2010a; Wennerholm et al., 2010: 11). However, terrorism appeared to be absent from the 2014–17 Multiannual Indicative Programme, suggesting that this instrument might have shifted away from combating terrorism (European Commission, n.d.b).

Third, the DCI is one of the most significant instruments of the European Commission with a budget of €19.6 billion for the period 2014–20. Albeit not specifically linked to combating terrorism, the DCI can be seen as seeking to address the supposed root causes of terrorism by supporting development and democracy, as well as preventing conflicts. Thus, a number of projects supported by this instrument can be seen as contributing to the combating of terrorism around the world (European Commission, 2016a).

The final tool in the European Commission’s arsenal is the ENPI, which is linked to the ENP. The ENPI had a budget of €11.2 billion between 2007 and 2013. This instrument is specifically mentioned as playing a significant role in combating terrorism (European Commission, 2016b). This is particularly important because the ENPI specifically targets states in the EU’s neighbourhood, some of which have been the sources of terrorism that has affected Europe in the recent past.

While it can be argued that none of these tools specifically focuses on addressing terrorism and that all these instruments could be better resourced, the fact remains that the European Commission has a number of tools at its disposal, which it can use autonomously for combating terrorism.
The European Commission as a Negotiator of International Counter-Terrorism Agreements

In addition to managing the aforementioned tools, the European Commission has been responsible for negotiating a number of agreements for the EU. The European Commission has long had competences for negotiating trade deals, which explains why it negotiated the EU–US CSI in 2004, although it had a security dimension. This agreement aimed to ensure greater protection for containers being transported to the USA (MacKenzie, 2012). Furthermore, the European Commission negotiated the first EU–US PNR Agreement in 2003–04 on the basis of its first pillar competences. However, the Court of Justice of the EU annulled the agreement on the basis of an incorrect legal foundation, which led to the negotiation of a new agreement based on alternative terms. Nevertheless, the European Commission used the momentum created by these negotiations with the USA to promote the development of an EU PNR system (Pawlak, 2009a).

A greater role for the European Commission did not really emerge until 2009 and the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. On that occasion, the European Commission gained greater powers to negotiate agreements with third states. From then onwards, it was able to negotiate agreements in the former third pillar, starting with the re-negotiation of the SWIFT Agreement between February and July 2010 after it had originally been rejected by the European Parliament in February of that year (Ripoll Servent and MacKenzie, 2012). Further agreements that have been negotiated by the European Commission include the EU’s PNR agreements with the USA (2012), Australia (2012), and Canada (2014), although the Court of Justice of the EU ruled that the latter could not be signed in its current form in July 2017. Thus, a gradual expansion of the European Commission’s powers has taken place since the early 2010s, which has enabled it to play a more significant role in counter-terrorism, including in its external dimension.

In sum, the European Commission’s role in counter-terrorism has developed significantly since 9/11. To begin with, it played primarily an internal role. Then, its external capabilities also grew over time to encompass a wide range of activities. Moreover, it has also sought to import some ideas developed in international negotiations into the EU’s internal context, although this has not always been popular, such as in the case of using PNR data for counter-terrorism purposes.
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND EU COUNTER-TERRORISM

Prior to the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, the European Parliament had almost no role in external counter-terrorism, although it had attempted to increase its powers. Originally, it had been critical of a number of practices developed during the US-led ‘war on terror’ in the name of protecting civil liberties in general and data protection in particular (Ripoll Servent and MacKenzie, 2011). Notably, it had mounted a legal challenge against the Council and the European Commission with regard to the adoption of the 2004 EU–US PNR Agreement. This agreement was subsequently annulled by the Court of Justice of the EU, which considered that the internal market was the wrong legal basis for its adoption. The European Parliament had criticised the agreement on the grounds of necessity, data protection, and proportionality. Furthermore, in 2006, the European Parliament carried out an enquiry into the extraordinary renditions being carried out by the USA in cooperation with some European states (European Parliament, 2006). In short, in the pre-Lisbon period, the European Parliament appeared to be a critical actor in counter-terrorism and was rather vocal against some of the counter-terrorism measures adopted by the EU without much of its own involvement. However, this changed with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. The increase in its competences has rendered it more consensual and more receptive to the security concerns of member states (Acosta, 2009; Ripoll Servent, 2015).

In terms of its powers, the European Parliament had always had the right to protest from the sidelines, notably through the adoption of resolutions, although the member states had no legal obligation to engage with its arguments. It also had the competence to mount legal challenges if it considered that its competences had not been respected. Importantly, the European Parliament gained the power of consent for most of the EU’s international agreements with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. It used it to great effect only a couple of months later when it refused to consent to the EU–US SWIFT Agreement in February 2010, as further discussed later in this book. Through its power of consent, the European Parliament can, in one plenary vote, either accept or reject an international agreement on a security matter. The political consequence of this legal competence has been that the European Parliament has managed to gain some indirect influence over the negotiation of such international agreements, as negotiators now already take into account the preferences of the European Parliament – this is what Ripoll Servent and MacKenzie (2011: 400) have termed ‘quasi-co-decision’ (original emphasis). In short, the European Parliament has managed to gain influence beyond what
Institutions in EU counter-terrorism was envisaged in the treaties. Although this may have come about as the result of turf wars amongst EU institutions (Pawlak, 2009b), this reinforcement of the role of the European Parliament has also had the effect of pushing EU counter-terrorism towards supranational governance.

It is also striking that, more recently, the European Parliament has accepted the priority given to security by member states – as well as the USA – although it has sought to promote greater respect for data protection and a strengthening of scrutiny, as shown by the cases of the PNR and SWIFT Agreements with the USA (European Union, 2010a). Although some observers have been critical of the influence of US norms in European countries, most of which have a tradition of stronger protection of private life and data protection standards, the negotiation of agreements with the USA has also led some to try and replicate the EU–US arrangements amongst EU member states (Argomaniz, 2009b; Ripoll Servent and MacKenzie, 2012).

In sum, the European Parliament used to be largely side-lined in counter-terrorism, but its powers have grown over time. It has moved from being a critical to a significantly more accommodating policy actor as it has gained more competences over time. Being awarded the power of consent to most international agreements has been a particularly important step up in terms of its role in the EU. Negotiations with third states have also helped push the European Parliament towards new possibilities for counter-terrorism cooperation within the EU. While the European Parliament does not enjoy the right to propose new measures, it has sometimes appeared to be in favour of exploring some new ideas for EU cooperation, including some emanating from the USA – a move viewed with suspicion at times by some observers.

THE COUNCIL SECRETARIAT AND THE EU COUNTER-TERRORISM COORDINATOR

The Council Secretariat is responsible for assisting the European Council and the Council of the European Union. The Secretariat, among other tasks, drafts agendas, provides legal advice, and circulates documentation. Ultimately, it is supposed to ensure continuity between the rotating six-month presidencies. The Secretariat may appear to hold a relatively modest position at first sight. Yet, it can act as an ally to the European Commission, it can attempt to persuade others and push them in a certain direction, and it has gained executive power in the intergovernmental aspects of the Union. Above all, the Council Secretariat can exercise significant influence when working in unison with the Commission, as it did in the case of the EU’s counter-terrorism financing regime (Kaunert and Della Giovanna, 2010: 279–80).

This section now turns to considering the role of the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator (CTC). In 2004, following the Madrid bombings, the EU decided
to appoint a CTC, with the first incumbent being Gijs de Vries, a Dutch politician. Yet, several problems have plagued the EU’s position, not least the fact that the EU is an organization of (now) 27 member states, all of which have had different experiences of terrorism, making it inevitable that some member states will be more concerned about terrorism than others (Bures, 2010a; Monar, 2007a). This starting point puts the post-holder in an unenviable situation, before looking at the restrictions on the position. Since the appointment of the first CTC in 2004, it has generally been assumed that the Coordinator is ineffecual, with no mandate; a lack of real power to force member states to cooperate and a general dependence upon their good behaviour. Also, in the case of de Vries, he was considered to be inexperienced when it came to intelligence matters and to have insufficient knowledge of the internal workings of the EU (Bossong, 2008a; Keohane, 2005; Mukhopadhyay, 2004; Zimmermann, 2006). The weakness of the position appeared to be confirmed on the grounds that de Vries resigned in March 2007, with the post being left vacant for six months and rumours abounding that the post itself might thereafter be dropped. However, Gilles de Kerchove – an EU insider – took up the position in September 2007 and held it until 2021. Although de Vries is known to have become disillusioned with the lack of any real power vested in his position, Spence (2007b: 19) suggested that his resignation may also have had something to do with a European Parliament report criticizing his reticence to give information about member state compliance with the controversial activities of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Europe and the more general lack of transparency regarding his position. However, under de Kerchove’s leadership, significant efforts were made to improve cooperation with certain key partners, making him active not only within Europe, but around the world.

There is no specific legislation establishing the post and setting out the Coordinator’s powers. Formally, the post was established by the European Council in its Declaration on Combating Terrorism that was adopted shortly after the Madrid bombings (Council of the European Union, 2004a). As a consequence, although quickly nicknamed the EU’s ‘Mr Terrorism’ and the ‘European terrorism czar’ by the media, the actual formal mandate of the EU CTC is rather general and their precise tasks and powers are not entirely clear. According to Javier Solana, the then EU’s High Representative and thus also the direct superior of the EU CTC, the expectation was that the incumbent of the new post would take action in three main areas:

1. To present proposals aimed at better organizing and streamlining the work of the EU Council Secretariat on the fight against terrorism;
2. To prepare proposals for better EU coordination between EU Councils of Ministers and their preparatory bodies;
3. To maintain regular contacts with [member states] so as to ensure coordination between EU and national action (Rhinard et al., 2007: 18).

In practice, the EU CTC has published a broad range of reports on various aspects of the EU counter-terrorism policy. Although these reports have sometimes been rather critical of both the deficiencies of EU member states and agencies involved in the fight against terrorism, at least in the latter case, the content of the report is generally an outcome of prior consultations. As a senior Europol official put it,

it is not that the CTC is saying to the outside world Europol is going to do this or that without talking to us first. And if we think it is not feasible, we tell him. It would not be handy for the CTC to announce something that is not feasible. (Interview with a Europol official, September 2009)

The Coordinator should also coordinate a plethora of other institutions and committees that have a role in different aspects of the EU counter-terrorism policy and encourage greater cooperation between the Commission (which drafts legislation) and the Council (where national Interior and Foreign Affairs ministers meet to decide EU policies). As one high-level EU official noted, the very creation of the post of the EU CTC

was about providing a visible symbol and a feeling that there needs to be somebody specifically charged with terrorism simply because the subject is spread out over so many parts of a huge and complex bureaucracy, which tends to work very effectively but also slowly, and is not always very good in making horizontal connections. (Interview with EU official A, October 2008)

The problem has been, however, that formally the Coordinator has lacked both powers and resources to coordinate the work of the Commission, Council, and the other EU agencies involved in the fight against terrorism. At the very best, according to one Commission official, ‘the EU CTC can manage coordination within the Council’ (Interview with a Commission official, October 2008). Moreover, some Commission officials were originally suspicious of de Vries because formally he was supposed to work for the national governments represented in the Council. As such, they feared that ‘as an “agent” of the governments, de Vries would try to limit the Commission’s role in EU counterterrorism efforts’ (Keohane, 2005: 19). Therefore, they ‘took great pains to emphasize that the work of the Co-ordinator should be restricted to the inner workings of the Council and the overseeing of implementation’ (Argomaniz, 2008: 197–8). According to Argomaniz (2008: 197), this emphasis on the complementary role of the Coordinator to that of the Commission was a ‘result of the Commission’s instinct to protect their competencies in those counter-terror
areas that intersect with the common market and their independence from the Council’s institutional influence’. Similarly, Spence (2007b: 18) has argued that the origin of the Commission’s opposition to this post resides in their perception that the Council Secretariat was proposing structures that would put the then first and third pillars at the service of the second by locating policy initiative and coordination under High Representative Solana. The official view of the Commission’s Directorate General (DG) Justice, Liberty and Security (JLS) Director was that he simply does ‘not believe that the co-ordinator has the resources, the mandate or the institutional position to co-ordinate operational action of the various bodies in the European Union’ (cited in Argomaniz, 2008: 198).

Another, and arguably even more important, role of the EU CTC has been to cajole the member states towards timely implementation of EU-level counter-terrorism agreements and initiatives. The ability of the EU CTC to do so in practice has been, nevertheless, severely circumscribed by the fact that they cannot force the national governments to act, have no independent budget, cannot propose legislation, and cannot chair meetings of national Justice, Interior and/or Foreign Affairs ministers to set the EU’s counter-terrorism agenda. In fact, even at the press conference announcing de Vries tenure as the first EU CTC, the new incumbent was asked whether his mandate was sufficient, which led Zimmermann (2006: 133) to suggest that

[...]his question, again, is symptomatic of the EU’s inherent, and some would say ingrained, weakness of lacking a robust executive mandate. In the final analysis, to efficiently utilize the EU’s counterterrorism capacities, Mr. de Vries would have to be given the same powers on the Union level that interior ministers have at their disposal in the Member States.

One Council official commented that, in the absence of such powers, de Vries ‘occasionally managed to “shame” laggard member states into speeding up their implementation processes. Otherwise, he mostly fulfilled a purely representational role towards the media and third countries’ (Bossong, 2008b: 7).

Although some observers noted that de Vries successfully pushed the EU into developing some new counter-terrorism policies, the position of the CTC has not changed much since 2004. In fact, the lack of real powers and the EU member states’ ‘deeply ingrained dislike of sharing information on counterterrorism activities’ were cited by the press as the key explanations for de Vries’ decision to step down in March 2007 after only three years in the job (EUObserver, 2007). Disagreements over the exact scope of the job of the EU CTC not only prompted de Vries to quit, but also delayed his replacement. On the one hand, there was almost unanimous agreement among ministers that the new EU CTC should be a bureaucrat with established knowledge of
the inner workings of the EU, rather than a politician. This was due to the criticism of de Vries’ attempts to assume an ambassadorial role that, in the view of most member states, should be reserved for national authorities. On the other hand, several EU member states had been particularly keen for the new CTC to enjoy greater powers in JHA. Their calls were echoed by the EU’s High Representative for the CFSP, who suggested that de Vries’ successor should have a ‘deeper’ mandate and enjoy ‘a much closer relationship’ with EU governments and institutions: ‘[c]ircumstances have changed since the first mandate was agreed. We have learned during this period and it is for intelligent people to adapt to the new circumstances’ (Euractiv, 2007). Some member states, however, not only opposed the idea of a more politically visible CTC, but were actually in favour of abolishing the post altogether (Argomaniz, 2008: 114, 204).

In the end, Gilles de Kerchove was appointed to the post on 19 September 2007, after a summer full of failed or foiled terrorist plots in Germany, Denmark, and the UK, which once again revived political interest in counter-terrorism. As an EU law professor and the director for JHA within the Council Secretariat, de Kerchove had already personally managed much of the EU’s counter-terrorism agenda and was also a choice that addressed most of the aforementioned concerns of the EU member states. This was confirmed in an interview with a Council official who argued:

There was a shift of priorities between the two coordinators. The first coordinator was a former MEP and thus was clearly someone who was used to having a very public role at a high level. His successor is someone whose main prior experience was in the Council bureaucracy in JHA and is therefore more experienced in getting the bureaucratic machine fully engaged and this is where the current focus lies. (Interview with EU official A, October 2008)

Formally, de Kerchove’s mandate remained identical to that of his predecessor – he was supposed to ‘coordinate the work of the Council of the EU in the field of counterterrorism, maintain an overview of all the instruments at the Union’s disposal, closely monitor the implementation of the EU counter-terrorism strategy, and ensure that the Union plays an active role in the fight against terrorism’ (European Union, 2007a). This was also confirmed in his first public interview, where de Kerchove stated that his primary role was ‘to coordinate the work of the various Councils in the field of counterterrorism’ and ‘to ensure that the Commission and the Council work together in this area’ (European Union, 2007b). In practice, according to EU officials in Brussels, de Kerchove concentrated on more low-key coordination within the Council and followed a more hands-on approach than his predecessor on information transfer within the Council. His background in JHA also shifted the attention
of the post towards the internal side in contrast with de Vries’ emphasis on the external dimension of counter-terrorism (Argomaniz, 2008: 207).

Overall, it appears that despite some calls to the contrary, the role and powers of the EU CTC are likely to remain rather limited. Moreover, the very future of the post was actually in question prior to the Treaty of Lisbon, raising questions about its overall usefulness. The treaty established the new post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, thus merging the responsibilities of the then High Representative for the CFSP and Secretary General of the Council of the EU with those of the EU Commissioner for External Relations, which ‘raises interesting questions regarding the future of the Counter-terror Coordinator. The position is a creation of Solana’s cabinet, but it is questionable whether the new HR will keep Solana’s practice of special representatives’ (Argomaniz, 2008: 114, 211).

Having established the mandate and possible contribution of the CTC to EU counter-terrorism efforts, this section now turns to examining the responsibilities of the Coordinator in the external dimension of counter-terrorism, as they are outlined in EU documents.

The External Responsibilities of the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator

It was previously stated that the EU CTC’s general responsibilities are not entirely clear. However, based upon their actions and EU documents, one can identify certain responsibilities that have been assumed by the Coordinator over the past few years. Upon taking on the position, the main focus of de Kerchove’s tenure as EU CTC became internal counter-terrorism efforts, whilst the implementation of existing counter-terrorism measures became a specific area of attention. This focus on the internal is not unsurprising given the problems that have arisen with EU counter-terrorism legislation, such as member states being slow to transpose EU law into their national law. However, this internal action does not preclude external action; in fact, the EU has become increasingly active on external counter-terrorism issues over the last ten or so years. The Coordinator has at times even become the EU’s face in the presentation of its counter-terrorism policies to the outside world (Bures, 2011: 172). Perhaps most notably, this includes the UN, where he has appeared several times to brief the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee that oversees the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (Eling, 2007: 113). This may have also prompted the UN to entertain the idea of establishing a counter-terrorism coordinator of its own. Even so, many caveats exist regarding what the EU is able to do internationally. Perhaps the most high-profile counter-terrorism actions by the EU are its agreements with third states – such as with the USA, Canada, and Australia – and technical assistance projects in countries across the world, but it must be remembered that the EU is not able to
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undertake military missions and is restricted to the personnel that the member states will provide for any kind of action abroad.

According to a UK House of Lords report, the EU CTC is responsible for the following:

1. Coordinating the counter-terrorism work of the Justice and Home Affairs Council (including a multitude of working groups and working parties);
2. Maintaining an overview of the relevant EU instruments in this area;
3. Ensuring effective follow-up of Council decisions;
4. Monitoring the implementation of the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, including making reports to the Council;
5. Fostering better communication between the EU and third countries;
6. Ensuring that the EU plays an active role in the fight against terrorism as a whole (House of Lords, 2011).

Numbers five and six in this list are of particular interest because they appear to comprise the CTC’s external responsibilities. However, these responsibilities are in no way specific about what the Coordinator can do. The CTC does not have any power to make agreements or to initiate projects in third countries, but it is expected that they will improve counter-terrorism cooperation with third states and that they will ensure that the Union plays an active role in the fight against terrorism, which provides them with the scope to undertake a broad range of possible, but non-binding, actions. In terms of practical actions undertaken by the EU CTC in 2011 (for example), de Kerchove held discussions on terrorism with Russia and India and was also involved in an Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) and a major international UN conference in Riyadh (Council of the European Union, 2011b). From this, it is evident that the EU CTC has become an increasingly important voice in EU counter-terrorism activities abroad. Therefore, while it is difficult to detect actual growth in cooperation between the EU and these third countries, it is clear that other countries do recognize the CTC’s position and will discuss terrorism issues with them. This recognition by, and interaction with, third states is an important part of the CTC’s role in EU counter-terrorism. In the same report, we see that the EU has launched a strategy for security and development in the Sahel and that the CTC visited Algeria in order to discuss this strategy (Council of the European Union, 2011b). Clearly, in this instance, the EU CTC was involved in detailing the counter-terrorism aspects of the strategy and articulating them to the third states in the area. In other words, the CTC is involved in discussing the EU’s counter-terrorism actions with third states and in the formulation of EU counter-terrorism activity. In this case, he also worked closely with the European External Action Service Senior Coordinator
for the Sahel, showing that the CTC cooperates with other institutions (Council of the European Union, 2011b).

Furthermore, the EU CTC has worked closely with the UN, going beyond simple communication. For example, the CTC has engaged with UN agencies, specifically the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), to deliver technical assistance to third countries (Wennerholm et al., 2010: 10). According to one interviewed EU official, although the Office of the EU CTC does have links to many multilateral organisations,

probably the closest relationship exists with the UN Counterterrorism Executive Directorate, in part because we are sort of similar business and also because for the CTED, the EU is an interesting partner because we can do more with 27 states than they can do with 192 states. We are also significant donors to the UN system so we can be of significant assistance. (Interview with EU official A, October 2008)

Evidently, the CTC lacks the ability to perform any executive tasks or to force member states to do anything, but they can coordinate activities and bring the EU and third states closer together on terrorism issues; help the EU and the member states formulate counter-terrorism action in certain areas around the world; and deal directly with the UN, including regarding the provision of technical assistance.

THE EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE

The Treaty of Lisbon, through its article 27(3), established the European External Action Service (EEAS). It serves as a platform for EU diplomacy to support the functions of the High Representative and Vice-President (HR/VP) of the EU and, in parallel, is the primary liaison between the diplomatic services of each member state, embodying therefore the key instrument for future European diplomacy actions (European Council, 2010). Following the events of the Arab Spring, the EEAS entered the history of the EU as one of the fastest services to be designed and created (Drieskens and Van Schaik, 2010: 7; Helwig and Rüger, 2014: 6). It enables a more consistent and harmonised EU external coordination with other EU policies, including member states, guaranteeing the effective functioning and coordination of European external action. While the Treaty of Lisbon was one of the most transformative constitutional pieces for the counter-terrorism agenda, introducing key amendments and creating new core actors to enhance coherence in the objectives of the EU’s external action, it also generated more ambiguity and sometimes function overlaps, particularly with regard to decision-making between the different actors in counter-terrorism (Ciascai, 2011; Balfour et al., 2015). Therefore, it is
of particular interest to examine the dynamics amongst the institutional actors of EU counter-terrorism. This section focuses on the role of the EEAS.

The position of High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Secretary-General of the Council was created by the Treaty of Amsterdam. Despite the review of this role by the Treaty of Nice, their functions were still contained and somewhat limited – supporting the Presidency and the Council in matters of common foreign and security policy and, whenever necessary, assuming a diplomatic role on behalf of the Council at the Presidency’s request and building bridges with third parties (Amadio Viceré, 2015: 4). However, Javier Solana’s appointment to the post brought about a dynamic that would informally transcend the provisions of the Treaty (Helwig, 2015: 90; Denza, 2012: 484; Amadio Viceré, 2018). Throughout his mandate, Solana balanced the role overlaps between his tasks as HR and the duties as the External Relations Commissioner. In 1999, he publicly endorsed the idea that the EU, as an important global actor, should be given a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. This caused some friction amongst some member states that quickly came forward against this unapproved EU policy (Bates, 1999; Denza, 2012: 482). In 2000, Chris Patten, EU Commissioner for External Relations, publicly criticised him for interfering in his own sphere of influence during the Balkan crisis:

The creation of the High Representative of the CFSP, which also assumes the function of secretary general of the Council, has not contributed to resolving the tension [that exists between the Governments of the Fifteen and the community powers]. In fact, it has given rise to new institutional complications […] It could also have increased the tendency of the CFSP to usurp functions incumbent on the Commission. (El País, 2000)

To overcome this institutional conundrum, the Treaty of Lisbon established the role of the HR and VP of the EU, creating an effective platform for a new institutional approach to this policy at institutional level and smoothing over the inter-pillar incoherence. The role of the HR thus translated into a new institutional approach by merging and reinforcing the functions previously held by the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the Secretary-General, and the Commissioner for External Relations. The HR/VP was conceived not only as the EU’s diplomatic emissary, but also as a mediator with intergovernmental and supranational responsibilities (European Commission, 2012b: 29).

