PREVENTING CRIME IN COMMUNITIES: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF COMMUNITY SAFETY IN A LOWER INCOME NEIGHBOURHOOD IN NAIROBI, KENYA

LOUISE SKILLING

A submission presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the University of South Wales/Prifysgol De Cymru for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

February 2018
Graduate Research Office
Swyddfa Ymchwil Graddedigion

Candidate’s Declaration Form

Louise Skilling

A submission presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the University of South Wales/Prifysgol De Cymru for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

I declare that while registered as a candidate for a research degree at the University of South Wales, I have not been a registered candidate or enrolled student for another award of the University or other academic or professional institution.

I declare that no material contained in the thesis has been used in any other submission for any academic award.

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Abstract

The World Bank (2011) refers to Kenya’s capital, Nairobi as one of the most crime-ridden cities in Africa. The purpose of this thesis is to critically analyse community safety initiatives as an approach to crime prevention in lower-income Nairobi, Kenya. Qualitative research took place in 2015 in Kibera, an informal settlement that is considered to have one of the highest crime rates in the city (SRIC, 2014).

This research identified the main crimes occurring in Kibera to be robbery, stealing, burglary and sexual violence. Community safety initiatives established for the purpose of crime prevention require collaboration with formal and informal social control mechanisms; however, within Kibera there appears to be an absence of law enforcers (SRIC, 2014) and a lack of procedural justice and trust in them (Sunshine and Tyler, 2003). As a consequence of this a security void is created which is filled by various actors and methods of informal social control, including collective violence and the formation of vigilante groups.

This thesis argues that a community safety approach to crime prevention can enhance collective efficacy, and effectively improve security through developing subtle informal social control mechanisms to regulate deviant behaviour of both the police and the public (Reiner, 2010). This has the potential to improve the perceived legitimacy of formal social control methods.

It is hoped this research will contribute to the literature and gaps in knowledge on existing community initiatives and responses to deal with crime in Nairobi’s lower-income neighbourhoods, which has been identified to be limited (Ruteere et al. 2013; Mutahi, 2011a; Mutahi, 2011b). This research also suggests that community safety initiatives could play a role in supporting democratic policing reforms through improving community – police relations and assist with developing lawful informal and formal social control mechanisms.
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List of abbreviations and acronyms

ACPO Association of Chief Police Officers
APCOF African Policing Civilian Oversight Forum
APCC Association of Police and Crime Commissioners
BBC British Broadcasting Cooperation
BHC British High Commission
BIEA British Institute in East Africa
CBO Community Based Organisation
CCTV Closed-Circuit Television
CEO Chief Executive Officer
CHRI Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative
CHRIPS Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CIPEV Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence
CRDF Crisis Response Development Foundation
CSEW Crime Survey for England and Wales
CVAW Culturally Justified Violence Against Women
DDG Danish Deming Group
DFID Department For International Development
DPP Director of Public Prosecutions
DRC Danish Refugee Council
EACF East Africa Cricket and Character Foundation
ESRC Economic and Social Research Council
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GDS Geneva Declaration Secretariat
GPS Global Positioning System
GSU General Service Unit
HAART Awareness Against Human Trafficking
HDI Human Development Index
HRW Human Rights Watch
IAU Internal Affairs Unit
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<th>Full Name</th>
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<tr>
<td>IJM</td>
<td>International Justice Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>IJR</td>
<td>Institute for Justice and Reconciliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPOA</td>
<td>Independent Policing Oversight Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KANU</td>
<td>Kenya African National Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDF</td>
<td>Kenya Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KENSUP</td>
<td>Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KHRC</td>
<td>Kenya Human Rights Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIPPRA</td>
<td>Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNCHR</td>
<td>Kenyan National Commission on Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>KPR</td>
<td>Kenyan Police Reserves</td>
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<tr>
<td>KWPF</td>
<td>Kibera Women’s Peace Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>M-PESA</td>
<td>Mobile money (pesa in Swahili translates as money)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSF</td>
<td>Médecins Sans Frontières</td>
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<tr>
<td>MYSA</td>
<td>Mathare Youth Sports Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPCC</td>
<td>National Police Chief’s Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPSC</td>
<td>National Police Service Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>NYS</td>
<td>National Youth Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>Office of the United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCSOs</td>
<td>Police Community Support Officers</td>
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<td>SAS</td>
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<td>SGBV</td>
<td>Sexual and Gender Based Violence</td>
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<td>SRIC</td>
<td>Security Research and Information Centre</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDSS</td>
<td>United Nations Department for Safety and Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHABITAT</td>
<td>United Nations Human Settlements Programme</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commission for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund Kenya</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIPTF</td>
<td>United Nations International Police Task Force</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMAS</td>
<td>United Nations Mine Action Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
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<tr>
<td>US CDC</td>
<td>United States Centres for Disease Control and Prevention</td>
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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Introduction

According to United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC) all available evidence suggests Africa has a serious crime problem (UNODC, 2005). In 2012 nearly a third of intentional homicides that occurred across the world, took place on the African continent (Gilgen and Tracey, 2011). Africa has a number of development challenges that are closely linked to social factors associated with high crime globally. These factors include income inequality, high rates of youth populations out of education or work, rapid rates of urbanisation, poorly resourced criminal justice systems and the proliferation of firearms. While none of these factors alone cause crime, their presence together makes it more likely that crime will occur. Insecurity and high levels of violence have negative consequences for public institutions, the national economy, social cohesion and ultimately the quality of people’s lives (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2008; Martino, 2012).

The World Bank (2011) refers to Kenya’s capital, Nairobi as one of the most crime-ridden cities in Africa. Violence and crime is widespread throughout the capital but especially in Nairobi’s poorer neighbourhoods. This is due to a failing in law and order, political disorder, unemployment, poverty and inequality (Tranchant, 2013). Kawachi et al. (1999) suggest crime mirrors the quality of the social environment so that within an urban setting crime is influenced by poor living conditions and a breakdown of relationships (Carli and Shaw, 2011). It would appear that areas with little sense of community cohesion are particularly vulnerable to criminality (UNODC, 2005). Due to the high crime rates in Kenya for example, there would appear to be a need for strong law enforcement but the police force are poorly equipped, inadequately trained, underpaid and often allegedly corrupt so that communities are reluctant to rely on them for protection (UNODC, 2005). However, the World Bank’s study (2011) on ‘violence in the city’ in lower-income communities in Nairobi found that residents expressed a desire for policing that was based on trust and coordination with the community. According to Ruteere et al. (2013) responses to crime and violence in Nairobi’s poor neighbourhoods are rarely informed by community-level knowledge and expertise on what is likely to work. They recommend community efforts should be considered when attempting to address and mitigate crime and violence. This
research demonstrates that community driven safety projects can be effective in lower-income, socially disorganised areas of Nairobi.

