A Critical Analysis of the Use of Community Intelligence in Local Neighbourhood Policing in South Wales

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Abstract

This research critically analyses the use of community intelligence in the delivery of local neighbourhood policing in South Wales and the police service in general. It examines in detail the development of policing and intelligence, particularly neighbourhood policing and community intelligence from its early beginnings and evaluates the contemporary definitions and police officer and staff perceptions of neighbourhood policing and community intelligence. This research also proposes a new definition of community intelligence and analyses how community intelligence is gathered, recorded and processed, and its relationship to the Intelligence Cycle and the National Intelligence Model. It further examines the operational application of community intelligence, including in counter terrorism and tackling organised crime, and the competing priorities, tensions and contradictions between performance management, neighbourhood policing, problem-oriented policing and intelligence-led policing. This research also evaluates the decision making process and how that may be affected by organisational issues such as, organisational culture, behaviour, management, leadership, information and knowledge. It examines the importance of community engagement in developing community intelligence and providing cohesive policing services to the public. Furthermore, this research considers the future directions of community intelligence and research on policing. The findings from this research indicate that some community intelligence is used to direct policing patrols and operations. However, there is some confusion by police officers and staff as to what constitutes community information and intelligence and thus it is not always recorded correctly limiting its use in the delivery of local neighbourhood policing and resulting in the loss of intelligence. This serves to highlight some of the areas for improvement in the policies, procedures, systems and management of intelligence. The findings also indicate the potential use of community intelligence in counter terrorism and in the provision of improved policing services to the public.
Acknowledgements

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Finally, my family and friends, particularly my father Cliff, late mother Vera and my wife Deb, who have given me unconditional support over the years for which I am sincerely grateful.
Author’s Declaration

I declare that the work in this thesis was carried out in accordance with the regulations of the University of South Wales (and previously the University of Glamorgan). The work is original except where acknowledged or indicated by special reference in the text. No part of this thesis has been submitted for any other degree.

Any views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and in no way represent those of the University of South Wales.

This thesis has not been presented to any other university for examination in the United Kingdom or overseas.

Signed:

Date:
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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

9/11 11\(^{th}\) September 2001
24/7 Twenty-four hours a day/seven days a week
ACPO Association of Chief Police Officers
ASB Anti-Social Behaviour
BCE Before the Common Era (synonymous with the Christian: Before Christ (BC))
BCPD Baltimore County Police Department
BCU Basic Command Unit
Blog Web Log
BSA British Sociological Association
CAPS Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy
CCTV Closed Circuit Television
CDRP Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership
CE Common Era (synonymous with the Christian: Anno Domini (AD))
CHEERS Community, Harmful, Expectation, Events, Recurring, Similarity
CHIS Covert Human Intelligence Source
CIA Central Intelligence Agency (USA)
CIC Commission on Integration and Cohesion
CLG Communities and Local Government
COPE Citizen Oriented Police Enforcement
CompStat Computer Statistics or Comparative Statistics
CRCSG Crime Reduction and Community Safety Group
CSAS Community Safety Accreditation Scheme
CSO Community Support Officer
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CSP</td>
<td>Community Safety Partnership</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSU</td>
<td>Dedicated Source Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>EFQM</td>
<td>European Foundation for Quality Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESRC</td>
<td>Economic and Social Research Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EVA</td>
<td>Environmental Visual Audit</td>
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<tr>
<td>FIB</td>
<td>Force Intelligence Bureau</td>
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<tr>
<td>FIO</td>
<td>Field Intelligence Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>FLSO</td>
<td>Front Line Support Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>GIS</td>
<td>Geographic Information System</td>
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<tr>
<td>GPS</td>
<td>Global Positioning System</td>
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<tr>
<td>HMCE</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s Customs and Excise</td>
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<tr>
<td>HMIC</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMRC</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (formerly HMCE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IALEIA</td>
<td>International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBM</td>
<td>International Business Machines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDeA</td>
<td>Improvement and Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMI</td>
<td>Intelligence Manager Interview</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMQ</td>
<td>Intelligence Manager Questionnaire</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMPACT</td>
<td>Intelligence Management, Prioritisation, Analysis, Coordination and Tasking</td>
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<tr>
<td>iR3</td>
<td>Resource Management System deployed by South Wales Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIS</td>
<td>Information Systems Improvement Strategy</td>
</tr>
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</table>
JUSE  Japanese Union of Scientists and Engineers

KIN  Key Individual Network

LAPD  Los Angeles Police Department
LIO  Local Intelligence Officer
LNPQ  Local Neighbourhood Policing Questionnaire

MoP  Member of the Public
MOPI  Management of Police Information
MP  Member of Parliament

NBM  Neighbourhood Beat Manager
NCA  National Crime Agency
NCIS  National Criminal Intelligence Service
NCS  National Crime Squad
NDM  National Decision Model
NICHE  Record Management System utilised by South Wales Police
NIM  National Intelligence Model
NIMIP  National Intelligence Model Implementation Project
NIR  National Intelligence Report
NNPP  National Neighbourhood Policing Programme
NPIA  National Policing Improvement Agency
NPT  Neighbourhood Policing Team
NRPP  National Reassurance Policing Programme
NSPIS  Command and Control System utilised by South Wales Police
NYPD  New York Police Department
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PACT</td>
<td>Partnerships and Communities Together</td>
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<td>PCC</td>
<td>Police and Crime Commissioner</td>
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<td>PCSD</td>
<td>Police and Crime Standards Directorate</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCSO</td>
<td>Police Community Support Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDCA</td>
<td>Plan, Do, Check and Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDSA</td>
<td>Plan, Do, Study and Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>PhD</td>
<td>Doctor of Philosophy</td>
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<td>PIE</td>
<td>Prevention, Intelligence and Enforcement</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNC</td>
<td>Police National Computer</td>
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<tr>
<td>PND</td>
<td>Police National Database</td>
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<tr>
<td>POLKA</td>
<td>Police On-Line Knowledge Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPO</td>
<td>Persistent and Prolific Offender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Public Service Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>QC</td>
<td>Queen’s Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QPM</td>
<td>Queen’s Police Medal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADAR</td>
<td>Results, Approaches, Deploy, Assess and Refine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAI</td>
<td>Research, Analysis and Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RITES</td>
<td>Researching Identifying and Tracing the Electronic Suspect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMS</td>
<td>Record Management System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rt Hon</td>
<td>Right Honourable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SARA</td>
<td>Scanning, Analysis, Response and Assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>SB</td>
<td>Special Branch</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCPO</td>
<td>Schools Community Police Officer</td>
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<td>SID</td>
<td>Systems for Investigations and Detection</td>
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<tr>
<td>SN</td>
<td>Social Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPSS</td>
<td>Statistical Products and Service Solutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRA</td>
<td>Social Research Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSO</td>
<td>Sector Support Officer (formally FLSO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWP</td>
<td>South Wales Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>UKBA</td>
<td>United Kingdom Border Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKVI</td>
<td>United Kingdom Visas and Immigration</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>USB</td>
<td>Universal Serial Bus</td>
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<tr>
<td>USIC</td>
<td>United States Intelligence Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAG</td>
<td>Welsh Assembly Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>WECTU</td>
<td>Welsh Extremism and Counter Terrorism Unit</td>
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Chapter 1: Introduction

Overview

Policing in the United Kingdom (UK), particularly in England and Wales is undergoing significant challenges and changes as the drive for professionalisation and the creation of a body of police knowledge to support the concept of policing as a profession is developed. In support of these changes such institutes as the College of Policing are attempting to promote the idea of evidence-based practice, focusing upon quality research, including academic and practitioner based research and evaluations (College of Policing, 2013a). However, research on policing remains an emotive subject, particularly when discussing what should be researched. Initiated in the United States of America (USA) in the early 1950s and in the UK in the 1960s, research on policing has gone through many stages of development and has been undertaken and supported by a variety of different institutions (Reiner, 1989; 1992a; 2010; Thomas, 2014).

This research on policing, critically analyses the use of community intelligence in local neighbourhood policing in South Wales, within the context of the National Intelligence Model (NIM) and the delivery of policing services. In view of the number of theoretical perspectives and concepts that were considered as part of the research literature review, a mixed methods research methodology and methods were used to investigate the research question; What use is made of community intelligence in informing and directing local neighbourhood policing in South Wales?

This mixed methods approach included the collection of primary data from postal survey self-completion questionnaires and semi-structured interviews. The research findings will also be critically analysed to assess how community intelligence and local neighbourhood policing is perceived by police officers and staff from South Wales Police. It will evaluate how community intelligence is obtained through community engagement, the analysis of
command and control and record management systems, and social media sites. This research will also examine the processes used to record and analyse community and criminal intelligence, the value placed on community intelligence and the application of community intelligence to inform and direct local neighbourhood policing. It will also analyse the application of community intelligence in reducing crime, anti-social behaviour and the fear of crime, and particularly its use in counter terrorism and tackling organised crime.

Research Synopsis

Chapter 2 examines policing in the UK from its earliest beginnings and places this into context, but focuses on the development of policing in the metropolis and the provinces since the formation of the Metropolitan Police in 1829 (Home Office, 1829). This chapter continues to examine the origins of the Nine Principles of Policing often associated with Sir Robert Peel and the first joint commissioners of the Metropolitan Police, Sir Charles Rowan and Sir Richard Mayne (Flanagan, 2007). It goes on to explore the various modern styles of policing (Alderson, 1979; Emsley, 1999), the role of the modern police, police reform and the extended police family (Cassels, 1996), as well as neighbourhood policing as a concept (Rodriguez, 1993) and as a style of policing (Association of Chief Officers (ACPO), 2006e). This chapter also considers the importance of community engagement in obtaining community intelligence from diverse local communities in order to provide the services that meet the needs and expectations of those communities and the techniques that are available to enhance engagement (Myhill, 2006). It explores the concepts of social capital and collective efficacy (Putnam, 1993; 2000; Bandura, 1997) in developing social networks and trust, and its importance in solving community problems. This chapter also examines the Coalition Government’s commitment to the concept of the ‘Big Society’ (Home Office, 2010i) and police reform (Home Office, 2010f). Furthermore, it examines the links between community engagement, social capital, the Big Society and citizen participation (Arnstein, 1969) and their relationship with social cohesion (Renauer, 2007) and a more democratic style of policing (Lowe and Innes,
This chapter concludes by examining the key messages and themes emerging from the literature and official guidance, and the importance of the interactive relationship between those themes, namely; neighbourhoods, neighbourhood profiling, Key Individual Networks (KINs), partnership resource audits, community engagement, community cohesion, citizen focus, problem solving, community intelligence, communication, social marketing and evaluation in providing cohesive policing services to the public.

Chapter 3 explores the development of intelligence from its historical origins and again places this into context (Kahn, 2008), whilst introducing the concept of criminal intelligence (ACPO, 1975). This chapter focuses on the development of community intelligence and examines the various definitions of community intelligence in use at the time of this research (Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC), 1999b; ACPO, 2005c; 2006a; 2006c; 2010b; Innes, Roberts and Maltby, 2005; Innes and Roberts, 2007; National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA), 2010b). The researcher also proposes an alternative definition of community intelligence in this chapter. It also considers the various incarnations of the Intelligence Cycle (United States Intelligence Community (USIC), 2011) and examines in detail the NIM (National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS), 2000) and its use by the police and Community Safety Partnerships (CSPs) (Home Office, 2006e). Furthermore, this chapter provides an in depth discussion of the application of intelligence and intelligence process outcomes (NCIS, 2000). This discussion examines the NIM and its compatibility with performance management, particularly CompStat (Maple and Mitchell, 2000), problem-oriented policing (Goldstein, 1990) and intelligence-led policing (Ratcliffe, 2008a). This chapter also examines the relationship between the three main models of policing; neighbourhood policing, problem-oriented policing and intelligence-led policing and other prominent models such as broken windows theory (Kelling and Wilson, 1982), zero-tolerance policing (Dennis, 1998), knowledge-based policing (Williamson, 2008) and evidenced-based policing (Sherman, 1998). In addition this chapter considers the importance of intelligence and
the NIM in counter terrorism and tackling organised crime. The chapter concludes by examining how the NIM as a business model and organisational decision making (Drucker, 1967) are affected by organisational culture, behaviour, management, leadership, information and knowledge, and the police National Decision Model (NDM) (ACPO, 2012).

Chapter 4 describes the research question, aim, objectives and rationale for this research. It explains in detail the mixed methods research methodology and design chosen for this research. This chapter also goes on to describe the quantitative and qualitative research methods employed in this research (i.e. postal survey self-completion questionnaires and semi-structured interviews) and discusses the concept of the inside-insider and the outside-insider researcher (Brown, 1996). In addition this chapter discusses sampling and data analysis, and concludes by examining the ethical, political and legal considerations, the validity, reliability and objectivity of the research and reflexivity. It also provides a personal first person account of the researcher’s reflexivity.

Chapters 5 provides a comprehensive and critical analysis of the research findings, from the postal survey self-completion questionnaires and semi-structured interviews, whilst Chapter 6 discusses the research findings in great detail and provides an overall interpretation of the results from the research methods employed. It also emphasises the broader implications of this research and the key messages and themes that emerged from the review of the academic literature and official guidance.

Chapter 7 (the final chapter) considers the original contribution to scientific knowledge made by this research and the practical lessons from this research, which includes a number of recommendations that South Wales Police and other police forces may wish to consider for the possible improvement of policing systems and services. It also considers
potential future research and future directions in policing, and provides a first person description of the researcher’s personal learning and development from this research.
Chapter 2: Policing and Community Engagement

Introduction

Whilst much of the current debate on policing in the UK has focused on the changes introduced in the last two decades, it would be incomplete if an appraisal of the wider history of policing in the UK was not considered. By doing so, the debate surrounding the methods of policing employed within the UK, particularly within England and Wales can be placed into context, as well as increasing the understanding of the concept of community or neighbourhood policing as advocated by, for example, Sherman, Milton and Kelly (1973); Alderson (1979); Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux (1990); Friedmann (1992); Bayley (1994); Skogan and Hartnett (1997); Hartnett and Skogan (1999); Innes (2004b); Fielding and Innes (2006); Skogan (2006) and Tilley (2008) and the importance of community engagement (Myhill, 2006), social capital (Putnam, 1993; 2000), the Big Society (Home Office, 2010) and citizen participation (Arnstein, 1969), in obtaining community intelligence (Innes and Roberts, 2007) from diverse local communities, in order to provide cohesive policing services to those communities.

Policing in the United Kingdom in Context

A style of policing, which to some extent, is recognisable in the modern police organisation appears to have originated during the early eleventh century, CE with the Saxon frith-borh (peace pledge) or frankpledge, which required every adult male to give an obligation or pledge to be collectively responsible for the good behaviour of himself and others, and to keep the King's peace (Lee, 1901; Critchley, 1967; Alderson, 1979; Rawlings, 2008).

The later became more formalised with a group of ten families forming themselves into a teothung or tything, which was headed by a tythingman. A group of ten tythings or a hundred was then headed by a royal-reeve or hundredman, who reported to the local
shire-reeve or sheriff of a shire or county. This person had overall responsibility for keeping the King’s peace in the shire. However, if an individual witnessed a crime being committed, there was an expectation and an obligation to the King that they would raise the alarm or *hue and cry* and pursue the offender, with the intention of bringing them to justice (Lee, 1901; Critchley, 1967; Alderson, 1979; Giblin, 2007; 2009; Rawlings, 2008; Metropolitan Police Service, 2009; Osborne, 2009). In addition, under the common law power of the county or *posse comitatus*, the sheriff could summon the assistance of all males over the age of 15 years to prevent any disorder or to pursue offenders (Lee, 1901; Critchley, 1967; Rawlings, 2002; Zedner, 2006).

It was only after the Norman Conquest of 1066 that this system of social policing changed, although many of the former practices survived. The Normans introduced the old French term of *conestable* (later *constable*), which is believed to have been derived from the Latin *comes stabuli* (master of the horse or head of the stable), a military term of high office first used by the Romans in the fifth century, CE. However, the Norman concept of the constable was not a military one, but involved an adult male from a village or parish being chosen to hold the position of parish constable for a period of one year. This position was unpaid and often the duties of constable were carried out in addition to the individual’s main form of employment (Lee, 1901; Critchley, 1967; Alderson, 1979; Giblin, 2007; 2009; Osborne, 2009).

In 1166 the Assize of Clarendon ordained that people of the villages should report criminals (‘a robber or murderer or thief’) or make ‘presentments’ to the constable who would then give evidence to a further ‘twelve of the more lawful men of the hundred’, who in effect would act as a jury and if necessary report matters to the sheriff who would then take the accused before the King’s justice (Stephenson and Marcham, 1937b: 76; Critchley, 1967; Alderson, 1979; Halsall, 1996). This can be seen to be the basis of the present day jury system in the UK, which operates within the wider criminal justice system.
It was not until 1242, sometimes incorrectly reported as 1252 (Critchley, 1967; Giblin, 2007; 2009), that a Royal Writ, The Ordinance for the Preservation of the Peace, 1242 finally formalised the office of chief constable (or high constable) of the hundred and the constable of the vill (also referred to as the petty or parish constable). The chief constable was responsible for the command of all men between the age of 15 and 60 years who were sworn to arms, (the assize of arms) in the hundred and for the conservation of the King’s peace. The chief constable was only answerable to the commands of the sheriff and two knights appointed by the King to keep the peace in the larger geographical area of the shire (Stephenson and Marcham, 1937c; Critchley, 1967; Emsley, 1996).

From its early beginnings, policing continued to develop over the centuries, through watch schemes (Rawlings, 2002), private thief-takers (Emsley, 1996; Rawlings, 2008; Osborne, 2009), Henry and Sir John Fielding’s Bow Street Runners (or Principle Officers) (Cox, 2010), the science of preventative policing (Colquhoun, 1796; 1800; 1803) and the night watch schemes (Lyman, 1964; Reynolds, 1998; Reiner, 2010), and was put on a more statutory footing by the introduction of various Assizes (e.g. Assizes of the Watch, 1233, 1242 and 1253), Ordinances (e.g. Ordinance for the Preservation of the Peace, 1242), Statutes (e.g. Statute of Winchester, 1285) and Acts of Parliament (e.g. Justices of the Peace Act, 1361, Vagabonds Act, 1383, the Vagabonds and Beggars Act, 1495, the Poor Act, 1575 and the Vagabonds Act, 1609 (Home Office, 1361; 1383; 1495; 1575; 1609; Stephenson and Marcham, 1937a; 1937c).

The New Police of the Metropolis
The formation of the Metropolitan Police in 1829 is nevertheless generally regarded as the birth of modern or new policing by the traditionalist or orthodox historians such as Lee (1901), Howard (1953), Reith (1956), Lyman (1964), Critchley (1967) and Ascoli (1979). For example, Lyman (1964) asserts that;
The Metropolitan Police Act of 1829 introduced a centralized and unified system of police in England. The Act constituted a revolution in traditional methods of law enforcement.
Lyman (1964: 141)

Revisionists such as Storch (1975), Brogden (1987), Styles (1987), Paley (1989), Emsley (1996; 1999; 2007; 2008; 2009), McMullan (1998), Reynolds (1998), Philips and Storch (1999), Reiner (2000; 2010), Harris (2004), Zedner (2006), Smith (2007), Rawlings (2008), Paley and Reynolds (2009) and Cox (2010) hold an alternative and often opposing view of the development of policing. Emsley (2008: 73) argues that the formation of the Metropolitan Police was not the start of new policing, but ‘a significant refinement and centralisation of the old London watches’. Rawlings (2008: 66) also suggests that earlier orthodox police historians, sympatihised with the idea that policing was ‘largely defective’ before 1829, whilst not fully understanding the objectives of the ‘previous systems’ of policing and what they set out to achieve. Styles (1987), McMullan (1998) and Reiner (2000; 2010) also share this viewpoint and argue that the emergence of modern policing was an evolutionary process within the English legal constitution, rather than a revolution in policing. From a slightly different perspective Harris (2004: 153) studied the development of the City of London Police from 1780 to 1840 and came to the same conclusion as other revisionists, that policing during this period ‘evolved gradually’ and ‘no single point defines when the City’s police became more modern or professional’.

Lee (1901: 219) argues that Patrick Colquhoun (1745-1820) was ‘the architect who designed our modern police’ and Sir Robert Peel (1788-1850) was ‘the builder who constructed its framework’, but even Lee concedes that there was a long time between design and construction. However, Paley (1989: 97:98) suggests that Henry Fielding and Colquhoun ‘have been accorded an importance they do not deserve by later historians of police’. Paley (1989: 97:98) also suggests that Henry and Sir John Fielding had ‘no influence at all’ over the legislation in relation to the formation of the Metropolitan Police,
and that Colquhoun had ‘little or no influence in government circles’ and was ‘an astute self-publicist’. McMullan (1998: 138-139) argues that the Fieldings and Colquhoun were ‘three key police thinkers’ whose writings on police reform centred on a ‘system of social control’ and ‘preventive policing’, and many of their ideas eventually resurfaced in Peel’s plan for the Metropolitan Police.

McMullan (1998) also argues that the Fielding’s Bow Street Runners were encouraged and often motivated by market incentives, such as fees and rewards, in an increasingly capitalist society. Brogden (1987) and McMullan (1998) intimate that Colquhoun’s actions in persuading the West India merchants to provide most of the finance for the Thames River Police (Anon, 1819) may be seen as market led private policing with overtones of ‘neo-liberalism’ (Zedner, 2006: 83-84 & 92). Brogden (1987: 12) goes further and suggests that it was market forces that saw the introduction of professional policing and stated that; ‘... professional policing was directly linked to the commercial interests of an expanding capitalism in search of new markets and resources’.

Brogden (1987: 4) further suggests that ‘Ethnocentricity, inadequate comparative knowledge of policing, and a-historicism are the hallmarks of the Anglo-American sociology of the police’. Furthermore, Brogden (1987) argues that the orthodox view of the history and development of British policing has been very insular in its historiography and there has been a failure on behalf of some researchers to look at the wider international picture, particularly policing in the British colonies and its influence on policing in the UK. Styles (1987) disagrees with Brogden’s chronology of events in the history of British colonial policing and their influence on the development of the Metropolitan Police, but agrees on the importance of the comparative history of policing in other countries.

Although Peel is generally credited with the formation of the first modern professional police force in the UK in 1829, in the guise of the Metropolitan Police, other historians
consider the Irish Constabulary Police formed in 1822, with its roots in the Peace Preservation Force, to be the forerunner of modern policing and the model used by Peel to establish the Metropolitan Police (Lyman, 1964; Paley, 1989; Smith, 2007).

There was a conscious effort made by the Government of the time to demilitarise the image of the constable, particularly as the Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815) were still fresh in the minds of the population. It also wished to distance itself from what it believed to be the military style of policing introduced throughout Europe and particularly in France, in the form of the Gendarmerie, which Reith (1956: 134) described as ‘tyrannical, early-totalitarian police’. As a result constables were not armed in the true sense of the word and only carried a wooden staff or baton for protection, as part of their appointment to the office of constable (Lee, 1901; Emsley, 1999; 2007; 2008). Despite this, the first joint commissioners of the Metropolitan Police, Sir Charles Rowan (1782-1852), an Army Colonel and Sir Richard Mayne (1796-1868), a barrister, organised the newly formed police in a distinct hierarchical style, with strict discipline (Emsley, 2008). Rowan had previously served in the Royal Irish Constabulary and had brought much of his experience of policing to bear in creating the policing style for the Metropolitan Police (Lee, 1901).

**Policing in the Metropolis and the Provinces**

Many, particularly the governing and ruling classes saw the establishment of the Metropolitan Police and later the County and Borough Police forces as a professional preventative police force, quite distant from the ‘tyrannical’ Gendarmerie of France described by Reith (1956: 134) above (Philips and Storch, 1999; Emsley, 2008). Nevertheless, there was an expectation that the role of the new police would involve some form of social control in an attempt to raise the moral standards of predominantly the working classes and the poor in society; referred to at the time as the ‘dangerous classes’ (Storch, 1975: 62; 1976: 495). Others feared that the new police would be a domestic standing army based on the Gendarmerie, centrally and politically controlled to
subjugate the poor (Lee, 1901; Lyman, 1964; Storch, 1976; Ascoli, 1979). Although the
new police were eventually accepted by the ruling classes in the provinces, Storch
(1975; 1976) argues that they were resisted in the industrial working class areas, such
as the north of England. The working classes saw the new police as ‘a political, not a
protective force’, who were on a mission of moral reform (Storch, 1975: 66; Paley,
1989).

Emsley (1999; 2007) argues that to put the establishment of the new police into
context, the comparative history of policing in other countries, particularly France, is of
particular importance during this period. In his comparison of policing in Europe, Emsley
(1999: 36-37; 2007: 237-238) identifies three main types of policing systems, namely;
state civilian, state military and municipal. Emsley (1996: 1) also helpfully provides a
general definition of the police as ‘... the bureaucratic and hierarchical bodies employed
by the state to maintain order and to prevent and detect crime.’

Mawby (2008: 17) suggests that the police as an organisation ‘can be distinguished in
terms of its legitimacy, its structure and its function’. This determines the style of
policing adopted by the police organisation, which will generally fall into one of two
categories; those that are ‘control dominated’ or those that are ‘community-oriented’
(Mawby, 2008: 37). Control dominated systems are generally associated with policing
styles in, for example; mainland Europe, British and other European colonies, and
communist European countries. A more community-oriented system of policing is often
associated with the UK and the USA. Mawby (2008) also suggests that the system of
policing that is adopted is inextricably linked to the structure, culture and politics of the
society within which it operates.

The structure, culture and politics at the time of the establishment of the Metropolitan
Police in 1829 certainly would have had an influence on the development of the
Metropolitan Police General Instructions (Rowan and Mayne, 1829). It is now generally
accepted that it was Rowan and Mayne who were responsible for the development of the Metropolitan Police General Instructions on which the Nine Principles of Policing are thought to have been based, but that Peel may have had some influence over their development (Reith, 1956; Ascoli, 1979). Both Reith (1956) and Ascoli (1979) also suggest that Rowan was responsible for writing Part I of the original General Instructions, which dealt with organisational issues and duties, whilst Mayne was responsible for Part II, which was concerned with the legal issues and powers in relation to constables. Part III of the General Instructions, concerned with the General Orders issued between 1829 and 1835 was not added until 1836, which Reith (1956) attributes to Rowan. Reith (1956) and Ascoli (1979) also intimate that in compiling Part I of the General Instructions, Rowan was greatly influenced by the military training of Sir John Moore (1761-1809) and his two part training plan entitled: ‘Military Training’ and ‘Moral Training’ (Moore, 1803 in Reith, 1956:134), which advocated that if crime was prevented, then punishment was unnecessary. Reith (1956: 141) also suggests that ‘… Mayne never fully understood his older colleague’s [Rowan’s] vision and ideas’, particularly in relation to the concept of the prevention of crime. In the opening paragraphs of Part I of the General Instructions to the Metropolitan Police, Rowan was quite specific that policing was about the prevention and detection of crime, the protection of life and property and the preservation of order. However, it was the prevention of crime that was foremost in his mind, when he wrote:

It should be understood, at the outset, that the principal object to be attained is the Prevention of Crime. To this end every effort of the Police is to be directed. (Rowan, 1829 in Reith, 1956: 135)

The Nine Principles of Policing and Modern Policing Styles

The Nine Principles of Policing, often referred to as Peel’s Principles (Flanagan, 2007) are concerned primarily with the prevention of crime and disorder, whilst indicating that the power of the police is dependent on the approval and wilful cooperation of the public. Furthermore, the cooperation of the public will diminish proportionately if the police are
seen to use unnecessary physical force and their main focus is on achieving police objectives, rather than providing a service to the public. The Principles further state that the police must demonstrate absolute impartially in administering the law and only use minimum physical force in achieving their objectives. Cognisance must also be given to the fact that the police are members of the public who are paid to police the community with the interests of the community in mind. The Principles also state that the police must recognise all the facets of the criminal justice system and not take the law into their own hands, and that the efficiency of the police service will ultimately be measured by the absence of crime and disorder. See Appendix 1 for the Nine Principles of Policing.

Lentz and Chaires (2007) in their study of policing textbook history were not able to find any evidence to suggest that the Nine Principles were ever formally documented or listed by Peel. Lentz and Chaires (2007) found that some authors of police history cite orthodox police historians such as Lee (1901) and Reith (1956) as being their source for the list of the Nine Principles of Policing. Unfortunately, Lee (1901: 241) did not produce such a list, but suggests that; ‘... a set of rules and regulations were drawn up embodying principles and maxims upon which our modern police codes rest’. Reith (1956: 287-288) did produce a list entitled; ‘The Nine Principles of Police’, but did not cite its source. Other authors have cited the nine principles produced by Mayhall (1985: 425-426), the 10 principles produced by Folley (1976: 57), and the 12 principles produced by Germann, Day and Gallati (1968: 60-61) and by More (1979: 9). Mayhall (1985) and More (1979) cited Lee (1901) and Reith (1956) as their source for the principles of policing. Folley (1976) cited Browne (1956) as his source, but unfortunately, Browne did not produce a list of the principles and Germann, Day and Gallati (1968) did not cite their source. Reith (1956) conceded that the remaining archive material in relation to the Nine Principles of Policing did not have any evidence of their author or of the date that they were compiled. Lentz and Chaires (2007) therefore, concluded that the Nine Principles of Policing were more likely to have been formulated
by authors from the twentieth century rather than by Rowan, Mayne or Peel in the nineteenth century.

Despite the controversy surrounding their origin, it was with the General Instructions and Nine Principles of Policing in mind that policing developed in the Metropolitan District and across the UK. One particular aspect of the Nine Principles that is often quoted from Principle 7 is that there is a ‘historic tradition the police are the public and that the public are the police’ (Flanagan, 2007: 5). There is a resonance with early forms of policing within this principle, dating back to the Saxon frankpledge and the Norman constable. Furthermore, Principle 2 recognises what we now term, policing by consent.

*To recognise always that the power of the police to fulfil their functions and duties is dependent on public approval of their existence, actions and behaviour and on their ability to secure and maintain public respect.*  
(Flanagan, 2007: 4)

Flanagan (2007), formerly Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary suggests that the Nine Principles of Policing are as valid today as they were in 1829. Mawby (2008) also suggests that this distinguishes the police as an organisation and determines its style of policing. In this case a community-oriented style of policing, that is dependent on public approval. Reith (1956: 140) noted that this policing style was ‘unique in history and throughout the world because it is derived not from fear but almost exclusively from public co-operation with the police’. Alderson (1979) also agrees that without the support of the public, the power of the police to enforce laws will be less effective. Willink (1962: 45) was more pragmatic and suggests that ‘the police are merely paid to act on the citizens’ behalf’.

**Styles of Policing Explored**

Alderson (1979: 35-48) argues that policing styles ‘vary according to cultural, religious, legal, social and political systems’ and highlights a number of different policing styles, namely; Informal Policing, Passive Policing, Punitive Policing, Preventative Policing,
Proactive Policing, Reactive Policing, Repressive Policing and Communal Policing. Alderson suggests that Informal Policing stems from traditional and informal social controls such as customs, shared values and moral standards in a cohesive and stable society. Passive Policing uses informal methods to maintain order in communities that have a high tolerance level of crime and disorder, and regulate their own affairs, whilst Punitive Policing relies on the law to provide extremely harsh penalties that deter people from committing crime. Alderson also suggests that Preventative Policing is the most ethical of the policing styles, in that through crime prevention, there is a reduction in the financial costs to the state and in the suffering of victims. He also makes the link between preventative policing and Proactive Policing, in that proactive policing is preventative as opposed to Reactive Policing, which is ‘a centralized system of responsive policing’ (Scott, 1998: 270). Alderson (1979) argues that proactive policing relies on the cooperation of partner agencies and the community, and provides social leadership. He also blames technology introduced in the 1960s and 1970s, such as Unit Beat Policing technology (Rogers, 2004) for the decline in preventative foot patrols, which provided much more contact with the community and the advent of reactive policing through mobile patrols, but concedes that the police must be capable of reacting to emergencies. Furthermore, Alderson suggests that Repressive Policing generally occurs where the government relies on the police to keep them in power and the police are alienated from the community. He argues that this style of policing can only be sustained when the culture, tradition and the law allow it.

Alderson (1979) further subdivided Communal Policing, into four distinct additional styles of policing, namely; (1) Primitive Communal Policing, (2) Totalitarian Communal Policing, (3) Unofficial Communal Policing and (4) Democratic Communal Policing. Primitive Communal Policing links back to the Saxon frankpledge, tythingman, hundredman, shire-reeve and the hue and cry, which still lies at the heart of policing in the UK. Totalitarian Communal Policing is ruled by politics and is a method of persecution and oppression of the people by the state. Unofficial Communal Policing normally arises in
communities where official policing is weak and other groups take over the role of policing. Alderson argues that this unofficial control can be either benign or malign depending on the will of the group. Democratic Communal Policing on the other hand has the primary aim of creating a community climate free from fear and uncontrolled delinquency and crime. This style of policing would involve the police working in partnership with statutory and voluntary agencies, and representatives of the community for the benefit of the community. Alderson acknowledges that this style of policing is difficult to achieve and is reliant on social action. This has many similarities to what we now term neighbourhood policing and the current Coalition Government’s quest for the Big Society (Home Office, 2010l), which will be discussed in more detail below.

Emsley (1999; 2007) identified three main types of policing systems across Europe as follows: The state civilian police in the cities, the state military police in rural areas and the municipal police in urban areas. Cain (1973) suggests that the style of policing can also vary depending on the location that is being policed and the type of police officer policing those locations. Cain (1973: 123) in her study of policing in the UK argues that ‘... county policemen are more likely than city policemen to share a world – conceptual framework, a set of values – with those they police’. The county police had more contact with the community they policed and had a better understanding of the community’s needs, expectations and aspirations in terms of policing. On the other hand the city police had less knowledge of the people with whom they came into contact, saw the community as fragmented and tended to stereotype individuals. This in effect created two styles of policing; county policing and city policing.

Walters (1996) suggests that other factors also had an influence on the style of policing adopted in the UK in the closing decade of the twentieth century, including the findings from the 1988 British Crime Survey, (Mayhew, Elliott and Dowds, 1989), which indicated a decline in public satisfaction with the police; the launch of the Metropolitan Police Plus Programme (Metropolitan Police Service, 1989; Mawby and Worthington, 2002), which
had a renewed emphasis on service; the Police Service’s Operational Policing Review (Joint Consultative Committee of the Police Staff Associations, 1990) and the Statement of Common Purpose and Values (ACPO, 1990), which reviewed the quality of the service provided to the public. This subsequently led to the Police Service’s commitment to the National Quality of Service Initiative (ACPO, 1990; 1991; Mawby and Worthington, 2002), and many forces adopting the Total Quality Management ethos (Atkinson, 1990; Warcup, 1992). This in turn promoted a customer focused style of policing, which required forces to gather information on customer satisfaction in relation to the service provided by the police. It also required a change in organisational culture, the development and appraisal of staff, and the continual improvement of service provision to achieve organisational goals (Deming, 1986; Atkinson, 1990). Organisational culture will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3: Intelligence and its Policing Applications.

The Role of the Modern Police
Since the establishment of the Metropolitan Police in 1829, the concept and functions of policing have changed and expanded to include a myriad of roles, in line with the ever changing society in which we live. The Royal Commission on the Police (Willink, 1960; 1962) attempted in its final report to summarise the functions of the police into eight succinct points, which included; the prevention and detection of crime, the maintenance of order, the prosecution of offenders, controlling road traffic, assisting certain Government departments and dealing with major and minor emergencies. See Appendix 2 for the Main Functions of the Police.

Alderson (1979) argued that this summary was far too narrow and did not allow or encourage the growth and evolution of policing functions. Alderson developed his own policing objectives, which in addition to the functions outlined above, included objectives in relation to liberty, equality, freedom, human rights, human dignity, happiness, social action, trust and the feeling of security.
Many other studies have been undertaken into policing functions and roles (Banton, 1964; Martin and Wilson, 1969; Punch and Naylor, 1973; Comrie and King, 1974, Steedman, 1984; Shapland and Vagg, 1988; Skogan, 1990; Mawby, 2000). The findings from such studies suggest that many of these policing functions and roles do not initially appear to be related to the prevention and detection of crime or the maintenance of order. Some of the roles, including dealing with welfare and social service functions, have developed as a result of the police being one of the few public services to be available 24 hours a day/seven days a week (24/7) to the public of the UK (Home Office, 1995). However, Mawby (2000) also argues that this is not unique to the UK and that similar roles within policing can be found in the USA and in some parts of Continental Europe.

Due to the increasing demands on the Police Service after World War II (1939–1945) the Service began to employ civilian (or police support) staff to take on many of the administrative processes that were required in the post war era. However, the growth in the number of police support staff members, which ranged from five percent to 25 percent of overall police establishment in some forces, caused concern in some quarters. The increase in support staff numbers was commented upon by the Royal Commission on the Police (Willink, 1960; 1962) which was also concerned about the Police Service’s ability to respond to major incidents. However, despite the concerns of the Royal Commission, the Road Traffic and Roads Improvement Act, 1960 (Home Office, 1960) saw the introduction of traffic wardens and the Police Act, 1964 (Home Office, 1964: 7, Para 10(1)) gave police authorities the statutory authority to ‘employ civilians for police purposes’ within the police area for which a police authority had responsibility. This later enactment paved the way for the future employment of Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs). Reiner (1992b: 781) also suggested that the traditional and fictional Police Constable George Dixon character from the television series, Dixon of Dock Green, (which ran from 1955 to 1976), should be replaced by ‘more pragmatic conceptions of acceptability’, that police personnel should reflect the more diverse communities they
serve and local policing should take into account the priorities and cultures of a postmodern society. Reiner (1992b: 773-775) explains the term ‘postmodern’ by quoting from Mills (1959: 165-176), who suggests that: ‘Our basic definitions of society and of self are being overtaken by new realities’, in a period towards the end of the modern age of enlightenment and industrialisation, which ‘is being succeeded by a postmodern period’.

**Moving the Reform Programme Forward**

The White Paper on Police Reform (Home Office, 1993: 1) clearly stated in its introduction that the problem of increased crime could not be tackled by the police alone, but needed the ‘active support and involvement’ of the people from the communities that the police serve. Sheehy (1993: 16) also ‘recognised that the levels of demand for policing will always outstrip the available resources’. However, Runciman (1993: 6) suggested that there should be a more efficient use of police resources, in that wherever possible police support staff should carry out tasks that did not require the authority of a warranted police officer and that police officers should be supported by the most up-to-date technology. The Police and Magistrates’ Courts Act, 1994 (Home Office, 1994) allowed for the first time, that any police (civilian) support staff member employed by a police authority would come under the direction and control of the chief constable for that police authority area. It also gave the Home Secretary the power to amalgamate police forces and to restructure police authorities.

The Posen Inquiry (Home Office, 1995) was commissioned to review police core and ancillary tasks. The inquiry attempted to distinguish between these tasks and to determine the impact of ancillary tasks being undertaken by other service providers, who were outside the control of the police. The main concerns were that the removal of some or all of the ancillary tasks from the police could undermine the relationship between the police and their communities, and that the public may not have confidence in the new service providers. Mawby (2000: 119) agreed that ‘separating core from ancillary tasks
is a dangerous, if not impossible exercise’ and that there was more public support for transferring some police officer tasks to police support staff, than transferring those tasks to other independent organisations to perform.

The Extended Policing Family

Controversially, one of the options put forward by Cassels (1996) who chaired an independent inquiry into the role and responsibilities of the police, was based on the Dutch Stadswacht (city warden) and Politiesurveillant (police patroller). The Stadswacht operate in 26 Dutch cities and provide high visibility uniformed patrols, deal with minor public enquiries, assist with crime prevention, control minor anti-social behaviour, afford public reassurance and act as the eyes and ears of the police. Many are managed by the police, but they do not have any police powers and do not act as law enforcement officers. By contrast, the Politiesurveillant operate in several large Dutch cities, where they also provide high visibility uniformed patrols. They are at a rank, which is lower than a constable, but higher than the Stadswacht. They are less well trained police officers and have all the powers of a constable, albeit that their duties are more restricted (Cassels, 1996).

Other options put forward by Cassels (1996) were the use of Local Authority Wardens, private security patrols and an increase in the establishment of the Special Constabulary. However, it would appear that Cassels’ preferred option was ‘a greater degree of experimentation within police forces themselves’, citing the Dutch option above as an example (Cassels, 1996: 32). The Police Reform Act, 2002 (Home Office, 2002d) supported Cassels’ preferred option and created the Community Support Officer (CSO), generally referred to as the PCSO in England and Wales. The PCSO is a hybrid of the Stadswacht and the Politiesurveillant. They provide high visibility uniformed patrols and have 20 designated standard police powers and numerous other discretionary powers, which can be allocated at the discretion of the chief constable for the area in which the PCSOs perform their duties (Home Office, 2002d; 2006c; 2007e; 2007f; NPIA, 2008b;
The role of the PCSO may have its origins in the Metropolitan Police Act, 1829 (Home Office, 1829), where Peel’s modern police were intended to have a preventative function by their mere uniformed presence and surveillance of the streets of the Metropolis, in a similar manner to that of PCSOs today.

In addition to PCSOs, The Police Reform Act, 2002 also created the Extended Policing Family, including; Detention Officers, Escort Officers, Investigators and persons accredited by chief constables under the Community Safety Accreditation Scheme (CSAS), such as Neighbourhood Wardens and members of the Private Security Industry (Home Office, 2002d; HMIC, 2004a; 2004b; ACPO, 2010a).

The HMIC (2004a; 2004b) thematic inspection report on the theme of ‘Modernising the Police Service’ also recommended increasing the ratio of the number of police support staff members to police officers in the workforce structure (or the ‘mixed economy’ of staffing), to allow police support staff to carry out tasks that do not require a warranted police officer. This included; non-warranted police staff, police staff with powers (for example, PCSOs), contracted staff, re-employed retired staff, neighbourhood and street wardens, accredited private sector organisations and volunteers. Part of this modernisation programme involved the expansion of PCSOs into more operational roles, including high visibility patrols and engagement with hard to reach groups from more diverse minority communities (HMIC, 2004a; 2004b; Loveday, 2005b; Loveday and McClory, 2007).

During 2004, neighbourhood policing was being promoted as the new model of policing for the 21st century, which would incorporate the extended policing family. In particular PCSOs would play an integral part in the policing of communities. By engaging with communities, and rebuilding trust and confidence between the police and the public, this would allow communities to become more involved in selecting their policing priorities.
for the area, rather than the local police deciding what those community priorities should be (Home Office, 2004a).

**Neighbourhood Policing as a Concept**

Neighbourhood Policing in the UK appears to have its origins in the community policing experiments in the USA during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s (Skogan, 2008) and the communal policing style, particularly the democratic communal policing style advocated by Alderson (1979) in the UK during the 1970s. See *Styles of Policing Explored* above.

During the 1960s in the USA there was a period of civil unrest, tension and widespread rioting associated with the Civil Rights Movement, as a result of racial injustices and discrimination against African-Americans. This period saw police community relations units taking a more proactive role in public meetings and forming advisory groups to defuse tensions, which was in stark contrast to the existing *professional* policing model, which tended to ignore public opinion and politics (Skogan, 2008). As a result of the civil unrest, President Lyndon B. Johnston (1908-1973) established the Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice (under Executive Order 11236) between 1965 and 1967 to extensively research all aspects of crime and law enforcement in the USA (Katzenbach, 1967).

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, ‘Team Policing’, which is often regarded as an early form of community policing was developed in the USA in an attempt to build a better relationship with the community by providing a stable geographical area for patrol by police team members, by ensuring greater interaction between police team members and by maximising the communication opportunities between the policing team and the community (Sherman, Milton and Kelly, 1973: 3).

The 1970s saw the emergence of community crime prevention initiatives in the USA involving the police and community organisations, with the communities themselves
forming neighbourhood watch groups and resident patrols (Skogan, 2008). This period also saw the introduction of the concept of problem-oriented policing (Goldstein, 1977; 1979). See The National Intelligence Model and Problem-Oriented Policing below.

By the early 1980s in the USA attention had turned to reducing the fear of crime within communities by increasing visible police foot patrols, introducing public outreach and policing disorder (Skogan, 2008). This led to the hypothesis generally referred to as the ‘Broken Windows Theory’, where signs of physical decay and social disorder are tackled to prevent any escalation in disorder (Kelling and Wilson, 1982). See the Broken Windows Theory section below.

In the early 1990s there was recognition in the UK and the USA that the response policing culture introduced in the UK as unit beat policing in 1967 (Home Office, 1967), had become too reactive, with a greater emphasis being placed on enforcement. This approach needed to be balanced with more proactive police activity and saw the development of crime prevention and reduction programmes (Home Office, 1991), problem oriented policing (Goldstein, 1979; 1990; 1996) and intelligence-led policing (Audit Commission, 1993). There was a developing theory through research and the work that was being undertaken in the USA, that information provided by communities or community intelligence could provide intelligence not just in relation to crime, but in relation to other issues that were of equal importance to the people living, visiting or working within a community. It was believed that if the police tackled these community issues as well as the crime issues, then not only would crime reduce but the fear of crime would also reduce and public confidence in the police would increase.

Many of these ideas appear to have been included in another innovative approach pioneered in the USA. The Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS) was launched in 1993 as a pilot initiative in five neighbourhoods (or beats) in Chicago, USA and was later rolled out to incorporate all 279 neighbourhoods within the 25 police districts of Chicago.
The strategy was developed by Superintendent Matt L. Rodriguez of the Chicago Police Department and was entitled; ‘Together We Can: A Strategic Plan for Reinventing the Chicago Police Department’ (Rodriguez, 1993). It is interesting to note that in his introduction to the strategy Superintendent Rodriguez used the following quote, which he inadvertently attributed to Sir Robert Peel:

To maintain at all times a relationship with the public that gives reality to the historic tradition that the police are the public and that the public are the police: the police being only the members of the public that are paid to give full-time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interest of community welfare and existence.

(Rodriguez, 1993: 2)

It is also of interest that Sir Ronnie Flanagan also used the same quote in his introductory ‘The Context’ to the Review of Policing: Interim Report 2007, as Principle 7 of the Nine Principles of Policing (Flanagan, 2007: 5).

Clearly, the view taken by Rowan and Mayne (1829), Rodriguez (1993) and Flanagan (2007) is that the community are reliant on the police and the police are reliant on the community, to ensure that the best interests of the community are served. In order to achieve this aim the Police Service must ensure that it positively engages with the communities it serves and rebuilds the relationships that may have been weakened over the past few decades. An underlying factor in successful democratic policing appears to be the complete trust and interaction of the community with the police service. The CAPS gave a commitment to the people of Chicago that the Chicago Police Department would adopt a more community sensitive style of policing, working in partnership with the community.

As part of our new strategy, we have made a commitment to establish a relationship between the community and the police that will break down longstanding barriers, reduce community tensions, open up avenues of information, and provide constructive and meaningful opportunities for collaboration. Responsibility for forging this partnership cannot be assigned to a select few individuals in the Department. It must be pervasive: every Department member – but especially those at the most basic operational level - must see community outreach as an important and ongoing element of their jobs.

(Rodriguez, 1993: 27)
Bratton (1998: 30-32) who had previously described response policing or the so called ‘Professional Era’ of policing in terms of the three R’s; Rapid Response, Random Patrols and Reactive Investigation, agreed with Rodriguez (1993) and suggested that the era of ‘community policing is defined by three P’s: Partnership, Problem Solving, Prevention’.

The strategy put forward by Rodriguez (1993) has been extensively researched over the ensuing years (Skogan, 1996; 2006; Skogan and Hartnett, 1997; Hartnett and Skogan, 1999; Skogan et al, 2000a; 2000b; 2002a; 2002b; Skogan and Steiner, 2004) and was referred to and further developed by the UK Government, in their consultation paper entitled; ‘Policing: Building Safer Communities Together’ (Home Office, 2003a). This paper concentrated on four key themes, namely; increasing community engagement, strengthening the accountability of policing, improving operational effectiveness and modernising the police service. Although the main emphasis of this paper was on policing, it also highlighted the importance of community safety and the part that the community plays in policing, through volunteering and active citizenship.

Prior to this consultation paper being released, the then Labour Government had embarked on a process of police reform and outlined its intentions in a White Paper entitled; ‘Policing a New Century: A Blueprint for Reform’ (Home Office, 2001), which also influenced the content of the consultation paper. The White Paper included chapters on Making the Most of Police Officers and Helping to Build a Civil Society. The former chapter suggesting ways in which the police could become more visible in the community, reduce the fear of crime and increase public reassurance. The latter chapter encouraged agencies, groups and individuals to become involved in the fight against crime and disorder. It also proposed the introduction of the Extended Police Family mentioned above and much of what was advocated in the White Paper was later transformed into legislation under the Police Reform Act 2002 (Home Office, 2002d).
As a result of this reform programme the National Reassurance Policing Programme (NRPP) took place in England between 2003 and 2005 at 16 sites in eight police forces (Innes, 2004b). A key element of the programme was community engagement, which would identify those issues seen as priorities by local communities and in dealing with those priorities, provide reassurance to those communities. Local officers being visible, accessible and familiar was an integral part of the engagement process, as was the community focused style of policing being advocated by the programme (Millie and Herrington, 2004). Community engagement will be discussed in more detail below.

Another element of the NRPP was the ‘signal crime perspective’ (Innes and Fielding, 2002; Innes, 2004a; 2004c), which has links to other concepts such as the broken windows theory, (Kelling and Wilson, 1982), the CAPS (Rodriguez, 1993) and community efficacy (Sampson and Raudenbush, 1999). The signal crime perspective, advocates that certain crimes and disorderly behaviour act as warning signals to individuals and communities in relation to their perceptions of the risks affecting their safety and security. If the police were to tackle these signal events, it would increase public confidence and reassurance, and reduce the fear of crime. This would have an impact on traditional policing methods, where the focus has been on tackling more serious crimes, and not signal crimes and disorders. This was supported by the findings from the ‘Public Perceptions of Police Accountability and Decision Making’ report, where there was a perception by all the groups interviewed, that the police have ‘inappropriate priorities’ and are only concerned with ‘serious incidents’ (Docking, 2003: 8-9). Innes also advocated that community intelligence should also be used to identify signal events as these are the ‘drivers of insecurity’ (Innes, 2007: 14).

An early evaluation of the NRPP provided a positive indication of an increase in public confidence in the local police and an increase in public reassurance. Building on the initial findings from the NRPP (Millie and Herrington, 2004; Irving, 2005; Morris, 2006;

In this White Paper (Home Office, 2004a) the Government gave ten commitments to the public to reform and improve policing in England and Wales. From the initial evaluation of the NRPP, the Government believed that neighbourhood policing was the vehicle by which it could deliver on its commitments. As a result in April 2005 the National Neighbourhood Policing Programme (NNPP) was established and all police forces in England and Wales were required to fully implement neighbourhood policing by April 2008.

**A Neighbourhood Policing Style**

In 2005, the ACPO produced draft guidance for the Police Service entitled; ‘Practice Advice on Professionalising the Business of Neighbourhood Policing’ (ACPO, 2005d) to assist with the initial implementation of neighbourhood policing. This guidance was later replaced by a more substantive document in 2006, bearing the same title (ACPO, 2006e). The Practice Advice on Professionalising the Business of Neighbourhood Policing (ACPO, 2006e: 4) advocated that neighbourhood policing has three requirements. The first requirement was based on the suggestion from the HMIC report ‘Open All Hours: A Thematic Inspection Report on the Role of Police Visibility and Accessibility in Public Reassurance’ (HMIC, 2001), that dedicated police officers should be visible, accessible and familiar to the community, which they served. The second requirement was that of intelligence-led policing concentrating on community concerns (Maguire and John, 1995; Ratcliffe, 2002b; 2003; 2005; 2007; 2008a; 2008b; 2008c) and the third requirement centred on joint problem solving between the police, their partners and the community.

The three requirements of neighbourhood policing are also consistent with the research undertaken by Skogan (2006) in relation to the CAPS where he suggested that community [neighbourhood] policing has ‘three core strategic components’, namely; (1) Decentralisation of resources and decision making to middle managers at a district level, with greater responsibility being given to dedicated officers within a given community; (2) Citizen involvement, which uses community engagement as a means of sharing information and then taking joint action in relation to that information or intelligence, and (3) Problem solving, using a wide range of crime prevention and problem solving techniques (Skogan, 2006: 5-8).

The Practice Advice (ACPO, 2006e: 4) went on to advise that when these requirements are in place, the police service would be able to meet the policing expectations of the community in relation to four main themes; Access, Influence, Interventions and Answers. This could be achieved by allowing a community access to a dedicated neighbourhood policing officer and by engagement with the officer, be able to have an influence over what is determined to be a priority for the community. Members of the community can then participate in interventions to resolve some of the community’s problems and to ensure that the solutions are sustainable and that the community receive answers on the progress of any problem solving interventions that they may or may not have been involved in.

For example, if a community identifies a problem with anti-social behaviour by young people with litter being dropped in the street outside a local shop in their neighbourhood, then representatives of the community can engage with their local neighbourhood policing officer in the most appropriate manner and explain their concerns in relation to the anti-social behaviour and litter problem. As this problem was identified by the
community, their representatives can exert some influence on the police to ensure that this problem becomes a neighbourhood priority. The community and the police can then work with other partners such as the Local Authority and the shopkeeper to resolve the identified problem. At all stages through the problem solving process, all members of the community should be informed of the progress and the outcomes of the initiative.

Unfortunately, from the researcher’s experience of policing, this process does not always run smoothly. Many problems that are identified to the police are personal problems presented by individual members of the public or by individuals who have their own personal agenda, as opposed to community problems presented by representatives of the community. Although the police should deal with these individual personal problems, they fall outside the scope of what was intended for this particular process. Access to local police officers and PCSOs can sometimes be problematic due to shift work, rest days, annual leave, sickness, training and other abstractions from the neighbourhoods in which they work. The representatives of the community can sometimes find it difficult to influence the police into accepting what the community believes are their neighbourhood priorities, particularly if the police are insistent on only dealing with police priorities or try to coerce the community into choosing the police priorities as their neighbourhood priorities. Once the priorities have been identified and agreed, difficulties can arise in persuading the relevant partners to actively participate in the problem solving process. This also applies to the participation of the local community in resolving their own problems, as there is sometimes a belief within the community that partner agencies, such as the police and local authority are responsible for resolving these problems. Information in relation to the progress of the problem solving process is not always fed back to the community, which can result in deceased confidence and satisfaction in the police and the other partner agencies involved.

The Practice Advice (ACPO, 2006e: 10) also identifies the ten ‘Key Principles of Neighbourhood Policing’. Many of the elements that make up the Key Principles of
Neighbourhood Policing can be found in earlier research by authors such as Sherman, Milton and Kelly (1973: 3-7), Alderson (1979: 239-240), Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux (1990: xiii-xv), Friedmann (1992: 3-4), Bayley (1994: 115-117) and Skogan and Hartnett (1997: 5-9). The research by Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux (1990) is of particular interest as the ten Key Principles of Neighbourhood Policing appear to be very similar in content to their Ten Principles of Community-Police Relations, which they present in far more detail. See Appendix 3 for the Ten Principles of Community-Police Relations.

The ten Key Principles of Neighbourhood Policing may be summarised as follows; Neighbourhood policing is an organisational strategy, which is flexible, adaptable and integrated with other policing services. It requires a NIM evidence-based deployment of dedicated, identifiable, accessible, knowledgeable and responsive resources who work directly with the local community to identify local policing priorities and problems, and work with other agencies and the community to resolve those problems. In order to achieve this there must be an effective engagement, communication and feedback strategy, and rigorous performance management (ACPO, 2006e: 10). See Appendix 4 for the ten Key Principles of Neighbourhood Policing.

The ten Key Principles of Neighbourhood Policing, and in particular principles four, six, seven, eight and nine, also reinforce the three requirements and the four themes of neighbourhood policing mentioned above, and emphasise the importance of neighbourhood policing officers being identifiable, accessible and able to engage with their community (ACPO, 2006e: 10).

Crawford (2008: 148) suggests that ‘policing’ as opposed to ‘the police’ or ‘police roles and responsibilities’, is much wider and can be carried out by a number of organisations, such as local government agencies and departments, private security companies and more importantly the general public. He also suggests that technology, such as Closed
Circuit Television (CCTV) cameras, listening devices and environmental design play an integral part in policing. Flanagan (2008) agrees with Crawford (2008) and advocates that policing is not just the domain of the police, but must be carried out in partnership with the public.

Policing is far too important to be left to the police alone. It is a public service and one that can only be effectively carried out with the support and consent of the public. Using and developing this engagement with the public is one of the most important challenges in modern policing and it is a challenge that must be met at all levels. (Flanagan, 2008: 5)

Thus, the use of community engagement in the development of community intelligence will present a real and important challenge for policing, particularly neighbourhood policing, which was fully implemented across England and Wales in April 2008.

Community Engagement
Myhill (2006) undertook an extensive literature review of community engagement in policing and defines community engagement as follows:

The process of enabling the participation of citizens and communities in policing at their chosen level, ranging from providing information and reassurance, to empowering them to identify and implement solutions to local problems and influence strategic priorities and decisions.

The police, citizens and communities must have the willingness, capacity and opportunity to participate. The Police Service and partner organisations must have a responsibility to engage and, unless there is a justifiable reason, the presumption is that they must respond to community input. (Myhill, 2006: 8)

This is a complex definition, but at the heart of the definition is the proposal that the engagement process enables members of a community to become involved in and influence policing at a level that is most appropriate for that individual or the community. Thus, community engagement with the police allows members of the community to express their needs, fears and expectations of policing, including the fear of crime and perceived risks, threats and harms to the community and for the police to respond by providing a service that the community wants and not what the police believe the
community wants (Lowe and Innes, 2012). It also allows the police to gather community information and intelligence on all sorts of issues including anti-social behaviour, organised crime and terrorism.

Much of the community engagement by police in the UK is undertaken in partnership with local partners from the public, private and third sectors based on the Police and Communities Together (PACT) community engagement initiative introduced in 2004 by the Lancashire Constabulary (Lee and Pearson, 2011) and adopted by other UK forces as Partners or Partnerships and Communities Together (PACT). Under the umbrella of PACT there are numerous primary, secondary and tertiary community engagement techniques, providing evidence of a visible police presence. Primary techniques include; face to face contacts, directed patrols, meetings, school councils, youth fora, surgeries, house to house visits, social interactions, community events, open days, environmental visual audits (EVAs), consultation, focus groups, workshops, citizen juries, delphi surveys and neighbourhood visioning. Secondary techniques include; posters, social media, surveys, public information points, community access points, mobile telephones and call handling. Tertiary techniques include; existing engagement techniques employed by partners, neighbourhood empowerment and neighbourhood delegation. However, most importantly all the parties who could participate in this process must have the ‘willingness, capacity and opportunity’ to do so (Myhill, 2006: 8).

There are a number of other concepts that are associated with community engagement, intelligence and cohesion such as; social capital, the Big Society and citizen participation.

**Social Capital**

Social capital has become one of the more predominant concepts and involves the development of social networks and trust, and emphasises the importance of ‘reciprocity’ in solving community problems (Putnam, 2000: 20). Putnam (1993: 167) defines social
capital as; ‘Features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions’.

Woolcock (2001: 13) distinguishes between three different types of social capital namely; Bonding Social Capital (which relates to the ties or relationships between family members, close friends and neighbours), Bridging Social Capital (which refers to the ties between people of similar demographic characteristics, such as distant friends, associates and colleagues) and Linking Social Capital (which refers to the capacity to leverage resources, ideas and information from those outside of the community). Woolcock (2001) argues that it is a combination of the three types of social capital that is responsible for a range of outcomes that change over time. Granovetter (1973: 1378) also highlights the paradox of the strength of weak ties through linkage, where weak ties are; ‘indispensable to individuals’ opportunities and to their integration into communities’, whilst strong ties ‘breeding local cohesion, lead to overall fragmentation’.