In the pursuit of a coherent institutionalization in counter-terrorism, in addition to now combining the HR functions set out in the Treaty of Amsterdam with those of the hitherto Commissioner for External Relations, the Treaty of Lisbon also renamed the post ‘High Representative of the Union’, while adding the important role of Vice-President of the Commission. Moreover, the second
HR/VP was also put in charge of the Presidency of the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC), a function previously assigned to the member state presiding over the rotating presidency. In short, the new superposition of the HR/VP, in addition to becoming a bridge between both EU institutions, now has direct responsibility for all the different dimensions of EU external relations (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 168–9; Vanhoonacker and Reslow, 2010: 2; Piris, 2010: 244). Assuming that one single individual would assume the same three functions, colloquially defined as ‘hats’ (Piris, 2010: 243; Griller and Ziller, 2008), has led many scholars to characterize this position as a true mission impossible (Euroactiv, 2009; Dietrich, 2019). The amendments to the functions of the HR have been introduced by Articles 18 and 27 Treaty on European Union (TEU). They include a significant coordinating role, while introducing a hybridization of HR/VP functions that oscillates between the supranational and intergovernmental arenas, with the aim of enhancing the robustness of institutional coherence between CFSP actors and other member states in the fight against terrorism. From a supranational standpoint, with regard to CFSP, and under the umbrella of ‘ensuring the unity, consistency and effectiveness’ of Union action, the HR/VP additionally has the right of initiative, both in High Representative matters (CFSP) and as Vice-President of the European Commission on matters of external relations managed by the Commission (De Ruyt, 2005: 15). The role of HR is also extended and now encompasses the power to conduct ministerial political dialogues with third countries, not only on CFSP issues, but also acting and actively participating as a policy entrepreneur in the Commission’s external relations (Amadio Viceré, 2015, 2016). Concurrently, the HR/VP also heads the Union’s Special Representatives (EUSRs), while also having the possibility of attending the work of the European Council, despite not being a member or being able to vote (Denza, 2012; Helwig, 2015; Helwig and Rüger, 2014). The wide range of HR/VP representation functions also embody the roles concerning ‘common foreign and security policy issues’ and, additionally, the task of representing the EU in international organizations and international conferences, including the United Nations Security Council. Lastly, the HR/VP also heads the negotiation of ‘international agreements relating exclusively or principally to CFSP matters on behalf of the Union’, aside from also shouldering the consultation and information obligations on CFSP matters towards the European Parliament. Given the transnational dimension of terrorism, the post-Lisbon era gives the HR/VP opportunities for actively participating in CFSP proposals, opening up the possibility of further extending the dialogue on such delicate matters as the strategy against terrorism, the fight against organised crime and fraud, or even discussing de-radicalization approaches with third countries. This competence, which previously lay solely with member states, enables a whole new externalization of EU security. The EU agenda for counter-terrorism has been mark-
edly event-driven and the fact that it has always been shaped by precipitating security events stressed the need to ensure an articulated relation especially among core EU actors, namely between the HR/VP and the CTC. However, if one looks more closely at the spectrum of its functions one may arguably find that many of the CTC functions overlap with those of the HR/VP, as outlined in the previous section (MacKenzie et al., 2013a: 328–9).

With regard to the links between the EEAS and the implementation of the counter-terrorism agenda, the EEAS now controls five external relations committees and working groups of the Council. One of the most visible effects of this post-Lisbon organization was precisely the suppression of the biennial rotation of the Council Presidency (Wouters and Chané, 2016: 313). Moreover, ‘the EEAS, led by the HR/VP, also plays a part in counter-terrorism in the Council Working Group via the Director of the EEAS Security Policy Division, as well as in the Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security (COSI) and the Working Party on Terrorism – International Aspects (COTER). Finally, the EEAS actively cooperates with COSI (that gathers the Ministries of Interior and/or Justice of each member state, Commission and EEAS representatives, as well as Europol, Eurojust, Frontex, and the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL)) through the European Union Intelligence and Situation Centre (EU INTCEN), whose role is to provide non-public information to the EU HR/VP and the member states aiming to advise the EU decision-making bodies in the fields of CFSP and CSDP and counter-terrorism (Plater-Zyberk, 2017; Gruszczak, 2016a, 2016b).

The role of the EU HR has celebrated 20 years of existence, having gone through a number of politically critical moments, particularly those that have shaken the security of the EU as a whole. During that time, three officials have held the position of High Representative of the Union, all of them with different profiles, all marking the post at the institutional and instrumental levels, but above all revealing the entrepreneurial power of the HR/VP. For that reason, it is important to seek to understand how the performances of Javier Solana, Lady Ashton and Federica Mogherini have oscillated between diplomatic officer, mediator, and policy entrepreneur.

Javier Solana will retain the feat of having been the first to answer Kissinger’s question: ‘What is Europe’s phone number?’ (Reuters, 2009). Javier Solana’s mandate is intrinsically linked with the seminal counter-terrorism institutionalization and policies in the EU as it was during his tenure that the Madrid bombings in 2004 and London in 2005 took place. The 9/11 attacks had obviously influenced the course of action of EU policies against terrorism but, in truth, between the creation of the CTC and the Madrid terrorist attacks, Europe was largely characterized by inertia when it came to its counter-terrorism policy agenda. The terrorist attacks against Madrid were therefore a wake-up call to
develop more robust institutionalization and more coherent counter-terrorism policies and tools. As the Madrid attack was seen as targeting European values, during this period all the steps forward were rarely questioned. George W. Bush’s earlier global call for a united response against the transnational ‘evil’ triggered the initial adoption of external and internal security frameworks (de Vries, 2008; Kaunert and Léonard, 2012: 423; Argomaniz, 2009a). Solana personally engaged in an action plan on combating terrorism brought forward by the European Council and, despite the limitations of his mandate under the Treaty of Amsterdam, acted not only as a mediator between the Council and the Commission, but also retained the merits of policy entrepreneur in the aftermath of 9/11. Javier Solana authored the European Security Strategy adopted by the European Council in 2003, identifying not only the globalized nature of terrorism, but also breaking old paradigms, namely in how to address these ‘dynamic’ threats (European Council, 2003a, 2003b). The number of speeches and media engagement is quite significant during this period. Solana personally engaged not only in designing the counter-terrorism strategy, but also in actively seeking to get public support for his political counter-terrorism strategy (Bates, 1999; El País, 2000; Irish Times, 2003; Solana, 2004).

The years 2004 and 2005 were heavily marked by a trigger-reaction policy period. After the Madrid and London bombings, Javier Solana created a new coordinating role, designating Gijs de Vries as CTC whose mission was to coordinate the Council’s counter-terrorism tasks, supervise the implementation of the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, and play the role of EU mediator in the fight against terrorism, under the pillars of ‘prevent, protect, pursue and respond’, introduced by the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy in 2005 (European Council, 2005). In 2007, Gilles de Kerchove replaced de Vries after three years of limited activity. Solana, once again, stepped forward, announcing that the new CTC would have enhanced functions and would be working in synergy with other EU bodies in order to effectively put in place the Counter-Terrorism Strategy. This period marks a new stage for the EU security agenda where a conjoint vision for the external dimension of freedom, security, and justice set in motion the prospective actions within this framework. In terms of intelligence cooperation, Solana was also involved as a policy entrepreneur bringing forward the Joint Situation Centre to start producing intelligence-based classified assessments. At his request, the Council of the European Union agreed in June 2004 to establish within the existing Joint Situation Centre (SITCEN) a counter-terrorist cell that would later become the EU INTCEN (Keohane, 2005: 15; Bossong, 2013: 77–8). He had previously shaped this outcome through several proposals to the Council and discursively in released summary remarks on terrorism and intelligence cooperation (European Council, 2004b). However, ‘his biggest achievement was the development of his supporting bureaucratic organisation (...) When he was appointed in 1999, he had some
seventy civil servants working for him. Ten years later when he left office, there were approximately 600–700 civil servants in Brussels directly reporting to him’ (Dijkstra, 2011: 66).

Catherine Ashton’s mandate will be forever linked to some distinctive features: she was the first HR/VP with the new double-hat formulation; she set up the entire EEAS from scratch in the midst of a European economic crisis; and she began her mandate during another trigger-event, namely the Arab Spring. Despite being considered by many a weak mandate without much impact, in truth Catherine Ashton had to deal with the fact that she was succeeding a charismatic leader who was also the architect of the entire post-Lisbon CFSP structure. Ashton’s main task was to set up the EEAS and perhaps because she was an ‘accidental diplomat’, her diplomatic and negotiating experience was weak (O’Connor, 2010). Ashton began her mandate at about the same time as the Arab Spring and just as new warnings regarding a growing terrorist threat began to be voiced. The instability caused by the Arab Spring uprisings opened up possibilities for al-Qaeda to look for new niches in North Africa and strengthen the organization. The MI5 Director-General made it public that there were already signs of self-organisation in the UK and that there were already some British Jihad candidates. They also warned that there was a possibility that some would return to the UK and that this could pose a threat to the European territory. Europol’s own report also stated that the Arab revolutions and the economic crisis could increase the risk of terrorist attacks in the EU by Islamists (Hopkins, 2012). Gilles de Kerchove also warned that the Arab Spring could mean enhanced danger and that one of his concerns was the ‘dismantling of the security services in Tunisia and Egypt’ provoking ‘a security vacuum’, which led him to call for EU support, saying ‘that’s where I see an urgent need for the EU to help’ (Sommers, 2011). In northern Mali, radical Islamic groups closely linked to the terrorist organisation aQIM controlled part of the territory. This was a significant warning of the EU’s southern neighbourhood’s instability. Consequently, the EEAS released a new strategy focused solely on the Sahel where it assumed a mid-to-long-term intervention in order to counter terrorism and radicalization at the source (EEAS, 2011).

From the beginning of her term, Federica Mogherini advocated active debate and effective investment in counter-terrorism policies. At the end of her term, Mogherini could be satisfied in having actively promoted all the functions under the ‘hats’ she wore (Dietrich, 2019). Her mandate, similarly to what happened during Solana’s tenure, was also marked by several terrorist attacks on European soil, such as those against the Charlie Hebdo magazine and the Bataclan theatre in Paris, as well as the attacks in Brussels, Nice, Manchester, London, Barcelona, and Berlin, in addition to the biggest political challenge the EU has faced in recent years, the ‘refugee crisis’. The exercise of Mogherini’s mandate differed greatly from others, namely through the
vehicles she used to communicate with citizens and their counterparts. All the diplomatic machinery was oriented towards new technologies and statements were often made in advance on social platforms in order not only to spread the message faster, but especially to act autonomously. And this translated into a significant number of statements between 2014 and 2019. Actually, HR/VP Mogherini made more statements on terrorism and counter-terrorism than any of her predecessors.

As with Solana, Mogherini somehow took advantage of the fact that there was unanimity against the terrorist attacks on European soil. This enabled her to become a policy entrepreneur in ways that had not been widely imagined before, reinforcing the spectrum of her message and thus shaping the member states’ own political decisions and policy action in the EU. Particularly, she actively worked towards the better integration of the internal and external dimensions of security and highlighted the importance of the implementation of the European Agenda on Security linking the external and internal dimensions of the security realm (Aspenia, 2015). In her speech at the EU Global Strategy Conference in Barcelona, she mentioned terrorism as an example of the need to bridge the ‘different dimensions of action’, as one of the key issues for the EU internal–external security nexus (Mogherini, 2015b), which must be outlined under a consistent and responsible engagement framework:

A starting point for our work is the close link between our internal and external policies and the effect this has on our security. (…) I will focus on two main principles. One is consistency, the other is responsible engagement. Consistency means that our external and our internal action must be guided by the same interests and the same values. (Mogherini, 2015b)

If for Solana the turning point had been the Madrid terrorist attacks, for Mogherini the paradigm shift was the Charlie Hebdo attack. In addition to joining the joint march in Paris, with the heads of state and government, she became committed to including the issue of counter-terrorism on the agenda of the subsequent Foreign Affairs Council Meeting where the core statement was that ‘[for] the first time, there was a real awareness that we need to work together to fight a common threat. We took a decision within the Foreign Affairs Council to cooperate in a much more active way than it has been the case so far’.

Moreover, as a demonstration of real commitment and need to build synergies, Gilles de Kerchove (CTC) was invited to attend this meeting (Mogherini, 2015a). After the Paris attacks in 2015, the FAC set a point of departure to a novel approach to terrorism. As Mogherini put it:

I have to say that, probably for the first time, there was a real deep awareness of the need to work together and – I was surprised to know for the first time – the Foreign
Affairs Council had a discussion with our EU Counter terrorism coordinator Gilles de Kerchove. I think this was not only a good exchange of views but also discussions on some decisions to take that is obviously only the first step. (Mogherini, 2015a)

Additionally, not only as a policy entrepreneur, but also as a bridge-maker bringing together the Council, the Commission, the Parliament, and the member states, she stated skilfully that:

We have re-invited the European Parliament to work on the Passengers name record, the PNR. This is not the competence of the Foreign Affairs ministers, but still they are politicians and members of the national cabinets; so our Council gave a strong call for moves in that direction, as well as the need to increase our work preventing financing of terrorist networks. (Mogherini, 2015a)

In one single statement she managed to unite the different EU bodies towards the same objective: to fight terrorism. If it is true that the terrorist threat has been changing in shape and techniques, it is also true that it changed more rapidly during Mogherini’s mandate. From the overwhelming nature of big terrorist attacks, Europe is nowadays increasingly used to the diffuse and pervasive nature of lone wolf attacks that were predominant during the last two years of her tenure.

Moreover, for the last three years, the threats were also of a hybrid nature calling for different actions. She engaged in a robust dialogue not only with different agencies, but also underlined the need for a global response to a transnational dimension of terrorism. Countering cyber-threats has become one of the core areas of counter-terrorism within the agenda of EU counter-terrorism and, as such, there has also been much progress by the HR/VP in this area. Her policy entrepreneurship has been increasing on both internal and external levels, notably in relation to NATO:

We are all affected, in Europe and beyond, and we all need to mobilise (…) We cannot do this alone, and we are not doing this alone. Our coordination with member states – starting from the digital one [Estonia] is constant, and we have strong and important partnerships, starting with NATO (…) We got to a stage of cooperation with NATO, especially in this field, that has no precedent in our history. (Mogherini, 2017; EEAS, 2017)

Mogherini has been actively working towards greater harmonization and joint synergies between the supranational and intergovernmental spheres that characterize the EU decision-making process, especially with regard to counter-terrorism. Perhaps the most consolidated incarnation of her vision is the European Union Global Strategy, which points towards a stronger Europe (EEAS, 2018) where, among other issues, counter-terrorism appears as a cornerstone to sustain the EU’s external resilience (EEAS, 2018). On the external
level, Mogherini has been working to build as many partnerships as possible. Today, the outreach of the EEAS is quite remarkable. The launch of the EU Global Strategy has not only strengthened cooperation with the EU’s neighbourhood, notably the Middle East, North Africa, and the Western Balkans, but also with the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Arab League, which has also been strengthened by the posting of counter-terrorism and security experts across EU delegations and CSDP missions.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has identified and examined the respective roles of the EU institutions in counter-terrorism, namely the European Commission, the European Parliament, the Council Secretariat and the EU CTC, as well as the EEAS. It has shown that EU institutions played a significant role in EU counter-terrorism. From 9/11 onwards to the more recent terror attacks in Paris, Brussels, Berlin, Barcelona, Manchester, and London, they have channelled EU counter-terrorism towards ‘European’ – rather than ‘national’ – policy. This is clearly suggestive of increased supranational security governance. These changes have been facilitated by exogenous shocks like September 11 and subsequent terror attacks, as well as the policy entrepreneurship displayed by EU institutional actors.
4. Counter-terrorism in the transatlantic relationship

The transatlantic relationship is of crucial importance to the EU. The USA has encouraged the integration of Europe through, among other things, the Marshall Plan of 1948, has traditionally underwritten the security of the region through its leadership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) since the end of the Second World War, led the ‘war on terror’, and remains the world’s most powerful state.

Despite occasional disagreements, European states and the USA have tended to share broadly similar world views and values surrounding the desirability of a liberal world order and a preference for democratic political systems. Hill (2004: 145) has summed up European views on the USA as follows: ‘[f]or all the anti-Americanism that is to be found in parts of western Europe, and widespread hostility to right-wing Republicanism, democratic Europeans have not forgotten American sacrifices in two world wars, and know which side they are on in any conflict between pluralism and theocracy’. Indeed, links between European countries and the USA run deep. The EU and the USA cooperate on a vast array of issues ranging from trade to counter-terrorism. One can also argue that it would be mutually beneficial to the EU and the USA to deepen their cooperation in future given the significant shifts that are currently taking place globally, including the rise of China and the concomitant relative decline of the USA on the international stage. By cooperating with the EU, Washington has conferred a certain status on Brussels. It has significantly contributed to establishing the EU as a recognized security actor and has signalled this new status to others. The European Commission (2018a) has stated that ‘[t]he European Union and the United States have the largest bilateral trade and investment relationship and enjoy the most integrated economic relationship in the world’, together accounting for about half of world gross domestic product (GDP) and roughly one-third of world trade. For its part, and even though there have been some tensions in transatlantic relations at times – and most recently under the Trump administration – the USA has
also benefited from a strong EU. This is epitomized by the website of the US Mission to the EU, which argues that

[a] strong, united, and integrated Europe as envisioned by the EU’s founders benefits Europeans and Americans alike. Europe’s security and success are inextricably linked to our own. Our economies, cultures, and peoples are intertwined, and a Europe whole, free, and at peace helps to uphold the norms and rules that maintain stability and promote prosperity around the world.

In short, both sides need each other and are in closer alignment on several global issues than the vast majority of other actors in global politics.

Against that backdrop, it is no surprise that the EU’s most important and most developed counter-terrorism relationship has been with the USA, where cooperation has reached a high level of intensity, ranging from dialogues to various agreements that require the transfer of personal data. This importance has been reflected in the literature on transatlantic ties, where the security relationship – often in relation to terrorism – has become a major area of research in the last few years (Argomaniz, 2009b; Kaunert, 2010a, 2010b; Kaunert et al., 2012; MacKenzie, 2010, 2012; Monar, 2010; Occhipinti, 2010; Pawlak, 2009a; Rees, 2006, 2009; Rees and Aldrich, 2005; Ripoll Servent and MacKenzie, 2011, 2012; Tzanou, 2015; Soare, 2020). Importantly, prior to 9/11, there was almost no cooperation between the EU and the USA on security matters, to the frustration of Washington. Now, two decades after 9/11, it can be concluded that the attacks on New York and the Pentagon made possible cooperation and measures that would not have been acceptable otherwise, chiefly because of concerns of the EU member states surrounding sovereignty or possible infringements of the civil liberties of private individuals.

Thus, international terrorism and the response of the US administration to it have acted as a major catalyst for the EU’s development in at least four ways. First, 9/11 created a new international environment enabling actors to suggest policy solutions within the USA and the EU. In times of crisis, great changes not otherwise thought possible can occur. Second, actors able and willing to bring about change included those considered to be neo-conservative pushing their agenda in the USA and, in the EU, the European Commission taking the opportunity to create a greater security role for the EU. Third, the EU offered its support to the USA after 9/11. The US administration produced a list of over forty demands in response to the attacks and has continued to put direct pressure on the EU on occasion since then – for example, when negotiating the agreements over PNR and SWIFT. Fourth, against the backdrop of the ‘war on terror’, the EU and its member states have felt under indirect pressure to act in support of the USA. It is worth noting though that this relationship has been asymmetrical, as the USA has been the dominant partner. Indeed, the
USA has had more influence on the EU than vice versa (Argomaniz, 2009b), despite many European states being more experienced in counter-terrorism than the USA. Having said that, European support for the USA in its ‘war on terror’ has not been unconditional. Concern about the unilateralism of the US administration, its willingness to violate global norms under certain circumstances, and its emphasis on military methods certainly troubled a number of European leaders after 9/11. The ‘Snowden revelations’ about significant US telecommunication ‘snooping’ around the world, including on German Chancellor Angela Merkel, were not well received in Europe either (Hopkins and Wintour, 2013).

It is also important not to approach the EU as a monolith in this policy area. In the aftermath of 9/11, there were some significant disagreements amongst member states, notably with regard to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. On this occasion, the UK, Italy, and Spain chose to support the USA, while Germany and France opposed that decision. Furthermore, not all EU member states have pulled in the same direction on data protection in the context of growing data exchange – a crucial issue in the EU–US relationship, given the types of cooperation requested by the USA and traditionally higher European data protection standards. The European Commission often acted to enhance its own role and facilitated EU–US cooperation by attempting to construct the EU as a partner to the USA (Argomaniz, 2009b; Bossong, 2008a; Ripoll Servent and MacKenzie, 2011, 2012; Kaunert et al., 2012). Traditionally, the European Parliament attempted to challenge counter-terrorism measures and agreements infringing upon the rights of citizens. However, this has changed in the last few years for several reasons, including its increased powers in the form of consent to international agreements following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon and the strength of the European People’s Party (EPP). As a result, the European Parliament has become less critical, although this trend already had its precedents (Pawlak, 2009b; Ripoll Servent, 2009, 2010). Despite the existence of some pockets of resistance at times, the forces encouraging security ties have mostly won out and EU institutions are now probably more aligned than they were in the past. Remarkably, the EU member states, the European Commission, and the European Parliament have internalised US norms by proposing or requesting EU programmes similar to those developed with the USA, such as an EU PNR programme.

One should also note that member states remain important for the USA. Nevertheless, Washington has sought cooperation with Brussels in counter-terrorism, notably because it is more expedient to negotiate with one party than with more than 25. Thus, the EU and its institutions can now be seen as major players in Europe’s relationship with the USA, alongside the member states.
This chapter is structured into two main parts. First of all, it examines the historical development of the relationship between the EU and the USA. This includes their respective experiences of terrorism and counter-terrorism. This discussion provides context for the developments following 9/11 and highlights the significance of the changes that took place after 9/11. Second, the chapter analyses EU actorness in this relationship, drawing upon the revised version of the conceptual framework for actorness, with its focus on context, coherence, and capability. Overall, this chapter makes three main points: that the EU is now a significant actor in its own right in this relationship, especially in terms of agreements concerning transfer of personal data and criminal justice; that EU institutions and agencies have been important in processes of cooperation with the USA and have helped push elements of the security relationship to the supranational level; and that the relationship has been asymmetrical, which, importantly, has suited some actors in the EU and has enabled them to achieve their objectives of greater EU–US cooperation and of a stronger security role for the EU more generally.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EU–US RELATIONSHIP

The USA played a vital role in the reconstruction and the integration of Europe after the Second World War. Diplomatic relations between the USA and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) were established in 1953, with the focus being firmly on trade. In the climate of the Cold War, security concerns were mainly military, and with the failure of the European Defence Community (EDC) in 1954, Europe did not seem likely to make progress on military integration. Therefore, the main vehicle for military cooperation became NATO for the duration of the Cold War – and beyond. The USA has also had historical ties with many member states individually – arguably the UK, first and foremost – whilst the ‘Five Eyes’ alliance remains key for the USA and the UK, alongside Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, when it comes to intelligence matters.