The study area involved in this research was Kibera, a lower-income, informal settlement that is considered to have one of the highest crime rates in Nairobi and apparently a significant absence of the police (SRIC, 2014). Residents of Kibera are at high risk of crime, particularly robbery, burglary and sexual violence (SRIC, 2014; MapKibera, 2010). Kibera has a transient, young population and high rates of unemployment. It significantly lacks a ‘sense of community’ (Wedlock, 2006) residents do not always know, or trust their neighbours but yet reside in close proximity to one another. Kibera is Nairobi’s largest informal settlement, with an estimated population of 200,000 who all reside on an area of two and half kilometres squared (MapKibera, 2010). In the absence of law enforcers and trust in the justice system, residents adopt a variety of protection mechanisms and are obligated to rely on methods of informal social control that can improve their safety but can also place them at risk.

1.2     Kenya’s commitment to improving security
Safety and security is one of the strategic areas of Kenya’s long-term national planning strategy, officially known as Kenya Vision 2030 (Government of Kenya, 2007). The government’s vision for security is a ‘society free from danger and fear’ and to provide Kenyans with a more secure living and working environment. The government propose to achieve this through improving the practice of community policing, increasing the number of police officers, adopting information and communication technology in crime detection and prevention, and enhancing police training (Government of Kenya, 2007, p. 9).

The elections in 2007 were surrounded by accusations of vote rigging and triggered nationwide violence for months at the end of 2007 and beginning of 2008. During this period 1300 people are believed to have lost their lives and there was an increase in the number of reported rapes targeting mostly poor women in their homes (Tranchant, 2013). Human Rights Watch (2011) reported that police officers committed more than one-quarter of these recorded rapes.
Kenya has a history of violence around election periods and the next elections are scheduled to take place on 8th August 2017 (Wafula, 2017). The violence is usually orchestrated by youths and vigilante groups from informal settlements who have been hired by politicians to carry out politically motivated violence (Anderson, 2002). The Institute for Security Studies have already raised concerns that the escalating political tension in Kenya in 2016, is alarmingly similar to conditions that preceded the electoral violence in 2007 (Aling’o and Noor, 2016).

The Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence (CIPEV) indicted the police were majorly responsible for a series of crimes that were committed during the post-election violence in 2007 and 2008. The CIPEV report (CIPEV, 2008) proposed recommendations for a police reform, starting with the establishment of a task force on the police reform to examine the institutional, policy, legislative and operational framework of the police. As part of the police reform three critical laws were passed in 2011, the National Police Service Act, the National Police Service Commission Act and the Independent Police Oversight Authority Act.

Two important reports have been produced in relation to the police reform in Kenya:

- Commission of Inquiry Report into the Post-Election Violence (CIPEV) produced in October 2008, also known as the Waki report (CIPEV, 2008).
- The National Taskforce on Police Reform, produced in November 2009, which is also known as the Ransley Report (Republic of Kenya. National Task Force on Police Reforms, 2009).

Key recommendations made within the Ransley Report were for the police to apply democratic policing principles and adopt community policing. Police reforms usually indicate a significant loss of public confidence in the police (Hope, 2015), hence the Ransley report identified that improving community – police relations and building public confidence in the police was a crucial aspect of the reform (Republic of Kenya. National Task Force on Police Reforms, 2009).
1.3 Community safety in lower-income Nairobi, Kenya

The informal settlement of Kibera was studied in an attempt to critically analyse the crime situation from the perspective of lower-income residents in Nairobi and explore formal and informal crime prevention mechanisms which could be effectively adopted in such a context. The discussion concentrates around the topics of community efficacy, procedural justice and social control mechanisms over deviant behaviour.

The informal settlement of Kibera is socially disorganised and lacks social cohesion. There appears to be a lack of belonging, political trust and respect for diversity within the settlement. The population is highly transient which disrupts the ability to establish or maintain ties and form attachments. Wedlock’s (2006) study demonstrated a relationship between crime and community cohesion and how crime decreases as a ‘sense of community’ increases. Other academic research has shown a link between social control as an aspect of community cohesion and a decrease in crime (Sampson and Raudenbush, 1999; Lee, 2000; Hirschfield and Bowers, 1997). Sampson and Raudenbush (1999) state residents from cohesive neighbourhoods are more likely to come together and intervene in deviant behaviour for the public good, they refer to this as collective efficacy.

In Kenya formal social control mechanisms appear to be strained through poor relations between the Kenyan police and the public, particularly amongst the lower-income populations. The Kenyan police are reportedly known for their excessive use of force, brutality, illegal arrests and detention, corruption, partiality, extra-judicial executions and abuse of process (Human Rights Watch, 2011; CHRI, 2007). In societies where there is an absence of a legitimate police service and a lack of trust, the public may rely upon other informal means for regulating behaviour (World Bank, 2011). This enables an environment where other forms of ‘policing’ may operate and various forms of informal social control mechanisms, such as community collective violence (Black, 1976) or the establishment of vigilante groups can flourish.

Situational crime prevention takes a more structured and conservative approach to crime prevention (Clarke, 2005), compared to informal methods. Situation crime prevention methods can ‘design out’ crime and reduce the opportunities available to commit crime.
through pre-emptive approaches (Clarke, 1992, 2005; Newman 1972). However, it has been criticised for not addressing the root causes of crime (Bright, 1997) and creating displacement of crime (Bar and Pease, 1990). It has also been suggested that access to situational crime prevention methods is more available to the wealthy and can therefore exacerbate already fragmented societies, for example through the creation of gated communities (Blakely and Snyder, 1997).

In addition, it is acknowledged that social conditions have a key bearing on crime (Hirschi, 1969; Garland, 2001) and therefore this needs to be taken into account when discussing and considering community crime prevention interventions. Community safety takes a broad approach to addressing crime and has the scope to incorporate both situational and social crime prevention. Community safety projects can also adopt or build upon subtle informal social controls, which Reiner (2000) considers to be the most effective method for preventing deviant behaviour.

Residents of Nairobi appear to be in favour of policing that is based on trust and coordination with community actors and groups (World Bank, 2011). Further, community safety initiatives can create natural surveillance through ‘eyes on the street’ (Jacob, 1961), encourage social cohesion and develop subtle informal social controls to manage deviant behaviour (Reiner, 2000) whilst simultaneously improving relations between the police and the public.

This particular topic will be explored through reviewing relevant literature, media reports, information gathered from seminars, forums and conferences plus qualitative research. The qualitative research took place in Nairobi throughout 2015, interviews were conducted with key informants to discuss the topics of policing and security, protection issues, victims of crime and community safety. In-depth interviews, focus group discussions and the diary method took place with residents from two wards (administrative areas) of Kibera, plus weekly meetings were attended with elders from Kibera during the data collection period.

This research will consider whether or not community safety projects can successfully reduce crime and improve safety in lower income, socially disorganised areas of Nairobi. It
will further critically analyse whether particular projects require an element of collective efficacy within the community to initiate a project, lead it and mobilise resources. The question as to whether there needs to be subtle informal social control mechanisms designed to regulate deviant behaviour will also be critically explored, as well as whether or not there is a need to regulate the behaviour of the police just as much as civilians.

In order to achieve this, this research will focus on the below aims and objectives.

1.4 Aims and objectives

Aim:
To critically analyse community safety initiatives as an approach to crime prevention in lower-income Nairobi, Kenya.