Sykes (1951: 382) suggests that ideally informed citizens with community knowledge should actively participate in the life of the community. However, higher levels of community knowledge are dependent on attributes such as; length of residence, home ownership, work location and high socio-economic status, which are only possessed by a relatively small proportion of members of the community.

Adler and Kwon (2002: 29-32) suggest that social capital has a number of benefits including; access to and the improved quality of information, influence, control and power, and solidarity within a social network, but they warn that each benefit has its own risks and that a balance has to be found. Grix (2001: 189) suggests that the more social capital there is in society the more democratic that society is likely to be.

The decline in social capital found in the USA (Putnam, 2000) has not been characterised to any appreciable extent in Britain and may be due to the post war revolution in
education, transformation in social structure and government policy on the delivery of social services, particularly by third sector voluntary organisations (Hall, 1999; Maguire, 2012). From a UK perspective the last Labour Government continued to support policies that regenerated and promoted cohesive communities, and in order to measure social capital, five main aspects of social capital were identified; ‘civic participation’, ‘social networks and support’, ‘social participation’, ‘reciprocity and trust’ and ‘views about the area’ (Babb, 2005: 4). (See also: Harper, 2001; Coulthard, Walker and Morgan, 2002; Ruston, 2003; Office for National Statistics, 2008).

Haezewindt (2003: 25) argues that people with higher levels of social capital are less likely to commit or be victims of crime and are more likely to prevent criminal activity. Jackson and Wade (2005: 62-63) agree and argue that when the police perceive that there is a low level of social capital within a community they have a greater feeling of responsibility and are more likely to be proactive in that community in utilising their law enforcement powers, compared to communities that have a perceived higher level of social capital. Dynes’ (2006: 68) argues that social capital is the most significant resource available to respond to the damage caused by hazards such as terrorism.

Linked to social capital is collective efficacy. Bandura (1997: 477) suggests that; ‘Perceived collective efficacy is defined as a group's shared belief in its conjoint capabilities to organize and execute the courses of action required to produce given levels of attainments’. Sampson (2004: 108) argues that; ‘The key causal mechanism in collective efficacy theory is social control enacted under conditions of social trust’. Self-efficacy beliefs determine how people feel, think, motivate themselves and behave (Bandura, 1994: 71). People with a high level of self-efficacy approach difficult tasks as challenges, rather than threats to be avoided and the opposite is true for people with lower levels of self-efficacy (Bandura, 1993: 144). Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls (1997: 919) suggest that collective efficacy decreases in communities that are economically disadvantaged and have residential instability.
The Big Society

The concept of the Big Society appears to have its roots in the theory of social capital (Rowson, Broome and Jones, 2010) and was initially an idea developed by the UK Conservative Party, but appeared in the Coalition Government’s document, entitled; ‘The Coalition: Our Programme for Government’ (Home Office, 2010l). This document set out the Coalition’s programme for partnership government over the term of the current parliament (2010-2015). Under the headings of Crime and Policing and Social Action the Coalition Government has promised to support a number of initiatives including; the introduction of directly elected Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) to ensure more police accountability, the publication of local crime data on a monthly basis, regular community ‘beat meetings’, the further development of mutuals, co-operatives, charities and social enterprises, the training of community organisers, a National Citizen Service for 16 year olds, volunteering, and the involvement of individuals and communities in social action (Home Office, 2010l: 13-14 & 29-30). These themes were further developed and featured in the Government’s police reform consultation document entitled; ‘Policing in the 21st Century: Reconnecting Police and the People’ (Home Office, 2010f) and the ‘Home Office Draft Structural Reform Plan’ (Home Office, 2010e).

In his speech on criminal justice reform to the Policy Exchange on the 23rd June 2010 the then Minister of State for Policing and Criminal Justice, Rt. Hon. Nick Herbert, MP, commented on the ‘Big Society’ and advocated a ‘resurgence in community activism’, where local groups would share the responsibility for community safety and the Government would support people ‘to do the right thing’ (Herbert, 2010: 6). This would include linking Community Crime Fighters and Neighbourhood Watch schemes together, and making them more accessible and attractive, so that people would be encouraged to become involved. The Minister also stated that partnership working would be the key to the development of the Big Society with local service providers being accountable to the local communities they serve (Herbert, 2010).
In the Prime Minister’s speech to community groups in Liverpool on the 19th July 2010, the Prime Minister, Rt. Hon. David Cameron, MP, went further and announced that there were three main stands in the development of the Big Society, namely; Social Action, Public Service Reform and Community Empowerment (Cameron, 2010: 3-4). These three main strands should also be accompanied by three supporting techniques, namely; decentralisation (which would allow a shift in power from centralised government to neighbourhoods); transparency (where data (including crime data) is provided at a neighbourhood level) and providing finance (which would pay public service providers by results and provide financial support for social enterprises, charities and voluntary groups through the creation of a Big Society Bank) (Cameron, 2010: 4-5). (See also: Rogers and Gravelle, 2011; Maguire, 2012; Morgan, 2012).

Chanan and Miller (2010: 12) suggest that in order to make the concept of the Big Society work, a process of ‘community proofing’ should be used to ensure that all public policies are subject to a community impact assessment before being implemented. In addition, all available data should also be used to profile and engage with communities to gain their views and an understanding of their needs to ensure that the services provided are relevant and needed. Help with training should be provided to ensure that empowerment skills are spread to all those who work with local communities and public authorities should get involved with initiatives identified by those communities through the community engagement process. (See also: Rogers and Milliner, 2010).

**Citizen Participation**

Clearly, social capital, the Big Society, community engagement, intelligence and cohesion all require participation by members of the public from diverse local communities, if they are to succeed and meet their intended aims and objectives (Rowson, Mezey and Dellot, 2012). Arnstein (1969: 217) identified eight types or levels of participation as the eight rungs on a ladder of citizen participation, which are further divided into three categories. Rungs one and two at the bottom of the ladder;
*manipulation* and *therapy* are categorised as levels of non-participation. Rungs three, four and five; *informing, consultation* and *placation* respectively are categorised as degrees of tokenism. Towards the top of the ladder, rungs six, seven and eight; *partnership, delegated power* and *citizen control* respectively are categorised as degrees of citizen power. Arnstein’s model suggests that there must be some degree of transfer of power from government to the citizen if these initiatives are to be successful. This view is also held by Pateman (1970: 71), who is critical of government attempts to consult with citizens and identified three types of citizen participation; pseudo, partial and full participation. To achieve Arnstein’s ultimate goal of *citizen control*, the police and their existing partners would need to work in true partnership with the local community and delegate real power to the community to make their own decisions.

Other authors have attempted to redesign Arnstein’s ladder by either increasing or decreasing the number of levels of public participation or renaming the levels. For example, Burns, Hamilton and Hogget (1994) suggest twelve levels of participation, whilst Wilcox (1994: 4) has five levels. Choguill (1996: 435-442) who studied community participation in underdeveloped countries has eight levels commencing with *self-management* at the bottom of the ladder rising to *empowerment* at the top.

However, Tritter and McCallum (2006) argue that these models are all hierarchical and have citizen power as their goal. Tritter and McCallum (2006: 161-165) are particularly critical of Arnstein’s model and argue that it is too simplistic, as it does not consider important issues such as; the ‘methods adopted to involve users’, ‘the sustainability of any development designed to increase user involvement’, ‘the distinct, but overlapping, theoretical justifications or types of user involvement’ and ‘that some users may not wish to be involved’. They suggest a mosaic model that captures the complex and dynamic relationships between individuals, communities and professionals or ‘social citizenship’. Yang (2005) goes further and suggests that the professional’s lack of trust in the citizen adds to the complexity and is often a barrier to public participation.
Bishop and Davis (2002: 26-28) argue that there are five main participation types; ‘consultation’, ‘partnership’, ‘standing’, ‘consumer choice’ and ‘control’, which should be viewed as a ‘discontinuous set of techniques chosen according to the issue in hand and the political imperative of the times’, rather than a linear ladder model of participation. Thomas (1990) views public participation from a problem solving perspective and who should be involved in the decision making process to resolve the problem. Thomas (1990: 437) identified five levels of decision making; ‘autonomous managerial decision’, ‘modified autonomous managerial decision’, ‘segmented public consultation’, ‘unitary public consultation’ and ‘public decision’, which require varying degrees of public participation. Schauer (1995) argues that when a decision is made, the reasons behind the decision should be communicated to those that they affect, as this shows commitment, respect and a willingness to engage, and can make the decision more acceptable.

Collins and Ison (2006) also agree that a ladder model of participation is limited because of its simplistic hierarchical association with power and suggest the alternative paradigm of social learning. Social learning involves questioning such things as aims, objectives, policy, procedures and normal practices in an interactive process with all those wishing to participate in more complex issues (Collins and Ison, 2006). In this regard it is similar to the social learning associated with communities of practice, where ‘learning becomes an informal and dynamic social structure among the participants’ (Wenger, 2010: 2). However, Collins and Ison (2006: 11) suggest that even though their model has boundaries between information provision, consultation, participation and social learning, they recognise that they all have a common origin and where these elements overlap ‘they can be systemically related’.

Community engagement by police in the UK has traditionally resulted in citizen participation in the various forms of ‘watch schemes’ (for example; Neighbourhood
Watch, Business Watch and Farm Watch), residents associations and PACT meetings (Home Office, 1992; Laycock and Tilley, 1995; Sharp, Atherton and Williams, 2008). More recently initiatives such as; the ‘Public Takes Charge Scheme’ (City of Rotterdam, 2011) and ‘Citizen Police Academies’ (Cohn, 1996) have been advocated as a means of improving community police relations and community engagement (Boyd, 2012: 11-12). (See also: Rogers and Thomas, 2013).

Citizen participation in various initiatives may also be seen as a means of informal social control, which Silver and Miller (2004: 553) conceptualize as; ‘the willingness of neighborhood residents to actively engage in behaviors aimed at preventing criminal and deviant behavior in the local area ...’. Renauer (2007: 76) argues that neighborhood policing alone is insufficient to increase informal social control and that social cohesion and government responsiveness has a greater impact. Thus, changing people’s perceptions of police effectiveness and legitimacy, and managing the risks associated with the Big Society initiatives, could increase informal social control within communities (Westmarland, 2010; Rogers, 2012). Lowe and Innes (2012: 315) argue that a community intelligence-led version of neighbourhood policing (Neighbourhood Policing v2.0) is more responsive to community needs and demands, and can change people’s perceptions of the police. This can also lead to greater public confidence and satisfaction in the police (Jackson and Sunshine, 2007; Rix et al, 2009; Jackson and Bradford, 2010; Myhill and Quinton, 2010).

Lowe and Innes (2012: 296-297) suggest that the introduction of neighbourhood policing, the Coalition Government’s drive for the Big Society and local accountability through elected PCCs has instigated a more ‘democratic style’ of policing, which focuses on three main principles; Seeing like a citizen (where defined community problems become neighbourhood policing priorities), Participative policing (which includes the idea of informal social control as part of the Big Society) and See through services (which involves transparent local accountability and decision making). This democratic style of
policing focusing on community engagement, intelligence and cohesion, may form the basis for the provision of far more cohesive policing services.

**Synthesis of the Messages Emerging from Literature and Official Guidance**

There appear to be a number of key recurring messages and themes emerging from the examination of the academic literature and official guidance in relation to neighbourhood policing, which may also have an influence on the democratic style of neighbourhood policing proposed by Lowe and Innes (2012) and the provision of effective cohesive policing services for diverse communities. These key themes have been identified as follows: (1) Neighbourhoods, (2) Neighbourhood Profiles, (3) Key Individual Networks (KINs), (4) Partnerships Resource Audits, (5) Community Engagement, (6) Community Cohesion, (7) Citizen Focus, (8) Problem Solving, (9) Community Intelligence, (10) Communication, (11) Social Marketing and (12) Evaluation.

The messages emerging from these key themes in neighbourhood policing also appear to produce a number of contentious and conflicting ideas often associated with police cultural issues. For example, the competing priorities between citizen-focused neighbourhood policing, problem solving through problem-oriented policing, intelligence-led policing utilising community intelligence and evaluation in the form of performance management, all exist within a police culture influenced by crime fighting and crime detection (Scott, 1998; Maguire and John, 2006). (See the Summary of the Competing Priorities, Tensions and Contradictions between Performance Management, Neighbourhood Policing, Problem-Oriented Policing and Intelligence-Led Policing in Chapter 3: Intelligence and its Policing Applications). However, by contrast many of the themes identified also appear to complement each other. For example, identifying and profiling neighbourhoods, and identifying and utilising KINs and partners may assist with community engagement, community cohesion, citizen focus, problem solving and community intelligence (ACPO, 2006e; NPIA, 2009b).
Neighbourhoods

The first of these themes involves identifying the parameters used to define a neighbourhood, which will be critical to future decisions on what should be profiled, as a neighbourhood can be more than just a geographical area, such as an electoral ward (in the UK), an easily identifiable community or a locality. Some communities are not easily identifiable and do not fall within established geographical boundaries (Flynn, 1998: 9; ACPO, 2006e: 18). These are often referred to as virtual or non-traditional communities and may be regarded as a group of people who have common concerns or a shared identity, but are not confined by geographical boundaries (Flynn, 1998: 9). This may include the more hard to reach or hard to hear groups within diverse communities. These groups are also referred to as failed to reach groups, as the use of engagement techniques has not been exhaustive (NPIA, 2010).

Official guidance suggests that the definition of a neighbourhood can be decided upon through local agreements between statutory partners (e.g. CSPs), non-statutory partners (e.g. the third or voluntary sector) and the community, taking into account traditional and non-traditional communities (ACPO, 2006e: 18, NPIA, 2010b: 106). However, consideration may also be given to adopting a more corporate approach to defining traditional communities and neighbourhoods, to avoid confusion when the police and their partners provide services and move from one geographical area to another.

Neighbourhood Profiles

Once a neighbourhood has been defined then it is then possible to create a neighbourhood profile. The official guidance from the NPIA advises that a neighbourhood profile should contain the following categories or sections, which are relevant to a particular neighbourhood; A contextual map, general and housing demographic data, physical and human infrastructure, neighbourhood priorities, data sets on satisfaction, confidence and the fear of crime, and an overview of the neighbourhood demographics (NPIA, 2009b: 10). Ottiwell and Hashdi (2007) argue that the data collected for each
category should include all the available partnership data, which may be shared in accordance with data sharing protocols (Information Commissioner’s Office, 2007) and the Data Protection Act, 1998 (Home Office, 1998b). Neighbourhood profiles can then be used to identify and engage with diverse communities, identify real or perceived areas of risk, vulnerability and tension, identify high, medium or low priority neighbourhoods for the intelligence-led deployment of staff and assist in deciding on the most appropriate policing model or combination of models for those neighbourhoods, for example; intelligence-led policing or problem-oriented policing (Audit Commission, 2006; NPIA, 2009b).

The data and information contained within a neighbourhood profile can also be used to identify KINs and partners, and to develop bespoke engagement techniques for a specific neighbourhood (NPIA, 2009b). Official guidance also suggests that a neighbourhood profile should be reviewed and updated every three to six months to inform the CSP Joint Strategic Assessment and to assist with police and partnership decision making (ACPO, 2006e), and should be managed in accordance with the ACPO Guidance on the Management of Police Information (ACPO, 2006c; 2010b).

**Key Individual Networks**

A KIN is comprised of individuals who are able to use their experience and influence to resolve specific problems within the community in which they live or work, for example; a local head teacher, religious leaders, the chair of the local chamber of commerce, the chair of the local residents association or neighbourhood watch, or a local councillor (NPIA, 2009b). Members of a KIN are therefore, ideally placed to assist in enhancing and developing community engagement, intelligence, cohesion and local partnerships, and identifying community tensions at an early stage. The official guidance suggests that a KIN should form part of a neighbourhood profile under the heading of human infrastructure (NPIA, 2009b: 12).
The notion of a KIN appears to be associated with the concepts of social capital, collective efficacy, the Big Society and citizen participation mentioned above, where KINS may be seen to facilitate coordinated actions (Putnam, 1993), introduce elements of social control (Bandura, 1997), volunteer and take part in social action (Home Office, 2010) and obtain varying degrees of citizen power (Arnstein, 1969).

**Partnership Resource Audits**

The official guidance also suggests that various policing partners, such as local authorities and voluntary organisations should be included in the neighbourhood profile under the heading of human infrastructure (NPIA, 2009b: 10). Therefore, it may be advantageous if a partnership resource audit was also included as part of the neighbourhood profile, as this may assist in improving community engagement, partnership problem solving and the development of the CSP Joint Strategic Assessment as part of the NIM process (ACPO, 2006e; Home Office, 2007b). A partnership resource audit:

- Provides a brief summary of the role of all organisations within the CDRP/CSP;
- Outlines existing information-sharing protocols;
- Lists existing joint working protocols;
- Identifies existing community engagement structures;
- Lists local initiatives, e.g., crime reduction, regeneration and education;
- Describes financial opportunities to fund activity;
- Assesses the relevant capability and capacity of partners.

(ACPO, 2006e: 31)

Thus, undertaking a partnership resource audit for a specific neighbourhood may assist individuals and agencies to identify existing and new partners, and to assess what their capability and capacity is within the partnership. A partnership resource audit may also identify all available resources, ensure that engagement opportunities are not lost, there is no duplication of effort and that public funds are utilised to the maximum effect (ACPO, 2006e).
Community Engagement

To ensure comprehensive community engagement, it may first be necessary to identify a community or neighbourhood, prepare a neighbourhood profile, identify a KIN and undertake a partnership resource audit. This process may serve to enhance the quality and completeness of community engagement, as it could provide the information necessary to develop bespoke engagement techniques for every section of our diverse communities. In order to engage with the more hard to reach or hard to hear groups, it may be necessary to use a combination of engagement techniques that are tailored to individual needs and consideration may need to be given to other factors, such as; race, gender, sexual orientation, disability, age, religion, faith, ethnicity and culture (NPIA, 2010b). See the Community Engagement section above for a discussion on community engagement techniques.

The ‘Practice Advice on Professionalising the Business of Neighbourhood Policing’ (ACPO, 2006e) highlights a number of critical success factors for community engagement:

- Sharing resources with local authorities to develop community engagement plans.
- An approach to neighbourhood engagement that goes beyond public meetings to include, for example, street briefings, house-to-house calls, 'have a say' days, use of KIN and other innovative methods.
- Tailoring community engagement processes to the specific needs of individual communities – including the police going to the community rather than expecting communities to come to them.
- Ensuring that engagement strategies specifically address the needs of hard-to-reach/ hear groups and minority groups.
- Dedicating PCSOs to neighbourhoods in order to increase community engagement.
- Developing officers’ visibility and familiarity to incorporate accessibility and the delivery of interventions to improve public confidence.
- Using community engagement processes as opportunities to actively involve community participants in problem-solving processes.

(ACPO, 2006e: 15)

Rogers and Robinson (2004: 50) argue that community engagement can assist in building stronger active communities through; ‘socialisation’ (informal social controls), ‘guardianship’ (social support networks) and ‘information flows’ (providing public bodies with information on how services could be made more effective). Thus, community
engagement may be considered a key factor in the development of community cohesion, citizen focus, problem solving and community intelligence (NPIA, 2009b).

**Community Cohesion**

Two key elements of the Commission on Integration and Cohesion’s (CIC) definition of an integrated and cohesive community are that;

- *Those from different backgrounds have similar life opportunities, access to services and treatment.*
- *There is a strong sense of trust in institutions locally to act fairly in arbitrating between different interests and for their role and justifications to be subject to public scrutiny.*
  
  (CIC, 2007: 42)

This definition was mirrored by the previous Labour Government’s vision of an integrated and cohesive community based on:

- *People from different backgrounds having similar life opportunities.*
- *People knowing their rights and responsibilities.*
- *People trusting one another and trusting local institutions to act fairly.*
  
  (Home Office (Communities and Local Government) (CLG), 2008: 10)

Thus, to ensure community cohesion in this context, community engagement is essential in giving diverse communities similar life opportunities and access to public services based on their rights and responsibilities, and their trust in local institutions. Only by including people from different backgrounds within our diverse communities can service providers be truly citizen focused. Creasy, Gavelin and Potter (2008) argue that if the circumstances are right in diverse communities, then the drivers for citizen participation and community cohesion can complement one another and the two agendas can be addressed together.

**Citizen Focus**

The Home Office (2006a: 10) suggest that; ‘A citizen-focused culture exists when every member of staff considers the impact that their actions have on the people they serve and proactively seeks ways of improving the quality of the service that they provide’.
The Home Office (2005c) also produced ‘The Quality of Service Commitment’, which aims to make it easier to contact service providers, provide a professional and high quality of service, deal with initial enquiries appropriately, keep customers informed, ensure the customer’s voice counts and support victims of crime.

In order to truly understand the customer or citizen and to provide the services they require it may first be necessary to gain an insight into the customer, which is also referred to as customer intelligence. Customer insight involves; ‘the use of data and information about customers to better understand their needs, wants, expectations, behaviours and experiences’ and ‘the active application of this understanding in the design and delivery of services that better meet customers’ needs’ (Improvement and Development Agency (IDeA), 2006: 8).

Customer insight and thus citizen focus may be achieved through comprehensive community engagement and consideration of the key elements of an integrated and cohesive community, which allows everyone in the community the same opportunities to influence service providers in the design and delivery of services to meet their needs.

HMIC (2008: 9) advocate that; ‘Citizen Focus policing is about developing a culture where the needs and priorities of the citizen are understood by staff and always taken into account when designing and delivering policing services’. In an attempt to develop a citizen focus culture within the principles of neighbourhood policing the NPIA (2008a: 4) developed four Citizen Focus Hallmarks; ‘Understanding People’, ‘Understanding Services’, ‘Designing Services’ and ‘Delivering Services’, which were underpinned by five key enablers; ‘Leadership’, ‘Communications’, ‘People’, ‘Partnerships’ and ‘Processes’. These were designed to improve public confidence in the police and partners and to empower communities to identify the services the community needs and how those services are provided. Mastrofski (1999: 2-4) argues that citizen focused policing or what he terms ‘policing for people’ has six main elements; ‘Attentiveness’, ‘Reliability’,
'Responsive service', 'Competence', 'Manners' and 'Fairness'. Lloyd and Foster (2009) agree and suggest that by exploiting these elements the police can provide good service, enhance customer satisfaction and improve community engagement. However, Lloyd and Foster (2009: 1) also argue that there is a lack of understanding about citizen focus and community engagement and that citizen focus, neighbourhood policing and community engagement activities are ‘bolted on’ to existing policing structures, rather than transforming the service delivery.

**Problem Solving**

In the opening vignette of a paper entitled; ‘Reform of Neighbourhood Policing: Making Public Problems Policing Priorities’, the ACPO (2004) state that by engaging with communities, enabling and strengthening community cohesion, building relationships and problem solving the police service could help communities be more confident and secure.

> By making public problems policing priorities the Police Service can be a positive force for good within neighbourhoods, enabling and strengthening community cohesion. By listening, building relationships, problem solving, and acting together we will engage with communities, helping them to become confident and secure. (ACPO, 2004: 1)

Therefore, public problems may be identified and prioritised through a more citizen focused cohesive community engagement process, which if appropriate, may be included in the CSP Joint Strategic Assessment (Home Office, 2007b). Less serious problems may be prioritised and dealt with at a local neighbourhood level, (e.g. through a partnership neighbourhood tasking and coordinating process), which may involve members of the KIN in the decision making process and in influencing outcomes, by using social capital (Putnam, 1993), delegating power and promoting citizen control (Arnstein, 1969).

Myhill and Quinton (2010: 278-279) appear to agree with the ACPO (2004: 1) statement above and argue that the evidence suggests that if the police provide a service that
deals with the concerns of local communities and are able to influence public perceptions through improved community engagement, then they are likely to increase public confidence in the police. Thus, it is envisaged that by being more citizen focused and solving local community problems this will increase confidence, satisfaction and trust in the police, increase citizen participation and reduce the fear of crime (Jackson and Sunshine, 2007; Myhill and Beak, 2008; Jackson and Bradford, 2010; Myhill and Quinton, 2010). Problem-oriented policing and the NIM are discussed in more detail in Chapter 3: Intelligence and its Policing Applications.

**Community Intelligence**

The official guidance suggests that community intelligence (which is defined in Chapter 3: Intelligence and its Policing Applications), does not only provide intelligence on crime and disorder (including organised crime and terrorism), but on community problems and priorities, tensions between the same and different communities, threat, harm, risk and vulnerability, and on emerging communities (Chainey, 2008; NPIA, 2010g). Community intelligence may also provide valuable intelligence for identifying neighbourhoods and KINs, for assisting with neighbourhood profiles, partnership resource audits and community engagement, and for providing evidence for cohesive policing services.

The ‘Practice Advice on Professionalising the Business of Neighbourhood Policing’ (ACPO, 2006e: 26) suggests that greater community engagement and citizen focused problem solving will lead to an increase in confidence and trust in the police and partners, which in turn will lead to an increase in community intelligence and engagement, through what is generally referred to as the ‘Confidence Cycle’. This notion appears to be supported by other researchers, such as; Jackson and Sunshine (2007), Myhill and Beak (2008), Jackson and Bradford (2010) and Myhill and Quinton (2010). Community Intelligence, Intelligence-Led Policing and Evidence-Based Policing are discussed in more detail in Chapter 3: Intelligence and its Policing Applications.
Communication

The police and their partners use various forms of communication such as; newsletters (Rix et al, 2009; Wunsch and Hohl, 2009) and Social Media (ACPO, 2013) to provide information and feedback to communities on a variety of issues. However, the NPIA (2010d) advocate that the communication process should also allow members of the community to express their feelings on the quality of the customer experience and be able to report complaints and dissatisfaction with policing services. It is therefore important that the police and their partners develop an effective communication strategy to address the issues highlighted by the NPIA (2010d).

The NPIA (2010d: 17) suggest that any communication strategy should be mindful of internal and external communications, keeping people informed, the methods of communication to be used, delivering core messages, pursuing marketing and media opportunities and ensuring that partner and stakeholder needs are considered. Keeping people informed and delivering core messages on the positive outcomes of problem solving initiatives as a result of community intelligence, may increase confidence, satisfaction and trust in the police, enhance community engagement and provide further community intelligence (NPIA, 2010d).

Partnerships such as CSPs, may wish to consider a joint communication and marketing strategy to ensure corporacy between all partners and that all communications represent the mission, vision and values of the partnership, whilst reinforcing the ethos of community safety and what can realistically be achieved.

Social Marketing

Kotler and Zaltman (1971) are often credited with being the first to use the term social marketing and believe that marketing thinking and planning could be of benefit to specific social causes. Having reviewed a number of definitions of social marketing including that of Kotler and Zaltman (1971), Andreasen (1994: 110) defines social
marketing as; ‘the adaptation of commercial marketing technologies to programs designed to influence the voluntary behaviour of target audiences to improve their personal welfare and that of the society of which they are a part’. Stanford (2009: 3) suggests that social marketing can be used in policing to assist in understanding communities, to deliver effective prevention techniques and to positively affect behaviour.

With the dramatic increase in technology over recent years, social media has become one of the most effective marketing tools. The police in the UK, supported by ACPO, have been using social media since 2008, but due to the constraints of a risk averse police culture and restrictive guidelines (Flanagan, 2007; 2008; Devon and Cornwall Constabulary, 2010; NPIA, 2010a; ACPO, 2013), platforms such as Facebook and Twitter have only been used to reinforce existing communication methods and is used mainly to ask the public for information (Crump, 2011). This view is supported by research in the USA, where social media is mainly used for informational purposes, as opposed to transactional or collaborative purposes (Brainard and McNutt, 2010).

**Evaluation**

The final key theme to be identified was evaluation. Evaluation can take many forms and may be associated with issues such as; performance management, the quality of service provided or the assessment of operational processes.

Performance management may be described as; ‘the process by which decisions are taken in response to current performance, to make future performance better than it might otherwise be’ (Home Office, 2006a).

Parasuraman, Zeithaml and Berry (1985) advocate a conceptual model of service quality and propose four gaps in the perception of service quality by consumers, which may
assist service providers to evaluate their performance in relation to the quality of service they provide:

*Proposition 1:* The gap between consumer expectations and management perceptions of those expectations will have an impact on the consumer's evaluation of service quality.

*Proposition 2:* The gap between management perceptions of consumer expectations and the firm's service quality specifications will affect service quality from the consumer's viewpoint.

*Proposition 3:* The gap between service quality specifications and actual service delivery will affect service quality from the consumer's standpoint.

*Proposition 4:* The gap between actual service delivery and external communications about the service will affect service quality from a consumer's standpoint.

(Parasuraman, Zeithaml and Berry, 1985: 45-46)

Therefore, the evaluation process may provide sufficient evidence to assist in closing the quality of service gaps perceived by consumers and to identify any learning and development needs by service providers.

The assessment process, in for example problem solving, can also serve to inform local policing partnerships (such as CSPs), of what works, what doesn't and what looks promising (Sherman et al, 1997) and assist in the development of policing strategies, including communication and social marketing strategies.

It is evident from the messages emerging from the literature and official guidance that the 12 key themes highlighted above are interlinked, with one theme affecting the development of a number of others. This relationship is represented in the form of a connected web in Figure 2.1 below. Thus, by fully understanding and utilising the relationship between these key themes, policing services to the public may be far more cohesive, in that they are inclusive of all members of our diverse communities, key individuals and partners.
Developed from a Review of the Literature and Official Guidance on Neighbourhood Policing

Although individually some of the 12 key themes identified above may introduce a number of contentious and conflicting ideas, collectively they also appear to support the three requirements (‘visibility, accessibility and familiarity’, ‘intelligence-led policing’ and ‘joint problem solving’), the four main themes (‘Access’, ‘Influence’, ‘Interventions’ and ‘Answers’) and the ten key principles of neighbourhood policing (including effective engagement, a communication and feedback strategy, and rigorous performance management) (ACPO, 2006e: 4 & 10), and principles two and seven of the nine principles of policing (Flanagan, 2007: 4-5). (See Appendix 1 for the Nine Principles of Policing and Appendix 4 for the ten Key Principles of Neighbourhood Policing). Thus, it is feasible that these key neighbourhood policing themes could be managed within the NIM, to enhance the delivery of effective cohesive policing services for diverse
communities, but may still be subject to cultural resistance (Maguire and John, 2006). (See Chapter 3: Intelligence and its Policing Applications).

**Summary and Discussion**

This chapter has examined and traced the development of policing in the UK from Saxons times in the early eleventh century, CE to the the formation of the Metropolitan Police in 1829 (Home Office, 1829) and the origins of the Nine Principles of Policing associated with Sir Robert Peel (Flanagan, 2007). This examination placed into context how the various modern styles of policing (Alderson, 1979; Emsley, 1999) have developed from those early principles of policing established between the eleventh and nineteenth centuries, CE and may be summarised by an extract from Principle 7 of the Nine Principles of Policing, which highlights that there is a historic tradition; ‘that the police are the public and that the public are the police’ (Flanagan, 2007: 5). It has also explored issues in relation to police reform, the extended police family, including the introduction of PCSOs, and the concept and principles of neighbourhood policing (Cassels, 1996; Rodriguez, 1993; ACPO, 2006e; Skogan 2008). Neighbourhood policing is an important concept within this thesis, particularly in relation to the research question and when considering the aim and objectives of this research. (See Chapter 4: Research Methodology and Methods).

Another important concept examined in this thesis is community engagement (Myhill, 2006) and its importance in obtaining community intelligence from diverse local communities in order to meet the needs and expectations of those communities.

It has been argued that individuals within communities must have the willingness, capacity and opportunity to; engage with the police (Myhill, 2006), be involved in policing through concepts such as social capital (Putnam, 1993; 2000), collective efficacy (Bandura, 1997), the Big Society (Home Office, 2010l) and citizen participation (Arnstein, 1969), and provide community information and intelligence to support a more
democratic style of policing (Innes and Roberts, 2007; Lowe and Innes, 2012). It has also been suggested that in order for policing to be carried out in true partnership with the public, information and intelligence should be shared between the partners involved, so that joint action can be taken in relation to that information or intelligence (Skogan, 2006). Therefore, it is envisaged that the future development, purpose and usefulness of community intelligence and the associated policing intelligence systems, is likely to have an impact on the efficient and effective delivery of local neighbourhood policing.

A number of key messages and themes have been identified from the review of the literature and official guidance on neighbourhood policing and the interactive relationship between; neighbourhoods, neighbourhood profiling, Key Individual Networks (KINs), partnership resource audits, community engagement, community cohesion, citizen focus, problem solving, community intelligence, communication, social marketing and evaluation in providing cohesive policing services to the public has been examined, taking into consideration the competing priorities, tensions and contradictions between performance management, neighbourhood policing, problem-oriented policing and intelligence-led policing within an action-centred crime control policing culture (Scott, 1998; Maguire and John, 2006). (See Chapter 3: Intelligence and its Policing Applications).

These key messages and themes (together with those from the critical examination of community intelligence in Chapter 3: Intelligence and its Policing Applications) were later used to develop and answer the research question and objectives, to achieve the aim of this research, and to construct the postal survey self-completion questionnaires and the semi-structured interview guide used in this research. (See Chapter 4: Research Methodology and Methods, and Appendices 5, 8 and 11).
Chapter 3: Intelligence and its Policing Applications

Introduction

As policing has developed over the centuries so has the concept of intelligence (Kahn, 2008). Therefore, the history of intelligence and in particular the history of police intelligence in the UK should also be considered as part of the debate in relation to a policing model for the UK. In recent years more emphasis has been placed on the term, community intelligence, as opposed to intelligence or criminal intelligence and therefore, these terms also need to be defined and placed into context. The use of intelligence and in particular the use of community intelligence in meeting the current and future challenges for policing will also need to be considered.

Innes and Roberts (2007) in their study into community intelligence in relation to policing and community safety defined intelligence as follows:

*Intelligence is prospective information in that when subject to some form of analysis it is information that gives a sense of how to act at some point in the future, under certain conditions, in order to achieve particular objectives.*

(Innes and Roberts, 2007: 2)

In an earlier study into community intelligence, Innes, Fielding and Cope (2005) argued that there are four principal modes of intelligence, namely; Criminal Intelligence, Crime Intelligence, Community Intelligence and Contextual Intelligence. *Criminal Intelligence* is mainly concerned with the activities of known suspects; *Crime Intelligence* is concerned with the understanding of crime, *Community Intelligence* is provided by members of the public and *Contextual Intelligence* is concerned with other factors that may impact on crime and offending (Innes, Fielding and Cope, 2005: 44).
Intelligence in Context

Intelligence is not a new phenomenon and at its most basic level may be considered to be ‘biological’ and ‘essential to survival’ (Kahn, 2008: 4), and as Aristotle wrote (c350 BCE); ‘All men by nature desire to know’ (Ross, 1924). Intelligence has been used throughout history, but may have its origins in ancient Chinese mysticism. The I Ching or Book of Changes is thought to have first appeared in China during the Hsia Dynasty (2205-1766 BCE) as a collection of mystical teachings, which were also used as an instructional guide for spies (Wilhelm and Baynes, 1967; Bowers, 1984).

Intelligence has been collected and used for military purposes over many centuries. Some of the earliest recorded examples of the use of intelligence are found in ‘The Art of War’ by Sun Tzu (c490 BCE) (Giles, 1910; Bowers, 1984; Kahn, 2008; Warner, 2008), The ‘Arthashastra’ by Kautilya (c300 BCE) (Shamasastry, 1915: 491) and ‘The Book of Five Rings’ (Musashi, 1644 CE). These books are still studied by military, intelligence and business strategists today.

A Theory of Intelligence

Kahn (2008: 4) suggests that, ‘Intelligence has been an academic discipline for half a century now’, but unfortunately, no theory of intelligence has been forthcoming. Laqueur (1995: 8) agrees with Kahn and argues that ‘... all attempts to develop ambitious theories of intelligence have failed’. Kahn (2001; 2008) highlights the historical theory of intelligence from a military perspective and divides intelligence into two main types, namely; physical intelligence and verbal intelligence. Physical intelligence arises mainly from things that can be observed or experienced, such as fortifications and motor vehicle noise. Verbal intelligence can be oral or written, such as a report or a plan. It is verbal intelligence that distinguishes human beings from the more basic physical intelligence displayed by other animals and life forms. Kahn (2008) suggests that verbal intelligence is more valuable than physical intelligence, as verbal intelligence is more concerned with intentions than the physicality of a situation. The psychological element of verbal
intelligence plays an important part in the decision making process of those who are required to take action in relation to the intelligence.

Kahn (2008: 8-10) also identifies three principles, which should be incorporated into a theory of intelligence, namely; Intelligence ‘optimizes resources, it is an auxiliary function in war, and it is essential to the defense but not to the offence ...’.

Kahn (2008) also argues that intelligence has two major problems, namely; how to predict what is going to happen and how to persuade decision makers to accept information that is contrary to their beliefs. These perceived problems can be reduced if logical decisions are made taking into account all the available information and the facts provided by the intelligence. Intelligence can therefore, reduce uncertainty and by the optimisation of resources, save money.

Marrin (2008: 147-148) argues that in the development of a new theory of intelligence, ‘... the relationship between intelligence analysis and decision making needs to be re-evaluated and replaced’ and greater understanding is needed of how intelligence fits into the decision making process.

Sims (2008: 154) suggests that the purpose of intelligence is for the decision maker to gain an advantage over their rivals and argues that; ‘The crucial moment for advantage is the moment of decision, when idea and intent become action’. Sims (2008: 154-158) also suggests that to gain an advantage for decision makers any intelligence system should optimize four critical functions; ‘collection, transmission, anticipation and leveraged manipulation, or counterintelligence’. The collection of information should come from a wide variety of available sources to provide the best intelligence possible. However, the collection system should be integrated with the other critical functions and the overall command and control system, which includes decision makers. The transmission of intelligence into action requires trust on behalf of the decision maker in relation to the collection system and in particular the intelligence analysts. Intelligence professionals need to collect, analyse and transmit what becomes evident from the data to the decision maker in an unbiased manner, whilst the decision maker must maintain
an oversight of the process used to produce the data. The *anticipation* function has two main elements, which firstly, should have the capability to collect information independently of policy makers and secondly, be able to provide warnings of anticipated future events and adversarial subjects. Finally, *counterintelligence* can also be divided into two forms; offensive and defensive. *Offensive* counterintelligence in its passive form is concerned with manipulating what the opposition see and allowing them to come to their own conclusions. In its active form, a more proactive approach is taken, where an individual assists the opposition to come to the wrong conclusion. By contrast *defensive* counterintelligence is more concerned with security, the protection of your own intelligence and not allowing it to be subjected to the opposition’s counterintelligence strategies.

Sims (2008: 161) argues that although secrecy may be important in manipulating the opposition, for example in counterintelligence. It ‘... is not integral to the concept of intelligence and it is certainly not a defining characteristic of all intelligence systems’. Johnson (2008: 50-51) suggests that any theory of intelligence must include the supervision or ‘intelligence oversight’ of operations, particularly in the case of ‘secret operations’, where accountability may be a significant factor. Scott (2004) disagrees with Sims (2008) and argues that too much emphasis is placed on the collection, analysis and dissemination of information or knowledge, with not enough focus on secrecy. Scott (2004: 322) suggests that the; ‘Exploration of secret intervention illuminates important themes and issues in the study of intelligence, and identifies challenges and opportunities for enquiry …’. 

Sheptycki (2008: 166) argues that previous discussions in relation to the theory of intelligence have been concerned with the ‘national security intelligence paradigm’ and ‘international relations realism’, and proposes an alternative paradigm, namely; the ‘human security intelligence paradigm’. Alkire (2003: 2) provides a working definition of human security as follows: ‘The objective of human security is to safeguard the vital core
of all human lives from critical pervasive threats, in a way that is consistent with long-term human fulfillment’.

Sheptycki (2008: 171) suggests that the human security paradigm is concerned more with human rights than state security and already appears in the ‘sociology of policing’ literature within key principles such as, neighbourhood policing and problem solving, and is closely linked to the ‘liberal democratic policing ideology’, which focuses on the causes of insecurity. Johnson (2008: 52) also suggests that the ‘findings and methodologies’ of disciplines such as; history, psychology, economics, public administration, anthropology and political science, together with the experiences of intelligence practitioners should also be used in the development of a theory of intelligence.

Scott and Jackson (2004: 143) agree and suggest that scholars approach the study of intelligence from ‘three relatively distinct perspectives’. The first perspective advocates the study of intelligence ‘as a means of acquiring new information’, which is then used to explain the decisions made by policy makers and generally features in disciplines such as history and organisational behaviour. The second perspective concentrates on establishing models to explain the intelligence process, in particular the analysis and decision making components of that process, and is favoured by disciplines such as political science. The third perspective is embraced by the discipline of politics and is concerned with how intelligence can be used ‘as a means of state control’.

Gill (2008: 213) argues that when consideration is given to the development of a satisfactory theory of intelligence, it is first necessary ‘to distinguish “intelligence” from all the other information processing activities …’ and ‘to identify the key elements of the process …’. Gill (2008) also cites Agrell’s (2002) essay and speech entitled; ‘When everything is intelligence – nothing is intelligence’. Agrell (2002) suggested that due to the continuing developments in the intelligence field and the cultural changes that
accompany those developments, there is a danger that all information may become regarded as intelligence.

There is an old saying from the debate over the drawbacks of a closed intelligence culture in the 1960s and 1970s: “When everything is secret – nothing is secret.” The meaning of every concept is in the limitation. A word for everything is a word for nothing specific. Intelligence analysis runs the risk of ending up here. When everything is intelligence – nothing is intelligence. (Agrell, 2002: 4-5)

Warner (2006) agrees with Gill (2008) that in order to develop a theory of intelligence it is essential to have a workable definition of intelligence. Kahn (2008: 4) suggests that in addition to there being no satisfactory theory of intelligence, none of the definitions of intelligence he has seen work in practice and defines intelligence simply as ‘information’. Warner (2002: 21) scrutinised seventeen different definitions of intelligence, mainly promulgated by those whose expertise was in national state security, before providing his own definition of intelligence as follows: ‘Intelligence is secret, state activity to understand or influence foreign entities’.

However, when considering a definition of intelligence for a proposed European Union (EU) Intelligence Community, Muller-Wille (2004: 7) argues that due to the increased availability of open source intelligence, secrecy and the use of clandestine resources are not a prerequisite for intelligence and offers the following definition: ‘In the broadest sense, intelligence can be understood as processed information aimed at assisting a certain receiver’s decision-making’. This definition is broadly similar to the definition offered by Innes and Roberts (2007) above.

**Criminal Intelligence**

The ACPO Subcommittee on Criminal Intelligence was formed in 1974 to specifically review criminal intelligence matters. In 1975 the ACPO ‘Report of the Subcommittee on Criminal Intelligence’ (The Baumber Report) (ACPO, 1975) provided a definition of criminal intelligence as follows:
Criminal Intelligence can be said to be the end product of a process often complex, sometimes physical and always intellectual derived from information which has been collated, analysed and evaluated in order to prevent crime or secure the apprehension of offenders. (ACPO, 1975: 7)

This report advocated that there were five types of criminal intelligence, namely; biographical intelligence (which builds a picture of a person engaged in crime), indicative intelligence (which is fragmented or unsubstantiated intelligence), tactical intelligence (which requires action including observation or surveillance), strategic intelligence (which is collected from all sources to reveal a pattern of criminal activity) and evidential intelligence (which is factual intelligence including records of surveillance) (ACPO, 1975: 6-7). The report also highlighted the need for the co-ordination of intelligence in relation to serious and organised crime and those crimes, which crossed police force boundaries, the introduction of Local Intelligence Officers (LIOs), Field Intelligence Officers (FIOs), Force, Regional and National Intelligence Officers, the Force Intelligence Bureau (FIB) and the computerisation of criminal intelligence (ACPO, 1975).

Innes and Sheptycki (2004: 10) also provide the following definition of criminal intelligence, which also focuses on the individual or group of individuals; ‘Criminal intelligence is data that provide some understanding about the identity and activities of a particular nominated individual or group of individuals’. Interestingly they describe criminal intelligence as data, rather than information. Data generally being regarded as raw facts from which information is derived.

The International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts (IALEIA) (2012: 28) maintains that criminal intelligence is; ‘Information compiled, analyzed, and/or disseminated in an effort to anticipate, prevent, or monitor criminal activity’. However, it does not directly relate to offenders or individuals as in the previous examples, but to the criminal activity associated with offenders.
Community Intelligence

The development of military and criminal intelligence has its roots firmly embedded in the historical past, but the concept of community intelligence and its associated terminology is relatively new. Community intelligence became more prominent during the 1990s, as it emerged as a key factor in the policing of minority ethnic communities, problem-oriented policing and intelligence-led policing, which will be discussed in more detail below.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, in 1997 the term community intelligence was more prevalent in HMIC's thematic report on the theme of community and race relations (HMIC, 1997b), than it was in their report on criminal intelligence (HMIC, 1997a). The HMIC report 'Winning the Race: Policing Plural Communities' (HMIC, 1997b), emphasised the need for community intelligence to be held in the same esteem as criminal intelligence.

*Community intelligence should come to be valued by force managers as highly as 'criminal intelligence' in terms of its contribution to effective policing.*

(HMIC, 1997b: 28)

This point was re-emphasised in a further HMIC's thematic report on the theme of diversity, entitled; 'Diversity Matters' (HMIC, 2003: 148).

Although emphasising the importance of community intelligence, HMIC stopped short of suggesting a definition of community intelligence at that time. However, a second thematic inspection on community and race relations, 'Winning the Race: Revisited' (HMIC, 1999b: 47) was undertaken and it was found that two years after the initial inspection `... most forces could not define community intelligence adequately ...'.

Towards a Definition of Community Intelligence

As a result of their thematic inspection report, 'Winning the Race: Revisited' (HMIC, 1999b: 47) and the lack of a satisfactory definition of community intelligence, HMIC developed a definition to assist forces in gaining a greater understanding of community
intelligence and in particular highlighted that this was intelligence centred on the ‘quality of life issues’ being experienced by local communities and that this should ‘inform’ the policing of those communities. Although the term ‘community’ was used 182 times in the HMIC report and in the following definition, it was never defined.

Community intelligence may be defined as: Local information, direct or indirect, that when assessed provides intelligence on the quality of life experienced by individuals and groups, that informs both the strategic and operational perspectives in the policing of local communities. (HMIC, 1999b: 47)

In 2003 HMIC’s thematic report entitled; ‘Diversity Matters’ recommended that the ACPO develop a national strategy to gather and use community intelligence as part of the NIM, which could be used in the police service training on diversity (HMIC, 2003: 149 & 165).

In 2005 the ACPO Guidance on the NIM (ACPO, 2005c) did feature a definition of community intelligence, which used much of the terminology provided by the HMIC (1999b) definition. Using such phrases as ‘local information’, ‘direct or indirect’, ‘strategic and tactical operational policing of local communities’ and ‘when assessed provides intelligence’ (ACPO, 2005c: 47). However, the ACPO (2005c: 47) definition also suggested that information may come from the ‘community and partner agencies’ and that community intelligence ‘may include issues ranging from the general quality of life in the community to serious crime and terrorism’. A similar definition was also used in the ACPO Guidance on the Management of Police Information (ACPO, 2006c: 110; 2010b: 166).

The ACPO (2005d) also advocated that local information from the community and other partner agencies, who were working on the same or similar problems, could usefully direct police services towards meeting community needs.

In their report to the National Community Tensions Team, Innes, Roberts and Maltby (2005) also proposed a definition of community intelligence. This definition expanded on
the HMIC (1999b) definition and clearly states that community intelligence ‘... will inform police about the views, needs and expectations of a community and the risks and threats posed to it or by it ...’ (Innes, Roberts and Maltby, 2005: 2; Innes and Roberts, 2007: 3).

A further definition of community intelligence was provided by the ACPO in their Practice Advice on Professionalising the Business of Neighbourhood Policing (ACPO, 2006e). This definition incorporated many of the elements from the previous HMIC (1999b), Innes, Roberts and Maltby (2005) and ACPO (2005c) definitions. A broadly similar definition of community intelligence also appeared in the ACPO Briefing Paper on Neighbourhood Policing and the National Intelligence Model (ACPO, 2006a: 14).

A further HMIC thematic inspection report entitled; ‘Serving Neighbourhoods and Individuals: A Thematic Report on Neighbourhood Policing and Developing Citizen Focus Policing’ (HMIC, 2008: 34) identified that there were now at least three definitions of ‘community intelligence’ in use, but that community intelligence was still not fully understood nor was its capture, analysis and evaluation, when compared to ‘criminal intelligence’. HMIC again recommended that the ‘Association of Chief Police Officers, supported by the National Policing Improvement Agency, develops guidance clearly defining community intelligence and how it may best be collected within the neighbourhood context’ (HMIC, 2008: 35).

In 2010 the NPIA produced a guide, entitled; ‘Local Policing and Confidence’ (NPIA, 2010b), which contained a definition similar to that which appeared in the ACPO Practice Advice document (ACPO, 2006e: 25). However, this definition appeared within the context of the ‘Use of Neighbourhood Profiles’ (NPIA, 2010b: 56) and the ‘NIM and Neighbourhoods’ (NPIA, 2010b: 139), and included the additional terms ‘threat’, ‘harm’ and ‘critical incidents’ as follows:
Community intelligence is created when local information obtained from the community has been subject to a defined evaluation and risk assessment process to support police decision making and inform both strategic and operational perspectives in the policing of local communities.

Information may be direct or indirect and come from a diverse range of sources including the community and partner agencies. Information from the community can include information on:

- community problems and priorities
- crime and disorder
- changes in tension between different communities
- changes in tension between people within the same community
- threat, harm, risk and vulnerability
- incoming and outgoing communities
- critical incidents.

Risk refers to the level of threat posed by people, and also incidents that happen at certain places and times. 
Vulnerability refers to the increased likelihood of victimisation and crime. 
Tension refers to the state of relationships within and between different communities. 
Threat refers to the scope and intensity of demands which a force’s intelligence leads it to believe it faces. 
Harm refers to the total cost to society from these demands being unmanaged by the police service.

(NPIA, 2010b: 56)

The NPIA (2010b: 56) definition of community intelligence is very comprehensive and includes many of the issues associated with ‘community’ and ‘intelligence’. However, it lacks reference to all the factors proposed by Flynn (1998) that define a community in terms of its geography, shared character or identity and common concerns or problems.

Community may be defined by the following three factors: geography (people who live or work in a given place), shared character or identity (people share common characteristics, such as ethnicity, age, economics, and religion), and common concerns or problems (people tend to join together when they share common concerns or problems).

Groups of people who more or less exhibit each of these three factors can be considered a community, at least for the purposes of community policing.

(Flynn, 1998: 9)

The NPIA (2010b: 56) definition also excludes the sentence; ‘It may include issues ranging from the general quality of life in the community to serious crime and terrorism’, that appeared in the definition from the ACPO Guidance on the NIM (ACPO, 2005c: 47). This sentenced was also omitted from the ACPO Guidance on the Management of Police Information definitions (ACPO, 2006c: 110; 2010b: 166). By contrast the definition
proposed by Innes, Roberts and Maltby (2005: 2) appears less complex and is more succinct, but again does not elaborate on the term ‘community’.

There are a number of common themes that appear in the definitions of community intelligence outlined above, which may be summarised as follows:

- Information acquired directly or indirectly from a variety of sources, including the community and partner agencies.
- A process – assessed, analysed, evaluated and risk assessed.
- To inform policing interventions, strategic and tactical operational policing of local communities.
- Issues affecting neighbourhoods.
- Views, needs and expectations.
- Threats, harm, risks, vulnerability and tensions.
- Problems and priorities.
- Assisting decision-making.

When these common themes are combined then a single definition of community intelligence may be proposed as follows:

*Community Intelligence may be defined as information acquired directly or indirectly from a variety of sources, including the community (a geographical area or a group of people with shared identity or common concerns) and partner agencies, which when processed is used to understand issues affecting a community (including their views, needs, problems, priorities and expectations) and to reduce the level of uncertainty, by providing forewarning of threats, harm, risks, vulnerability and tensions (including serious crime and disorder, and terrorism), and of opportunities, which assists the decision-maker to achieve particular objectives.*
It is evident from the ACPO (1975: 7) definition of criminal intelligence outlined above that the main focus is on the prevention and detection of crime and the apprehension of offenders. By contrast the definitions of community intelligence highlight the views, needs, problems, priorities and expectations of local communities.

Once a workable definition of criminal intelligence and community intelligence has been agreed, an efficient and effective process must be put in place to be able to manage the information and intelligence acquired, so that any gaps in the intelligence can be identified. This process is often referred to as the Intelligence Cycle (Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 1994)

**The Intelligence Cycle**

The origins of the Intelligence Cycle are not clear, but may be traced back to a book entitled; ‘Intelligence is for Commanders’ (Glass and Davidson, 1948). This intelligence cycle comprised of four main elements, namely; Collection of Information, Processing of Information, Use of Intelligence and Direction of Collection Effort, all within the context of a military mission (Glass and Davidson, 1948: 5). Mallory (2007: 5) suggests that the Intelligence Cycle has similarities to the Shewhart Cycle (Shewhart, 1939), which is concerned with business processes and predates the Intelligence Cycle proposed by Glass and Davidson (1948).

The Shewhart Cycle was initially a linear model of Specification, Production and Inspection, but Shewhart later realised that to obtain continuous business improvement and knowledge, this should be a cyclical process. The Shewhart Cycle was further developed by Deming (1950) into what is now regarded as the Deming Wheel or Deming Cycle and initially comprised of four main elements; Design the product, Make or produce the product, Sell the product and Test or research the success of the product (Moen and Norman, 2010a; 2010b).
The Deming Cycle was redesigned in 1951 by the Japanese Union of Scientists and Engineers (JUSE) after Deming’s seminar in Japan in 1950, which they sponsored. No individual has taken credit for the redesign of the Deming Cycle into what is now known as the Plan, Do, Check and Act (PDCA) Cycle (Moen and Norman, 2010a; 2010b). Ishikawa (1985: 56-61) made further amendments to the PDCA Cycle particularly enhancing the ‘planning’ and ‘doing’ stages of the cycle, which allowed more control over the process.

After further modifications of the Shewhart, Deming and PDCA Cycles in 1986 (Deming, 1986: 88), Deming proposed the Plan, Do, Study and Act (PDSA) Cycle (Deming, 1993: 132). Mallory (2007: 5) noted that there was a similarity between the process of what he referred to as the ‘Deming Cycle of Plan, Do, Study and Act’, and the Scanning, Analysis, Response and Assessment (SARA) problem solving process first introduced by Eck and Spelman (1987a) as part of their study into problem solving at Newport News, Virginia, USA, which was later developed by Goldstein (1990). However, it would appear that the SARA process is more aligned to the PDCA Cycle involving problem solving, rather than the PDSA Cycle for managing change. The SARA process will be discussed in more detail below.

The development of the Shewhart, Deming, PDCA and PDSA Cycles for business processes coincided with the development of the Intelligence Cycle for intelligence processes and there appear to be many similarities as many business processes rely on what is now commonly termed ‘business intelligence’ to assist users to make better business decisions (Davenport, 2006: 106-107).

A modern version of the Intelligence Cycle was developed in 1994 by the USIC and had five key elements; Planning and Direction/Needs, Collection, Processing and Exploitation, Analysis and Production, and Dissemination (CIA, 1994). A more recent Intelligence
Cycle proposed by the USIC (2011) is in the form of a very simple cycle consisting of five main elements, namely; Planning, Collection, Processing, Analysis and Dissemination. This version of the Intelligence Cycle has been augmented by the following five new headings corresponding to the five main elements of the Intelligence Cycle; Management (Planning), Data Gathering (Collection), Interpretation (Processing), Analysis and Reporting (Analysis) and Distribution (Dissemination) (USIC, 2011). However, the five new headings do not appear on the diagrammatic form of the Intelligence Cycle. See Figure 3.1 below. The reason for their inclusion in the description of the Intelligence Cycle is unclear, but may be an attempt to modernise the terminology used.

**Figure 3.1: The Intelligence Cycle**

![Intelligence Cycle Diagram](Image)

*Adapted from The Intelligence Cycle developed by the United States Intelligence Community (USIC, 2011)*

A number of observers have commented on the simplistic nature of the traditional Intelligence Cycle developed by the USIC over the last two decades. Herman (1996: 293-295) argues that the ‘real intelligence cycle’, where intelligence itself is the main driving force, is comprised of four main elements, namely; ‘Study users reactions. Adjust collection accordingly’, ‘Collection and analysis’, ‘Disseminate product and seek user
reaction’ and ‘Users receive and react’. This process is bespoke to the needs of the user and relies on positive and negative feedback from the user. Herman (1996: 293) suggests that; ‘The intelligence objective in this constant modification – akin to the cat’s shifting on the hearthrug – is to maximise user satisfaction over the product received’. However, Herman (1996: 294-295) warns that the intelligence cycle is driven by a number of complex issues, including the ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors. The push factor occurs when data is pushed to managers where there is a belief that the information will be of use to them. The pull factor occurs when data is requested by management for their own purposes. This can be further complicated if the pushers do not know the requirements of the managers and the pullers in management do not actually know what data they require to assist in the decision making process. Marrin (2008: 132) argues that when the push factor dominates and the requirements of the decision makers are not taken into account, the intelligence cycle becomes linear and consists of ‘collection, analysis and dissemination’.

Berkowitz (1997: 112) argues that the traditional intelligence cycle; ‘... reflects a conception of information services that fit the 1940s, ...’ and went further, stating that; ‘... the traditional concept was often inapplicable or unworkable’. Treverton (2001: 104) agrees that the traditional intelligence cycle is an ‘overly simple representation of what occurs’ and it is understood that the cyclical process is often interrupted to allow feedback at various stages of the process. Johnson (2005: 46) concurs and suggests that it; ‘... is not an accurate representation of the way intelligence is produced’. Treverton (2001: 106) also suggests that the ‘real’ intelligence cycle takes into account this feedback process and the push and pull factors outlined by Herman (1996: 294-295).

Treverton (2001: 106) agrees with Herman (1996) that some managers or policy makers do not have the time or knowledge to ‘task intelligence operators effectively’. As
a result the traditional intelligence cycle is driven by the intelligence *pushers* rather than the policy *pullers*.

**The National Intelligence Model**

In the UK the NIM was created by the NCIS in 2000 as a business excellence model, which considers inputs, processes and outputs (NCIS, 1999; 2000; 2002). Brian Flood and Roger Gaspar, the two principle authors of the NIM advise us that consideration had been given to describing the model as a national policing business model, but in 2000 it was thought that this nomenclature would have been inappropriate and would have made the acceptance of a national model by the ACPO even more difficult.

'It was the view of those in NCIS in 2000 that it would not have been acceptable for NCIS to produce a UK "Policing Business" Model even if that is what it was. The product was the same whatever the title but consideration had to be given to the acceptability of its presentation’.

(Flood and Gaspar, 2009: 53)

Their strategy obviously worked, as in the same year the NIM was accepted as policy by the ACPO and in 2002 it was placed at the centre of police reform by the then Home Secretary, the Rt. Hon. David Blunkett, MP. Flood and Gaspar (2009: 64) suggest that the NIM was also ‘firmly embedded’ in the Home Office National Policing Plan 2005-2008 (Home Office, 2004b: 8), which described it as ‘... a cornerstone of policing in England and Wales ...’.

The NIM appears to have links to the European Foundation for Quality Management (EFQM) Excellence Model, which was launched in 1991 (EFQM, 2010). The EFQM Excellence Model is also used in conjunction with and is at the heart of the Results, Approaches, Deploy, and Assess and Refine (RADAR) Logic Cycle, which is similar to the business improvement and intelligence cycles mentioned above.