The end of the Cold War changed the entire structure of the international system. Russia declined, the USA was no longer allegedly kept in check by its rival, and the world appeared to be entering an unprecedented period of unipolarity. This coincided with what appeared to be a major leap forward for European integration in the form of the Treaty of Maastricht, which was signed in 1992. With the launch of the EU’s CFSP, it appeared to the USA that the Europeans were – at long last, in their view – considering helping with the burden of managing global security. Washington therefore looked for closer direct cooperation with the EU throughout the 1990s: ‘seeking information sharing, improved extradition of criminal suspects and the creation of a transatlantic judicial network. But the Europeans were more concerned with
generating their own patterns of collaboration and rebuffed the US advances as premature’ (Rees, 2006: 38). Even so, the EU and the USA did put terrorism forward as an international challenge in the 1990 Transatlantic Declaration and the 1995 New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) (Transatlantic Declaration, 1990; New Transatlantic Agenda, 1995).

In the 1990s, Washington viewed global terrorism with growing concern. The USA was heavily affected by the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993, the East Africa Embassy bombings in 1998, and the attack on the USS Cole in 2000, which, for the Americans, pointed to a growing and potentially global jihadist threat (Kfir, 2008; Raymonda, 2006). Even so, Washington stopped short of declaring an all-out ‘war on terror’ in the 1990s. By contrast, terrorism in Europe appeared to be finally declining following high levels of violence in a number of states from the 1960s onwards. For example, circumstances in Northern Ireland appeared to be edging towards a peaceful conclusion after decades of conflict. Perhaps the exception and an indicator of things to come was France’s experience with the Algerian Islamic Army Group (GIA) in the 1990s (Gregory, 2003). The USA was frustrated by the lack of enthusiasm for counter-terrorism cooperation across the Atlantic in the 1990s, chiding the Europeans for not sharing the burden of global security and for being generally soft on terrorism. However, Hoffman (1999: 63) disagrees, as he argues that Europeans simply saw terrorism in a different way – as primarily a domestic issue, rather than a global threat. During the 1990s, therefore, the USA had effectively moved from focusing on the global threat of the USSR to the global threat of terrorism. Still according to Hoffman (1999: 65), this could be mainly explained by ‘[t]he paucity of domestic terrorism itself’, which ‘only accentuated America’s preoccupation with international terrorism’. Furthermore, terrorism was seen as being linked to a nexus of other threats by the USA in the 1990s, including nuclear proliferation (Rees and Aldrich, 2005: 909). One caveat is important here, however. The USA did experience a number of one-off attacks in the 1990s, the most infamous arguably being the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, which killed 168 people and injured many more (New York Times, 1995). What the USA did not experience was any high-profile, long-term campaigns of violence on the scale that several European states did. Hard lessons were learnt by the Europeans in these instances, not least that significant military force could rarely end terrorist campaigns on its own and could even become inflammatory.

The 9/11 attacks were a turning point that sent shockwaves around the world, as almost 3,000 people died in the largest terrorist attack ever (BBC, 2013a). To show how 9/11 changed US views on terrorism, Crelinsten (2009: 13) differentiates between 10 September and 12 September (2001) thinking, comparing how the criminal justice model still prevailed on 10 September, before being overtaken by the war model on 12 September, among a range
of other serious changes. All of a sudden, terrorism leapt to the top of the international security agenda, which notably jolted the EU and its member states into action. Without their knowledge, European states had acted as bases for planning 9/11, whilst several of the hijackers had passed through Europe to reach the USA. For instance, the infamous ‘Hamburg Cell’ that assisted with the planning of 9/11 had been based in Germany (BBC, 2005). For many political leaders, 9/11 exposed the weaknesses of the EU, and they set about enhancing the security dimension of the organisation. European states took unprecedented steps to enhance internal and external cooperation on counter-terrorism, an ambiguous and potentially wide-ranging policy area. Thus, 9/11 provided new impetus to European integration and in a new direction, although it is worth recalling that member states have often preferred coordination and cooperation instead of true integration in this area since 2001 (Monar, 2007b: 267). Even so, for the first time, European integration began to penetrate areas that were previously considered too important to the sovereignty of member states for them to consider integrating in – areas of ‘high politics’. The EAW has been an excellent example of this trend (Kaunert, 2007). From then onwards, the EU’s role in counter-terrorism has significantly grown, as has EU–US counter-terrorism cooperation. To summarize, this section has discussed the historical development of the EU–US relationship, demonstrated how US thinking on counter-terrorism changed after 9/11, and highlighted the ways in which EU–US counter-terrorism cooperation was given strong impetus by that event.

EU ACTORNESS IN THE TRANSATLANTIC COUNTER-TERRORISM RELATIONSHIP

As previously explained, the conceptual framework used for the analysis of the EU–US relationship comprises three criteria: context, cohesion, and capability (Brattberg and Rhinard, 2012). Context concerns the level and types of recognition by the partner in question and the extent to which circumstances have enabled EU action. Cohesion refers to agreement and consistency regarding values, procedures, and outputs, both horizontally and vertically. Finally, capability relates to the EU’s authority to act and the availability and deployment of instruments. This chapter shows that the USA was ready for cooperation in the 1990s, while the EU was not until 9/11. Since then, although circumstances have changed, notably with regard to threats and leaders on both sides of the Atlantic, the context since 9/11 has broadly enabled EU–US cooperation, despite some periods of tensions. In terms of cohesion, there have been many divides over the years, but member states and the EU institutions have, overall, a lot more in common with the USA than that which divides them. In addition, internal cohesion has grown over the years. The USA has exercised significant
influence over the EU and its role has arguably compelled or encouraged cohe-
sion in a number of instances. Finally, with regard to capability, the chapter
shows that EU–US security cooperation – often motivated by terrorism – has
developed to be extensive and broad-ranging. Overall, it demonstrates that the
EU is now an important actor and component in a transatlantic security con-
stellation, which plays an especially important role in relation to agreements
over high-technology information-sharing and criminal justice.

Context

Recognition by the USA
The EU–US relationship has been more informal than many others, given
the absence of any overarching, legal agreement, such as an association
agreement, between both parties. It is instead based on the Transatlantic
Declaration of 1990 and the NTA of 1995. The Transatlantic Declaration
outlined a number of common goals; principles of the partnership; economic
cooperation; education, scientific, and cultural cooperation; transnational
challenges; and an institutional framework for consultation (Transatlantic
Declaration, 1990). Cooperation was taken forward with the NTA, which
included four broad objectives: promoting peace and stability, democracy, and
development around the world; responding to global challenges; contributing
to the expansion of world trade and closer economic relations; and building
bridges across the Atlantic (New Transatlantic Agenda, 1995). It is of note
that both documents contain references to a joint commitment to tackle inter-
national terrorism. However, these were primarily rhetorical and did not lead
to substantive engagement on the issue at the time. There are regular summits,
meetings, dialogues, and other forms of interaction that indicate the USA’s
recognition of the EU and its close cooperation with it. Furthermore, the
Commission’s Delegation to the USA was established in 1954, the US Mission
to the ECSC was created in Luxembourg in 1956, and the US Mission to the
EU opened in 1961. Over the past few decades, cooperation has broadened and
deepened into numerous policy areas. President George W. Bush’s letter of
October 2001 requesting cooperation directly with the EU and developments
in terms of security agreements and cooperation with EU agencies demonstra-
that the USA recognises the EU as an actor in counter-terrorism.

Have circumstances enabled or hindered a role for the EU?
In the 1990s, the USA wanted to cooperate with the EU on security challenges.
While some actors in the EU would happily have responded affirmatively to
such requests, the pre-9/11 context did not allow for such moves. Some small
internal moves by the EU in the 1990s set the stage for cooperation with third
states after 9/11, such as those enabling agreements between the EU and third
The European Union as a global counter-terrorism actor

states on JHA issues, as well as the establishment of Europol in 1999. Both of these developments became important later for the EU–US relationship after 9/11. The USA requested cooperation with Europol as early as the 1990s (New Transatlantic Agenda, 1995). Nevertheless, Europol’s initial role was rather modest. It started limited drug-related operations in 1994, whilst its mandate did not initially extend to counter-terrorism tasks (Bures, 2008: 501). The USA attempted to push the EU forward and probably hoped to influence the direction of the EU’s evolution, but cooperation was not possible at that stage. From Washington’s point of view, the benefits of cooperating directly with the EU on as many matters as possible were significant. For example, the USA could deal with only one legal system that would bind all the member states, rather than having to engage with many different legal systems. However, the EU member states did not perceive any pressing reason to significantly involve the EU in counter-terrorism matters at that time. However, 9/11 brought about several significant changes. First, terrorism jumped to the top of the security agenda. Second, there was a general outpouring of international sympathy towards the USA, since 3,000 people had died in the biggest terrorist attack of all time and it would have been unacceptable for European states not to help. Even in France, often one of the greatest Western critics of the USA, the headline of Le Monde daily newspaper was ‘[w]e are all Americans’ (BBC, 2013a; Guardian, 2006). Third, the USA responded robustly and often by coercing even its closest allies. Fourth, the apparent global nature of the threat arguably left Europe uniquely vulnerable due to its level of integration.

Prior to 2001, terrorism was primarily a national threat for most European countries. In other words, for European terrorist groups, the main target was generally the government or institutions representing the power of the state (Wilkinson, 2007: 371), although they may have had transnational links to other countries, like the USA for funding or Libya for weapons as in the case of the PIRA. However, it is noteworthy that, in the French intelligence community, it had already been observed in the 1990s that Islamist groups were becoming increasingly linked to al-Qaeda. Nevertheless, this focus on France could be at least partially explained by the close relationship between France and Algeria and its intervention in the Algerian Civil War in the 1990s (Gregory, 2003). Al-Qaeda operatives were being tracked in various places across the world, such as in Kenya and Tanzania, Yemen and Bosnia, which suggested that al-Qaeda was active all over the world. Even so, at the time, the group was arguably viewed as more of a nuisance than a global threat. More broadly, many probably underestimated how much destruction non-state actors could and might be willing to cause. Then, 9/11 made it clear that terrorists could cause immense amounts of damage with modern technology and were not just focused on a single state as their target. It is not possible to replicate the fear, uncertainty, and lack of available accurate information
about al-Qaeda after 9/11, but many people saw this event as ushering in a new era. It was seen as a harbinger for a future in which huge acts of violence by non-state actors had become possible, not the one-off that it has turned out to be. The US administration argued at the time that al-Qaeda terrorists, and those who harbour them, were a threat to civilization (White House, 2002). With more measured language, the European Security Strategy (European Council, 2003a, 2003b) saw terrorism as putting ‘lives at risk; it imposes large costs; it seeks to undermine the openness and tolerance of our societies, and it poses a growing strategic threat to the whole of Europe. Increasingly, terrorist movements are well-resourced, connected by electronic networks, and are willing to use unlimited violence to cause massive casualties.’ An abundance of literature followed from these terrorist attacks, which often depicted al-Qaeda as a truly global threat with affiliates all over the world waiting to attack. For instance, in 2003, Schultz and Vogt (2003: 10) claimed that al-Qaeda ‘[had] established cells from New Zealand to India to the United States’. Similarly, David Whittaker (2003: 44) noted that al-Qaeda and its affiliates were thought to be a threat in perhaps over 50 countries. The threat posed by al-Qaeda was arguably less severe than governments believed at the time – and had notably been led to believe by the group itself (Kaunert and Léonard, 2019b). However, given the perception of a serious transnational threat, a European response was viewed as vital.

Despite differing perceptions and interpretations amongst observers as to the exact nature of al-Qaeda (Byman, 2017), it appears that al-Qaeda, its affiliates and successors had a core, alliances, and inspired, unconnected individuals (or ‘freelancers’) (Errera, 2005: 72–5). It was this third group that often caused the greatest anxiety because of its unknown size and the difficulties inherent in identifying its ‘members’. Piazza (2009: 65) provided a useful way of categorising al-Qaeda as an ‘abstract/universal group’, with ‘highly ambitious, abstract, complex, and nebulous goals that are driven primarily by ideology’. Bin Laden’s fatwa of 1998 can be seen as a general guide to what al-Qaeda wanted under his leadership. First, they believed in establishing strict sharia religious law rule. Second, they wanted to expel the USA and other ‘infidels’ from the Middle East and from Muslim lands anywhere in the world. Third, they aimed to topple Muslim regimes that they claimed were betraying ‘true’ Islam and collaborating with the USA and its allies. Fourth, they wished to ultimately establish a pan-Islamist caliphate uniting all Muslims. Fifth, al-Qaeda had declared a jihad or holy war against the USA and its allies and had set up a World Islamic Front for Jihad, declaring it the ‘duty of all Muslims to kill US citizens – civilian and military – and their allies everywhere’ (Wilkinson, 2006: 40). Such goals are not compatible with or acceptable to governments around the world, but this should not lead to the assumption that jihadist ‘terrorists’ are utterly incorrigible. However, it did mean that action to
combat such ideas and groups, as well as supporting the USA, were vital. After all, the aims, ideology and religious motivations behind al-Qaeda appeared to suggest that anybody anywhere could be a potential target. Later, Daesh would take up this mantle and continue the threat of transnational jihadist terrorism, albeit with a number of differences, such as having a political centre and attempting to present itself as a state (‘Islamic State’) with a specific territory and a population.

While the level and the type of threat have been important in terms of context, so have the US administrations. Broadly speaking, they have been supportive of EU–US cooperation, especially under George W. Bush and Barack Obama. The first Bush presidency (2001–05) was more coercive in its actions, but this did have the effect of pushing along EU activity. The second Bush presidency (2005–09) was a productive time in terms of EU–US cooperation and was less coercive in its approach to its allies. Obama continued cooperation with the EU through his presidencies (2009–17) and broadly adopted a cooperative posture. By contrast, the Trump administration (2017–21) generally attempted to sideline the EU, which meant that EU–US counter-terrorism cooperation did not significantly develop further. Some observers have pointed out that the responsibilities of large online platforms in the context of the debates on freedom of expression could be an area where both sides of the Atlantic would gain by cooperating under the new Biden administration (Bossong, 2021).

Ultimately, the context created by al-Qaeda – and later by Daesh – since the early 2000s has fluctuated in terms of threat level, but the terrorist threat has remained. Other issues have emerged, such as the financial crisis, Russian resurgence, and China’s continuing growth, but terrorism has continued to be on the political agenda. As previously mentioned, EU activity has followed attacks, primarily those committed against Europe, and 9/11 and subsequent attacks transformed the focus of the EU member states on national security and pushed them towards working more together at the supranational level. Also, the need for supporting the USA and Washington’s interest in developing counter-terrorism cooperation with the EU created a new environment in which EU–US cooperation was seen not only as desirable, but actually necessary for securing Europe.

Coherence

The EU, the USA, and values

Notwithstanding the existence of some disagreements amongst European states or between Europe and the USA at times, these states largely share the same values. There have traditionally been some differences between Europe and the USA, but these have often been overstated (Kagan, 2003). Also, there have been some recent challenges to transatlantic ties, including the stance
taken by the Trump administration on various global issues. Before then, the Bush years were also marked by disagreements over the conduct of the ‘war on terror’ and the designation of the so-called ‘axis of evil’, including the violation of international norms and some of the methods employed in military campaigns. Nevertheless, broadly speaking, Europe and the USA have faced many challenges together and have been deeply interconnected over the past decades. They share a continuing support for a liberal rule-based order and a preference for democracy over other forms of political system. This has been well summed up in the preamble to the ‘EU–US and Member States 2010 Declaration on Counterterrorism’:

Noting that the enduring EU–U.S. partnership is and will continue to be built upon shared values and the corresponding actions which give them substance and meaning; […] and Recommitting to the proposition that respect for the rule of law and international law, including human rights law, international humanitarian law, and refugee law, are fundamental in the national and international efforts in the fight against terrorism and are at the basis of our shared action, in contrast to the acts of terrorists which undermine the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms. (Council of the European Union, 2010)

This highlights how enduring EU–US cooperation is, including in the field of counter-terrorism, whatever the political leadership on either side of the Atlantic. All EU member states felt the need to assist the USA after 9/11, especially with a view to cooperating directly with Washington, but also in terms of external action where considered legitimate in regions such as South Asia. The 2005 EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy stated that ‘[c]ontinuing to make counter-terrorism a high priority in dialogue with key partner countries, including the USA, will also be a core part of the European approach’, the US being mentioned before any other state in the document (Council of the European Union, 2005a). More recent summaries of the strategy published by the EU have given the USA even greater importance – ‘[c]ooperation with the US is a fundamental component of the EU’s strategy. In recent years, cooperation agreements have been reached in areas such as terrorism financing, transport and borders, mutual legal assistance and extradition. The US authorities are working more and more closely with Europol and Eurojust’ (EUR-Lex, 2018). While there have been disagreements over the exact methods used to combat terrorism and the invasion of Iraq at the political level, EU–US cooperation has substantially grown over the past twenty years. There is arguably no other counter-terrorism relationship where the actors are so aligned in terms of values and preferences. If 9/11 and other threats have highlighted anything, it is how close Europe and the USA are and, many would argue, need to be. It will be interesting to see how Brexit influences EU–US relations. President Trump had voiced his support for Brexit, which had not been warmly received
in much of Europe, whilst the Biden administration has been more critical. In addition, the UK used to act as a supporter of EU–US cooperation and a ‘bridge’ between the two when it was an EU member state. Time will tell how a new UK outside the EU decides to position itself in relation to the EU–US relationship.

**Methods and outputs**

Methods relate to ways of doing and achieving things, but also to procedures. The book considers the extent and the consistency of agreement on the ways of combating terrorism amongst the actors and whether outputs occur from within or outside the EU. There have been major disagreements over the methods of dealing with terrorism between the USA and European states, including the invasion of Iraq, as well as the use of controversial methods, such as torture, extraordinary rendition, and mass surveillance. Nevertheless, only the last element has been directly relevant to the EU with reference to the policy areas where it possesses competences. The most significant issue of contention both horizontally and vertically where the EU has competence has arguably concerned data protection, especially given the types of cooperation that have developed between the Atlantic partners. In the aftermath of 9/11, European states typically viewed the USA as having low data protection standards. Data transfers have therefore proven problematic in the transatlantic relationship, whilst the importance of data and the capacities for data transfer have significantly increased.

**Capability**

Here, the EU’s legal authority to act has been embedded in each area of substantive cooperation. In this section, the legal authority of the EU to act is first outlined. Then, the process through which cooperation has emerged is discussed. Finally, the substance of the cooperation is examined and assessed. While general disagreements and trends have been covered earlier – over data protection, for instance – this section examines in greater detail specific instances and processes of cooperation that have mainly aimed to foster security cooperation. It is shown that EU–US cooperation has centred around information-sharing and judicial cooperation where the EU has competence. The section also highlights how the EU now plays an important role in transatlantic relations, notably through its agencies. EU–US counter-terrorism cooperation has the following main components: police cooperation, judicial cooperation, trade security cooperation, air and border security cooperation, as well as cooperation against the financing of terrorism.
Police cooperation

Police cooperation across the Atlantic has mainly developed as a result of the signing of an agreement between the US authorities and Europol (formerly the European Police Office and now the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation). Europol started limited anti-drugs operations in 1994, with its role expanding into other criminal activities from then onwards. In terms of counter-terrorism, a special preparatory group was set up in 1997, before the Treaty of Amsterdam subsequently extended Europol’s role to formally include counter-terrorism tasks. Europol fully began its activities in July 1999 (Bures, 2008: 501). With regard to cooperation with third states and international organisations, Europol used to have the competence to conclude two types of cooperation agreements: strategic agreements, which include threat tips, crime patterns and risk assessments; and operational agreements, which allow for the transfer of personal information, such as names, addresses, and criminal records. Once the Europol Regulation of 2017 began to apply, Europol lost the competence to sign new cooperation agreements from 1 May 2017, although the agreements concluded until then have been preserved (Léonard and Kaunert, 2021a). In addition, liaison officers from a variety of different states have been stationed at Europol, whilst Europol has also had the ability to send liaison officers to partner states. Over time, Europol has become of increasing importance in counter-terrorism (Kaunert, 2010c; Mounier, 2009). In 2010, it became an agency of the EU following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. More recently, in the context of the preparations for Brexit, it has been claimed that Europol was ‘transformed (…) into a much more effective organisation’ under the management of Sir Rob Wainwright, its director up until May 2018, which has been involved in over 40,000 international criminal investigations per year, and has been described as ‘the jewel in the crown of EU law enforcement co-operation’ (Parliament.uk, 2018). Even so, Bures (2016: 57) has warned against expecting it to become a genuine European intelligence agency in the near future.

The USA had already requested cooperation with Europol back in the 1990s. US information from EU agencies was also one of Bush’s demands in his October 2001 letter to the EU. Europol and the USA then signed two agreements in 2001. The first was an operational agreement, whilst the second was a supplemental agreement on the exchange of personal data and related information. Moreover, the USA has stationed personnel from a range of departments at Europol, including the FBI, the Secret Service, and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) (Europol, 2017a). Also, Wainwright indicated in a lecture at George Washington University in April 2018 that Europol and the USA have worked together on terrorist financing and travel, which has generated 82,000 intelligence leads (George Washington University, 2018). Thus, cooperation between Europol and the USA appears to have grown over time.
Judicial cooperation
EU–US judicial cooperation for counter-terrorism purposes also developed after 9/11. It was underpinned by the signing of several agreements, including one with Europol’s judicial counterpart, Eurojust, which was established in 2002 and is now known as the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust, 2019a, 2019b). First of all, negotiations on a mutual legal assistance (MLA) treaty and an extradition treaty between the USA and the EU were initiated in the wake of 9/11. On 20 September 2001, the EU’s Justice and Home Affairs Council decided that a series of measures needed to be taken in order to enhance cooperation with the USA on criminal matters. On the basis of the then Articles 24 and 38 of the TEU – which stipulated that the conclusion of international agreements in third pillar matters was granted to the Council and should be done on the basis of a recommendation by the Presidency – an agreement on MLA and an agreement on extradition between the USA and the EU were signed in June 2003. Even so, some member states were slow to implement these agreements. Rees (2008: 101) has noted the ‘inordinate’ amount of time that some member states took to pass the MLA in their own parliament, which meant that it only came into force on 1 February 2010. Nevertheless, these agreements were impressive on several grounds. First of all, they were rapidly negotiated, especially given the sensitivity of a matter such as extradition (Council of the European Union, 2009c). Of particular note in that respect was the acceptance by the USA that the death penalty would not be applied to anyone extradited to the USA on the basis of the EU–US Extradition Agreement. Moreover, these agreements modernised and supplemented existing bilateral treaties, also making extradition to the USA possible for the first time for some countries, such as Bulgaria, Latvia, Malta, and Romania (Occhipinti, 2010). In addition, the MLA Agreement updated previous bilateral agreements of this sort, but also represented the first MLA agreement between the USA and Bulgaria, Finland, Malta, Portugal, Slovakia, and Slovenia (Occhipinti, 2010). A review of the MLA Agreement was carried out in 2016. The general consensus appeared to be that the agreement has added value as thousands of requests for legal assistance were registered by both sides between 2010 and 2014, although six areas were identified for improvement (Council of the European Union, 2016).