Objectives:
- To critically examine criminality and its impact upon the community of Kibera.
- Critically evaluate formal social control within the community of Kibera.
- Critically explore informal responses to crime and criminality by the community of Kibera.
1.5 Structure of thesis

This chapter has established that residents of Kibera, a lower-income informal settlement of Nairobi, Kenya will be the focus of this study. It has demonstrated that the residents are at high risk of becoming victims of crime, but there is a significant lack of presence of law enforcers and therefore there is a need to explore methods that could improve their safety, effectively.

The theoretical framework for this research is provided within chapter two, it begins by discussing the concept of community safety as an approach to crime prevention and sets the context of the research in Kenya. Key literature relating to procedural justice, social control and collective efficacy is explored within the chapter.

Chapter three explains the methodological approach adopted for the research, discussing the stages of the study, research design and how the data was analysed.

Through research conducted with residents of Kibera, chapter four considers criminality and the safety and security phenomenon within the informal settlement.

Chapter five draws on Sunshine and Tyler (2003) legitimacy scale to explore lower-income Kenyan’s perception of procedural justice within formal social control processes. It then analyses alternative options for ‘policing’ in lower-income areas of Nairobi and their perceived effectiveness to improve safety.

An analysis of the empirical information contained within chapter four and five is provided in chapter six. The discussion focuses around the importance of developing subtle informal social control mechanisms to be able to regulate the behaviour of the police.

Chapter seven summarises the contribution this thesis has made to knowledge and answers the research questions. It also provides recommendations and presents potential avenues for further research.
Chapter 2: Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

This chapter will explore the literature on the topics of ‘policing’, crime prevention, community safety and social control mechanisms. The literature review highlights a change in the landscape of ‘policing’ and demonstrates how the concept of ‘policing’ has broadened, this is often referred to as the pluralisation of policing (Jones and Newburn, 1998; Reiner, 2010). ‘Policing’ is no longer monopolised by the ‘public police’ it now encompasses a variety of security provisions, including citizen-led community safety initiatives. The literature review focuses on democratic and community policing within the ‘public police’ and the relevance of their legitimacy (Sunshine and Tyler, 2003) for police-community relations. It then considers policing ‘below the state’ (Stenning, 2000) and social control mechanisms, drawing on Reiner’s (2000) concept that deviant behaviour can be regulated through subtle informal social controls.

2.2 ‘Policing’

Reiner (1997 p. 1005) describes policing as an attempt to produce security through ‘the creation of systems of surveillance coupled with the threat of sanctions’. Human behaviour is governed by laws and the police are the representatives of the state, who ensure compliance with those laws (Hough, 2003). Although, as Sklansky (2008) acknowledges the police cannot be everywhere and often the publics’ expectation exceeds the police’s capacity. ‘Policing’ implies a set of processes with specific social functions that may be carried out by a diverse range of people and techniques, of which the state police is only one. A number of academics have recognised the need to distinguish between ‘police’ and ‘policing’ as it is clear that policing has evolved from the state having the monopoly of control over policing. The concept of ‘policing’ is closely associated with social control (Newburn and Reiner, 2007). Reiner (2000) is of the opinion that the most effective method to regulate potential deviance is through subtle, informal social controls, and ‘policing’ processes embedded in other institutions.

Whilst there are parallels between policing and social control, it is important to recognise a distinction should be made between the two to avoid the concept of policing being
stretched and lose its focus (Jones and Newburn, 1998; Reiner, 2010). Cohen (1985) provides further clarity to this, suggesting when social control is used in reference to ‘policing’ it should be restricted to ‘organised’ social control actions to deal with deviant behaviour. Stenning (2000) discusses ‘policing’ in terms of different levels; ‘policing’ that takes place ‘above’ the state such as international policing like Interpol, ‘policing’ by the state, ‘below’ the state where ‘policing’ is undertaken by citizens or the community for example in the form of organised residential groups, and ‘policing’ that takes place outside or beyond the state, often referred to as ‘private policing’.

Clapham (1999) is of the opinion that most African states have not developed ‘public policing’ that protect civilians without discrimination and that are accountable to them. Clapham (1999) would argue that the ‘public police’ are no different from ‘private police’ because they have been developed to support the ruling elite. In the African context, he states there is no need to differentiate between ‘public’ and ‘private’ security because all security systems are private in that they all serve less than the whole population.

Private policing is not always focused on crime and law enforcement, although private policing can also include the provision of technology for situational crime prevention, such as access control, guards and alarms. The growth in private security has, however, been attributed to gaps within the state provision of security, a growth in ‘mass private property’ (the expansion of privately owned space that are generally open to the public, such as shopping malls and leisure centres) and neo-liberal governance which has encouraged contracting out what would usually be state services.

There are a number of benefits to the pluralisation of policing, increased cost-effectiveness and efficiency, approaches are more easily tailored to local needs and beneficiaries are more likely to contribute towards the financial costs. However, as Clapham (1999) identifies the pluralisation of policing also brings with it some challenges, such as biased access to effective policing, public interest becoming subordinate to private interests, difficulties with regulation and the risk of exploitation. This leads to the question of what constitutes the most appropriate way to govern and regulate these new forms of ‘policing’.
However, according to Hough (2007) it is the police who stand as the symbolic ‘guardians’ of social stability and order. Jackson and Sunshine (2007) suggest we look to the police to defend community values and moral structures, and expect their intervention when those values and structures are felt to be under threat. Although at the centre of this, is the public’s belief that agents of criminal justice act appropriately, properly and justly (Tyler, 2006).

The Criminal Justice System relies on legitimacy and consent far more than any other public service. Support from the public is vital if the police and other criminal justice agencies are to function effectively. Collantes-Celador (2005) recognise that democratic policing principles assist with transforming a society but identify that it cannot work in isolation from a broad range of other social mechanisms. The concept of democratic policing will be discussed next.

2.3 Democratic policing

‘In a democratic society, the police serve to protect, rather than impede, freedoms. The very purpose of the police is to provide a safe, orderly environment in which these can be exercised. A democratic police force is not concerned with people’s beliefs or associates, their movements or conformity to state ideology. It is not even primarily concerned with the enforcement of regulations or bureaucratic regimens. Instead, the police force of a democracy is concerned strictly with the preservation of safe communities and the application of criminal law equally to all people, without fear or favour.


Democratic policing promotes transparency, accountability and adherence to the law. It is viewed globally as a model of good practice both by academics and practitioners and is often promoted as the basis for police reforms (Bayley, 2001; Collantes-Celador, 2005; OSCE, 2008; Marenin, 1998; Manning, 2010; CHRI, 2014; Stenning, 2014). The concept of democratic policing considers the police as a service rather than a police force because it aims to provide a safe and orderly environment, through ensuring the security of individuals rather than the state (Marenin, 1998). Police officers operating within the democratic policing model apply the law equally to all, without fear or prejudice and are accountable for their actions (Bayley, 2001).
Manning (2010) outlines principles of democratic policing through a set of guidelines for democratic police practice, through which police actions can be judged. These principles include, police being procedurally fair and constrained in dealing with citizens; being largely reactive to citizens’ complaints and concerns; equal in application of coercion to populations defined spatially and temporally; fair in firing, hiring and evaluation and being accountable.