The NIM has five main elements, which are essential to business planning and performance management, namely; the Tasking and Coordinating Process, Analytical
Products, Intelligence Products, Knowledge Products and System Products. The Tasking and Coordinating Process takes place on a number of levels, which is generally based on geographical areas and the seniority of the participants in the process. Police Strategic Tasking and Coordinating Meetings usually consist of a group of senior police managers who have strategic responsibility for a police Basic Command Unit (BCU). In the case of partnership joint Strategic Tasking and Coordinating Meetings, they generally include senior managers from the organisations represented in the CSP, (formally Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs) in England). Members of the Strategic Tasking and Coordinating Groups usually meet every six months (NCIS, 2000; ACPO, 2006f).

At a lower level sits a Tactical Tasking and Coordinating Group, who usually meet every two weeks unless there is a need to meet more frequently. This group is generally chaired by a member of the Strategic Tasking and Coordinating Group to ensure continuity and the group will have a responsibility for the same geographical area as the Strategic Group. At an even lower level would sit the Neighbourhood Tasking and Coordinating Group, who usually meet on a monthly basis and would be concerned with specific neighbourhood priorities (NCIS, 2000; ACPO, 2006f).

Analytical Products are prepared by specialist analysts as a result of the analysis of information from a number of sources. This could include electronic data on crime trends or information received from a Covert Human Intelligence Source (CHIS), (also referred to as an informant), who must be managed very carefully within strict guidelines to minimise the risks to both the CHIS and their handler or controller. Section 71 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000 (Home Office, 2000a: 82) places an obligation on the Home Secretary to produce codes of practice in relation to the 'exercise and performance' of investigatory powers and duties. In pursuance of Section 71 of the Act (Home Office, 2000a), the Home Office issued regulatory orders (Home Office, 2002e; 2010g) and produced codes of practice (Home Office, 2002a; 2010a) for the management of CHISs by public authorities.
A set of standards were also developed by the ACPO and Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC), (formerly Her Majesty’s Customs and Excise (HMCE)) to assist in the management of CHISs (ACPO and HMCE, 2005a). All those involved in the management of CHISs must be properly trained and must record all CHIS activity within the CHIS management system. CHISs should also be tasked in accordance with the Tasking and Coordinating Process (ACPO, 2005c; 2006b). Some of the analytical products from these sources may be developed into intelligence products.

*Intelligence Products* are generally divided into Strategic Assessments, Tactical Assessments, Target (Subject) Profiles and Problem Profiles. The Strategic Tasking and Coordinating Group will produce a *strategic assessment*, which takes into consideration Government policy, aims and objectives, police and partnership aims and objectives, and information provided by the analytical products mentioned above. The Government directed that all CDRPs in England produced a joint strategic assessment by April 2008. The Welsh Assembly Government (WAG) extended this period to April 2009 for CSPs in Wales. The strategic assessment should highlight and prioritise problems, such as crime and disorder, criminal activity, persistent offenders (targets or subjects) and local issues (problems), which have been identified in the geographical area, for which the Strategic Tasking and Coordinating Group has responsibility. The assessment should also be instrumental in developing the intelligence requirement for the area. This should allow senior managers to manage and coordinate their response as part of their business plan. The strategic assessment should be reviewed every three months (NCIS, 2000; ACPO, 2006f).

As a result of this assessment a *control strategy* should be developed, which should outline the priorities identified by the group and should control the focus of operational response and activity for that geographical area (NCIS, 2000; ACPO, 2006f).
The Tactical Tasking and Coordinating Group should take into account the problems highlighted and prioritised by the Strategic Group in the strategic assessment and the control strategy. The Tactical Tasking and Coordinating Group produce a tactical assessment, which outlines the tactical or operational response to the targets and problems identified. Target (subject) and problem profiles are usually prepared using the most up-to-date intelligence on persistent offenders and local problems respectively, with the flexibility to introduce more serious issues as and when they arise. Any gaps identified in the intelligence in relation to the above will become the subject of a further intelligence requirement for the area. These profiles assist in the planning of operational responses (NCIS, 2000; ACPO, 2006f).

Knowledge Products are a range of products that assist in professionalising the business model, creating protocols and defining effective practice for the processes used within the model. They take into account information sharing protocols, regulatory orders and the various codes of practice that are associated with the NIM (ACPO, 2003; 2005b; 2005c; 2006b; 2007; Home Office, 2002a; 2002b; 2002c; 2002e; 2003b; 2004c; 2005b; 2006d; 2007a; 2007d; 2010a; 2010b; 2010g; 2010h; 2010i; 2010j; 2010k; 2012a), the European Convention on Human Rights (Council of Europe, 1950; 2003) and legislation such as the Data Protection Act, 1998 (Home Office, 1998b), the Human Rights Act, 1998 (Home Office, 1998c) and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000 (Home Office, 2000a).

System Products are associated with the information and communication technology systems that support the processes for the collection, retention, analysis, use, evaluation and deletion of information. The system products also provide security systems for the information and the standardisation of products is essential if information is to be shared securely with other recognised law enforcement agencies (NCIS, 1999; 2000).
One of the main purposes of utilising the five main elements of the NIM mentioned above is to ensure a successful solution to any problem identified and to ensure that areas for improvement are identified and effective practice is disseminated. These two processes are commonly referred to as the Tactical Resolution and the Results Analysis (ACPO, 2006f).

The **Tactical Resolution** relies on a tactical plan being developed by the problem owner, who is also responsible for attaining a positive tactical outcome. The tactical plan is linked to the target and problem profiles, and should include Prevention, Intelligence and Enforcement (PIE) tactics. The tactical plan must be kept updated by the problem owner, along with the target and problem profiles. The execution of the plan should be undertaken with appropriate partners who can assist in the successful resolution of the problem. Any tactical resolution of the identified problem should be resolved to the satisfaction of the community (ACPO, 2006f).

The **Results Analysis** phase is concerned with the identification of any areas within the process that could be improved and may lead to a more successful outcome in the future. The analysis should also consider what worked well and be disseminated as effective practice for future tactical planning. The desired outcomes of the tactical resolution should be decided at the commencement of the tactical plan to ensure that all of the objectives in the plan were achieved. The resolution of the problem to the satisfaction of the community should be included as a measure of the desired outcomes (ACPO, 2006f).

Flood (1999: 9) described the NIM as being ‘very ambitious’ and added that ‘for the first time [the NIM offered] the realisable goal of integrated intelligence in which all forces might play a part in a system bigger than themselves’.
The NIM was designed to operate at three levels, namely; Level One (Local Level), Level Two (Cross Border Level) and Level Three (National and International Level). Level One is concerned with local crime and disorder issues, which can be managed locally at a police BCU level. Level Two is concerned with crime and disorder issues, which cross borders between BCUs in one force or borders between neighbouring forces and thus, should be managed at a regional level. Level Three is concerned with serious and organised crime and disorder issues, which require national or international management (NCIS, 2000; ACPO, 2005c). See Figure 3.2 below.

**Figure 3.2: The National Intelligence Model**

Adapted from the National Criminal Intelligence Service’s National Intelligence Model (NCIS, 2000: 9)

Flood and Gasper (2009) describe the NIM as follows:

‘... a single doctrine for tackling crime and disorder on an intelligence-led basis at local and regional levels and for tackling the organised criminality that generally operates in the national and international arenas.’

(Flood and Gaspar, 2009: 52)
Flood and Gaspar (2009: 60-61) also produced their own very succinct precis of the intelligence processes and products outlined above. Sheptycki (2004: 312) argues that the processes within ‘intelligence system models are based on hierarchies of information flow’ and are often represented by a pyramid, with the national and international level being at the top of the pyramid (Level 3), followed by the regional level (Level 2) and the local level (Level 1).

More recently there have been discussions nationally as to whether there should be a Level Zero included in the NIM, which would operate at a neighbourhood or electoral ward level to cater specifically for what may be considered low level community intelligence.

The counter argument is that community intelligence is essential in the management of crime and disorder at Levels One, Two and Three. In this postmodern era, terrorism is a national and international serious and organised crime issue, which would comfortably fit into Level Three of the NIM. However, the potential perpetrators of an act of terrorism often live within a local community or neighbourhood. For example, the four persons responsible for the suicide terrorist attacks in London on 7th July 2005 were all British Nationals. Three of the four (Mohammed Siddeque Khan, Hasib Hussein and Shazad Tanweer) were of Pakistani origin, born in the UK and resided within their individual communities in Leeds, West Yorkshire. The fourth (Jermaine Lindsay) was of West Indian origin, born in Jamaica and resided in Aylesbury, Buckinghamshire (Intelligence and Security Committee, 2006: 11).

It has been suggested that community intelligence is one method of identifying radical extremism and potential terrorists, their associates, their locations and their modes of transport. In that respect community intelligence is directly linked to Level Three of the NIM.
This particular example in relation to terrorism also directly relates to the Government’s long term strategy for countering international terrorism, commonly referred to as the Contest Strategy, which was introduced in 2003 and formalised in 2006 (Home Office, 2006b). The Strategy has four main strands, namely; The Prevent Strand, The Pursue Strand, The Protect Strand and The Prepare Strand. This will be discussed in more detail below. Further examples of the links between community intelligence and Level Three intelligence could be identified with international people trafficking and illegal immigration. There are similar associated links with Level Two and Level One intelligence.

The NCIS saw the NIM as more than just a business model, but also a model to assist with Crime and Disorder Act, 1998 audits (Home Office, 1998a) and providing the community intelligence requirements sought by the HMIC thematic inspection ‘Winning the Race’ (NCIS, 2000: 7).

Over a 21 month period between 2001 and 2002 John and Maguire (2003; 2004a; 2004b) conducted a study into the early implementation of the NIM in three selected police forces (Lancashire, Surrey and West Midlands). During the course of their study John and Maguire (2003; 2004a; 2004b) also interviewed members of the National Intelligence Model Implementation Project (NIMIP) team and identified several common problems associated with the implementation process and made a number of recommendations that police forces should consider in relation to the development of the NIM. These may be summarised as follows: (1) Leadership and committed management, (2) Widening the understanding of the NIM, including frequent presentations and the training of all staff (3) Communication and ownership of the NIM, (4) Training, (5) Tasking and Coordinating as core police business, (6) Managing demand, (7) Standardisation of products and practices, (8) Sufficient analytical resources, (9) Measurement of the impact and effectiveness, and (10) Allowing the NIM to mature (John and Maguire (2004a: 57). Flood and Gaspar (2009) agree that training is an
important issue and acknowledge that most training is still delivered in a way which focuses on the NIM as a means of tackling crime and not as a policing business model.

‘In training, the Intelligence Model still retains that title and is delivered as a way to tackle crime and not police business.’ (Flood and Gaspar, 2009: 64)

John and Maguire (2004a: 7) identified that police forces used different methods to process intelligence, which ‘contributed to the creation of barriers to the effective flow of information between forces’ at all three levels within the NIM and that individual forces had failed to create an intelligence culture that functioned effectively.

Sheptycki (2004: 312) agrees that the intelligence process is further complicated by the fact that ‘the police sector is not a unified whole, but is itself a variegated institutional field.’ The police sector being made up of institutions such as; the National Crime Agency (NCA), HMRC, United Kingdom Visas and Immigration (UKVI) and of course the 43 separate police forces in England and Wales. Sheptycki (2004: 313) argues that as each of these organisations has its own hierarchy of information flow, ‘there is not one pyramid of intelligence, but many’, which can lead to problems of intelligence sharing between organisations in the police sector. Sheptycki (2004: 313-327) refers to these problems as ‘organizational pathologies’ and has identified 11 such pathologies as follows: ‘digital divide; linkage blindness; noise; intelligence overload; non-reporting; intelligence gaps; duplication; institutional friction; intelligence-hoarding and information silos; defensive data concentration; and the differences of occupational subculture’.

Friedman et al (1998) argue that the intelligence process must involve the whole organisation, not just a small group of intelligence professionals and that an intelligence culture was essential to the creation of intelligence systems.

*Intelligence systems cannot be created without creating a culture of intelligence. With that culture, professionals may or may not be necessary. Without the culture, professionals are a waste of space.*
(Friedman et al, 1998: 8)
HMIC (2002a: 320) also agreed that any intelligence gathering process should be a ‘crucial’ and ‘integral’ function of the police service and should not just concentrate on crime intelligence, but should embrace all forms of intelligence, including community intelligence. HMIC also produced a thematic report in 2002 on the theme of scientific and technical support, entitled; ‘Under the Microscope: Refocused’ (HMIC, 2002b), which revisited a previous thematic report on the same subject; ‘Under the Microscope’ (HMIC, 2000). The 2002 thematic report (HMIC, 2002b: 21) also highlighted that; ‘In the majority of forces, intelligence from scientific sources does not feature in the intelligence strategy’. It also supported the views of Friedman et al (1998) that even intelligence staff did not understand the potential of intelligence from scientific sources and recommended that forces review how ‘forensic science intelligence’ can be incorporated into the NIM (HMIC, 2002b: 21).

HMIC (2005) also commented that forces had committed to the NIM at a BCU level, but there was not the same commitment at a force level.

*The demonstrable commitment and investment in the National Intelligence Model (NIM) by forces at a BCU level has clearly been effective, the same degree of commitment and adoption at a force level would significantly enhance the way intelligence is collected, handled and directed, and this is an essential part of the future.*

(HMIC, 2005: 30)

John and Maguire (2004a: 8) further highlighted that the implementation of the NIM and intelligence-led policing had to be undertaken at a time when new legislation such as the Police Act, 1996 (Home Office, 1996b), the Police Act, 1997 (Home Office, 1997b), the Data Protection Act, 1998 (Home Office, 1998b), the Human Rights Act, 1998 (Home Office, 1998c) and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000 (Home Office, 2000a) all had ‘major implications’ for the collection, processing and dissemination of information and intelligence.
The ACPO National Intelligence Model Team developed the NIM Minimum Standards (ACPO, 2003), which provided the criteria for the standardised application of the model. This document set the minimum standards for compliance in relation to the following eleven areas of intelligence management: (1) Knowledge Assets, (2) System Assets, (3) Source Assets, (4) People Assets, (5) Information Sources, (6) Intelligence and Information Recording, (7) Research and Development Analysis, (8) Intelligence Products, (9) Strategic and Tactical Tasking and Coordinating Groups, (10) Tactical Resolution and (11) Intelligence and Operational Review. See Figure 3.3 below.

**Figure 3.3: The National Intelligence Model Business Process**

![Diagram showing the National Intelligence Model Business Process](image)

*Adapted from the Association of Chief Police Officers’ National Intelligence Model Business Process (ACPO, 2005c: 14)*

(1) **Knowledge Assets** include legislation and case law, codes of practice, guidance, practice advice, policy, strategy and training; (2) **System Assets** include physical security, security policies, providing a secure sterile environment, effective briefing and debriefing, and information sharing protocols; (3) **Source Assets** include victims and witnesses, priority and prolific offenders, community intelligence, prison intelligence,
CHISs and forensic intelligence; (4) *People Assets* include minimum staffing levels, succession planning, Tasking and Coordinating Group chairs, directors of intelligence, intelligence managers, and CHIS handlers and controllers; (5) *Information Sources* include open and closed data sources, intelligence and other reports, and access to live data and external information sources; (6) *Intelligence and Information Recording* includes sanitisation and risk assessments, compliance with data protection legislation, a dissemination policy, use of the National Information/Intelligence Report (NIR) and data management; (7) *Research and Development Analysis* includes technical support and surveillance equipment, standards of delivery for products and services, and systems for the development and review of intelligence; (8) *Intelligence Products* include strategic assessments, tactical assessments, target and problem profiles, and operational intelligence assessments; (9) *Strategic and Tactical Tasking and Coordinating Groups* include Tasking and Coordinating Group policy and chairs, engagement of stakeholders and sanction of the intelligence requirement; (10) *Tactical Resolution* includes investigative and tactical capabilities, and (11) *Intelligence and Operational Review* includes results analysis and review, the national briefing model, organisational memory and community impact assessment reviews (ACPO, 2005c: 111-162; 2006d). The Home Office National Policing Plan 2003-2006 (Home Office, 2002f) placed a requirement on all police forces to implement the NIM Minimum Standards by April 2004.

In 2003 the HMIC thematic inspection report entitled; ‘Diversity Matters’ (HMIC, 2003) recommended that the ACPO should devise a strategy in relation to community intelligence within the NIM to enhance police training.

*HM Inspector recommends that the Service, led by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), within the framework of the National Intelligence Model, devises a national strategy for the gathering and use of ‘community intelligence’ to inform the training process.*
(HMIC, 2003: 148-149 & 165)

The ACPO Code of Practice on the NIM (ACPO, 2005b) came into effect on 12th January 2005 and was made under Section 39 of the Police Act 1996, Section 39A of the Police
Act 1996, as inserted by Section 2 of the Police Reform Act 2002, Sections 28 and 73 of the Police Act 1997, Sections 28A and 73A of the Police Act 1997, as inserted by Schedule 1 of the Police Reform Act 2002 (Home Office, 1996b; 1997b; 2002d). This Code of Practice applied to police forces in England and Wales defined under Section 1 of the Police Act 1996 (Home Office, 1996b), to the National Crime Squad (NCS) and the NCIS. Section 2.2.1 of the Code of Practice (ACPO, 2005b) placed a statutory responsibility on chief officers of police to comply with the NIM Minimum Standards and the principles of the code.

A revised edition of the NIM Minimum Standards document was produced in November 2004 with a requirement that all the minimum standards were to be implemented by November 2005. There are 135 minimum standards outlined in the ACPO Guidance on the NIM (ACPO, 2005c). Minimum Standard 30 – Access to Community Intelligence, refers specifically to community intelligence and its importance in neighbourhood policing and the deployment of resources.

_Access to community intelligence is an important aspect of integrating NIM with neighbourhood policing. Information gained from local communities should be used to inform the strategic and tactical assessments at level 1 and 2 which will assist in the deployment of resources in response to problems of crime and disorder._

(ACPO, 2005c: 121)

The ACPO guidance for meeting the criteria of minimum standards directs that there must be police management of community intelligence at both a force and local level in relation to information such as; ‘community contacts and resources, community profiles and multiagency information’ (ACPO, 2005c: 121).

In her article; ‘Where’s the Intelligence in the National Intelligence Model?’, Kleiven (2007: 270) explains that she ‘... found little evidence of the use of community intelligence within the NIM’ and that community intelligence was still a low priority for those involved in her study.
The National Intelligence Model and Community Safety Partnerships

In 1991 The Home Office Standing Conference on Crime Prevention chaired by James Morgan, which is commonly referred to as the Morgan Report (Home Office, 1991) made 19 main recommendations in relation to crime prevention and community safety. Recommendation five of the report advocated that local authorities ‘should have clear statutory responsibility for the development and stimulation of community safety and crime prevention programmes’ (1991: 6). However, it was not until 1997 that the Home Office produced a consultation document, ‘Getting to Grips with Crime: A New Framework for Local Action’ (Home Office, 1997a), which set out the Government’s intention to introduce legislation, in the form of a Crime and Disorder Act, 1998 (Home Office, 1998a) to ensure that key partners worked together with communities to actively reduce crime and increase community safety. This document not only acknowledged the importance of the Morgan Report, but emphasised the introduction of the concept of community safety.

The Crime and Disorder Act was enacted in 1998 and Section 5 of the Act (Home Office, 1998a: 5-6) placed a statutory obligation on the ‘responsible authorities’ (the local authorities and the police service of England and Wales), to ‘act in co-operation with’ police authorities, the probation service, health authorities and any other person or body ‘prescribed by order of the Secretary of State’ for Home Affairs (the Home Secretary). Furthermore, Section 6 of the Act (Home Office, 1998a: 6) also placed an obligation on the responsible authorities to ‘formulate and implement’ a crime and disorder reduction strategy and Section 17 (Home Office, 1998a: 14) placed a duty on authorities ‘to prevent, crime and disorder in its area’. This saw the creation of CDRPs in England and CSPs in Wales (Home Office, 1998a).

In the police reform White Paper; ‘Building Communities, Beating Crime: A Better Police Service for the 21st Century’ (Home Office, 2004a: 158) the Government announced that it would be undertaking a detailed review of the partnership provisions of the Crime and
Disorder Act, 1998, as amended by the Police Reform Act, 2002 (Home Office, 1998a; 2002d). In 2006 the Home Office published the findings of the review and as part of the Government’s delivery programme they outlined their intention to adapt the ‘principles and practices behind NIM’ to ensure that partnership working became intelligence-led and actually tackled the problems highlighted by communities (Home Office, 2006e: 3). This was also reiterated in the CLG White Paper of the same year, to encourage partnerships to focus their ‘action on the drivers of crime, anti-social behaviour and substance misuse’ (Home Office (CLG), 2006: 8).

Stoner and Ridgman (2006) undertook a study of the Crime and Disorder Act Review implementation process and as part of their consultation they found that for the NIM to work effectively in partnerships there needed to be robust information sharing processes and a clear understanding of the different cultures that exist within the partner agencies. Partnership strategies should therefore, take into account short, medium and long term problem solving initiatives as part of the NIM process to accommodate the inevitable cultural issues and priorities. For example, the police tend to deal with critical incidents in a relatively short timescale, whereas local authorities tend to plan their service provision and engagement over a far longer period.

By integrating problem solving within the NIM it would enhance the NIM products and should provide more successful and sustainable solutions to the problems identified (Kirby and McPherson, 2004; McPherson and Kirby, 2004: 24). The CDRPs in England (now CSPs) and CSPs in Wales are essential to this process and the NIM enables partners to share information and intelligence, and to influence strategic and tactical tasking and coordinating processes.

The Home Office Police and Crime Standards Directorate (PCSD) outlined ‘six hallmarks of effective practice’ for CDRPs and CSPs, namely; (1) Empowerment and effective leadership, (2) Intelligence-led business processes, (3) Effective and responsive delivery
structures, (4) Engaged communities, (5) Visible and constructive accountability and (6) Appropriate skills and knowledge. Each of the six hallmarks is comprised of two main elements, namely; ‘new statutory requirements for partnership working’ and ‘suggested practice to achieve increased effective partnership working, using the statutory requirements as a foundation’ (Home Office (PCSD), 2007: 11).

The new statutory requirements for partnership working were introduced under Sections 19 to 22 and Schedules 8 and 9 of the Police and Justice Act, 2006 (Home Office, 2006c), which amended the Crime and Disorder Act, 1998 (Home Office, 1998a). These statutory requirements came into force in August 2007 in England and November 2007 in Wales.

Section 115 of the Crime and Disorder Act, 1998 (Home Office, 1998a) as amended by the Police Reform Act, 2002 (Home Office, 2002d) and the Police and Justice Act, 2006 (Home Office, 2006c) identified the responsible authorities within these partnerships as the police, police authorities, local authorities, local probation boards, fire and rescue authorities, strategic health authorities, primary care trusts, local health boards (in Wales) and registered social landlords.

The Police and Justice Act, 2006 (Home Office, 2006c) made it a statutory requirement for the responsible authorities to share certain anonymised data on a quarterly basis and to prepare a strategic assessment annually. The Home Office also produced a number of Crime and Disorder (Formulation and Implementation of Strategy) Regulations to strengthen the obligation of the responsible authorities to conform to existing legislation (Home Office, 2007c; 2011c), to formulate and implement a strategy to reduce reoffending and to establish the Probation Service as a responsible authority on the CSP for a particular area, rather than just a co-operating body (Home Office, 2009; 2010c: 1; 2010d: 11-14).
As a result of the 2007 Regulations (Home Office, 2007c) the Home Office recommended that partnerships adopt the NIM ‘as a framework for partnership working’ (Home Office (PCSD), 2007: 126) and produced a toolkit to assist CSPs in the development of their strategic assessments (Home Office, 2007b).

In November 2012 police authorities were replaced by elected PCCs, which were introduced under Section 1 of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act, 2011 (Home Office, 2011b: 1-2). Section 5(10) of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act, 2011 (Home Office, 2011b: 6) requires a PCC to send a copy of their police and crime plan to the relevant chief constable and responsible authorities for that police area. Sections 10(1) and 10(2) of the same Act (Home Office, 2011b: 10) requires a PCC for a police area to ‘have regard to the relevant priorities of each responsible authority’ and for the PCC and responsible authority when exercising their functions to ‘act in co-operation with each other’. In 2012 a further Crime and Disorder (Formulation and Implementation of Strategy) Regulation (Home Office, 2012b) was introduced in England, which specifies that a PCC may require representatives of the responsible authorities to attend a meeting to assist in formulating and implementing any strategies relating to their police area.

**Police Application of Intelligence**

Over the centuries intelligence strategies and products have mainly been developed for military and political purposes. More recently intelligence has been seen as an essential element in the formulation of business models and strategies, in both the private and public sectors, including the police service.

The 1990s saw the development of policing models and strategies in the UK, such as problem-oriented policing (Goldstein, 1979; 1990; 1996) and intelligence-led policing (Audit Commission, 1993) in response to the unexplained increase in recorded crime.
levels during the late 1980s and the early 1990s, and the decline in public confidence and satisfaction in the police (Mayhew, Elliott and Dowds, 1989).

During the 1990s HMIC also produced several thematic inspection reports in relation to a number of key themes, such as criminal intelligence (HMIC, 1997a), community and race relations (HMIC, 1997b; 1999b), crime reduction (HMIC, 1998) and policing disorder (HMIC, 1999a), which provided many positive recommendations to the police service of England and Wales. For example, the development of ‘an integrated intelligence structure’ to ensure that information is properly processed to produce intelligence that is dealt with proactively and in a timely manner (HMIC, 1997a: 33) and the use of a ‘problem solving approach’, which uses information and intelligence to provide solutions to problems that satisfy the needs of local communities (HMIC, 1998: 10).

Thus, there is a need to review the perceived outcomes of the intelligence process, to determine whether those outcomes are compatible with central government and PCCs’ performance management indicators and to examine the police application of intelligence utilising policing models such as problem-oriented policing and intelligence-led policing, and to consider the organisational influences that may impact on the decision making process.

**Intelligence Process Outcomes**

The Intelligence Cycle suggests that through the process of Management (Planning), Data Gathering (Collection), Interpretation (Processing), Analysis and Reporting (Analysis), and Distribution (Dissemination), intelligence can provide forewarning of threats and opportunities, and reduce the level of uncertainty for decision-makers in order to achieve particular objectives (USIC, 2011).

However, there are a number of other views as to what this process it is expected to achieve. Clark (2010: 13) argues that the intelligence process should be ‘target-centric
or objective oriented’, with all stakeholders being part of the process. Furthermore, the target-centric intelligence process is not a linear or cyclical process, ‘it is a network process, a social process, with all participants focused on the objective’. Treverton et al (2006: 8) suggest that intelligence should identify opportunities for ‘intervention’, provide a ‘comparative advantage in decision making’, ‘maximize security’, ‘optimize resources’ and ‘enhance understanding’, whilst Godfrey (1978: 642) maintains that ‘... the real purpose of intelligence [is] – truth telling ...’.

The NIM is more specific and advocates that by managing crime, criminals, disorder and problems, and through business planning, the tasking and co-ordination process, and the application of intelligence, knowledge and system products, the following outcomes may be achieved; community safety, reduced crime, controlled criminality and controlled disorder. The NIM also suggests that its intelligence process offers operational decision making opportunities and professionalises the business of policing (NCIS, 2000). However, intelligence process outcomes are also influenced by central government and more recently, PCCs’ objectives, priorities and performance indicators for the police.

**The National Intelligence Model and Performance Management**

The plethora of central government performance management indicators, policies and practices introduced over the last 30 years may have served to diffuse the initial intentions of the NIM (NCIS, 2000). Maguire and John (2006) highlighted that as a result of this diffusion, some police managers involved in leading tasking and coordinating groups, tended to concentrate on central government performance indicators and targets rather than on the priorities identified through the local intelligence process. This in turn had a knock on effect on their intelligence staff, who would prepare intelligence reports based on the requirements of their managers and not the requirements of the local community (Scott-Lee, Martin and Shipman, 2008). Berry (2009: 29) agrees and suggests that over-zealous performance management creates a culture of ‘what gets counted gets done’ and can lead to counter-productive behaviour. Furthermore, the
systems and processes put in place to manage performance create even more bureaucracy.

Loveday (2008: 129) also argues that central government target setting and performance management has resulted in a decline in leadership in the police service, as public service managers rather than leaders are likely to achieve performance success. (See also: Golding and Savage, 2008: 735-736). Collier (2001a: 37) further suggests that by comparison, the rewards for police managers to comply with performance targets are greater than those for complying with human rights and thus this can influence decision making behaviour. This can lead to ‘unintended and perverse consequences’, which can impact on ethical standards and ‘policing integrity’ (Loveday, 2005a: 97; 2006: 289-290). Smith (1995: 277-310) identified eight unintended consequences of the interpretation of performance indicators by managers, namely; *Tunnel vision* (or emphasising the indicators that are easiest to measure), *Sub-optimisation* (or concentrating on a small number of indicators to the detriment of others), *Myopia* (or focusing on short term targets only), *Measure fixation* (or concentrating on the measure rather than the intended service outcome), *Misrepresentation* (or deliberate corruption of data), *Misinterpretation* (or uncritical acceptance of performance data), *Gaming* (or deliberate underperformance to lower targets for subsequent performance assessments) and *Ossification* (or the pursuit of performance indicators that have ceased to be effective). Tilley (1995:5) suggests an additional two consequences to those outlined above, namely; *Demoralisation* (or the loss of confidence and commitment by staff delivering the service being measured) and *Discredibility* (or public scepticism in the performance data which has been sabotaged by disillusioned staff).

John and Maguire (2004a: 58-59) in their report on the early implementation of the NIM, identified that if enthusiasm for the NIM was to be maintained, it was vitally important that ‘robust and meaningful ways of measuring the effectiveness and impact of this way of policing’ were found. An outcome such as ‘reduced crime’ was far too wide and
suggested that reducing specific crimes, in specific locations, at specific times may be more appropriate, as crime types and locations change over a period of time (2004a: 58-59). A ‘much more flexible means’ of measuring outcomes linked to ‘specific plans and targets’ should be developed and monitored by the local Strategic Tasking and Coordinating Group (2004a: 58-59). John and Maguire (2004a) also suggested that there should be further research in this field, with the addition of qualitative, as well as quantitative indicators, which should include partner agencies data. Pollitt (1988: 83) also suggests that what has been ‘conspicuously absent’ from most performance measurement schemes has been ‘direct consumer-citizen participation in the design and operation of these schemes’. (See also: Moore and Braga, 2004: 14-18).

The Government had previously described the NIM as the ‘cornerstone of policing’ for the 21st century and ‘with the development of a more citizen-focused police service and spread of dedicated neighbourhood policing across the country, the kind of intelligence received from communities will help direct police resources in the most effective and efficient way possible, whilst also responding to the needs and priorities of local communities’ (Home Office, 2004a: 106). In 2005, during the launch of neighbourhood policing the Government suggested a number of additional outcomes for the NIM, including; driving the development of neighbourhood policing, making the police service more proactive by targeting crime hotspots, increasing detections and bringing offenders to justice (Home Office, 2005a: 7). Even with the introduction of neighbourhood policing, the central government focus still appeared to be on crime and crime detection rates, with intelligence-led policing, crime reduction and community safety being seen as a by-product of increased police proactivity.

Maguire and John (2006) also identified that too great an emphasis was being placed on crime detection rates to satisfy centralised performance indicators, which was contrary to the principles behind intelligence-led policing, problem-oriented policing and partnership crime reduction initiatives. John and Maguire (2003) had previously
concluded that the NIM, as a business model can be used to organise information to assist in decision making in relation to resource allocation and was designed for a much wider application in tackling problems that are not specifically classed as crimes.

*It is in essence a business model – a means of organising knowledge and information in such a way that the best possible decisions can be made about how to deploy resources, that actions can be coordinated within and between different levels of policing, and that lessons are continually learnt and fed back into the system.*

(John and Maguire, 2003: 38)

However, the tasking and coordinating element of the NIM is often integrated with the CompStat process originally developed in the USA, which historically has focused on crime.

**CompStat**

On becoming Police Commissioner for New York, USA in 1994, William J. Bratton initiated a process of ‘re-engineering’ the New York Police Department (NYPD) by setting clear goals, restructuring the organisation to achieve those goals, maximising the involvement of the Department’s personnel and outside expertise, decentralising policing and increasing the responsibility and accountability of precinct commanders for reducing crime and increasing the quality of life for the citizens of New York (Bratton, 1998: 35-36). As part of this process Bratton introduced a strategic crime fighting strategy, which became known as CompStat and is often associated with broken windows theory (Kelling and Wilson, 1982) and zero-tolerance policing (Dennis, 1998), which are discussed in more detail below. Osborn (2012: 58-59) argues that because of the popular interest and support in the UK and its association with the idea of zero-tolerance policing, CompStat played its part in influencing the design of the NIM, particularly the strategic element of the model.

The initial CompStat process was developed by Bratton’s deputy and crime strategist, Jack Maple and had four main principles, namely; (1) Accurate, timely intelligence; (2)
Rapid deployment; (3) Effective tactics; and (4) Relentless follow-up and assessment (Maple and Mitchell, 2000: 32). The origin of the term CompStat is unclear as Jack Maple explained; ‘The name was short for “Computer Statistics” or “Comparative Statistics” – nobody can be sure which’ (Maple and Mitchell, 2000: 33). At the centre of the CompStat process was the CompStat meeting, where computer generated statistics for each precinct (similar to a BCU) were reviewed and precinct commanders were questioned by the Deputy Commissioner Jack Maple in relation to what they were doing to reduce crime in specific areas (Bratton, 1998). Kelling (interviewed in Fischer et al, 2013: 27) argues that; ‘Compstat is the most important administrative policing development of the past 100 years’. Thus, CompStat is not in itself a policing model, but an administrative performance management process (Smith and Bratton, 2001; Walsh and Henry, 2008; Walsh, 2001).

Moore (2003: 470) suggests that in its broadest sense; ‘COMPSTAT could be viewed as a combined technical and managerial system that embeds the technical system for the collection and distribution of performance information in a broader managerial system designed to focus the organization as a whole, and a subset of managers who are relied on to exercise leadership in meeting the organization’s objectives, on the task that the organization faces’. Whist, Firman (2003: 458) presents a more simplified version of CompStat; ‘At its heart, Compstat is elegantly simple: leaders leading, information systems providing critical knowledge, and entire departments targeting and solving prioritized issues’.

Initially the NYPD version of the CompStat meeting was very adversarial with precinct commanders and their staff on one side of the room and Maple and his headquarters staff on the other. The meeting room was often referred to as the ‘war room’ (Bratton, 1998: 38) and Kelling and Sousa (2001: 11) describe the meetings as ‘important ceremonies’. Carter (2009: 89) suggests that the value of CompStat is in its ability to identify crime hot spots by the timely analysis of incident data and similarly, Kelling and
Sousa (2001: 11) argue that its effectiveness is its ability to drive the development of crime reduction tactics at precinct (BCU) level. By contrast, Pollard (1998: 45) describes CompStat as a ‘confrontational accountability’ system driven by the ‘single-minded pursuit of short-term results’ with little emphasis on working in partnership with other agencies or with communities to focus on medium or long-term needs.

When Bratton became Chief of Police of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) in October 2002 he introduced his version of CompStat there, but it was found to be too confrontational for the LAPD (Bratton and Malinowski, 2008: 262). In 2004, Bratton’s Assistant Chief of Police and Director of Operations, George Gascon developed an augmented version of CompStat known as CompStat Plus, which he describes as; ‘... an enhanced application of the well-known CompStat principles of inspection and accountability as well as the use of more in-depth auditing methods, mentorship, and close collaboration’ (Gascon, 2005: 34). The effectiveness of CompStat Plus is based on three main strategies; (1) Accurately identify the causes of underperformance; (2) Create a universally accepted conclusion as to what the findings mean and (3) Task the affected commands to develop their own plan of action (Gascon, 2005: 43).

Bratton and Malinowski (2008: 263) also warn against the aggressive implementation of CompStat as a performance management system without considering the two most commonly occurring problems; namely, the ‘process trap’ where subordinate commanders only spend their time preparing for the next CompStat meeting rather than dealing with the issues in their area, and the ‘gotcha syndrome’, where commanders are subjected to stressful, embarrassing and often humiliating questioning rather than being supported to succeed. Bratton and Malinowski (2008: 263) argue that CompStat inspections are most effective when they are carried out in an atmosphere of collaboration, encouragement and respect for participants whilst avoiding prejudgement and heavy handed questioning. However, Kelling (interviewed in Fischer et al, 2013: 27)
argues that if commanders make bad decisions and overall performance is poor, they should not be protected from humiliation.

Manning (2005: 151) argues that CompStat only provides a tactical veneer to cover the traditional reactive style of policing beneath and does not offer organisational flexibility. (See also: Willis et al, 2004: 55). Weisburd et al (2003: 450) suggest that what most characterises CompStat is the control element of the reform.

*This of course raises the question of whether American police agencies have adopted Compstat enthusiastically more because of its promise of reinforcing the traditional hierarchical model of police organization than for its efforts to empower problem solving in police agencies.* (Weisburd et al, 2003: 450)

Fischer et al (2013: 27-28) suggest that police leaders are exploring a move to a more strategic or long-term future oriented process. Bratton’s vision for the future of the CompStat process involves the inclusion of predictive policing and social media, where information is gathered and algorithms are applied to predict where crime will occur (Fischer et al, 2013: 28), whereas, Kelling highlights the dangers of only focusing on crime in the future.

*If you only focus on crime, you can develop a distorted view of whether the Department is succeeding. The Compstat systems of the future must reflect all of the values the police should be pursuing.* (Kelling, interviewed in Fischer et al, 2013: 27)

**The National Intelligence Model and Problem-Oriented Policing**

The continued central government drive for economy, efficiency and effectiveness that began during the late 1970s and early 1980s, prompted senior police managers and academics to consider alternative policing strategies to satisfy the Government’s performance management demands (Metcalf, 2001). It was at this time, both in the UK and the USA, that consideration was being given to more proactive law enforcement and preventative policing strategies, rather than the traditional incident oriented reactive rapid response strategy of ‘professional policing’ that was currently in use (Manning,
Proactive law enforcement strategies include intelligence-led policing, which will be discussed in more detail below. The earliest proactive preventative strategies included community (or neighbourhood) policing (see Chapter 2: Policing and Community Engagement) and problem-oriented policing (Cordner and Biebel, 2005; Metcalfe, 2001). Tilley (2004: 170) argues that although problem-oriented policing addresses issues of efficiency and effectiveness, it does not endorse the New Public Management methods of target setting, monitoring and performance indicators as they are an anathema, because they focus on central government objectives rather than the problems that emerge from the communities the police serve.

Herman Goldstein is credited with being the first to develop the concept of problem-oriented policing, the foundations for which originated in his book entitled; ‘Policing a Free Society’ (Goldstein, 1977). He developed this concept further in an article entitled; ‘Improving Policing: A Problem-Oriented Approach’ (Goldstein, 1979) and in greater detail in a later book; ‘Problem Oriented Policing’ (Goldstein, 1990).

Goldstein (1990: 33) argued that the first step in problem-oriented policing is to move away from the traditional reactive rapid response policing strategy of just handling incidents and recognise the underlying problems. Goldstein identified three main types of problems as follows:

- A cluster of similar, related, or recurring incidents rather than a single incident
- A substantive community concern
- A unit of police business
  (Goldstein, 1990: 66)

There is a clear distinction between the latter point which represents police problems and the previous two points which represent community problems. Police problems may be identified by police staff from their professional undertakings in their day to day police business. However, community problems require engagement with members of the community in order to specifically define the problems causing concern, rather than the
police defining those problems on behalf of the community (Goldstein, 1990: 33). The police often define problems by the use of four main characteristics: Behaviour (such as, domestic violence, various assault categories and anti-social behaviour), Territory (a particular area or specific location), Persons (for example; offenders, victims, complainants, families, organised crime groups and the homeless) and Time (for example; a regularly recurring event, by hour of the day, day of the week and seasonal or annual events, such as Christmas and Halloween) (Goldstein, 1990: 67-68).

Community involvement is therefore essential not only to defining the problem, but in finding the best solutions to resolve the problem with the police and other partner agencies. Goldstein also emphasises the importance of the community in policing:

\textit{A community must police itself. The police can, at best, only assist in that task.} (Goldstein, 1990: 21)

Goldstein first put this concept into practice when he and his colleagues in collaboration with the Madison Police Department, Wisconsin, USA, examined two substantive problems; the drinking-driver (operating while intoxicated) and the repeat sexual offender (Goldstein and Susmilch, 1981; 1982a; 1982b; 1982c). Further fieldwork utilising the concept of the problem-oriented approach to policing was undertaken by other researchers in the USA during the early 1980s at Baltimore County, Maryland (Cordner, 1986; 1988) and at Newport News, Virginia (Eck and Spelman, 1987a), and in the UK at Surrey and in the London Metropolitan Police area (Leigh, Read and Tilley, 1996).

In 1981, the Baltimore County Police Department (BCPD) created the Citizen Oriented Police Enforcement (COPE) Unit to combat the fear of crime after two murders in the County. In 1983, this dedicated Unit adopted Goldstein’s problem-oriented approach and conducted a survey of local residents and businesses in the community to establish the specific nature of the problems being experienced and also took advice from other agencies (Cordner, 1985; Eck and Spelman, 1987b; Scott, 2000). Cordner (1988: 15)
argues that it is essential to get the community’s views on their problems and their solutions, and his experience with the COPE project had ‘demonstrated the fallacy of assuming that a police department's sense of a community's problems matches community resident's actual concerns’.

In 1982, dedicated teams from Surrey Police and the Metropolitan Police were involved in a joint initiative in Addlestone and Camberley, Surrey and in Egham, Surrey respectively. The initiative developed the concept of a neighbourhood and a framework for addressing the problems and needs of the neighbourhood in collaboration with the residents. Between 1983 and 1984, the Metropolitan Police also conducted an experiment, which involved dedicated police teams tackling the problems of prostitution and motor vehicle crime at four pilot sites within the Metropolitan area (Leigh, Read and Tilley, 1996).

Eck and Spelman (1987a) used the term ‘problem-oriented policing’ in their research into solving persistent community problems in Newport News in 1984 and defined it as follows:

*Problem-oriented policing is a department wide strategy aimed at solving persistent community problems. Police identify, analyse, and respond to the underlying circumstances that create incidents.*

(Eck and Spelman, 1987a: xv)

For the purpose of the Newport News problem-oriented policing project, the dedicated Newport News Police Department Task Force identified two main problems; theft from vehicles and dwelling burglaries. Eck and Spelman (1987a: xix-xx) give credit to the Task Force, for designing a four stage problem solving process, involving scanning, analysis, response and assessment. This process is now commonly referred to as the SARA problem solving model and is widely used by policing agencies in the UK and USA. See Figure 3.4 below.
Figure 3.4: Scanning-Analysis-Response-Assessment (SARA) Process

Adapted from ‘A Problem Solving Process’ (Eck and Spelman, 1987a: 43)

The first and vital stage of the SARA process is Scanning, which involves identifying problems, collecting information to establish if the problems are real and worthy of further investigation and prioritising the problems for further analysis (Eck and Spelman, 1987a: 43-47). Clarke and Eck (2005) recommend the CHEERS test when defining problems at the scanning stage. This test takes in to consideration the six elements of; Community (Who in the community is affected by the problem?), Harmful (What are the harms created by the problem?), Expectation (What are the expectations for the police response?), Events (What types of events contribute to the problem?), Recurring (How often do these events recur?) and Similarity (How are the events similar?) (Clarke and Eck, 2005: 27). Once these questions have been answered and the problem specified, then the problem solver can move on to the analysis stage.

The Analysis stage involves developing a thorough understanding of the problem by utilising resources within the community such as, local residents, business leaders and partner agencies and by researching information and data from other initiatives and research (Eck and Spelman, 1987a: 47-48).
The *Response* stage involves selecting a solution and implementing it. The Newport News research identified that problem solving solutions generally fall into one of five groups:

1. **Solutions designed to totally eliminate a problem**;
2. **Solutions designed to substantially reduce a problem**;
3. **Solutions designed to reduce the harm created by a problem**;
4. **Solutions designed to deal with a problem better (treat people more humanely, reduce costs, or increase effectiveness)**; and
5. **Solutions designed to remove the problem from police consideration**. (Eck and Spelman, 1987a: 49).

The first group of solutions will generally apply to small simple problems; the second group to neighbourhood crime and disorder problems; the third group to problems where it is very difficult to reduce the number of incidents, but it may be possible to change the characteristics of the incidents; the fourth group to problems that have a wide jurisdiction and involve larger social concerns, and the fifth group to problems generated by the operating procedures of a specific business or group and a resolution cannot be agreed. The selection of the appropriate solution group and how it is implemented influences the effectiveness of the solution and how it is assessed (Eck and Spelman, 1987a: 49-50).

The *Assessment* stage provides feedback to the police on how effective the response was, whether the analysis should be improved and whether the nature of the problem should be redefined. The problem solving process can then be refined if necessary and the information used to tackle similar problems in the future (Eck and Spelman, 1987a: 50).

Much has been made of the benefits of problem-oriented policing by its supporters in the USA (Eck and Spelman, 1987a; Goldstein, 1990; Scott, 2000) and the UK (Leigh, Read and Tilley, 1998; Read and Tilley, 2000). However, Leigh, Read and Tilley (1996: 13) conclude that the police service in the UK, particularly in England and Wales, has
adopted a mixed approach to problem-oriented policing, with individual forces utilising small teams of dedicated officers. All forces reported some success, but none had developed a system to properly assess the outcomes. However, none of the initiatives examined had incorporated all of the factors advocated by Goldstein. In a second report, Leigh, Read and Tilley (1998: vii & 54-55) advise that for the successful and significant implementation of problem-oriented policing across forces there should be long-term commitment by senior management to encourage its development and overcome cultural resistance. A training programme should be developed specifically for the needs of local communities and technical support made available to assist with data. The assistance of criminological analysts should be sought to develop new ways of approaching problems and mechanisms introduced to facilitate working with other agencies. Goldstein’s frustration that problem-oriented policing is not being utilised as he advocated is evident in the following statement:

“This bare-bones premise - that operations should be informed by knowledge - is so elementary and so self-evident, that one feels apologetic in drawing attention to it. It is not an especially controversial proposition. It is certainly not radical. And it is not novel. Indeed, it is precisely for these reasons that problem-oriented policing strikes many people as just plain common sense.

(Goldstein, 2003: 19)

Cordner and Biebel (2005) suggest that problem-oriented policing has lost its focus due to the introduction of community policing, as individual officers are now involved in the problem solving of relatively minor problems within their communities rather than the substantive problems originally envisaged by Goldstein. In addition, Innes (2005) argues that officers, particularly reactive officers, do not have the capacity to identify and resolve problems, due to their busy work routine of rapidly responding to incidents. Herbert (2005: 182) also suggests that the police are under pressure to ‘conform to the latest fashionable model’ of policing and many police officers appear to ‘embrace the language of problem solving’, but little actually changes in practice as it is seen as an externally imposed model.
Since its inception many developments and refinements have been made to problem-oriented policing and the problem solving process in order to renew its focus (Scott, 2000; Scott et al, 2008). Attempts have also been made to include greater community involvement in crime and disorder problem solving (Forrest, Myhill and Tilley, 2005; Innes, 2005) and to introduce problem-oriented partnerships (Lancashire Constabulary, 2003). Bullock and Tilley (2009) describe problem-oriented partnerships as follows:

‘Problem-oriented partnerships’ describe larger or smaller groups (including statutory police services, but extending beyond them) that aim to reduce, ameliorate or remove significant community crime-related crime and disorder issues that it is the responsibility and/or interest of members to address them. (Bullock and Tilley, 2009: 382)

The more recent developments in problem-oriented policing have coincided with the implementation of the NIM in the UK and some concern was expressed that as problem-oriented policing was already well established in some forces this ‘may have an impact upon the implementation of the NIM’ (John and Maguire, 2003: 39). However, it was also recognised that both models were compatible and the NIM could also be applied to ‘non-crime problems such as disorder and anti-social behavior’ (John and Maguire, 2003: 38). In a later report, Maguire and John (2006: 74) suggested that more far sighted and strategic police mangers were able to dovetail the principles of problem-oriented policing into the NIM process with considerable success. Kirby and McPherson (2004: 46) agree and suggest that integrating a problem solving approach into the NIM develops and enhances NIM products and creativity in respect of problem solving. Bullock, Erol and Tilley (2006: 149) highlight Lancashire Constabulary’s attempt to integrate problem-oriented policing with the NIM, where the scanning process overlaps with the business of managing crime, the analysis and response processes overlap with the tasking and coordinating process and the use of intelligence products, and the assessment process overlaps with the predicted outcomes of the NIM process (Lancashire Constabulary, 2003: 13).
From the research conducted by Bullock, Erol and Tilley (2006) it would appear that the integration of problem-oriented policing with the NIM is at best ad hoc, even though the NIM as a business model could be utilised to deliver problem-oriented policing (John and Maguire, 2003; Tilley, 2003b). Another factor which may have contributed to the lack of integration, is the competition between other alternative policing models such as; reassurance policing, neighbourhood policing, knowledge-based policing, evidence-based policing and in particular, intelligence-led policing (Cordner and Biebel, 2005; Herbert, 2005; Tilley and Scott, 2012).

**The National Intelligence Model and Intelligence-Led Policing**

A sustained period of technological development, the quest for efficiency and effectiveness, and the increase in recorded crime during the 1990’s, saw a greater emphasis being placed on more proactive law enforcement styles of policing (Clarke, 2006; Flood and Gaspar, 2009). Intelligence-led policing again came to the forefront of policing in the UK and was given even more prominence as a result of a report produced by the Audit Commission (1993) entitled; ‘Helping with Enquiries: Tackling Crime Effectively’. The Audit Commission (1993: 54-56) report recommended that policing should; ‘Target the criminal and not just the crime’, as analysis by the Home Office suggested that a small number of male offenders were responsible for a disproportionately larger number of detected crimes (Home Office, 1989: 8). The Audit Commission report focused on proactivity and performance issues in relation to the detection of crime, and supported the notion of intelligence as evidence. The report stated that; 'evidence will be of two types - forensic (fingerprints, fibres, blood samples etc.) and intelligence-based' (Audit Commission, 1993: 32).

In 1991, prior to the Audit Commission (1993) report, the Metropolitan Police Service was developing an initiative called Systems for Investigation and Detection (SID) to review intelligence functions, to drive intelligence education, activity and responsibility, and to inform all policing strategy, tactics and operations (Hilliard, 1994: 18-19; Grieve,
Also in 1993, Kent County Constabulary (now Kent Police) developed a Crime Management Model, which was further developed into the Kent Policing Model. The Kent Policing Model was successfully piloted in 1994 and implemented county-wide in 1995. The implementation was accompanied by a programme of financial investment in information technology systems to support the policing model. The Kent Policing Model was later described by HMIC (1995: 1) as; ‘an intelligence-led, proactive, problem solving approach to policing with crime reduction as its primary objective’. Maguire and John (1995) suggest that a fully integrated, strategically informed approach is necessary if forces are to make a contribution to crime control and not get diverted back into reactive demand-led policing.

Amey, Hale and Uglow (1996) later developed a Crime Management Model that included the ideas from the Audit Commission (1993) and the Kent Policing Model. Amey, Hale and Uglow (1996: 2-5) suggest that the new Crime Management Model should be based on nine key concepts, which include the broad themes of; proactivity, intelligence requirements, force priorities, intelligence units, crime desks, single visits to crime scenes, specialist teams (including tasking and coordinating groups, intelligence units and crime desks), performance indicators and the financial implications. Amey, Hale and Uglow (1996: 33) highlighted that the Crime Management Model was ‘designed to reduce the levels of those crimes which the force prioritises and not crime in general’.

In 1997, HMIC suggested that; ‘Much attention has been paid to promoting the concept of ‘intelligence led policing’, and it is widely acknowledged that law enforcement operations are far more likely to be effective if directed by accurate information’ (HMIC, 1997a: 4). HMIC (1997a: 33-35) also supported the integration of an intelligence-led approach within the culture of all police forces and the concept of a force director of intelligence at the rank of Assistant Chief Constable. Thus in 1998 the NCIS commenced the development of the NIM and in 2000 it was accepted as policy by the ACPO (NCIS, 1999; 2000). James (2011) suggests that due to the influence of David Phillips, the then
chief constable of Kent Police, the Kent Policing Model was the precursor to the NIM. Flood and Gaspar (2009: 51) agree that; ‘The UK’s National Intelligence Model (NIM) is the direct descendant of those early developments in intelligence-led policing’. Phillips (2008: 26) himself argues that the NIM ‘might best be described as a ‘knowledge-based deployment model’.

Tilley (2008: 383) suggests that in the UK the NIM has now become the ‘major vehicle for conducting intelligence-led policing’ and this intelligence-led model focuses on crime and addresses problems through enforcement and disruption. Thus, the organisations involved in intelligence-led policing are generally enforcement agencies. Ratcliffe, (2005: 437) argues that intelligence-led policing differs from other strategies in that it focuses on recidivist offenders and encourages the use of surveillance and informants to gather intelligence that may not have come to the attention of police. The widespread use of these techniques has also raised some concerns in relation to intrusion, accountability, ethics and human rights (James, 2003).

Ratcliffe (2008a; 2008b) defines intelligence-led policing as follows:

> *Intelligence-led policing is a business model and managerial philosophy where data analysis and crime intelligence are pivotal to an objective, decision-making framework that facilitates crime and problem reduction, disruption and prevention through both strategic management and effective enforcement strategies that target prolific and serious offenders.*

Ratcliffe (2008a: 89)

Ratcliffe (2008a: 235-237) also identifies ten basic structural and cultural standards or yardsticks of intelligence-led policing, including; a supportive and informed command structure, an organisation-wide approach, the integration of crime and criminal analysis, a focus on prolific and serious offenders, analytical and executive training, strategic and tactical meetings, routine investigation is screened out, data are sufficiently complete, reliable and available to support decision making, management structures exist to action intelligence products and the appropriate use of prevention, disruption and enforcement.
Gill (2000: 83) also argues that intelligence is intended to be used to target and convict ‘criminally active’ people and through problem analysis inform crime prevention strategies.

Maguire and John (2006: 74-78) highlight the developments in policing, which compete with intelligence-led policing, such as; problem-oriented policing, reassurance policing, neighbourhood policing, the management of volume crime (particularly in relation to increasing the detection of crime) and the evolution of CSPs (formally CDRPs in England). All these different developments compete for resources and funding, but Maguire and John (2006: 82-84) argue that by use of the NIM as a business model they may all be compatible. Peterson (2005: vii) suggests that; 'Intelligence-led policing is a collaborative enterprise based on improved intelligence operations and community-oriented policing and problem solving ...'. Tilley (2008: 398-399) agrees and suggests that intelligence-led policing under the auspices of the NIM can accommodate some problem-oriented policing and the use of community engagement through neighbourhood policing can feed information into the NIM. However, Keane and Kleiven (2009: 331) still contend that intelligence-led policing sits within a traditional policing system, which is performance driven and is mainly concerned with law enforcement and the detection of crime.

For policing to be effectively intelligence-led, any gaps in the intelligence already gathered need to be filled before action is taken. These gaps are generally referred to as the *intelligence requirement*, which is defined by the ACPO (2005c: 196) as follows: ‘Within the intelligence process, the identified gap between what is known and what is not forms the intelligence requirement’. The process of gathering intelligence to fill the intelligence requirement can involve the proactive deployment of a variety of resources, including open data sources, patrol police officers and PCSOs, CHISs, undercover officers, covert surveillance officers and covert technical surveillance equipment (ACPO, 2005c: 32), and as Ratcliffe (2000; 2002a; 2009; 2011) suggests intelligence analysts.
Manning (2001: 101) argues that the combining of technology with technique (such as intelligence-led policing) has been the greatest innovation in policing in recent years, mainly because it highlights the basic contradiction that policing can control crime and reduce the fear of crime, and yet be almost entirely responsive, demand driven and situational, doing just enough, just in time to maintain order. Heaton (2000: 352) argues that academic opinion agrees that the criminal justice system alone ‘cannot substantially reduce crime levels’ as they are influenced by social forces and actions. Reiner (1994: 755) also argues that the police should be seen as managers of crime, as crime reduction is ‘largely beyond the ambit of any policing tactics’. Manning (1977: 20) agrees that the police cannot control crime and suggests that as there are ‘massive discrepancies between their claims and their accomplishments’ they have ‘resorted to the dramatic management of the appearance of effectiveness’ in crime control. James (2003: 54) agrees and suggests that there are many successful intelligence-led initiatives in the UK, but not to the extent that the police service would have us believe.

Ratcliffe (2000; 2002a) advocates that crime mapping or hotspot analysis by intelligence analysts, utilising a Geographic Information System (GIS) should be integrated into the police intelligence environment to provide additional intelligence on where crime is actually taking place, rather than relying on police officers’ perceptions. Ratcliffe and McCullagh (2001: 339) suggest that GIS crime mapping can be used to refine the perceptions of officers in relation to the distribution of crime in their local patrol areas and would lead to a more intelligence-led solution to the problem of high volume crime. Ratcliffe (2002a: 224) also recognises that GIS crime mapping has the ‘potential to engage the public with local community problems’, but consideration should also be given to the socio-economic and ethical implications of providing such information.
Summary of the Competing Priorities, Tensions and Contradictions between Performance Management, Neighbourhood Policing, Problem-Oriented Policing and Intelligence-Led Policing

The introduction of unit beat policing (Home Office, 1967) in the UK in 1967 and the advent of the now familiar police *panda car* saw the decline of preventative foot patrols within communities and an increase in reactive policing through mobile patrols (Rogers, 2004). This emerging culture of response policing placed a greater emphasis on enforcement and professional policing, and lesser importance on prevention and engagement with the community. By the late 1970s sceptics of this form of policing including Alderson (1979) and Goldstein (1979) were proposing alternative proactive strategies such as communal policing and problem-oriented policing respectively.

In 1988 the British Crime Survey for England and Wales highlighted an increase in crime (including unreported crime) and a corresponding decrease in public confidence in the police (Mayhew, Elliott and Dowds, 1989). As a result in the early 1990s, more proactive preventative policing strategies were being considered, which saw the development of crime prevention and community safety programmes (Home Office, 1991; 1998a) and the re-emergence of problem-oriented policing (Goldstein, 1990; 1996) in an attempt to re-establish contact with communities and increase public confidence in the police.

However, in 1993 an influential Audit Commission report proposed a more proactive enforcement policing strategy based on an intelligence-led policing model, with the main emphasis being on targeting the criminal and increasing crime detections (Audit Commission, 1993). The introduction of intelligence-led policing initiatives in the UK eventually led to the development and launch of the NIM in 2000, as a business model for policing (NCIS, 2000).

The early 2000s also saw the introduction of a more community or citizen focused proactive policing strategy in the form of reassurance policing, which incorporated the ‘signal crime perspective’ (Innes and Fielding, 2002; Innes, 2004a; 2004c), with the
intention of reducing the fear of crime, increasing public confidence in the police and improving the quality of community intelligence (Millie and Herrington, 2004; Irving, 2005; Morris, 2006; Tuffin, 2006; Tuffin, Morris and Poole, 2006). In 2005, reassurance policing was succeeded by a neighbourhood policing model, which combined elements of reassurance with problem-oriented and intelligence-led policing (ACPO, 2006e).

From the early 1980s the central government drive for efficiency, effectiveness and economy (value for money) in public services, including the police, led to the introduction of a myriad of performance indicators, which have influenced the developments and changes in policing strategies mentioned above in order to achieve government performance targets. These changes have also resulted in a number of competing priorities, tensions and contradictions in policing.

Since the Audit Commission (1993) report; ‘Helping with Enquiries: Tackling Crime Effectively’ and the introduction of the NIM, it would appear that intelligence-led policing has predominantly focused on crime and in particular on reoffenders, utilising surveillance and CHISs to provide intelligence (Ratcliffe, 2005; Tilley, 2008). The NIM tasking and coordinating process, which is often replaced by a CompStat style process, also appears to focus on crime and performance targets rather than on the evidence presented by intelligence analysts in relation to local issues (John and Maguire, 2003; 2004a; 2004b; Maguire and John, 2006). This emphasis on crime and criminal intelligence via formal sources, such as surveillance and CHISs may also be detrimental to the gathering, processing and use of community intelligence in neighbourhood policing to resolve local priorities (Innes, 2007; Innes and Roberts, 2007; Lowe and Innes, 2012).