Furthermore, the USA concluded an agreement with Eurojust in 2006 in order to enhance cooperation on serious transnational crime. Eurojust has played a role in MLA with the USA. It has been presented as a ‘facilitator of casework, training and policy discussions in the context of judicial cooperation between EU Member States and the U.S.’, which can add value where several member states are involved in a case with the USA, as shown by the 135 cases involving the USA that were opened between 2010 and 2015 (Council of the European Union, 2016).
Trade security
With regard to trade security, EU–US cooperation has mainly revolved around the CSI programme, which was established by the Department of Homeland Security in 2002. Millions of containers are shipped into the USA and not all used to be systematically checked for their contents. Thus, it seemed possible that containers could be used to smuggle dangerous materials into the USA, especially by terrorist groups after 9/11. Initially, the USA targeted the world’s 20 busiest ports, which included 14 ports in eight EU member states. The USA made bilateral agreements with each country, stipulating that US cargo would get its own terminal and that US officials would screen the containers side-by-side with their European counterparts. This led the European Commission to open proceedings against these member states because it potentially jeopardised the customs union. At the same time, it sought a mandate for an EU-wide agreement with the USA given that external trade is a communitarised policy area (Cameron, 2007; Occhipinti, 2010). An agreement was eventually signed between the EU and the USA in April 2004. By 2010, there were 23 CSI ports in ten EU member states (Occhipinti, 2010). In 2018, the US CBP claimed to have 58 operational CSI ports around the world that now pre-screen over 80 per cent of US-bound containers (Customs and Border Protection, 2018). Evidently, it is the USA that has most benefited from this cooperation, whilst the EU – like others – has had to respond to US demands, whilst also benefiting from this increase in global security. In addition, the CSI programme has helped identify other illicit activities and has acted as a deterrent, although criminals may have adapted by choosing different means of transport or superior ways of concealing what they transport into the USA.

Air and border security
In the aftermath of 9/11, US authorities examined ways in which they could strengthen border security. In November 2001, the US Aviation and Transportation Security Act introduced the requirement that airline companies operating passenger flights to, from or through the USA, provide the US CBP and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) with electronic access to PNR data. This refers to information that airlines and other passenger service operators collect as part of their business, such as the information required to process a booking including passengers’ names and addresses and credit card details (de Hert and de Schutter, 2008). It can also include ‘sensitive data’, such as meal choices or health information. However, there was a significant problem with passing on European PNR data to US authorities. It contravened Article 25 of the EU’s Data Protection Directive (DPD), which prevented the EU from transferring data to a country not considered to have a sufficient level of data protection (European Parliament and European Council, 1995). The
USA failed this requirement at the time—and some are still critical of data protection standards in the USA, although workarounds have been agreed (Fuster et al., 2008: 191). Thus, the US demand placed European air carriers in a difficult situation. On the one hand, if they did not pass PNR data on to US authorities, airlines could face large fines or even lose their flying rights. On the other hand, if they broke the EU’s DPD and handed data to the USA, air carriers would also face fines (Argomaniz, 2009b; Brouwer, 2009; Guild and Brouwer, 2006). Therefore, significant pressure was placed on the EU to reach an agreement with the USA. After negotiating a series of requirements with the US authorities aiming to ensure an adequate level of data protection, the European Commission adopted a decision on adequacy based on Article 25 of the DPD (European Commission, 2004c). It subsequently negotiated an agreement on the transfer of data with the US administration, using as a legal basis the implicit legal power provided by Community law concerning transport and data protection (Kaunert et al., 2012: 484). The EU–US PNR agreement was approved by the Council on 17 May 2004 and subsequently signed on 28 May 2004 in Washington. However, the European Parliament, which considered that it had not been sufficiently involved during the negotiations of the agreement, sought to have it annulled by the Court of Justice of the EU. In May 2006, the latter did annul the agreement, ruling that it should not have been based on the EU transport policy, given that its main aim was to combat terrorism and strengthen security (Pawlak, 2009b: 37–8).

Consequently, this first EU–US PNR Agreement had to be re-negotiated on the basis of third pillar provisions. Thus, this time, the negotiations were led by the Council Presidency with the assistance of the European Commission (de Hert and de Schutter, 2008: 330). An interim PNR agreement—negotiated under police and judicial cooperation—was adopted in the meantime and entered into force in October 2006, which ensured similar levels of data protection as before. The Council of Ministers approved a new EU–US PNR Agreement in July 2007, which began to apply provisionally. Under this new EU–US PNR Agreement, the US administration agreed to receive fewer fields of data—19, instead of 34 compared to the first PNR agreement—even though this decrease was partially due to the merging of some categories of data (Kaunert et al., 2012: 485; Rhinard et al., 2007: 21). In exchange, the Council agreed that US authorities would be allowed to share the data with a larger number of federal authorities and to store them for longer, namely 15 years, instead of three and a half years (Occhipinti, 2008: 19).

The entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in December 2009 meant that the European Parliament had now the right to consent to most international agreements. In May 2010, the European Parliament withheld its consent to the 2007 agreement, which led to new negotiations led by the European Commission. The Council signed the agreement in December 2011 and the
European Parliament voted on the agreement in April 2012. Despite the rapporteur in the Civil Liberties, Justice, and Home Affairs (LIBE) committee, Sophie in ’t Veld, advising its rejection, the European Parliament gave its consent to the agreement by 409 votes to 226, with 33 abstentions (European Parliament, 2012). Despite its controversial character (see EDRI, 2017), the EU–US PNR Agreement remains in place and is subject to regular reviews (European Commission, 2017a).

The European Commission (2019a) has argued that many states consider PNR data to be important for law enforcement, although not much detailed evidence for this claim has been provided to date, which could also be due to security reasons (European Commission, 2019a). Some information was provided in the context of the debates on an EU PNR system, which indicated that PNR data was solely or predominantly responsible for 95 per cent of drug seizures in Belgium in 2009, solely responsible for 65–75 per cent of drug seizures in 2009 in Sweden, whilst, in the UK, within a six-month period in 2010, PNR data enabled the seizure of over 200 kilos of cocaine and heroin (European Commission, 2011a). Relating this back to the EU–US relationship, the USA has coerced states around the world to submit PNR data to its authorities. Thus, the USA has exercised a significant level of influence over other states, including the EU member states. It has diffused its norms to the EU, which eventually established its own PNR system in 2016 (Argomaniz, 2009b; Ripoll Servent and MacKenzie, 2012).

**Countering the financing of terrorism**

The US Treasury instigated a Terrorist Financing and Tracking Program (TFTP) after 9/11. SWIFT, which is responsible for worldwide financial messaging and facilitating worldwide bank transfers (Fuster et al., 2008: 192) found itself obliged to cooperate with the US authorities, because, although it is a company based in the EU, it had a mirror of its data in Virginia, USA. The company is responsible for the standardised financial messages of more than 11,000 banking organisations, securities institutions, and corporate customers (SWIFT, n.d.). Furthermore, and most importantly, SWIFT possessed 80 per cent of the electronic transfer market at that time (Deutsche Welle, 2010). Crucially, these messages frequently include personal data of the payer and the payee (Fuster et al., 2008: 192), which made them interesting to US authorities in the framework of the fight against terrorism.

The TFTP system was kept secret until 23 June 2006 when the *New York Times* leaked information that SWIFT had provided the USA with access to international bank data. This came as a surprise ‘almost for everybody’ (Fuster et al., 2008: 194). Fuster et al. (2008: 194) pointed out that ‘[f]rom a European perspective, the main problem with data processing as foreseen by counter-terrorist US law is in general terms not the absence of checks and
balances to ensure data protection, but the exclusion of non-US citizens from access to such protection in the cases where it is granted’. In 2009, SWIFT began to relocate the mirror of its data from the USA to Switzerland – thus requiring the USA to request data from Europe. As a result, the adoption of an agreement between the EU and the USA became necessary.

Member states rapidly recognised the security benefits of the TFTP system. For instance, the USA passed on over 1,500 leads to European authorities, some of which have led to the prevention of terrorist attacks and arrests (Archik, 2012: 5; Occhipinti, 2010: 137). A nine-month interim agreement was concluded by the Council on 30 November 2009 – that is, one day before the Treaty of Lisbon granted the European Parliament consent over the agreement. Unsurprisingly, this move was not well received by the European Parliament, which rejected the agreement in February 2010. In addition to ‘flexing its muscles’ in the context of the EU’s inter-institutional relations, the European Parliament was also attempting to raise its concerns about the transfer of bulk data to the USA, also citing what it perceived as US coercion as one of the reasons for the rejection of the interim agreement (Ripoll Servent and MacKenzie, 2011: 397).

As a result, the Commission had to re-negotiate the SWIFT Agreement. This time, it had to take into account the concerns of the European Parliament in relation to data protection. Without some changes being made to the agreement, it was possible that the European Parliament would once more reject it. A second – permanent – SWIFT Agreement was then accepted by the European Parliament in plenary in July 2010. It differed from the first one in several ways. It included a role for Europol as a clearing house, which had to ‘green light’ the transfers of data, data protection provisions were strengthened, a ‘scrutineer’ was to be employed by the EU for oversight purposes, whilst the idea of an EU TFTP was launched (Archik, 2012; European Union, 2010a). Moreover, as discussed by an interviewee, this agreement arguably got the EU involved in intelligence gathering for the first time (Interview with EU official B, June 2010). Although this is a development that increases the security role of the EU, this second SWIFT Agreement has been criticised by some for being actually very similar to the first (Council of the European Union, 2011a; Europol Joint Supervisory Body, 2011). A review of the agreement was also undertaken in 2017, which credited EU–US cooperation and suggested only a few minor improvements (European Commission, 2017b). This agreement is an instance of US dependence on the EU for the continuing flow of data. Of course, member states also welcome the intelligence received from the USA, making it a situation of interdependence. It is noteworthy that the European Commission decided not to pursue the development of an equivalent EU system (European Commission, 2019b).
CONCLUSION

Overall, this chapter has shown that the EU is a significant actor in the case of the EU–US relationship, although it lacks a sense of separateness from the USA, which has taken the leadership in their interactions. Importantly, relations with the USA have led other states to approach the EU to ask for cooperation along the lines of the agreements that the EU has already concluded with the USA. In this way, cooperation with the USA has opened the door to cooperation with others. In so doing, it has contributed to the EU’s presence and provided new opportunities for EU action.

Since 2001, the EU has become a credible interlocutor for the USA, even though Washington has at times – depending on the policy area – preferred to cooperate with individual member states. It has also on occasion divided the EU, not only with regard to Iraq, but also when attempting to sign separate agreements with individual member states. Furthermore, disagreements over issues such as data protection have frustrated the USA at times. This appears to have become less of an issue recently, since the European Parliament has become seemingly less resistant overall to security measures emanating from the USA. It will be interesting to see the evolution of the sensitive debates on data protection on both sides of the Atlantic and the impact that this has on EU–US cooperation.

Furthermore, the development of EU counter-terrorism cooperation means that the EU now possesses a high level of capability in its relationship with the USA. Policy formulation has fewer obstacles, but there has been a significant level of dependence on ideas emanating from the USA. There was some resistance in the past from the European Parliament on issues such as data protection – and there are still some concerns in some member states in that respect – but the possibility for policy formulation is now high.

NOTES

1. ‘Transatlantic relationship’ refers in this chapter to the EU and the USA, not including Canada.

2. The letter from President George W. Bush to Romano Prodi, the then President of the European Commission, from 16 October 2001 listed over 40 demands for closer EU–US cooperation following 9/11. Details can be found at: http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-2-useu.pdf.
5. EU counter-terrorism and South Asia

This chapter establishes and assesses the EU’s counter-terrorism role in South Asia, with a specific focus on Afghanistan and Pakistan. This region has been particularly important in the field of counter-terrorism for several reasons. First, it is the place where al-Qaeda emerged and was based prior to 9/11, under the protection of the Taliban. Second, it is where the ‘war on terror’ began with the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. Third, it was largely viewed as the epicentre of global terrorism prior to the emergence of Daesh in the Middle East (Gunaratna and Nielsen, 2008) and jihadist groups continue to have a major presence in the region nowadays. Afghanistan and Pakistan are contiguous countries, which explains why the insurgency in Afghanistan has also caused major problems for Pakistan. While Pakistan has been a major victim of terrorist violence, it has also been a well-known sponsor of terrorist groups (Riedel, 2008). After invading Afghanistan without adequately planning for post-conflict reconstruction, the USA and its allies have enabled the Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders to find shelter in the border areas between Pakistan and Afghanistan. After years of stalemate, President Biden’s decision to withdraw the remaining US troops led to a swift re-conquest of Afghanistan by the Taliban, who entered Kabul on 15 August 2021 (Bildt, 2021). Thus, two decades after 9/11 and the ensuing Afghanistan War, instability and violence still characterise the region. The hope expressed at the 2001 Bonn Conference that Afghanistan would see ‘a broad-based, gender-sensitive, multi-ethnic and fully representative government’ (United Nations, 2001a) has remained elusive.

In general, the type of role that the EU plays in counter-terrorism depends on the situation in the country. When combined with the other case studies, this chapter demonstrates the diverse range of external tasks that the EU can now perform. Overall, the EU’s external role – particularly in Afghanistan and Pakistan – has been largely overlooked by both scholars and journalists. Because of how the EU’s presence expanded in countries like Afghanistan, it is difficult to conclude that the EU is still ‘an absent friend’ (Keohane, 2008), if it ever were. The growth of the EU’s role is the most important issue to consider, as it has evolved from a modest regional security actor at best to becoming more globally active. It is questionable whether this level of commitment to global counter-terrorism efforts will be seen again soon now that the Taliban have reconquered Afghanistan. Nevertheless, that does not change the fact that
the EU’s involvement in this region developed considerably between 2001 and 2021.

This chapter examines how the EU became involved in Afghanistan after the US-led war in 2001, before analysing the important contributions that it has made to security in the region since then. Almost all EU member states have contributed to the war efforts in Afghanistan, through aid or troops. The activities of the member states are not examined here, as the chapter focuses on the role of the EU institutions, even where member states have seconded their nationals to EU missions, such as with EUPOL Afghanistan. There has been little literature addressing the EU’s role in South Asia in general, and even less on EU counter-terrorism activities in the two countries examined here (Duke, 2002; Monar, 2015; Rummel, 2002; Siegel, 2009; Toro, 2010; Wennerholm et al., 2010). A further limitation has been that most of that scholarship has focused on what was previously known as the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and the missions that took place under its auspices. However, in general, such activities have not specifically included counter-terrorism in their mandate.

Nevertheless, it is argued here that the EU has made significant contributions to security and counter-terrorism activities in the region, which deserve further exploration. As argued by Klaus-Peter Klaiber (2007: 10), the EU Special Representative to Afghanistan between December 2001 and July 2002, the EU and its member states account for

over one-third of financial assistance and aid programmes to Afghanistan, contribute over one-third of troops to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and have worked on building up some of Afghanistan’s key functions, such as police (Germany), judiciary (Italy), and anti-narcotics (UK) … [d]espite these facts, the work and contribution of the EU for the reconstruction is hardly ever mentioned in books and articles written about Afghanistan. In the last few years, the UN and a number of individual states have figured prominently in assessments by experts, whereas the EU has been noticeably absent from these reports. This is regrettable given its major contributions.

This view is shared by Cameron (2013: 38–9), who states that ‘the EU has played a significant but often unrecognised role in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, both in terms of its financial contributions and institutional support, and in exerting political influence through the appointment of an EU special representative’. Thus, this chapter fills a significant gap in the literature by analyzing the EU’s contribution to counter-terrorism efforts and its broader security role in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Although the success of some of the EU’s projects – especially the EUPOL Afghanistan mission – has been questioned within the media and in other circles (New York Times, 2009; EUObserver, 2010), this chapter does not specifically
focus on the issue of success. In fact, the success of all actors that operated in Afghanistan – not just the EU – can be seriously questioned, especially since the Taliban’s return to power in 2021. It is very unlikely that democracy will flourish in Afghanistan in the coming years. However, the focus of this book is the expanding role and actorness of the EU in counter-terrorism, which has seen a significant strengthening since 2001. Frequently, expectations of EU action have been raised too high. Considering the evolution of the EU in combination with an appreciation for what it is and what it can do can lower expectations, which allows for a more realistic evaluation of EU activity, notably in the field of counter-terrorism – hence, the choice of an analytical framework centred on ‘actorness’.

This chapter is structured into two main sections. First, it analyzes the development of the EU’s activities in and cooperation with Afghanistan and Pakistan in the field of counter-terrorism. Second, the actorness framework is applied to explore the context, the capability, and the coherence of the EU’s counter-terrorism activities related to Afghanistan and Pakistan. In so doing, the chapter develops three key arguments. First of all, the EU came to fulfil several important counter-terrorism-related functions in Afghanistan and Pakistan – particularly in the traditionally ‘softer’ areas of security, notably capacity-building and funding of national and international projects. Those have been significant, albeit often underappreciated, projects. Furthermore, the evolution of the EU’s role in the region, as well as the range and the scope of the activities undertaken, has been impressive by EU standards. Finally, this chapter aptly illustrates how the EU became a significant counter-terrorism actor on the global scene in a short time period following 9/11 and in contrast to its traditional focus on internal matters or on its geographical neighbourhood.

THE EU’S RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN

This section outlines the evolution of the relations between the EU and Afghanistan and Pakistan up to 2001, as well as the security environment and experiences of terrorism within these two states. The EU was primarily a provider of aid and an important trade partner to both countries prior to 9/11. However, these terrorist attacks thrust the EU into developing a broader and heavier presence in the region. The EU had been active in Afghanistan from the 1980s onwards, mainly as a provider of aid, which began during the Soviet–Afghan War. This aid continued until the late 1990s, when the Taliban made a series of unreasonable requests of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) working in the country, which led to the suspension of EU aid. As for direct EU–Afghanistan cooperation at the governmental level, it was almost non-existent prior to 2001, because of the lack of a government and the sub-
sequent Taliban regime. EU–Pakistan relations date back to 1974, but again, this relationship was mainly aid- and trade-related. Pakistan has experienced political upheavals over time and the EU has had to adapt. It is a fragile, but functioning, state. The EU has been Pakistan’s most important trade partner and Afghanistan’s fourth (EEAS, 2016a; European Commission, 2018b). This should have given the EU considerable leverage over both states, but the situation has been rather more complicated, as shown later in this chapter.

Afghanistan’s problems date back much further than the 1970s and include conflicts over the leadership of the state and differences between its centre and periphery (OECD, 2002: 4). It has experienced serious and protracted conflicts over the past few decades. The USSR invaded Afghanistan in 1979, before withdrawing in 1989, leaving terrible destruction, including an estimated one million civilian deaths (Taylor, 2014). During the war, thousands of ‘Afghan Arabs’ travelled to fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Osama bin Laden was one of these. While others left, he stayed in the region to form al-Qaeda in Peshawar, Pakistan, in 1988, with the desire to form a ‘jihadist vanguard movement’ that would perform three tasks: first, to be a terrorist group in its own right; second, to organise, train and provide logistics for jihadists around the world; and third, to offer leadership, unify, and reorient the global jihadist movement (Byman, 2015: 9). The group was, of course, of greater relevance later on, after al-Qaeda’s move to Sudan in 1991–92 and its subsequent return to Afghanistan in 1996. Following the Soviet withdrawal, the country slipped into civil war. This lasted until the Taliban – a group which emerged in 1994 from the country’s majority Pashtun ethnic group – seized the capital, Kabul, in 1996, and took control of over 90 per cent of the country by 1998 (Rashid, 2010: 1–5). It was the Taliban who invited bin Laden back to Afghanistan, where he remained until 2001. Thus, 9/11 was planned in Afghanistan. Furthermore, Afghanistan had an entrenched drug economy, with a key role for heroin – a practice supported and extended by the Taliban (Felbab-Brown, 2017).

Resistance to the Taliban mainly revolved around the so-called ‘Northern Alliance’, which was supported by the US-led coalition during the invasion of 2001. However, many of these warlords were almost as religiously hard-line as the Taliban. Therefore, concern was raised over what would replace the Taliban after the invasion (Gannon, 2004: 37). In the aftermath of the Taliban’s downfall, various warlords were given posts in the new government under Hamid Karzai, Afghanistan’s prime minister, leading to questions of whether peace and stability were possible in a new Afghanistan or whether the new government would simply repeat the practices of the government that it was supposed to replace (Gannon, 2004).

The EU provided significant amounts of aid to Afghanistan during the 1980s and 1990s through the European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO)
based at Peshawar, Pakistan. However, in 1998, the EU suspended all aid to the parts of Afghanistan under Taliban control after it made a series of unreasonable demands to NGOs that were providing assistance, such as requiring all female UN aid workers to be chaperoned by a blood relative and requesting that all NGOs working in Kabul move their offices to ruined buildings outside of the city, which were formerly the polytechnic college (Rashid, 2010: 71–2). Until this point, the EU donated two-thirds of all aid to the country (European Union, 1998). Subsequently, the EU, along with the UN, appears to have criticised the Taliban for their activities and maintained aid sanctions until the US-led invasion of the country in 2001. Ultimately, the OECD (2002: 6) concluded that attempts to use aid incentives and disincentives to influence policy had not been successful and that Afghanistan was not a favourable environment for their use, given how far apart the donors and the Taliban were. In the end, Afghanistan was a war-torn and divided state. Western states had little influence over it with their aid, whilst it was a base for al-Qaeda and its training camps, as well as a major producer of heroin.

As for Pakistan, its cooperation with the EU began under a different set of circumstances compared to Afghanistan. Pakistan and the EU started cooperating in 1974, but only signed an official Cooperation Agreement in 2004. Since 1974, the EU has committed money to various projects and programmes in Pakistan (European External Action Service Website, n.d.). The Cooperation Agreement set out several areas for cooperation between the two partners. Particularly pertinent to counter-terrorism are Article 13 (drug precursor chemicals and money laundering) and Article 17 (evolutive clause) (Council of the European Union, 2004b). However, these are not the only forms of cooperation relevant to counter-terrorism between the EU and Pakistan. Since 2001, Pakistan was also expected to become a key recipient of EU technical assistance (Wennerholm et al., 2010: 8).1

In addition, new areas for EU–Pakistan cooperation have opened up over time. Pakistan has seen the EU primarily as a trade actor. Security has not been a significant theme for Pakistan in its relationship with the EU. This is confirmed by examining the Cooperation Agreement, which holds few clauses on security cooperation, and the Europa website, which highlights that most of the money that the EU sends to Pakistan is sent for humanitarian purposes and crises, with few references to security (European External Action Service Website, n.d.). However, Islam (2013: 587) has highlighted the fragility of the state of Pakistan, as well as the fact that Pakistan has been on the periphery of Europe’s Asia policy until recently, but that with concerns about terrorism and following US and UK pressure, the EU has begun to play a greater role in Pakistan. Even so, Islamabad has continued to rely primarily upon the USA and the UK for military support.
EU COUNTER-TERRORISM ACTORNESS IN SOUTH ASIA

The chapter now turns to examining the growing role of the EU in the domain of counter-terrorism in the South Asian states of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The section on ‘context’ shows how 9/11 led to new circumstances, in which EU actors pushed for the development of an external role for the EU in counter-terrorism, whilst Afghanistan and Pakistan were also encouraged to engage with the EU. The section on ‘coherence’ considers matters related to values, methods, and procedures, before questioning whether EU actors have all pulled in the same direction. Finally, the section on ‘capability’ analyses the growing range of activities that the EU has performed in Afghanistan and Pakistan over the course of its involvement following 9/11.