**Procedural justice**

The procedural justice perspective argues that the legitimacy of the police is linked to public judgments about the fairness of the processes through which the police make decisions and exercise authority (Sunshine and Tyler, 2003). Sunshine and Tyler (2003) developed a legitimacy scale using the principle components of trust in the police, obligation to obey the police as an institution or the law enforcers, and cynicism towards the law. The title of Bradford et al’s (2004) paper ‘officers as mirrors’ provides a good analogy for police legitimacy, if the police exercise their authority using fair procedures, the police will be seen as legitimate by the public and they will be willing to cooperate and assist the police. However, if the police are perceived to be unfair it will lead to alienation, defiance and non-cooperation. Sunshine and Tyler (2003) believe that the police gain acceptance from the public when police performance is considered to be effective in controlling behaviour, there are credible sanctions in place when the rules or laws are broken and police services and resources are fairly distributed.

If the public views the police as legitimate, then they are more likely to obey the law. Tyler (1990) has demonstrated that when people believe the police or the criminal justice system are fair, they are more likely to comply with the law and law enforcers. Bringing the behaviour of members of the public into line with norms, rules, and laws is a core function of the police, as they are a method of formal social control. Although, it is important to understand how and why people respond to different mechanisms of social control, whether those are formal or informal (Tyler, 1990).

According to Sunshine and Tyler’s (2003) theory when the public view the police as legitimate, they will not only conform to the law but be willing to provide them with
support and cooperation. This allows the police to invest their time dealing with serious issues rather than being tied up with trivial, time consuming issues. These circumstances facilitate public support when the police need to use their discretion.

Many scholars recognise the importance of having a positive relationship between the public and the police in order to generate police legitimacy, and community policing is promoted as a strategy to build these relationships (Kelling and Moore, 1988; Friedmann, 1992 and Skogan et al, 1999). Traditional policing is often accused of alienating citizens and the police from one another because traditional policing strategies are often reactive to incidents and police officers are considered to be less accessible to members of the public because they are usually in vehicles (Moore, 1992).

Democratic policing respects the rights of all those who come into contact with officers and demands that officers behave in procedurally fair manner. Democratic police organisations are careful not to use excessive force and when force is used it is used proportionately and only when it is absolutely necessary to do so. Officers have to be accountable and responsible for their actions. Exercising power in this way is required if police are to convince the public of their claim to legitimacy.

Studies have suggested that procedural justice could be just as important within policing organisations as it is in the relationship between police and public. Officers’ confidence in their own authority (known as ‘self-legitimacy’) is connected to their identification with their organisation and perceptions of the procedural justice of senior management. Bradford and Quinton (2014) suggest that democratic policing is broader than public perceptions of police procedural justice and should include measures related to organisational justice.

*The United Kingdom model*

The British policing model is deeply rooted in the concept of democratic policing, the Association of Chief Police Officers (2012) describes the British model to be neighbourhood policing and the Peelian principles. Within the Peelian principles trust and accountability are paramount, the principles recognise the police’s responsibility to the public by
acknowledging that ‘the police are the public and the public are the police’ and that the police must ‘demonstrate absolute impartial service to the law’. Although the idea of the Peelian discourse is not without critic, the principles have been criticised for being too general and lacking coverage and status. Loader (2014) states the principles are a product of their time and are now insufficient to the contemporary challenges of urban policing. Loader (2014) claims they are too vague to shape regulatory action and lack constitutional standing or legal force. The report of the Independent Police Commission (2013, p. 13) states the ‘police service needs to be professional, democratically accountable and serve the common good and ultimately policing should contribute to the creation of a safer, more cohesive and just society’.

Bayley (2001) believes that through the police being fair, effective and open in their actions they can contribute to creating an environment that reduces the potential for hatred to result in violence and creates a ‘bond of citizenship’. There is a clear overlap between democratic policing and community policing (Aitchison and Blaustein, 2013) and as community policing involves working with a variety of partners to fight crime and violence it is a form of policing that can be utilised to address this issue. An overview of the concept of community policing will be discussed next.

2.4 Community policing
The implementation of community policing will be considered from two different perspectives; a top-down approach, implemented by the ‘public police’ and a bottom-up approach initiated by the community or community members (Wisler and Onwudiwe, 2008). A number of international examples relating to the implementation of community policing using the top-down approach are discussed below along with some of the challenges encountered. This will be followed in the next section by discussing the concept of bottom-up approaches to community policing.

Overview of community policing
The philosophy of Sir Robert Peel’s ‘principles of policing’ and his notion of ‘the police are the public and the public are the police’ has shaped the concept of community policing.
Over a number of years, the National Neighbourhood Foot Patrol Centre at Michigan State University developed the following principles for community policing:

1. Community policing is a philosophy and a strategy.
2. It requires implementation by all police personnel.
3. It requires a new type of police officer, the Community Policing Officer (CPO).
4. The CPO should work with volunteers.
5. It introduces a different kind of relationship between officers and citizens.
6. It adds a proactive dimension to police work.
7. It aims to protect the most vulnerable segments in society.
8. It seeks to balance human skills with technological innovations.
9. It must be implemented and integrated force-wide.
10. It emphasises decentralisation.

(Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1990)

Friedmann (1992) states the ‘community’ within ‘community policing’ assumes that policing is not done to it, but with it. Community policing involves a wide variety of actors who work through partnerships to fight crime and violence (Rogers, 2006). Community policing is preventative and proactive, focusing on identifying and analysing problems and developing solutions. This requires front line patrol officers to be able to use their discretion to make decisions (Zwane, 1994; Brogden and Nijhar, 2005) which is not always the case in traditional style policing.

Traditional policing differs from community policing as it involves the police being the central institution in fighting crime and violence, it is reactive in nature and responds to incidents after they have occurred. The focus is on internal resources and information from the community is generally limited. The police force is managed in a top-down, hierarchical manner with decision making concentrated at the top of the organisation.

According to Trojanowicz (1990) the philosophy of community policing requires a police officer who can work pro-actively and independently, whilst being able to work in partnerships. Due to the partnership connections in the community policing concept, it is suggested that information from a variety of sources is more widely available to the police. Rogers (2006) promotes community policing rather than the traditional policing as it takes a broader problem solving approach that is more focused on solving individual crimes.
Friedmann (1992, p. 4) defines community policing as:

“Community policing is a policy and a strategy aimed at achieving more effective and efficient crime control, reduced fear of crime, improved quality of life, improved police services and police legitimacy, through a proactive reliance on community resources that seeks to change crime-causing conditions. It assumes a need for greater accountability of police, greater public share in decision making and greater concern for civil rights and liberties”.

According to Friedmann (1992) community policing can build the relationship between the police and the public, while improving crime control. He is of the opinion that fighting crime and police-community relations are intimately related. Although, Harcourt (2001) is of the opinion that the motivation for ‘community policing’ can be based upon the state intending to advance control rather than building a relationship between the community and the police.