Central government performance targets also contradict the aims of neighbourhood policing and problem-oriented policing, which are both proactive preventative policing models focused on resolving local problems within communities rather than meeting
centrally devised performance targets (Tilley, 2004). In addition neighbourhood policing is concerned with resolving local neighbourhood priorities, increasing reassurance in communities and increasing public confidence in the police. The latter two points are much more difficult to measure and thus more expensive to administer, compared to crime detection rates. This may cause tensions within policing in deciding what services should be provided due to the competing priorities between central government targets and local problems. Police managers may tend to favour dealing with issues in relation to central government performance targets rather than local problems identified through analytical intelligence processes, as they are under pressure to meet those targets and an individual’s performance is often assessed against achieving those same targets (Maguire and John, 2006).

The removal of central government performance indicators and the introduction of directly elected PCCs (Home Office, 2011b) in November 2012 to ensure more local police accountability may go some way to introducing a more democratic style of policing (Lowe and Innes, 2012), but intelligence process outcomes are still likely to be influenced by local PCC’s objectives, priorities and performance indicators for the police, particularly as PCCs can now employ and dismiss chief police officers.

The NIM was designed as a business model for policing and if utilised properly has the capability and capacity to integrate and manage the various aspects of performance management (including efficiency, effectiveness and economy), neighbourhood policing, problem-oriented policing and intelligence-led policing and may help to reduce the competing priorities, tensions and contradictions in policing targets (Maguire and John, 2006). However, there may still be some organisational cultural resistance to utilising the NIM in this way, with the emphasis still on central government or PCC performance targets. If integration does not occur through the NIM then there is a danger that this could lead to silo working, where officers fail to share information and intelligence (Maguire and John, 2006). See the section on Organisational Culture below.
Relationships between Neighbourhood, Problem-Oriented and Intelligence-Led Policing and other Prominent Policing Models

Neighbourhood or community policing, problem-oriented policing and intelligence-led policing are often referred to as the three main models of policing (Tilley, 2008). Other prominent models linked to neighbourhood policing, problem-oriented policing and intelligence-led policing include; Broken Windows Theory (Kelling and Wilson, 1982), Zero-Tolerance Policing (Dennis, 1998), Knowledge-Based Policing (Williamson, 2008) and Evidence-Based Policing (Sherman, 1998).

Broken Windows Theory

Kelling and Wilson (1982) provide a hypothesis (generally referred to as broken windows theory), which speculates that if disorder is left untended this would lead to the fear of crime and to more serious crime. Kelling and Wilson (1982) use the metaphor broken windows to argue that if a window in a building is broken and it is not repaired, then soon afterwards other windows in the building would be broken, because those responsible believe that no one cares. Thus, repairing the first broken window would prevent an escalation in disorder and indirectly reduce crime. This hypothesis was further developed by Kelling and Coles (1996) in their work entitled; ‘Fixing Broken Windows: Restoring Order and Reducing Crime in Our Communities’.

Zero-Tolerance Policing

Dennis (1998: 3) suggests that zero-tolerance policing is based on three main principles: (1) ‘nip things in the bud’ to prevent the feeling that anti-social persons are in control and to prevent the environment from becoming neglected and fostering crime and disorder; (2) low-intensity, humane and good natured controls should be used by police officers for lower level offences, and (3) low level control can make a difference by reducing minor criminal offences, vandalism, graffiti and low level disorder and creating an environment less attractive to serious criminals. Dennis’ description of zero-tolerance policing resembles many of the core principles of broken windows theory, indeed Pollard
(1998: 46) suggests that zero-tolerance policing stems from broken windows theory. Pollard (1998: 47) distinguishes between the two by advocating that broken windows theory is essentially about ‘identifying and describing a complex problem’, where law enforcement is only one part of the solution to resolving the problem in partnership with social agencies, whereas zero-tolerance policing is only concerned with law enforcement solutions. Pollard (1998) concludes that the more aggressive side of zero-tolerance policing may alienate communities and further reform would be needed in the future to restore harmony between the police and the communities they serve.

Thus, there appear to be some tenuous links between broken windows theory, zero-tolerance policing and the principles of problem-oriented policing as outlined by Goldstein (1979).

**Knowledge-Based Policing**

The common factor between the NIM, neighbourhood policing, problem-oriented policing and intelligence-led policing appears to be knowledge and knowledge-based policing (Bullock and Tilley, 2009, Williamson, 2008).

Goldstein (1996: 4) argues that policing in the USA has developed without the ‘benefit of a careful, systematic building of knowledge’ about the numerous problems the police are asked to deal with. Goldstein (2003: 20) also identifies knowledge as being fundamental to problem-oriented policing and again shows his frustration by its lack of use when he suggests that; ‘there is no discernible, sustained and consistent effort within policing to make the basic premise that "knowledge informs practice" a routine part of professional policing’.

Williamson (2008: 6) envisages knowledge-based policing as; ‘responding to technological and social drivers that are leading to an emerging new policing paradigm whose purpose is the management of risk’. Ericson and Haggerty (1997: 17-19) suggest
that policing should be seen as ‘risk communications’ within a risk society, where the traditional police focus on ‘deviance, control, and order’ is replaced by a focus on ‘risk, surveillance, and security’. Ericson and Haggerty also suggest that the police are ‘knowledge workers’ (1997: 19), knowing how to deal with different situations, who to contact internally and externally for expert knowledge and where information in relation to policing may be found. In addition, community policing should be considered as ‘communications policing’ in relation to risk (1997: 70).

Bullock and Tilley (2009: 383), citing (Williamson, 2008), suggest that knowledge-based policing simply refers to; ‘the use of research, intelligence and technology to inform policing’. Henry and Mackenzie (2012: 326) suggest that there are a number of factors that influence the ‘Knowledge Transfer Exchange’ between academics and practitioners. These include; ‘personal relationships, organisational structures and cultures, local contexts, the contestability of the research ‘message’, and the tacit, collective and negotiated character of knowledge and practice’. All these factors can be recognised and understood by developing a community of practice.

The NPIA tended to agree and developed a Policing Knowledge Strategy and Action Plan for ‘creating knowledge’, ‘assuring knowledge’, ‘sharing knowledge’ and ‘using knowledge’ (NPIA, 2010e: 2). The four main goals of this strategy also incorporate and refer to ‘evidence’, that is; determining what works in policing as evidence, assuring the strength of the evidence, sharing evidence for innovation and using evidence in decision making (NPIA, 2010e: 6), which has led to the further development of evidence-based policing. Indeed the terms knowledge and evidence are often used interchangeably in the literature referring either to knowledge-based policing or evidence-based policing.

**Evidence-Based Policing**

Bullock and Tilley (2009: 382) suggest that as with knowledge-based policing the NIM is one example of the efforts being made to develop evidence-based policing. Sherman
Evidence-based policing is the use of the best available research on the outcomes of police work to implement guidelines and evaluate agencies, units, and officers.

Bullock, Erol and Tilley (2006: 167-168) and Bullock and Tilley (2009: 382) suggest that evidence-based policing is an important factor in all four stages of the SARA problem solving model, particularly the assessment stage (Eck and Spelman, 1987a; Eck, 2003), as the assessment stage provides information and evidence of what works, what doesn’t and what’s promising (Sherman et al, 1997). Bueermann (2012: 13) suggest that evidence-based policing; ‘blends the science of controlling crime and disorder with the principles of community [neighbourhood] policing and problem solving’.

Bullock and Tilley (2009: 386) argue that there are four main factors that may facilitate the development of evidence-based practice, including; (1) a commitment to the generation of evidence about the impact of interventions in policing and crime reduction, (2) a need to instil evidence-based practice more routinely into policing, (3) a commitment to recognising and supporting progress and good practice, and (4) a need to manage expectations about what can be achieved and how quickly it can be achieved.

The College of Policing was established in 2012 and officially launched on the 4th February 2013 as a professional body for policing, to understand policing needs, identify what works, share knowledge, develop, maintain and test standards, enable professional development and via its Research Analysis and Information (RAI) Unit, forge links with academics (College of Policing, 2013b). Bryant et al (2013: 384) argue that higher education has an important role to play in helping the College of Policing develop professionalism, but engagement with the police service cannot be partial, selective or limited, it must be all encompassing.
The Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and the College of Policing, RAI Unit are already collaborating on five police research projects to determine the evidence available to inform policymakers and practitioners. The five projects chosen for research are as follows: (1) ‘How knowledge is shared – Exploring the use of the police service’s social media platform POLKA [Police On-Line Knowledge Area]’; (2) ‘What’s going on out there? Mapping police-related research activity in the UK’; (3) ‘Understanding ‘Evidence-Based Policing’ – How does the police service need to change?’ (4) ‘Mapping what we know about policing’ and (5) ‘The role of research evidence in national standards for policing’ (ESRC, 2013: 1-2). It can be seen from the above that the national drive for the future of policing in the UK is towards evidence-based policing.

Weisburd and Neyroud (2011: 1) propose a new paradigm of ‘Police Science’, which builds on evidence-based policing policies and seeks to radically reform ‘the role of science in policing’. This model would require the ownership of police science research to pass from universities to police agencies, with universities operating from police centres and the partnership led by a large public research institute. Reference is made to the NPIA fulfilling this role in the UK, whilst recognising that the NPIA was due to be phased out by the current Coalition Government, as a result of their austerity measures. The new College of Policing has taken on some of the responsibilities of the now defunct NPIA, particularly in the area of police science and education, and already has a research function within its RAI Unit. Weisburd and Neyroud (2011: 12) also draw comparisons with medical and educational evidence-based science models (Sackett et al, 1996; Slavin, 2002), a concept supported by Sherman (1998). However, Thacher (2001: 409) argues that the medical model approach ‘could undermine other important aspects of policing’ and not address ‘the full range of police concerns’.

The National Intelligence Model and Counter Terrorism

It would appear that there is no one single definition of terrorism that has international approval (Carlile, 2007). In the UK the definition of terrorism is provided by the
Terrorism Act 2000 (Home Office, 2000b: 1), which interprets the meaning of terrorism in the following terms: The use or threat of action, where the use or threat is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause; and it (a) involves serious violence against a person, (b) involves serious damage to property, (c) endangers a person’s life, other than that of the person committing the action, (d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or (e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system.

This interpretation or definition was reviewed by both Lord Alex Carlile, QC (Carlile, 2007) and David Anderson, QC (Anderson, 2013), and both made certain recommendations for slight amendments to the definition. However, to date the interpretation provided by the Terrorism Act 2000 (Home Office, 2000b) remains the official working definition of terrorism in the UK.

In the wake of the terrorist attacks on 11th September 2001 (9/11) in the USA the then Labour Government produced the UK’s strategy for countering international terrorism, which was introduced in 2003 and published in July 2006 after the terrorist attacks in London on 7th July 2005 (Home Office, 2006b). This strategy is commonly referred to as the Contest Strategy and is comprised of four principle strands; The Prevent Strand, The Pursue Strand, The Protect Strand and The Prepare Strand.

*The Prevent Strand is concerned with tackling the radicalisation of individuals.*
*The Pursue Strand is concerned with reducing the terrorist threat to the UK and to UK interests overseas by disrupting terrorists and their operations.*
*The Protect Strand is concerned with reducing the vulnerability of the UK and UK interests overseas.*
*The Prepare Strand is concerned with ensuring that the UK is as ready as it can be for the consequences of a terrorist attack.*

(Home Office, 2006b: 1-2)
In 2006 the Home Office published an updated National Community Safety Plan for 2006 to 2009 (Home Office (Crime Reduction and Community Safety Group (CRCSG)), 2006: 18), which underlines the vital role that the police service has in preventing terrorism by working closely with local communities, particularly minority communities, taking action against extremists, developing responses to radicalisation, improving the flow of information and developing community intelligence. Clarke and Newman (2007: 10) suggest that the role of the police in counter terrorism should involve; collecting intelligence about possible terrorist activity, ensuring that vulnerable targets are protected and being ready to respond in the event of a terrorist attack.

Clarke and Newman (2007: 19) advocate that community or neighbourhood policing has a function in the collection of intelligence by neighbourhood officers engaging with their local communities. This view is supported by Kelling and Bratton (2006: 2) who argue that local neighbourhood officers communicate regularly with residents and business owners and are more likely to notice ‘even subtle changes’ in the neighbourhoods they patrol. This close contact allows neighbourhood officers to understand what is normal, in order to identify what is abnormal within their communities. Innes (2006: 11) highlights the police use of ‘Strategic Contacts’, who are local leaders and opinion formers from particular groups within the community. These individuals have a similar role to KINs (ACPO, 2006e). See Chapter 2: Policing and Community Engagement.

Lippert and O’Connor (2006: 64) also highlight the role played by private security companies in the selective provision of security intelligence to the public police, to their clients and to plural policing in general, as they tend to work outside the auspices of the state security networks.

Innes (2006) argues that community intelligence, which is used by police to build a bigger picture of the concerns and risks within a community, may also be applied to counter terrorism to help fill any intelligence gaps.
Whereas criminal intelligence tends to target particular individuals, and crime intelligence particular incident types, community intelligence covers a range of issues, frequently being used by police to build a picture of the contextual risks that a particular community group feels concerned about. Community intelligence applied to counterterrorism is precisely the type of data that might help police to circumvent the intelligence gaps and blind spots that seemingly inhere in their established methods.
(Innes, 2006: 9)

National and international terrorism and violent extremism sits within Level Three of the NIM, where serious crime and disorder requires national or international management. In 2009 HMIC carried out an inspection of the early implementation of the ACPO Prevent Strategy and Delivery Plan (ACPO, 2008). The inspection found that there was a ‘general lack of local to national linkage on Prevent’ and it had not yet been ‘routinely integrated within NIM decision making’ (HMIC, 2009). Later that year ACPO published a Prevent Development Plan 2010-2011, which asserted that Prevent should be mainstreamed into everyday policing, enhancing links with other areas of policing such as; ‘Neighbourhood policing’, ‘Tasking and co-ordination processes (NIM)’, ‘Community engagement’, ‘Effective partnership working’ and ‘Enhancing trust and confidence within communities’ (ACPO, 2009: 6). See the discussion on the NIM above.

Rogers and Gravelle (2009) advocate that knowledge management is a key ingredient in tackling terrorism and improving national security, and knowledge such as criminal or community intelligence within the NIM needs to be managed efficiently and effectively, underpinned by the knowledge management cycle.

Knowledge management offers a framework for all agencies both in this country and abroad to work together, utilising and sharing intelligence which could result in improved decision making and strategies, thus leading to improved national security.
(Rogers and Gravelle, 2009: 296)

See the Knowledge Management section below for a further discussion on the knowledge management cycle.
The National Intelligence Model and Organised Crime

In 2013 the Coalition Government updated their Serious and Organised Crime Strategy (Home Office, 2013) and in so doing highlighted that there is no legal definition of organised crime in England and Wales. However, for the purpose of the Strategy they defined organised crime as follows:

... organised crime is serious crime planned, coordinated and conducted by people working together on a continuing basis. Their motivation is often, but not always, financial gain.
(Home Office, 2013: 14)

This latest version of the Serious and Organised Crime Strategy utilises the strategic framework developed for the UK’s strategy for countering international terrorism and uses the same four main work-streams of; Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare.

- **Pursue:** prosecuting and disrupting people engaged in serious and organised criminality;
- **Prevent:** preventing people from engaging in this activity;
- **Protect:** increasing protection against organised crime, and
- **Prepare:** reducing the impact of serious and organised crime where it takes place.
(Home Office, 2013: 25)

Unsurprisingly, the NCA uses the same strategic framework for their National Strategic Assessment of Serious and Organised Crime (NCA, 2014: 5-6). The similarity in strategies for counter terrorism and organised crime, which both operate at the national and international levels (Level Three of the NIM), indicates that many of the issues discussed above in relation to intelligence and counter terrorism, including the suggestions made by Clarke and Newman (2006; 2007), Innes (2006), Kelling and Bratton (2006), Lippert and O’Connor (2006: 64) and Rogers and Gravelle (2009) may also be applicable to tackling organised crime. Intelligence managed by the NIM is critical in understanding the threat from organised crime and for focusing on how intelligence can be best exploited through organisational decision making (Home Office, 2011a: 6). As Flood and Gaspar (2009: 64) remind us; ‘The design of the National Intelligence Model was not the conclusion of this work; merely the beginning’.
The National Intelligence Model and Organisational Decision Making

Drucker (1967: 92-93) suggests that effective decision making is a systematic process with six sequential steps, namely; (1) The classification of the problem, (2) The Definition of the problem, (3) The specifications which the answer to the problem must satisfy, (4) The decision as to what is ‘right’, rather than what is acceptable, in order to meet the boundary conditions, (5) The building into the decision of the action to carry it out and (6) The feedback which tests the validity and effectiveness of the decision against the actual course of events.

Harvey (2007: 7-8) and Martin (2007: 63-66) support the view of Drucker that decision making is a systematic step by step process resulting in the desired outcome, whilst Shapira (1997: 4-5) suggests that organisational decision making has five main characteristics rather than steps. However, Drucker (1967: 92) argues that unless a decision is carried out and put into practice, then; ‘it is at best a good intention’.

Organisational decision making may also be influenced by a number of other important factors such as; Organisational Culture, Organisational Behaviour, Organisational Management, Organisational Leadership, Organisational Information and Organisational Knowledge.

Organisational Culture

Marshall and McLean (1983) define organisational culture as; ‘... the collection of traditions, values, policies, beliefs, and attitudes that constitute a pervasive context for everything we do and think in an organisation’.

There appear to be four main types of culture; the power culture, the role culture, the task culture and the person culture (Harrison, 1972: 121-123; Handy, 1993: 183-191). Handy (1993: 191-200) also identified six principle factors that influence culture; (1)
History and ownership; (2) Size; (3) Technology; (4) Goals and objectives; (5) The environment and (6) The people.

Harrison and Stokes (1992: 1) argue that; ‘Culture impacts most aspects of organizational life, such as how decisions are made, who makes them, how rewards are distributed, who is promoted, how people are treated, how the organization responds to its environment, and so on’.

Organisational culture also has an impact on the performance of the organisation (Wilkins and Ouchi, 1983; Gordon and DiTomaso, 1992; Schütz and Bloch, 2006), its competitiveness (Barney, 1986), its quality management (Benson, Saraph and Schroeder, 1991; Boyne, 1996; Boyne, Martin and Walker, 2004; Atkinson, 1990) and its willingness for organisational change (Atkinson, 2010).

Schein (2004: 25-36) suggests that there are three levels of culture, namely *Artifacts* (visible organisational structures and processes, which can be hard to decipher), *Espoused Beliefs and Values* (strategies, goals and philosophies, with espoused justifications) and *Underlying Assumptions* (unconscious, taken-for-granted beliefs, perceptions, thoughts and feelings, which are the ultimate source of values and action). Atkinson (2012: 33) highlights the difference between ‘real values’ (what drives organisational behaviour) and ‘espoused values’ (what the organisation says it stands for), and how organisational behaviour affects the organisational culture. See *Organisational Behaviour* below.

Reiner (2010: 118-132) suggests that police culture or ‘cop culture’ has eight core characteristics, namely; *Mission/Action* (where policing is seen as a way of life, a moral imperative, taking hedonistic action to protect the weak against the predatory), *Cynicism/Pessimism* (an acquired set of views, that the moral principles adhered to by the police officer are being eroded), *Suspicion* (an attitude of constant suspicion,
including stereotyping), Isolation/Solidarity (the marked internal solidarity and social isolation of police officers), Police Conservatism (the tendency to be conservative, politically and morally), Machismo (the product of a masculine heterosexual police force, including sexual and alcoholic indulgences), Racial Prejudice (the police suspiciousness, hostility and prejudice towards black ethnic minority groups and vice versa) and Pragmatism (a very pragmatic, concrete, down-to-earth, anti-theoretical perspective).

Alderson (1979: 68-70) discusses what the police perceive as ‘real policing’ in terms of police culture and how this culture is influenced by the leadership of the police service by their preferred values, policies and beliefs. Neighbourhood policing is often seen as a soft option, whilst the traditional reactive response style of policing is considered real policing undertaken by real police officers. Thus, a ‘cultural conflict’ can arise within individual police forces during organisational change, such as the introduction of neighbourhood policing, if the leadership of the organisation do not consider organisational culture (Alderson, 1979: 69). This may result in the formation of subcultures within an organisation (Trice, 1993; Waddington, 1999; Boisnier and Chatman, 2002) and the provision of an unsatisfactory service to members of the public (Alderson, 1979).

Scott (1998) argues that the introduction of central government performance targets and the creation of a performance culture have reinforced the action-centred crime fighting police culture based on responding to incidents, arresting offenders and detecting crimes. Waddington (1999: 299) describes the self-image of police officers as crime fighters within the police (canteen) sub-culture as a ‘collective delusion’, as research indicates that police have little impact on crime rates. Thus, the role of helping and assisting the public, for example through neighbourhood policing, is often seen by officers as a distraction from the ‘real job’ (Waddington, 1999: 300). This view is supported by Cochran and Bromley (2003: 89) who also argue that crime control and crime fighting are afforded a very high priority within police culture, whilst other elements of the police role are devalued.
**Organisational Behaviour**

Robbins and Judge (2013: 10) describe organisational behaviour as; ‘a field of study that investigates the impact that individuals, groups, and structure have on behaviour within organizations, for the purpose of applying such knowledge toward improving an organization’s effectiveness’.

Wilson (2004) suggests that behaviour should not be looked at in isolation within the organisational environment, but other factors such as rest, leisure, emotions, feelings, gender and work, unemployment and work, and casual work should also be considered within the context of organisational behaviour. Mullins (2010: 211) reminds us that ‘perception’ is a mental function that affects an individual’s behavioural response to particular situations.

Mullins (2010: 6-7) also suggests that there are four interrelated dimensions; ‘the individual, the group, the organisation and the environment’ that can influence organisational behaviour in the workplace and thus affect performance and effectiveness. Colquitt, LePine and Wesson (2010: 8) agree and argue that the two primary outcomes of organisational behaviour are ‘job performance’ and ‘organizational commitment’.

**Organisational Management**

Bartol and Martin (1994: 6) define management as; ‘the process of achieving organizational goals by engaging in the four major functions of planning, organizing, leading, and controlling’.

Buckingham (2005: 72) distinguishes between average and great managers and argues that; ‘Great managers know and value the unique abilities and even the eccentricities of their employees, and they learn how best to integrate them into a coordinated plan of attack’. Buckingham (2005: 74-78) also argues that great managers, make the most of
the strengths of their individual employees, they know the precise trigger to use to get
the best performance from each individual and they know how to utilise bespoke
learning styles for each individual employee. However, many police forces have adopted
CompStat (Moore, 2003) as a one size fits all technical managerial system for planning,
organising, leading, and controlling police resources and for internal accountability,
which does not take into account the unique abilities of individual employees. See the
CompStat section above.

Organisational Leadership

Bartol and Martin, (1994: 408) define leadership as; ‘the process of influencing others to
achieve organizational goals’. Buckingham (2005) agrees and argues that leaders have
to deal quickly and effectively with inequality and focus on the few needs we all have.

> Great leaders discover what is universal and capitalize on it. Their job is to rally
  people towards a better future.
> (Buckingham, 2005: 72)

The emphasis on human needs is also synonymous with the theory of human motivation
(Maslow, 1943) and the process of influencing and rallying people within organisations
with trust (Tyler, 2003).

Pearce and Robinson (1997: 353) argue that leaders also stimulate commitment to
change through three interrelated activities; ‘clarifying strategic intent’, ‘building an
organization’ and ‘shaping organizational culture’. However, Adlam (2002: 17) suggests
that police leaders appropriate and exploit a wide range of tactics and technologies of
power to govern policing. Mullins (2010: 391) highlights the distinction between these
two fundamental forms of leadership; ‘Transformational Leadership’, which is a process
of engendering motivation and commitment in others and ‘Transactional Leadership’,
which is based on the legitimate authority within the structure of the bureaucratic
organisation. Leban and Zulauf (2004) believe that the emotional intelligence of the
leader is linked to transformational leadership and ultimately to the performance of the organisation. (See also: Burns, 1978; Bass, 1985; 1990).

Buckingham (2005) suggests that individuals can become great managers and great leaders, but they need to be aware of the very different skills required for each role. Bennis (1989; 2003; 2009) highlights the distinction between management and leadership and compares the traits of good managers and leaders. See Table 3.1 below.

**Table 3.1: The Manager and The Leader**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Manager</th>
<th>The Leader</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administers</td>
<td>Innovates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copies</td>
<td>Is an original</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintains</td>
<td>Develops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focuses on systems and structure</td>
<td>Focuses on people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relies on control</td>
<td>Inspires trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has a short range view</td>
<td>Has a long range perspective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asks how and when</td>
<td>Asks what and why</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has eyes always on the bottom line</td>
<td>Eyes are on the horizon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imitates</td>
<td>Originates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accepts the status quo</td>
<td>Challenges it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the classic good soldier</td>
<td>Are their own people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does things right</td>
<td>Does the right thing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Adapted from ‘On Becoming a Leader’ (Bennis, 2009: 42)*

Bennis (1999: 23) also argues that; ‘Exemplary leaders believe they have a responsibility to extend people's growth and to create an environment where people constantly learn’. This will engender intellectual capital and help create new value for the organisation.

In his review of police leadership and training, Neyroud (2011a, 2011b) advocated the creation of a new single professional body for policing (now the College of Policing) to enable a transformation of the culture of learning in the police service. This would be achieved in partnership with higher education establishments, where leaning would be
linked with practice (evidence-based policing) and the development of a new professional qualification. White and Heslop (2012) compare professional education in teaching, nursing and policing, and highlight that teaching and now nursing are both graduate professions.

**Organisational Information**

In the wake of the conviction of Ian Huntley for the murders of Jessica Chapman and Holly Wells in 2003, Sir Michael Bichard was appointed by the then Home Secretary, Rt. Hon. David Blunkett, MP, to enquire into such matters as intelligence-based record keeping, vetting practices and information sharing (Bichard, 2004). Recommendations eight and nine of the Bichard Enquiry Report (Bichard, 2004: 14 & 138) recommended that there should be a code of practice in relation to information management, which would cover the creation, review, retention, deletion and sharing of information.

As a result of those recommendations a number of codes of practice, guidance, briefing papers and practice advice were produced, including the following: Code of Practice on the Management of Police Information (ACPO, 2005a; 2010b), Guidance on the Management of Police Information (ACPO, 2006c), Code of Practice on The Recording and Dissemination of Intelligence Material (ACPO and HMCE, 2005b) and Data Protection: Framework Code of Practice for Sharing Personal Information (Information Commissioner’s Office, 2007) to name but a few. In particular the Code of Practice on the Management of Police Information (ACPO, 2005a) was seen as the national standard and was incorporated into the NIM operating protocols. However, Flood and Gasper (2009: 64) suggest that the benefits of intelligence and information within a policing business model are still not being realised and as a result; ‘... there is not much evidence that information management, as opposed to information collection, is really at the heart of UK law enforcement, either in policy or routine policing practice.’
However, in addition to the codes of practice, guidance, briefing papers and practice advice mentioned above and as a direct result of the Bichard Enquiry (Bichard, 2004) the Home Office initiated the Intelligence Management, Prioritisation, Analysis, Coordination and Tasking (IMPACT) Programme. This Programme was managed by the NPIA to develop the Police National Database (PND), which would allow direct access to local force intelligence and information (NPIA, 2010f; 2011c). The PND was eventually launched on 22nd June 2011 and forms part of the wider Information Systems Improvement Strategy (ISIS) (NPIA, 2009a; 2011a; 2011b); a national strategy that the NPIA suggested; ‘will transform the way police information technology is developed, procured, implemented and managed’ (NPIA, 2011b: 1).

Ratcliffe (2007: 1) argues that in an information-rich age the challenge is to gather together the available information to produce knowledge, which will enhance decision making, improve strategies and increase crime prevention.

**Organisational Knowledge**

Sir Francis Bacon (1597) once wrote: *Nam et ipsa scientia potestas est* (For knowledge itself is power), generally translated as; *knowledge is power*.

Davenport and Prusak (1998: 5) provide a more contemporary definition of knowledge as; ‘Knowledge is a fluid mix of framed experience, values, contextual information, and expert insight that provides a framework for evaluating and incorporating new experience and information’. The ACPO Guidance on the NIM (ACPO, 2005c: 111-115) describes ‘knowledge assets’ as including explicit knowledge such as; legislation and case law, codes of practice, guidance, practice advice, policy, strategy and training, but appears to exclude tacit knowledge (or less tangible intellectual capital) such as; experience, values, skills, competence and expertise (Edvinsson and Malone, 1997; Hooper and Potter, 2000; Collier, 2001b, 2006; Edwards, Collier and Shaw, 2003; Collier, Edwards and Shaw, 2004; Edwards, Shaw and Collier, 2005; McNabb, 2007;
Mullins, 2010). Gratton (2004: 85-86) suggests that intellectual capital provides the individual with the capacity to be a ‘continuous learner’, for ‘cognitive complexity’ and to develop and accumulate ‘specialized knowledge’. See Knowledge-Based Policing above.

Nonaka (1991: 97-99) advocates that there are four basic patterns for creating knowledge in an organisation, which exist together in a spiral of knowledge, namely; (1) From Tacit to Tacit (socialization), where one individual shares tacit knowledge directly with another, (2) From Explicit to Explicit (combination), where discrete pieces of explicit knowledge are combined to form a new whole; (3) From Tacit to Explicit (articulation), where tacit knowledge is converted into explicit knowledge allowing it to be shared and (4) From Explicit to Tacit (internalization), where new explicit knowledge is shared to broaden, extend and reframe other individuals tacit knowledge. Dalkir (2005) defines knowledge management as follows:

Knowledge management is the deliberate and systematic coordination of an organization’s people, technology, process and organizational structure in order to add value through reuse and innovation. This coordination is achieved through creating, sharing and applying knowledge as well as through feeding the valuable lessons learned and best practices into corporate memory in order to foster continued organizational learning.
(Dalkir, 2005: 3)

Jashapara (2004: 5-7) initially identified five generic activities within a continuous ‘Knowledge Management Cycle’; (1) Discovering Knowledge; (2) Generating Knowledge; (3) Evaluating Knowledge; (4) Sharing Knowledge and (5) Leveraging Knowledge.

However, Jashapara (2011: 6-8) later refined this cycle into an interactive cyclical ‘Web of Knowledge Management’, similarly comprising of five generic activities; (1) Nature of Knowledge; (2) Leveraging Knowledge; (3) Creating Knowledge; (4) Knowledge Artifacts and (5) Mobilising Knowledge. See Figure 3.5 below.
Bellinger (2004) highlights the relationship between information, knowledge and wisdom. *Information* relates to description, definition or perspective (the: What? Who? When? Where?), *knowledge* relates to strategy, practice, method or approach (the: How?) and *wisdom* relates to principle, insight, moral or archetype (the: Why?). Thus, through understanding information, one gains knowledge and through knowledge one gains wisdom. As T. S. Eliot (1934) reminds us, the converse can also apply:

*Where is the wisdom we have lost in knowledge? Where is the knowledge we have lost in information?*  
(Eliot, 1934: Choruses from ‘The Rock’ – Stanza 1: Lines 14 and 15)

**Organisational Decision Making and the National Decision Model**

In 2012 the ACPO approved the adoption of a single NDM for the police service and suggested that the NDM is suitable for all decisions in both operational and non-operational situations (ACPO, 2012: 1).
At the heart of the NDM is the Statement of Mission and Values for the Police Service of England and Wales (ACPO, 2011). Stage 1 of the NDM refers to gathering information and intelligence, but makes no mention of the NIM as the preferred business excellence model for managing information and intelligence, nor of organisational information and knowledge management. Stage 2 involves assessing the threat and risk, and developing a working strategy. The emphasis is clearly on making an assessment of the threats, risks of harm and potential benefits before deciding on a suitable strategy. Stage 3 considers the police powers, policies and legislation that may be appropriate for any given situation. This stage appears to refer to the NIM ‘knowledge assets’ mentioned above (ACPO, 2005c: 111-115), but does not refer to organisational learning and the possible lessons learned from similar previous situations. Stage 4 is concerned with identifying and considering the options and contingencies that are available with the least risk of harm. The decision maker is also prompted to consider their own knowledge, experience and skills. Stage 5 requires the decision maker to take action and implement their decisions by responding, recording and monitoring, and later reviewing their decisions.

Bartol and Martin (1994: 245-247) suggest that decision making processes are biased by a number of factors including; Framing (the tendency to make different decisions depending on how the problem is presented), Prospect Theory (the prospect of an actual loss is more painful than the possibility of a gain), Representativeness (the tendency to be overly influenced by stereotypes), Availability (the tendency to judge the likelihood of an occurrence on the basis of the extent to which a similar occurrence can easily be recalled), Anchoring and Adjustment (the tendency to be influenced by an initial figure even when the information is largely irrelevant), and Overconfidence (the tendency to be more certain of the likelihood of a future event than the actual predictive evidence indicates). Evans (2009: 195-199) agrees and argues that where intelligence products
are involved in police decision making, intelligence officers and analysts must know who
the key decision makers are and what ‘pushes their buttons’. (See also: Marrin, 2008).

Mintzberg and Westly (2001: 89-91) suggest that there are three approaches to making
a decision which are influenced by the biases of the decision maker; *Thinking First*
(which is science based and features planning, programming and facts), *Seeing First*
(which is an art and features visioning, imaging and ideas) and *Doing First* (which is a
craft and features venturing, learning and experience). Phillips and Sobol (2012) also
argue that police decision making can be influenced by the working environment and
workloads. However the NDM does not include any precautionary text in relation to
potential bias.

Villiers (2003: 24) noted that; ‘the performance management culture has weakened the
protective constitutional barrier of operational independence which was the police
version of professional autonomy’. Golding and Savage (2008: 748) argue that centrally
imposed government targets and performance management within the police service
(Home Office, 2008) limits discretion and the capacity to truly lead, and thus options for
decision making. Loveday (2008: 124) suggests that performance management
reinforces the importance of management over leadership (see Table 3.1 above) and
that; ‘Within the target culture, informed decision making or risk-taking has no place and
only reflects the further degradation of leadership qualities within public services’.
Loveday (2008: 129) also argues that performance management drives out imagination
and innovation, rewarding only those who meet performance targets and promotes a
culture of risk aversion.

In the wake of the development of a centrally imposed performance management culture
in the latter part of the twentieth century came the growth of the ‘Risk Society’ (Beck,
1992) and the advent of risk assessments and risk management in policing (Ericson and
Haggerty, 1997). The Report of a Royal Society Study Group defines risk as; ‘the
probability that a particular adverse event occurs during a stated period of time, or results from a particular challenge’ (Warner, 1992: 2). Reiss (1989: 392) argues that in our modern society risk has become institutionalised in complex organisations. Maguire (2000: 333) suggests that there is an urgent need for ‘ethical, philosophical, political and policy debates’ to address major questions in relation to human rights, social control, and the future of criminal justice to determine the new risks created by a risk society.

Central to the study of risk is the social construction of risks and the means by which they are controlled (Manning, 1989: 352). Slovic (1987: 280) argues that the majority of us rely on intuitive risk judgements or ‘risk perceptions’ before making decisions, that is; how risky do we think it is to take a particular course of action? Our perceptions of risk are influenced by our worldviews, emotion and affect (or the evaluative feelings of goodness (benefits) or badness (disadvantages)) (Slovic, 1999: 693-696; Slovic et al, 2004; 2005). Slovic (2001: 23) also argues that; ‘Risk assessment is inherently subjective and represents a blending of science and judgment with important psychological, social, cultural, and political factors’.

Flood and Gaspar (2009: 56) argue that; ’The procedures and products of the National Intelligence Model were designed to enable the better management of the risks in the difficult law enforcement environment on the basis of enhanced knowledge and more formalised decision-making’ and that risk management is more about defending decisions than developing law enforcement practices.

Conflict between individuals within an organisation can also influence decision making when a compromise is reached or the conflict is unresolved (March, 1991: 102-104). Another interesting factor in relation to conflict and decision making that poses a potential risk to organisations is highlighted by Boddy (2006: 1464), who suggests that one percent of the general population employed in organisations are ‘organisational psychopaths’ who appear extroverted, charming, charismatic, reasonable and sincere,
but are characterised by their lack of conscience and are shrewd, manipulative, selfish, ruthless and dangerous. They will make decisions to achieve their own enrichment, empowerment and self-gratification often to the detriment of the organisation. (See also: March, 1994; Simon, 1997).

Summary and Discussion

This chapter has explored the historical development of intelligence (Kahn, 2008) and introduced the concept of criminal intelligence (ACPO, 1975). However, the main focus of this chapter was to examine the development of community intelligence and the various definitions of community intelligence that were in use at the time of this research (HMIC, 1999b; ACPO, 2005c; 2006a; 2006c; 2010b; Innes, Roberts and Maltby, 2005; Innes and Roberts, 2007; NPIA, 2010b). This examination allowed the researcher to propose an alternative definition of community intelligence. (See the section on Community Intelligence above).

Consideration was also given to the development of the Intelligence Cycle (USIC, 2011) and a detailed examination of the NIM (NCIS, 2000) was undertaken, including its use by the police and CSPs (Home Office, 2006e). An in depth discussion of the application of intelligence and intelligence process outcomes examined the NIM and its compatibility with performance management, particularly CompStat (Maple and Mitchell, 2000), problem-oriented policing (Goldstein, 1990) and intelligence-led policing (Ratcliffe, 2008a). The competing priorities, tensions and contradictions between performance management, neighbourhood policing, problem-oriented policing and intelligence-led policing were also discussed and how this may be overcome by utilising the NIM and challenging cultural biases towards central government and PCC performance targets that are mainly related to crime control.

The relationship between neighbourhood policing, problem-oriented policing and intelligence-led policing, and other prominent models such as broken windows theory
(Kelling and Wilson, 1982), zero-tolerance policing (Dennis, 1998), knowledge-based policing (Williamson, 2008) and evidenced-based policing (Sherman, 1998) were also examined. Consideration was also given to the importance of intelligence and the NIM in counter terrorism and tackling organised crime.

Organisational decision making (Drucker, 1967) was examined within the context of the NIM as a business model and how this may be affected by organisational culture, behaviour, management, leadership, information and knowledge, and the police National Decision Model (NDM) (ACPO, 2012). It was concluded that it is unlikely that the procedures and products of the NIM or the key elements of the NDM will completely eliminate the biases that influence decision making, which are based on our psychological, social, cultural and political beliefs.

The key themes from this chapter (together with those from the critical examination of neighbourhood policing in Chapter 2: Policing and Community Engagement) were later used to develop and answer the research question and objectives, to achieve the aim of this research, and to construct the postal survey self-completion questionnaires and the semi-structured interview guide used in this research. (See Chapter 4: Research Methodology and Methods, and Appendices 5, 8 and 11).
Chapter 4: Research Methodology and Methods

Introduction

Previous chapters have included a literature review on policing in general, neighbourhood policing, community engagement, cohesive policing services, intelligence, community intelligence, the NIM, the police application of intelligence and organisational decision making. The first part of this chapter outlines the research question, aim and objectives, and the rationale behind the research, taking into account discussions from the previous chapters. It also reviews and evaluates the literature in relation to the most appropriate research methodology and methods for this research, including mixed methods research designs and sampling. It highlights issues in relation to accessibility into an organisation such as the police and considers objectively the various ethical aspects of being an insider researcher, compared to that of the outsider. This chapter will also discuss the sensitive nature of policing and the impartiality of the insider researcher in producing research findings that may be critical of their own organisation.

The second part of this chapter discusses the ethical, political and legal issues that were considered as part of this research as well as the validity, reliability and objectivity of the research. It concludes with a discussion on reflexivity, including the researcher’s reflexivity, which highlights the researcher’s background and inherent beliefs, biases, prejudices and values as well as the limitations of the approach taken for this research.

The Research Question, Aim and Objectives

The research question posed is as follows:

*What use is made of community intelligence in informing and directing local neighbourhood policing in South Wales?*
This research questions the extent to which community intelligence impacts on local neighbourhood policing in South Wales, within the context of the NIM. Therefore, the main aim of this research is: To critically analyse the use of community intelligence in local neighbourhood policing in South Wales.

In order to achieve this aim, the following associated objectives were also considered:

1. What does South Wales Police consider to be local neighbourhood policing?
2. How do South Wales Police engage with the diverse communities within the South Wales area?
3. What systems do South Wales Police have in place in relation to the processing of community intelligence?
4. What use is made of community intelligence, particularly in solving community problems?
5. How is community intelligence used to inform or direct local policing?
6. How can the use of community intelligence be improved to assist in the delivery of policing.

**Rationale**

An initial review of the literature in relation to the research question revealed that not a great deal of research had been undertaken into the relationship between community intelligence and neighbourhood policing. However, contributions from Innes (2006; 2007), Innes and Roberts (2007), Rogers (2007; 2008), Rogers and Gravelle (2008), Innes et al (2009), Bullock (2010) and Lowe and Innes (2012) were identified. Therefore, in undertaking this research, there was an opportunity to contribute to the debate on and add to the scientific knowledge in relation to both community intelligence and neighbourhood policing. Indeed, Collis and Hussey (2009: 3) define research as; ‘a systematic and methodical process of enquiry and investigation with a view to increasing knowledge’.
The aim and objectives of this research also satisfy three of Brown’s (1996: 177-178) four main functions of research on policing, namely; to measure the professionalism of the police, to ensure efficiency, effectiveness and economy (value for money) in policing, and to prepare for change in policing. The fourth function of accountability in describing the constitutional position of the police is not included in this research. This research also incorporates the following categories and sub-categories of research identified by Mazeika et al (2010: 522): Organization of Police, Police Strategies including Community Policing and Intelligence-Based policing, and Citizen Satisfaction.

This research was undertaken during a period of unprecedented austerity, ‘crime control’ and police reform, and the relentless drive for increased performance through performance management (Reiner, 2010: 13; Gravelle and Rogers, 2011) and would sit within what Reiner (2010: 9-11) describes as Official Police Research under the category of Internal Police Research and the subcategory of Local Internal Police Research. When this research commenced the researcher could be considered to be an ‘inside insider’ and by the conclusion of the research an ‘outside insider’ (Brown, 1996: 180-186). The Research Methods section below contains further discussion in relation to the researcher’s status as a both an inside insider and an outside insider. This research also sits within what Innes (2010: 128) describes as ‘research with the police’.

On reviewing the literature in relation to sensitive research and topics, the only identifiable threat to this research would be that of a ‘political threat’ as defined by Lee (1993: 4). However, when this threat is applied to the most frequently cited definitions of sensitive research and topics by Lee (1993: 4) and Lee and Renzetti (1993: 5), it is the view of the researcher that any ‘political threat’ would not pose a substantial or even moderate threat to the researcher or the participants. Therefore, this research will not be regarded as sensitive research. However, as Sieber (1993) suggests, when considering sensitive topics, it particularly highlights other aspects of the research, such
as; ethical, political and legal issues, which will be discussed in more detail below. It is with those issues in mind that consideration was given to the research design.

A pragmatic approach will be adopted for this research as it focuses on the research question and the aim and objectives of the research, and is associated with a mixed methods methodology (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003; Mertens, 2005). The methodology for this research will be discussed in more detail in the Research Methodology section below.

Research Methodology
Grix (2002: 179) suggests that research methodology ‘is concerned with the logic of scientific inquiry; in particular with investigating the potentialities and limitations of particular techniques or procedures’. Having considered the quantitative, qualitative and mixed methods research methodologies and the rationale for using a mixed methods research methodology, this research will use a mixed methods methodology.

Mixed Methods Research Methodology
This approach will adopt research methods from both the quantitative and qualitative methodologies, such as; postal survey self-completion questionnaires and semi-structured interviews to address the research question. The main rationale behind using a mixed methods research methodology is that of; Triangulation, Offset, Completeness and Enhancement, but will also include elements of Explanation, Credibility, Context, Illustration, Utility and Diversity of views (Bryman, 2006: 105-107).

Triangulation (or greater validity) refers to the combination of quantitative and qualitative research findings as a means of mutual corroboration, whilst Offset refers to the suggestion that quantitative and qualitative research methods have their own strengths and weaknesses, and when combined the researcher can offset their weaknesses and utilise their combined strengths to build stronger conclusions. In
addition, Johnson and Turner (2003: 299) suggest that the fundamental principle of mixed methods research is that; ‘methods should be mixed in a way that has complementary strengths and nonoverlapping weaknesses’. **Completeness** refers to the use of quantitative and qualitative research to develop a more comprehensive and complete understanding of the area of inquiry that is of interest to the researcher and **Enhancement** refers to augmenting or enhancing quantitative or qualitative findings by gathering data from a quantitative or qualitative research approach (Bryman, 2006: 105-107).

**Explanation** refers to quantitative research being used to explain the findings generated by qualitative research and vice versa. **Credibility** refers to employing both quantitative and qualitative research to enhance the integrity of the findings. **Context** refers to the combination of research methodologies, where qualitative research is used to provide a contextual understanding and quantitative research is used to provide external validation, generalisation and broad relationships between variables. **Illustration** refers to the use of qualitative data to illustrate the findings from quantitative data, which is often referred to as ‘putting the meat on the bones’. **Utility** (or improving the usefulness of findings) refers to the suggestion that the combination of quantitative and qualitative research will be more useful to practitioners and others, and adopts a pragmatic, pluralistic problem and consequence oriented approach. **Diversity of views** refers to the use of quantitative and qualitative research to combine the perspectives of the researcher and the participants, and determining the relationship between variables through quantitative research, whilst discovering the meaning from participants through qualitative research (Bryman, 2006: 105-107).

As Webb et al (1966: 3) suggest; ‘Once a proposition has been confirmed by two or more independent measurement processes, the uncertainty of its interpretation is greatly reduced’. Citing the work of Webb et al (1966), Denzin (2009: 26) concludes that; ‘no single method will ever permit an investigator to develop causal propositions
free of rival interpretations’. Thus, a mixed methods research design has been considered for this research.

**Mixed Methods Research Designs**

Creswell (2009: 5) refers to research design as ‘the plan or proposal to conduct research’, which ‘involves the intersection of philosophy, strategies of enquiry, and specific methods’. Bryman (2012: 45) on the other hand describes research design as ‘a framework for the generation of evidence that is suited both to a certain set of criteria and to the research question in which the investigator is interested’. Similarly, Yin (2009) noted that the main purpose of a research design is to ensure that sufficient evidence is gathered to answer the research question posed.

> Note that a research design is much more than a work plan. The main purpose of the design is to help to avoid the situation in which the evidence does not address the initial research questions. In this sense, a research design deals with a logical problem not a logistical problem. (Yin, 2009: 27)

Creswell and Plano Clark (2007: 59-79) identified four main types of mixed methods research design, namely; Triangulation Design, Embedded Design, Explanatory Design and Exploratory Design. A *Triangulation Design* is used when the research wishes to compare and contrast quantitative data with qualitative data or to validate the data obtained from the mixed methods approach. An *Embedded Design* is used when data collected from one research method (e.g. qualitative data from semi-structured interviews) is embedded in the data from another type of research methodology (e.g. quantitative data from postal survey questionnaires), the latter being the primary dataset or vice versa. An *Explanatory Design* is a two phased design which is used when qualitative data is collected to explain or build on initial quantitative data findings. An *Exploratory Design* is also a two phased design that uses qualitative data research methods to develop and inform the second and primary quantitative research method.
Creswell and Plano Clark (2007: 80-84) also suggest that there are three factors that affect the decision of the choice of research design, namely; the Timing Decision, the Weighting Decision and the Mixing Decision. The **Timing Decision** relates to the time when the data are analysed and interpreted rather than when the data was collected (i.e. concurrently or sequentially). The **Weighting Decision** relates to the priority or emphasis that is placed on the quantitative and qualitative methodologies used in the research and whether the research methods have equal priority or one method has a greater priority. The **Mixing Decision** relates to how the datasets from each of the research methods will be mixed. This may be achieved by merging, embedding or connecting the data. **Merging** the data involves integrating the data at the analysis or the interpretation phase of the research design. **Embedding** the data involves embedding data from one research methodology within the data from a larger different research methodology (i.e. embedding qualitative data within the larger quantitative data or vice versa). **Connecting** the data occurs when analysis of data from one research methodology leads to and connects to data from another different research methodology (i.e. qualitative data leads to and connects to quantitative data or vice versa). (See also: Greene, Caracelli and Graham, 1989; Morse, 1991; Morgan, 1998; Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998; Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2006; 2009; 2010; Creswell et al, 2008 and Symonds and Gorard, 2010).

Similarly, Bryman (2006: 98) identified five dimensions of mixed methods (or multi-strategy) research; (1) the timing of the data collection (i.e. simultaneously (concurrently) or sequentially), (2) the weighting (or priority) of the quantitative and qualitative data, (3) the stage at which mixing (or integration) occurs (i.e. at research question formulation, at data collection, at data analysis or at data interpretation), (4) the function of integration (e.g. triangulation, explanation or exploration) and (5) the number of strands of data (e.g. for multi-strand research there is more than one research method and source of data).
Having considered the decision factors (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007) and dimensions of mixed methods research (Bryman, 2006) above, the choice of mixed methods research design will include the following: the concurrent analysis and interpretation of data; the research methodology and methods will have equal weighting (or priority), the data will be merged at the interpretation phase of the research design for the purpose of triangulation utilising the strands of data from the two research methods employed in this research. Therefore, a mixed methods *Triangulation Design* was considered to be the most appropriate research design for the purpose of this research.

**Mixed Methods Triangulation Design**

Since the 1950’s a number of authors have supported the mixed methods research design by utilising triangulation, as a cross validation process. Campbell and Fiske (1959: 101) are often regarded as being the first to formalise the use of multiple methods in research, which they termed ‘multiple operationalism’. However, Webb et al (1966) are credited with the first use of the term triangulation.

> *Once a proposition has been confirmed by two or more independent measurement processes, the uncertainty of its interpretation is greatly reduced. The most persuasive evidence comes through a triangulation of measurement processes.*  
> (Webb et al, 1966: 3)

Although, Webb et all (1966) introduced the term triangulation in research, it was Denzin (1978: 291) who discussed the use of triangulation in detail and described triangulation as; ‘the combination of methodologies in the study of the same phenomena’. Denzin (1978: 295) identified four basic types of triangulation, namely; *Data Triangulation* (which uses different data sources), *Investigator Triangulation* (which uses more than one investigator), *Theory Triangulation* (which uses more than one theoretical perspective) and *Methodological Triangulation* (which uses Within-method Triangulation or Between-method Triangulation). *Within-method Triangulation* involves the use of multiple strategies within a single methodology (i.e. quantitative or qualitative) and utilises a single method approach, whilst *Between-method* (or Across-
method) *Triangulation* involves the use of both quantitative and qualitative methodologies, and utilises a multiple or mixed methods approach (Denzin, 1978: 301-302). Denzin recommends between-methods triangulation as a type of convergent validation, which balances out the biases prevalent in research methods and data sources, and in the investigators (researchers) themselves. ‘The rationale for this strategy is that the flaws of one method are often the strengths of another; and by combining methods, observers can achieve the best of each while overcoming their unique deficiencies’ (Denzin, 1978: 302).

Kidder and Fine (1987: 62-68) identified three main usages of triangulation, namely; Triangulation of Measurement, Triangulation of Conclusions Within a Study and Triangulation of Conclusions Across Studies. *Triangulation of Measurement* means ‘locating a point in space along one or more dimensions to describe a single person (or group or object – whatever the unit of analysis is)’. *Triangulation of Conclusions Within a Study* occurs ‘if different measurements produce the same pattern of results or if different informants give the same account of an experience or institution’. *Triangulation of Conclusions Across Studies* tries to find ‘agreement between research conclusions across studies using different methods*. Denzin (1978) and Kidder and Fine (1987) hold similar views to Webb et al (1966) in relation to convergent validation. In addition Webb et al (1966: 3) argue that confidence is increased if error is minimised in each of the research instruments. Jick (1979: 608) suggests that the overall strength of a mixed methods research design is that it gives the researcher more confidence in their results.

Mathison (1988) provides an alternative conception of triangulation to that espoused by Denzin (1978) and questions the assumption that between-methods triangulation balances or cancels out biases in research methods, data sources and investigators, to leave only the truth from the investigation. Mathison argues that researchers do not only rely on findings that provide convergent validation, but also utilise inconsistent and
contradictory findings. Mathison describes convergence, inconsistency and contradictory as follows:

- **Convergence**: When data from different sources or collected from different methods agree, the outcome is convergence.
- **Inconsistency**: The data obtained through triangulation may be inconsistent, not confirming but not contradictory.
- **Contradictory**: At times, data are not simply inconsistent but are actually contradictory, leading the researcher to incommensurable propositions.

(Mathison, 1988: 15-16)

Mathison (1988: 16) also argues that for the researcher to ‘construct plausible explanations’ from the triangulation process, convergent, inconsistent and contradictory findings should be utilised within the context of the research project/programme and a general understanding of the wider social world. This is a view supported by Fielding (2010: 128) who suggests that; ‘We need to understand the policy environment and political frame of reference in which applied research is done’.

Jick (1979: 604) argues that not only does triangulation allow for a phenomenon to be examined from multiple perspectives, but it can be used to ‘enrich our understanding by allowing for new or deeper dimensions to emerge’. Similarly, Rossman and Wilson (1985) suggest that a combination of quantitative and qualitative research methodologies enables confirmation through triangulation (corroboration), provides richer data (elaboration) and develops new ways of thinking (initiation).

Creswell and Plano Clark (2007: 63-65) advise that the Triangulation Design has four main models, namely; the Convergence Model, the Data Transformation Model, the Validating Quantitative Data Model and the Multilevel Model. The Convergence Model and the Data Transformation Model only differ in the way that the researcher merges the two types of quantitative and qualitative data. The Validating Quantitative Data Model is used to validate quantitative data with qualitative data and the Multilevel Model is used to investigate quantitative and qualitative data within the different levels of the system being researched (e.g. the different levels within an organisation (Tashakkori and
Teddlie, 1998: 50). The triangulation model considered to be the most appropriate for this mixed methods research design was a Convergence Model. See Figure 4.1.

Gorad (2010: 4) argues that; 'The structure of a standard design is not intended to be restrictive, since designs can be easily used in combination; nor is it assumed that any off-the-shelf existing design is always or ever appropriate'. This view is supported by Mertens (2005: 301-304) who suggests that the type of mixed methods research design can be modified to suit the purpose of the research and the research question.

The Convergence Model consists of collecting and analysing quantitative data to produce quantitative results, whilst a similar process of collecting and analysing qualitative data is conducted concurrently to produce qualitative results. The quantitative and qualitative results are then compared and contrasted, before they are interpreted to provide quantitative and qualitative research findings (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007). See Figure 4.1 below.

In the model proposed for this research the Convergence Model would be used to compare, contrast and interpret the results from the quantitative and qualitative data elements of the postal survey self-completion questionnaires for local neighbourhood policing staff and intelligence managers, and the qualitative data from the semi-structured interviews with intelligence managers. See Figure 4.1 below.
The research methods utilised as part of this mixed methods research methodology will now be discussed in more detail below.

**Research Methods**

With the limited resources available to the researcher it was decided to focus this research on the four BCUs within the South Wales Police area, namely; the Central, Eastern, Northern and Western BCUs. However, due to logistical, time and financial constraints, it was impracticable to include the whole population of South Wales Police in the sample for the collection of primary data. The main aim of this research as posed by the research question is to critically analyse the use of community intelligence in local neighbourhood policing. Therefore, samples were drawn from police staff involved in local neighbourhood policing and the management of intelligence. A sample size of 414 local neighbourhood policing staff (60.5 percent) and a population of 60 intelligence...
managers were used in this research. Sampling methods and sizes will be discussed in more detail in the Sampling section below.

Webb et al (1966) argue that all research methods are subject to bias and weakness, and thus methods should be supplemented by other methods that test the same variables.

_No research method is without bias. Interviews and questionnaires must be supplemented by methods testing the same social science variables but having different methodological weaknesses._ (Webb et al, 1966: 1)

By utilising a mixed methods approach it is anticipated that any biases or weaknesses in individual quantitative and qualitative methods will be significantly reduced. Diesing (1971: 5) suggests that there is such a great variety of combinations of research methods in use that; 'survey research and participant observation can now be seen as two ends of a continuum rather than as two distinct kinds of methods'.

Having considered the aim and objectives of this research, how research on policing has previously been undertaken and the research methodologies above, a mixed methods methodology, utilising a combination of quantitative and qualitative research methods was used to investigate the research question. These methods included the use of primary data from postal survey self-completion questionnaires and semi-structured interviews. It must also be noted that the choice of research methods was influenced by the fact that this research was undertaken by a single researcher, who was self-funded and thus subject to personal financial constraints.

Due to the large sample sizes in this research, a postal survey involving a self-completion questionnaire was considered to be the most appropriate research instrument for obtaining a large amount of data from the sample group across the four BCUs within a relatively short period of time (Neuman, 2000: 247; Mertens, 2005; 167). Other
methods of surveying, such as the online web-based survey questionnaires (Mertens, 2005: 205-206; Bryman, 2012: 216-217 & 670-678), the telephone survey questionnaire (Newell, 1993: 97-98; Neuman, 2000: 272; Mertens, 2005: 198-199; Bryman, 2012: 214-215) and the interview schedule questionnaire (Neuman, 2000: 272-273; Bryman, 2012: 210) were not considered appropriate for this research, again due to logistical, time and financial constraints (Neuman, 2000: 272-274). The quantitative and qualitative data obtained from this survey would also act to corroborate other qualitative data obtained from interviews.

Semi-structured face to face interviews were considered to be the most appropriate means of interview for obtaining more detailed qualitative data from a smaller population group of intelligence managers (Bryman, 2012: 470). Structured and unstructured face to face interviews were considered, but were found to be inappropriate for this research, due to their inflexible and informal nature respectively. Semi-structured telephone interviews were also considered, but were found to be impractical and raised ethical issues in relation to the tape recording of interviews over the telephone, without the use of specialist equipment.

Secondary data from other research papers on local neighbourhood policing and intelligence were analysed and discussed as part of the literature review in Chapter 2: Policing and Community Engagement and Chapter 3: Intelligence and its Policing Applications.

**The Postal Survey Self-Completion Questionnaire**

Denzin (1978: 158) defines a survey as; ‘a methodological technique that requires the systematic collection of data from populations or samples through the use of the interview or the self-administered questionnaire’. Neuman (2000: 247) also adds that; ‘Surveys are appropriate for research questions about self-reported beliefs or behaviors’,
which also includes attitudes, opinions, characteristics, expectations, self-classification and knowledge.

**Local Neighbourhood Policing Staff**

A postal survey self-completion (or self-administered) questionnaire was believed to be the most efficient and cost effective method of systematically collecting data from a large sample of 414 local neighbourhood policing staff, spread across the four geographical BCUs within the South Wales Police area (Bryman, 2012: 233). The self-completion questionnaire was designed and piloted with the respondent’s perspective in mind, by providing an introduction and clear instructions, guaranteeing anonymity, ensuring that questions were phrased so as to be comprehensible, avoided jargon and confusion, and were in a logical sequence, and by allowing the respondents to complete the questionnaire at a time convenient to them (Newell, 1993: 96; Neuman, 2000: 251-255; Mertens, 2005: 179-182; Bryman, 2012: 237-239).