Context

Recognition by Afghanistan and Pakistan

Before 9/11, it was actually not clear by whom the EU could be recognised in Afghanistan. Although the Taliban controlled about 90 per cent of the territory of Afghanistan, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan that they had established was not recognized by the international community (Ibrahimi, 2017: 956). Following the US-led invasion, Afghanistan had little choice but to accept that the EU would play a role within the state because of the attempts to build up the country. One key document on EU–Afghanistan cooperation was the EU–Afghanistan Joint Declaration of 2005, which was supposed to launch a new partnership. As evidenced by the main headings in this document, it was expected that EU–Afghanistan cooperation would occur in the following areas: political and economic governance, security sector reform and justice sector reform, counter-narcotics, development, human rights, civil society and refugee return, education and culture, and political dialogue (Council of the European Union, 2005b). Thus, several areas for future cooperation were linked to counter-terrorism.

Subsequently, EU–Afghanistan cooperation was placed on a firmer footing with a first agreement in the form of the Cooperation Agreement on Partnership and Development (CAPD). It was ratified by Afghanistan’s parliament in July 2017. The CAPD, among other issues, committed the EU and Afghanistan to deal with common challenges, including ‘(1) the fight against terrorism, international crime and illegal trafficking; (2) non-proliferation, disarmament and nuclear security; (3) Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD); (4) Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW); and (5) counter-narcotics’ (European Commission, 2015b). It was supplemented by a new strategy on Afghanistan,
which was adopted in October 2017. This strategy emphasised that ‘[the] EU [was] committed to working with Afghanistan to combat terrorism, the financing of terrorism and terrorist threats in all their forms and to step up dialogue and cooperation to prevent and counter violent extremism, radicalization and recruitment and to address their root causes’ (Council of the European Union, 2017: 4). Thus, EU–Afghanistan cooperation – notably in the field of counter-terrorism – developed significantly after 2001.

In contrast, the EU’s formal relations with Pakistan have a longer history, as both parties had already concluded a Cooperation Agreement in 2004. This agreement set out several areas for cooperation between the EU and Pakistan, but was very limited when it came to counter-terrorism (Council of the European Union, 2004b). In the EU’s post-9/11 efforts to become an exporter of technical assistance, Pakistan was expected to become a key recipient of EU support. This initially did not materialize (Wennerholm et al., 2010: 8) and it is only over time that counter-terrorism cooperation has developed between the EU and Pakistan. To highlight the expanding relationship between the EU and Pakistan across a range of sectors, June 2009 saw the first EU–Pakistan summit, which discussed a range of challenges, from trade to counter-terrorism cooperation (Council of the European Union, 2009c). A second summit took place in 2010, during which a five-year engagement programme was discussed. In 2012, the EU and Pakistan agreed on the programme (EEAS, 2012), which was followed by the 2019 EU-Pakistan Strategic Engagement Plan (SEP). The SEP covers various areas, including peace and security (which includes counter-terrorism cooperation); democracy, rule of law, good governance, and human rights; migration and mobility; and trade and investment (Council of the European Union, 2019). Compared to Afghanistan, Pakistan is a functioning state that has not had to rely on external support to the same extent. Moreover, the Pakistani government appears to view the EU mainly as a trade actor, rather than a security provider or partner. This can notably be explained by the fact that the EU is Pakistan’s second most important trading partner, whilst the USA has been able to give Pakistan considerable military assistance in a way that has been beyond the EU’s capabilities.

**Have circumstances enabled or hindered a role for the EU?**

The events of 9/11 significantly changed the environment in which the EU operates, as the ‘war on terror’ became the defining feature of the first decade of the twenty-first century for many states around the world. Terrorism was to be combated with much greater urgency and on a larger geographical scale than had occurred in the past. In these circumstances, new relationships had to be forged and different policy matters reached the top of the agenda. Combating terrorism globally became an important objective for the EU. Therefore, following the US-led invasion of Afghanistan and as a result of the role of
Pakistan in providing a base for insurgent groups and al-Qaeda, increasing the EU’s cooperation with these two states became a major objective. The war in Afghanistan made post-conflict reconstruction necessary, whilst Pakistan was believed to require assistance in order to strengthen its institutions with a view to combating terrorism more effectively within its borders.

Thus, circumstances propelled the EU towards a greater role in global counter-terrorism efforts, with Afghanistan and Pakistan being the most important region in the ‘war on terror’ – at least initially. For much of the twenty-first century, Afghanistan and Pakistan have been seen as a focal point for the fight against jihadist terrorism, but Afghanistan has also been known as a major supplier of world heroin, producing perhaps as much as 90 per cent of the world’s supply (NBC, 2015). Given that these significant challenges need to be tackled, South Asia can arguably be seen as providing a context conducive to EU action. However, in such challenging circumstances, the EU’s role has tended to be contingent upon the continuing presence of the USA. As seen in August 2021, once the USA decided to withdraw its last troops from Afghanistan, it was no longer possible for the EU and its member states to maintain their presence in the country. The security situation has been such on the ground that the US withdrawal has not opened space for the EU to act, but rather has significantly hindered its capacity to act.

Whereas Afghanistan has been a priority for the EU, Pakistan had been on the periphery of the EU’s Asia policy until the early part of the 2010s, with the true focus of EU activities being China and India as the two major states on the continent (Islam, 2013: 587). However, security links with Afghanistan, threats to Europe, and pressure from the USA and the UK have all coalesced to push the EU to step up its links with Pakistan. In sum, 9/11 created an external environment that has encouraged EU action in external counter-terrorism. Given the problems in the region and concern over leaving the region to once again become a base for terrorists, the circumstances have arguably supported a role for the EU in the region until recently. Now that the Taliban are in power again in Afghanistan, the EU can do little else but offer humanitarian aid and attempt to support rights-based groups (Hassan, 2021). As emphasised by Hassan (2021), ‘[the] Taliban takeover and the U.S. withdrawal have created profound problems for European policy in Afghanistan’.

Coherence

Shared values within the EU and between the EU, Afghanistan and Pakistan

The EU’s involvement in these states has been centred on assisting the USA, combating the Taliban, and preventing Afghanistan and Pakistan from becoming havens for terrorist groups by building a stable Afghan state. However,
there have been divisions over the role of the USA in Afghanistan, tensions between the USA and the EU, and difficulties amongst member states due to their own foreign policy preferences, personnel, and resources. At the same time, there has been significant reluctance to go against the USA, which means that the EU has had to adhere to US actions in Afghanistan, even if those were controversial or ineffective. In this instance, coherence was arguably a greater problem in the early stages when member states were individually deployed in Afghanistan. After European troops left, the EU’s position in terms of funding and running projects became somewhat easier.

Several values have drawn together EU member states and have helped sustain the EU’s involvement in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The outpouring of sympathy for the USA following 9/11 was significant. In fact, it would have been difficult for the EU and its member states not to help the US in the region following 9/11. NATO invoked Article 5, the mutual defence clause, following 9/11, whilst the EU and its member states pledged to support the USA in Afghanistan. Most European states remained committed to Afghanistan for years after 2001, with many British troops not leaving until 2014. While the invasion of Iraq gave rise to a number of challenges, it did not seriously alter the commitment of European states to Afghanistan. Supporting the USA was clearly of great importance to the EU and its member states. This cannot only be explained by the historical links between the USA and Europe; the widespread perception after 9/11 that al-Qaeda constituted a global threat, which did not only concern the USA, but also Europe and many other nations, was also relevant. This was further emphasized by the Madrid bombings in 2004, which Reinares (2010) has linked back to the al-Qaeda leadership in Pakistan. Afghanistan and Pakistan have continued to be a key area of the world for the planning and execution of terrorist attacks. While not all EU member states have been equally concerned about terrorism related to Afghanistan and Pakistan, these two countries have also come under attention for their role in the illegal drugs trade.

Thus, in the aftermath of 9/11, the EU made a long-term commitment to state-building and to preventing the region from again becoming a haven for terrorists. The EU seems to have been initially driven by the hope of establishing a liberal-democratic Afghanistan. It aligned itself with the UN’s ambitious objectives for the country, including its vision for the new Afghan administration, which

should be broad-based, multi-ethnic and fully representative of all the Afghan people and committed to peace with Afghanistan’s neighbours; should respect the human rights of all Afghan people, regardless of gender, ethnicity or religion; should respect Afghanistan’s international obligations, including by cooperating fully in international efforts to combat terrorism and illicit drug trafficking within and from Afghanistan; and should facilitate the urgent delivery of humanitarian
assistance and the orderly return of refugees and internally displaced persons, when
the situation permits. (United Nations, 2001b)

However, optimism decreased over time amongst the EU member states
and a more pessimistic – or perhaps realistic – assessment of the situation in
Afghanistan began to take shape. Accordingly, the EU’s objective became
more modest. This is epitomised by the EEAS’s (2016a) summary of the EU’s
position in 2016:

The EU has a long-term commitment to Afghanistan and its people. Its main aim
is to develop Afghanistan’s institutions so that the progress already made is main-
tained. The EU also wants to help in establishing a sustainable Afghan state.

**Methods and outputs**
Both the European Commission and the EU member states have made contri-
butions to the security and reconstruction of Afghanistan following the war in
2001 (European Union, 2009). There were various reasons for this involve-
ment, which notably included the willingness to demonstrate solidarity with
the USA and amongst European states. Concerns over illegal drugs also played
an important role and can be seen as having the potential to create more cohe-
sion within the EU than terrorism. This is because terrorism has not affected
all EU member states in the past, whereas drugs – heroin in this specific case
– have been an issue in all EU member states, as drug routes have developed
through the Balkans and from Russia into Eastern Europe (Klaiber, 2007).

Nevertheless, some EU member states did have strong concerns related to
terrorism. This was particularly the case with the UK, as demonstrated by the
fact that the UK’s CONTEST Strategy highlights the terrorist threat linked
to Pakistan and Afghanistan (HM Government, 2011: 9). As a result, the
UK – when it was still an EU member state – encouraged the EU to become
more involved in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Council of the European Union,
2009b). Moreover, Europol’s 2011 Terrorism Situation and Trend (TE-SAT)
report (Europol, 2011: 17) noted that “[v]olunteers are recruited in the EU to
support Islamist activities in Afghanistan [and] Pakistan”. This demonstrates
that there was some concern at the EU level about the threat posed to Europe
by Islamist groups linking back to Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Given that Pakistan is a former British colony, it is perhaps unsurprising
that the UK has played a particular role in Pakistan. However, even countries
like Poland, with no experience of terrorism, became more aware of the threat
of terrorism in Pakistan, notably when a Polish engineer was beheaded while
working there (Guardian, 2009). Therefore, in several European countries,
there was a growing awareness of the threat of terrorism to European countries
emanating from this region in the aftermath of 9/11. In addition, attacks on
the West stemming from South Asia and attacks on the people in the region highlighted the volatility of these countries and added to the appreciation that both Pakistan and Afghanistan needed assistance for both their own security and that of Europe. Therefore, the member states, although they may not have all assessed the terrorist threat in the same way, have provided more output in areas relevant to counter-terrorism, which has contributed to enhancing the EU’s actorness in counter-terrorism.

In terms of horizontal coherence, there have been some disagreements amongst institutions, although they have all agreed on the need for an EU presence in the region. The appointment of a first EU Special Representative for Afghanistan in 2001 demonstrated the EU’s commitment to the country and its importance for the EU. However, the European Commission’s external action – particularly on counter-terrorism – may have been truncated by the decision of the European Court of Justice to prevent the European Commission from over-reaching with a border management project in the Philippines. Consequently, the European Commission has been reluctant to use its money and powers at times (Wennerholm et al., 2010: 20).

Even so, all the EU institutions have undoubtedly seen the need to act in some way in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The signing of the CAPD with Afghanistan in February 2017 demonstrated this commitment and the EU’s willingness to deepen its cooperation with Afghanistan. Nevertheless, some have questioned whether the resources allocated by the EU have been used wisely or whether they have disappeared due to corruption or ended up in the hands of warlords. Questions were already raised a few years ago, notably by several MEPs, including Thijs Berman during an Election Observation Mission (Burke, 2014: 7), as well as Pino Arlacchi who undertook a report on the EU’s activities in Afghanistan in 2010 (European Parliament, 2010). Thus, overall, the various EU institutions have engaged more with Afghanistan in the last few years than they did in the past. Priorities may have also differed amongst member states and institutions, but this has not prevented the EU from taking action in Afghanistan.

By contrast, although several documents have mentioned the need for the EU to increase its counter-terrorism cooperation with Pakistan (e.g. European Commission, 2010b), it appears that neither the EU institutions nor the EU member states have placed as much emphasis on this country as they have on Afghanistan. Although there have been summits between Pakistan and the EU and engagement documents, such as the SEP, EU action in Pakistan has remained minor in comparison with Afghanistan. It can therefore be argued that the EU member states and the EU institutions have shown a certain level of coherence around the idea that it is necessary to be involved in South Asia, particularly in Afghanistan. However, there has been much less evidence of EU member state and EU institution action in Pakistan.
The then CTC Gilles de Kerchove (2009: 472) noted that Pakistan was one of the countries that ‘overemphasise the military approach to the fight against terrorism’. Indeed, Pakistan has shown a preference for military aid and similar forms of cooperation. The USA, for instance, gave Pakistan more than $20 billion in civilian and military aid in 2001–2011, which dwarfed that on offer by the EU – which, by 2011, the EU claims, amounted to more than €500 million since the start of cooperation in 1974 (EEAS Website, n.d.; Guardian, 2011). Concerning the EU member states, the UK – which was a member of the EU until 2020 – has maintained close relations with Pakistan as a result of history and because the UK has for years trained the Pakistani security services (Keohane, 2005: 35).

Thus, in its activities, the EU has focused on the ‘soft’ side of security, as shown by the details of the missions and the projects in which it has been involved. While the EU can perform these functions and has increasingly done so since 2001, it has largely remained in the shadow of the USA. Even so, it is apparent that the EU can now take more autonomous action and in more areas than it could in the past. However, autonomous action has been somewhat inhibited by the lack of commitment of the member states when it comes to sizeable missions. In contrast, EU action has at times been facilitated by the willingness of some member states to ‘hide’ behind the Union. For example, a country like the UK used to support EU action – when it was still within the EU – in places like Pakistan and Afghanistan because it allowed it to escape the legacy of its colonial past in this area. In fact, one interviewee stated that, for countries like the UK, which have a legacy in South Asia, it was the motives that Pakistan and Afghanistan questioned, not the capabilities. It was the opposite for the EU; countries questioned its capabilities, not its motives (Interview with EU Official C, June 2010). Consequently, although the EU has been hamstrung by the lack of commitment of its member states on occasions, it has increasingly shown that it can perform certain autonomous roles with its own instruments, including through the IcSP.

**Capability**

According to Hassan (2021: 2), ‘[since] the 2016 Brussels Conference on Afghanistan, the EU has committed 5 billion euros (…) to the country’. In addition, he noted that ‘[t]he EU and its [member states] collectively were the largest donor to the international [organisations] that helped rebuild Afghanistan, contributing around 34 percent of the funds for these multilateral reconstruction efforts between 2002 and 2021’, leading him to conclude that ‘Europe’s role in the country’s reconstruction was not insignificant’. Indeed, there have been many EU projects of note in Afghanistan and to a lesser extent in Pakistan. This section focuses on projects that can be found in the various
Multiannual Indicative Programmes, Country Strategy Papers, and regional documents, such as the 2009 Action Plan for Afghanistan and Pakistan. With regard to the instruments funding these projects, this chapter examines the EIDHR, the IcSP, the DCI, and the predecessors of these instruments, in order to identify measures that could be seen as related to counter-terrorism. In addition, this chapter considers projects specific to Afghanistan, focusing on EUPOL Afghanistan and the EU’s funding of the UN’s Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan. This section highlights how the EU has conducted a wide range of projects in Afghanistan and has also increased its cooperation with Pakistan.

**European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)**

Previously known as the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (2000–06), the EIDHR was established in 2007. In the period 2014–20, it had an overall budget of €1.3 billion and five main objectives: (1) support to human rights and human rights defenders in situations where they are most at risk; (2) support to other priorities of the Union in the field of human rights; (3) support to democracy; (4) EU Election Observation Missions; and (5) support to targeted key actors and processes, including international and regional human rights instruments and mechanisms (European Commission, 2017d).

Wennerholm et al. (2010: 12) have noted that the 2007–10 EIDHR strategy paper explicitly mentioned that the instrument would be used for counter-terrorism, because democracy and poverty reduction could be vital to combating terrorism. While this concern with terrorism seems to be absent in later documents, the regulation for the establishment of the EIDHR for the period 2014–20 still discussed the rule of law, security and justice, all of which are relevant to counter-terrorism (European Union, 2014a).

The projects discussed here have been identified on the basis of the compendiums of projects produced by the EU. Projects concerning Afghanistan will be discussed first, followed by those relating to Pakistan. The projects will also be discussed in chronological order. With regard to the 2007–10 compendium, the analysis will focus on the following areas of the EIDHR: ‘democracy – rule of law’, ‘economic, social and cultural rights’, ‘fighting impunity’, ‘fundamental rights protection’, and ‘gender and women’s rights’ (European Commission, 2011b). In the 2007–10 compendium, four projects were identified as relevant to counter-terrorism. Those were ‘justice assistance mechanism’, ‘promoting human rights and democratic reform through the enhanced role of civil society in supporting transitional justice’, ‘women connect across conflicts: building accountability for implementation of UN SCR 1325, 1820, 1888, 1889’ (which overlaps with Pakistan), and ‘Victims’ Shuras: women victims of war mobilizing towards reconciliation and justice’. In Pakistan, three projects could be identified, one of which was already mentioned above – ‘women connect
across conflicts’, which was run as a regional project. The other two were ‘police training and capacity building for democracy and human rights’ and ‘promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms in Pakistan’ (European Commission, 2011b). Other projects were run between 2010 and 2013. For example, in Afghanistan, ‘mitigating ethnicity: a democratic response to social division in Afghanistan’ was a project that could be seen as contributing to addressing the terrorist threat, whereas no non-confidential projects related to counter-terrorism took place in Pakistan between 2010 and 2013 (European Union, n.d.).

**Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI)**

The DCI was created in 2007. It has been the largest EU instrument with funding of €19.6 billion over the period 2014–20 (European Commission, 2017e). This funding was split between three programmes: €11.8 billion for geographic programmes; €7 billion for thematic programmes; and €845 million for the pan-African programme (European Commission, 2017e). The geographic programmes can notably contribute to ‘development and security, including conflict prevention’, which is certainly of relevance to counter-terrorism, especially in countries where there has been significant terrorist activity, which is clearly the case with Afghanistan and Pakistan (European Union, 2014b). The 2007–13 programme had a smaller budget of almost €16.9 billion (European Union, 2006).

**Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)**

The IcSP is a Commission-based instrument previously known as the IfS (or Stability Instrument) with funding of approximately €2.3 billion for the years 2014–20 (European Commission, 2016c). The decision establishing the IcSP highlighted its three main objectives: (a) in a situation of crisis or emerging crisis, to contribute swiftly to stability by providing an effective response designed to help preserve, establish or re-establish the conditions essential to the proper implementation of the Union’s external policies and actions in accordance; (b) to contribute to the prevention of conflicts and to ensuring capacity and preparedness to address pre- and post-crisis situations and build peace; and (c) to address specific global and trans-regional threats to peace, international security, and stability (European Union, 2014a). Counter-terrorism features highly in the regulation, meaning that the IcSP has had a significant role to play in the EU’s ‘fight against terrorism’.

A number of projects have been run under the IcSP over the last few years in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Using the search tool on the IcSP website (2014–20) reveals that no projects are currently specifically taking place under ‘countering violent extremism/counter-terrorism’. However, this appears to result from a narrow interpretation of counter-terrorism. In fact, projects can be
discovered by selecting the search items ‘security sector reform’, ‘rule of law/legal and judicial development’, ‘children, youth, and conflict’, and ‘women, peace and security and gender mainstreaming’, all of which are relevant to counter-terrorism (European Commission, n.d.c). Projects that contribute to peace and resolving conflict certainly have a crucial role to play in dealing with terrorism.

A range of projects took place in Afghanistan, some funded by very large budgets. Over €10 million were devoted to five projects that took place between 2014 and 2020. Those included: ‘clean and green cities: promoting stabilisation, peace building and local service delivery in three key cities’; ‘support to in-country civil society actors in conflict prevention, peace-building, crisis preparedness’; ‘strengthening women’s role in peace’; ‘women building peace: promoting the role of Afghan women in peace and security processes in the prevention of gender-based violence’; and ‘building peace through support for women’s access to services and decision makers in Jalalabad, Afghanistan’.

In Pakistan, two projects were conducted under the IcSP between 2014 and 2020, with funding totalling over €7 million. They were: ‘support to Pakistan’s action to counter-terrorism, with special reference to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’ and ‘building sustainable peace through developing an internal community mechanism’ (European Commission, n.d.c). The IFS also ran projects in the region in previous years. One that particularly stands out took place in Pakistan between 2010 and 2011, where a sum of €11.5 million was spent on a project around Islamabad and Punjab to improve law enforcement, focusing particularly on improving civilian law enforcement agencies and the judicial system (European Union, 2010b). In particular, this project has helped set up and train Pakistan’s National Counter-Terrorism Authority. There were also two smaller projects in Pakistan, including a project for post-crisis needs assessment (European Union, 2010b).

In short, the EU has undertaken projects in Pakistan that have been relevant to counter-terrorism by aiding the country in improving its police and its judicial system, thereby possibly contributing to reconciliation amongst the population and dealing with crises. There was also an IfS-funded project in Afghanistan conducted from June 2007 for 18 months and at a cost of €1.35 million (European Commission External Relations, 2008: 28). This project was focused on reforming the justice sector by reducing corruption and ensuring appropriate pay for those involved in it (European Commission External Relations, 2008). Because a weak and corrupt judicial system paralyzes a country’s ability to combat terrorism and other threats, this could be considered an important area in which the EU has helped Afghanistan to fight terrorism, insurgency, and drugs. Thus, this analysis shows that the IcSP has grown as a tool to be used for combating terrorism along with other threats.
The number of projects in Afghanistan and Pakistan has grown and the amount of money used for some of these projects has been quite significant.