Bringing police forces closer to the community according to Friedmann (1992) will strengthen the accountability of the police to the public. Although a study conducted in Nigeria found that community policing created more opportunities for corrupt or unethical practices through police officers having closer ties with community members, whereby preferential treatments developed (Olusegun, 2009).

Inspired by the work of Goldstein (1990) British police initiated an innovation known as Problem-Oriented Policing (POP) which is closely linked with the concept of community policing. The difference between the two is that POP involves problem orientated tactics for a specific issue whereas community policing refers to a general policing approach. Community policing and POP both require decentralisation of police authority to patrol officers and both place emphasis on collaboration between police and agencies (Brogden and Nijhar, 2005).

Kelling and Bratton’s (1998) experiences with the New York subway highlighted another benefit to community policing. Their work on the subway taught them that community policing provides the police with an opportunity to make contact with and arrest serious offenders for minor offences. It was recognised that many serious offenders also behave in a disorderly fashion and commit minor offenses like farebeating. Newburn (2008) agrees
that certain behaviours are markers or triggers of other kinds of criminal activity; for example within the UK a number of serial killers have been brought to justice through being apprehended for minor offences.

‘Broken windows’ was used by Wilson and Kelling (1982) as a metaphor for disorder within neighbourhoods. Their theory links disorder within a community to subsequent occurrences of serious crime. Kelling and Bratton (1998) state that disorderly behaviour needs to be dealt with early to prevent the cycle from accelerating and perpetuating, they believe waiting until serious crimes occur to intervene is too late.

The presence and prevalence of disorder creates fear amongst citizens. Disorder is generally defined in two ways, either physical or social. In an urban setting physical disorder takes place in the form of vacant buildings, broken windows, broken streetlights or abandoned vehicles; whereas social disorder occurs through noisy neighbours, prostitution (which is also a crime – but there is often a blurred line between disorder and crime) or groups of youths congregating on street corners. Disorder undermines social cohesion, residents and their capacity for collective action. Those that can, often move away from areas where there is disorder and many of those remaining withdraw from community public life and everyday uses of public space. The withdrawal of the community weakens social control and social capital that may have contributed to supressing criminal activity. Without this, a vicious cycle can occur whereby disorder causes crime and crime causes further disorder and crime (Skogan, 2008). Wisler and Onwudiwe (2008) point out that consideration should be given to the resources available to the community for self-regulation and community driven security provision.

In Merseyside, UK a community policing initiative was established by the community in the form of a ‘community patrol’ (Hancock, 2001). In consultation with the police a ‘community patrol’ was conducted by members of the community who dealt with incidences that were considered not to be serious, such as youths causing annoyance. The police would then be called to any incidences which residents considered to be serious or where a crime had been committed. Hancock conducted a study of the initiative in 2001 and found that respondents in the study approved of the ‘community patrol’ and all but a few had used
the service. The initiative allowed police resources to be utilised effectively, efficiently and appropriately. The communities that were involved in Hancock’s (2001) study identify the importance of supporting ‘root solutions’ which were linked to ‘root causes’ of neighbourhood decline and disorder. Therefore in this case the significance of poverty, poor housing, political decisions made by government, banks, insurance companies and other powerful stakeholders was recognised.

Skogan (2004) acknowledges that community policing is not cheap as it is labour extensive. In the early 2000s it was recognised within the UK that police resources had not been available to maintain certain functions such as high visibility patrols and it was believed that this, among other factors had increased the fear of crime within communities (Madsen, 2007). In 2002 Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) were introduced in the UK as a designated role under the Police Reform Act (2002). Their role is to contribute to policing neighbourhoods, primarily through highly visible patrols (with the purpose of reassuring the public) increasing orderliness in public places and being accessible to communities and partner agencies working at the local level. Within the neighbourhood policing policy PCSOs were described as ‘the eyes and ears of the service’ with a responsibility to address the spectrum of anti-social behaviour issues (Madsen, 2007). Crawford (2008) suggests the introduction of PCSOs could be interpreted as the government’s attempt to integrate plural policing within the police organisation.

Initially PCSOs were subjected to criticism being accused of being cheap replacements for ‘real’ police officers and not being adequately trained to properly patrol neighbourhoods. However, an analysis of PCSO’s activities that was carried out between 2006 and 2007 by the Home Office demonstrated that the majority of PCSOs’ time was being spent on being highly visible within the community, dealing with minor offences and supporting front-line policing, which corresponded well with the Home Office guidance for the purpose of their role (Dale and Mason, 2008).

2.4.1 Challenges with adopting community policing

Community policing has many benefits but it is recognised that there can be challenges with its implementation. Wisler and Onwudiwe (2009) argue against importing policing
practices from places with different structures and cultures as they are likely to fail. They state that even within stable democracies community policing does not always transfer effectively.

Centralised structure adopting a decentralised policing approach

In the 1990s the South African Police Service (SAPS) decided to move towards a community policing model in an effort to address the country’s high crime rates. The community policing programme was based on Western principles such as emphasising democratic control, accountability, impartiality, transparency and a demilitarised democratic style of policing. This was the complete opposite to the previous structure within the police that was highly centralised, paramilitary in style and an authoritarian institution. Prior to 1994 (year of the first democratic election in South Africa) the police’s strategy was completely reactive and there was a lack of trust and confidence between communities and the police (Minaar, 2009).

Community members in South Africa saw the new approach as an opportunity to change the balance of power and take the opportunity to make the police accountable for community needs. Community police forums were established and were designed to be the link between local communities and the new SAPS. However the distrust between the communities and the police led to a reluctance to work together and in addition to this some community members were benefiting from the proceeds of crime and illegal activities and therefore were unwilling to share information with the police.

During apartheid there were forms of self-policing (such as mob justice) that occurred at the local level in the black townships. When the new community policing model was introduced it was assumed by those who were self-policing that they would continue to do so with additional resources but with limited interference; which was not the case. Following the failure of introducing the new model the self-policing continued, community forums were re-established in the form of neighbourhood watch patrols without any collaboration with SAPS (Minaar, 2009).
In the more affluent areas community forums turned into not-for-profit companies who contributed money to equip and resource the police who were operating in their area (this did not take place in the poorer areas) (Minaar, 2009). Later residents within the more affluent areas began to take an interest in the private security industry in relation to the provision of guarding, monitoring, escorting and armed response.

There were a number of factors that contributed to the failure of adapting a community policing model in South Africa. The SAPS were ill-equipped for crime control and prevention, the force was unaccountable and lacked the capability to gather intelligence as they were distrusted by the population (Pauw, 2007). SAPS personnel did not have the policing skills that are required to deal with social problems and crime prevention as they were used to the more militarised and forceful approach (Minaar, 2009). This supports Trojanowicz’s (1990) philosophy of community policing which requires an independent police officer who works closely with community residents to solve the problems of crime, fear of crime and social disorder, rather than maintaining a controlling demeanour. Myhill (2012) suggests a method of engaging police officers in community policing and to acknowledge the importance of the role it should be recognised and measured through performance indicators.