The self-completion questionnaire consisted of nine pages, which included an introductory first page, followed by a personal demographic characteristics page and 30 questions spread over the remaining pages. The introductory page included instructions on how to complete the questionnaire and how to return it to the researcher upon completion. The personal demographic characteristics page requested details of Gender, Age, Ethnicity, Length of Police Service, Position and Basic Command Unit, whilst protecting the anonymity of the respondent. Participants were asked to select their response from a list of given variables, which were coded to assist with future statistical analysis. The 30 questions on the remaining pages were divided into four main themes, namely; Intelligence and Policing Systems (eleven questions), Policing in Context (nine questions), Police Application of Intelligence (five questions) and Community Engagement, Intelligence and Cohesion (five questions). Of the 30 questions, 22 were considered to be quantitative multiple choice closed questions and eight being qualitative open questions requiring a more contextualised response. Nine of the closed questions
also afforded the opportunity for participants to contextually expand on the reason for their choice of answer (e.g. Please explain why below, Other (please specify), and Only know part of the process (please specify)). The questionnaire included questions in relation to community intelligence, criminal intelligence, local neighbourhood policing, neighbourhood profiles, intelligence-led policing, community engagement and community cohesion. By adopting a mainly deductive logic approach, the response variables for each question were again coded to assist with future statistical data analysis (Neuman, 2000: 250). See Appendix 5 for the questionnaire distributed to the sample of local neighbourhood policing staff.

Closed and open questions both have certain advantages and disadvantages. Closed questions are easier to complete and provide clarity for the respondent, and are generally easier to compare, code and process by the researcher. However, answers are more restrictive, not exhaustive and can prove frustrating for the respondent if their choice of answer does not appear. Open questions allow respondents more freedom to provide a more detailed response and thus give an indication of their knowledge and understanding of a certain issue. However, they are more time consuming and require greater effort to complete by respondents. This may also have an impact on response rates, particularly with self-completion questionnaires. The coding process of developing key themes or words from the written response is also more difficult and time consuming for the researcher (Neuman, 2000: 260-264; Bryman, 2012: 246-252). Neuman (2000: 260) suggests that the disadvantages of closed and open questions can be reduced by ‘mixing open-ended and closed-ended questions in a questionnaire’.

A pilot study of the self-completion questionnaire was undertaken in March 2012 prior to the full survey, to ascertain if the instructions for the completion of the questionnaire were clear, if the mix of closed and open questions was suitable and comprehensible, if the format was user friendly, if the length of the questionnaire was appropriate and if
the questions were effective in answering the research question (Bogen, 1996: 1020-1025; Neuman, 2000: 264-265; Mertens, 2005: 182; Bryman, 2012: 263-264).

The postal survey self-completion questionnaire was initially piloted in the Roath/Cathays and Cardiff City Centre policing sectors, within the Eastern BCU, where the researcher was employed at the time of the pilot. The small stratified (by rank/position) random sample of 22 participants for the pilot survey included police sergeants, police constables, PCSOs, special constables and police Front Line Support Officers (FLSOs) who were involved in local neighbourhood policing on a daily basis. Sampling methods and sizes will be discussed in more detail in the Sampling section below.

All participants were provided with an information sheet, which outlined the purpose of the research, why they had been chosen as a participant and explained issues such as confidentiality, participant’s concerns and withdrawing from the research. The sheet also described what would happen to the findings of the research and provided the contact details of the researcher and the Director of Studies for the research, should the participant require any further information. See Appendix 6 for the information sheet distributed to the sample of local neighbourhood policing staff.

All participants were also provided with a consent form, which highlighted data protection issues, their right to withdraw from the research study at any time, future research publication and analysis, and confirmation that they had read and understood the information provided on the information sheet, they had been given sufficient time to consider the information and ask further questions, that their participation was voluntary and thus they could withdraw at any time. Participants were then requested to sign the consent form agreeing to participate in the research study. See Appendix 7 for the consent form distributed to the sample of local neighbourhood policing staff. The issues of ethics and informed consent will be discussed in more detail in the Ethical Considerations section below.
A copy of the self-completion questionnaire, information sheet and consent form were sent to prospective participants via the South Wales Police internal mail system. In addition, participants were also sent pre-addressed envelopes for the return of the questionnaire and consent form to the researcher.

Of the 22 self-completion questionnaires initially distributed as part of the pilot, seven were returned and subsequently analysed for their suitability and effectiveness in answering the research question. The analysis revealed that the pilot self-completion questionnaire appeared to be effective in its design.

The pilot study of the self-completion questionnaire provided a response rate of (31.8 percent). Although the pilot study only involved a small sample size, it was a useful indicator when considering anticipated response rates for the full survey.

Neuman (2000: 268) suggests that; ‘A response rate of 10 to 50 percent is common for a mail survey’. Bryman (2012: 199) agrees and states that research studies suggest that response rates have declined over the last forty years, with some response rates being as low as 10 and 15 percent. Bryman (2012: 235) argues that when considering response rates, the researcher should not despair if they achieve a low response rate, as; ‘The key point is to recognize and acknowledge the implications of the possible limitations of a low response rate’. Implications for the research include; the reduced number of respondents may not fully represent the sampled population, the increased possibility of bias and weakened validity (Bryman, 2012).

Bogen (1996) conducted a review of the literature to determine the effect the length of a questionnaire had on response rates. The common perception held is that the shorter the questionnaire the higher the response rate (Neuman, 2000: 264-265; Bryman, 2012: 236). However, on completion of the review, Bogen (1996: 1020) admitted that;
‘The results are still confusing and contradictory, the conclusions are still not clear’. Thus, there is no empirical evidence to suggest that the response rate for a shorter questionnaire would be higher than that for a longer questionnaire. Bogen concludes that very little experimental work has been undertaken to assist researchers in making a practical decision about the length of a survey.

Bogen (1996) also suggests that basic follow up procedures can negate any distinction between questionnaire length and response rate. Neuman (2000) and Bryman (2012) agree that two or three follow up reminders can greatly increase response rates. Other factors that can increase response rates and were considered in this research include; a letter of introduction or information sheet, clear instructions and pre-addressed envelopes for returns (Neuman, 2000; Mertens, 2005; Bryman, 2012).

Having considered the above and the results from the pilot study, the pilot self-completion questionnaire was utilised for the full survey with the remaining 392 participants from the local neighbourhood policing staff sample. These participants also included police sergeants, police constables, PCSOs, special constables and police FLSOs who were involved in local neighbourhood policing on a daily basis.

In a similar manner to that of the pilot study, the self-completion questionnaire, information sheet, consent form and pre-addressed envelopes were sent to all the remaining 392 participants via the South Wales Police internal mail system during the period April 2012 to September 2012. Initial response rates were monitored and follow up reminders including copies of the self-completion questionnaire, information sheet and consent form were sent via e-mail to participants who had not yet replied. This process was repeated three times at intervals of approximately one month for those who had not replied. Of the 392 self-completion questionnaires distributed, 90 were returned. As the same self-completion questionnaire and process had been used for the pilot study, the completed questionnaires from the pilot study were added to those from the
full survey. Thus, the overall sample size remained at 414. The total number of questionnaires returned, including those from the pilot study was 97 (7+90), providing a response rate of 23.4 percent. All the data from the self-completion questionnaires were later analysed and the findings reported in Chapter 5: Research Findings.

**Intelligence Managers**

A postal survey self-completion (or self-administered) questionnaire was again believed to be the most efficient and cost effective method of systematically collecting data from the population of 60 intelligence managers, who were also spread across the four geographical BCUs within the South Wales Police area (Bryman, 2012: 233).

A similar process was used in relation to the administration of the self-completion questionnaire for intelligence managers, although the population size in this case was much smaller. As with the self-completion questionnaire for the local neighbourhood policing staff, the self-completion questionnaire for intelligence managers also consisted of nine pages, which included an introductory first page, followed by a personal demographic characteristics page and 30 questions spread over the remaining pages. In addition to the personal characteristics, there was a space at the top of the page for the respondent’s name. This was included so that the respondent could be identified for a further follow up semi-structured interview if consent was given. See the Semi-Structured Interview section below. The questions were also slightly modified to take account of the differing managerial role of the intelligence managers group.

The postal survey self-completion questionnaire for this population group was initially piloted in March 2012 within the Eastern and Northern BCUs. The small random sample of 16 participants for the pilot survey included those of inspector and sergeant rank who were involved in the management of intelligence as part of their duties. Sampling methods and sizes will be discussed in more detail in the Sampling section below. See Appendix 8 for the questionnaire distributed to the sample of intelligence managers.
All participants were provided with an information sheet and consent form containing the information described above. In addition the information sheet and consent form contained information in relation to semi-structured interviews. See Appendices 9 and 10 for the information sheet and consent form distributed to the sample of intelligence managers. The issues of ethics and informed consent will be discussed in more detail in the Ethical Considerations section below.

A copy of the self-completion questionnaire, information sheet, consent form and pre-addressed envelopes were sent to prospective participants via the South Wales Police internal mail system. Of the 16 self-completion questionnaires initially distributed as part of the pilot, four were returned and subsequently analysed for their suitability and effectiveness in answering the research question. The pilot study of the self-completion questionnaire provided a response rate of 25.0 percent.

The analysis again revealed that the pilot self-completion questionnaire appeared to be effective in its design. Therefore, the pilot self-completion questionnaire was utilised for the full survey with the remaining 44 participants from the intelligence managers’ population group. These participants included local policing inspectors, detective inspectors (intelligence), detective sergeants (intelligence), LIOs and FIOs who were involved in the management of community intelligence as part of their duties.

Using a similar process to that of the pilot study and the survey of local neighbourhood policing staff, the self-completion questionnaire, information sheet, consent form and pre-addressed envelopes were sent to all the remaining 44 participants via the South Wales Police internal mail system during the period April 2012 to September 2012. The same process of monitoring response rates and follow up reminders was also used for this survey.
Of the 44 self-completion questionnaires distributed, 16 were returned. The completed questionnaires from the pilot study were also added to those from the full survey. Thus the overall population size remained at 60. The total number of questionnaires returned, including those from the pilot study was 20 (4+16), providing a response rate of 33.3 percent. All the data from the self-completion questionnaires was later analysed and the findings reported in Chapter 5: Research Findings.

**Semi-Structured Interviews**

Mason (2004: 1020) suggests that; ‘The defining characteristic of semistructured interviews is that they have a flexible and fluid structure, unlike structured interviews, which contain a structured sequence of questions to be asked in the same way of all interviewees’.

Semi-structured interviews were chosen for this research because it provided a more flexible method of interviewing and collecting data from the population group of intelligence managers, which included local policing inspectors, detective inspectors (intelligence), detective sergeants (intelligence), LIOs and FIOs. This population group had a variety of different roles and responsibilities in the management of intelligence, which made the use of structured interviews using an interview schedule impractical (Barriball and While, 1994: 330). Conversely, the use of unstructured interviews using at most an aide memoire to assist in a conversation with the interviewee lacked the structure required to discuss the research topics identified by this research (Bryman, 2012: 471).

The same population group of 60 intelligence managers who had been sent a self-completion questionnaire, information sheet and consent form were also invited at that time to participate in the semi-structured interviews. The same process used to monitor response rates and follow up reminders for the self-completion questionnaires was also utilised for the semi-structured interviews. Of those 60 intelligence managers invited to
participate, 21 (or 35.0 percent) agreed to participate in the interview process. This participant group contained representatives from the five subgroups of intelligence managers mentioned above. It was identified that of the 21 participants, six participants had not and did not wish to complete a self-completion questionnaire, but gave their consent to be interviewed. Conversely, five intelligence managers who had completed a self-completion questionnaire did not wish to be interviewed. The issues of ethics and informed consent will be discussed in more detail in the Ethical Considerations section below.

The semi-structured interviews were arranged with the 21 participants at a time, date and location that was convenient to each individual interviewee. The interviews were generally held in an office within a police station at or near to the interviewee’s normal place of work. Prior to the commencement of the interviews the interviewees were again provided with an information sheet and reminded of the terms and conditions under which they had given their consent to be interviewed. Each interviewee was also given the option of whether their interview would be tape recorded or not. Of the 21 participants, two did not wish their interview to be tape recorded, whilst the remainder were in agreement. Participants were also informed that the tape recorded interviews would be transcribed and they were offered a copy of the transcript of their interview. All interviewees declined this offer. Notes were made of the interviews where the participant did not wish the interview to be tape recorded (Bryman, 2012).

The semi-structured interviews lasted between 45 and 60 minutes and took place during the period December 2012 to July 2013. The interviews were conducted using an interview guide to allow as much freedom as possible when discussing the research topics, whilst providing sufficient structure to the interview process to be able to answer the research question (Bryman, 2012: 471). The interview guide included similar themes and questions to those used in the self-completion questionnaire for intelligence managers and afforded the opportunity to ask additional questions specifically aimed at
the particular area of expertise of the interviewee (Mason, 2004: 1020). See Appendix 11 for the interview guide used with the sample group of intelligence managers.

Bryman (2012: 470) argues that structured interviews are quantitative, whilst semi-structured and unstructured interviews are qualitative. This view is also supported by Kvale (1996), Mason (2004) and Mertens (2005). Kvale (1996: 1) suggests that; ‘The qualitative research interview attempts to understand the world from the subjects’ point of view, to unfold the meaning of peoples’ experiences, to uncover their lived world prior to scientific explanations’. Thus, the intention of the qualitative semi-structured interviews in this research was to obtain an account of the interviewee’s perceptions, views, experiences and understanding of the research topics, and to complete and enhance the data collected from the self-completion questionnaire survey with the intelligence managers (Mason, 2004).

The 19 interviews that were tape recorded were later transcribed by the researcher. Heritage (1984: 238) suggests that recording interviews is essential to correct the limitations of the researcher’s recollection and intuition, and enables ‘repeated and detailed examination’ of the interaction between researcher and interviewee, and makes observation more precise. If the recordings are transcribed it makes it easier for other researchers to have access to the data for secondary analysis, opens the research to public scrutiny and helps to reduces the researcher’s preconceptions and biases. All the data from the semi-structured interviews was later analysed and the findings reported in Chapter 5: Research Findings.

**Rich Thick Descriptions**

The concept of *thick description* was first developed by Ryle (1949; 2009) in his work entitled; ‘The Concept of Mind’. However, it was not until the 1960s that Ryle used the term thick description in his lectures entitled; ‘Thinking and Reflecting’, and ‘The Thinking of Thoughts: What is “La Pensuer” Doing?’ which were published in 1971 under
the title; ‘Collected Papers, Volume II, Collected Essays 1929-1968’ (Ryle, 1971). Geertz (1973) further developed Ryle’s concept of thick description in his ethnographical work and suggested that the researcher’s interpretation of events should be thickly described. Denzin (1989) builds on Geertz’s work and agrees that thick description provides greater context and meaning. Denzin argues that a thick description has the following features:

(1) It gives the context of an act; (2) it states the intentions and meanings that organize the action; (3) it traces the evolution and development of the act; (4) it presents the action as a text that can then be interpreted. A thin description simply reports facts, independent of intentions or the circumstances that surround an action.
(Denzin, 1989: 33)

Banyard and Miller (1998: 491) suggest that the thick description of qualitative methods such as semi-structured interviews help researchers to capture details of ‘multiple voices and perspectives’ and to provide a greater understanding of the unique relationship between the researcher and participants. Ponterotto (2006: 546-547) proposes that when used in the interview process, thick description can manifest itself in the following four categories: Participants (describing the participants without compromising anonymity), Procedures (describing the settings and the procedures), Results (ensuring the participants have a voice by using quotations) and Discussions (merging the participants’ experiences with the researcher’s interpretations of those experiences).

Creswell and Miller (2000: 128) argue that a rich thick description also adds ‘credibility’ and ‘applicability’ to the research findings.

Rich thick descriptions will be used in this research to enhance the findings from the semi-structured interviews mentioned above.

The Inside-Insider and Outside-Insider Researcher
The researcher was employed as a police officer by South Wales Police from July 1982 to July 2012. Thus, during the course of this research and post July 2012, the researcher changed from being an ‘inside-insider’ to being an ‘outside-insider’ (Brown, 1996: 180-
186). This change was to have implications for the research, particularly in relation to access.

The postal survey self-completion questionnaire component of this research involving local neighbourhood policing staff and intelligence managers (including the pilot studies) took place between March 2012 and September 2012. During the first part of this period, up to the end of July 2012 the researcher may be considered an ‘inside-insider’ (Brown, 1996: 180-181). This enabled the researcher to have direct access to the South Wales Police internal mail, e-mail and telephone systems, which allowed the researcher to communicate directly with the selected sample group.

Post July 2012 the researcher became an ‘outside-insider’ (Brown, 1996: 181-183) and communication with the sample group became more difficult, as access to the internal South Wales Police systems was no longer available. Two main issues arose associated with the restricted access; the collection of the completed consent forms and postal survey self-completion questionnaires, (which had previously been sent and received via the internal mail system), and follow up reminders, (which had previously been sent via the internal e-mail system). These issues were overcome by utilising a very trustworthy third person, still employed by South Wales Police, who very kindly agreed to collect the consent forms and questionnaires, and forward follow up reminders to participants on behalf of the researcher, using the South Wales Police internal mail and e-mail systems respectively. The collected consent forms and questionnaires were received in sealed envelopes, which were not opened by the third person and forwarded directly to the researcher. The follow up reminders were prepared by the researcher and forwarded to the participants by the third person. No data was viewed by this third person.

Although invitations to participate in the semi-structured interviews were sent to the population group of intelligence managers, prior to July 2012, when the researcher was an ‘insider-insider’ (Brown, 1996: 180-181), all the semi-structured interviews were
undertaken between December 2012 and July 2013. Therefore, the researcher was an ‘outside-insider’ (Brown, 1996: 181-183) for the whole of this part of the face to face interview process. In order to overcome the access and communication issues experienced in the postal survey self-completion questionnaire process mentioned above, the researcher identified four key individuals from each of the four BCUs to assist with the final arrangements for the interviews. This included arranging office space to conduct the interviews and sending e-mails via the South Wales Police internal e-mail system to potential participants confirming the arrangements for the interviews. No data was viewed by any third person.

Breen (2007: 164) highlights two further issues in relation to ‘insider-researchers’ conducting interviews, including; the researcher’s ‘reflections’ on the nature of the data can distract the researcher away from the focus of the interview process and the assumption by the participants that ‘the researcher already knows the answers’. Breen (2007), and Corbin-Dwyer and Buckle (2009) argue that the dichotomy of the insider or outsider status is too simplistic and can reduce understanding, knowledge and experience of the research topic. All these issues were considered by the researcher prior to the decision to adopt the insider status and undertaking the semi-structured interviews for this research.

It was decided that the use of postal survey self-completion questionnaires (quantitative and qualitative) and semi-structured interviews (qualitative) in a mixed methods methodology was the best approach to address the research question. Having decided on the most appropriate research methods the researcher then considered the most appropriate research sampling design, which would combine these methods to produce the greatest effect (Bryman, 2006: 105-107).
Sampling

At the time of the sampling process for this research in March 2012, South Wales Police had an establishment of 2,893 regular police officers, 306 PCSOs, 147 special constables and 1,625 police support staff members (including 19 FLSOs, now known as Sector Support Officers (SSOs)), a total of 4,971 full and part time staff (South Wales Police Authority, 2012).

The number of full and part time staff (of all ranks/positions) directly involved in operational policing in each BCU (including FLSOs) was found to be as follows: Central BCU had 484 staff, Eastern BCU had 760 staff, Northern BCU had 544 staff and Western BCU had 747 staff. A total of 2,535 staff involved in operational policing across the four territorial BCUs. The above figures were derived from the unpublished establishment lists provided by the business managers from the four territorial BCUs at the request of the researcher, whilst still employed by South Wales Police and were also used to calculate the number of staff designated to local neighbourhood policing and the management of community intelligence in each BCU.

The number of staff designated to local neighbourhood policing in each of the BCUs including regular police officers (neighbourhood sergeants, Neighbourhood Beat Managers (NBMs) (constables) and Schools Community Police Officers (SCPOs), (formally Schools Liaison Officers) (constables)), PCSOs, special constables and FLSOs was as follows: Central BCU had 153 staff (31.6 percent), Eastern BCU had 177 staff (23.2 percent), Northern BCU had 137 staff (25.1 percent) and Western BCU had 217 staff (29.0 percent). A total of 684 staff (26.9 percent) were designated to local neighbourhood policing across the four territorial BCUs. This equates to 20.3 percent of the South Wales Police establishment of regular police officers, PCSOs, special constables and FLSOs at the time of the sampling process. The 21 local policing inspectors were not included in the total of 684 staff as they formed part of the intelligence managers’ population group for the purposes of this research.
The number of identifiable staff involved in the management of community intelligence in each of the four BCUs was as follows: Central BCU had nine staff, Eastern BCU had 16 staff, Northern BCU had 13 staff and Western BCU had 22 staff. A total of 60 identifiable staff (including local policing inspectors, detective inspectors, detective sergeants, LIOs and FIOs) were involved in the management of community intelligence across the four territorial BCUs.

With the research question and the main aim of this research in mind, the population groups considered most suitable for the postal survey self-completion questionnaires, were the 684 designated local neighbourhood policing staff and the 60 intelligence managers involved in the management of community intelligence.

Similarly, the population group considered most suitable for the semi-structured interviews was the same 60 intelligence managers involved in the management of community intelligence.

**Postal Survey Self-Completion Questionnaires Samples**

For the purpose of sampling, the unit of analysis for the postal survey self-completion questionnaire component of this research was each individual member of staff (or unit) designated to local neighbourhood policing from a population of 684 and each intelligence manager (or unit) involved in the management of community intelligence from a population of 60. Bryman (2012: 187) describes a population as; ‘the universe of units from which the sample is to be selected’ and a sample as; ‘the segment of the population that is selected for investigation’.

Cognisance was taken of the experience of the researcher as an ‘inside-insider’ (Brown, 1996: 180-181) within South Wales Police, when determining the sample size for the postal survey self-completion questionnaires. A relatively low, but not unusual response
rate (of approximately 25.0 percent) was anticipated, due to apathy or refusal to participate (Bryman, 2012: 235). Other factors taken into consideration were spoilage rates whether intentional or otherwise, the total population size, the resources available to the researcher, (such as time and funding), the strength and depth of the participants’ views being measured and the overall extent of the analyses that would need to be undertaken at the end of the data collection process (Bryman, 2012: 197-200).

Therefore, in relation to the local neighbourhood policing staff population of 684 an estimated sample size of 410 (60.0 percent) was considered to be appropriate. In practice the actual sample size was 414 (60.5 percent). The researcher also decided that due to the relatively smaller number of intelligence managers, that this population group would not be sampled and the whole population of 60 (100.0 percent) would be used in this research.

The establishment lists provided by each of the four territorial BCUs were used as the sampling frame for the local neighbourhood policing staff population in this part of the research. Bryman (2012: 187) describes a sampling frame as; ‘the list of all units in the population from which the sample will be selected’. The four establishment lists (although in different formats) all contained details of the name, rank/position, role and location of each member of staff employed in the BCUs and was also used to identify the intelligence managers population group.

Non-probability and probability sampling were both considered as sampling methods for this research. Bryman (2012:187) describes a non-probability sample as; ‘a sample that has not been selected using a random selection method’ and thus, ‘some units in the population are more likely to be selected than others’. By contrast, Bryman (2012:187) describes a probability sample as; ‘a sample that has been selected using random selection so that each unit in the population has a known chance of being selected’, providing a more representative sample and minimising sampling error. (See also: Leming, 1997; Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003; Handwerker, 2005; Mertens, 2005 and
Teddle and Yu, 2007). In order to provide a more representative sample of the population being studied and to minimise sampling error, probability sampling was used in this research.

Mertens (2005: 314-316) suggests that once the sample size is estimated, there are five main types of probability sampling, namely; simple random sampling, systematic sampling, stratified sampling, cluster sampling and multi-stage sampling. Simple random sampling means that every unit of analysis is allocated a number, and the sample is selected by the use of computer generated random numbers (or through the use of a table of random numbers) to produce the sample size required. Thus, each unit has an 'equal and independent chance of being selected' (Mertens, 2005: 314). Systematic sampling involves taking 'every nth name' from the sample frame to provide the sample and the sample size required (Mertens, 2005: 315). Stratified sampling is used when there are 'subgroups (or strata) of different sizes' that need to be investigated as part of the research study (Mertens, 2005: 315). For example in this research, subgroups (or strata) within the local neighbourhood policing staff population would include neighbourhood sergeants, NBMs, SCPOs, PCSOs, special constables and FLSOs. Bryman (2012: 192-193) prefers the term 'stratified random sampling’ and advises that this method should only be used when there are easily identifiable units of analysis that can be allocated to each stratum. Cluster sampling is used where there are ‘naturally occurring groups of individuals’ at a particular location and when a sampling frame (or list of all the units in the population) is not available, but a list of clusters is available (Mertens, 2005: 316). Multi-stage sampling consists of a combining a number of sampling methods. For example; combining cluster sampling with simple random sampling (Mertens, 2005: 316). Bryman (2012: 193-195) reduces the number of main types of probability sampling from five to four, by combining cluster sampling and multi-stage sampling into ‘multi-stage cluster sampling’. Bryman (2012: 194) argues that ‘cluster sampling is always a multi-stage approach’, because clusters are always sampled first followed by further clusters or units in the population.
Stratified sampling and in particular ‘stratified random sampling’ (Bryman, 2012: 192-193) was considered as the most appropriate sampling method for this research, to provide a random sample from each stratum of neighbourhood sergeants, NBMs, PCSOs and special constables. However, because the population size of SCPOs and FLSOs was so small, 25 and 19 respectively, the whole of the population of these two strata was used in this research.

Having identified the strata for stratified random sampling as neighbourhood sergeants, NBMs, PCSOs and special constables, a sampling frame for each stratum was produced and each unit of analysis within the stratum was allocated a unique number. The sample from each stratum was then selected by use of computer generated random numbers to achieve the estimated sample size of 60.0 percent. The population of SCPOs (25) and FLSOs (19) was added to the stratified random sample to produce the overall sample of 414 units of analysis for this research.

Semi-Structured Interviews

For the purpose of the semi-structured interviews component of this research, the unit of analysis was specified as each individual intelligence manager involved in the management of community intelligence. Due to the relatively smaller number of intelligence managers (a population of 60), the researcher decided that this population group would not be sampled and the whole population would be used in this research.

Sampling Error

Although probability sampling minimizes sampling error, it may still occur through chance, random error, bias or even pure bad luck. Non-sampling errors may also occur through researcher error, such as data analysis error and participant error, such as the inability or unwillingness to participate, non-response, cheating and participant bias (Mertens, 2005; Bryman, 2012).
Data Analysis

Data analysis was undertaken concurrently on the primary data collected from the postal survey self-completion questionnaires and semi-structured interviews. Quantitative data was analysed using the International Business Machines (IBM) Statistical Product and Service Solutions (formally Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) (SPSS) Version 20.0 for Microsoft Windows and qualitative data using thematic analysis. Bryman (2012: 717) describes thematic analysis as; ‘A term used in connection with the analysis of qualitative data to refer to the extraction of key themes in one’s data’. A framework or matrix approach to thematic analysis was used in this research utilising Microsoft Excel. See Chapter 5: Research Findings for more details and the findings from the data analysis.

Ethical Considerations

Bryman (2012: 133-134) identifies five main stances on ethics by researchers, namely; universalism, situation ethics, ethical transgression is pervasive, anything goes (more or less) and deontological versus consequentialist ethics. Universalism adopts the stance that ethical principles should never be broken. Proponents of situation ethics argue that the ethics of each study should be considered on its own merits, deception may be appropriate if ‘the ends justify the means’ (otherwise researchers would never know certain phenomenon exist) or there is ‘no choice’ (otherwise the researcher would not be able to conduct an investigation). Ethical transgression is pervasive is a view that participants are not given all the information about the research or the information given is varied. Those researchers who support the anything goes (more or less) stance argue for a certain amount of flexibility in making ethical decisions. The deontological versus consequentialist ethics stance considers the two differing views of the deontologists (who argue that certain acts are right or wrong in themselves) and the consequentialists (who argue that it is the consequences of certain acts that are right or wrong, not the acts themselves). Having taken a pragmatic stance to using a mixed methods methodology and research design, a more pragmatic situational approach to ethical decisions was also
considered appropriate for this research (Punch, 1994: 90). However, this pragmatic situational approach will still consider the main ethical principles of social research.

Diener and Crandall (1978: 7) suggest that there are four main ethical principles that are generally considered in relation to the treatment of participants in social and behavioural research, namely; harm to participants, informed consent, privacy and deception.

**Harm to Participants**

Factors that may be considered harmful to individual participants are psychological harm, such as anxiety and stress, physical harm, the invasion of privacy, lack of anonymity, breaches of confidentiality, damage to reputation and the use of deception (Diener and Crandall, 1978; Punch, 1994; Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995). Physical harm was not considered to be a factor in this research. However, careful consideration was given to minimising other potentially harmful effects of this research on the participants.

The provision of information to prospective participants about the postal survey self-completion questionnaire and semi-structured interview components of this research was considered an essential part of the research design to enable participants to make informed decisions on whether they wished to consent to take part in this research. It was also used to minimise any unnecessary anxiety and stress by offering assurances that their privacy, anonymity, confidentiality and reputation would be maintained, and that they were not being deceived. See Appendices 6 and 9, and the *Informed Consent* and *Privacy* sections below.

Punch (1994: 89-90) suggests that there have been three main developments in research that have influenced ethical considerations and reduced its harmful effects on participants. Firstly, *feminist research*, which emphasises 'trust, empathy, and non-
exploitive relationships’ with participants; secondly, action research, where participants are empowered and regarded as ‘partners in the research process’ and thirdly, funded research, where funding agencies insist on ethical statements by the researcher and that academic bodies review and monitor the ‘ethical components’ of the research. In addition the British Sociological Association’s (BSA) Statement of Ethical Practice (2004) also outlines the responsibility of the researcher in minimising harm to participants.

*Sociologists have a responsibility to ensure that the physical, social and psychological well-being of research participants is not adversely affected by the research. They should strive to protect the rights of those they study, their interests, sensitivities and privacy, while recognising the difficulty of balancing potentially conflicting interests.*

(BSA, 2004: 2)

The same potentially harmful factors mentioned above can be minimised during and after the research process (Punch, 1994).

The publication of the research findings can also cause harm to participants and/or the organisation being studied. If the findings are made public, then others who may not be so ethically considerate may manipulate this information to further their own agenda and cause unforeseen harm to individuals or organisations (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995). It may be easier to minimise the potential harm to individuals, as organisations, particularly large organisations are much more difficult to disguise (Punch, 1994). For example, in this research the only organisation responsible for public policing in the South Wales area is South Wales Police. Other considerations when studying large public organisations such as the police include, for example, the damage to their reputation, which has to be balanced against the search for knowledge and truth. All these factors were considered in relation to this research and Informed Consent and Privacy are discussed in more detail below.
Informed Consent

The ESRC (2010: 40) define informed consent as follows: ‘Informed consent entails giving sufficient information about the research and ensuring that there is no explicit or implicit coercion so that prospective participants can make an informed and free decision on their possible involvement’. This view is supported by the Social Research Association (SRA) (2003) and the BSA (2004: 3) who also advise that; ‘As far as possible participation in sociological research should be based on the freely given informed consent of those studied’. Sieber (1992: 26) suggests that in addition to being an agreement about the conditions of a participant’s involvement in the research, voluntary informed consent is ‘an ongoing two-way communication process between the subjects and the investigator’. Diener and Crandall (1978) argue that voluntary informed consent is based on Western cultural values and legal systems, which emphasise freedom of choice. Article 9 (Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion) and Article 10 (Freedom of Expression) of the Human Rights Act 1998 (Home Office, 1998c: 24-25) and the European Convention on Human Rights (Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) (Council of Europe, 2010: 11-12) tend to support this argument.

Linked to this legislation is an increased expectation that researchers will obtain signed consent from participants in order to ensure that they understand what their participation in the research involves and as a means of protecting the rights of the participant and those of the researcher (Wiles et al, 2004). However, formalising the consent process in this way may dissuade some prospective participants from taking part in the research, thus reducing response rates and may compromise their privacy, anonymity and confidentiality (Coomber, 2002; Singer, 1978; 2004; Wiles et al, 2004).

Although accepted as a common strategy by researchers, the concept of voluntary informed consent is not as straightforward as it may first seem and is not a panacea for all ethical problems (Kimmel, 1988; Hammersley and Traianou, 2012). Concerns arise
when determining how to fully inform prospective participants of the research and how much detail to communicate to them, as this could become a technically complicated, laborious and possibly unattainable task. Stanley, Sieber and Melton (1987: 736) advise that; 'The comprehension of consent information is relatively poor' and the lengthier and more complex the information, the less it is understood. Therefore, the information should be presented in such a way that it is comprehensible to each individual prospective participant (Kimmel, 1988; Wiles et al, 2004). Freely given informed consent also poses other issues about how free the consent actually is. Hammersley and Traianou (2012) argue that prospective participants are not truly free and independent individuals, as they are influenced by certain social factors and relationships, which affect their decision making. Particularly if those factors and relationships involve an organisation that has power or influence over them and they feel obliged to agree or disagree to consent due to the constraints the organisation or individuals within the organisation place upon them. Hammersley and Traianou (2012) also argue that cultural issues within society and within organisations will also influence full and free informed consent. Although full and free informed consent may not always be possible in certain circumstances, it is still desirable.

Therefore, for the postal survey self-completion questionnaire and semi-structured interview components of this research, information was provided to perspective participants in the form of an information sheet, so that they would be in a position to give their informed consent to participate in the research. See Appendices 6 and 9. The informed consent was requested in a written format using a consent form, which perspective participants were required to read, sign and return to the researcher. See Appendices 7 and 10.

In relation to those intelligence managers who agreed to participate in the semi-structured interviews the issue of informed consent was again addressed just prior to the commencement of the interviews and any questions in relation to the research were
answered at this point. Participant information sheets and consent forms were also made available to the participants prior to the interview, should they wish to refresh their memories in relation to their content. See Appendices 9 and 10 respectively.

**Privacy**

Privacy, confidentiality and anonymity are inextricably linked when discussing ethical issues in research, which is emphasised by the following paragraph from the BSA’s Statement of Ethical Practice:

> The anonymity and privacy of those who participate in the research process should be respected. Personal information concerning research participants should be kept confidential. In some cases it may be necessary to decide whether it is proper or appropriate even to record certain kinds of sensitive information. (BSA, 2004: 5)

Diener and Crandall (1978: 55-57) identify three dimensions of privacy, which they describe as; sensitivity of information, the setting being observed and the dissemination of information. The sensitivity of information relates to; ‘how personal or potentially threatening it is’, as some information such as religious beliefs, sexual orientation, racial prejudices, personal finances and honesty are considered more sensitive than other information, such as a person’s name (Diener and Crandall, 1978: 55). The greater the sensitivity of the information the more safeguards have to be put in place to protect the privacy of the individual. The setting being observed considers the ‘continuum from very private (e.g., your bathroom) to completely public (e.g., a downtown sidewalk)’ (Diener and Crandall, 1978: 57). The more private the setting the more precautions have to be taken to ensure privacy. Spicker (2011) argues that it is a difficult and often complex task to distinguish the boundaries between private and public settings. For example, if a group hire a normally public room in a public house for a meeting, does that room become a private setting for the purposes of ethical research? This is a very difficult question to answer, as each case would have to be examined on its own merits. The dissemination of information is concerned with the number of people that ‘can connect personal information to the name of the person involved’ (Diener and Crandall, 1978: 57).
The more people who have knowledge of the personal data of an identifiable individual the more concern there must be for privacy. Thus, in all cases the researcher should assess the sensitivity of the information, the setting or location to be used for the research and how the resulting information will be disseminated to ensure that safeguards are put in place to protect the privacy of the individual.

Privacy is also linked to the provision of information to participants, so that they can determine what impact the research may have on their private lives prior to giving informed consent (Bryman, 2012). The BSA (2004: 5) suggest that; 'covert methods violate the principles of informed consent and may invade the privacy of those being studied'. Thus, even greater focus should be given to the three dimensions of privacy highlighted by Diener and Crandall (1978) when considering covert research.

However, Spicker (2011) argues that the actions of public agencies such as the police are still in the public domain even behind closed doors.

> Some actions are public in their very nature. The formal actions of governments and public agencies, even in closed rooms, are intrinsically public. (Spicker, 2011: 124)

The BSA (2004: 5) also advise that; 'There may be fewer compelling grounds for extending guarantees of privacy or confidentiality to public organisations, collectivises, governments, officials or agencies than to individuals or small groups'. Thus, there is an argument pertinent to this research that the actions of all police officers and police staff are in the public domain. As a powerful public organisation, the police are constitutionally accountable to the public for their actions, which restricts their right to privacy and increases the need for scrutiny through research (Holdaway, 1983). The BSA’s (2004) statement above also includes the possibility that there would be no guarantee of confidentiality for public organisations and their officials, including the police.
Wiles et al (2008: 418) define confidentiality as follows: ‘In a research context, confidentiality means (1) not discussing information provided by an individual with others, and (2) presenting findings in ways that ensure individuals cannot be identified (chiefly through anonymisation)’. This definition further confirms the link between confidentiality and anonymity. Wiles et al (2008: 417) assert that anonymity is one way that ‘confidentiality is operationalised’.

Bulmer (1982: 225) suggests that to protect individuals, all identities and locations should be concealed, collected data is anonymised and all data is kept confidential and secured. However, there may be occasions when confidentiality has to be broken and information disclosed (BSA, 2004: 5). Deliberate disclosure may occur due to a number of reasons including; legal requirements, public safety issues, preventing a criminal act and preventing someone from becoming a victim of crime or suffering serious harm (Wiles et al, 2008: 419). Accidental disclosure can also occur if the process to ensure confidentiality is not robust enough and a participant’s personal details are inadvertently passed to a third party (Wiles et al, 2008: 421). For example, one researcher discusses their research findings with another independent researcher or a researcher is overheard whilst in conversation with another member of the same research team.

The main way that researchers prevent accidental disclosure and protect research participants is through the use of anonymity. Mertens (2005: 333) suggests that; ‘Anonymity means that no uniquely identifying information is attached to the data, and thus no one, not even the researcher, can trace the data back to the individual providing them’. Complete anonymity as suggested by Mertens above is very difficult to achieve, particularly when the research methods include the researcher interviewing the participants. By the very nature of the interviewing process, it is generally undertaken face to face with a smaller population or sample group of participants. Even if the data is coded and anonymised to prevent identification of participants by a third party, the
researcher will undoubtedly be able to identify a number of participants from the specific data they provided.

During the course of this research, the researcher was assisted by four trusted individuals who only helped with certain logistical arrangements as described above, but were unaware of the identity of the final group of participants who agreed to participate in this research. However, this did not prevent the researcher from being able to ensure anonymity for the participants in respect of any other third party. No data was viewed by any third party.

For the purpose of this research every effort was made to ensure the privacy, confidentiality and anonymity of participants, even though the participants may be regarded as officials in a public organisation (i.e. the police) (BSA, 2004).

In relation to the postal survey self-completion questionnaires for local neighbourhood policing staff and intelligence managers, the questionnaires were sent out via the South Wales Police internal mail system and completed questionnaires were returned using the same method. Similarly, all follow up enquiries in relation to the questionnaires were made via the internal e-mail system. This offered security from external interference, but did not prevent internal interference within the organisation. However, none of the questionnaires or e-mails was found to have been interfered with in any way.

The questionnaires for local neighbourhood policing staff were anonymised and the researcher was not able to identify the participants from the returned forms. Unfortunately, a small number of participants returned their completed participant consent form with their completed questionnaire, even though they had been instructed to return them separately to maintain anonymity. Where this occurred the two forms were separated immediately. Therefore, at the point of analysis the researcher was unable to identify the participant, who remained anonymous.
The intelligence manager’s questionnaires were not initially anonymised as participants were requested to include their name at the top of page two, which could easily be removed at a later date. This request was made as intelligence managers were also being asked to participate in semi-structured interviews and the researcher wished to pursue in more depth some of the questions contained in the intelligence manager’s questionnaire. The researcher also wished to compare and contrast the answers provided by the intelligence managers in the questionnaire and the interview. Page two containing the name of the participant was removed from the rest of the questionnaire as soon as was practicable after the interviews had taken place.

Hard copies of the completed questionnaires were stored in a secure office, which was also protected by a burglar alarm system. Data transferred from the questionnaires for computer statistical analysis and thematic analysis was stored on a secure Universal Serial Bus (USB) flash drive (or memory stick), which was placed in a secure safe when not being used. The personal computer used for the analysis was also password protected (Bulmer, 1982).

The questions in the questionnaires were related to the participants work as a public official and not to their personal life, thus this research was not considered to be sensitive. The questionnaire was completed by the participants at a location (or setting) convenient to them. The information provided by the participants in the questionnaires was not disseminated or discussed with others and the findings of this research were presented so that no individual could be identified. Thus, the privacy, confidentiality and anonymity of the participants were ensured for this part of the research process (Diener and Crandall, 1978; Mertens, 2005; Wiles et al, 2008).

In relation to the semi-structured interviews with intelligence managers, all requests to participate and all follow up enquiries in relation to the interviews were made via the
South Wales Police internal e-mail system. Similar security issues in relation to e-mails were considered to those for the self-completion questionnaires.

Face to face semi-structured interviews were conducted with 21 intelligence managers and thus anonymity was not possible, as the researcher had direct contact with the participants (Mertens, 2005). However, every effort was made to protect the participants’ anonymity from any other third party.

The interviews were tape recorded with the consent of the participants. Where consent was not given, field notes of the conversation were made at the conclusion of the interview. Field notes were not made contemporaneously as this would have interfered with the flow of the semi-structured nature of the interviews. The interviews were analysed and also compared with the answers from the intelligence managers' questionnaires. Each micro cassette tape was then coded to reflect an interview with an intelligence manager (i.e. IMI 1, IMI 2, IMI 3, etc.). No reference to the intelligence managers’ names were made in the research findings. The micro cassette tapes were also stored in a secure safe when not being used and the field notes were stored in a secure office, protected by a burglar alarm system (Bulmer, 1982).

As with the questions in the questionnaire, the interview questions were work related and thus not considered sensitive. The interviews were conducted in police offices at or near to each participant’s place of work. Dissemination of the information provided was restricted so that no individual could be identified. The privacy, confidentiality and anonymity of the participants was again ensured for this part of the research process (Diener and Crandall, 1978; Mertens, 2005; Wiles et al, 2008).

**Deception**

Bryman (2012: 143) suggests that; ‘Deception occurs when researchers represent their work as something other than what it is’. Spicker (2011) argues that deception is often
confused with covert research and many of the objections to covert research are actually objections to deception. Spicker (2011: 119) defines covert research as; ‘... research which is not disclosed to the subject - where the researcher does not reveal that research is taking place’ and by contrast defines deception in a similar manner to Bryman (2012) as follows: ‘Deception, by contrast, occurs where the nature of a researcher’s action is misrepresented to the research subject’.

In this research, the researcher did not misrepresent his actions to the research subjects, did not represent his work as something it was not and there was no intent to deceive. Informed consent can assist in minimising deception, but it is not always possible to provide prospective participants with all the details of the research. See the Informed Consent section above. Therefore, no form of deception was intentionally used in any of the components of this research.

**Political Considerations**

Political considerations differ from the ethical considerations described above as they are concerned with the substance and use of the research rather than with the research methods used. Hammersley (1995: 103) suggests that there are two main ways in which research may be seen as political; firstly through the ‘exercise of power’ and secondly through the ‘making of value judgements’ and the action taken as a result of those judgements. Hammersley argues that the exercise of power can be seen from two opposing perspectives. The first perspective concerns researchers and research institutions maintaining their autonomy from external powers, such as the state and others in society with power and influence. The second perspective concerns the power exercised by researchers and research institutions themselves, where the research or knowledge itself is power. Hamersley (1995: 109) also argues that the making of value judgements also has a political aspect, as research cannot be totally value free or neutral as it is influenced by the quest for knowledge and the social, political and economic conditions, and intellectual presuppositions of the time.
Unlike ethical considerations there is no professional code of conduct for political issues, but it is generally accepted that the researcher’s political views should not be allowed to interfere with or influence the research. During the course of this research the researcher was aware of the political issues to be considered and made every effort to minimise their effect on this research.

Research can also be undertaken and used to advise central government on policy issues, which can ultimately lead to changes in legislation. Thus, in this respect political considerations may also be linked to legal considerations.

**Legal Considerations**

In addition to the ethical and political considerations above, attention was also given to the legal considerations associated with consent, privacy, confidentiality and anonymity. Wiles et al (2004: 8) argue that; ‘Article 8 of The Human Rights Act 1998 and the Data Protection Act 1998 have relevance to consent in relation to all research’.

Article 8 (Right to Respect for Private and Family Life) of the Human Rights Act 1998 (Home Office, 1998c: 24) and the European Convention on Human Rights (Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) (Council of Europe, 2010: 10-11) states that; ‘Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence’. Thus, privacy is regarded as one of the most fundamental rights of an individual, which is protected by legislation.

The Data Protection Act 1998 (Home Office, 1998b: 47) also outlines eight statutory principles for the processing of personal data to ensure that; it is processed for a lawful purpose, it is adequate, relevant, not excessive, accurate, timely and necessary, and that it is managed to prevent unauthorised or unlawful processing, accidental loss,
destruction and damage. Therefore, these statutory principles serve not only to protect an individual’s privacy, but also their confidentiality and anonymity.

In summary, having given careful thought to the ethical, political and legal considerations above, this research will adopt a pragmatic situational approach to ethics, whilst still taking into consideration the four main ethical principles of harm to participants, informed consent, privacy and deception (Diener and Crandall, 1978), the main political issues of power and values (Hammersley, 1995), and the legal issues associated with freedom, privacy and confidentiality (Home Office, 1998b; 1998c). Concerted efforts were made during the course of this research to reduce the harm to participants, to gain informed consent where appropriate, to ensure the privacy, confidentiality and anonymity of participants and subjects, and to nullify all forms of deception, whilst operating within the associated human rights and data protection legislation.

However, there are other considerations that have to be taken into account such as, the validity, reliability and objectivity of the research, which may also have ethical implications. Gorard (2010: 247) suggests that the ‘quality of the research’, the ‘robustness of the findings’ and the ‘security of the conclusions drawn’ are key ethical considerations for researchers, particularly for publicly funded research.

**Validity, Reliability and Objectivity**

The terms validity, reliability and objectivity are generally associated with the quantitative research methodology, and quantitative research methods and designs (Bryman, 2012). However, a number of researchers (e.g. Kirk and Miller, 1986; Mason; 2002) have applied these traditional criteria to the qualitative research methodology, whilst others (e.g. Lincoln and Guba, 1985) argue that because they are grounded in quantitative research they are inappropriate for qualitative research and have proposed alternative criteria based on the concept of ‘trustworthiness’, which will be discussed in
more detail below (Lincoln and Guba, 1985: 290). Golafshani (2003) suggests that if traditional criteria such as validity and reliability are to be applied to qualitative research then they need to be redefined. Morse et al (2002) agree and argue that authors use different terminology for the same or similar criteria, which causes confusion and can undermine the issue of rigor in the research.

**Validity**

Bryman (2012: 47) suggests that; ‘Validity is concerned with the integrity of the conclusions that are generated from a piece of research’. Bryman (2012: 47-48) also identifies four main types of validity, namely; measurement validity, ecological validity, internal validity and external validity.

*Measurement validity* refers to whether an instrument devised to measure a concept actually does reflect the concept that it is measuring. Measurement validity is invariably linked to reliability as the measurement must also be stable and reliable for it to be valid (Campbell and Fiske, 1959; Neuman, 2000: Bryman, 2012). (See the section on *Reliability* below). The research instrument for the quantitative component of this research (the postal survey self-completion questionnaire) was piloted and a well-tested and widely used quantitative data analysis system, the IBM SPSS Version 20.0 for Microsoft Windows was used to analyse the data to improve the measurement validity.

*Ecological validity* is concerned with whether the findings from social research are applicable to people’s everyday lives in their natural social settings. The more the research interferes with those settings the more unnatural they become (Bryman, 2012). The postal survey self-completion questionnaires in this research were completed by each of the participants in a social setting chosen by them, with no interference from the researcher.
**Internal validity** relates to the causality or causal relationship between two variables (the independent variable and the dependent variable) and whether the researcher is confident that any conclusion derived from this relationship is genuine (Bryman, 2012). Consideration was given to the Hawthorne Effect, where participants modify their behaviour when they are aware that they are the subjects of a research study (Bramel and Friend, 1981; Olson et al, 2004). This behavioural change can affect the causality between variables and adversely affect the internal validity of a study. This can also manifest itself in participants providing answers to a self-completion questionnaire that they think the researcher wants to see, rather than providing open and honest answers. Randomisation is one factor that can assist in increasing internal validity, but care must be taken not to introduce too many controls, as the more controls put in place the more contrived the research becomes. Therefore, internal validity has to be balanced with external validity, which requires generalisability (Jupp, 1989).

**External validity** is concerned with whether the results of specific research can be generalised in the wider context of further research. Sampling methods are important to external validity, as for the results to be generalised the sample must be representative of the population studied (Bryman, 2012). Stratified random sampling (Bryman, 2012: 192-193) was considered the most valid sampling method for the large population group of local neighbourhood policing staff and provided a representative random sample from each stratum being studied. Triangulation can also increase the external validity of a research study by combining quantitative and qualitative research findings as a form of corroboration (Denzin, 1978). (See the sections on Sampling and Triangulation above). The generalisability of this research cannot be absolutely guaranteed, as the quantitative element of the research, which examined the relationship between local neighbourhood policing and community intelligence was undertaken with a specific police force, namely; South Wales Police. Priorities for the police service may change over time, due to internal or external influences, which may result in police forces having different priorities with a greater or lesser emphasis on local neighbourhood policing and
community intelligence. However, qualitative anecdotal evidence suggests that other police forces experience similar problems in relation to local neighbourhood policing and community intelligence, which increases the generalisability of this research. (See the section on Transferability below and Chapter 6: Discussion and Observations).

**Reliability**

Neuman (2000: 164) suggests that reliability ‘means that the numerical results produced by an indicator do not vary because of characteristics of the measurement process or measurement instrument itself’. Thus, if the same measurement instrument and process are used again, the numerical results obtained should be the same (Campbell and Fiske, 1959). As mentioned above reliability is linked to measurement validity and the same measures used to increase validity can be used to increase reliability. In order to increase reliability, the stability, representativeness and accuracy of the measurement was considered by piloting the postal survey self-completion questionnaires. Consideration was also given to the possibility that some respondents to the questionnaires may have provided answers to certain questions that toe the party line rather than give open and honest answers, particularly as the police service is a powerful authoritative organisation (Holdaway, 1983). However, there was no evidence from the critical analysis of the data to suggest that this had taken place. Thus, it is believed that the quantitative and qualitative data in this research is reliable and dependable. (See also the section on Dependability below and Chapter 6: Discussion and Observations).

**Objectivity**

Payne and Payne (2004: 152) describe objectivity as follows: ‘...as far as possible, researchers should remain distanced from what they study so findings depend on the nature of what was studied rather than on the personality, beliefs and values of the researcher ...’. Therefore, the researcher must try to remain objective and not allow personal biases to influence the research, whilst readers of the research must be confident that the researcher has constrained their personal prejudices (Payne and
Payne, 2004: 153). However, opponents to this view, suggest that complete objectivity is unattainable or inappropriate as researchers do not operate in isolation, but interact with and are influenced by others within the research setting (Scott and Marshall, 2009: 522). The researcher was aware of his personal values and biases, and how they may affect his objectivity when dealing with the quantitative components of this research. (See the Reflexivity section below).

The concept of ‘trustworthiness’ was proposed by Lincoln and Guba (1985: 290) to answer the question: ‘How can an inquirer persuade his or her audiences (including self) that the findings of an inquiry are worth paying attention to, worth taking account of?’ Lincoln and Guba (1985: 189) developed four aspects of trustworthiness for qualitative research, namely; credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability to parallel the four traditional quantitative research criteria of internal validity, external validity, reliability and objectivity respectively.

**Credibility**

*Credibility* refers to the accuracy of the researcher’s understanding and interpretation of an aspect of social reality and the acceptability of that account to others in that social setting (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Bryman, 2012). Techniques for internally validating credibility include, utilising well established research methods, random sampling, reciprocity (a mutually cooperative interaction between participants and researcher), respondent validation (where respondents or participants involved in the research, corroborate the researcher’s account) and triangulation (Webb et al, 1966; Bloor, 1978; Denzin, 1978; Harrison, MacGibbon and Morton, 2001; Shenton, 2004). (See the sections on *Triangulation* above). In this research the well-established qualitative research methods such as semi-structured interviews were utilised with the whole population group of intelligence managers. Care was taken to ensure that the semi-structured interviews were conducted at or near to the participants’ normal place of work.
**Transferability**

*Transferability* relates to the depth of the qualitative research findings produced by the researcher, which allows others to make judgements as to whether the findings are transferable to other social settings (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Bryman, 2012). Techniques for externally validating transferability include, thick descriptions to allow others to have a proper understanding of the phenomenon being studied (Geertz, 1973; Denzin, 1989; Harrison, MacGibbon and Morton, 2001). Rich thick descriptions were used in this research to enhance transferability. (See the section on *Rich Thick Descriptions* above). During the period of this research the researcher worked as a member of and the secretary to the All Wales Neighbourhood Policing Development Group and later the NPIA. This allowed the researcher to gain first-hand knowledge and evidence of the developments in neighbourhood policing and community intelligence throughout Wales and nationally. It was evident that the majority of police forces were experiencing similar problems to South Wales Police in implementing neighbourhood policing, particularly in relation to community intelligence. Therefore, the qualitative anecdotal evidence obtained at that time strongly supports the transferability (and generalisability) of this research. (See the sections on *Validity* (particularly *External Validity*) above and *Researcher Reflexivity* below, and Chapter 6: Discussion and Observations).

**Dependability**

*Dependability* refers to the researcher’s account of any changes that exist in the social setting being studied and responding to those changes in reality by modifying the research design. This involves the researcher keeping detailed records of every stage of the research process, including the formulation of the research question, the research methodology, methods and design, sampling procedures, transcripts of interviews, field notes, data analysis and the research findings (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Bryman, 2012). Dependability is closely related to credibility, thus ensuring credibility significantly helps
to ensure dependability (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). Techniques for ensuring the reliability and dependability of the research include, peer reviews, (where peers act as auditors during or at the end of the research to establish that all procedures have been followed correctly) and researcher reflexivity (Bryman, 2012). Detailed records of this research were maintained throughout the research process and this research will be subject to review as part of the Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) examination process. Reflexivity was also used as part of this research process. (See the section on Reflexivity below).

**Confirmability**

*Confirmability* is concerned with ensuring that the researcher remains as objective as possible and has not allowed their personal beliefs, values or biases to influence the conduct of the research or its findings, whilst recognising the subjective nature of qualitative research (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Bryman, 2012). Techniques for ensuring confirmability can be linked to the peer review (audit process) for ensuring dependability and a triangulation research design such as the one mentioned above (Denzin, 1978; Lincoln and Guba, 1985). Triangulation was also used in this context to reduce the effect of the researcher’s values and biases, and to ensure the findings were the result of the participants’ experiences and ideas, not the researcher’s personal preferences (Shenton, 2004: 72).

Following on from trustworthiness, Guba and Lincoln (1989: 245-250) also introduced the concept of ‘authenticity’, which is concerned with the quality of qualitative research and the wider implications of research on politics, but this concept has not been widely influential and still remains quite controversial in some quarters (Morse et al, 2002; Bryman, 2012).

Bryman, Becker and Sempik (2008) conducted a study to establish which of the criteria mentioned above was deemed by social policy researchers to be most appropriate for quantitative, qualitative and mixed methods research. Bryman, Becker and Sempik
(2008: 264-267) found that researchers believed that validity and reliability were the two most appropriate traditional criteria for both quantitative and qualitative research, whilst credibility was found to be the most appropriate alternative criteria for qualitative research. The majority of researchers (82.1 percent) considered that a combination of traditional and alternative criteria should be utilised for mixed methods research and over three quarters (76.5 percent) of researchers favoured utilising different criteria (traditional and alternative) for the quantitative and qualitative components of mixed methods research respectively (Bryman, Becker and Sempik, 2008: 268-269).

For the purpose of this research a combination of traditional (validity, reliability and objectivity) criteria and alternative (credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability) criteria was used to ensure the quality and robustness of the quantitative and qualitative components respectively.

**Reflexivity**

Guillemin and Gillam (2004: 274) describe reflexivity in research as ‘a process of critical reflection both on the kind of knowledge produced from research and how that knowledge is generated’. Hammersley and Atkinson (2007: 15) emphasis that ‘the production of knowledge by researchers has consequences’, in that publication of research findings can influence political and practical decision making, and may even ‘change the character of the situations that were studied’. They also argue that the orientations of the researcher are shaped by their socio-historical locations and they are not insulated from wider society or from their own biography and therefore, reflexivity is a ‘significant feature of social research’ (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007: 15).

Reflexivity allows the researcher to acknowledge and describe their socio-historical assumptions, beliefs, prejudices and values, and through this reflective self-awareness process, minimise identified biases as the research proceeds (Creswell and Miller, 2000: 127).
Pels (2000: 3) suggests that reflexivity adds another level or dimension of self-reference, which moves the research ‘one step up’. Lynch (2000: 34-35) disagrees and suggests that the term reflexivity has many different meanings and is often claimed as a ‘theoretical or methodological virtue’, taking the intellectual high ground. However, Lynch (2000: 35) also argues that there is very little evidence to suggest that contemporary research which includes reflexivity is of any greater value or authority than previous research which did not.

Finlay, (2002: 209) suggests that there are five variants of reflexivity; introspection, intersubjective reflection, mutual collaboration, social critique and discursive deconstruction. *Introspection* involves the use of the researcher’s own reflections, intuitions, thinking and experience as primary evidence for the research. *Intersubjective reflection* is concerned with the meanings emerging from the complex relationship dynamics between researcher and participants, and is more than mere reflection. *Mutual collaboration* occurs when the researcher and participants collaborate, and the participants become co-researchers sharing a reflexive dialogue. *Social critique* reflects on the management of the power imbalance between the researcher and the participants, taking into account issues such as, class, gender and race. *Discursive deconstruction* reflects on the ambiguity in the meaning of the language used in the research and how this is interpreted.

Watt (2007: 82) suggests that the researcher is the primary instrument for data collection and analysis, and thus reflexivity is essential. Therefore, for the purpose of this research, a more introspective reflexivity was used to reflect on the research process as a whole.

There are problems that can confront researchers in relation to reflexivity, such as the use of rhetoric to support biases, the outpouring of personal emotions, a cycle of deconstruction and reconstruction of elements within the research process and endless
self-criticism, which may lose all meaning to the reader (Finlay, 2002: 226). With this in mind it may be prudent to reflect on the following poem:

Reflexivity, like hypnotherapy, has various levels. Some dabble near the surface, dipping into reflexive moments, flirting with the images evoked in the reflection, before returning to the safety of the mundane. Others attempt to confront the fear of the monster lurking in the abyss by descending into the deeper realms of reflexivity. It is those who confront the beast who will truly know what is there, in the dark beyond. Reflect on this as you spin down down deep within.