**EUPOL Afghanistan**

The EUPOL Afghanistan mission started life as a specifically German initiative, the German Police Project Office, which ran between 2002 and 2007. During the German Presidency of the EU in the first half of 2007, this project was brought under the auspices of the ESDP. Simultaneously, the EU was invited by the government of Afghanistan to launch a police mission. The EUPOL Afghanistan mission was essentially a civilian deployment. Originally, it was planned to run for an initial period of three years (from 2007 until 2010) (Council of the European Union, 2007). However, the mission was later extended to continue until the end of 2016. The basic objective of the mission was to contribute to the establishment of a sustainable and effective civilian police, which works together with the Afghan justice system to improve the local population’s safety. More particularly, the mission monitors, mentors, advises and trains at the level of senior management of the Afghan Ministry of Interior, Afghan Ministry of Justice, Afghan Attorney General’s Office, in Kabul and in several regions. (European Commission, 2016b)

Information surrounding the mission has become rather difficult to access, as even its website has been shut down. This is likely linked to the fact that the mission had at best ‘mixed results’, as the European Court of Auditors – possibly generously – entitled their report on the mission (European Court of Auditors, 2015). What is undisputed is that the mission suffered from a number of problems, from insufficient staffing to the very high levels of corruption present in Afghanistan (Burke, 2014). This has been a rather negative result for a project on which the EU spent a significant amount of money. For instance, the annual budget in 2013–14 was €68 million (European Commission, 2016b). The Court of Auditors demonstrated that the project had improved over time and noted how it had been ‘largely successful in training-related activities but less so in mentoring and advising’ (European Court of Auditors, 2015: 7).

While the EU clearly attempted to play a significant role in building up an effective Afghan police force – which is crucial for success against terrorist campaigns – it has almost certainly not justified the investment. Even so, it is not only the EU that has struggled in the Afghan political environment, as underlined by the US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (2021) in a report published in August 2021.
**Law and Order Trust Fund of Afghanistan (LOTFA)**

The LOTFA was established in May 2002 as part of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan under the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and by request of the new Afghan government. The project has been nationally managed by the Ministry of the Interior, whilst the Ministry of Finance has been the other implementing partner (United Nations Development Programme, 2010). The programme has six priorities: (1) payment of the police force remuneration; (2) institutional development; (3) procurement, maintenance, and operations of non-lethal police equipment and supplies; (4) rehabilitation, maintenance, and operation of police facilities; (5) gender orientation (selection, recruitment, and training of police); and (6) payment of remuneration of uniformed personnel employed by the Central Prisons Department through specially earmarked contributions (United Nations Development Programme, 2010).

The European Commission has been a key contributor to the LOTFA, alongside significant contributions from the EU member states. For instance, between 2003 and 2008, the EU as a whole (including the member states) provided €205 million to LOTFA and was its largest contributor (European Commission External Relations, 2008: 22). This shows the EU’s significant contribution to a major Afghan national project. One of the key ideas behind the project was to ensure that the Afghan National Police would be paid, which would – optimistically – ensure that police facilities are improved and that police officers receive training and apply high professional standards. However, this initiative has been plagued by accusations of bad management and corruption, which has remained a significant challenge for Afghanistan (Afghanistan Ministry of Finance, 2009).

**Money laundering project in Pakistan**

In the aftermath of 9/11, Pakistan was chosen as a priority country for EU technical assistance. As it was decided that countries should be targeted for support under UN Security Council Resolution 1373, an anti-money laundering project was set up in Pakistan under the DCI (European Commission, 2006a). A sum of around €2 million was to be spent on this project (European Commission Website, n.d.). However, it failed to progress. The European Commission has largely blamed the Pakistani government for this negative outcome, claiming that the project cannot materialise without the necessary legislation in place (Wennerholm et al., 2010: 20).

To sum up, in Afghanistan, the EU has been conducting an impressive range of activities. However, now that the Taliban are back in power, it raises important questions as to what exactly the EU has achieved in the country at great cost. Overall, the EU has been considerably less active in Pakistan. It has been mainly hindered by Islamabad’s reluctance to cooperate in counter-terrorism,
which can itself be explained by the strong ties that it already enjoys with the USA – making EU funding less attractive than for other countries – and its willingness to raise its own profile in the region and beyond.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has shown that the EU has played a more active counter-terrorism role in South Asia than has been widely perceived, particularly in Afghanistan. Whilst most of the focus has been on military activities, the EU has – more quietly – engaged in a wide range of counter-terrorism activities and has spent a considerable amount of funding in the region. The Taliban’s return to power raises important questions as to what the EU has exactly achieved in the region, though. The lesser amount of counter-terrorism cooperation with Pakistan also highlights the necessity for the EU to find favourably inclined interlocutors in order to develop its counter-terrorism activities. Given the considerable financial support that Pakistan receives from the USA, the EU’s willingness to cooperate in counter-terrorism has not traditionally been received with much enthusiasm or interest by the Pakistani government. The souring of the US–Pakistan relations around the same time as the US retreat from the region may provide the EU with an overture as Islamabad may seek to develop new relationships. However, it remains to be seen how the EU will now be able to continue to develop its role in the region without American support.

NOTES

1. In the aftermath of 9/11, the EU targeted seven countries for technical assistance. However, the countries concerned were not all formally identified. It has been established that Morocco, Algeria, and Pakistan were three of them (Council of the European Union, 2008, 2009b; Wennerholm et al., 2010).
2. The IcSP was known as the Instrument for Stability (IIS) prior to 2014, which itself succeeded the EU’s Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM). The appropriate name is used in relation to the date of the project in question.
6. EU counter-terrorism, Iraq, and Syria

The US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 will likely go down in history as one of the greatest strategic errors of the early twenty-first century. By invading Iraq, the USA caused tensions with many of its closest allies in Europe and beyond; violated widely respected global norms and opened up space for other states to deviate from them; diverted attention and resources away from Afghanistan and Pakistan, which became a serious problem later on; and opened up a whole new battleground for jihadists in a state that likely had no strong connection to al-Qaeda or the weapons of mass destruction that were used as a justification for the invasion. Indeed, the US-led invasion allowed militants to take advantage of the chaos that erupted in the early stages of the occupation and existing sectarian divides that had festered for decades under Saddam Hussein. He had privileged his own minority Sunni group and marginalised the majority Shia, and notoriously even used chemical weapons against the Kurds in the north of the country in 1988 (BBC, 2013b). The 2003 invasion unleashed a new and extremely violent insurgency in the country, with civilian deaths peaking at nearly 30,000 in 2006 (Iraq Body Count, 2019). The invasion of Iraq is probably best explained by the presence of a ‘neo-conservative bloc’ in the Bush administration that had championed regime change in Iraq for a number of years. The 9/11 attacks presented the perfect opportunity to justify such an undertaking (Paul, 2007). Indeed, such an objective had been commonplace in neo-conservative circles already in the 1990s, including in think tanks such as the Project for a New American Century, which included among its members a number of Bush administration officials (Rogers, 2014: 16).

At least initially, there were divisions within Europe and the EU as to how to deal with the invasion of Iraq. Donald Rumsfeld, the then US Secretary of Defense, angered many Europeans when he labelled those states that disagreed with the invasion ‘old Europe’ and those that supported them ‘new Europe’ (Guardian, 2003). The UK, Spain, Italy, and a number of states due to join the EU, including Poland, sent troops to assist with the initial invasion or offered political support or military assistance during the ensuing occupation. The run-up to the invasion was probably the nadir in Europe–US relations following the end of the Cold War, as Cox (2005: 203) warned that a ‘more complex and more abrasive kind of relationship [was] in the making’. Nevertheless, the relationship between the EU and the USA eventually improved following the invasion of Iraq, although the Trump presidency was marked by renewed
transatlantic tensions. Lower-level cooperation, however, seems to have generally been unaffected and has probably strengthened despite the aforementioned disagreements, as shown in Chapter 4 on transatlantic relations. For its part, the EU had not always played a significant role in Iraq and Syria over the past two decades. However, as the threat of Daesh to Europe grew, the EU turned its attention towards this region.

Europe has been significantly affected by the conflicts in Syria and Iraq and by Daesh, especially when one considers the proximity of the region to Europe and the fact that small groups of people linked to or inspired by Daesh have committed a number of attacks across the continent. The attacks on *Charlie Hebdo* and Paris in 2015, Brussels airport in Belgium in 2016, the Berlin Christmas market in Germany in 2016, and Westminster and London Bridge in the UK in 2017 highlighted the threats that European states faced. A further challenge for Europe — and where the EU has been particularly important — has been that posed by foreign fighters and others who travelled to join Daesh. Foreign fighters are not a new phenomenon. They were already a challenge in some older conflicts, but the number of people who travelled to join Daesh was much larger than that of the fighters who joined al-Qaeda or any one of its affiliates (Tammiko, 2018). According to a report by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (2018: 14), 41,490 people from over 80 states travelled to join Daesh, with 5,904 coming from Western Europe and 7,252 from Eastern Europe, including Russia. In 2016, it was estimated that between 3,900 and 4,300 foreign fighters had come from EU member states and that about a third had returned home by then (International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2016). With the loss of Daesh’s last stronghold, Baghuz, in Syria in March 2019, some of the people who travelled to join Daesh may return home, although many will do so without any intention of continuing the fight. The next crucial question is, what happens to Daesh now — does the failure of the group mark the end of the religious wave or the start of a new stage, perhaps characterised by a more dispersed, or even digital, caliphate? It has even been argued that Daesh might pose a bigger danger as a global terrorist network than as an organised political entity (Sultygov, 2019). Somewhat controversially, Crenshaw (2018) has suggested that it might be time to negotiate with al-Qaeda and Daesh.

This chapter offers an investigation of the EU’s role in Iraq and Syria, focusing on the period since 2003. The region has — perhaps surprisingly given its proximity to Europe and the events unfolding in the region — been largely neglected by EU scholars until now. The chapter is structured into two main sections. The first provides a history of the EU’s engagement with Iraq and Syria and the challenges faced by the two states until 2011, which saw the start of the Syrian Civil War and the rise of Daesh. The second section examines the region through the conceptual lens of actorness, focusing on the events
The European Union as a global counter-terrorism actor after 2011. Once again, the context, capability, and coherence of the EU as an actor in the region are examined in turn. This chapter focuses primarily on the EU’s role in the conflict against Daesh. It argues that EU action has noticeably grown in the region since about 2014. Before then, the EU’s role was likely hindered by the existence of civil wars in these states, which had also led to the military forces of the states concerned, the USA, Russia, some EU member states, and other involved states to take precedence. As is well known, the EU largely lacks the capabilities to be involved in high-intensity conflicts in anything other than a support capacity. Due to the range of threats posed by Daesh, the EU has also taken a series of robust internal measures to combat external threats. These will be detailed where relevant. It is worth noting that the EU may well become a more important actor in the region following the end of the formal conflict, given that it is generally better suited to dealing with capacity-building and post-conflict situations. It will be important to attempt to prevent the re-emergence of similar problems to those currently affecting the Middle East in future, but the states in the region must also show a genuine commitment to addressing such problems, especially sectarian divides and the poor treatment of minorities. The EU might be able to play a role in that respect, although divisions amongst member states remain when it comes to engaging with Bashar al-Assad or dealing with other challenging regional actors, such as Iran.

EU–SYRIA–IRAQ RELATIONS PRIOR TO 9/11

Historically, the Middle East was part of the Ottoman Empire, but following the end of the First World War, the region was divided up between the victorious Allies, specifically the UK and France, under the secret 1916 Sykes–Picot Plan. After the Second World War, the colonial powers gradually withdrew or were forced out of the region, leaving a number of weak states, border problems, and exacerbated sectarian problems due to the favouring of one ethnic or religious group over others during colonial rule. The legacy of European colonial rule continues to hang over the region, and some European states, as well as the USA, remain intimately involved in the area, for its strategic importance, among other lingering ties. In contrast, some states in the Middle East, such as Iran, were never colonised at all. The relations between member states and Middle Eastern states have varied and have been controversial at times, such as the UK’s military ties with Saudi Arabia, which were criticised against the backdrop of the Yemeni Civil War (Stavrianakis, 2018).

Under the rule of President Saddam Hussein (1979–2003), the EU had ‘no political or contractual relations with Iraq’, but implemented United Nations Security Council sanctions that were introduced after the first Gulf War in 1990–91 and was the second largest donor of humanitarian relief after the UN
EU counter-terrorism, Iraq, and Syria

from 1992 onwards (European Commission, 2011e: 7). Following the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the EU focused on reconstruction and humanitarian, political, and financial support. Over time, however, the Union has increasingly developed to take on a stronger security role. EU studies dealing with Iraq have focused on the divides in the EU over the invasion of the country in 2003. Little attention has been given to the development of the EU–Iraq relationship and even less to the widening and deepening role of the EU since the invasion of 2003 (Kienzle, 2013; Puettter and Wiener, 2007; Schweiger, 2004). This is puzzling given the history and the continuing importance of the ties between Europe and the Middle East, the EU’s substantial financial support and range of projects, and the global focus on the region, especially since 2003.

By contrast, the EU’s relationship with Syria was historically more developed than that with Iraq. A cooperation agreement was signed between the two in 1977 and the state was part of the ENP. An EU–Syria Association Agreement was drafted in 2004 and updated and initialled in 2008, but it was never properly concluded. After the start of the civil war, the EU suspended all its bilateral cooperation with the government of Syria in May 2011 because of the escalation of violence and the unacceptable human rights situation. Sanctions have also been put in place. EU–Syria cooperation under the ENP has been put on hold, whilst its membership of and participation in the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) has been suspended (EEAS, 2016b). Furthermore, the EU has scaled back its role in Damascus, closing its delegation in December 2012 due to safety concerns and in protest at the Assad regime’s handling of the conflict, including its suspected use of chemical weapons. While the drastic decline in EU–Syria relations after 2011 has likely decreased the EU’s leverage over Damascus and may have even backfired (Turkmani and Haid, 2016), this is arguably different to the extent of EU action in the region, which has actually grown, certainly in relation to counter-terrorism, since 2011. Evidently, the deterioration of ties has been an obstacle to EU activity, as seen with the Assad regime’s decision to suspend multiple-entry visas to EU diplomats, which has made it more difficult for the EU to dispense aid in Syria (Reuters, 2019a). Assad’s victory in the civil war now seems likely, but the EU remains divided over whether to start dealing with his regime again, rendering a return to close cooperation unlikely for the foreseeable future.

Iraq and Syria were historically well known for being state sponsors of terrorism, with the latter still on the American list in 2018 (Congressional Research Service, 2018). Both states were infamously identified as being part of the ‘axis of evil’ identified by President George W. Bush in his State of the Union speech in January 2002. They have experienced significant internal strife: internal conflicts and regional wars have occurred at times over the last few decades (e.g. the Iran–Iraq War, 1980–88). Iraq also faced significant sanctions from many states following its invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the
ensuing Gulf War. There have long been rumours that discussions between Iraq and the al-Qaeda leadership took place in the 1990s, when the group was based in Sudan. However, these talks are thought to have been fruitless (Byman, 2015: 115). Iraq had also possessed WMDs at some point, but it is now widely believed that ‘Saddam had no serious WMD capability and certainly not one capable of threatening the US’ by the time of the invasion in 2003 (Hinnebusch, 2007: 209).

The US-led invasion unleashed huge sectarian violence from both Sunnis and Shias, from which al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) emerged. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of AQI until he was killed by a US airstrike in 2006, travelled to Iraq to resist the invasion and agitate for a sectarian civil war. The alliance between al-Qaeda core and AQI/Daesh had existed since al-Zarqawi swore allegiance to Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda in 2004. This enabled AQI to gain resources and a brand and al-Qaeda core a stake in this new front, although the core had little control over AQI – an issue that was the source of significant friction between the two in the ensuing years, especially regarding strategy. AQI was a loose and peculiar network of groups of militants, including foreign fighters, former Baathists in the armed forces under Saddam Hussein that had been disbanded by the USA, as well as Sunni tribespeople, who saw themselves as marginalised in the new democratic Iraq (Byman, 2015). However, the group was extremely brutal, which repelled many people. This led to the ‘Awakening’, where Sunnis increasingly turned against AQI, as violence decreased in Iraq after 2007. All this time, Syria had allegedly been involved in encouraging, or at least turning a blind eye to, foreign fighters traversing its borders (New York Times, 2007). Al-Qaeda officially severed its ties with Daesh in February 2014 following a dispute concerning the ownership of the al-Nusra Front, which had originally been established by Daesh in Syria to stir up support (Bacon and Grimm Arsenault, 2017: 9). Daesh subsequently became al-Qaeda’s main rival, perhaps even superseding its erstwhile ally – at least temporarily (Byman, 2017: 1106).

The USA left Iraq in 2011 following a dispute with the Iraqi government over the status of US forces. In addition to this withdrawal, the ongoing marginalisation of Sunnis by leaders, such as Nouri al-Maliki, who was then prime minister, the Arab Spring, and the Syrian Civil War enabled the resuscitation of AQI. As a result, Iraq and Syria drifted into chaos. The split between AQI and al-Qaeda core and the emergence of Daesh as the leader of the global jihadist movement ensured that Iraq and Syria would once again become the main battleground for jihadists. However, this time, Daesh appealed to a younger generation of jihadists and offered a more messianic message than al-Qaeda had (Kaplan and Costa, 2015).

Against the backdrop of this extremely complicated and fast-moving situation that has involved a wide range of players, the EU has not typically been
viewed as a major security actor in the region. While the EU has been present in the most recent conflict with Daesh, military force used by powerful states, such as the USA and Russia, has been the real focus, rendering the EU’s contributions virtually invisible. Inevitably, it is necessary to limit the scope of this chapter, which will therefore not address the Middle East Peace Process or the Saudi Arabia–Iran rivalry, despite their historical importance for the region and their impact on the conflicts under examination. These issues will only be examined where necessary.

The remainder of this chapter will show that the EU currently has limited contact with the Syrian government, but has acquired a growing role in Iraq. The EU has stepped up its efforts to combat terrorism in both states, as well as increasing internal and international cooperation in the face of the threat posed by Daesh. It may also play a more significant role in the aftermath of the conflicts in a bid to prevent such problems from arising again in the future. This will notably require deeper problems in society to be addressed, such as sectarian divides in Iraq.

THE EU AS A COUNTER-TERRORISM ACTOR IN IRAQ AND SYRIA

These two states are inseparable in terms of the terrorist threats that they have faced in recent times, especially Daesh. Indeed, the group was able to take advantage of the Syrian Civil War from Iraq to rejuvenate itself. Because of this, it is unlikely that progress could be made in one without progress in the other. That is the main rationale for examining them together in one case study. With the decline of Daesh, both states turn to problems of regime survival, with Syria’s Assad intent on the continuation of his regime, whereas Iraq may or may not stay on the democratic path. Both states will have to deal with demobilisation of armed groups and severe sectarian divides in the future. There is also the extremely controversial question of what will happen to the Kurdish population, which played a key role in the defeat of Daesh and was given substantial support by the West for doing so. Of course, the impact of the conflict has been felt across the world, with people fleeing the conflict as refugees to other Middle Eastern states, Europe, and North America. Indeed, the UN has estimated that there are over 5.5 million registered Syrian refugees and 6 million internally displaced people (UNHCR, 2018a). Iraq has faced a similar problem, with 3 million people displaced in Iraq and 260,000 who are refugees in other states due to the conflict (UNHCR, 2018b). This is an extremely complex issue, upon which this book only briefly touches as it examines the tools created with the purpose of combating terrorism inside and outside of the EU in the region.
The European Union as a global counter-terrorism actor

Context

The EU used to enjoy fairly close and stable ties with Syria in the past, with this country being involved in both the ENP and the UfM, whereas Iraq’s leadership was effectively isolated with the exception of aid up until 2003. Clearly, then, the invasion of the latter in 2003 brought about a huge change and an opportunity for the EU to engage with the new regime. As pointed out before, since 2011, the EU–Syria relationship has basically been frozen. Also, the attention of the EU has largely shifted towards the ‘refugee crisis’ that occurred as a result of the Syrian Civil War (European Commission, 2019a). By contrast, the relationship with Iraq has grown. The most significant events that occurred following the 2003 invasion of Iraq and changed the context for action were arguably the departure of US troops from Iraq in 2011, the start of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, and the rise of Daesh that followed. After the apparent defeat of Daesh in Iraq and Syria, the USA has quickly shifted its attention towards Iran. Post-conflict issues in Iraq have remained largely neglected, which may further add to the instability of the region.

The invasion of Iraq offered the opportunity of a reset of the EU’s relationship with that country. The EU responded fairly swiftly after the invasion, with the 2004 ‘The EU and Iraq: a framework for engagement’ document, a 2005 Joint Declaration on Political Dialogue, as well as the European Commission’s ‘Recommendations for renewed engagement with Iraq’ in 2006. The original framework for engagement outlined a set of ways in which the EU–Iraq relationship might develop, listing a number of priorities for the EU from what was required immediately to the medium-term future, all ‘to help lay the foundations for a secure, stable, democratic and prosperous Iraq, at peace with its neighbours and its region, and a full and active member of the international community’ (European Commission, 2004a). Then, the 2005 Joint Declaration on Political Dialogue established a political dialogue between the two parties. It was intended that discussions would focus on: ‘promotion of good governance; the protection of human rights; rule of law and democracy; dialogue on non-proliferation and counter-terrorism; conflict prevention and resolution; and cultural issues’ (Council of the European Union, 2005c). Finally, the ‘Recommendations for renewed engagement with Iraq’ were published in changed circumstances in the midst of increasing violence. The EU praised the progress that Iraq had made with regard to political and constitutional issues, but also highlighted greater inclusiveness in the political process and government and the security situation as being crucial for greater EU engagement at the time (European Commission, 2006b). In 2012, the EU and Iraq agreed on a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, the first such agreement between the two states. Interestingly, the ‘Title 1’ section focused on foreign and security policy, including combating terrorism (Article 4) (European Union, 2012).
Thus, the EU–Iraq relationship has significantly developed in the last few years, going beyond the more ad hoc cooperation of the post-invasion period towards being more settled and dealing with an expanded range of issues. Much of what the EU originally provided was aid-based. It has been a key aid provider to Iraq since the start of the twenty-first century. However, the EU has also taken on a stronger role in a wider range of activities linked to security, as explained below.

The Syrian Civil War evidently caused a sea change in the relations between the EU and Syria. In the past, there had been a certain degree of EU–Syria cooperation. However, European governments expressed criticisms at the Assad regime’s handling of the war and a deteriorating security situation contributed to the Union’s decision to close its delegation in Damascus in 2012. Whereas Syria was historically part of a number of regional programmes, it was now excluded. This has reduced EU leverage over the state and repairing the ties between the two – should this be seen as desirable – will be difficult. However, if Assad remains in power, the EU will face a difficult choice between re-engagement or maintaining the freeze on relations. For the time being, the EU’s leverage over the state is not significant and it will likely need to rebuild its connections with the Assad regime in order to seriously increase the importance of its role in the long term should Assad’s regime survive. Furthermore, the Syrian government has been reasserting its control over its territory, thereby decreasing the space for EU action in relation to terrorism in any case.