Centralised and hierarchical police structure

Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux (1990) are of the opinion that a police force that has a highly centralised and hierarchical structure is not conducive to adapting a community policing model. They suggest a centralised police force is designed to protect the state rather than engaging with the public, which is essential for community policing.

France has a centralised policing structure and in the past community policing practices (such as foot patrols) have proven to be unsuccessful due to police officers not considering it to be ‘real police’ work. Many officers are posted away from their homes and rotate on a regular basis which is not compatible with building a relationship with the community. Their zero tolerance policies often lead to unnecessary tensions created between the public and police, which only exacerbates the distrust between communities and the police. Police chiefs in France also cause challenges to implementing community policing.
due to their reluctance to allow officers to use their own discretion in case they begin to question the hierarchical structure (Mouhanna, 2009). Wisler and Onwudiwe (2009) also highlight internal resistance within the police as a constraint to community policing. This was demonstrated in Tanzania when despite having political and popular support, it was police officers who resisted adapting to community policing (Scher, 2010).

In Nigeria the police force was originally decentralised and maintained by the local government because it was designed to reflect community needs. However, following the coup in 1966 military leaders feared being overthrown by the police and local leaders. The military leaders therefore decided to prevent local authorities from maintaining these local forces. As a consequence of this, local informal policing emerged as a result of the government’s inability to ensure the safety and security of citizens. Informal policing groups have the support at the local level, they’re considered to be closer to the people and more responsive to their needs, however they lack any form of accountability. They are faced with the challenges of lack of funding and resources and are subjected to persecution and threat from the police. Another limitation to these groups is that membership is often closed, with women and certain age sets being excluded (Onwudiwe, 2009).

A centralised policing structure does not appear to be conducive to a community policing model due to police officers being removed from interacting with the community on a regular basis. When a police organisation moves to a community policing model they need to consider the skills required by police officers to implement this approach and it should not be assumed that all police officers skills will naturally be transferable. As recognised by Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux (1990) community policing requires a ‘new type of officer’. It is evident that when communities do not feel their security needs are being addressed forms of self-policing can be adopted, this can range from the establishment of mobs, not for profit businesses or the provision of an individual’s own security through private security companies. Wisler and Onwudiwe (2008) state there are two forms of community policing, one which is top-down, initiated and controlled by the police or state and bottom-up originating from society, such as gated communities and vigilantism.
**Summary of community policing**

As per Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux (1990) principles, it is evident that a decentralised police structure needs to exist in order for community policing to be a success. A decentralised structure allows policing to be supervised at the local level, ensuring police officers implement the law fairly and without bias, whilst having the scope to use their discretion when appropriate.

A key theme related to the failure of community policing initiatives appears to be the absence of democratic policing norms. Lack of police accountability and transparency leads to a lack of trust and collaboration between communities and the police. One of the reasons that community policing requires collaboration is to ensure that all stakeholders have the same agenda and objectives for the initiative because without this, it will inevitably fail.

Skogan (2004) acknowledges community policing can be expensive due to the large amount of resources required, but with community and police collaboration, volunteer groups can be established, and potentially resources can be generated from within the community to support community policing projects. The use of community members as volunteers (as recommended by Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1990) significantly reduces costs, with the added benefit that people from within the community have local knowledge and a vested interest in making the initiative a success.

During the review of the literature on community policing it was noted that there is limited current literature on the topic. Whereas, there appears to be an increasing discussion on the pluralisation of policing, including ‘pluralisation below the state’. This may be arising from the current era of austerity and non-state organisations or individuals increasingly being encouraged to take on the responsibility for their own security (Garland, 2001; Wood and Shearing, 2007). However, the increasing acceptance for ‘citizen-led’ or self-policing highlights a need for regulation and accountability (Lister and Jones, 2016). Otherwise, in some contexts a lack of oversight could potentially allow community groups to evolve into vigilante groups, who may become uncontrollable by the state.
The idea of the bottom-up approach, or policing below the state as Stenning (2000) refers to it, is an interesting concept as it has the capacity to promote collaboration between informal and formal social control mechanisms. This will be explored further within the following section that will discuss preventing crime in communities.

2.5 Preventing crime in communities

There are various approaches that can be adopted to prevent crime in communities. This section will begin by discussing prevention methods that can ‘design out’ crime through the management and manipulation of the built physical environment. This will be followed by considering approaches that focus on addressing the root causes of criminality and then community crime prevention. Examples of community initiatives that encourage ‘eyes on the street’ and the involvement of citizens will also be considered.

2.5.1 Situational crime prevention

The foundation of the situational crime concept (Clarke, 1980) relies on the assumption that easier crimes attract more offenders, and more opportunity leads to more crime. Situational crime prevention primarily targets robbery, burglary and street crimes and is less relevant for addressing crimes such as domestic violence or corporate crime. Situational crime prevention primarily concerns ‘designing out’ crime and reducing opportunity, Hughes (1998) refers to this approach as ‘offence based’ as it typically involves pre-emptive approaches. It can involve taking measures directed at a specific crime such as reducing the risk of burglaries through creating gated communities, or manipulating the immediate environment by placing alley gates behind rows of houses (see Rogers, 2013). Another example of situational crime prevention is increasing the risk of a perpetrator being caught, for instance the installation of Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV), or decreasing the reward by removing an item or making an item be of no use if it is not operated by the authorised owner. An example of this would be the requirement for a code to gain access to electronic devices (Clarke, 1992).

Situational crime prevention is associated with three theories, routine activity, crime pattern and rational choice (Clarke, 2005). In order for a crime to occur the routine activity theory states that a likely offender, a suitable target and the absence of a capable guardian
are all required. The crime pattern theory explains the reasons why crimes are committed in certain areas and the theory of rational choice considers the criminal as an economic actor who weighs the potential gains of a criminal act against its possible losses. The theory reflects on the way in which offenders make decisions about offending in particular situations and in relation to specific types of crime (Clarke and Mayhew, 1980).

The actions related to situational crime prevention are designed to affect the behaviour of those who commit crime, or who are tempted to. Actions can involve target removal, target hardening or target de-valuing. It can also involve actions designed to enhance surveillance such as the installation of CCTV, in an attempt to deter potential offenders by the threat of being captured on film. CCTV is an example of where the threat of ‘being seen’ can produce self-discipline in which an individual polices their own behaviour (Armitage, 2002). Cameras could be considered as a ‘capable guardian’, which the routine activity theory identifies as a factor required to reduce the likelihood of crime (Cohen and Felson, 1979). However, prevention approaches such as CCTV have been accused of diminishing civil liberties and creating a ‘big brother’ society where personal freedoms are subjected to intrusions (Clarke, 2005).

Walklate (1996) is of the opinion that situational crime prevention moves the blame away from the perpetrator to the victim and assumes victims of crime have failed to adequately protect themselves. Although, Clarke (2005) would argue that the victim is empowered through receiving information about crime risks and how to avoid them through situational crime prevention mechanisms.