(MacMillan, 1996: 29)

Researcher Reflexivity

I was employed by South Wales Police from July 1982 to July 2012 and was seconded to the NPIA from December 2008 to August 2010 inclusive. I carried out operational duties with South Wales Police at a BCU level, where I also undertook the role of Crime and Disorder Manager. At an organisational level I was involved in the introduction of Police Schools Liaison Officers, Drug and Alcohol Arrest Referral Schemes and Neighbourhood Policing throughout South Wales. I was also a member of the All Wales Neighbourhood Policing Development Group between October 2005 and December 2008. As a result of my work at a regional level, I was seconded to the NPIA where I was a Field Officer for the South West Region of England, which included Avon and Somerset Constabulary, Devon and Cornwall Constabulary, Dorset Police, Hampshire Constabulary, Thames Valley Police and Wiltshire Police. This role involved providing advice and guidance to chief police officers and senior project leads from the six regional police forces on all matters concerning local neighbourhood policing and confidence in the police. Since retiring from the Police Service in July 2012 I have been a part time PhD research student at the International Centre for Policing and Security (formally the Centre for Police Sciences), University of South Wales (formally the University of Glamorgan). Having served as a police officer for the majority of my adult life my values are strongly influenced by the morality of right and wrong, and a pragmatic and practical determination to resolve problems. I am aware that my values also impact on the rhetorical language used during all stages of this research.
One of the most important, if not the most important aspect of my 30 year police career with South Wales Police was working in partnership with residents and agencies in the local communities I served. I quickly realised in the early 1980’s that policing was more than just about the police and that community policing in partnership was the way forward. Unfortunately, this was not the general consensus within the management of the police service at that time. The emphasis was on police force rather than police service. All my initial attempts to introduce community policing fell on deaf ears and I was told by more than one police manager that community policing was not proper policing, it was “pink and fluffy” and instead I should be concentrating on “kicking doors in”. However, at every opportunity throughout my career, despite all the obstacles, I endeavoured to promote community policing, locally within South Wales Police, regionally across Wales and nationally throughout the UK. I believe in the ethos of community policing (and later neighbourhood policing), in that it is a style of policing to be adopted by all police officers and police staff, no matter what their role. I also believe in providing the best possible service to local communities and a service that communities want and not what the police think they want. Community engagement is the key to unlock the policing potential in communities.

In 2005 I was given the opportunity to work as part of a small team responsible for the implementation of neighbourhood policing into South Wales Police in a more structured manner. It was at this time that my interest in neighbourhood policing, community engagement and community intelligence really started to develop. From my previous experience as a BCU Crime and Disorder Manager, I was of the opinion that South Wales Police were not utilising the true potential of community intelligence in preventing and detecting crime and disorder. However, there was little evidence available to support my claim. With the introduction of dedicated neighbourhood policing teams across the South Wales area and their full implementation in April 2008, it provided a further opportunity to conduct research into what use is made of community intelligence to inform and direct
neighbourhood policing teams in the policing of their communities. This was the initial idea that resulted in the research question for this research.

I obtained permission from a chief officer at South Wales Police to conduct research based on my initial idea. A research proposal was submitted, accepted and given ethical approval. Thus, it was with my policing background and inherent beliefs, biases, prejudices and values that this journey began.

Summary and Discussion

This chapter described the research question, aim, objectives and rationale behind this research and explained in detail the mixed methods research methodology and design chosen for this research. This research adopted research methods from both the quantitative and qualitative methodologies (i.e. postal survey self-completion questionnaires and semi-structured interviews respectively) to address the research question (Johnson and Turner, 2003; Bryman, 2006).

The mixed methods research design included; the concurrent analysis and interpretation of data, the equal weighting of research methodology and methods, and the merging of data at the interpretation phase, utilising data from the two research methods mentioned above. Therefore, a mixed methods Triangulation Design: Convergence Model was considered to be the most appropriate research design for this research (Bryman, 2006; Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007).

Postal survey self-completion questionnaires were used to obtain quantitative and qualitative data from a sample of 414 local neighbourhood policing staff and a population of 60 intelligence managers, which provided response rates of 23.4 and 33.3 percent respectively. In addition, semi-structured interviews were used to obtain qualitative data from the same population of 60 intelligence managers, which provided a response rate of 35.0 percent. Rich thick descriptions were used to enhance the findings from the semi-
structured interviews and the concept of the *inside-insider* and the *outside-insider* researcher (Brown, 1996) was discussed in relation to the researcher.

Stratified random sampling (Bryman, 2012) was considered the most appropriate sampling method for this research in relation to the sample of 414 local neighbourhood policing staff, which provided a random sample from each stratum of neighbourhood sergeants, NBMs, PCSOs and special constables. Due to the relatively small number of intelligence managers, the whole population group of 60 intelligence managers was used in this research. Data analysis was undertaken concurrently, with quantitative data being analysed using the IBM SPSS Version 20.0 and qualitative data using thematic analysis (Bryman, 2012).

The ethical, political and legal considerations were examined together with the internal validity, external validity, reliability and objectivity of the quantitative methods and the credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability of the qualitative methods employed in this research (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Bryman, 2012). A process of critical reflection or reflexivity on the knowledge produced by this research was undertaken, where the researcher also provided a personal account of the researcher’s reflexivity (Guillemin and Gillam, 2004; Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007).
Chapter 5: Research Findings

Introduction

*What use is made of community intelligence in informing and directing local neighbourhood policing in South Wales?*

These research findings are concerned with the responses of the local neighbourhood policing staff and the intelligence managers who took part in the postal survey self-completion questionnaire and the intelligence managers who took part in the semi-structured interviews in relation to intelligence and policing systems, policing in context, the police application of intelligence and community engagement, intelligence and cohesion to answer the research question above. See Chapter 6: Discussion and Observations for a critical discussion on the research findings.

Postal Survey Self-Completion Questionnaires and Semi-Structured Interviews

Each participant in the Local Neighbourhood Policing Questionnaire (LNPQ) was assigned a unique reference number to protect their privacy, confidentiality and anonymity, for example; LNPQ 1, LNPQ 2, LNPQ 3 through to LNPQ 97. Similarly, each participant in the Intelligence Managers Questionnaire (IMQ) was assigned a unique reference number, for example; IMQ 1, IMQ 2, IMQ 3 through to IMQ 20.

Each participant in the Intelligence Managers Interview (IMI) was also assigned a unique reference number, to correspond with their IMQ unique reference number, for example; IMI 2 and IMQ 2 relate to the same participant. Where the participants only completed a questionnaire they are referred to by their IMQ unique reference number, i.e. IMQ 1, IMQ 7, IMQ 8, IMQ 9 and IMQ 10. Where participants only took part in an interview they are referred to by their IMI unique reference number, i.e. IMI 21, IMI 22, IMI 23, IMI 24, IMI 25 and IMI 26. The fifteen respondents who took part in the interview and completed
the questionnaire are referred to by both their IMI and IMQ unique reference numbers when referring to the semi-structured interviews, for example; IMI 3 (IMQ 3).

**Intelligence and Policing Systems**

This section considers intelligence and the policing systems utilised to process intelligence from the viewpoint of local neighbourhood policing staff and intelligence managers. The findings below were obtained by analysing both quantitative and qualitative data from the local neighbourhood policing staff and intelligence managers’ questionnaires and qualitative data from the intelligence managers’ interviews.

**Community Intelligence**

The academic literature associated with intelligence tends to separate community intelligence from criminal intelligence and in some instances introduce further categories, for example; Criminal Intelligence, Crime Intelligence, Community Intelligence and Contextual Intelligence (Innes, Fielding and Cope, 2005: 44). The police service in general has followed the academic stance and now speaks in terms of criminal and community intelligence. See Chapter 3: Intelligence and its Policing Applications for a discussion on criminal and community intelligence.

South Wales Police has also chosen to separate community and criminal intelligence and defines community intelligence as follows: ‘Community intelligence is ‘local information’ which, when assessed, provides intelligence on issues that affects neighbourhoods’ (Dodd, 2008a: 3; 2008b: 2, South Wales Police, 2010: 3; 2012a: 3).

When asked via the questionnaire, what they considered to be community intelligence, local neighbourhood policing staff provided the following main key themes: ‘Information’; ‘Gathered or received’; ‘Community or locality’; ‘Crime or criminality’; ‘Anti-Social Behaviour (ASB) or disorder’; ‘People or places’ and ‘Other issues’. Thus, collectively local neighbourhood policing staff consider community intelligence to be;
information that is gathered or received from a community or locality on crime, criminality, ASB, disorder and other issues in relation to people and places.

The same consideration of community intelligence by intelligence managers revealed the following main key themes: ‘Information’; ‘Provided or received’; ‘Community or locality’; ‘ASB or disorder’; ‘Other issues or trends’; ‘Impact of threat, harm and risk’ and ‘Quality of life’. Thus, collectively intelligence managers consider community intelligence to be; information that is provided or received from a community or locality on ASB, disorder, quality of life issues, other issues and trends, which can be used to assess the impact of the threat, harm and risk on a community.

Both these considerations have similar key themes. However, the intelligence managers have reduced the significance of crime and criminality, and given more prominence to quality of life issues and the assessment of threat, harm and risk. Interestingly, local neighbourhood policing staff consider crime and criminality to be a significant factor of community intelligence.

In addition intelligence managers were interviewed in relation to community intelligence using semi-structured interviews, which were based on the following interview question; ‘What do you consider to be the difference, if any, between community intelligence and criminal intelligence?’

Generally, local policing inspectors tended to differentiate between community intelligence and criminal intelligence, and were able to provide their understanding of the differences. Other intelligence managers, mainly from the four BCU Intelligence Units, generally tend not to differentiate between the two, as once identified as intelligence, it all goes through the same intelligence process. However, there are widespread differences of opinion amongst intelligence managers as to what constitutes community intelligence. One local policing inspector stated that;
"... community intelligence is more about the vibe of the community and what is happening within the community" (IMI 2 (IMQ 2))

Another local policing inspector suggests that;

"... community intelligence ... can be linked to crime, but it’s not about crime, it’s about the community, it’s about community tensions, about what’s going on in the community. And whilst crime is important, it isn’t the be all and end all ... we may pat each other on the back because our crime rate is down, detections are up, that kind of stuff, but the community may not feel that way, what may be important to them is ASB issues, maybe race hate issues or whatever". (IMI 4 (IMQ 4))

One intelligence manager (IMI 11 (IMQ 11)) from within a BCU Intelligence Unit found it very difficult to distinguish between community and criminal intelligence as they felt it was dependent on what was happening in the BCU at the time. Another Intelligence Unit based intelligence manager (IMI 21) did not distinguish between community and criminal intelligence and highlighted the issue of personal perception when defining community intelligence.

A further intelligence manager (IMI 23) suggested that they did not distinguish between community and criminal intelligence, but differentiated intelligence by the source of the intelligence, its reliability and how it is dealt with. They placed greater emphasis and reliability on Dedicated Source Unit (DSU) CHIS led intelligence than community intelligence from CrimeStoppers and members of the public via police staff. They also added that community intelligence would not be actioned if it was uncorroborated, whereas they would take more of a risk with a known CHIS, even if the intelligence was not corroborated. A different view was expressed by another Intelligence Unit based intelligence manager (IMI 6 (IMQ 6)) who suggests that community intelligence drives policing on a day to day basis.
Criminal Intelligence

When asked what they considered to be criminal intelligence, local neighbourhood policing staff provided the following main key themes: ‘Information’; ‘Gathered or received’; ‘Crime or criminality’ and ‘Nominals or Persistent and Prolific Offenders (PPOs)’. Thus, collectively local neighbourhood policing staff consider criminal intelligence to be; *information that is gathered or received on crime, criminality, nominals and PPOs.*

The same consideration of criminal intelligence by intelligence managers revealed the following main key themes; ‘Information’; ‘Provided or received’; ‘Crime or criminal activity’ and ‘Nominals or PPOs’. Thus, collectively intelligence managers consider criminal intelligence to be; *information that is provided or received on crime, criminal activity, nominals and PPOs.*

Both these considerations are very similar, which suggests that there is little disagreement between local neighbourhood policing staff and intelligence managers as to what constitutes criminal intelligence. It appears that there is greater agreement on the understanding of criminal intelligence by local neighbourhood policing staff and intelligence managers compared to community intelligence, which intelligence managers, particularly LIOs find hard to define.

In addition intelligence managers were interviewed in relation to criminal intelligence using semi-structured interviews, which were based on the following interview question; ‘What do you consider to be the difference, if any, between community intelligence and criminal intelligence?’

Some of the difficulties being experienced by intelligence managers in distinguishing between community and criminal intelligence have been highlighted above. However,
intelligence managers were able to define criminal intelligence in more specific terms. For example, one intelligence manager defined criminal intelligence as follows:

"I think that criminal intelligence is more about intelligence related to crimes and the criminals that commit them, criminals associates ... their vehicles, anything that paints a picture of crime in the area and who’s committing the crime, the reasons for that." (IMI 17 (IMQ 17))

Similarly, another intelligence manager (IMI 22) suggested that criminal intelligence also included building up a picture of the lifestyle of known criminals.

**Recording Community and Criminal Intelligence**

Respondents were asked how they recorded community and criminal intelligence during their day to day activities and were requested to select the appropriate answers from a list of the most probable responses, i.e. ‘National Intelligence Report’, ‘Intelligence Blog/Log’, ‘Neighbourhood Profile’, ‘Station Intelligence Log Book’, ‘Pocket Note Book’, ‘Keep intelligence in your head’, ‘All of the above’ and ‘Other (please specify)’.

**Recording Community Intelligence**

The most popular method of recording community intelligence by local neighbourhood policing staff was to record the intelligence in their personal Pocket Note Books (77.3 percent), followed by the NIR (72.1 percent) and the Community Intelligence Diary (commonly referred to as the Intelligence Blog or Log) (70.1 percent). Just over half (50.5 percent) of local neighbourhood policing staff utilised all three of these methods of recording community intelligence. A small number of staff (6.1 percent) indicated that they utilised all six main methods of recording community intelligence. The 36 respondents (37.1 percent) who indicated that they kept intelligence in their head also utilised at least one other method of recording community intelligence. One respondent (LNPQ 76) who used this method did not utilise the other main methods of recording community intelligence, but recorded it on ‘sector briefing’ documents. Those respondents who recorded community intelligence on Neighbourhood Profiles (18.5
percent) or in the old style Station Intelligence Log Book (5.1 percent) also utilised the other available methods of recording intelligence. Of the 12 respondents (12.3 percent) who indicted 'Other', only one respondent (LNPQ 11) did not utilise any of the other available methods of recording community intelligence and specified that they passed the intelligence to their NBM (constable) or PCSO to record. Others in this group specified that they recorded community intelligence on partnership and neighbourhood watch briefing documents, on ourbobby.com, on newsletters and on BlackBerry Logs (NICHE Record Management System (RMS) occurrences).

The most popular methods of recording community intelligence by intelligence managers were on NIRs (85.0 percent) and on the Intelligence Blog/Log (80.0 percent). Half (50.0 percent) of the intelligence managers recorded community intelligence in their Pocket Note Books and only one local policing inspector (IMQ 14) indicated that they used all six main methods of recording community intelligence. A half (50.0 percent) of the local policing inspectors also recorded community intelligence on their Neighbourhood Profiles. Six (30.0 percent) of the intelligence managers indicated that they recorded community intelligence in other ways, including using covert methods (IMQ 6), on e-mails (IMQ 10), on intelligence bulletins (IMQ 18) and on briefing and tasking documents (IMQ 7; IMQ 8; IMQ 18).

It would appear that intelligence managers are more likely to record community intelligence on a more accessible and searchable NIR or Intelligence Blog/Log compared to local neighbourhood policing staff who are more likely to record it in their less accessible personal Pocket Note Books.

In addition, intelligence managers were interviewed in relation to the recording of community intelligence using semi-structured interviews, which were based on the following interview questions; ‘How do staff record community intelligence?’, ‘Is that
different to the way they record criminal intelligence?’ and ‘Do you think that all community intelligence is recorded?’

**Issues in Recording Community Intelligence**

The majority of intelligence managers confirmed that the community intelligence submitted by police staff is mainly recorded on a NIR via the NICHE RMS in the same way that criminal intelligence is submitted and recorded. One LIO advised;

"Right, right, all intelligence is submitted via NICHE and via an intelligence log. That is submitted to us via NICHE, via a task that’s sent into the LIO Inbox and then we look at it, we process it, we link it to make sure it appears on NICHE and then we, if it’s relevant then we would send tasks or e-mails to whoever it may affect." (IMI 20 (IMQ 20))

However, when asked if community intelligence was submitted on a NIR, one intelligence manager based in a BCU Intelligence Unit showed their frustration with the current intelligence process and lack of Intelligence Unit staff, when they replied;

"Very little, we try to discourage it. Purely down to the number of intelligence logs that we prioritise that need to go [on] the system and we run, we run, the backlog of 500 logs that aren’t on the system, I don’t think they should be going on there. So, so we run a quite strict priority list of what goes on first; medium, high and low priority, who puts them on, what time scales they have to get things off. You then get to the low ones which we would like to get on within a week, but sometimes that’s not achievable, you know. The figures, as I remember it went from December last year [2012], towards the end of last year [2012], eight, nine hundred maybe a thousand intelligence logs a month. In May [2013], fifteen hundred intelligence logs a month. That’s a fifty percent increase in the workload coming through. So we’ve been successful in one way, people are putting intelligence logs in. We have also gone out and got people to make sure they were quality, they meet the intelligence requirement and most coming [in] were in the correct format ... and people had made enquiries and all that sort of stuff. But then just the quantity coming through, just …” (IMI 11 (IMQ 11))

This view was supported by a local policing inspector (IMI 13 (IMQ 13)) from a different BCU. A number of intelligence managers also indicated that due to the volume of work and lack of Intelligence Unit staff they had become office bound and in some cases worked from a centralised office within a BCU. This arrangement restricted their engagement with police staff and partner agencies and removed the localised aspect of their work.
Intelligence managers based in BCU Intelligence Units also receive community intelligence from partner agencies in a variety of ways including by e-mail and by telephone. LIOs then have to create a NIR from the intelligence provided by the partner agency.

Some police staff also attempt to submit community intelligence to the Intelligence Units via e-mail or record it on a NICHE RMS occurrence for the incident they are dealing with, but this process is not accepted by intelligence managers from the BCU Intelligence Units and is returned to the original member of staff for the submission of a NIR, so that it can be properly recorded and actioned.

Intelligence managers also receive intelligence from the community via anonymous police hotlines and from CrimeStoppers. One intelligence manager (IMI 23) considers all intelligence from CrimeStoppers as community intelligence as the source is community oriented, but is cautious about its use and any subsequent action because it is derived from an unknown anonymous source.

The Use of the Community Intelligence Diary

The South Wales Police Community Intelligence Diary is also referred to as the Community Information Diary, the Community Intelligence Blog and the Intelligence Blog. The initial concept behind the Community Intelligence Diary was that community intelligence received or gathered by police staff would be entered onto a dedicated NICHE RMS occurrence for a particular area or sector. The intelligence would then be monitored by supervisory sergeants, the sector or local policing inspector and the LIO to determine if further intelligence was required or action could be taken in relation to the existing intelligence as part of the NIM process.
It would appear that the Community Intelligence Diary has limited use in two of the four BCUs. The limited of use of the Community Intelligence Diary was confirmed by one intelligence manager who also offered a possible explanation for their lack of use as a result of internal auditing:

"I don’t believe they are, no. I’ve got a feeling the [Name] Sector used them for longer than [Sector] did, but I know we did this discussion in the office the other day about, there’s been a review of it or there is an ongoing review into intelligence from headquarters and they’re looking at the whole process of it and basically they want for us and LIOs to be accountable about what we’ve done with a piece of intelligence. Now they are saying for every single piece of intelligence that’s been submitted there should be an audit trail as to what we’ve done with it. Now a lot of intelligence used to go onto the Blog because it’s not actually actionable intelligence, but it is of benefit for officers to know, exactly. So we had this discussion in that the Blogs aren’t looked at or used anymore. (IMI 22)

In the two BCUs where the Community Intelligence Diary is used more frequently there appears to be some confusion as to what should be entered on the Diary and what should be submitted on a NIR.

"Yeah, they do use the Blog, but again that is more geared to criminal intelligence as opposed to community intelligence.” (IMI 2 (IMQ 2))

"Criminal intelligence should come in on a National Intelligence Record on, Report on NICHE. Then it should be properly graded, sanitised and linked onto NICHE. That’s down to all the LIOs when it comes in, to assess it and then decide whether we should keep it. Some of the stuff we get in is of no value, so they send it back and say this is community intelligence put it on the community Blog”. (IMI 11 (IMQ 11))

A number of intelligence managers including (IMI 12 (IMQ 12)), (IMI 16 (IMQ 16)), (IMI 21) and (IMI 23) suggested that the volume of intelligence being submitted and the lack of intelligence management staff to monitor the Community Intelligence Diary appears to be an issue in all four BCUs. The issue of the content and the quality of the intelligence or information entered on the Community Intelligence Diary is also causing some intelligence managers concern and is affecting their monitoring of it and its continued use by police staff.
“There, yes, there is the NICHE occurrence. What I tend to find with them they tend to be used [more] by the PCSOs than anybody else. A lot of it is a lot of things that are on there are things like sightings of Joe Bloggs walking down the street and things like that. What we, again what we [were] encouraging PCSOs to do when it was first set up, was if it is an intelligence issue for that to be submitted on a NIR. My own personal view of that Blog is it, it becomes unwieldy, it’s one occurrence that’s set up, alright renewed every so often, but there’s reams and reams of information on there that some of it is, you can’t pick the wheat from the chaff out of it that’s the problem with it. There’s too much information on there.” (IMI 20 (IMQ 20))

**Recording All Community Intelligence**

There was a general agreement by intelligence managers across all four BCUs that not all community intelligence is recorded. As one intelligence manager put it;

“It would be nice to, but the reality is we just can’t cope with the amount of intelligence that is coming in. So then it’s a matter of putting that somewhere accessible, but it doesn’t need all the rigmarole of, that goes into putting something onto the intelligence network”. (IMI 11 (IMQ 11))

This again highlighted the potential use of the Community Intelligence Diary as a repository for community intelligence that is considered to be of no immediate value by Intelligence Unit staff, particularly LIOs. Other issues in relation to the willingness and competence of staff to record all community intelligence were highlighted by intelligence managers.

There are also some discrepancies between BCU intelligence managers as to the amount of community intelligence that is recorded, ranging from smaller to significant amounts of intelligence.

**Recording Criminal Intelligence**

A similar picture emerged for the recording of criminal intelligence by local neighbourhood policing staff. The most popular method of recording criminal intelligence was to record the intelligence in personal Pocket Note Books (79.3 percent), followed by the NIR (78.3 percent) and the Intelligence Blog/Log (63.9 percent). This shows a slight increase in the recording of criminal intelligence in Pocket Note Books and NIR compared
to community intelligence, but a decrease of 6.1 percent in the recording of criminal intelligence on the Intelligence Blog/Log. Just under half (49.4 percent) of local neighbourhood policing staff utilised all three of these methods of recording criminal intelligence, which equates to only a 1.0 percent decrease in the use of these methods.

The most popular method of recording criminal intelligence by the vast majority (90.0 percent) of intelligence managers was to use a NIR. The second most popular method of recording criminal intelligence by intelligence managers was the Intelligence Blog/Log (65.0 percent). When compared to the recording of community intelligence on the Intelligence Blog/Log there is a 15.0 percent decrease in the recording of criminal intelligence. Just under a third (30.0 percent) of the local policing inspectors also recorded criminal intelligence on their Neighbourhood Profiles. Again, six (30.0 percent) of the intelligence managers also indicated that they recorded criminal intelligence in other ways, including using covert methods (IMQ6), on sector briefing boards (IMQ15), on intelligence bulletins (IMQ18) and on briefing and tasking documents (IMQ7; IMQ8; IMQ18).

Interestingly, nearly two-thirds of local neighbourhood policing staff (63.9 percent) and intelligence managers (65.0 percent) utilise the Intelligence Blog/Log to record criminal intelligence, which was originally designed as a Community Intelligence or Information Diary and is referred to by both terms in the South Wales Police Community Intelligence Policy (South Wales Police, 2010; 2012a). Of further interest is that both local neighbourhood policing staff and intelligence managers keep a certain amount of community and criminal intelligence in their heads that they do not share with others. It would also appear that some criminal intelligence is recorded onto the Neighbourhood Profile database, which is a less secure intranet based system, than the secure and monitored NICHE RMS.
Sharing Community and Criminal Intelligence

Over half (58.7 percent) of the local neighbourhood policing staff indicated that they shared community intelligence ‘all the time’, with 40.2 percent, only sharing community intelligence ‘sometimes’. Only one FLSO (LNPQ 35) stated that they never shared community intelligence because in their role they rarely receive community intelligence. Similarly, all 20 intelligence managers indicated that they either shared community intelligence ‘all the time’ (60.0 percent) or ‘sometimes’ (40.0 percent). Only local policing inspectors and LIOs did not share community intelligence ‘all the time’.

However, to put this into perspective, only one detective inspector, one detective sergeant and one FIO responded to the questionnaire.

A similar number (58.3 percent) of the local neighbourhood policing staff who responded to this question (Q6) indicated that they would share criminal intelligence ‘all the time’, with 40.6 percent, only sharing criminal intelligence ‘sometimes’. Therefore, local neighbourhood policing staff are just as likely to share criminal intelligence as they are community intelligence. Only one FLSO (LNPQ 35) stated that they never shared criminal intelligence because it was not applicable to their role and one constable (LNPQ 92) did not respond to this question (Q6) in the questionnaire.

Again all 20 intelligence managers indicated that they either shared criminal intelligence ‘all the time’ or ‘sometimes’. However, in this case 40.0 percent of intelligence mangers shared criminal intelligence ‘all the time’, whilst 60.0 percent only shared criminal intelligence ‘sometimes’. Thus, none of the intelligence mangers ‘never’ shared either community or criminal intelligence. It would also appear that intelligence managers are more likely to share community intelligence ‘all the time’ rather than criminal intelligence.

Local neighbourhood policing staff were asked to explain why they shared community and criminal intelligence, whilst intelligence managers were asked to explain how they
shared community and criminal intelligence. Their responses were analysed and several key themes identified. Some of these key themes were found to have a greater frequency and thus were more significant than others.

In response to why they shared community intelligence local neighbourhood policing staff indicated that they did so in order to update ‘other police staff’ and ‘partner agencies’, to assist with ‘planning and targeting’, to obtain a ‘bigger picture’ of what was happening in that community, to ‘increase knowledge’ and to ‘improve policing’.

Similarly, local neighbourhood policing staff indicated that they shared criminal intelligence in order to update ‘other police staff’ and ‘partner agencies’, to assist with ‘planning and targeting’, to obtain a ‘bigger picture’ of what was happening in that community, to ‘increase knowledge and understanding’, to highlight ‘crime and criminal activity’ and to assist in the ‘prevention and reduction’ of crime.

Although, the key themes are very similar for both community and criminal intelligence, there is more emphasis on sharing criminal intelligence to highlight ‘crime and criminal activity’ and to assist in the ‘prevention and reduction’ of crime than on ‘improve policing’.

In response to how they shared community intelligence, intelligence managers indicated that they did so via ‘intelligence bulletins and briefings’, ‘partner agencies’, ‘e-mails’ and ‘meetings and other forums’. Similarly, intelligence managers indicated that they shared criminal intelligence via ‘intelligence bulletins and briefings’, ‘partner agencies’, ‘information sharing protocols’, ‘other police departments’, ‘national intelligence reports’ and ‘e-mails’.

Thus, it appears that the sharing of criminal intelligence by intelligence managers is more formalised than with community intelligence, as ‘information sharing protocols’ and ‘national intelligence reports’ are given more significance. The sharing of criminal
intelligence with ‘other police departments’ is also given more importance and the informal sharing of intelligence at ‘meetings and other forums’ less significance.

**Obtaining Community Intelligence**

Local neighbourhood policing staff were asked how they obtained community intelligence and were requested to select all the appropriate answers from a list of the most probable responses, i.e. ‘Engagement with the community’, ‘NSPIS Incidents’, ‘NICHE Occurrences’, ‘Local Intelligence Officers’, ‘Briefings’, ‘Tasking and Coordinating Groups’, ‘Partners’, ‘All of the above’ and ‘Other (please specify)’.

The most popular method of obtaining community intelligence by local neighbourhood policing staff was by ‘Engagement with the community’ (57.7 percent), followed by gaining intelligence from ‘Partners’ (53.6 percent). The other main methods were obtaining community intelligence from ‘NICHE Occurrences’ (45.3 percent) and from ‘Briefings’ (42.2 percent). Just over a quarter (27.8 percent) indicated that they obtained community intelligence from LIOs. Over two-fifths (41.2 percent) of respondents indicated that they utilised all seven main methods of obtaining community intelligence. A small number of staff (6.1 percent) gave the response of ‘Other’, but all six respondents also obtained community intelligence by at least three other methods. Four of the six also indicated that they used all seven main methods of obtaining community intelligence. Other methods of obtaining community intelligence included utilising Facebook (LNPQ 51) and CrimeStoppers (LNPQ 61).

Intelligence Managers were asked how they obtained community intelligence and were requested to select all the appropriate answers from a list of the most probable responses, i.e. ‘Engagement with the community’, ‘NSPIS Incidents’, ‘NICHE Occurrences’, ‘Local Intelligence Blogs’, ‘Briefings’, ‘Tasking and Coordinating Groups’, ‘Partners’, ‘Social Media Sites’, ‘All of the above’ and ‘Other (please specify)’. 
The most popular individual method adopted by intelligence managers for obtaining community intelligence was researching the NICHE RMS (40.0 percent). This was followed by researching the NSPIS Command and Control System (35.0 percent) and obtaining intelligence from ‘Partners’ (35.0 percent). More than half (60.0 percent) of intelligence managers indicated that they used all of the eight main methods of obtaining community intelligence. The two managers who indicated that they also use other methods to obtain community intelligence specified; ‘liaising with community staff’ (i.e. local neighbourhood policing staff) (IMQ 6) and ‘attending forums and monitoring the news’ (IMQ 13). Unsurprisingly, the intelligence managers did not engage with the community to obtain community intelligence as much as the local neighbourhood policing staff.

The option of ‘Social Media Sites’ was not added to the local neighbourhood policing staff questionnaire as access to social media sites for staff is restricted by South Wales Police. It was added to the intelligence managers questionnaire as certain nominated managers within the BCU Intelligence Units do have official access to social media sites, but the number and role of the manager can vary from one BCU to another. Generally this responsibility would lie with nominated LIOs. However, from these findings it would appear that individual local neighbourhood policing staff (LNPQ 51) and intelligence managers (IMQ 5) are using social media sites, possibly privately, to obtain community intelligence as they do not have official access and are unable to login via South Wales Police computer terminals in the workplace.

South Wales Police has a Social Networking Policy (South Wales Police, 2012b), which was only introduced in August 2012 towards the end of the postal survey questionnaire distribution period (April 2012 to September 2012) and just prior to the semi-structured interviews with intelligence managers (December 2012 to July 2013). The Social Networking Policy (South Wales Police, 2012b: 2) is divided into two main sections; the Personal Use of Social Networks and the Official Use of Social Networks.
The *Personal Use of Social Networks* is further subdivided into; ‘Personal use of SNs [Social Networks] by SWP [South Wales Police] personnel and officers during work time’ and ‘Personal use of SNs by SWP personnel and officers during their own time and using their own resources’. The personal use of social media during work time is strictly forbidden and it is strongly recommended that staff do not identify themselves as South Wales Police employees when using social media in their own time as the ‘safety and security of SWP, its operational effectiveness and assets are paramount’ (South Wales Police, 2012b: 3).

The *Official Use of Social Networks* is also subdivided into the ‘Use of SNs as a communication tool’ and the ‘Use of SNs by SWP personnel for legitimate investigative or research purposes’. South Wales Police assert that the use of social media to communicate with the public must be achieved via their primary and official internet site maintained by the Corporate Communications Department. Any request for a secondary official site must be supported by the Corporate Communications Department and approved by the Information Security Board (South Wales Police, 2012b: 4-5). Requests for access to social media sites for work based research requires the same support and approval as above (South Wales Police, 2012b: 6).

South Wales Police also assert that legitimate investigations, specifically intelligence gathering can only be conducted by specially trained and accredited police personnel, and all their enquiries must be recorded.

*It is a national recommendation that only officers who have attained RITES (Researching Identifying and Tracing the Electronic Suspect) accreditation should use SNs and the Internet for police investigative purposes, especially for intelligence gathering. FIB [Force Intelligence Bureau] and some BCU's have such key personnel trained.* (South Wales Police, 2012b: 6).

The Social Networking Policy (South Wales Police, 2012b) refers only to intelligence and thus without further clarification this would appear to include community intelligence.
Intelligence managers were also interviewed in relation to whether community intelligence was obtained from social media sites, using semi-structured interviews, which were based on the following interview question; ‘Who monitors social media sites if anyone) to obtain community intelligence, for example; Facebook, Twitter, Linkedin, Myspace and Google Plus+? See also: Community Engagement Techniques below.

All the intelligence managers interviewed agreed that official research, investigation and intelligence gathering on social media sites were conducted by specially trained and accredited police personnel, generally the LIOs from the BCU Intelligence Units. The intelligence managers also confirmed that the day to day monitoring of social media sites for community intelligence does not generally take place because there are only a small number of trained staff in each BCU and those members of staff that are trained are not able to undertake this task due to their heavy workload.

“No. We’ve got one officer on the shift who is open source trained then so can go onto Facebook and Twitter and is allowed to, but generally on the level of workload that we’ve got in there he goes on specifically to look for either something that an officer has asked him to, for example we had an intel report in the other day that someone has got a picture on Facebook and he’s got a gun.” (IMI 22)

However, one intelligence manager (IMI 6 (IMQ 6)) stated that they were able to monitor social media on a daily basis, which assisted the tasking and coordination process. Another intelligence manager (IMI 11 (IMQ 11)) indicated that they would like to be able to monitor social media sites more frequently as long as this process was transparent, but also feared that many police officers and staff look at social media sites at home to find out what is happening in their area.

Other intelligence managers, particularly local policing inspectors (IMI 3 (IMQ 3) and IMI 13 (IMQ 13)) highlighted the issue of access to social media and believed that police officers and staff resorted to using their own personal social media accounts.
Knowledge of the Intelligence Process

Nearly two-thirds (64.9 percent) of local neighbourhood policing staff indicated that they knew what happens to intelligence once it had been submitted and nearly a quarter (24.7 percent) knew part of the process. Five PCSOs made up the largest group of staff who either did not know what happened to intelligence once it had been submitted or did not know if they knew what happened to the intelligence. A further 10 PCSOs (27.7 percent of PCSOs) and 12 constables (28.5 percent of constables) indicated that they only knew part of the intelligence process.

Intelligence managers were asked to explain what happened to community intelligence once it had been submitted. Their responses were analysed and several key themes identified. Some of these key themes were found to have a greater frequency and thus were more significant than others.

In response, intelligence managers indicated that community intelligence was ‘sanitised and recorded’, ‘assessed and processed’, and ‘disseminated’ via the ‘NICHE’ RMS or via ‘intelligence bulletins and briefings’ before being ‘actioned’. However, one intelligence manager had reservations about the community intelligence process:

On the blog it can be read over, on NICHE it can be later referred to, but anywhere else it is forgotten and not used which is very poor. (IMQ 12)

Intelligence Managers Requesting Community Intelligence

The vast majority (90.0 percent) of intelligence managers requested community intelligence as part of a wider intelligence requirement. Only one local policing inspector (IMQ 5) and one LIO (IMQ 19) did not request community intelligence.

In addition intelligence managers were interviewed in relation to how they requested community intelligence, using semi-structured interviews, which were based on the following interview questions; ‘How do you request community intelligence as part of a
wider intelligence requirement?’, ‘What process do you use to make your request?’, ‘How is that intelligence fed back to you?’ and ‘What happens next?’

**The Process of Requesting Community Intelligence**

All the intelligence managers interviewed described the process used to request community intelligence as part of the wider intelligence requirement. This included the two intelligence managers (IMI 5 (IMQ 5) and IMI 19 (IMQ 19)) who answered ‘No’ to question (Q9) on the postal survey questionnaire: Do you request community intelligence as part of a wider intelligence requirement? When asked in interview how they requested community intelligence and what process they used to make the request, they replied;

"Yeah, we’ve got our briefing Blog where it says this is what I want you to do, what we want all of the staff to do today. So to be fair, we say to the staff this is what is happening you are to do this so basically if I need something done or I need an intelligence requirement I will summarise it briefly on the display but I’ll also send an e-mail out to either the sergeants or maybe all staff expanding on it and maybe giving the rationale as why I want it yeah.” (IMI 5 (IMQ 5))

"It’s sent by e-mail mainly and obviously, if it’s come in by a NIR then I’ll get the unique reference number for the occurrence and we task the relevant, relevant Inspector or whoever as we mentioned earlier ... So we try and minimise the amount of tasks, but maximise the amount of people it will go to, so it will get disseminated. We’ll send it to an Inspector rather than send it to a PCSO, because hopefully the Inspectors will disseminate the stuff ...” (IMI 19 (IMQ 19))

Therefore, it would appear that all the intelligence managers that responded to the postal survey questionnaire do request intelligence as part of a wider intelligence requirement.

The intelligence managers that were interviewed indicated that there were a number of ways in which community intelligence was requested, for example using the Community Intelligence Diary (Blog), creating a specific occurrence or a task on the NICHE RMS, via intelligence bulletins, tasking documents and daily intelligence briefings, verbally and by e-mail. However, one intelligence manager (IMI 3 (IMQ3)) was content to allow the LIO
to prepare all the intelligence requirements and to discuss this with their staff at the daily briefings, but did not directly task staff with additional intelligence requirement requests. Thus, there does not appear to be a specific process for requesting community intelligence as part of a wider intelligence requirement.

**The Community Intelligence Feedback Process**

Once community intelligence has been requested, there is no identifiable single process for intelligence to be fed back to the intelligence manager who requested it. Intelligence managers indicated that the intelligence feedback process depends on the intelligence requested and the urgency of the request.

“I suppose it depends on the urgency of what I’m looking for and what I’m asking for really.” (IMI 14 (IMQ 14))

Intelligence managers, particularly local policing inspectors appear to have their own processes for receiving the requested community intelligence. Again these can vary and include; intelligence packages prepared by LIOs and FIOs, verbal updates, e-mails and reports from staff, NIRs submitted directly to the LIO via the NICHE RMS, dedicated NICHE RMS master occurrences and the Community Intelligence Diary (Blog).

**The Next Step in the Process**

When asked what happened to the requested community intelligence once it had been fed back, there were again a variety of replies depending on the type of intelligence requested and the role of the intelligence manager.

For example, LIOs were more involved in processing the intelligence correctly, deciding who it should be tasked to and ensuring an audit trail. Whilst local policing inspectors were more concerned with what action should be taken and who should take that action.
One local policing inspector (IMI 13 (IMQ 13)) stated that they would use some of the community intelligence from the feedback process to determine and log (or record) the best location for ‘Waymarkers’ on the South Wales Police iR3 system, which monitors the deployment of resources to priority areas within communities via a Global Positioning System (GPS).

A further local policing inspector (IMI 14 (IMQ 14)) indicated that they would not necessarily see the community intelligence from the feedback process as it would be returned directly to the Intelligence Unit on a NIR for processing and dissemination if appropriate.

**Local Neighbourhood Policing Staff Receiving Community Intelligence after Processing**

Of the local neighbourhood policing staff who responded to question Q9, over two-thirds (68.0 percent) indicated that they received community intelligence after it had been collected, processed and analysed. However, nearly a quarter (24.4 percent) indicated that they did not receive community intelligence once it had been processed and the remainder (7.4 percent) did not know if they received community intelligence once it had been processed. Thus nearly a third (31.9 percent) of those who responded did not or did not know if they received community intelligence after processing. One FLSO (LNPQ 59), one constable (LNPQ 92) and one sergeant (LNPQ 76) did not respond to this question (Q9).

**South Wales Police Community Intelligence Policy**

Just over a third (34.3 percent) of local neighbourhood policing staff who responded to question Q10 were aware of the South Wales Police Community Intelligence Policy (South Wales Police, 2010b; 2012b). Nearly a quarter of staff (22.9 percent) did not know if they were aware of the policy and 42.7 percent were not aware of the South
Wales Police Community Intelligence Policy. One sergeant (LNPQ 76) did not respond to this question (Q10).

Similarly, just under a third (30.0 percent) of intelligence managers were aware of the South Wales Police Community Intelligence Policy and one intelligence manager did not know if they were aware of the policy. Almost two thirds (65.0 percent) of intelligence managers were not aware of the South Wales Police Community Intelligence Policy.

It would appear that a similar number, only approximately one third of local neighbourhood policing staff and intelligence managers were aware of the policy.

**Responsibility for Community Intelligence**

The South Wales Police Community Intelligence Policy (South Wales Police, 2010; 2012a) states that;

> The BCU Intelligence Manager [Detective Inspector (Intelligence)] will assume the overall responsibility for the sanitisation and dissemination of Community Intelligence. This will be achieved through the Intelligence Review of all Diary entries.  
> (South Wales Police, 2012a: 5)

Over a quarter (26.0 percent) of local neighbourhood policing staff who responded to question Q11 were aware that the detective inspector from the BCU Intelligence Unit had overall responsibility for community intelligence within the BCU. However, 26.0 percent of local neighbourhood policing staff also believed that the LIO had overall responsibility, with 19.7 percent indicating the BCU Commander and 18.7 percent indicating ‘Other’ and specifying other responses such as; ‘Me’, ‘We all have responsibility’, ‘Everybody’, ‘Down to individuals and individual teams’, ‘Not sure’, ‘All would have some sort of responsibility’ and ‘All of the above’, and other joint responsibility options such as; ‘BCU Commander and Detective Inspector (Intelligence Unit)’, ‘Local Policing Inspector, Detective Inspector (Intelligence Unit) and Local Intelligence Officer’, and ‘Detective
Inspector (Intelligence Unit), Detective Sergeant (Intelligence Unit) and Local Intelligence Officer’. One PCSO (LNPQ 70) chose not to respond to this question (Q11).

Only 10.5 percent of the intelligence managers who responded to this question were aware that the detective inspector from the BCU Intelligence Unit had overall responsibility for community intelligence within the BCU. By comparison over twice as many local neighbourhood policing staff were aware of the detective inspector’s responsibility. Just under a third (31.5 percent) of intelligence managers indicated that they believed that the BCU Commander had overall responsibility, whilst 10.5 percent indicated that it was the local policing inspector who had overall responsibility and a further 10.5 percent indicated it was the LIO. Just over a third (36.8 percent) indicated ‘Other’ and specifying alternative responses such as; ‘All staff have responsibility’, ‘All are responsible for community intelligence, at different levels’ and ‘I don’t know’, and other joint responsibility options such as; ‘BCU Commander, Local Policing Inspector, Detective Inspector (Intelligence Unit), Local Intelligence Officer and Field Intelligence Officer’, ‘Local Policing Inspector, Local Intelligence Officer and Field Intelligence Officer’, ‘Local Policing Inspector, Detective Inspector (Intelligence Unit), Detective Sergeant (Intelligence Unit), Local Intelligence Officer and Field Intelligence Officer’. One intelligence manager (IMQ 6) chose not to respond to this question (Q11).

**Policing in Context**

**Local Neighbourhood Policing**

Local neighbourhood policing staff and intelligence managers were asked to explain what they understood by the term neighbourhood or local policing. Their responses were analysed and several key themes identified. Some of these key themes were found to have a greater frequency and thus were more significant than others.

Local neighbourhood policing staff responded by defining neighbourhood or local policing under the following key themes; ‘local’ policing within a ‘community’, which involves
‘engaging’ with the community, building ‘relationships’, being ‘visible’, ‘accessible’ and ‘familiar’ to identify their ‘needs and priorities’ and offer ‘reassurance’, then, ‘working with partners’ to ‘resolve issues’ by ‘problem solving’ and being ‘proactive’.

Intelligence managers also defined neighbourhood or local policing using similar key themes; ‘local’ policing within a ‘community’, which involves ‘engaging’ with the community, building ‘relationships’, being ‘visible’, ‘accessible’ and ‘familiar’ to identify their ‘needs and priorities’ and then proactively problem solving the issues identified. However, intelligence managers appeared less concerned with offering ‘reassurance’ and ‘working with partners’.

Interestingly, ‘tackling crime and ASB’ was found to be of fairly low significance and only two intelligence managers mentioned ‘gathering intelligence’ as a feature of neighbourhood or local policing.

**Neighbourhoods**

Nearly two-fifths (39.1 percent) of local neighbourhood policing staff regarded a neighbourhood to be an ‘Electoral Ward’, whilst over a quarter (27.8 percent) regarded it to be a ‘Locality’. The largest group of constables believed a neighbourhood to be an ‘Electoral Ward’. Fifteen local neighbourhood policing staff (15.4 percent) regarded a neighbourhood to be a ‘Sector’ and the remainder (17.5 percent) indicated ‘Other’ and specified joint options such as; ‘Sector, Electoral Ward and Locality’, ‘Sector and Electoral Ward’ and ‘Electoral Ward and Locality’, and alternative responses such as; ‘Policing Ward’, ‘Beat Area’, ‘Any group of people linked together by any definition’, ‘The communities in the locality’, ‘A collection of people with similar needs/requirements and ideas’, ‘Any Community’ and ‘The community interactions and people living there’.

One local neighbourhood policing officer defined a neighbourhood as follows:
Any group of people who have some sort of common purpose within a community whether resident or just a user of the resources within the community. So whilst a neighbourhood is by definition tied to a geographical area, it is the people who use this area who are the neighbourhood. (LNPQ 9)

This definition takes into account the concept of virtual or non-traditional communities, which are not based on geographical boundaries (ACPO, 2006e: 18).

Two-fifths (40.0 percent) of the intelligence managers regarded a neighbourhood to be a ‘Locality’ and a quarter (25.0 percent) regarded it to be an ‘Electoral Ward’. This is the reverse of the findings for the local neighbourhood policing staff above. A further fifth (20.0 percent) of the intelligence managers regarded a neighbourhood to be a ‘Sector’ and the remaining 15.0 percent indicated ‘Other’ and specified joint options such as; ‘Sector and Electoral Ward’ and ‘Can be all of the above’. One intelligence manager elaborated and suggested that the term neighbourhood can have different meanings to different people.

‘Can mean different things to different people depending on their links within the community such as other family members/schools etc. (IMQ 3)

The greatest number of local policing inspectors (40.0 percent) regarded a neighbourhood to be a ‘Locality’. This stance was supported by a detective inspector, a detective sergeant and a FIO. However, 30.0 percent of local policing inspectors regarded a neighbourhood to be a ‘Sector’. Over half (57.1 percent) the LIOs considered a neighbourhood to be an ‘Electoral Ward’.

These findings suggest that there is a lack of corporacy in defining a neighbourhood, which also affect the corporacy of neighbourhood profiles and other associated matters. See Neighbourhood Profiles below.
Neighbourhood Profiles

Over four-fifths (81.4 percent) of local neighbourhood policing staff indicated that they were aware of a neighbourhood profile for each of the neighbourhoods they worked in. Only 6.1 percent of local neighbourhood policing staff indicated that they did not have a neighbourhood profile for each of their neighbourhoods. A further 12.3 percent indicated that they did not know if they had a neighbourhood profile for each of their neighbourhoods.

By comparison, only 45.0 percent of intelligence managers were aware of the neighbourhood profiles. Half (50.0 percent) of the intelligence managers did not know if there was a neighbourhood profile for each of the neighbourhoods in their BCU. Only one intelligence manager (IMQ 8), a LIO indicated that there were no neighbourhood profiles available for their BCU. Half the local policing inspectors were aware of neighbourhood profiles for their local policing area and the other half did not know if there were neighbourhood profiles for their area.

The Content of Neighbourhood Profiles

Local neighbourhood policing staff and intelligence managers were instructed to skip this section if they answered ‘No’ or ‘Don’t know’ to the question (Q14): ‘Do you have a neighbourhood profile for each of the neighbourhoods you work in, as indicated in Q13 above’ (What do you regard a neighbourhood to be?) (for local neighbourhood policing staff) or ‘Is there a neighbourhood profile for each of the neighbourhoods in your BCU, as indicated in Q13 above’ (for intelligence managers).

However, one of the local neighbourhood policing staff respondents who responded ‘No’ to their awareness of neighbourhood profiles gave the response of ‘Don’t know’ to knowing the content of a neighbourhood profile. A further four local neighbourhood policing staff respondents who responded ‘Don’t know’ to their awareness of neighbourhood profiles also gave the response of ‘No’ (one) and ‘Don’t know’ (three) to
knowing the content of a neighbourhood profile. Similarly, two of the intelligence managers’ respondents who gave the response; ‘Don’t know’ to their awareness of neighbourhood profiles also gave the response of ‘No’ to knowing the content of a neighbourhood profile.

The above mentioned responses were not included in the calculation of percentages for those who were aware of the neighbourhood profiles and were also either aware or not aware of the content of the profiles.

The majority (87.3 percent) of the local neighbourhood policing staff who indicated that they were aware of a neighbourhood profile for each of their neighbourhoods were also aware of the content of those profiles. Only 6.3 percent of local neighbourhood policing staff who were aware of neighbourhood profiles did not know the content of the profiles and a further 6.3 percent did not know if they knew the content of the neighbourhood profiles. Two thirds (66.6 percent) of the intelligence managers (five local policing inspectors and a detective inspector) who were aware of a neighbourhood profile for each of their neighbourhoods were also aware of their content. The remaining third (two LIOs and a FIO) were not aware of the content.

For the local neighbourhood policing staff, 69 respondents out of the overall sample of 97 participants (71.1 percent) were aware of their neighbourhood profiles and their content. By contrast, for the intelligence managers, six respondents out the population of 20 participants (30.0 percent) were aware of their neighbourhood profiles and their content.

In addition intelligence managers were interviewed in relation to neighbourhood profiling and community intelligence, using semi-structured interviews, which were based on the following interview questions; ‘Do you think that neighbourhood profiling is part of the
One local policing inspector (IMI 2 (IMQ 2)) stated that they did use neighbourhood profiling as part of the community intelligence process and one of the benefits was being able to identify the needs of the community and address the issues that arose from those needs. Another local policing inspector (IMI 15 (IMQ 15)) from the same BCU was also going to pilot the use of the Experian Mosaic profiling system to enhance the existing neighbourhood profiles for their Sector.

Whilst another local policing inspector (IMI 4 (IMQ 4)) from a different BCU stated that neighbourhood profiles had not been used for at least 18 months and they did not look at or refer to them at all.

Three intelligence managers from a BCU Intelligence Unit appeared to be unaware of neighbourhood profiles and had never used them.

"No, I don’t even know what it means. No.” (IMI 16 (IMQ 16))

"I’ve never seen one to be honest I wouldn’t know ... I don’t even know where to look.” (IMI 17 (IMQ 17))

"No. With the profile, what do you mean? What is the profile then?” (IMI 18 (IMQ 18))

All three had also completed the postal survey questionnaire and two of the three (IMQ 17 and IMQ 18) had indicated on the questionnaire that they were aware of neighbourhood profiles, but did not know their content.

Other intelligence managers from BCU Intelligence Units appeared to be aware of neighbourhood profiles, but due to heavy workloads and lack of resources they were unable to utilise them.
“Sounds an oxymoron, but our intelligence tends to be reactive. So, we haven’t got the capability of dealing with the intelligence we’ve got coming in without going out and looking for a hell of a lot more. So what we tend to do is pick out what intelligence we’ve got for our priorities and then look at the areas that the priorities will predominantly be around offence type, burglary, etc.” (IMI 11 (IMQ 11))

One intelligence manager (IMI 23) stated that they would use neighbourhood profiling in conjunction with the DSU in order to identify a possible CHIS from a particular community.

**Neighbourhood Profiles and Diversity**

Over a quarter (28.8 percent) of local neighbourhood policing staff indicated that they used neighbourhood profiles to assess the diversity of the different communities within their BCU. A further 28.8 percent indicated that they sometimes used profiling to assess diversity. However, nearly two-fifths (38.1 percent) of local neighbourhood policing staff stated that they did not use neighbourhood profiles to assess diversity. Just under a half (47.6 percent) of constables did not use neighbourhood profiling to assess the diversity of the communities they worked in compared to a quarter (25.0 percent) of PCSOs.

Just over one third (35.0 percent) of intelligence managers indicated that they used neighbourhood profiles to assess the diversity of the different communities within their BCU. The majority (85.7 percent) of this group were local policing inspectors. However, 40.0 percent of intelligence managers did not use neighbourhood profiling to assess the diversity of their neighbourhoods. Half of that group were found to be LIOs. When considering the position of the LIOs alone, all LIOs indicated that they did not use or did not know if they used neighbourhood profiles to assess diversity. By comparison 80.0 percent of local policing inspectors either used or sometimes used neighbourhood profiles to assess diversity.
Neighbourhood Profiles and Community Engagement

Just over a fifth (21.6 percent) of local neighbourhood policing staff indicated that they used neighbourhood profiles to decide on the most appropriate community engagement techniques and just over a quarter (27.8 percent) stated that they sometimes used profiling to decide on the most appropriate technique. However, nearly half (47.4 percent) of the local neighbourhood policing staff indicated that they did not use neighbourhood profiles to decide on the most appropriate community engagement techniques. Perhaps alarmingly, 54.7 percent of constables and 44.4 per cent of PCSOs did not use profiling to assist with decisions on engagement techniques.

Similarly, over half (55.0 percent) of the intelligence managers indicated that they did not use neighbourhood profiling to assist with decisions on the most appropriate community engagement technique. Just under a third (30.0 percent) of intelligence managers (all local policing inspectors) either used (15.0 percent) or sometimes used (15.0 percent) neighbourhood profiles to decide on community engagement techniques. Sixty percent of the local policing inspectors either used or sometimes used neighbourhood profiles in this way. If the results of those who indicated they did not use or did not know if they used neighbourhood profiles to assist with community engagement are combined this would account for 70.0 percent of all intelligence managers. Again, all the LIOs indicated that they did not use or did not know if they used neighbourhood profiles to assist with community engagement.

Neighbourhood Profiles and Key Individual Networks

Over half (50.5 percent) local neighbourhood policing staff indicated that they used neighbourhood profiles to identify KINs, almost doubling their use compared to assessing the diversity of the community (28.8 percent) and deciding on the most appropriate community engagement techniques (21.6 percent). A further fifth (20.6 percent) of these staff also indicated that they sometimes used profiling to identify KINs. However,
over a quarter (26.8 percent) of local neighbourhood policing staff stated that they did not use profiling to identify KINs.

A similar picture emerges for intelligence managers in their use of neighbourhood profiles to identify KINs as it did with the use of profiling for assessing the diversity of the community and deciding on the most appropriate community engagement techniques. Two fifths (40.0 percent) of intelligence managers either used (30.0 percent) or sometimes used (10.0 percent) neighbourhood profiles to identify KINs. However, 60.0 percent of intelligence managers indicated that they did not use or did not know if they used neighbourhood profiles to identify KINs. This group again included all the LIOs.

In addition intelligence managers were interviewed in relation to KINs, neighbourhood profiling and community intelligence, based on the following semi-structured interview questions; ‘What do you understand to be a Key Individual Network (KIN)?’, ‘What sort of an individual would you consider to be a KIN? and ‘What would you consider to be their role?’

One local policing inspector outlined the type of individual they would consider as a KIN.

“In the main councillors, local leaders as in we’ve got Asian shop keepers, and a mosque then in [Location] and obviously people linked, that and the [Name] Crime Prevention Association and certain maybe voluntary organisation or other sort of organisations that would have information or collate on ... and other maybe, would be individuals who see themselves and are regarded as key individuals ...” (IMI 4 (IMQ 4))

Another local policing inspector (IMI 3 (IMQ 3)) questioned whether their staff particularly PCSOs fully understood the concept of KINs.

Again a number of intelligence managers from BCU Intelligence Units, mainly LIOs appeared to be unfamiliar with the terms Key Individual Network or KIN and as a result had no contact with them.
“I’ve never heard of it.” (IMI 16 (IMQ 16))

“I don’t even know what that is.” (IMI 18 (IMQ 18))

“To be honest with you until I looked at the form I’d never heard of that.” (IMI 19 (IMQ 19))

Another LIO (IMI 21) was aware of KINs as they had previously been involved with neighbourhood policing, but stated that they had no involvement with KINs in their current role. A further LIO (IMI 20 (IMQ 20)) clarified that they tended to liaise with staff from local authority departments rather than recognised KINs.

Whilst another intelligence manager (IMI 24) saw the role of the KIN as offering reassurance to the community at the time of a serious incident rather than being a possible source of community intelligence.

**Partnership Resource Audits**

Only 8.2 percent of local neighbourhood policing staff indicated that they had undertaken a partnership resource audit and a further 6.1 percent stated that they sometimes undertake a partnership resource audit. The majority (70.1 percent) of local neighbourhood policing staff indicated that they had not undertaken a partnership resource audit.

Only one intelligence manager (a LIO) had undertaken a partnership resource audit and two local policing inspectors indicated that they sometimes undertake an audit. However, three quarters (75.0 percent) of intelligence managers have not undertaken a partnership resource audit with a further 10.0 percent indicating that they did not know if they had undertaken an audit.
Partner Agencies Considered

Local neighbourhood policing staff and intelligence managers were instructed to skip this section if they answered ‘No’ or ‘Don’t know’ to the question (Q19): ‘Have you undertaken a partnership resource audit?’

However, three of the local neighbourhood policing staff respondents (LNPQ 7 LNPQ 43 and LNPQ 62) who responded ‘No’ to undertaking a partnership resource audit, did answer the question (Q20): ‘What types of partner agencies have you considered?’ A further two local neighbourhood policing staff (LNPQ 76 and LNPQ 77) who responded ‘Don’t know’ to undertaking a partnership resource audit, also answered this question (Q20). Therefore, 19 local neighbourhood policing staff (19.5 percent) responded to this question compared to the 14 staff (14.4 percent) who answered ‘Yes’ or ‘Sometimes’ to having undertaken a partnership resource audit.

Similarly, two of the intelligence managers (IMQ 2 and IMQ 12) who gave the response ‘No’ and one (IMQ 14) who responded ‘Don’t know’ to undertaking a partnership resource audit also answered this question (Q20): ‘What types of partner agencies have you considered?’ Therefore, six intelligence managers (30.0 percent) responded to this question compared to the three managers (15.0 percent) who answered ‘Yes’ or ‘Sometimes’ to having undertaken a partnership resource audit.


By comparison, the six intelligence managers who responded identified 15 key partners with which they had undertaken a partnership resource audit for their areas of responsibility. These included; ‘Youth Groups’, ‘Problem Solving Groups’, ‘Anti-Social Behaviour (ASB) Groups’, the ‘Probation Service’, the ‘Health Service’, ‘Social Services’, ‘Local Authority’, ‘Trading Standards’, ‘United Kingdom Border Agency (UKBA)’, ‘Environment Agency’, ‘Community Safety Partnerships’, ‘Housing Providers’, ‘Residents and Watch Groups’, the ‘Business Sector’ and the ‘Voluntary Sector’. The two most popular partners by far were found to be the ‘Local Authority’ and ‘Housing Providers’.

Intelligence managers do not appear to have undertaken a partnership resource audit in respect of ‘Councillors’, ‘Education and Schools’, ‘Police Departments’, ‘Religious Groups’, and ‘Minority Ethnic Groups’, but included an additional partner of ‘Problem Solving Groups’ in their audits.

**Police Application of Intelligence**

**The Value of Community Intelligence**

All local neighbourhood policing staff indicated that they valued community intelligence ‘a lot’ or ‘some’. The vast majority, 87.6 percent stated they valued community intelligence ‘a lot’. All the FLSOs and sergeants indicated that they valued community intelligence ‘a lot’. Similarly, all intelligence managers indicated that they valued community intelligence ‘a lot’ or ‘some’, with 80.0 percent valuing community intelligence ‘a lot’. All LIOs valued community intelligence ‘a lot’, whilst a detective inspector gave ‘some’ value to it.

When considering their own definitions of community and criminal intelligence, just under three quarters (72.9 percent) of local neighbourhood policing staff and three
quarters (75.0 percent) of intelligence managers indicated that community intelligence was of the same value as criminal intelligence.

Interestingly, 15.6 percent of local neighbourhood policing staff believed that community intelligence was of higher value than criminal intelligence, whilst 6.2 percent believed it was of lower value. One PCSO chose not to answer this question (Q22).

Only one intelligence manager (a local policing inspector) believed that community intelligence was of higher value than criminal intelligence. However, 20.0 percent of intelligence managers (including a local policing inspector, a detective inspector and two LIOs) believed that community intelligence was of lower value that criminal intelligence.