The rise of Daesh and terrorist attacks in Europe linked to this group were a further contextual change that compelled the EU and European states into action, with the EU responding with elements of a regional strategy for Syria and Iraq in 2015. This was a first for the EU – a strategy focusing so clearly on a particular terrorist group. The overall objectives of the strategy were:

- to counter the threat posed by [Daesh] and other terrorist groups to regional and international stability, and simultaneously to create the conditions for an inclusive political transition in Syria and lasting stability in Syria and Iraq as well as in refugee-hosting countries in the region, while alleviating the human suffering caused by the ongoing violence and displacement. (European Commission, 2015c)

The strategy foresaw engagement with not only Syria and Iraq, but also adjacent affected states, such as Jordan. It offered a range of concrete actions involving various EU tools and has been revised on an annual basis since then. Building on this, the EU agreed on a specific strategy for Syria in 2017 and one for Iraq in 2018 (Council of the European Union, 2018b; European Council and Council of the European Union, 2017).
Furthermore, the conflicts in Iraq and Syria presented a significant internal problem for the EU on a hitherto unprecedented scale, namely the challenge of foreign fighters (Council of the European Union, 2015). Indeed, Daesh has acted as a point of attraction for a small, but not insignificant number of people. This has posed serious problems for some European states, as their own citizens normally have the right to return and move around Europe if they choose to do so. It is therefore possible that radicalised individuals might be able to travel back to Europe, spread propaganda, divide communities, recruit others, and even plan and carry out attacks. Nevertheless, the flow of returnees following the declining fortunes of Daesh has not been as significant as feared at one point, although many will pose a long-term threat to their states. It will be challenging to manage this over a long period of time (New York Times, 2017). One of the main concerns is that some individuals or groups will return home and ‘professionalise’ local groups, as seen in Sri Lanka in the case of the Easter 2019 attacks, which killed nearly 300 people. The terrorist group that has been accused of the attack, the Sri Lankan National Thowheed Jamath, went from small-scale smashing of Buddhist statues in December 2018 to an extremely sophisticated and coordinated large-scale bombing in April 2019 (BBC, 2019b).

In December 2018, the Trump administration made the surprise announcement that US troops would be withdrawn from Syria, following their ‘defeat’ of Daesh (The Economist, 2019). Three years later, the US-led global coalition against Daesh also announced that it had ended its combat mission in Iraq. This US withdrawal has led some observers to fear that it will lead to the increasing influence of Russia and Iran in the region (BBC News, 2018). Furthermore, Daesh has continued to pose a threat, notably with its cells operating in rural areas, which carry out hit-and-run attacks. There is a concern that Daesh may take advantage of the current power vacuum to regroup and grow considerably again in future.

It can be argued that the US withdrawal from the region has created opportunities for the EU and its member states to demonstrate their credentials as security providers. They are no substitute for the USA’s immense military power, but they might be able to pressure the Iraqi government into reconciling its Sunni and Shia populations and to assist with building more robust institutions for the long term. For instance, European states have acquired significant experience in managing ethnic, religious, and national divides through, for example, consociational democratic systems. Nevertheless, this remains a very challenging context for EU action, especially if the security situation were to become more unstable again.

To sum up this section, the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 completely changed the context of EU–Iraq relations. Where the Union had not engaged with Iraq under Saddam Hussein, the invasion opened up the way for a possible
improvement in this relationship. This was challenging while the state was existentially threatened, but the considerable weakening of Daesh has led to an enhancement of the EU–Iraq relationship. EU–Iraq ties have certainly expanded in scope since 2003. However, these advances remain fragile and could be threatened should the security situation in Iraq deteriorate again. With regard to Syria, the opposite has occurred since the start of the civil war. The EU suspended its cooperation with the Assad regime, thereby decreasing its leverage on the state, if it had any. Should Assad remain in power, then the EU may eventually have to engage with his regime again in the years to come. It is also likely that Assad will not make re-engagement easy. Moreover, some have criticised the effects of the sanctions imposed by Western states on Syria, which may end up strengthening the Assad regime at the expense of its citizens and allow its allies to further assert themselves in the Middle East (European Council on Foreign Relations, 2019a). Furthermore, the rise and decline of Daesh brought the region to the particular attention of the EU, not least because of foreign fighters and attacks in Europe linked to Daesh. Evidently, the context for action in this region has fluctuated and has been rather challenging for the EU overall. Nevertheless, the US withdrawal from the region may have arguably opened up space for a more significant EU role, although this may remain rather modest given the continued security challenges characterising the region.

**Coherence**

As previously mentioned, the EU has often been criticised for lacking coherence when it comes to its counter-terrorism policy. Perhaps expectations cannot be set very high due to the disparate experiences of terrorism across Europe. Scholars have frequently commented on the varied perceptions of terrorism within the EU (Bures, 2010a; Monar, 2007a). Foreign fighters and others travelling to join Daesh have somewhat changed this picture. Daesh has brought EU member states closer together on the issue. Notably, there have been reports of terrorist activity in Eastern European states, many of which previously tended to pay only limited attention to terrorism.

An analysis of the coherence of the EU’s action must start with the divides over the war in Iraq in 2003. Germany and France famously objected to the US-led invasion of Iraq, while the UK and a set of other states chose to support Washington. Although this was a serious low point for transatlantic ties in the post-Cold War period and caused problems within Europe, the damage did not last for long. Transatlantic cooperation increased in the following period, despite some disagreements. Counter-terrorism cooperation in Europe has only grown since 2002–03. The UK was even able to take a lead on counter-terrorism during its presidency in 2005, with the adoption of the EU’s
Counter-Terrorism Strategy and other measures. Thus, the disagreements over Iraq do not appear to have caused serious damage in hindsight. Not only this, but the EU also quickly became involved in post-invasion Iraq, although its role has taken some time to fully develop. Brexit will likely prove much more damaging, dividing European states further, as well as reducing resources and expertise overall.

Even so, the invasion of Iraq created a brand new battleground for jihadis that was geographically closer than Afghanistan and Pakistan. In this sense, it is entirely possible that the US-led invasion of Iraq ultimately led to greater convergence on the issue of terrorism and thus, at least to an extent, cohesion due to the long-term consequences of the invasion significantly affecting Europe in a myriad of ways. In particular, the issue of foreign fighters has been a serious one. This problem existed even prior to the rise of Daesh. For instance, ‘Europe’s first female suicide terrorist’ Muriel Degauque, who killed herself in Iraq in late 2005, is a case in point; she was Belgian and considered a convert to Islam. Even so, foreign fighters from Europe to Iraq were far fewer in number than what occurred following the rise of Daesh. Fighters mainly travelled to Iraq from places other than Europe prior to the emergence of Daesh. With Daesh, the challenge of foreign fighters became significantly more acute for Europe. Almost all European states were affected in some way, even though numbers varied widely, from 2,000 from France to a handful from Bulgaria (BBC, 2019c). Nonetheless, the majority of EU member states, from the historically most to least experienced with terrorism, had some foreign fighters. Indeed, numerous stories of Eastern European foreign fighters have emerged in recent years, raising awareness of the threat of terrorism and at least going some way in reducing the gap between Western and Eastern European states. The threat was varied and still is, but it is now most of Europe that has a similar problem. Even so, differences remain and familiar problems continue to act as obstacles to the EU’s approach to terrorism and foreign fighters, including perceptions of the threat posed by terrorism (Bures, 2018).

It is also worth being aware of the possibility that terrorism could be used as a way of further marginalising, for example, Roma communities in Europe. Calling someone ‘terrorist’ or susceptible to radicalisation can open the door to further government intervention. The very existence of an EU strategy focusing on foreign fighters indicates that there is a certain level of coherence on the issue (Council of the European Union, 2015). The main concern, of course, has been that foreign fighters would be able to re-enter the EU, then travel freely within the Schengen zone and commit attacks anywhere.

A further complicating factor has been the ‘refugee crisis’ triggered by the conflicts in the region and how to deal with it. This also relates to how to deal with Assad and the future of Syria. The EU’s stance on this has typically been that it supports a UN-led peace process (United Nations, 2019). However, in
some member states, some voices have begun to call for re-engaging with Assad, notably in order to send refugees home, as the UN-led process has ended up in deadlock (Reuters, 2019b). On Syria, without a single voice, the EU is unlikely to have much influence in practice, even though the withdrawal of the US has potentially opened the door to a stronger role for the EU. A further point is that broader regional concerns will also play a role in Syria. Iran has backed the Assad regime. An Assad victory would therefore empower Iran to some extent, and relations between the USA, the UK, and Iran have been very tense, while the EU has attempted to hold together the nuclear deal agreed with the USA in 2015 (European Council on Foreign Relations, 2019b). Given that Iran has now breached the terms of this deal in protest, it is not entirely clear to what extent it is still alive (BBC, 2019c). Iraq will also come into play here on the basis that Iran and Iraq appear to be more politically united than they were in the past. Therefore, there are a number of linked issues in the Middle East on which the EU has appeared divided at times in recent years.

While terrorism has gone up the agenda and member states have evidently been more concerned about it generally, threat perceptions have not been uniform and are unlikely to ever be so. The decline of Daesh in Iraq and Syria might even decrease concern about the problem, although the group might actually become more dangerous, notably because of uncertainties stemming from its decentralisation. The ‘refugee crisis’ and what to do about Assad and Syria have been significant questions for the EU, on which it appears to have been quite divided. Thus, even though the US withdrawal may seem to have left more space for EU action in the region, it will be extremely challenging for the EU to develop its role given the challenges that it faces on the ground, in addition to a certain lack of coherence on the key issues.

**Capability**

The EU has claimed that, between it and the member states, €10.8 billion has been raised for those affected by the Syrian conflict and other states in the region, as well as €1.05 billion for those inside Syria (European Commission, 2018c). However, the EU has suspended direct cooperation with Syria. It has also been criticised for some of the measures that it has taken in order to reduce the flows of asylum-seekers coming from the region, in particular a controversial agreement with Turkey (Deutsche Welle, 2018; Léonard and Kaunert, 2021b). For Iraq, the EU has provided hundreds of millions of euros across a range of sectors (European External Action Service, 2018). This section examines how the EU has grown as a counter-terrorism actor over time in this region, especially to help deal with Daesh, but also to assist with capacity-building and reconciliation. As previously mentioned, the US decision to withdraw troops from the region may facilitate the development
of a more significant role for the Union. In that respect, it is important to recall that Syria is part of the ENP, contrary to Iraq. This has an impact on the instruments that the EU has at its disposal in relation to each of these countries.

**Legal basis for cooperation**

The legal basis for the EU’s relationship with Iraq has been the 2012 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, which has sanctioned EU–Iraq cooperation on counter-terrorism, although such cooperation had been of concern since the renewal of EU–Iraq relations following the US-led invasion. The frozen and likely abandoned 2004 EU–Syria Association Agreement also included a section on counter-terrorism cooperation (Title 9) (European Commission, 2004b). At that time, hopes were high that reforms in Syria were under way and that such an agreement would strengthen the credibility of them, although there was concern that the clause on weapons of mass destruction might offer a loophole and exit option (Zorob, 2008). Having said this, the existence of such clauses says little about whether any substantive cooperation actually followed these agreements. At present, for instance, EU direct cooperation with the Syrian government is non-existent. Ultimately though, agreement on the importance of counter-terrorism cooperation is clear in the existing agreement with Iraq and in the proposed one with Syria, with the caveat that these might mainly aim to signal some willingness to cooperate with no actual intention or idea as to how this might be carried out in practice.

**EU instruments**

*Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI)*

The EU has used the DCI in its cooperation with Syria, but not for the purpose of tackling counter-terrorism directly. It has been used for an agricultural project. Having said that, climate change and drought have been blamed by some for being a cause of the Syrian Civil War as people allegedly travelled to the cities following a drought, although this link has also been disputed (Selby et al., 2017).

In Iraq, longer-term projects have been financed by the DCI. Total development assistance between 2014 and 2017 amounted to €124.4 million. Of course, not all projects have concerned terrorism, but there have been projects concerned with good governance and stabilisation, which very clearly link to the post-conflict challenges and long-term management of sectarian issues in Iraq. The EU has also topped up some of these efforts since 2017 with more funding (EEAS, 2018).
Contributions to UN projects
The EU has also contributed large amounts of money to stabilisation funds to deal with post-conflict challenges and de-mining, including €50.4 million to restore services, to repair the infrastructure, and to support small businesses for restoring economic activity, as well as €10 million for de-mining (European Commission, 2017f). These projects have been implemented following the withdrawal of Daesh from these areas. They have been conducted by the UNDP Funding Facility for Stabilisation and the UN Mine Action Service. In addition, in 2019, the EU contributed €50 million in humanitarian aid and development cooperation to help deal with post-conflict challenges, from healthcare through jobs for vulnerable youth to the restoration of Iraq’s cultural heritage, which Daesh had attempted to obliterate (European Commission, 2019d).

The provision of this funding has brought the EU’s total humanitarian assistance to €420 million and its development cooperation to €309 million since the beginning of the EU’s real entry into the conflict against Daesh in 2015 (European Commission, 2019d). Some may object to the linkages that have been made in this way between development and humanitarian aid, on the one hand, and security and the interests of the EU member states, on the other hand. Indeed, it may be considered a questionable activity to link development and the provision of humanitarian aid to places where it benefits Europe and is in line with security challenges.

Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)
The IcSP has been used by the EU in Syria, with nearly €58 million having been spent in the state on 20 projects since 2015 and over €73 million over the longer term (European Commission, 2019c). Once again, not all of this money or the projects have been relevant to counter-terrorism, but some of the largest ones have related to mine clearing (€10 million) and support for the peace process (€9 million) (European Commission, n.d.c).

In Iraq, the IcSP has been used to offer over €40 million since 2015 and there have been some significant projects relevant to dealing with Daesh. Once again, the EU has not been able to directly combat Daesh, but it has supported institution-building and other forms of assistance, including for tackling post-conflict issues. Of particular note have been projects supporting the police (over €3.9 million) and a human rights compliant counter-terrorism strategy (two phases: (i) 2017–18, €3.5 million; and (ii) 2019–22, €7 million) (European Commission, n.d.c). Evidently, the EU has conducted a range of projects relevant to counter-terrorism under the IcSP.
Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis
Although it has not been set as a specific counter-terrorism tool, the EU has introduced a regional fund to help deal with the Syrian crisis. Between 2014 and 2021, over €2.3 billion for Syria were raised and used for a range of purposes (European Commission, n.d.e). This underlines again the significant level of funding spent by the EU on a number of projects in the region.

European Union Advisory Mission in support of Security Sector Reform in Iraq
In 2017, the EU launched the EU Advisory Mission in support of Security Sector Reform in Iraq (EUAM Iraq), with an original mandate of one year. This mission was requested by the Iraqi government to advise and offer assistance in implementing the civilian aspects of Iraq’s National Security Strategy. It originally had a budget of €14 million, as well as 51 staff, including 36 from the EU (EEAS, 2017). The mission was later extended until April 2020 (EUAM Iraq, 2018) and then again until 30 April 2022 (Council of the European Union, 2020). It ‘involves support to institutional reform and efforts to help counter terrorism (including countering violent extremism) and organised crime, with specific reference to border management, financial crime in particular corruption, money laundering and trafficking of cultural heritage goods’ (Council of the European Union, 2020).

European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)
This is the smallest instrument being used by the EU in Syria, with €16.1 million to support ‘human rights, accountability, and independent media’ (European Commission, 2019c). Projects funded by this instrument therefore have the potential to contribute to counter-terrorism efforts.

European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI)/European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI)
This tool has not been used to Iraq because this country is not covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy, whilst cooperation with the Syrian government was suspended by the EU in 2011. However, the instrument has still been used within Syria to assist the local population and the provision of €268.6 million since 2011 has not been insignificant. It appears to have been used for ‘resilience’ and ‘post-conflict recovery’ (European Commission, 2019c), although little further information has been made available regarding the projects run under the ENI.

To conclude, this section has evidenced that the EU’s involvement in Syria and Iraq has considerably increased since 2011. The Union has conducted a range of projects in both states and has mobilised a vast range of tools in order to
conduct various projects at least partially linked to counter-terrorism. The EU has not been able to participate in the harder aspects of security. However, the decline of Daesh has enabled an increased role for the EU, which might help at least improve institutions and encourage better governance in the long term – contributions to security that military assets cannot make. The cases of Iraq and Syria have shown how many instruments the EU has developed for projects linked to counter-terrorism. Thus, its capabilities in the field of counter-terrorism have significantly increased. Nevertheless, some may find it unfortunate that development, humanitarian aid, and security have been linked. One should also not overestimate the capabilities of the EU, given the scale of the security challenges on the ground, especially if Daesh goes through a revival in future. Finally, another important factor to consider is whether the EU’s interlocutors will be cooperative and receptive to advice and training, which greatly matters when attempting to cooperate with other states.

CONCLUSION

Overall, the Middle East has experienced a significant amount of upheaval since 9/11. The American invasion of Iraq contributed to revive an al-Qaeda that was under significant pressure in Afghanistan and Pakistan and gave it a whole new battleground following its alliance with AQI. The invasion has led to the unleashing of a very high and long-lasting level of violence in the region. The uprisings from 2011 onwards initially took jihadist groups by surprise. However, they have been able to utilise them for their own ends, not least the continuing Syrian Civil War. The area comprising Iraq and Syria has been the focal point of terrorist violence, but the decline of Daesh has given way to a series of post-conflict challenges, such as sectarian problems and rebuilding, as well as concern about growing Iranian power and influence in the region. Global powers have been divided on how to deal with these challenges, which will make it more difficult to resolve them in the near future. Overshadowing this for the EU has also been the so-called ‘refugee crisis’, which has significantly divided member states (Léonard and Kaunert, 2021b, 2021c).

The issue of foreign fighters has brought the EU member states closer together to a significant extent in order to develop a common approach to dealing with Daesh. EU action has also significantly increased, ranging from humanitarian aid through institution-building to tackling the long-term challenges faced by Middle Eastern states. There has been an opportunity for the EU to play a significant role here, as the USA has begun to shift its attention away from the region. Indeed, as the largest aid donor in the world, the EU may well be expected to play a significant role in the reconstruction of Syria and Iraq. The EU and its member states also possess significant experience in dealing with terrorism, reconciliation, and building robust democratic institu-
tions that can assist with long-term solutions to sectarian divides. Nevertheless, raising its profile as an actor in the region will be a very significant challenge for the EU, in particular if the security situation deteriorates, possibly as a result of an increase in terrorist attacks.
7. Conclusion to The European Union as a Global Counter-Terrorism Actor

Our war on terror begins with al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.
(George W. Bush’s Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, 20 September 2001)

President George W. Bush had just announced the beginning of the ‘war on terror’ to the American people in the wake of 9/11. He was right in assessing that it would not end with al-Qaeda, as shown by the rise to prominence of Daesh. The EU, as this book has demonstrated, joined in this ‘war on terror’ and became a global counter-terrorism actor. The evidence presented in this book demonstrates that the EU has significantly grown as a counter-terrorism actor since 2001 in several areas of the world. This concluding chapter starts by restating the aims of the book. Then, it highlights its main research findings and contributions to the literature on EU counter-terrorism and that on European integration and actorness. The following section considers two important challenges that are likely to influence the development of the EU’s global counter-terrorism role in the near future, namely the rise of right-wing terrorism and the consequences of Brexit. Finally, the chapter identifies some promising avenues for future research.

REVISITING THE AIMS OF THE BOOK

The main aim of this book was to examine the extent to, if any, and the ways in which the EU has become an actor in global counter-terrorism. It was shown that many scholars have argued that the EU has not been particularly important in counter-terrorism and has mainly played a supporting role. However, this claim had not been substantiated by any systematic and detailed empirical study, particularly at the global level.

Thus, this book has addressed a distinct gap in the scholarship on European security and counter-terrorism. Although a growing body of literature has emerged that provides regional and thematic explorations of European counter-terrorism policies, there has not been any systematic study of the broadened role of the EU as a counter-terrorism actor at the global level. Furthermore, the existing literature on the policies that constitute European
counter-terrorism has tended to discuss them in isolation from one another, in line with the traditional divide between CFSP and AFSJ matters. The critical value of this book is thus twofold. Not only does it provide a comprehensive picture of EU activities in the area, but it also seeks to demonstrate that the above-mentioned divide, initially brought about by the Treaty of Maastricht (European Commission, 1992), has led to limitations in the understanding of the dynamics across the spectrum of European counter-terrorism activities. Instead, the position adopted here has been that of exploring various linkages and interaction between these policy fields from a theoretically informed and also substantively empirical perspective.

This book has shown that the EU’s role in external counter-terrorism has tended to be underestimated. In contrast to commonly held views in the literature, it has highlighted several interesting and important developments not only for EU counter-terrorism abroad, but also with regard to the progress that the EU has made towards becoming a truly global actor with a broad range of capabilities. In the last two decades, the EU has shown that it can extend its reach beyond trade and economic policy into certain aspects of foreign and security policy, which is a sign that the EU nowadays is a greatly enhanced actor when compared to that of 2001. Evidently, progress has been impressive – albeit in cooperation with some countries and in some policy areas more than others. As has been demonstrated, unprecedented and unexpected counter-terrorism cooperation now takes place internally amongst EU member states and externally between the EU and third states. Diverse forms of terrorism and many terrorist groups presented threats to Europe for much of the twentieth century. However, the more transnational nature of the Islamist threat has encouraged EU member states to deepen their cooperation. Nevertheless, more than two decades after the start of the EU’s ‘fight against terrorism’, European countries still face significant terrorist threats from various external and internal sources, ranging from jihadist terrorists – some of whom are more or less loosely affiliated with al-Qaeda or Daesh – to far-right terrorists.

Also, growing concerns over linkages between criminal gangs, terrorist groups, and a number of other threats has played a central role in raising awareness of terrorism in Europe, as set out in some of the most important EU documents, including the ESS (European Council, 2003a, 2003b). Furthermore, perhaps the clearest assessment of these links has been contained in Europol’s various TE-SAT reports. Criminal activities have been extensively used to finance terrorism. Such activities in which terrorist groups are involved, either through affiliation with criminal groups or through their own operations, include the trafficking of illegal goods and substances, such as weapons and drugs, trafficking in human beings, financial fraud, money laundering, and extortion. These links are summed up as a crime–terror nexus, which has led the EU to strengthen its commitment to fighting terrorism and other threats.
Many European countries face internal and external challenges to their security. However, it must be remembered that European states have been challenged at a level far lower than many other regions and countries around the world, especially the Middle East and South Asia, which have experienced attacks more frequently and suffered significantly higher casualties over the years. For example, the frequent bombings in Iraq, Syria, Pakistan, and Afghanistan serve as a constant reminder that many more people are killed or injured by terrorism every year in places outside Europe. Even so, with the world being so interconnected through transport and trade links, those trained in Pakistan or Afghanistan – especially those who possess European passports – can return to Europe and set up cells inspired by jihadi terrorism, raise money for such organisations or even perhaps commit a terrorist attack.

MAIN RESEARCH FINDINGS OF THE BOOK

This book has made theoretical and empirical contributions mainly to two strands of the academic literature, namely that on EU counter-terrorism and that on EU integration and actorness. First of all, it has been noted that the threat of international terrorism has made European integration proceed in surprising and interesting directions internally and externally, particularly as the EU has become increasingly involved in counter-terrorism policies by cooperating with a growing number of third countries. This growth in EU counter-terrorism cooperation has been driven by the ‘collective securitization’ of the transnational threat of terrorism within the EU, whereby the terrorist threat has been seen as a ‘European’ – rather than ‘national’ – threat calling for a collective response of the EU member states.