Some methods of ‘designing out’ crime have been criticised for encouraging fragmented societies, the creation of ‘gated communities’ is an example of this as it has the potential to heighten the sense of social exclusion for those who are not permitted entry into the ‘gated community’ space (Landman, 2000).

*Gated communities*

In many countries where the public lack confidence in law enforcers and the justice system they rely on alternative methods for protection. The poorer population may be forced to
depend on vigilante groups whilst the more affluent may chose to use private security, or live within a gated community (Landman, 2000).

In the context of the United States Blakely and Snyder (1997) define gated communities as areas which physically restrict access so that public spaces, such as sidewalks or streets, are privatised. Blakely and Snyder (1997) state that populations in America who reside in gated communities are generally separated by income, race and economic opportunity, although it is recognised that people with a range of backgrounds live within a gated community.

Blakely and Snyder (1997) divide gated communities into three categories:

1. **Lifestyle communities** – where gates are provided for security and in addition to accommodation leisure activities are available within the gated community. A retirement community is an example of a lifestyle community.
2. **Prestige communities** – lack the amenities of the lifestyle communities but the gates are markers of distinction and status.
3. **Security zone** – usually initiated/constructed by community members in response to crime or fear of it.

Bagaean and Uduku’s (2010) broader definition of ‘gated communities’ ranges from a boom across a dead end street to a lifestyle community. In Nairobi, like many African capital cities, the majority of the middle to upper income population reside within gated and fenced areas with guards who are responsible for controlling access into the compound.

There is a perception that living within a gated community will provide protection from crime and other problems generated from urbanisation. Wilson-Doenges (2000) believes that developers in the United States are creating gated communities in response to an increased demand. As communities become more urbanised, there is concern about a decline in a sense of community and an increase in the fear of crime. Urban areas are often inhabited by transient populations which lack the social cohesion found within a stable community. In Blandy and Lister’s (2005) study in the UK 72% of the respondents found the most attractive aspect of gated communities was that they provided ‘greater security’. In Wilson-Doenges’s (2000) study on gated communities in America, residents of gated
communities reported a significantly lower sense of community but considerably higher perceived personal safety compared to residents of non-gated communities even though there was no significant difference in actual crime rates between them. Landman (2010) recognises that in some situations, boundaries can assist in bringing residents together within a geographical area to fight crime because they have a common purpose, which can facilitate social cohesion and a sense of identity. However, it is noted that whilst these developments can promote benefits to those inside the gated community it excludes those outside of the gated community.

**Increasing urban fragmentation and separation**

Landman (2000) describes gated communities as a microcosm of the larger spatial pattern of segmentation and separation. Those who can afford it, can choose to remove themselves from public spaces and places through living within a gated community. Blakely and Snyder (1997) would argue that the boundaries determine membership and building a barrier against poorer neighbourhoods, or different races are common reasons why people chose to live within gated communities. Low (2001) suggests this has the potential to create residential segregation and exacerbate any social divides that already exist. Gated communities form a barrier to social interaction, reducing any potential to build networks or increase tolerance towards diverse cultural, racial or social groups. Low (2001) believes gated communities have a negative effect on the net social capital. Long term implications of increased social fragmentation could prove harmful to the overall vision of unity and peace among different groups of the population (Landman, 2000).

Gated communities can also be responsible for, or perceived to be responsible for displacing crime (Bar and Pease, 1990). Although they can create a false sense of security amongst residents because living within a gated community can make you a target as residents may be perceived to be wealthy. According to the United Nations Department for Safety and Security (UNDSS) in Nairobi most car-jackings take place when individuals are in their vehicles waiting to enter or whilst exiting their gated community (UNDSS, 2014).
Shearing (1997) believes that within South Africa security measures like gated communities can take on the traditional responsibilities of the state; and in some circumstances allow new ‘law and order’ bodies to operate outside of the state’s control. In South Africa it has been suggested that some gated communities have an elite security of their own, who are responsible for ‘policing’ the estates. The Ministry of Police has openly acknowledged that the regulation of the private security industry in South Africa needs to be improved (Defence Web, 2012).

Both Newman (1972) and Coleman (1985) highlighted the concept of defensible space and the relationship between the physical environment and crime. They demonstrated that the physical layout of areas could be manipulated to reduce crime in a neighbourhood. Newman (1972) believed residents would be more prepared to watch over their own private space than they would public space. Newman (1972) put forward a solution that centred on reconstructing residential environments in America to facilitate natural surveillance and to re-establish access control. Lack of surveillance, anonymity and ease of escape were factors Coleman (1985) identified as crime facilitators, which she focused on when redesigning public-sector housing estates in the UK. Rogers (2013) study of alley gates in South Wales demonstrated situational crime prevention methods have the potential to reduce fear of crime, encourage residents to take on more responsibility for space and potentially act as capable guardians.

Situational crime prevention has been accused of having a conservative approach to crime, that keeps the law enforcement agencies from being overwhelmed (Clarke, 2005). It has been identified that if situational crime prevention initiatives are not continued there is a high probability the problems will re-surface and therefore these are not permanent solutions. It has also been argued that situational crime prevention may not prevent crime but instead may result in ‘displacement’ through altering the patterns of offending behaviour. This may be temporal, where the crime takes place at a different time, or spatial when it is committed in a different place, tactical, where methods are adapted to take into account initiatives such as target hardening or functional where a different crime from that originally intended is carried out (Bar and Pease, 1990; Pease, 1997).
Bar and Pease (1990) discuss displacement in terms of being benign or malign, benign displacement resulting in a criminal committing a lesser offence than originally intended, and malign having the opposite effect. An example of a malign displacement would be if a car thief faced with target hardening measures decided to revert to car-jacking or kidnapping. Bar and Pease’s (1990) study supported the theory that displacement can take place as a result of situational crime prevention methods but noted that it was not very widespread. After examining 55 studies related to situational crime prevention Hesseling (1994) found that 22 of the studies did not have any displacement of crime and the 33 studies where displacement was identified, there was never as much crime displaced as prevented. Clarke (1992) believes that an increase in crime is often blamed on displacement, when actually the crimes were likely to have occurred anyway.

As well as creating displacement of crime, it is evident that situational crime prevention can create a ‘diffusion of benefits’, which according to Clarke and Weisburd (1994) can often be overlooked. For example with the Kirkholt burglary project, the ‘diffusion of benefits’ was captured when pre-pay gas and electricity meters were removed from some (but not all) houses within the Kirkholt estate, which discouraged potential burglars because they could not be sure of finding a meter with cash (Forrester et al, 1990). When residents benefit from crime prevention measures taken by others Miethe (1991) refers to them as ‘free riders’. Therefore the scale of the effectiveness of a situational crime prevention action will not necessarily be known but Welsh and Farrington (1999) are of the opinion that it can be an economically efficient strategy for reducing crime.