**Intelligence-Led Neighbourhood Patrols/Operations**

Half (50.0 percent) of the local neighbourhood policing staff indicated that neighbourhood patrols and operations were intelligence-led. A further 44.7 percent of staff stating that patrols and operations were only sometimes intelligence-led. Only 4.1 percent of staff indicated that patrols and operations were not intelligence-led. One PCSO chose not to answer this question (Q23). By contrast, three quarters (75.0 percent) of intelligence managers indicated that neighbourhood patrols and operations were intelligence-led. The remaining 25.0 percent indicated that neighbourhood patrols and operations were ‘sometimes’ intelligence-led. Therefore, it would appear from these findings that not all neighbourhood patrols and operations are intelligence-led.

In addition intelligence managers were interviewed in relation to the amount of community intelligence that is used operationally, using semi-structured interviews, which were based on the following interview question; ‘What percentage of that community intelligence is used for neighbourhood patrols, operations and other?
The majority of intelligence managers were unable to provide a percentage figure for the amount of community intelligence that is used for neighbourhood patrols and police operations. Intelligence managers, who were able to provide a percentage figure, suggested that the amount of community intelligence used ranged from 20 percent to over 50 percent.

Other intelligence managers from Intelligence Units suggested that the majority of intelligence used for neighbourhood patrols and police operations was criminal intelligence.

The issue of not recording community intelligence was again evident in the replies of some local policing inspectors and also highlighted issues in the management of directed patrols and police operations, particularly in relation to problem solving. For example one intelligence manager stated;

"Yeah, around anti-social behaviour where every Friday night, 50 to 60 youths are gathering to drink alcohol under the bridge in ... That’s picked up by our NPT, so every Friday night we do this." (IMI 5 (IMQ 5))

Other intelligence managers (IMI 11 (IMQ 11), IMI 13 (IMQ 13) and IMI 20 (IMQ 20)) believe that more and more community intelligence is being recorded on ‘Waymarkers’ on the South Wales Police iR3 system and is a way of directing patrols and making police officers more accountable.

It would also appear that Intelligence Unit staff, particularly LIOs are in direct contact with local policing inspectors and task them with any community intelligence they receive for their decision on action.

**Type of Intelligence Used/Received**

Nearly three quarters (71.8 percent) of local neighbourhood policing staff indicated that they use both criminal and community intelligence in their work. Just over a tenth (10.4
percent) of staff use mainly criminal intelligence and a further 14.5 percent of staff use mainly community intelligence. One PCSO chose not to answer this question (Q24).

Over half (55.0 percent) of intelligence managers indicated that the intelligence they received is ‘both’ criminal and community intelligence. However, 30.0 percent of intelligence managers (including Intelligence Unit supervisors) believe that the intelligence received is mainly criminal intelligence.

In addition intelligence managers were interviewed in relation to the amount of community intelligence received from the community compared to criminal intelligence, based on the following semi-structured interview question; ‘What percentage of intelligence you receive from the community is community intelligence?’

Eight intelligence managers indicated that they received more criminal intelligence (including intelligence on controlled drugs) than community intelligence from the community. One local policing inspector again highlighted the fact that the non-recording of some community intelligence was a factor in determining how much community intelligence was received from the community.

“I think criminal far outweighs community certainly from what I see on a daily basis I would like to guess. As a … guess I would say as much as 80 to 20 percent, criminal … community. Certainly that is recorded. Although a lot of … a lot of the community, is exchanged verbally as you know.” (IMI 13 (IMQ 13))

However, five intelligence managers suggested that community intelligence outweighs criminal intelligence. One intelligence manager (IMI 18 (IMQ 18)) from an Intelligence Unit again highlighted the problem of defining community intelligence. This raises the question: Is criminal intelligence received from the community, perceived as community intelligence?
The remaining eight intelligence managers were unable to estimate the amounts of community and criminal intelligence they received. One intelligence manager added;

"There’s no stats associated with the source of the intelligence ..." (IMI 23)

**Community Intelligence and Command and Control Systems**

Intelligence managers were also interviewed in relation to the amount of community intelligence obtained from the South Wales Police NSPIS command and control system and the NICHE RMS, using semi-structured interviews, which were based on the following interview question; ‘Who monitors South Wales Police systems such as NSPIS and NICHE (if anyone) to obtain community intelligence?

All the intelligence managers interviewed indicated that they or their immediate staff monitor the NSPIS command and control system and the NICHE RMS on a daily basis covering a 24 hour period between 7.00 am and 7.00 am the following day. However, these systems are not monitored specifically for community intelligence.

The main focus of the monitoring process is in preparation for the daily management meeting, where the emphasis is on crime. The LIOs prepare the daily management briefing documentation and highlight issues for further discussion during the meeting. The following reply from an intelligence manager based in an Intelligence Unit provides an example of the amount of work involved and the commitment that LIOs have to make on a daily basis, just to produce a briefing document for the daily management meeting.

"Yeah. Every morning we go through NICHE and NSPIS anyway as part of our duties to compile the tasking documents ... We look for stuff all the time it’s just a case whether we can remember the task, because we’re overloaded with so much information now, because we haven’t got specific responsibility for different areas now it’s too much, you can’t remember everything. If you go through every NSPIS incident which we do every day for [BCU Name] over the last 24 hours, it takes three and a half hours.” (IMI 21)
In addition to the work of the LIOs and Intelligence Unit staff, local policing inspectors and their deputies will go through the same process of monitoring NSPIS and the NICHE RMS incidents and occurrences for their areas to prepare for the daily management meeting. Often their sergeants, Neighbourhood Policing Team (NPT) officers and PCSOs, who would not generally attend the daily management meeting, will also go through the same process to prepare for duties in their areas.

One local policing inspector highlighted that not everyone is able to use the NICHE RMS as efficiently and effectively as they could, because they are not properly trained in its use.

“NICHE, is a great tool, but I think there are loads of training opportunities, we could have on it, people don’t know how to use it, they really don’t.” (IMI 2 (IMQ 2))

Community Engagement Techniques

Respondents were asked what community engagement techniques they utilised to obtain community intelligence and were requested to select the appropriate answers from a list of the most probable responses, i.e. ‘Face to Face Contacts’, ‘Directed Patrols’, ‘Partnerships and Communities Together (PACT) Meetings’, ‘School Councils’, ‘Youth Forums’, ‘Street Meetings’, ‘Surgeries’, ‘House to House’, ‘Dynamic Meetings’, ‘Social Interactions’, ‘Community Events’, ‘Open Days’, ‘Environmental Visual Audits (EVAs)’, ‘Focus Groups’, ‘Workshops’ and ‘Other (please specify)’.

The most popular method of community engagement to obtain community intelligence by local neighbourhood policing staff was by ‘Face to Face Contacts’ (92.7 percent), followed by ‘PACT Meetings’ (89.6 percent), ‘Directed Patrols’ (82.4 percent), ‘House to House’ contact (81.4 percent), ‘Community Events’ (80.4 percent) and ‘Surgeries (71.1 percent). Over half the staff respondents also utilised ‘Open Days’ (59.7 percent), ‘Street Meetings’ (56.7 percent) and ‘Social Interactions’ (55.6 percent). Only just over a third of staff respondents indicated that they engaged with young people through ‘School
Councils’ (38.1 percent) and ‘Youth Forums’ (34.0 percent) in order to obtain community intelligence.

The least popular techniques employed by staff were ‘Dynamic Meetings’ (23.7 percent), ‘EVAs’ (22.6 percent), ‘Focus Groups’ (18.5 percent) and ‘Workshops’ (18.5 percent).

A number of the local neighbourhood policing staff (16.4 percent) gave the response of ‘Other’. One of those respondents who was new to the role of neighbourhood beat manager had not yet engaged with the community to obtain community intelligence (LNPQ 92). Another respondent stated that their role was office based and therefore they did not engage with the community (LNPQ 59). Other community engagement techniques to obtain community intelligence included; liaising with various watch schemes (LNPQ 2), the cuppa with a copper scheme (LNPQ 25 and LNPQ 57), visiting faith groups (LNPQ 52) and utilising a partner’s Facebook (LNPQ 51).

As with the local neighbourhood policing staff the most popular form of community engagement by intelligence managers to obtain community intelligence was ‘Face to Face Contacts’ (85.0 percent). This too was followed by ‘PACT Meetings’ (75.0 percent), ‘House to House’ contact (75.0 percent) and ‘Directed Patrols’ (70.0 percent). The four techniques mentioned above were utilised by all the local policing inspectors and the majority of LIOs.

Over half (55.0 percent) of intelligence managers used ‘Community Events’ as a source of community intelligence, whilst half (50.0 percent) also used ‘Social Interactions’ with the community to obtain community intelligence.

Intelligence managers from the BCU Intelligence Units, particularly detective inspectors, detective sergeants and FIOs are limited in the amount of overt community engagement they can undertake due to the very nature of their role and rely on other police staff
including local neighbourhood policing staff and LIOs to engage with the community on their behalf. Of the six intelligence managers who indicated ‘Other’, three stated that they were unable to fully engage because of their role (IMQ 9, IMQ 11 and IMQ 19). One intelligence manager indicated that they used all of the community engagement techniques listed above (IMQ 14) and the remaining two used additional techniques including; attending anti-social behaviour task group and neighbourhood management meetings (IMQ 12), and attending local council and other partner agency meetings (IMQ 17).

Intelligence Managers were also interviewed in relation to the amount of community intelligence received from the community via social media sites, such as Facebook and Twitter. See Obtaining Community Intelligence above.

**Community Engagement, Intelligence and Cohesion**

**Counter Terrorism**

Over two-fifths (43.7 percent) of local neighbourhood policing staff indicated that they utilised community intelligence to assist with counter terrorism, with a further 17.7 percent stating that they sometimes utilised community intelligence. Therefore, 61.4 percent of staff utilise or sometimes utilise community intelligence in this way. However, just under a third (32.2 percent) indicated that they did not use community intelligence to assist with counter terrorism. One PCSO (LNPQ 50) chose not to answer question Q26a.

Only one intelligence manager (IMQ 11) did not utilise community intelligence to assist with counter terrorism. Four fifths (80.0 percent) of intelligence managers did utilise community intelligence to assist with counter terrorism and a further 15.0 percent sometimes utilised it for counter terrorism.
Organised Crime Groups

Just under a half (46.8 percent) of local neighbourhood policing staff indicated that they utilised community intelligence to assist with organised crime groups, with a further 28.1 percent stating that they sometimes utilised community intelligence. Therefore, three quarter (75.0 percent) of staff utilise or sometimes utilise community intelligence to assist with organised crime groups. However, just under a fifth (19.7 percent) indicated that they did not use community intelligence to assist with organised crime groups. One PCSO (LNPQ 50) chose not to answer question Q26b.

None of the intelligence managers indicated that they did not utilise community intelligence to assist with organised crime groups, with 90.0 percent indicating they did and the remainder indicating that they sometimes utilised it for organised crime groups.

Community Intelligence Scenario

In addition intelligence managers were presented with a progressive four stage community intelligence scenario, which could be applicable to either counter terrorism or tackling organised crime groups. The first stage of the scenario focused on the sighting of a white transit type van parked behind local shops near to some disused garages. The second stage involved the possible sighting of a white transit type van in one of the disused garages with the garage door now padlocked. The third stage progressed to the sighting of three male persons loading containers into the rear of a white transit type van, whilst still parked in the disused garage in the early hours of the morning. The fourth and final stage culminated in a sighting of three male persons living in a house a couple of streets away and the smell of chemicals emanating from that house. All four sightings were by different members of the public, who then either contacted their local police constable or PCSO directly via the telephone or spoke to them in the street without having contacted the South Wales Police Public Service Centre (PSC) (formally known as the police control room) where all calls are recorded. The purpose of this scenario was to determine if information from each of the four incidents/occurrences was
likely to be recorded, if it would be recorded as information or intelligence and in what manner, and if the four incidents would be linked to provide a bigger picture for further operational decision making.

First Stage of the Scenario

Scenario: Sighting of a white transit type van parked behind local shops near to some disused garages by a member of the public (MoP1) and reported directly to a PCSO (PCSO1).

The majority of intelligence managers agreed that additional enquiries should be made first at the location of the sighting, for example; Police National Computer (PNC) checks on the vehicle if still there, enquiries with the shop keepers and enquiries to ascertain why or if the sighting was suspicious. These enquiries should be completed before the information/intelligence is submitted by the PCSO or constable.

Another intelligence manager doubted whether all PCSOs would make further enquiries.

"Some would, some wouldn’t, some would say thank you very much mate and there we are then, we are the police. Others would start questioning them on ... it would depend on how thoroughly they questioned the person as to what the suspicion was.” (IMI 11 (IMQ 11))

When asked if it depended on the individual PCSO, the same intelligence manager stated;

"Absolutely, some are very, very good and some are bloody useless.” (IMI 11 (IMQ 11))

One LIO (IMI 20 (IMQ 20)) also outlined the procedure that should be followed, in that the PCSO or constable should ask the police PSC to create a NSPIS incident/NICHE RMS occurrence via their police radio with the known facts relating to the sighting.
One local policing inspector didn’t believe that the first stage of the scenario would be recorded and submitted as community intelligence.

“If they thought it was something meaty it may go on a NIR, but I would very much doubt it would go on a NIR and if it didn’t reach the Blog then it would just be left in their heads then for their little area, because unfortunately they all work in silos.” (IMI 12 (IMQ 12))

Whilst other local policing inspectors were confident that the first stage of the scenario would be recorded and submitted as community intelligence. For example;

“Yes I would like to think they would put some intelligence in about that, because that could lead to something bigger, it could lead to, even to some terrorist stuff. Who knows what it could lead to?” (IMI 14 (IMQ 14))

However, Intelligence Unit staff, particularly the LIOs stated that based on the information from the first stage of the scenario and after assessment, they would return any intelligence recorded and submitted on a NIR to the submitting officer for further enquiries. As one LIO explained;

“It depends which PCSO I would say … I would like to say that I wouldn’t want that intelligence because it’s not linkable, it’s not actionable it’s of no value until it’s researched properly by the submitting officer. They’ve got to take responsibility for that.” (IMI 21)

Second Stage of the Scenario

Scenario: Possible sighting of a white transit type van in one of the disused garages and the garage door padlocked, by a second member of the public (MoP2) and reported to a different PCSO (PCSO2).

Some intelligence managers would still expect further enquiries to be carried out in relation to the second stage of the scenario. One local policing inspector also expected a LIO and possibly a FIO to be involved with these enquiries, whilst other local policing inspectors suggested that community intelligence from the second stage of the scenario would be recorded and submitted.
Other intelligence managers from the Intelligence Unit were not so sure that the intelligence would be recorded and submitted.

"I don't think so. I don't know if the police officer would put that in. It all depends on ... Yeah, it all depends on the individuals and again the garages, the location and where this." (IMI 18 (IMQ 18))

In relation to the linking of the intelligence from the first two stages of the scenario there were serious doubts amongst local policing inspectors as to whether they would be linked.

"I would like to think so. Honest answer, no I doubt it. Do I have the faith in the Intelligence Unit that they'd pick up on that, probably not.” (IMI 12 (IMQ 12))

Intelligence Unit staff were equally as sceptical.

"I don't think so ... It depends how closely the neighbourhood policing relationship is between the two of the officers, if you have got a small team I would like to think they would talk and then put it on the Blog. Surely that sort of thing should be a Blog entry that everyone can ... and it should be linked that way. That's what I think the Blog's there for.” (IMI 21)

The issues involving the linking of intelligence on the NICHE RMS by location, if the registration number of the vehicle was not known were also highlighted by one intelligence manager from an Intelligence Unit.

"No. I think it would come in as a NIR. Again I think research would be done and as long as the first piece had been linked to location and the location was the same it should be picked up on, but without an index it’s always a, it would never be certain would it you know, because obviously you know what NICHE is like and it is a fantastic system don’t get me wrong, but there are so many different, I’m thinking of locations you know. If you put a street in, alright you come up with all the house numbers in the street, but then you’ve got different locations, street locations as well like junction of junction of, so you know. Unless you can guarantee that they’ve been linked to the same location then there’s a possibility it may be missed yeah.” (IMI 22)
Third Stage of the Scenario

Scenario: Sighting of three male persons loading containers into the rear of a white transit type van, whilst still parked in the disused garage in the early hours of the morning, by a third member of the public (MoP3) and reported to a different PCSO (PCSO3).

Some intelligence managers suggested that the third stage of the scenario should arouse suspicions and either result in intelligence being recorded and submitted or an investigation being undertaken.

"Probably that would be significant. We may not record the first incident, but where there is a progression on the second bit of information we would record it. We would investigate it, but in terms of recording it is an issue." (IMI 6 (IMQ 6))

However, other intelligence managers were not so sure that action would be taken, as it would depend on the manner in which the facts were reported by the member of the public and the receptiveness of the PCSO or constable to the member of public and the facts they reported.

"I would guess, I would like to think that something like that coming in from a couple of sources would be fed to the neighbourhood beat manager. But in saying that some of the PCSOs are bricks and again they don’t understand sometimes the significance of what they are being told and perhaps don’t piece things together like other police officers, who may think hang on, there is something wrong here.‘‘ (IMI 3 (IMQ 3))

One intelligence manager (IMI 19 (IMQ 19)) identified a problem with police officers submitting NIRs that were of a low standard without first having made any relevant enquiries themselves. When LIOs return them and task the police officer to make further enquiries and resubmit the intelligence, 50.0 to 60.0 percent of the NIRs are never returned resulting in a substantial loss of potential intelligence.
In relation to the linking of the intelligence from the first three stages of the scenario there were again serious doubts amongst local policing inspectors as to whether they would be linked.

"The processes are there for the links to be made, but again it is very much down to the individual … It depends critically I think on the individuals … if somebody is spoken to in the street, there is always an opportunity to turn a blind eye or whatever." (IMI 4 (IMQ 4))

One local policing inspector also identified that the frequency of the submission of the community intelligence and the ability to process it quickly if it was received on consecutive days by different staff, would present problems.

"Yeah, I suppose the thing there for me was, a lot of that would depend on the closeness of those three different pieces of information, because if for argument sake the first bit of information comes in on a Friday to a particular officer. So you have got certain staff working that day. The Saturday, the next bit of information may come in to a different officer. Different set of staff on who may not know about the first bit of information and with it being a weekend and LIOs don’t work and it would possibly worry me that on the Sunday then if that third bit of information come in. I’m not sure that the link would be made, you are relying, you are relying a lot there on personalities, individuals who know that information. If there was a week between then I would have expected that information to have been in and disseminated and gone back out again, so everybody would be aware of it." (IMI 14 (IMQ 14))

Another local policing inspector (IMI 13 (IMQ 13)) highlighted the issue of corporacy in the format of the recording and submission of community information and intelligence to be able to link separate pieces of community intelligence.

The problem of linking intelligence to street locations on the NICHE RMS was again highlighted by a number of the Intelligence Unit staff.

"On NICHE you’ve got to be able to link things to a current, to location … The problem you’ve got with the scenario you have given the likelihood is technically the locations would be different so because, they wouldn’t be linked …" (IMI 20 (IMQ 20))
Three of the local policing inspectors started to suspect that this scenario may be related to terrorism and considered the potential involvement of other police departments such as Special Branch (SB) and the Welsh Extremism and Counter Terrorism Unit (WECTU).

“Anyway, I would like to think that it should be linked at that point and I think it would be, to be honest with you. And then I would be thinking with the type of information there, that they would be informing WECTU at this point as well now, to consider any possible terrorist activity.” (IMI 14 (IMQ 14))

### Fourth Stage of the Scenario

**Scenario:** Sighting of three male persons living in a house a couple of streets away and the smell of chemicals emanating from that house, by a fourth member of the public (MoP4) and reported to a different PCSO (PCSO4).

The majority of intelligence managers were confident that the fourth stage of the scenario would be recorded, but some were uncertain how it would be recorded. One local policing inspector (IMI 12 (IMQ 12)) believed that it would be recorded on a NIR as criminal intelligence rather than community intelligence. A further local policing inspectors suggested that how the information or intelligence is recorded and whether the appropriate enquiries had been made by the PCSO or constable will determine if the four stages of the scenario are linked on the NICHE RMS.

“It depends on how the information is recorded. Again when I mentioned about the PCSO checking the area, I would expect that to be flagged up so that they’re doing the simple things asked of them. If that’s going on in your area then that should be picked up but it depends on whether that connection is made.” (IMI 5 (IMQ 5))

In relation to the linking of the intelligence from all four stages of the scenario there were again serious doubts amongst some intelligence managers as to whether they would be linked.

“In isolation they don’t mean an awful lot in someone’s head, it’s only once you task someone with it that the two separate pieces of information come down ... It’s really impossible as you don’t know what I know and I don’t know what you know.” (IMI 5 (IMQ 5))
One local policing inspector again highlighted the responsibility of the individual PCSO or constable and their perception of the facts reported to them and whether they would make any links between all four stages of the scenario.

“It’s very difficult to make that decision because some officers are pretty switched on and would think isn’t quite right and would do it and others who are absolutely clueless and wouldn’t. It’s all down to perception, it’s all down to experience, it’s all down to gut feeling. As far as I’m concerned in this job you need to have [a] sixth sense ... without a doubt you’ve got to have a sixth sense.” (IMI 24)

Another local policing inspector (IMI 12 (IMQ 12)) suggested that the officers would wait for someone else to make the links between all four stages.

One intelligence manager (IMI 23) from an Intelligence Unit suggested that at this stage WECTU would become involved and they would find the links.

**Possible Safeguards**

The issue of safeguards in the process of linking community intelligence from a number of NSPIS incidents/NICHE RMS occurrences was not raised directly during the course of the interviews. However, one intelligence manager (IMI 22) from an Intelligence Unit offered two possible safeguards to the linking of community intelligence at various stages of the scenario; the NPT Inbox on the NICHE RMS and the Daily Intelligence Management system. Although introduced as possible safeguards there is no evidence to suggest that this process would be undertaken and is reliant on information being forwarded to the NPT Inbox and individuals linking intelligence reports on the Daily Intelligence Management system from their own knowledge of the various stages of the scenario.

**Crime in General**

The vast majority (93.7 percent) of local neighbourhood policing staff indicated that they utilised community intelligence to assist with crime in general, with a further 4.1 percent
stating that they sometimes utilised community intelligence in this way. Therefore, 97.9 percent of staff utilise or sometimes utilise community intelligence to assist with crime in general. One PCSO (LNPQ 50) chose not to answer question Q26c.

Similarly, the overwhelming majority (95.0 percent) of intelligence managers indicated that they utilised community intelligence to assist in dealing with crime in general, with only one intelligence manager (IMI 11 (IMQ 11)) stating that they sometimes utilised community intelligence to assist in dealing with crime in general.

**Anti-Social Behaviour**

The vast majority (95.8 percent) of local neighbourhood policing staff indicated that they utilised community intelligence to assist with anti-social behaviour, with a further 2.0 percent stating that they sometimes utilised community intelligence in this way. Therefore, again 97.9 percent of staff utilise or sometimes utilise community intelligence to assist with anti-social behaviour. One PCSO (LNPQ 50) chose not to answer question Q26d.

Again, the overwhelming majority (95.0 percent) of intelligence managers indicated that they utilised community intelligence to assist in dealing with anti-social behaviour, with only one intelligence manager (IMI 11 (IMQ 11)) stating that they sometimes utilised community intelligence to assist in dealing with anti-social behaviour.

The same results emerged for intelligence managers utilising community intelligence to assist with reducing the fear of crime and local problem solving.

**Reducing the Fear of Crime**

Over four-fifths (85.4 percent) of local neighbourhood policing staff indicated that they utilised community intelligence to assist with reducing the fear of crime, with a further 9.3 percent stating that they sometimes utilised community intelligence in this way.
Therefore, 94.8 percent of staff utilise or sometimes utilise community intelligence to assist with reducing the fear of crime. One PCSO (LNPQ 50) chose not to answer question Q26e.

For the analysis of intelligence managers’ data in response to reducing the fear of crime, the same results were evident for intelligence managers utilising community intelligence to assist with anti-social behaviour and local problem solving. See the Anti-Social Behaviour section above.

**Local Problem Solving**

In a similar manner to Crime in General above, the vast majority (93.7 percent) of local neighbourhood policing staff indicated that they utilised community intelligence to assist with local problem solving, with a further 4.1 percent stating that they sometimes utilised community intelligence in this way. Therefore, 97.9 percent of staff utilise or sometimes utilise community intelligence to assist with local problem solving. One PCSO (LNPQ 50) chose not to answer question Q26f.

For the analysis of intelligence managers’ data in response to local problem solving, the same results were evident for intelligence managers utilising community intelligence to assist with anti-social behaviour and reducing the fear of crime. See the Anti-Social Behaviour section above.

**Assistance from Community Intelligence**

Local neighbourhood policing staff and intelligence managers were asked to explain in what ways did community intelligence assist them with counter terrorism, organised crime groups, crime in general, anti-social behaviour, reducing the fear of crime and local problem solving. Their responses were analysed and several key themes identified. Some of these key themes were found to have a greater frequency and thus were more significant than others.
Local neighbourhood policing staff indicated that community intelligence particularly assisted them in gaining ‘information and knowledge’ about their community, in ‘planning and targeting’ their response to various issues and to develop their own ‘patrol strategies’. It also provided a ‘bigger picture’ of what was taking place within a community as a whole and assisted in identifying crime and criminal activity, anti-social behaviour and disorder, and nominals and PPOs who were responsible for crime and disorder. In addition, community intelligence assisted staff to identify the needs and priorities of the community and to be ‘proactive’ in their response by taking a ‘problem-oriented policing’ approach to problem solving.

Intelligence managers indicated that community intelligence assisted them by identifying ‘problems and priorities’ and provided a ‘bigger picture’ of what was happening within their area of responsibility. It also assisted with ‘decision making and targeting’ their response to community problems, ‘resource allocation’ and identifying areas of ‘crime and criminal activity’ and ‘anti-social behaviour’.

**Understanding Community Cohesion**

Local neighbourhood policing staff and intelligence managers were asked to explain what they understood by the term community cohesion. Their responses were analysed and several key themes identified. Some of these key themes were found to have a greater frequency and thus were more significant than others.

Local neighbourhood policing staff responded by defining community cohesion under the following key themes; ‘community’, ‘working together’, harmony and unity’, ‘common aim or vision’, ‘partnership’ and ‘diversity’. Thus, as a collective local neighbourhood policing staff understood community cohesion to be; a *diverse community working together in partnership and in harmony and unity towards a common aim or vision.*
Intelligence managers also defined community cohesion using similar key themes; ‘community’, ‘harmony and unity’, ‘working together’, ‘diversity’ and ‘living together’. Intelligence managers excluded ‘partnership’ and ‘common aim and vision’ from their key themes, but included ‘living together’. Thus, as a collective intelligence managers’ overall understanding of community cohesion may be expressed as; a **diverse community living and working together in harmony and unity**.

One important aspect of community cohesion from an engagement and service delivery perspective was captured by one local neighbourhood policing staff member and one intelligence manager:

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Community is given same opportunities even if from different backgrounds. (LNPQ 14)
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It is ensuring that a community has its say from all sects. (IMQ 12)
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**Feedback to the Community**

Local neighbourhood policing staff and intelligence managers were asked to explain how they feedback to the community what had been achieved as a result of the community intelligence received. Their responses were analysed and several key themes identified. Some of these key themes were found to have a greater frequency and thus were more significant than others.

The most popular method of feedback to the community by local neighbourhood policing staff was by attending ‘meetings’, with 72.1 percent of staff indicating that they used this method. This was followed by ‘face to face’ encounters (37.1 percent), ‘OurBobby’ (31.9 percent), ‘newsletters’ (27.8 percent), ‘personal contact’ (22.6 percent), via the ‘media’ (22.6 percent), ‘surgeries’ (20.6 percent) and ‘social media’ (14.4). Over four-fifths (84.5 percent) of local neighbourhood policing staff indicated that they utilised more than one method of feeding back to the community. One local neighbourhood
policing staff member (LNPQ 50) chose not to respond to this question (Q29). Another member of staff (LNPQ 92) indicated that they had only been in their current role a short period of time and had not had an opportunity to feedback to the community, whilst a further member of staff (LNPQ 11) indicated that their role did not allow them the opportunity to provide feedback to the community. Therefore, the vast majority (96.9 percent) of local neighbourhood policing staff indicated that they fed back information directly to the community by whichever, method or methods they considered appropriate.

Intelligence managers used similar methods to feedback to the community, including the most popular methods of; attending ‘meetings’ (50.0 percent), ‘media’ (35.0 percent), ‘OurBobby’ (30.0 percent) and ‘personal contact’ (20.0 percent). Three-quarters (75.00 percent) of the intelligence managers indicated that they used more than one method of feeding back to the community on the outcome of the community intelligence they provided. Two intelligence managers [IMQ 9 and IMQ 19] indicated that they did not give feedback directly to the community because of their role within their BCU Intelligence Unit, but utilised NBMs (constables) and PCSOs to feedback on their behalf. Therefore, 90.0 percent of intelligence managers also indicated that they fed back information directly to the community by whichever, method or methods they considered appropriate.

**Evaluation of Community Intelligence**

Local neighbourhood policing staff and intelligence managers were asked to explain how they would evaluate the success of community intelligence. Their responses were analysed and several key themes identified. Some of these key themes were found to have a greater frequency and thus were more significant than others.

Local neighbourhood policing staff indicated that they found community intelligence to be ‘valuable’ and they would evaluate it by the ‘outcomes and results’ achieved from the
intelligence and by the ‘feedback’ received from the community. Other key themes included, ‘low crime and disorder’, the ‘perception of crime and safety’ by the community and the ‘quality of the intelligence’ received from the community.

Intelligence managers also indicated that they found community intelligence to be ‘valuable’ and they would also evaluate it by the ‘outcomes and results’ and a ‘reduction in crime and disorder’. They identified other key themes such as; ‘resolving issues’ that were a priority for the community and building ‘trust and confidence’ in the police within the community.

Although, both local neighbourhood policing staff and intelligence managers did consider ‘performance indicators’ as a theme in how to evaluate the success of community intelligence, only two members of local neighbourhood policing staff (LNPQ 10 and LNPQ 11) and one intelligence manager (IMQ 14) indirectly referred to them in their responses. However, one local neighbourhood policing staff member (LNPQ 4) did specifically refer to performance indicators and expressed their concern in the use of indicators in relation to intelligence.

Any Other Comments

Local neighbourhood policing staff and intelligence managers were asked if they wished to make any additional comments at the conclusion of the questionnaire. Just over a fifth (21.6 percent) of local neighbourhood policing staff responded, whilst only 10.0 percent of intelligence managers responded.

The main key themes highlighted by the local neighbourhood policing staff were ‘intelligence opportunities’, ‘improving policing’ and ‘neighbourhood policing cutbacks’, whilst intelligence managers highlighted ‘staff cut backs’ and ‘too little engagement’ with community leaders and partners.
Summary and Discussion

The research findings were presented in a manner which corresponds to the format of the questions from the postal survey self-completion questionnaire and the semi-structured interviews, and the key themes that emerged from the comprehensive literature review on neighbourhood policing and community intelligence under the headings of Intelligence and Policing Systems, Policing in Context, Police Application of Intelligence and Community Engagement, Intelligence and Cohesion. (See Chapter 2: Policing and Community Engagement and Chapter 3: Intelligence and Its Policing Applications).

These research findings represented the responses of the local neighbourhood policing staff and the intelligence managers who participated in the postal survey self-completion questionnaire and the intelligence managers who participated in the semi-structured interviews. The quantitative and qualitative data obtained was analysed concurrently and merged at the interpretation phase of the Triangulation Design: Convergence Model research design to answer the research question above (Bryman, 2006; Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007). A critical discussion of the research findings can be found in Chapter 6: Discussion and Observations.
Chapter 6: Discussion and Observations

Introduction
This chapter provides a critical discussion of the research findings from the previous chapter in relation to the primary data from the postal survey self-completion questionnaires and semi-structured interviews. It also highlights a number of observations from the research findings and from the researcher’s experience of working regionally with the All Wales Neighbourhood Policing Development Group and nationally with the NPIA during the period of this research. South Wales Police in particular and the police service in general may wish to consider the observations below, which may assist in the improvement of policing, particularly neighbourhood policing and community intelligence. (The specific recommendations are listed in Chapter 7: Conclusion).

Intelligence and Policing Systems
South Wales Police clearly differentiates between community and criminal intelligence, as it has produced an operational policy in relation to community intelligence, which contains its own definition of community intelligence; ‘Community intelligence is ‘local information’ which, when assessed, provides intelligence on issues that affects neighbourhoods’ (South Wales Police, 2010: 3; 2012a: 3). South Wales Police has also developed a Community Information/Intelligence Diary (or Community Intelligence Blog) based on an occurrence created on the NICHE RMS, together with its Standard Operating Procedures (Dodd, 2008a). However, there is still some considerable confusion amongst local neighbourhood policing staff and intelligence managers as to what constitutes community intelligence.

The definition of community intelligence used by South Wales Police is quite vague and is open to numerous interpretations. This has led to local neighbourhood policing staff and
intelligence managers devising their own definitions of community intelligence based on their own personal perceptions.

The responses received from local neighbourhood policing staff and intelligence managers identified that there is a lack of understanding of what constitutes community intelligence together with the associated implications. These include the recording of information and intelligence, the quality and quantity of the information and a tendency, particularly by Intelligence Unit staff to rely on criminal intelligence, even if under the guise of community intelligence.

The responses of local neighbourhood policing staff and intelligence managers indicate that there is still confusion between the terms information and intelligence particularly in relation to community information and intelligence across the South Wales Police area.

There appears to be greater agreement between local neighbourhood policing staff and intelligence managers as to what constitutes criminal intelligence when compared to community intelligence. There also appears to be a greater understanding of criminal intelligence making it easier for local neighbourhood policing staff and intelligence managers to define. The greater emphasis placed on crime and particularly on targeting criminals by the police service, originates from the Audit Commission (1993: 41) report; ‘Helping With Enquiries: Tackling Crime Effectively’, in an attempt to increase police performance in relation to tackling crime and increasing crime detections. This focus on crime and crime detections is still apparent in police organisational culture today (Cochran and Bromley, 2003).

From the researcher’s experience of working regionally with the All Wales Neighbourhood Policing Development Group and nationally with the NPIA, there is good anecdotal evidence to suggest that other police forces also experience difficulties in distinguishing between community information and intelligence, and in defining community intelligence.
Other police forces also appear to focus on criminal intelligence, crime and crime detections, which may indicate that this is a much wider cultural issue associated with the legacy of the Audit Commission (1993) report and the introduction of central government and latterly PCC performance targets (Scott, 1998). This action-centred crime fighting approach appears to be in conflict with the principles of neighbourhood policing and in dealing with neighbourhood problems and priorities (Scott, 1998; Tilley, 2004; Maguire and John, 2006). (See Chapter 3: Intelligence and its Policing Applications)

It would appear that there is a lack of corporacy in the way that community intelligence is recorded across the South Wales Police area. Although staff from all four BCUs submit community intelligence on NIRs, greater use of the Community Intelligence Diary occurs in the Central and Eastern BCUs. As the definition of community intelligence is unclear and relies on individual perception, this has caused confusion in the recording process. Confusion also arises when criminal intelligence is received from the community. Some local neighbourhood policing staff and intelligence managers regard this intelligence as community intelligence and record it on a NIR, whilst others may record this on the Community Intelligence Diary and may be required at a later date to re-submit it on a NIR. Concerns were raised by intelligence managers that some staff may not re-submit the intelligence in the required format and therefore intelligence would be lost.

These research findings suggest that the Community Intelligence Diary is being updated correctly in the Eastern BCU (Cardiff) and the Central BCU (The Vale of Glamorgan and Bridgend). However, the Bridgend section of the Central BCU is not as good at updating the Diary as the Vale of Glamorgan section. The Northern BCU (Merthyr and Rhondda Cynon Taf) and the Western BCU (Swansea and Neath Port Talbot) rely more on the submission of NIRs, but it would appear that some community information and intelligence is being lost as a result.
These research findings also suggest that the Community Intelligence Diary is being used to support the delivery of policing in the Eastern and Central BCUs. However, because the Diary is not being updated efficiently and effectively in the Northern and Western BCUs, its use in supporting the delivery of policing is limited.

This appears to be related to the time intelligence managers have to monitor the Community Intelligence Diary due to their heavy workloads and whether all the intelligence submitted is processed. The increased workload of Intelligence Unit staff and the backlog in the processing of NIRs also raises concerns in relation to the timeliness of imputing intelligence into the NICHE RMS for analysis. This has greater implications for community intelligence as it would appear that criminal intelligence is given a higher priority for action than community intelligence, as the detection of crime is given the highest priority. Some local neighbourhood policing staff may also record community intelligence on the Community Intelligence Diary as well as on a NIR, due to perceived accessibility issues with NIRs at a later date. This practice can encourage the duplication in the recording of both community and criminal intelligence.

Similar issues of corporacy in the recording of community information and intelligence has been identified from the researcher’s experience of working with other police forces regionally and nationally. How community information and intelligence is recorded, processed, stored and disseminated appears to vary within police forces and between forces, which presents practical problems locally, regionally and nationally when the information or intelligence needs to be accessed and analysed. This lack of corporacy may result in the loss of intelligence.

The centralisation of some BCU Intelligence Units caused concern amongst some LIOs as they believe that they were no longer Local Intelligence Officers and had lost touch with individual local policing areas (or sectors). They believed that the centralisation process
had also made them office bound due to the insufficient numbers of Intelligence Unit staff and their increased workload.

It would also appear that criminal intelligence was considered to be more formal in nature than community intelligence. The sharing of criminal intelligence by intelligence managers was therefore more formalised, taking into account information sharing protocols and the Data Protection Act 1998 (Home Office, 1998b). However, because of the perceived relative informality of community intelligence care should be taken and the appropriate safeguards put in place to ensure compliance with all data protection requirements when sharing community intelligence with partner agencies and members of the public.

The most popular methods of obtaining community intelligence by local neighbourhood policing staff was through community engagement and interacting with partners, whilst intelligence managers relied more on interrogating the NICHE RMS and NSPIS Command and Control System, although there was some liaison with partners. This highlights the importance of community engagement and partnership working particularly for local neighbourhood policing staff.

Access to social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter is very restricted due to licensing arrangements, with only a small number of police officers and staff having legitimate access and official training for police use. Therefore, the use of social media sites as a means of obtaining community intelligence is also very restricted due to the heavy workloads of RITES accredited staff such as LIOs, who are officially the only staff able to access these sites. This restricted access may result in some police officers and staff using their personal social media accounts to carry out work related enquiries into their own areas to glean community intelligence or to engage with their communities, which may have future implications for South Wales Police.
Although social media has officially been used by police in the UK since 2008, its use has been restricted nationally due to a risk adverse police culture (Flanagan, 2007; 2008; Devon and Cornwall Constabulary, 2010; NPIA, 2010a; ACPO, 2013), with Facebook and Twitter only being used to reinforce existing communication strategies and for public information purposes (Crump, 2011), rather than transactional or collaborative purposes (Brainard and McNutt, 2010). These studies tend to support the findings of this research.

The largest group of staff who either did not know what happened to intelligence once it had been submitted or did not know if they knew what happened to the intelligence were five PCSOs. A further 10 PCSOs and 12 constables indicated that they only knew part of the intelligence process. This suggests that there still appears to be gaps in the knowledge and understanding of the NIM and its associated processes, which was initially highlighted by John and Maguire (2003; 2004a: 2004b) in their research on the early implementation of the NIM in the UK.

It would appear that there is again a lack of corporacy in the processes that intelligence managers use to request community intelligence as part of the wider intelligence requirement, to receive feedback on their request and the processing of the community intelligence once it has been received.

Community intelligence was requested in a variety of ways including; using the Community Intelligence Diary (Blog), creating a specific occurrence or a task on the NICHE RMS, via intelligence bulletins, tasking documents and daily intelligence briefings, verbally and by e-mail. These processes differed between and within BCUs, with the only common factor being that all BCUs used the daily intelligence briefings to request community and criminal intelligence.

Similarly, there were a variety of methods employed to receive the community intelligence as part of the feedback process including; intelligence packages prepared by
LIOs and FIOs, verbal updates, e-mails and reports from staff, NIRs submitted directly to the LIO via the NICHE RMS, dedicated NICHE RMS master occurrences and the Community Intelligence Diary (Blog).

Once the community intelligence had been received by the various methods outlined above, the responsibility for deciding on who should action it and how it should be recorded also varied. For example some community intelligence is recorded as Waymarkers on the South Wales Police iR3 system. The lack of corporacy in the intelligence requirement process can cause confusion amongst local neighbourhood policing staff and intelligence managers. Without a specific audit trail to support the request and feedback processes, this may again result in the loss of intelligence.

Nearly a third of local neighbourhood policing staff who responded to the question (Q9): Do you receive Community Intelligence after it has been collected, processed and analysed? did not or did not know if they received community intelligence after it had been processed. This may be as a result of the lack of clarity in how community intelligence should be recorded or it may suggest that community intelligence is given a lower priority than criminal intelligence by Intelligence Unit staff when it comes to preparing intelligence packages for return to local neighbourhood policing staff. Further research would be necessary to examine and clarify this hypothesis.

The South Wales Police Community Intelligence Policy was first published on 8th December 2010 and was later reviewed on 19th December 2012 (South Wales Police, 2010; 2012a). The Community Intelligence Policy outlines the use, supervision and ownership of the Community Intelligence Diary and in conjunction with the Standard Operating Procedures (Dodd, 2008a; 2008b) sets out the procedures for the recording of community intelligence and information. However, only approximately, one third of local neighbourhood policing staff and intelligence managers were aware of the policy. This may have implications for South Wales Police in relation to the disclosure of information

Similarly, only 26.0 percent of local neighbourhood policing staff and perhaps more surprisingly only 10.5 percent of the intelligence managers were aware that the detective inspector from the BCU Intelligence Unit had overall responsibility for community intelligence within the BCU. The detective inspector also has the responsibility to ensure that Community Intelligence Diary entries are reviewed and to designate compliance issues to a LIO or a Sector Intelligence Officer, where there is one in place (South Wales Police, 2012a: 5). This also has implications in relation to the use of the Community Intelligence Diary, if it is not correctly supervised.

**Policing in Context**

Both local neighbourhood policing staff and intelligence managers defined neighbourhood or local policing using similar key themes. However, interestingly only two intelligence managers out of all the respondents identified gathering intelligence as a feature of local neighbourhood policing, even though the second requirement of neighbourhood policing advocates that policing should be intelligence-led and focused on community concerns (ACPO, 2006e).

It would appear that there is some confusion amongst local neighbourhood policing staff and intelligence managers as to what constitutes a neighbourhood. This has far reaching consequences in relation to neighbourhood profiling, which in turn directly affects assessing diversity, decisions on community engagement techniques, identifying KINs and undertaking a partnership resource audit for a defined neighbourhood, which are among the key messages and themes emerging from the academic literature and official
guidance on neighbourhood policing. (See Chapter 2: Policing and Community Engagement).

This also raises issues of corporacy and is confusing for staff, particularly local neighbourhood policing staff if they move from one local policing area to another. This lack of corporacy may also cause some concern for the South Wales Police and Crime Commissioner when making judgements about the effectiveness of community engagement throughout the South Wales Police area, as comparisons may become more difficult. From the researcher’s experience of working with other police forces regionally and nationally within the UK, there is further anecdotal evidence to suggest that other forces also experience difficulties in defining a neighbourhood, which is a fundamental element of neighbourhood policing.

Neighbourhood profiles allow an organisation and its staff to develop a greater understanding of the neighbourhood itself and the people visiting, working and living in that neighbourhood. Neighbourhood profiles can also assist in assessing the diversity of a neighbourhood and thus ensure engagement with all sections of the community and assist in identifying KINs (NPIA, 2009b).

Nearly three quarters of local neighbourhood policing staff were aware of their neighbourhood profiles and their content, whereas less than a third of intelligence managers were aware of their neighbourhood profiles and their content. This may have serious consequences for local policing inspectors when considering strategic and tactical assessments and identifying the risk, threat and harm to their areas. The ACPO Practice Advice on Professionalising the Business of Neighbourhood Policing (ACPO, 2006e: 34) recommends that neighbourhood profiles should be reviewed every three to six months and managed in accordance with the ACPO Guidance on the Management of Police Information (ACPO, 2006c; 2010b).
Intelligence Unit staff, particularly LIOs could also benefit from the information contained in neighbourhood profiles and could provide invaluable intelligence to local neighbourhood policing staff to further develop their profiles. However, it would appear that increased workloads and centralisation of some Intelligence Unit staff have made LIOs less proactive and more reactive.

Some intelligence managers recognise the value of neighbourhood profiles and one local policing inspector was attempting to further enhance their profiles with the inclusion of Experian Mosaic profiling. Others believe that this should be left to the local neighbourhood policing staff to update and monitor, as they have an in depth knowledge of their neighbourhoods. However, if neighbourhood profiles are not correctly managed in accordance with the ACPO Practice Advice and Guidance (ACPO, 2006c; 2006e; 2010b) they become inaccurate and outdated, and if experienced local neighbourhood policing staff leave their area, valuable information may be lost.

Nearly two fifths of local neighbourhood policing staff and two fifths of intelligence managers did not use neighbourhood profiling to assess the diversity of their neighbourhoods. Nearly half of the local neighbourhood policing staff and just over half of intelligence managers indicated that they did not use neighbourhood profiles to decide on the most appropriate community engagement techniques and over a quarter of local neighbourhood policing staff and over two fifths of intelligence managers stated that they did not use profiling to identify KINs. These findings represent a significant number of local neighbourhood policing staff and intelligence managers who do not profile their neighbourhoods to assess diversity, to decide on appropriate community engagement techniques and to identify KINs. (See Chapter 2: Policing and Community Engagement).

Surprisingly, nearly three quarters of local neighbourhood policing staff and three quarters of intelligence managers indicated that they had not undertaken a partnership resource audit. This implies that the majority of local neighbourhood policing staff and
intelligence managers were unaware of their potential partners and the resources that they have at their disposal. This has major implications for South Wales Police in relation to its efficiency, effectiveness and economy, and its overall performance management. It also has implications in relation to shared community engagement and community intelligence, and ultimately in providing cohesive policing services in times of austerity.

**Police Application of Intelligence**

Nearly three quarters of local neighbourhood policing staff and three quarters of intelligence managers indicated that community intelligence was of the same value as criminal intelligence. However, a higher percentage of intelligence managers (20.0 percent) believed that community intelligence was of lower value than criminal intelligence compared to 6.2 percent of local neighbourhood policing staff. Thus, when processing intelligence, a fifth of intelligence managers may be biased in their decision making and give criminal intelligence a higher priority compared to community intelligence. This again appears to relate back to police culture of *real policing* (Alderson, 1979) and the very high priority given to fighting crime and crime detections, often to the detriment of neighbourhood priorities and problem solving (Scott, 1998; Waddington, 1999; Cochran and Bromley, 2003; Maguire and John, 2006).

Half of the local neighbourhood policing staff and three quarters of intelligence managers indicated that neighbourhood patrols and police operations were intelligence-led (Ratcliffe, 2008a). Therefore, even taking into account the discrepancy between local neighbourhood policing staff and intelligence managers, not all neighbourhood patrols and operations are intelligence-led, although the majority of the remainder appear to be sometimes intelligence-led (Ratcliffe, 2002b).

This again raises the issue of the recording of community intelligence. If community intelligence is recorded on a NIR then it is the LIOs who are making the real decisions during the analysis process as to whether the intelligence should be actioned and who it
should be sent to for action to be taken. As part of this process LIOs may contact or task local policing inspectors to take action on the processed intelligence. However, not all community intelligence is recorded or recorded in a manner that is searchable and can be analysed. This has resulted in NBMs making decisions on local policing operations without the benefit of possible additional intelligence analysis by LIOs. This may result in only dealing with a given problem superficially and not getting to the root causes of it (Goldstein, 1990; 1996), which would prevent the scenario outlined by respondent IMI 5 (IMQ 5) in Chapter 5: Research Findings; where every Friday night, 50 to 60 young people gather to drink alcohol at a known location and every Friday night the local NPT respond to the same problem of anti-social behaviour.

The tasking of local policing inspectors with community intelligence for action and the introduction of Waymarkers on the South Wales Police iR3 system appears to have made local neighbourhood policing staff and intelligence managers more accountable in relation to the action taken once the intelligence has been received or gathered and processed, providing an audit trail for future inspection.

None of the intelligence managers interviewed could give an accurate figure of what percentage of the intelligence received is community intelligence. One intelligence manager indicated that there were no statistics available in relation to the source of the intelligence (IMI 23). Most of the replies were *guesstimates* and these varied widely from 20.0 percent to 80.0 percent. The replies were influenced by what each individual intelligence manager considered to be community intelligence or criminal intelligence or whether they distinguished between the two. Further research would be necessary to determine the percentage of community intelligence received by police, which would require police forces to distinguish community intelligence from other forms of intelligence (Innes, Fielding and Cope, 2005), so that it could be statistically analysed.
The LIOs were the only intelligence managers that actually see all the intelligence that is properly recorded and submitted by police staff and partners. Thus, LIOs make all of the decisions in relation to what is information and what is intelligence, what is community intelligence and what is criminal intelligence, and who should action that intelligence. Therefore, the LIOs appear to be the real intelligence managers and the decisions they make will be influenced by a number of factors including; organisational culture, behaviour, management, leadership, information and knowledge. (See Chapter 3: Intelligence and its Policing Applications).

It would appear that a greater emphasis is placed on the processing of criminal intelligence. However, some criminal intelligence, particularly intelligence related to controlled drugs may be being categorised as community intelligence by some LIOs, if it originates from the community, compounding the confusion mentioned above. Thus, the criminal element of community intelligence is also given a higher priority than the neighbourhood concerns element of community intelligence, for example; anti-social behaviour. This bias towards criminal intelligence appears to be driven by the daily management and monthly CompStat meetings, where little attention is paid to understanding neighbourhood views, needs, problems, priorities and expectations (Weisburd et al 2003; Manning, 2005).

Some LIOs requested instant feedback from intelligence packages they prepared, as they are no longer able to participate in police operations because of their increased workload. The feedback allows them to prepare better intelligence products in the future.

A great deal of time and effort is put into preparing a briefing document for the daily management meeting by laboriously trawling through every NSPIS incident and NICHE RMS occurrence. LIOs in particular put considerable efforts into producing the briefing document. However, the document is heavily weighted towards crime events that have occurred over the past 24 hours and to various criminals located within the local policing
areas (or sectors), with the aim of increasing crime detections. This process again highlights the emphasis placed on crime control and detections and the competing priorities, tensions and contradictions between performance management, neighbourhood policing, problem-oriented policing and intelligence-led policing. (See Chapter 3: Intelligence and its Policing Applications).

Local policing inspectors or their deputies may be challenged by members of the BCU Senior Management Team during the daily management meeting in a CompStat like manner to ascertain their understanding of the issues in their area and what they intend to do to resolve them. Therefore, local policing inspectors and their deputies spend a considerable amount of time each day preparing for the daily management meeting so that they don’t get caught out and embarrassed by their lack of knowledge and understanding when challenged. This can result in a considerable amount of duplication of effort by Intelligence Unit staff and local policing staff. This appears to be similar to the ‘gotcha syndrome’ and ‘process trap’ problems associated with the CompStat process identified by Bratton and Malinowski (2008: 263). Daily management (CompStat) meetings are also supplemented by monthly Force and BCU level CompStat meetings, which appear to have replaced the less adversarial and more supportive NIM Tasking and Coordinating Group meetings.

Minimising duplication may result in more effort being directed towards extracting both community and criminal intelligence from NSPIS and the NICHE RMS, and analysing the intelligence to ensure a more proactive and predictive method of policing.

It would appear that both local neighbourhood policing staff and intelligence managers are using a variety of community engagement techniques to engage with their local communities. Some intelligence managers, particularly detective inspectors, detective sergeants and FIOs have to restrict their overt activities within the community due to the covert nature of their role. As a result they have to rely on other police staff such as
local neighbourhood policing staff and LIOs to engage with the community. However, because of their increasingly high workload, LIOs are finding themselves more and more office bound and unable to engage with community members and partners. This may have an impact in the future on the quantity and quality of intelligence being gathered from the community and relevant partners.

Only approximately half of the local neighbourhood policing staff and intelligence managers use neighbourhood profiling to decide on the most appropriate engagement techniques for their communities. Without neighbourhood profiling, it is possible that sections of the community, particularly minority groups are not being identified and thus are not having any engagement with the police. The views of minority groups on policing and other matters may therefore be omitted and the true needs and expectations of the whole community misrepresented.

**Community Engagement, Intelligence and Cohesion**

Just over three-fifths of local neighbourhood policing staff utilise or sometimes utilise community intelligence to assist with counter terrorism compared to 95.0 percent of the intelligence managers. Similarly, three quarters of local neighbourhood policing staff utilise or sometimes utilise community intelligence to assist with tackling organised crime groups compared to all of the intelligence managers. The use of community intelligence by nearly all the intelligence managers in the management of counter terrorism and organised crime groups may be due to their roles as local policing inspectors and Intelligence Unit staff. Only one intelligence manager (perhaps surprisingly a detective inspector) did not utilise community intelligence to assist with counter terrorism.

The reliability of the data in relation to counter terrorism and tackling organised crime was considered as part of the critical data analysis, due to the relatively high percentage of respondents who indicated they utilised or sometimes utilised community intelligence
to assist with these categories of crime. However, it was found that South Wales Police (and other police forces) give a very high priority to these two categories of crime and all police staff are asked to gather community intelligence on terrorism and organised crime as part of their day to day duties. Thus, it is believed that this data is reliable and credible.

The vast majority of local neighbourhood policing staff utilised community intelligence to assist with ‘Crime in General’ (93.7 percent), ‘Anti-Social Behaviour’ (95.8 percent), ‘Reducing the Fear of Crime’ (85.4 percent) and ‘Local Problem Solving’ (93.7 percent). Similarly, 95.0 percent of intelligence managers utilised community intelligence to assist with all four categories. This appears to indicate the importance of intelligence that comes from the community in assisting with reducing crime, the fear of crime and anti-social behaviour and with local problem solving.

The local neighbourhood policing staff took a more tactical view of the assistance given by community intelligence, whilst the intelligence managers’ view is slightly more strategic incorporating ‘decision making’ and ‘resource allocation’.

The community intelligence scenario was designed in four stages and could be applicable to either counter terrorism or tackling organised crime groups. The scenario intentionally involved four different members of the public who contacted four different PCSOs or constables directly without using the South Wales Police PSC, where all calls would have been recorded. The purpose of the scenario was to determine if information from each of the four stages of the scenario would be recorded at all, if it was, would it be recorded as information or intelligence, the manner in which it would be recorded and if the information or intelligence from the four stages would be linked using the NICHE RMS to assist with operational decision making.
For the first stage of the scenario the majority of intelligence managers agreed that additional enquiries should be conducted at the location of the sighting of the white transit type van before any community intelligence is recorded and submitted. Submission of a NIR without those further enquiries being made would result in a LIO returning the NIR to the submitting officer and tasking them to conduct further enquiries. If further enquiries were made and there was no further information on this vehicle, particularly the vehicle registration number and the officer had not requested the creation of a NSPIS incident/NICHE RMS occurrence via the police PSC or created an entry on the sector Community Intelligence Diary, then it is unlikely that this initial sighting of the white van would be recorded as an occurrence or as community intelligence.

For the second stage of the scenario some intelligence managers suggested that further enquiries would still need to be made before community intelligence was recorded and submitted. A small number of intelligence managers believed that community intelligence would be submitted at this stage whilst others stated that they were not so sure that intelligence would be submitted. There was agreement amongst intelligence managers that the creation of a NSPIS incident/NICHE RMS occurrence and submission of intelligence depended to a great extent on the individual officer and their work ethic. Intelligence managers also had serious doubts as to whether the community intelligence from the first two stages would be linked if the vehicle registration number of the white van was not known and highlighted the problems associated with linking intelligence by location on the NICHE RMS.

For the third stage of the scenario some intelligence managers believed that community intelligence would be submitted at this stage or the incident would be investigated, whilst others stated that they were not convinced that intelligence would be submitted, as it depended on the emotional intelligence of the member of the public and the police officer at the time of the reporting. The poor standard of NIRs being submitted was also
highlighted at this stage with one intelligence manager estimating that 50.0 to 60.0 percent of NIRs that were returned to police officers for further enquiries and resubmission were never returned. Some intelligence managers again expressed serious doubts that community intelligence from the first three stages would be linked and again highlighted the problems of linking intelligence on the NICHE RMS by location only. Other issues in relation to the format of the recording and the frequency of the submission of the intelligence would also hamper the intelligence being linked. The involvement of other police departments such as SB and WECTU were also highlighted during this stage.

For the fourth and final stage of the scenario the majority of intelligence managers were confident that the incident would be recorded, but were unsure in what format, for example; as community or criminal intelligence on a NIR, in the Community Intelligence Diary or on a NICHE RMS occurrence. This would also influence whether the intelligence from all four stages of the scenario were linked. Again there were serious doubts amongst intelligence managers as to whether they would be linked. One intelligence manager suggested that the perceptions of the police officer receiving the report were an essential factor in whether the intelligence from the four stages would be linked. Another intelligence manager indicated that some police officers would prefer others to make the links for them. The involvement of the WECTU in possibly finding and making the links between the intelligence was also highlighted during this stage.

One intelligence manager also suggested that the NPT Inbox on the NICHE RMS and the Daily Intelligence Management system may act as safeguards to ensure that intelligence from the various stages were linked, but this again depended on staff passing information to the NPT Inbox and staff making the links from the information provided in the Daily Intelligence Management bulletin.
The recording and submission of information and intelligence in the correct format is completely in the hands of each individual PCSO or constable. During the course of the interviews there was some criticism of PCSOs by intelligence managers, particularly by local policing inspectors in relation to their ability to correctly deal with the handling of information and intelligence. This appears to suggest that there is a particular learning and development need for PCSOs in the way they respond to information provided by members of the public and how they deal with community intelligence.

There is clearly a problem of linking intelligence to street locations on the NICHE RMS, which needs to be resolved as soon as possible, as this problem will be exacerbated with time. The process for the resubmission of poor standard NIRs also appears flawed if 50.0 to 60.0 percent of NIRs returned are never resubmitted. A resubmission process including administrative checks and auditing would help to prevent intelligence being lost.

Safeguards should be considered in relation to the frequency of submissions of related intelligence, for example, when community intelligence on terrorism is submitted on three consecutive days when different members of police staff are working. Community intelligence that is submitted, but at first appears innocuous, may not be linked to further apparently innocuous incidents that would have given an insight into a bigger picture and future events. If not submitted as community intelligence on a NIR, processes should be strengthened to ensure that community information is recorded on the Community Intelligence Diary. Changing the name of the Diary to Community Information Log may assist this process.

Only one member of the local neighbourhood policing staff and one intelligence manager broadly identified an important foundation of an integrated and cohesive community, i.e. ‘People from different backgrounds having similar life opportunities’ (Home Office (CLG), 2008: 10), which is important in terms of engagement and service delivery.
Encouragingly, 96.9 percent of local neighbourhood policing staff and 90.0 percent of intelligence managers indicated that they fed back information directly to the community by whichever, method or methods they considered most appropriate, which undoubtedly assists in the engagement and communication processes.

Most local neighbourhood policing staff and intelligence managers indicated that they evaluated community intelligence by ‘outcomes and results’ and a ‘reduction in crime and disorder’. However, other issues such as the ‘perception of crime and safety’ and ‘trust and confidence’ in the police were also important.