Second, this book has adopted a unique theoretical approach to the study of EU counter-terrorism cooperation in the form of actorness, which it has applied to several case studies in order to analyse the evolution of the EU as a counter-terrorism actor. In addition, this research has taken a broader view of counter-terrorism and external relations. Thus, this project has added new empirical knowledge, which has included an examination of the development of the EU–US relationship following the Treaty of Lisbon and of the largely overlooked role of the EU in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as in Syria and Iraq. Overall, this has demonstrated that the literature on the external dimension of EU counter-terrorism has often lacked depth and geographical scope. Furthermore, this project has highlighted that the EU is, in fact, becoming a counter-terrorism actor of growing importance and with an ever-diversifying number of policy options available. Thus, this book has shown how European integration has been profoundly affected by international terrorism and has increasingly taken place in the field of counter-terrorism. In fact, very few observers would have predicted that EU integration in counter-terrorism
matters would have progressed so far in such a short space of time. In terms of theoretical contribution, this project has examined EU actorness in several case studies, focusing on the EU’s evolution in each case. The book has taken as a starting point that the EU is a *sui generis* actor in the global system (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006; Ginsberg, 2001). In doing so, this research project has viewed the EU as an individual type of actor, and one that cannot in all ways be compared to a state because many of the processes, the functions, and the structure of the organisation are different. In saying this, it is important to recall that the EU is neither a state nor a typical international organisation (Keohane, 2005). It follows that it is important to avoid systematically – and implicitly or explicitly – comparing the EU to a state and to the USA in particular as the EU’s significant other. This book has noted that other approaches to international relations have tended to overemphasise relations amongst states, which has led to not treating the EU as an actor. This focus on states has prioritised coercive methods over others, which has led to overlooking a range of activities that the EU performs. As has been demonstrated throughout this book, an actorness-based framework appreciates what the EU is, whilst also avoiding comparisons with other types of actors. Importantly, this book has asked a fundamental question about the EU: is the EU a counter-terrorism actor at all? It has analysed the EU as an actor in several case studies and has highlighted that EU counter-terrorism actorness has varied across the world. This approach to EU counter-terrorism has provided a new and interesting way of assessing it, which has helped construct the EU as an actor by examining what the EU can contribute – and has contributed – to global counter-terrorism, rather than mainly criticising it for what it cannot.

Third, this book has made significant empirical contributions to the literature. The external role of the EU in counter-terrorism has remained widely neglected. Whereas the internal dimension of EU counter-terrorism has seen a large amount of research, the same cannot be said about the external dimension. This lack of empirical data on the external dimension of EU counter-terrorism has largely led to the conclusion that the EU has not been a significant counter-terrorism actor. Importantly, this research project has challenged such an assumption. It has shown that EU cooperation with a range of third states has grown considerably since 2001. More specifically, this research has generated new insights that have contributed to the literature on the external dimension of EU counter-terrorism.

The case of greatest interest in the literature has traditionally been that of the EU–US relations. However, these studies have often been quite limited in their scope and timespan or overly focused on rhetoric more than practice. The argument that the EU has been heavily influenced by the USA in its counter-terrorism measures is not entirely new, but this book has provided a fuller, more nuanced, and more dynamic view of this bilateral relationship.
Most interesting of all empirically, perhaps, has been the EU’s major contribution to global counter-terrorism efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan, an area of the world that EU researchers have generally neglected. Similarly, little attention had generally been given in the extant literature to the EU’s efforts to combat Daesh in the Middle East. This book has highlighted the significant scope of activities related to counter-terrorism that the EU has conducted in Syria and Iraq.

The USA remains by far the most important counter-terrorism partner for the EU, although the transatlantic relationship has been marked by some tensions in the last few years. At the highest level, the EU’s overall approach to counter-terrorism has remained resolutely based on law enforcement, as the EU has attempted to re-frame the effort against jihadist movements as a more low-key ‘fight against terrorism’, rather than a war, although this move has not been supported by all member states. In the aftermath of 9/11, divisions amongst European states became visible over their relations with the USA, as epitomised by Rumsfeld’s distinction between ‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe in the run-up to the war in Iraq. Despite these disagreements, the USA has exercised considerable influence over the development of EU counter-terrorism measures, being referred to as a ‘norm-maker’, whilst the EU largely adopted the role of a ‘norm-taker’ and some controversial measures – that may not have been acceptable prior to 9/11 – were adopted (Argomaniz, 2009a; Ripoll Servent and MacKenzie, 2012). However, it is important to highlight the role of some internal players in the introduction of such measures (Kaunert et al., 2012). Thus, US influence should not be overestimated overall, as notably observed by de Goede (2008a) who has shown how the EU was a world leader in pre-emptive security practices prior to US intervention. EU–US cooperation is now wide-ranging and has been underpinned by various agreements covering the air travel of individuals, international bank transfers, and trade, amongst others. Given the seemingly decreasing importance of Europe for recent US administrations, it can be argued that EU–US counter-terrorism cooperation is likely to be maintained in future, albeit with limited potential for significant growth.

The ‘war on terror’ started in Afghanistan and Pakistan, a theatre of which the strategic importance has decreased over time with the withdrawal of Western troops. In August 2021, the US administration withdrew its last remaining troops after a 20-year war, which saw bloodshed and failed to defeat the Taliban (Williams and Parkin, 2021). The EU stepped up its efforts over time and contributed to a number of capacity-building projects. It footed the bill for a significant number of high-profile international projects that cost billions of euros, until it decided in August 2021 to freeze its development funding and government assistance to Afghanistan following the Taliban’s takeover. One can question what most Western efforts in Afghanistan, includ-
ing the EU-funded projects, have exactly achieved, especially as the country is now controlled again by the Taliban. In Pakistan, the EU has continued to run projects on a modest scale, but it is unclear what impact those have had. However, it is noteworthy that the EU has undertaken all these activities in an area not in its vicinity. However, given the lacklustre outcome in the region overall, it seems unlikely that the EU will often venture out further afield in the near future. Furthermore, one can argue that the most pressing challenges faced by the EU originate from within the organisation or in its neighbourhood.

Following on from this case of South Asia, the book has highlighted a higher than expected level of EU activity in Syria and Iraq after the rise of Daesh. Since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the main area of Western efforts to combat terrorism has been the Middle East. Unsurprisingly, the USA has been the dominant player here with a sizeable military presence, but the EU’s role in the region has grown significantly over time. It will be interesting to see how it will evolve in the years to come, now that Daesh has been considerably weakened, although the US withdrawal from the region could leave Europe more vulnerable should Daesh undergo a revival in future.

Thus, the overall assessment is that the EU has actually been far from being the ‘absent friend’ that Keohane (2008) called it in one of the first pieces considering the external dimension of EU counter-terrorism over a decade ago. However, this characterisation of the EU has remained influential overall. As previously discussed, it has notably been fuelled by the use of a rather narrow definition of external action, which has obscured the EU’s strengths, emphasised its weaknesses, and implicitly compared the EU to the USA. A more accurate description of the Union nowadays is arguably that it has been ‘an invisible friend’ – not absent, but working in the less spectacular and less visible aspects of counter-terrorism. The EU has been quietly active and growing in capabilities since the attacks on the USA almost twenty years ago. While not fighting a spectacular and newsworthy ‘war on terror’ in the style of the USA, it has focused on building up its tools to provide long-term counter-terrorism assistance and capability-building aid, whilst adopting agreements with third states. As demonstrated in this book, the EU has played a complex and diverse role in counter-terrorism around the world. In short, the EU has become one of the most significant, but certainly not the most visible, actors in global counter-terrorism. Nevertheless, this role has been shared with the member states, which also explains why the EU has sometimes remained in the background and has assumed long-term tasks that do not always make news headlines.

While the oft-neglected role of the EU is empirically interesting and worthy of research in itself, much more important has been the rapidity of the EU’s progress and how and why this has occurred. Looking at how and why entails drawing upon theoretical tools developed elsewhere to see if they help shed
light on this area of global politics. Furthermore, it is possible and illuminating to see if similar patterns can be discerned in the processes of European integration in various policy areas. The events of 9/11, subsequent terrorist attacks, and the general threat of jihadist terrorism have been of undeniable importance in expanding the EU’s security role overall. Indeed, the threat of terrorism has changed the EU and its governance substantially. The questions of how and why the EU has grown as a counter-terrorism actor have been addressed through our examination of actorness. What has been particularly significant is the shift towards terrorism being seen as an issue to be dealt with domestically to being an area where the EU has a high level of competence, whilst member states and their citizens want the EU to do more. This has likely occurred because of the material characteristics of the terrorist threat itself, which has indeed become increasingly transnational rather than simply domestic. However, it is important to also highlight the role of the EU, notably the European Commission, in framing it as such. The member states also appear to have increasingly accepted this perception. Thus, this book has shown how issues can move from national to supranational governance, which has also contributed to the theoretical literature on European integration.

To conclude, this study has demonstrated how much the EU has developed as a counter-terrorism actor since 9/11 and has examined the reasons for this growth. The EU has become significant in many of the main conflict zones of the globe, albeit not in a uniform manner. Overall, the growth in the EU’s global counter-terrorism role has been remarkable. This chapter now considers two important challenges that are likely to influence the development of the EU’s global counter-terrorism role in the near future. They are the rise of right-wing terrorism and the consequences of Brexit for the relations between the EU, the UK, and the USA.

TWO CHALLENGES AND THEIR LIKELY IMPACT ON THE EU’S GLOBAL COUNTER-TERRORISM ROLE

Terrorist threats are forever evolving, and much has changed since 2001. Rapoport’s (2001) ‘wave theory’ has shown how technology has often played a permissive role in such developments. Al-Qaeda declined and Daesh overtook it as the main jihadist threat, although it has now been considerably weakened. The main concern now stems from the fact that Daesh has become fragmented and some of those who travelled to fight for it may have been trying to return home. Small numbers of Muslims have been attracted to the world views of jihadist groups. Some have travelled to fight abroad or carried out attacks against Western states. It is in this changing context that efforts to combat terrorism have taken place. For Rapoport (2001), each ‘wave’ of terrorism lasted about a generation. Perhaps this one has now run its course.
with the dream of a caliphate and Islamic resurgence largely extinguished. Now it must seem like the obstacles to a caliphate are all but insurmountable and high levels of support from the abstract ‘community’ have not been forthcoming. Each wave appears to last just as long as there is a glimmer of hope. The present wave may have even been prolonged by what some have seen as a counter-productive over-reaction of the USA and its allies after 9/11, including the fateful invasion of Iraq. Through a complex set of events, including the Syrian Civil War, the invasion of Iraq has ultimately led to the emergence of Daesh – a threat that has ended up causing significant difficulties for Europe.

If indeed the demise of Daesh in the Middle East acts as the harbinger of the end of the fourth wave of modern international terrorism (Rapoport, 2001), then this book will have successfully covered the majority of the arc of the EU’s activities against terrorism – especially jihadist terrorism – since 9/11. Terrorism will not just disappear after one of its waves has ended – one of the great misunderstandings of the ‘war on terror’. More likely, terrorist groups disintegrate as they are hunted down, there is in-fighting within groups and future generations take little interest in carrying on the fight. Looking towards the future, there has been increasing concern about the growth in right-wing terrorism in Europe, notably as a reaction to the ‘refugee crisis’ and the terrorist attacks that have marked 2015–16 (Léonard and Kaunert, 2021c).

Right-Wing Terrorism and the EU

Right-wing terrorism has been on the rise and growing faster than other types of terrorism (Koehler, 2019). In Western states, the far-right accounted for 17.2 per cent of attacks in 2018 and had risen by 320 per cent over the five previous years (Global Terrorism Index, 2019). Some established terrorism studies scholars have speculated that the ‘fifth wave’ of terrorism might come from the right (Koehler, 2019). It is open to question whether the EU has hitherto taken this upcoming threat seriously enough and has taken all necessary measures that may become necessary to address it effectively.

Right-wing terrorism derives from a vision of the superiority of one societal group over others. In this specific instance, it is likely that the individuals and groups in question will focus on Muslims, Jews, and regional or state-specific minorities. Moreover, there are certain strategic and tactical trends. On the level of strategy, right-wing terrorists have pioneered the approach of ‘leaderless resistance’, which refers to individuals or small groups engaging in terrorism unrelated to a larger group (Kaplan, 1997; Michael, 2012). Questions abound as to whether this is an effective approach in terms of goals, but these individuals and small groups are more than just a mere nuisance; there is notably potential for violent spirals amongst societal groups. Also, the Internet can likely be seen as a game changer for leaderless resistance as more
Conclusion

people can access relevant material, such as extreme ideas or instructions for making weapons (Berger, 2019). Recent high-profile attacks by right-wing terrorists, such as Brenton Tarrant, Dylann Roof, and Anders Behring Breivik were carried out by single actors. However, it appears that they had engaged with other individuals – notably online – who offered them support, encouragement, and direction. Rarely have right-wing terrorists organised in large groups or lasted for a long time, at least not in Europe. Indeed, Koehler has pointed to an increasing trend of small unit tactics among German right-wing groups since 2000, whilst 73.2 per cent of groups existed for no longer than a year (Koehler, 2014). In terms of tactics, a wide range of methods have been used, but explosives and arson appear to have dominated in Germany (Koehler, 2014: 54). Shootings have been particularly noticeable in some of the aforementioned recent high-profile attacks. Piazza (2009: 67) has also highlighted the increasing violence of right-wing terrorist groups, which he has found to be generally more violent than nationalist and leftist groups, with 5.1 victims per attack on the basis of data between 1998 and 2005. Finally, it is noteworthy that there has been a tendency not to take responsibility for attacks, which is somewhat surprising since terrorism is usually seen as a form of political communication. It also further renders distinction from hate crime more difficult (Koehler, 2019: 9).

Right-wing terrorism is not a new issue in Europe. Indeed, not only is there abundant inspiration from the fascist regimes of the past, but there have been several right-wing terrorist groups of note since 1945, such as during Italy’s Years of Lead, Germany’s National Socialist Underground, and neo-Nazi skinhead movements across the continent, the origins of which have been traced back to the UK (Bjorgo, 1995; Hoffman, 1982; Manthe, 2018). The 1990s have typically been seen as a period of declining terrorism. Since 9/11, the issue of major concern has been jihadist terrorism (Blackbourn et al., 2019). Right-wing terrorism in Europe mostly seems to have been of lower importance until the 2010s. However, the difficulty of separating terrorism and hate crime may have played a role by masking the issue to some extent. Anders Behring Breivik’s attack in 2011 was particularly influential in generating concern about emerging right-wing terrorism in Europe. The global financial crisis, the ensuing austerity, the ‘refugee crisis’, an upsurge in populism, and the increasingly blurry lines between centre-right and extreme right all seem to be auspicious circumstances for its rise. Schuurman (2019) has shown that there has been only limited research on right-wing terrorism in general. However, this gap seems to be particularly acute in relation to Europe. Most literature on this issue has been either historical or focused on a limited set of states. There has been some research on Germany as it has come to terms with the upsurge of right-wing terrorism, whilst Pisoiu (2015) has applied subcultural theory to both jihadi and right-wing radicalisation in the country,
arguing for a greater focus on agency and subcultural context. In addition to Germany, Scandinavia has been of interest to scholars, perhaps spurred by Breivik, but more generally by powerful far-right groups in the region (Hardy, 2019; Ravndal, 2018).

Furthermore, the linkages between immigration and terrorism in Europe have been explored. For instance, McAlexander has argued that, between 1980 and 2004, increases in migration were positively correlated with increases in right-wing terrorism, notably because the arrival of migrants aggravated the grievances of those on the radical right. In this perspective, terrorism has been ultimately seen as a strategic choice (McAlexander, 2020). Some scholars have speculated that right-wing terrorism might become an increasingly transnational phenomenon, albeit probably not to the same extent as jihadist terrorism (Caiani and Kroll, 2014; Stevenson, 2019). What can be observed here is how patchy and somewhat limited the knowledge and understanding of right-wing terrorism in Europe remains, which adds to the challenges inherent to addressing it. However, this is not the only challenge to be faced by the EU in counter-terrorism in the next few years. It will also have to deal with the consequences of Brexit, which are also intertwined with possible tensions in the transatlantic relationship.

The EU, the UK, and the USA after Brexit

The UK’s departure from the EU on 31 January 2020 is likely to have significant and mostly unwelcome consequences for both the EU and the UK in the area of counter-terrorism. In general, it introduces a significant number of hurdles that will need to be overcome before a substantial level of cooperation becomes again a possibility. In addition, the UK used to act as a driving force for the development of EU counter-terrorism when it was still a member state. Its departure from the EU might therefore lead to a loss of impetus in this policy area. The proponents of Brexit may have been somewhat over-confident of what – and at what cost – the UK can achieve on its own, whilst the EU faces some challenges after losing such an important contributor to its counter-terrorism cooperation. This may lead to the creation of security gaps.

While not the only important actor in driving the EU’s counter-terrorism policy – the Commission and other member states have played key roles at times – the UK has in many ways been vital to the development of EU counter-terrorism at crucial points (Parliament.uk, 2016a; Rees, 2008). In fact, it can be argued that the UK has probably been the most important member state in pushing the EU counter-terrorism agenda forward (HM Government, 2017c). Like other member states, the UK recognised that cooperation at the EU level was urgent after 9/11, not least because a number of the hijackers had passed through London to reach the USA prior to the attacks. Subsequently,
the UK played a major role in several ways: it showed leadership in the area; it exported or uploaded domestic measures to the EU; and it consistently championed EU–US cooperation and agreements in the field of counter-terrorism.

First, the UK demonstrated leadership in counter-terrorism with its role in bringing about the EU’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy during its presidency in the second half of 2005 – a document that is strikingly similar to the UK’s own counter-terrorism strategy. As an interviewee pointed out in 2010, the EU’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy is the UK’s with just a few different words (Interview with a member state representative, June 2010). Second, UK efforts to upload domestic security measures to the EU level were evident in the cases of the DRD in 2006 (Ripoll Servent, 2013) and the EU PNR system, which was agreed in 2016 (itself originally exported from the USA). The UK had followed the US lead and started collecting and using PNR data in 2004 – many years before any other member state (Bakowski and Voronova, 2015). The UK (along with the European Commission) pushed for an EU PNR system for a number of years. Despite lukewarm support to begin with, amid scepticism and concern about mass data retention, other member states were slowly brought on board due to an apparent recognition of the benefits of collecting the data and the willingness to take action following several attacks (Bakowski and Voronova, 2015; Pawlak, 2009a). Third, the UK consistently supported EU–US counter-terrorism cooperation, such as in the cases of the several EU–US PNR Agreements. De Goede (2008a: 161) once commented that ‘[i]t becomes clear that, with respect to a number of policies that play a key role in preemptive security practice, including criminalizing terrorist support, data retention, and asset freezing, the European Union is world leader rather than reluctant follower’. Thus, the USA and the UK have been two of the key players pushing for more EU counter-terrorism cooperation. In the last few years, the EU has altered its previously strict data protection standards as it has concluded more agreements with the USA, notably as a result of windows of opportunity being exploited by the UK and others to push for more cooperation at the EU level. To sum up, the UK has evidently been a leader in the area of counter-terrorism in general, but it has also been important in pushing for controversial measures and cooperation with third states. With Brexit, the UK has lost its influence as an EU member state, whilst the EU has lost the driving force of the UK in this policy area.

For the UK, David Davis, the then Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, identified ‘maintaining the strong security co-operation we have with the EU’ as one of the government’s four main objectives in the negotiations with the EU in 2020 (Hansard, 2016). On the EU side, the appointment of Sir Julian King as the Commissioner for the Security Union following the resignation of Lord Hill after the EU membership referendum in the UK demonstrated the importance of the UK to the other EU member states.
in the area of security. With Brexit, the UK has lost both the ability to influence the EU’s direction and access to a number of EU agencies and databases, some of which have been considered important to the UK security agencies. As for the EU, the development of its counter-terrorism cooperation may lose some momentum, given the important role that the UK used to play in that policy area, including its contributions to the EU’s security information databases. It is possible for the EU and the UK to forge new forms of counter-terrorism cooperation, but this will require creativity and goodwill from all parties, whilst the results may be sub-optimal compared to what could be achieved when the UK was still an EU member state.

Finally, it is important to note that Brexit may also have an impact on the EU–US relationship on counter-terrorism, given the bridging role that the UK traditionally played between continental Europe and the USA when it was still a member of the EU. In general, EU–US relations have improved since Trump’s departure from the White House. Nevertheless, Europe has appeared to decline in strategic importance for the USA in recent decades, in parallel with America’s pivot to Asia. This suggests that, although EU–US counter-terrorism cooperation may well be maintained, it is unlikely to grow significantly.

AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

There are many possibilities for future research stemming from this work, both theoretical and empirical. On the theoretical front, how does the analytical framework map onto other areas of EU cooperation outside of counter-terrorism? Can such an approach help explain why certain issues have been moved to the EU level? Empirically, at this stage, it seems important to further assess EU counter-terrorism in relation to Daesh, which has been largely overlooked to date. How much of a role has the EU played, especially in Iraq and Syria? EU activity in Afghanistan has also remained under-researched. It is not clear why this issue has been so neglected, especially given the scale of the EU’s engagement. Perhaps the tools of international relations could be used to examine the EU’s relations with Afghanistan, not only in the area of counter-terrorism, but also in relation to aid and trade. This is a fascinating case of significant EU engagement that has remained largely under-researched. Literature on the EU’s engagement with Iraq and Syria has also remained limited, possibly because of the continued domination of state-based approaches.

Additionally, a significant amount has been written on the EU–US relationship and the influence that Washington has had on EU counter-terrorism, but what about the main players within the EU? For example, not much attention has been given to the UK’s role in the development of the external dimension
of EU counter-terrorism. It is now a particularly interesting issue in the wake of Brexit. To date, there have only been passing references to the UK’s role in this area, although it has been amongst the main member states pushing for greater counter-terrorism cooperation at the EU level. Leading on from this, how has the ‘war on terror’ influenced EU member states? There has been limited research on states, such as Germany, which have a history of strong data protection safeguards, and on the ways in which such protection has been eroded as the ‘war on terror’ has progressed. What influence have attacks such as those that occurred in France in 2015 had on the EU? Has France now become a more active player in EU counter-terrorism due to its own experiences? This is important in relation to Brexit because it raises the question of which member states, if any, will lead in the development of AFSJ cooperation, including counter-terrorism, following the departure of the UK from the EU? More generally, now with a longer-term view, how exactly and how much has European integration been influenced by terrorism? What role have the EU institutions played, possibly by taking advantage of ‘windows of opportunities’ that have opened following terrorist attacks?

Many possible avenues for future research follow from this book. Having said that, it can be concluded that the EU has become a much more important actor in counter-terrorism on the global stage than it was at the start of the twenty-first century. Terrorism has been a significant factor in fostering greater security cooperation amongst European states and has changed the course of EU integration, particularly since 2001. How will these decades marked by significant crises be viewed in decades to come in relation to European integration? If the EU weatheres the current storms, it will emerge a more influential actor than it was before.
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