**Summary and Discussion**

This research has found that some community intelligence is used to inform and direct local neighbourhood policing in South Wales. Community intelligence is used to direct local policing patrols and operations, and thus supports the delivery of local neighbourhood policing, but its use could be far greater. Community intelligence is also used to assist with counter terrorism, tackling organised crime, crime in general, anti-social behaviour, reducing the fear of crime and local problem solving. However, due to the confusion that exists in relation to what constitutes community information and intelligence and the lack of a viable definition of community intelligence within South Wales Police, some community information and intelligence is not recorded or not initially recoded correctly. If not recorded correctly, the current re-submission process can result in the loss of information or intelligence.

There is also confusion as to what constitutes a neighbourhood. This has implications for the other messages and themes that emerged from the comprehensive review of the literature and official guidance, such as; neighbourhood profiling, identifying KINs and partners, community engagement, community cohesion, citizen focused policing, problem solving and ultimately community intelligence. Importantly, included within...
these themes are strategies in relation to communication, social marketing and evaluation to ensure lessons are learnt and that the best possible service is provided to the public. This research supports the messages and themes that have emerged from the literature and official guidance, and has identified that a greater understanding of these individual themes and how they conflict and interact may increase the use of community intelligence in informing and directing local neighbourhood policing in South Wales (and other police forces), and in providing cohesive policing services to members of the public within our diverse communities.

The competing priorities, tensions and contradictions that exist between performance management, neighbourhood policing, problem-oriented policing and intelligence-led policing coupled with an organisational culture focused on crime fighting and crime detections through a CompStat style process also appear to restrict the use of community intelligence in informing and directing local neighbourhood policing. The use of NIM as a business model for policing to integrate performance management and the three main policing models may ease the restrictions on the processing and analysis of community intelligence for non-crime related matters.

Although these findings, discussion and observations relate to research undertaken with South Wales Police there is good anecdotal evidence from the researcher’s experience in working regionally with the All Wales Neighbourhood Policing Development Group and nationally with the NPIA to suggest that many of the findings would also be applicable to other police forces.
Chapter 7: Conclusion

Introduction
This chapter will consider the original contribution made by this research to scientific knowledge, the practical lessons from this research, potential future research, future directions in policing and the researcher’s personal learning and development.

Original Contribution to Scientific Knowledge
This research has critically analysed the use of community intelligence in local neighbourhood policing and through the research findings examined in detail how community intelligence and local neighbourhood policing were perceived by police officers and staff across the South Wales Police area. It also evaluated how community intelligence is obtained through community engagement, the analysis of NSPIS command and control and NICHE record management systems, as well as social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter. This research has examined the processes used to record and analyse community and criminal intelligence, the value placed on community intelligence and the application of community intelligence to inform and direct local neighbourhood policing, utilising policing models such as intelligence-led policing and problem-oriented policing. It has also analysed the application of community intelligence in reducing crime, anti-social behaviour and the fear of crime, and particularly its use in counter terrorism and tackling organised crime.

The original contribution to scientific knowledge relates to the following areas of research: Firstly, it has enabled a greater understanding of community intelligence, particularly how it is perceived by police officers and staff involved in local neighbourhood policing and the management of intelligence on a daily basis. Secondly, it has enabled the proposition of an alternative definition of community intelligence. Thirdly, it has allowed a better understanding of how community intelligence is used to
inform and direct local neighbourhood policing and its potential use in counter terrorism and tackling organised crime. Finally, it has provided an insight from practical lessons and the messages and themes that emerged from the literature and official guidance, as to how policing services may be improved in the future by providing cohesive policing services to the public in times of austerity and limited resources.

**Practical Lessons from this Research**

A number of practical lessons have been identified from this research, in relation to the learning and development needs of staff and managers, staffing levels and the location of BCU Intelligence Unit staff, the specialised training of staff, and the policies and procedures impacting upon community information and intelligence. These lessons may assist police managers to understand and tackle the issues that were highlighted in this research.

The following 17 recommendations have been accentuated for consideration by senior police managers in general and from South Wales Police in particular.

**Recommendations**

**Recommendation 1**: Consideration should be given to the implementation of further learning and development for all staff in relation to what constitutes community information and community intelligence, and the standard operating procedures for dealing with such information and intelligence.

**Recommendation 2**: The number of BCU Intelligence Unit staff should be increased in order to meet the current and future intelligence demands, including community intelligence and the role of the LIO should be decentralised to ensure a return to *local* working practices.
**Recommendation 3**: More staff should be trained to become RITES accredited, which would allow staff greater access to social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter.

**Recommendation 4**: The Social Networking Policy (South Wales Police, 2012b) in relation to the; *Official use of Social Networks by South Wales Police personnel and officers during their own or work time and using their own resources*, should be reviewed in order to clarify the situation arising from the use of personal resources.

**Recommendation 5**: Consideration should be given to providing additional learning and development for FLSOs, PCSOs and constables, including special constables to fill the knowledge gap in relation to the NIM and to provide a greater understanding of the whole intelligence process.

**Recommendation 6**: The community intelligence requirement process should be made more corporate with specific processes for requests, feedback, recording and action to ensure accountability and a defined audit trail.

**Recommendation 7**: Community intelligence gathering should be promoted and re-established as a feature of a local neighbourhood policing style for South Wales Police across all its BCUs and departments.

**Recommendation 8**: Consideration should be given to the implementation of further learning and development for all police staff in relation to the importance of neighbourhood profiles in developing a more complete picture of diversity and identifying appropriate community engagement techniques and KINs. This should also serve to enhance the overall scope and quality of the community intelligence received.
**Recommendation 9:** Consideration should again be given to the learning and development for all police staff in relation to partnership resource audits to provide a greater understanding of their importance in times of austerity and limited resources.

**Recommendation 10:** Consideration should be given to providing learning and development for all LIOs in relation to organisational decision making within the NDM and the NIM to minimise the bias caused by factors such as; organisational culture, behaviour, management, leadership, information and knowledge.

**Recommendation 11:** The Daily Management CompStat like meeting should be reviewed to minimise the considerable amount of duplication of effort by Intelligence Unit staff and local policing staff in preparing for meetings. More effort could then be directed towards extracting both community and criminal intelligence from NSPIS and the NICHE RMS and analysing the intelligence to ensure a more proactive and predictive method of policing.

**Recommendation 12:** Consideration should be given to the learning and development needs of all staff, particularly PCSOs when dealing with information from members of the public, from the creation of a NSPIS incident/NICHE RMS occurrence to the recording of community information or intelligence in the appropriate format.

**Recommendation 13:** The problem of linking intelligence to street locations on the NICHE RMS should be resolved as soon as possible, as intelligence which could provide a bigger picture is undoubtedly being lost and this problem will only get worse with time.
**Recommendation 14:** Consideration should be given to introducing a learning and development package for all staff in relation to the poor standard of NIR submission and the resubmission of reports when found to be substandard. A clear submission and resubmission process with built-in administrative checks and auditing would prevent intelligence being lost.

**Recommendation 15:** Consideration should be given to the learning and development needs of all staff in relation to emotional intelligence, which would assist with their verbal and non-verbal communications with members of the public.

**Recommendation 16:** The name of the Community Intelligence Diary should be changed to the *Community Information Log*, as it is a national policing policy that all intelligence is recorded on a NIR and the name Community Intelligence Diary causes confusion amongst staff. Procedures should then be strengthened to ensure that community information is added to the Community Information Log, and supervisors and LIOs monitor the Log for potential intelligence and compliance with procedures.

**Recommendation 17:** Consideration should be given to the learning and development needs of staff in relation to fully understanding and achieving community cohesion within their diverse local communities.

**Potential Future Research**

Having undertaken a comprehensive literature review as part of this research and from the research findings it became apparent that there were a number of factors that could affect the quantity and more importantly the quality of community intelligence, its use and its ability to assist in informing and directing the delivery of local neighbourhood policing and in providing more cohesive policing services.
Firstly, the recording of community intelligence and particularly community information requires further research to fully investigate and identify the pinch points in the administrative processes where community information and intelligence is apparently being lost, and whether processed and analysed community intelligence, in the form of an intelligence package, is being returned to local neighbourhood policing staff for action.

Secondly, further research would be necessary to determine what percentage of the total intelligence received by police is community intelligence and what percentage of that intelligence is used to inform and direct local neighbourhood policing. However, for this research to be undertaken the police service would have to introduce processes that enabled community intelligence to be distinguished from other forms of intelligence.

**Future Directions in Policing**

**Research on Policing**

Research on policing has seen many stages of development since the 1960’s, including ‘consensus’, ‘controversy’, ‘conflict’ and ‘contradiction’, and more recently ‘crime control’, with research focusing on policing strategies, the organisation of policing and evidence-based policing (Reiner, 1989; 1992a; 2010: 11-13). In her speech to the College of Policing on the 24th October 2013, the Home Secretary, Rt. Hon. Theresa May, MP was quite clear that she expected the research on policing to be directed towards evidence-based policing to reduce crime.

_The College will work with universities to collect and review evidence on the effectiveness of different strategies and practices for reducing crime. The knowledge of what works – and what doesn’t – will be shared with PCCs and the police, and with the public as well. This will help the police become an organisation where practice is always based on evidence rather than habit. The answer to the question: “Why do we do this?” will never be – “Because we always have done it that way”. It will be “Because this is what the evidence tells us works best”._

(May, 2013: 3)
The College of Policing has already identified over 40 academic institutions, mainly universities, who are conducting relevant ongoing policing related research at Masters’ degree level and above (College of Policing, 2013a). There is a danger here that research on policing could become totally embroiled in evidence-based crime control policing and that research funding would only be made available to researchers who were willing to comply with central government direction. As Hope (2004: 303) suggests there is a tendency for such networks to become introverted in the ‘prosecution of their common cause’ and could lead to ‘mutual pretence and self-delusion about the nature of the evidence being generated’. Punch (2010: 158) argues that research on policing should not just concentrate on ‘policy-relevant’ research, but should include research that allows the police to come under external scrutiny and fears that ‘governments will impose a one-sided, crime control model which seriously distorts policing’.

Whilst the merits of conducting evidence-based crime control research on policing are laudable, cognisance should also be given to research on other aspects of policing. If not, research on policing could return to what Reiner (2010) describes as the consensus era of the 1960s.

**Reducing Competing Priorities, Tensions and Contradictions in Policing**

The competing priorities, tensions and contradictions between performance management, neighbourhood policing, problem-oriented policing and intelligence-led policing, fuelled by a crime control and detection culture, are still prevalent in policing today (Scott, 1998; Waddington, 1999; Cochran and Bromley, 2003; Maguire and John, 2006). Therefore, in addition to the proposed evidenced-based crime control research that has been proposed and is being coordinated by the College of Policing, it may also be prudent to consider research into reducing the competing priorities, tensions and contradictions in policing. This would mean not just undertaking research into the consensus issues, but also the contentious issues in policing.
Reducing the conflict between performance management and the three main models of policing, and increasing the status of community intelligence, would require a change in police culture, which is currently influenced by action-centred crime fighting, focused on detecting crime rather than preventing crime (Scott, 1998; Waddington, 1999; Cochran and Bromley, 2003). The NIM as a business excellence model has the potential to manage performance management, the three main models of policing and all forms of intelligence, including community intelligence. The key themes in neighbourhood policing identified from the comprehensive literature review also suggest that neighbourhood policing as a style of policing can be used to deliver problem-oriented policing and intelligence-led policing, and to gather community intelligence, which can be utilised by all three main policing models.

**Community Intelligence: The Foundation of Modern Policing**

Finding the balance between resourcing local policing and national policing will be a difficult challenge for the police service. Local neighbourhood policing requires decentralisation (Skogan, 2008), whilst national policing, particularly collaboration to provide protective services, requires the centralisation of many functions for them to be more efficient and cost effective (Loveday and McClory, 2007). However, collaboration can also take place at a local level between partner agencies, with numerous formal and informal collaborations already in existence (e.g. the police and local authority sharing office space and equipment).

There are many overlaps between local and national policing priorities. In reality a crime or incident, whether minor or serious originates in a local neighbourhood or community. Neighbourhood policing as a style of policing should be able to provide the necessary structure to support national policing priorities, such as protective services, by bringing together other forms of policing, similar to the concept of ‘Asymmetrical Policing’
proposed by Mallory (2007), with a greater emphasis placed on intelligence and in particular, community intelligence.

The Coalition Government’s drive towards the ‘Big Society’ (Home Office, 2010) and their proposals for social action, public service reform and community empowerment, if successful, may enhance existing local partnerships between the police, partner agencies and the community. Working together with the community and being more, accountable, open and transparent in solving community problems should increase trust and confidence in the police and partner agencies. As trust and confidence increases the community are more likely to provide information and intelligence, (i.e. community intelligence), in relation to a variety of different issues, including counter terrorism, both at a local and national level (ACPO, 2006e).

Using community intelligence more efficiently and effectively, whilst working with existing or reduced resources in times of austerity may be the way forward to meet these and other future challenges for policing.

**Personal Learning and Development**

At the commencement of and for the greater part of this research I was still a serving police officer with South Wales Police and for the latter part I had retired. This presented a number of challenges, not least of all trying to balance a full time job (to which I was fully committed) with conducting this research. All of this research was conducted in my own time out of working hours and at no cost to South Wales Police. Thus, time management was an important issue for me and this research. As this research was not independently funded, finance also proved to be a challenge, as it restricted what could be achieved within my fiscal constraints. For example, the pilot survey self-completion questionnaire was restricted to the BCU I was working in at the time and it was not possible to carry out interviews with participants on a large scale and thus, this was restricted to intelligence managers only. Intelligence managers were spread across the
South Wales Police area and it was my intention to interview the participants at or near their normal place of work, to minimise disruption to them in their daily work and to provide a familiar setting for the interview. This provided logistical challenges, which were exacerbated by the fiscal constraints and meant that the interview period had to be extended to overcome the logistical problems. In summary, time, financial and logistical challenges restricted the use of certain research methodologies, methods and designs.

At the commencement of this research I considered myself to be an inside-insider, which allowed me virtually unrestricted access to the research participants for the self-completion questionnaires and semi-structured interviews as part of this research. On retirement I considered myself to be an outside-insider and found that access to participants had become much more restricted. This was particularly the case in relation to the intelligence managers, as all the interviews were conducted when I was an outside-insider. I had to rely on the goodwill of trusted ex-colleagues to assist with arranging interviews and suitable office accommodation where the interviews would take place. This became more difficult as time went on and interviews had to be postponed as some of the participants had other more important commitments. At this point almost a year after I had retired, I considered that I was verging on becoming an inside-outsider. From an access point of view it would have been easier to have conducted the interviews as an inside-insider. However, from a time and logistical point of view, the interviews had to be conducted when I was retired and an outside-insider.

The delay in the interview process for some participants also caused some ethical concerns. The time delay from initially providing the participants with information on the research and obtaining their informed consent to the actual interviews taking place, resulted in having to provide the information for a second time and ensuring that they still wished to give their informed consent prior to the interviews taking place. This may not be seen as bad practice, but it added further time and financial implications to the
research. The delays which were unforeseen may be attributed to the challenges associated with access and timing.

It has not been possible to disguise the identity of South Wales Police in this research, as they are the only organisation responsible for public policing in the South Wales area. Therefore, I have considered the possible ethical implications that may arise from the publication of the findings from this research, particularly the possible harm caused to the reputation of South Wales Police. However, this has to be balanced against the search for knowledge and truth.

Conducting this research has also given me the opportunity and the skills to write two peer reviewed articles in policing journals and contribute to two chapters in a book on researching the police, which I have found very rewarding.

Throughout this research I have endeavoured to minimise the effect of my own personal beliefs, biases, prejudices and values on this research. By taking a pragmatic stance, I trust that this research has critically analysed the use of community intelligence in informing and directing local neighbourhood policing in the South Wales area and that the findings can be used to improve policing systems and services, and provide a better service to the public.
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Appendix 1: The Nine Principles of Policing

The Nine Principles of Policing

1. To prevent crime and disorder, as an alternative to their repression by military force and severity of legal punishment.
2. To recognise always that the power of the police to fulfil their functions and duties is dependent on public approval of their existence, actions and behaviour and on their ability to secure and maintain public respect.
3. To recognise always that to secure and maintain the respect and approval of the public means also the securing of the willing co-operation of the public in the task of securing observance of laws.
4. To recognise always that the extent to which the co-operation of the public can be secured diminishes proportionately the necessity of the use of physical force and compulsion for achieving police objectives.
5. To seek and preserve public favour, not by pandering to public opinion; but by constantly demonstrating absolutely impartial service to law, in complete independence of policy, and without regard to the justice or injustice of the substance of individual laws, by ready offering of individual service and friendship to all members of the public without regard to their wealth or social standing, by ready exercise of courtesy and friendly good humour; and by ready offering of individual sacrifice in protecting and preserving life.
6. To use physical force only when the exercise of persuasion, advice and warning is found to be insufficient to obtain public co-operation to an extent necessary to secure observance of law or to restore order, and to use only the minimum degree of physical force which is necessary on any particular occasion for achieving a police objective.
7. To maintain at all times a relationship with the public that gives reality to the historic tradition that the police are the public and that the public are the police, the police being only members of the public who are paid to give full time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests of community welfare and existence.
8. To recognise always the need for strict adherence to police-executive functions, and to refrain from even seeming to usurp the powers of the judiciary of avenging individuals or the State, and of authoritatively judging guilt and punishing the guilty.
9. To recognise always that the test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder, and not the visible evidence of police action in dealing with them.

(Flanagan, 2007: 4-5)
Appendix 2: The Main Functions of the Police

The main functions of the police

At present, however, the main functions of the police may be summarised as follows:

- First, the police have a duty to maintain law and order and to protect persons and property.
- Secondly, they have a duty to prevent crime.
- Thirdly, they are responsible for the detection of criminals and, in the course of interrogating suspected persons, they have a part to play in the early stages of the judicial process, acting under judicial restraint.
- Fourthly, the police in England and Wales (but not in Scotland) have the responsibility of deciding whether or not to prosecute persons suspected of criminal offences.
- Fifthly, in England and Wales (but not in Scotland) the police themselves conduct many prosecutions for the less serious offences.
- Sixthly, the police have the duty of controlling road traffic and advising local authorities on traffic questions.
- Seventhly, the police carry out certain duties on behalf of Government Departments – for example, they conduct enquiries into applications made by persons who wish to be granted British nationality.
- Eighthly, they have by long tradition a duty to befriend anyone who needs their help, and they may at any time be called upon to cope with minor or major emergencies.

(Willink, 1962: 22)
Appendix 3: Ten Principles of Community-Police Relations

Ten Principles of Community-Police Relations

1. Philosophy and Organizational Strategy

Community policing is both a philosophy (a way of thinking) and an organizational strategy (a way to carry out the philosophy) that allows the police and the community to work closely together in creative ways to solve the problems of crime, illicit drugs, fear of crime, physical and social disorder (from graffiti to addiction), neighborhood decay, and the overall quality of life in the community. The philosophy rests on the belief that people deserve input into the police process, in exchange for their participation and support. It also rests on the belief that solutions to today's community problems demand freeing both people and the police to explore creative, new ways to address neighborhood concerns beyond a narrow focus on individual crime incidents.

2. Commitment to Community Empowerment

Community policing's organizational strategy first demands that everyone in the police department, including both civilian and sworn personnel, must investigate ways to translate the philosophy of power-sharing into practice. This demands making a subtle but sophisticated shift so that everyone in the department understands the need to focus on solving community problems in creative, and often ways, that can include challenging and enlightening people in the process of policing themselves. Community policing implies a shift within the department that grants greater autonomy (freedom to make decisions) to line officer, which also implies enhanced respect for their judgment as police professionals. Within the community, citizens must share in the rights and responsibilities implicit in identifying, prioritizing, and solving problems, as full-fledged partners with the police.

3. Decentralized and Personalized Policing

To implement true community policing, police departments must also create and develop a new breed of line officer who acts as a direct link between the police and the people in the community. As the department's community outreach specialists, community policing officers must be freed from the isolation of the patrol car and the demands of the police radio so that they can maintain daily, direct, face-to-face contact with the people they serve in a clearly defined beat area. Ultimately, all officers should practice the community policing approach.

4. Immediate and Long-Term Proactive Problem Solving

The community policing officer's broad role demands continuous, sustained contact with the law-abiding people in the community, so that together they can explore creative new solutions to local concerns, with private citizens serving as supporters and as volunteers. As law enforcement officers, community policing officers respond to calls for service and make arrests, but they also go beyond this narrow focus to develop and monitor broad-based, long-term initiatives that can involve all elements of the community in efforts to improve the quality of life.
As the community's ombudsman, the community policing officer also acts as a link to other public and private agencies that can help in a given situation.

5. Ethics, Legality, Responsibility and Trust

Community policing implies a new contract between the police and the citizens they serve, one that offers hope of overcoming widespread apathy while restraining any impulse of vigilantism. This new relationship, based on mutual trust and respect, also suggests that the police can serve as a catalyst, challenging people to accept their share of responsibility for the overall quality of life in the community. Community policing means that citizens will be asked to handle more of their minor concerns themselves, but in exchange, this will free police to work with people on developing immediate as well as long-term solutions for community concerns in ways that encourage mutual accountability and respect.

6. Expanding the Police Mandate

Community policing adds a vital, proactive element to the traditional reactive role of the police, resulting in full-spectrum policing service. As the only agency of social control open 24 hours a day, seven days a week, the police must maintain the ability to respond immediately to crises and crime incidents, but community policing broadens the police role so that they can make a greater impact on making changes today that hold the promise of making communities safer and more attractive places to live tomorrow.

7. Helping Those with Special Needs

Community policing stresses exploring new ways to protect and enhance the lives of those who are most vulnerable--juveniles, the elderly, minorities, the poor, the disabled, the homeless. It both assimilates and broadens the scope of previous outreach efforts such as crime prevention and police community relations.

8. Grass-Roots Creativity and Support

Community policing promotes the judicious use of technology, but it also rests on the belief that nothing surpasses what dedicated human beings, talking and working together, can achieve. It invests trust in those who are on the frontlines together on the street, relying on their combined judgment, wisdom, and experience to fashion creative new approaches to contemporary community concerns.

9. Internal Change

Community policing must be a fully integrated approach that involves everyone in the department, with community policing officers serving as generalists who bridge the gap between the police and the people they serve. The community policing approach plays a crucial role internally by providing information about and awareness of the community and its problems, and by enlisting broad-based community support for the department's overall objectives. Once community policing is accepted as the long-term strategy, all officers should practice it. This could take as long as ten to fifteen years.
10. Building for the Future

Community policing provides decentralized, personalized police service to the community. It recognizes that the police cannot impose order on the community from the outside, but that people must be encouraged to think of the police as a resource that they can use in helping to solve contemporary community concerns. It is not a tactic to be applied and then abandoned, but a new philosophy and organizational strategy that provides the flexibility to meet local needs and priorities as they change over time.

(Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1990: xiii-xv)
Appendix 4: The Ten Key Principles of Neighbourhood Policing

The Ten ‘Key Principles of Neighbourhood Policing’

Neighbourhood policing:

- [1] Is an organisational strategy that allows the police, its partners and the public to work closely together to solve problems of crime and disorder, and improve neighbourhood conditions and feelings of security;
- [2] Is a mainstream policing activity and integrated with other policing services;
- [3] Requires evidence-based deployment of neighbourhood teams against identified need;
- [4] Establishes dedicated, identifiable, accessible, knowledgeable and responsive neighbourhood policing teams which provide all citizens with a named point of access;
- [5] Reflects local conditions and is flexible, responsive and adaptable;
- [6] Allows the Police Service to work directly with the local community to identify the problems that are most important to them, thereby giving people direct influence over local policing priorities;
- [7] Establishes a regime for engaging other agencies and the public in problem-solving mechanisms;
- [8] Uses NIM as the basis for deployment;
- [9] Requires an effective engagement, communication and feedback strategy, and a clear explanation of where accountability lies;
- [10] Should be subject to rigorous performance management including clear performance monitoring against a local plan and commitments made to neighbourhoods.

(ACPO, 2006e: 10)
Appendix 5: Postal Survey Self-Completion Questionnaire for Local Neighbourhood Policing Staff

Questionnaire

A Critical Analysis of the Use of Community Intelligence in Local Neighbourhood Policing in South Wales

Introduction

Thank you for agreeing to take part in this research. Please read this questionnaire carefully and answer the questions as truthfully as you can. No individual will be identified from the information provided.

Please either tick the appropriate box or write your answer in the space provided.

Once completed, please return the questionnaire in the pre-addressed envelope provided within three weeks of receiving it, if possible.

Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire.

YOUR VIEWS ARE VERY IMPORTANT FOR THIS RESEARCH AND THIS IS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR YOU TO HAVE YOUR SAY.
| **Gender:** | Female | 1 | 01 |
|            | Male   |   | 2  |

| **Age:**   | 18 to 20 years | 1 | 02 |
|            | 20 to 25 years | 2 |
|            | 26 to 30 years | 3 |
|            | 31 to 35 years | 4 |
|            | 36 to 40 years | 5 |
|            | 41 to 45 years | 6 |
|            | 46 to 50 years | 7 |
|            | 51 to 55 years | 8 |
|            | Over 55 years  | 9 |

| **Ethnicity:** | Asian | 1 | 03 |
|                | Black  | 2 |
|                | Chinese | 3 |
|                | White  | 4 |
|                | Other (please specify) | 5 |

| **Length of Police Service:** | Under 2 years | 1 | 04 |
|                                | 2 to 5 years |   | 2  |
|                                | 6 to 10 years | 3 |
|                                | 11 to 15 years | 4 |
|                                | 16 to 20 years | 5 |
|                                | 21 to 25 years | 6 |
|                                | 26 to 30 years | 7 |
|                                | Over 30 years | 8 |

| **Position:** | Front Line Support Officer | 1 | 05 |
|                | Police Community            |
|                | Support Officer             | 2 |
|                | Police Constable            | 3 |
|                | Police Sergeant             | 4 |
|                | Special Constable           | 5 |
|                | Other (please specify)      | 6 |

| **Basic Command Unit:** | Central | 1 | 06 |
|                         | Eastern | 2 |
|                         | Northern | 3 |
|                         | Western | 4 |
|                         | Other Department (please specify) | 5 |
**Intelligence and Policing Systems**

Q1  
Please write below what you consider to be Community Intelligence?  

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

Q2  
Please write below what you consider to be Criminal Intelligence?  

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

Q3  
In your day to day activities, how do you record Community Intelligence?  

Please tick all the boxes below that are appropriate  

[ ] National Intelligence Report  1
[ ] Intelligence Blog / Log  2
[ ] Neighbourhood Profile  3
[ ] Station Intelligence Log Book  4
[ ] Pocket Note Book  5
[ ] Keep intelligence in your head  6
[ ] All of the above  7
[ ] Other (please specify)  8

Q4  
In your day to day activities, how do you record Criminal Intelligence?  

Please tick all the boxes below that are appropriate  

[ ] National Intelligence Report  1
[ ] Intelligence Blog / Log  2
[ ] Neighbourhood Profile  3
[ ] Station Intelligence Log Book  4
[ ] Pocket Note Book  5
[ ] Keep intelligence in your head  6
[ ] All of the above  7
[ ] Other (please specify)  8

Q5  
Do you share Community Intelligence with others?  

[ ] All the time  1
[ ] Sometimes  2
[ ] Never  3
Please explain why below

______________________________________________________

______________________________________________________

______________________________________________________

Q6  Do you share Criminal Intelligence with others?  

[ ] All the time  1
[ ] Sometimes  2
[ ] Never  3

Please explain why below

______________________________________________________

______________________________________________________

______________________________________________________

Q7  How do you obtain Community Intelligence?

Please tick all the boxes below that are appropriate

[ ] Engagement with the community  1
[ ] NSPIS Incidents  2
[ ] NICHE Occurrences  3
[ ] Local Intelligence Officers  4
[ ] Briefings  5
[ ] Tasking and Coordinating Groups  6
[ ] Partners  7
[ ] All of the above  8
[ ] Other (please specify)  9

Q8  Do you know what happens to Intelligence, once you have submitted it?

[ ] Yes  1
[ ] No  2
[ ] Don’t know  3
[ ] Only know part of the process (please specify)  4

Q9  Do you receive Community Intelligence after it has been collected, processed and analysed?

[ ] Yes  1
[ ] No  2
[ ] Don’t know  3
Q10  Are you aware of a South Wales Police policy in relation to Community Intelligence?  
[ ] Yes 1
[ ] No 2
[ ] Don’t know 3

Q11  Who do you think has overall responsibility for Community Intelligence in your Basic Command Unit (BCU)?  
[ ] BCU Commander 1
[ ] Local Policing (Sector) Inspector 2
[ ] Detective Inspector (Intelligence Unit) 3
[ ] Detective Sergeant (Intelligence Unit) 4
[ ] Local Intelligence Officer (LIO) 5
[ ] Other (please specify) 6

Policing in Context
Q12  What do you understand by the term Neighbourhood or Local Policing?  
___________________________________________
___________________________________________
___________________________________________

Q13  What do you regard a Neighbourhood to be?  
[ ] Sector 1
[ ] Electoral Ward 2
[ ] Locality 3
[ ] Other (Please specify) 4

Q14  Do you have a Neighbourhood Profile for each of the neighbourhoods you work in, as indicated in Q13 above?  
[ ] Yes 1
[ ] No 2
[ ] Don’t know 3

If you answered 'Yes' to Q14 above, go to Q15.

If you answered 'No' or Don’t Know' to Q14 above, go to Q16

Q15  Do you know what is contained within each Neighbourhood Profile?  
[ ] Yes 1
[ ] No 2
[ ] Don’t know 3
Q16  Do you use the Neighbourhood Profile to assess the diversity of the community you work in?  

[ ] Yes  
[ ] No  
[ ] Sometimes  
[ ] Don’t know

Q17  Do you use the Neighbourhood Profile to decide on the most appropriate community engagement technique?  

[ ] Yes  
[ ] No  
[ ] Sometimes  
[ ] Don’t know

Q18  Do you use the Neighbourhood Profile to identify your Key Individual Networks (KINS)?  

[ ] Yes  
[ ] No  
[ ] Sometimes  
[ ] Don’t know

Q19  Have you undertaken a Partnership Resource Audit?  

[ ] Yes  
[ ] No  
[ ] Sometimes  
[ ] Don’t know

If you answered ‘Yes’ or ‘Sometimes’ to Q19 above, go to Q20.  
If you answered ‘No’ or ‘Don’t Know’ to Q19, go to Q21.

Q20  What types of partner agencies have you considered?  

__________________________________________________________________________  
__________________________________________________________________________  
__________________________________________________________________________

Police Application of Intelligence

Q21  What value do you place on Community Intelligence?  

[ ] A lot  
[ ] Some  
[ ] Little  
[ ] None  
[ ] Don’t know
Q22 Would you consider Community Intelligence to be of a higher or lower value than Criminal Intelligence?

[ ] Higher 1
[ ] Lower 2
[ ] The same 3
[ ] Don’t know 4

Q23 Are your neighbourhood patrols/operations intelligence led?

[ ] Yes 1
[ ] No 2
[ ] Sometimes 3
[ ] Don’t know 4

Q24 Is the intelligence you use mainly Criminal Intelligence or Community Intelligence?

[ ] Criminal Intelligence 1
[ ] Community Intelligence 2
[ ] Both 3
[ ] Don’t know 4

Q25 Have you used any of the following community engagement techniques to obtain Community Intelligence?

Please tick all the boxes below that are appropriate

[ ] Face to Face Contacts 1
[ ] Directed Patrols 2
[ ] Partnerships and Communities Together (PACT) Meetings 3
[ ] School Councils 4
[ ] Youth Forums 5
[ ] Street Meetings 6
[ ] Surgeries 7
[ ] House to House 8
[ ] Dynamic Meetings 9
[ ] Social Interactions 10
[ ] Community Events 11
[ ] Open Days 12
[ ] Environmental Visual Audits (EVAs) 13
[ ] Focus Groups 14
[ ] Workshops 15
[ ] Other (please specify) 16

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**Community Engagement, Intelligence and Cohesion**

Q26  Do you utilise Community Intelligence to assist you with the following? 34

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<td><strong>Organised Crime Groups (OCG):</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Crime in general:</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Anti-Social Behaviour (ASB):</strong></td>
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**If you answered ‘Yes’ or ‘Sometimes’ to any of the above in Q26, go to Q27.**

**If you answered ‘No’ or ‘Don’t Know’ to all of the above in Q26 go to Q28.**
Q27 In what ways does it assist you?

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
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Q28 What do you understand by the term Community Cohesion?

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

Q29 How do you feedback to the community what has been achieved as a result of the Community Intelligence you have received?

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

Q30 How would you evaluate the success of Community Intelligence?

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

If there is anything else you would like to add, please write your comments below

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

One again, thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire
Information Sheet for Participants

Research Study Title:

A Critical Analysis of the Use of Community Intelligence in Local Neighbourhood Policing in South Wales

You have been invited to participate in a research study regarding the use of community intelligence by Neighbourhood Policing Teams within the South Wales Police area and its impact on local policing. Before you decide to participate you will need to know why the research is taking place and what involvement there would be for you. Should you choose to participate, you will be given the opportunity to speak with the researcher to discuss the information provided in this sheet and to ask any questions that you may have, before being asked to sign a consent form.

Part 1 of this Sheet outlines the purpose of the study and what will happen if you take part.

Part 2 gives you more detailed information about how the study will be undertaken.

Please ask if there is anything you are unsure about and take time to decide if you would like to take part.
Part 1

This research study is related to the great emphasis that the Government, particularly the last Labour Government, placed on Neighbourhood or Local Policing to close the reassurance gap between perceived and actual crime levels, and thus reduce the fear of crime. In order to achieve this, it may be argued that Neighbourhood Policing Teams and their partners would need to fully engage with all members of our diverse communities. It may also be argued that greater engagement with communities will lead to an increase in community intelligence received by the police and their partners.

**What is the purpose of the study?**
This research questions the extent to which community intelligence impacts on local neighbourhood policing in South Wales, within the context of the National Intelligence Model (NIM). Therefore, the main aim of this research is: To critically analyse the use of community intelligence in local neighbourhood policing in South Wales.

In order to achieve this aim the following associated objectives were also considered:

- What does South Wales Police consider to be local neighbourhood policing?
- How do South Wales Police engage with the diverse communities within the South Wales area?
- What systems do South Wales Police have in place in relation to the processing of community intelligence?
- What use is made of community intelligence, particularly in solving community problems?
- How is community intelligence used to inform or direct local policing?
- How can the use of community intelligence be improved to assist in the delivery of policing?

In order to answer these and other questions it is proposed to conduct a social survey with a larger sample group and undertake semi structured interviews and observational studies with a smaller group of key individuals involved in the processing of intelligence. The survey will be conducted by the use of a self-completion questionnaire and the semi structured interview guide will be developed from the questions posed in the questionnaire.
**Why have I been chosen?**
You are currently involved in Neighbourhood or Local Policing as a Neighbourhood Beat Manager (NBM), a Police Community Support Officer (PCSO), a Special Constable (SC) or a Front Line Support Officer (FLSO) and as a result you are ideally placed to participate in the study. You can provide valuable data that when analysed could potentially benefit you and those working in Neighbourhood Policing in the future.

**Do I have to take part?**
No. You do not have to take part in this study. It is your decision whether you take part or not. If you do decide you would like to participate, you will be asked to sign a consent form giving your permission. You are free to withdraw from the research study at any time.

**What will happen to me if I take part?**
You will be invited to complete a questionnaire and return the same to the researcher. If agreeable you may also be invited to take part in a semi structured interview to provide more detail in relation to some of the questions in the questionnaire. If you have a key role in the processing of intelligence within your Basic Command Unit (BCU) you will be invited to participate in a semi structured interview and observational studies.

**Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential?**
Yes. Ethical and legal practices will be followed at all times and all information about you will be handled in confidence. These details are included in Part 2.

**If you are considering participating in this research study, please continue to read the additional information in Part 2 before making any decision.**
Part 2

What if relevant new information becomes available?
You will be informed if any new information regarding the research becomes available during the course of the study.

What will happen if I don’t want to carry on with the study?
You are free to withdraw from the study at any time without giving a reason and will not be disadvantaged or penalised in any way. Any data stored about you will be destroyed.

What if I have any concerns?
If you have concerns about the study itself, you should speak to the researcher in the first instance. However, if you still have concerns you can contact the Director of Studies, Professor Colin Rogers. Please see Contact Details below.

Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential?
If you decide to take part in this study, your identity and your views will be kept confidential. Once the data has been collected, it will be coded and will only be shared with the researcher’s Director of Studies and two supervisors at the University of Glamorgan, who also have a duty of confidentiality to you and nothing that can reveal your identity will be disclosed.

What will happen with the findings of the study?
Findings from this study will be presented as part of a thesis for a postgraduate Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) degree. It is hoped that the findings from this research will also be published in professional journals and papers, with the aim of developing further understanding of the relationship between community intelligence and policing, and stimulating further research in this area. All information will be confidential and anonymous. On a more practical level, it is intended that this research will inform the police service of the benefits of gathering community intelligence to provide a more efficient and effective service to the communities it serves in times of austerity.

Who is organising and funding the research?
The Researcher is organising and self-funding this research study.

Who has reviewed the study?
- Faculty of Health, Sport and Science Research Ethics Committee, University of Glamorgan.
- The Director of Studies, Professor Colin Rogers.

Thank you for considering taking part in this research study
Contact Details:

**Researcher**
Mr Garry Thomas, BSc (Hons), MSc
PhD Research Student
Centre for Police Sciences
University of Glamorgan
Pontypridd
CF37 1DL
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gthomas3@glam.ac.uk

**Director of Studies**
Professor Colin Rogers, BA (Hons), MSc, PGCE, PhD, FHEA
Research and Post Graduate Co-ordinator
Centre for Police Sciences
University of Glamorgan
Pontypridd
CF37 1DL
01443 654260
crogers@glam.ac.uk
Appendix 7: Consent Form for Local Neighbourhood Policing Staff

Consent Form for Participants

Research Study Title:

A Critical Analysis of the Use of Community Intelligence in Local Neighbourhood Policing in South Wales

I agree to take part in the research undertaken by Garry Thomas, Faculty of Health, Sport and Science, University of Glamorgan. The purpose of the research has been explained to me, and I have read and understood the Participant Information Sheet.

Data Protection:
Information provided by the questionnaire will be stored and analysed for the following purposes:

- To be used by Garry Thomas to complete a Postgraduate research degree.
- To be used in possible future publications.
- To evaluate the use of Community Intelligence on Neighbourhood Policing in South Wales.

*I understand that all information provided by the questionnaire is confidential, and that no information will be disclosed in any reports/publications or to any other party that may lead to any individual being identified. No personal data will be published. No identifiable data will be shared with any other organisations. I understand that pseudonyms will be used in respect of me and my location in order to ensure confidentiality.*
I agree to the University of Glamorgan recording and processing information about me. This information will only be used for the purposes described earlier and my consent is conditional on the researcher complying with their duties and obligations under the Data Protection Act 1998.

**Withdrawal from the Research:**
I understand that my participation in the research is on a voluntary basis. I can chose at any time not to participate in all or part of the research. I can withdraw from the process at any time without being disadvantaged or penalised in any way.

**Further Publication or Analysis:**
I consent to any data I have contributed to the research being used in ethically approved further analysis, future publications, or future research that is undertaken by Garry Thomas, The University of Glamorgan or the Centre for Police Sciences.

**Please tick to confirm:**
I confirm that I have read and understood the Participants Information Sheet and the Participant Consent Form provided by Garry Thomas for the above research. 

I confirm that I have been given time to consider the information provided, and been given time to ask questions regarding the research, which have been answered satisfactorily.

I understand that my participation in the research is on a voluntary basis and that I am able to withdraw my consent at any time, without giving a reason and without detriment to me.

By signing below I am agreeing to participate in the research study:

*A Critical Analysis of the Use of Community Intelligence in Local Neighbourhood Policing in South Wales*

**Participant:**

Name: ........................................................................................................................................

Signature: .......................... Date: ........................................
Introduction

Thank you for agreeing to take part in this research. Please read this questionnaire carefully and answer the questions as truthfully as you can. No individual will be identified from the information provided.

Please either tick the appropriate box or write your answer in the space provided.

Once completed, please return the questionnaire in the pre-addressed envelope provided within three weeks of receiving it, if possible.

Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire.

YOUR VIEWS ARE VERY IMPORTANT FOR THIS RESEARCH AND THIS IS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR YOU TO HAVE YOUR SAY.
| Name: | __________________________________________ |
|------------------------------------------------|
| Gender: | [ ] Female 1 01 |
| | [ ] Male 2 |
| Age: | [ ] 18 to 20 years 1 02 |
| | [ ] 20 to 25 years 2 |
| | [ ] 26 to 30 years 3 |
| | [ ] 31 to 35 years 4 |
| | [ ] 36 to 40 years 5 |
| | [ ] 41 to 45 years 6 |
| | [ ] 46 to 50 years 7 |
| | [ ] 51 to 55 years 8 |
| | [ ] Over 55 years 9 |
| Ethnicity: | [ ] Asian 1 03 |
| | [ ] Black 2 |
| | [ ] Chinese 3 |
| | [ ] White 4 |
| | [ ] Other (please specify) 5 |
| Length of Police Service: | [ ] Under 2 years 1 04 |
| | [ ] 2 to 5 years 2 |
| | [ ] 6 to 10 years 3 |
| | [ ] 11 to 15 years 4 |
| | [ ] 16 to 20 years 5 |
| | [ ] 21 to 25 years 6 |
| | [ ] 26 to 30 years 7 |
| | [ ] Over 30 years 8 |
| Position: | [ ] Local Policing (Sector) Inspector 1 05 |
| | [ ] Detective Inspector (Intelligence) 2 |
| | [ ] Detective Sergeant (Intelligence) 3 |
| | [ ] Local Intelligence Officer (LIO) 4 |
| | [ ] Field Intelligence Officer (FIO) 5 |
| | [ ] Other (please specify) 6 |
| Basic Command Unit: | [ ] Central 1 06 |
| | [ ] Eastern 2 |
| | [ ] Northern 3 |
| | [ ] Western 4 |
| | [ ] Other Department (please specify) 5 |
**Intelligence and Policing Systems**

Q1 Please write below what you consider to be Community Intelligence?

____________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________

Q2 Please write below what you consider to be Criminal Intelligence?

____________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________

Q3 In your day to day activities, how do you record Community Intelligence?

Please tick all the boxes below that are appropriate

[ ] National Intelligence Report 1
[ ] Intelligence Blog / Log 2
[ ] Neighbourhood Profile 3
[ ] Station Intelligence Log Book 4
[ ] Pocket Note Book 5
[ ] Keep intelligence in your head 6
[ ] All of the above 7
[ ] Other (please specify) 8

Q4 In your day to day activities, how do you record Criminal Intelligence?

Please tick all the boxes below that are appropriate

[ ] National Intelligence Report 1
[ ] Intelligence Blog / Log 2
[ ] Neighbourhood Profile 3
[ ] Station Intelligence Log Book 4
[ ] Pocket Note Book 5
[ ] Keep intelligence in your head 6
[ ] All of the above 7
[ ] Other (please specify) 8

Q5 Do you share Community Intelligence with others?

[ ] All the time 1
[ ] Sometimes 2
[ ] Never 3
Please explain how below

Q6 Do you share Criminal Intelligence with others?

[ ] All the time 1
[ ] Sometimes 2
[ ] Never 3

Please explain how below

Q7 How do you obtain Community Intelligence?

Please tick all the boxes below that are appropriate

[ ] Engagement with the community 1
[ ] NSPIS Incidents 2
[ ] NICHE Occurrences 3
[ ] Local Intelligence Blogs 4
[ ] Briefings 5
[ ] Tasking and Coordinating Groups 6
[ ] Partners 7
[ ] Social Media Sites 8
[ ] All of the above 9
[ ] Other (please specify) 10

Q8 What happens to the Intelligence, once it has been submitted?

Q9 Do you request Community Intelligence as part of a wider intelligence requirement?

[ ] Yes 1
[ ] No 2
[ ] Don’t know 3
Q10 Are you aware of a South Wales Police policy in relation to Community Intelligence?

[  ] Yes 1
[  ] No 2
[  ] Don’t know 3

Q11 Who do you think has overall responsibility for Community Intelligence in your Basic Command Unit (BCU)?

[  ] BCU Commander 1
[  ] Local Policing (Sector) Inspector 2
[  ] Detective Inspector (Intelligence Unit) 3
[  ] Detective Sergeant (Intelligence Unit) 4
[  ] Local Intelligence Officer (LIO) 5
[  ] Field Intelligence Officer (FIO) 6
[  ] Other (please specify) 7

Policing in Context

Q12 What do you understand by the term Neighbourhood or Local Policing?

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

Q13 What do you regard a Neighbourhood to be?

[  ] Sector 1
[  ] Electoral Ward 2
[  ] Locality 3
[  ] Other (Please specify) 4

Q14 Is there a Neighbourhood Profile for each of the neighbourhoods in your BCU, as indicated in Q13 above?

[  ] Yes 1
[  ] No 2
[  ] Don’t know 3

If you answered ‘Yes’ to Q14 above, go to Q15.

If you answered ‘No’ or Don’t Know’ to Q14 above, go to Q16

Q15 Do you know what is contained within each Neighbourhood Profile?

[  ] Yes 1
[  ] No 2
[  ] Don’t know 3
Q16  Do you use Neighbourhood Profiles to assess the diversity of the different communities in your BCU?  

[ ] Yes 1  
[ ] No 2  
[ ] Sometimes 3  
[ ] Don’t know 4  

Q17  Do you use Neighbourhood Profiles to decide on the most appropriate community engagement technique?  

[ ] Yes 1  
[ ] No 2  
[ ] Sometimes 3  
[ ] Don’t know 4  

Q18  Do you use Neighbourhood Profiles to identify your Key Individual Networks (KINS)?  

[ ] Yes 1  
[ ] No 2  
[ ] Sometimes 3  
[ ] Don’t know 4  

Q19  Have you undertaken a Partnership Resource Audit?  

[ ] Yes 1  
[ ] No 2  
[ ] Sometimes 3  
[ ] Don’t know 4  

If you answered 'Yes' or 'Sometimes' to Q19 above, go to Q20.  
If you answered 'No' or 'Don’t Know' to Q19, go to Q21.  

Q20  What types of partner agencies have you considered?  

__________________________________________________________________________  
__________________________________________________________________________  
__________________________________________________________________________  

Police Application of Intelligence  

Q21  What value do you place on Community Intelligence?  

[ ] A lot 1  
[ ] Some 2  
[ ] Little 3  
[ ] None 4  
[ ] Don’t know 5
Q22 Would you consider Community Intelligence to be of a higher or lower value than Criminal Intelligence?

[ ] Higher 1
[ ] Lower 2
[ ] The same 3
[ ] Don’t know 4

Q23 Are neighbourhood patrols/operations intelligence led?

[ ] Yes 1
[ ] No 2
[ ] Sometimes 3
[ ] Don’t know 4

Q24 Is the intelligence you receive mainly Criminal Intelligence or Community Intelligence?

[ ] Criminal Intelligence 1
[ ] Community Intelligence 2
[ ] Both 3
[ ] Don’t know 4

Q25 Have you used any of the following community engagement techniques to obtain Community Intelligence?

Please tick all the boxes below that are appropriate

[ ] Face to Face Contacts 1
[ ] Directed Patrols 2
[ ] Partnerships and Communities Together (PACT) Meetings 3
[ ] School Councils 4
[ ] Youth Forums 5
[ ] Street Meetings 6
[ ] Surgeries 7
[ ] House to House 8
[ ] Dynamic Meetings 9
[ ] Social Interactions 10
[ ] Community Events 11
[ ] Open Days 12
[ ] Environmental Visual Audits (EVAs) 13
[ ] Focus Groups 14
[ ] Workshops 15
[ ] Other (please specify) 16

__________________________________________
__________________________________________
__________________________________________
Community Engagement, Intelligence and Cohesion

Q26 Do you utilise Community Intelligence to assist you with the following? 34

Counter Terrorism (CT):

[  ] Yes  1
[  ] No  2
[  ] Sometimes  3
[  ] Don’t know  4

Organised Crime Groups (OCG):

[  ] Yes  1
[  ] No  2
[  ] Sometimes  3
[  ] Don’t know  4

Crime in general:

[  ] Yes  1
[  ] No  2
[  ] Sometimes  3
[  ] Don’t know  4

Anti-Social Behaviour (ASB):

[  ] Yes  1
[  ] No  2
[  ] Sometimes  3
[  ] Don’t know  4

Reducing the fear of crime:

[  ] Yes  1
[  ] No  2
[  ] Sometimes  3
[  ] Don’t know  4

Local problem solving:

[  ] Yes  1
[  ] No  2
[  ] Sometimes  3
[  ] Don’t know  4

If you answered ‘Yes’ or ‘Sometimes’ to any of the above in Q26, go to Q27.

If you answered ‘No’ or ‘Don’t Know’ to all of the above in Q26 go to Q28.
Q27 In what ways does it assist you?

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

Q28 What do you understand by the term Community Cohesion?

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

Q29 How do you feedback to the community what has been achieved as a result of the Community Intelligence you have received?

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

Q30 How would you evaluate the success of Community Intelligence?

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

If there is anything else you would like to add, please write your comments below

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

One again, thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire
Information Sheet for Participants

Research Study Title:

*A Critical Analysis of the Use of Community Intelligence in Local Neighbourhood Policing in South Wales*

You have been invited to participate in a research study regarding the use of community intelligence by Neighbourhood Policing Teams within the South Wales Police area and its impact on local policing. Before you decide to participate you will need to know why the research is taking place and what involvement there would be for you. Should you choose to participate, you will be given the opportunity to speak with the researcher to discuss the information provided in this sheet and to ask any questions that you may have, before being asked to sign a consent form.

Part 1 of this Sheet outlines the purpose of the study and what will happen if you take part.

Part 2 gives you more detailed information about how the study will be undertaken.

Please ask if there is anything you are unsure about and take time to decide if you would like to take part.
Part 1

This research study is related to the great emphasis that the Government, particularly the last Labour Government, placed on Neighbourhood or Local Policing to close the reassurance gap between perceived and actual crime levels, and thus reduce the fear of crime. In order to achieve this, it may be argued that Neighbourhood Policing Teams and their partners would need to fully engage with all members of our diverse communities. It may also be argued that greater engagement with communities will lead to an increase in community intelligence received by the police and their partners.

What is the purpose of the study?
This research questions the extent to which community intelligence impacts on local neighbourhood policing in South Wales, within the context of the National Intelligence Model (NIM). Therefore, the main aim of this research is: To critically analyse the use of community intelligence in local neighbourhood policing in South Wales.

In order to achieve this aim the following associated objectives were also considered:

- What does South Wales Police consider to be local neighbourhood policing?
- How do South Wales Police engage with the diverse communities within the South Wales area?
- What systems do South Wales Police have in place in relation to the processing of community intelligence?
- What use is made of community intelligence, particularly in solving community problems?
- How is community intelligence used to inform or direct local policing?
- How can the use of community intelligence be improved to assist in the delivery of policing?

In order to answer these and other questions it is proposed to conduct a social survey with a larger sample group and undertake a social survey, semi structured interviews and observational studies with a smaller group of key individuals involved in the processing of intelligence. The survey will be conducted by the use of a self-completion questionnaire and the semi structured interview guide will be developed from the questions posed in the questionnaire.
**Why have I been chosen?**
You are currently involved in Neighbourhood Policing as a Local Policing (Sector) Inspector or the processing of Intelligence as a Detective Inspector (Intelligence), Detective Sergeant (Intelligence), Local Intelligence Officer or a Field Intelligence Officer and as a result you are ideally placed to participate in the study. You can provide valuable data that when analysed could potentially benefit you and those working in Neighbourhood Policing in the future.

**Do I have to take part?**
No. You do not have to take part in this study. It is your decision whether you take part or not. If you do decide you would like to participate, you will be asked to sign a consent form giving your permission. You are free to withdraw from the research study at any time.

**What will happen to me if I take part?**
As you have a key role in Neighbourhood Policing or the processing of intelligence within your Basic Command Unit (BCU) you will be invited to participate in a semi structured interview and observational studies.

**Will a record be made of the semi structured interviews and observational studies?**
Yes. All semi structured interviews will be tape recorded for ethical reasons. Notes will also be made during the course of the interview and observational studies to assist the researcher. You can request a copy of the transcript of your tape recorded interview and a copy of any notes taken during the interview or observational studies. You will also be given the opportunity to alter, add or delete any of the information you provide as part of the interview and observational studies, if you so wish.

**Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential?**
Yes. Ethical and legal practices will be followed at all times and all information about you will be handled in confidence. These details are included in Part 2.

If you are considering participating in this research study, please continue to read the additional information in Part 2 before making any decision.
Part 2

What if relevant new information becomes available?
You will be informed if any new information regarding the research becomes available during the course of the study.

What will happen if I don’t want to carry on with the study?
You are free to withdraw from the study at any time without giving a reason and will not be disadvantaged or penalised in any way. Any data stored about you will be destroyed.

What if I have any concerns?
If you have concerns about the study itself, you should speak to the researcher in the first instance. However, if you still have concerns you can contact the Director of Studies, Professor Colin Rogers. Please see Contact Details below.

Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential?
If you decide to take part in this study, your identity and your views will be kept confidential. Once the data has been collected, it will be coded and will only be shared with the researcher’s Director of Studies and two supervisors at the University of Glamorgan, who also have a duty of confidentiality to you and nothing that can reveal your identity will be disclosed.

What will happen with the findings of the study?
Findings from this study will be presented as part of a thesis for a postgraduate Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) degree. It is hoped that the findings from this research will also be published in professional journals and papers, with the aim of developing further understanding of the relationship between community intelligence and policing, and stimulating further research in this area. All information will be confidential and anonymous. On a more practical level, it is intended that this research will inform the police service of the benefits of gathering community intelligence to provide a more efficient and effective service to the communities it serves in times of austerity.

Who is organising and funding the research?
The Researcher is organising and self-funding this research study.

Who has reviewed the study?
- Faculty of Health, Sport and Science Research Ethics Committee, University of Glamorgan.
- The Director of Studies, Professor Colin Rogers.

Thank you for considering taking part in this research study
Contact Details:

**Researcher**
Mr Garry Thomas, BSc (Hons), MSc
PhD Research Student
Centre for Police Sciences
University of Glamorgan
Pontypridd
CF37 1DL
01443 654260
gthomas3@glam.ac.uk

**Director of Studies**
Professor Colin Rogers, BA (Hons), MSc, PGCE, PhD, FHEA
Research and Post Graduate Co-ordinator
Centre for Police Sciences
University of Glamorgan
Pontypridd
CF37 1DL
01443 654260
crogers@glam.ac.uk
Appendix 10: Consent Form for Intelligence Managers

Consent Form for Participants

Research Study Title:

*A Critical Analysis of the Use of Community Intelligence in Local Neighbourhood Policing in South Wales*

I agree to take part in the research undertaken by Garry Thomas, Faculty of Health, Sport and Science, University of Glamorgan. The purpose of the research has been explained to me, and I have read and understood the Participant Information Sheet.

**Data Protection:**
Information provided by the questionnaire, semi structured interview and observational studies will be stored and analysed for the following purposes:

- To be used by Garry Thomas to complete a Postgraduate research degree.
- To be used in possible future publications.
- To evaluate the use of Community Intelligence on Neighbourhood Policing in South Wales.

*I understand that all information provided by the semi structured interview and observational studies is confidential, and that no information will be disclosed in any reports/publications or to any other party that may lead to any individual being identified. No personal data will be published. No identifiable data will be shared with any other organisations. I understand that pseudonyms will be used in respect of me and my location in order to ensure confidentiality.*
I agree to the University of Glamorgan recording and processing information about me. This information will only be used for the purposes described earlier and my consent is conditional on the researcher complying with their duties and obligations under the Data Protection Act 1998.

**Withdrawal from the Research:**
I understand that my participation in the research is on a voluntary basis. I can choose at any time not to participate in all or part of the research. I can withdraw from the process at any time without being disadvantaged or penalised in any way.

**Further Publication or Analysis:**
I consent to any data I have contributed to the research being used in ethically approved further analysis, future publications, or future research that is undertaken by Garry Thomas, The University of Glamorgan or the Centre for Police Sciences.

**Please tick to confirm:**

I confirm that I have read and understood the Participants Information Sheet and the Participant Consent Form provided by Garry Thomas for the above research. □

I confirm that I have been given time to consider the information provided, and been given time to ask questions regarding the research, which have been answered satisfactorily. □

I understand that my participation in the research is on a voluntary basis and that I am able to withdraw my consent at any time, without giving a reason and without detriment to me. □

By signing below I am agreeing to participate in the research study:

*A Critical Analysis of the Use of Community Intelligence in Local Neighbourhood Policing in South Wales*

**Participant:**

Name: ................................................................................................................................................

Signature: ................................................................. Date: ..................................................
Appendix 11: Semi-Structured Interview Guide: Intelligence Managers

Semi-Structured Interview Guide

A Critical Analysis of the Use of Community Intelligence in Local Neighbourhood Policing in South Wales

Interviewees at Basic Command Unit (BCU) Level

1. Local Policing Inspectors
2. Detective Inspectors (Intelligence)
3. Detective Sergeants (Intelligence)
4. Local Intelligence Officers
5. Field Intelligence Officers

Introduction

Thank you for agreeing to take part in this research and in particular this semi-structured interview.

Please answer the questions as truthfully as you can.

No individual will be identified from the information provided.

Thank you for taking the time to participate in this interview. Your views are very important for this research.
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender:</td>
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<td>[ ] Over 55 years</td>
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<td>Ethnicity:</td>
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<td>[ ] Asian</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>[ ] Black</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>[ ] Chinese</td>
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<td>[ ] White</td>
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<tr>
<td>Length of Police Service:</td>
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<td>[ ] Under 2 years</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>[ ] 2 to 5 years</td>
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<td>[ ] 26 to 30 years</td>
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<td>[ ] Over 30 years</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Position:</td>
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<tr>
<td>[ ] Local Policing Inspector</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>[ ] Detective Inspector (Intelligence)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[ ] Detective Sergeant (Intelligence)</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>[ ] Local Intelligence Officer (LIO)</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>[ ] Field Intelligence Officer (FIO)</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>[ ] Other (please specify)</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Basic Command Unit:</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>[ ] Central</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>[ ] Eastern</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>[ ] Northern</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[ ] Western</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[ ] Other Department (please specify)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Intelligence and Policing Systems**

Q1 What do you consider to be the difference, if any, between Community Intelligence and Criminal Intelligence?

Q2 How do staff record Community Intelligence?
   (i) Is that different to the way they record Criminal Intelligence?
   (ii) Do you think that all Community Intelligence is recorded?

Q3 How do you request Community Intelligence as part of a wider intelligence requirement?
   (i) What process do you use to make your request?
   (ii) How is that intelligence fed back to you?
   (iii) What happens next?

**Policing in Context**

Q4 Do you think that Neighbourhood Profiling is part of the Community Intelligence process?
   (i) If so, what benefits do you think there are from profiling an area?

Q5 What do you understand to be a Key Individual Network (KIN)?
   (i) What sort of an individual would you consider to be a KIN?
   (ii) What would you consider to be their role?

**Police Application of Intelligence**

Q6 What percentage of the intelligence you receive from the community is Community Intelligence?

Q7 What percentage of that Community Intelligence is used for:
   (i) Neighbourhood patrols?
   (ii) Operations?
   (iii) Other?

Q8 Who monitors South Wales Police systems such as NSPIS and NICHE (if anyone) to obtain Community Intelligence?

Q9 Who monitors social media sites (if anyone), to obtain Community Intelligence, for example;
   (i) Facebook?
   (ii) Twitter?
   (i) Linkedin?
   (ii) Myspace?
   (iii) Google Plus+?

**Community Engagement, Intelligence and Cohesion**

Q10 Community Intelligence scenario:
   (i) Counter Terrorism (CT)
   (ii) Organised Crime Groups (OCG)

   Is there anything else you would like to add?

Once again, thank you for taking the time to participate in this interview
Appendix 12: Publications Related to this Research