Rock (1989) states that situational and opportunity factors may help to determine when and where crime occurs but they do not play a role in whether crime occurs. However, the success of the Kirkholt burglary prevention project, is attributed to having elements of both situational and social crime prevention. Forrester et al (1990) suggest that crime prevention should not be divided into physical and social because the two are so closely intertwined. They explain that physical methods such as target hardening would have wider social benefits, and likewise social crime prevention such as improving social cohesion, would improve physical security.
2.5.2 Social crime prevention

Social crime prevention is an approach to crime that addresses the root causes. It focuses on the social elements that can lead to crime such as a lack of social cohesion, unemployment, poor environmental conditions and a breakdown of family structures and values. Social crime prevention initiatives could include housing development projects or employment schemes.

Hirschi (1969) argues that high rates of crime can be explained by the absence of social bonds. Hirschi’s (1969) social control theory (later also known as the social bond theory) focuses on four sociological factors that he believes would prevent people from participating in ‘deviant’ behaviour. The model defines deviance as beliefs, values and/or behaviours which are inconsistent with acceptable social norms and present harmful consequences for the individual and/or the public. According to Hirschi (1969) social attachments, involvement in conventional activities, acceptance of social norms and recognition of the moral validity of law are most likely to prevent crime.

Social attachment refers to linkages between a person and society (Hirschi, 1969). Individuals with strong and stable attachments to others within society are presumed to be less likely to violate social norms. This also applies to an individual’s commitment to, or investment through time or resources in conventional activities such as school or employment, and an individual’s involvement in recreational and social activities. Belief relates to having shared social values and norms. Shared social values could involve complying with the law or could be ‘rules’ or ‘norms’ established through social contracts within a community (Wikstrom, 2010).

Lack of attachment, investment or commitment could potentially translate into a negative attitude and develop an individual or group who feel they have nothing to lose by breaking social norms. Hirschi (1969) believes that without a strong attachment to one or both parents it is unlikely that feelings of respect for others in authority will develop. Gottfredson and Hirschi’s (1990) later work on the self-control theory clearly stipulated that the focus of crime control must be on ‘parents or adults with responsibilities for child-rearing’ (1990, p. 269). In the case of South Africa, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS)
have evidenced how positive parenting relates to violence prevention and national development (Gould and Ward, 2015). The control theories (Hirschi 1969; Hirschi and Gottfredson, 1990) have received criticism over the decades for being too general and not taking into account factors such as deviant behaviour in relation to different types of crimes or people (Gibbs, 1987). It is claimed that little attention has been given to race, class and gender inequalities (Geis, 2000). It is also worth noting that Hirschi’s (1969) social control model was developed in America and is from an American’s perspective in the late 1960s. However, even with these weaknesses, as acknowledged by Lilly, Cullen and Ball (2015) and with winning The 2016 Stockholm Prize in Criminology, Hirschi has dominated control theory for four decades, and this is likely to continue for some years to come.

The social approach to crime prevention believes that social conditions have a key bearing on crime. Bright (1997) suggests the social approach attempts to reduce risk factors and strengthen protective ones and is of the opinion that it is directed at neighbourhoods rather than individuals. The social approach aims to improve social conditions, strengthen community institutions and enhance recreational, educational and employment opportunities. Unlike situational methods of crime prevention, social approaches seek to tackle crime ‘at its roots’, which can often be through a multi-agency (partnership) approach. Rogers (2010) states that when neighbourhoods and communities have cohesion, organisation and solidarity, they are able to resist crime and disorder.

2.5.3 Community crime prevention
As previously discussed, with the pluralisation of policing a wide range of security provisions are now considered within the concept of ‘policing’. Reiner (2010) highlights the importance of creating surveillance systems supported by the threat of sanctions to ensure the security of social order. In relation to crime control Jane Jacobs (1961, p. 31-32) articulated the role of informal social control:

*The first thing to understand is that public peace ... is not kept primarily by the police, necessary as the police are. It is kept primarily by an intricate, almost unconscious network of voluntary controls and standards among the people themselves, and enforced by the people themselves.*
Reiner (2010) and Jacobs (1961) both highlight the importance of informal social control and therefore the role community members and communities, as a collective, can play in preventing crime. It has been recognised that the responsibility for public safety should be shared between the police and the public, ‘policing’ should be adapted to local conditions and volunteer resources should be mobilised (Bayley, 1994; Goldstein, 1990; Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1990).

‘Eyes on the street’
A wide ranging initiative called neighbourhood watch began in the 1970s that promoted greater involvement of citizens in the prevention of crime. The essence of the neighbourhood watch scheme is that groups of neighbours act as each other’s ‘eyes and ears’. This approach was pioneered in America and introduced by the city of Seattle’s police department in 1974, although some police forces in Britain had also developed similar ‘good neighbourhood schemes’. The neighbourhood watch scheme in the UK (or now known as the Neighbourhood and Home Watch) is a voluntary network, where neighbours come together along with the police and local partners with the goal of building a safe and friendly community. Neighbourhood watch and home watch groups are based at ‘street level’ and are run by a coordinator. Typically, the coordinator liaises with local police and shares the information with the committee and the area’s residents through public meetings or newsletters. Over time, coordinators and schemes have collaborated and now form local, county and regional associations.

Neighbourhood watch schemes are established with the assumptions that the community take greater responsibility for crime control (Fielding, 2005) and are willing to actively watch and report anything suspicious to the police (Flemming, 2005). A number of studies have reviewed the effectiveness of neighbourhood watch but the results have largely been inconclusive mainly due to the difficulty in measuring the impact of the scheme on crime (Bennett, 1990; Rosenbaum et al., 1986). However it has been suggested that neighbourhood watch contributes to a reduction in crime through the various mechanisms of social control. Informal social control might indirectly enhance social cohesion and increase the ability of communities to control crime. Neighbourhood watch schemes may also assist with crime detection through the increase of useful information shared between
the police and the public. Information about crimes in progress and suspicious behaviour might lead to an increase in arrests made by the police and may potentially reduce the fear of crime (Flemming, 2005).

Community crime prevention initiatives have been criticised for the potential displacement of crime. Crawford (2007) notes that well ‘defended’ communities, who perceive themselves to be under threat from ‘outsiders’, could displace crime on to less well-defended residential areas. It has also been suggested that community-based crime prevention can have a perverse effect of skewing public resources towards those places which may least need them and to residents most capable of protecting themselves. There are often unrealistic views of what can be achieved by community based initiatives, Reiner (2000) cautions about the nostalgic views that community members or communities may hold about the police, from ‘the good old days’, and highlights that expectation may need to be managed to what can realistically be provided.

Despite widespread support for neighbourhood watch there is evidence that suggests that it is ineffective at preventing crime (Sherman and Eck, 2002; Bright, 1991; Laycock and Tilley, 1995), has a displacement effect (Barr and Pease, 1990; Mukherjee and Wilson, 1987) and is only marginally successful in middle class areas where crime rates are already low (Bright, 1991; Skogan, 1990; Husain and Bright, 1990). It has been suggested that people residing in high crime areas are reluctant to organise themselves in terms of crime prevention due to their distrust of neighbours. Hence, participation in neighbourhood watch is more popular in middle-class areas, where there is little crime to begin with and trust among neighbours is higher (Hope, 1995). Flemming (2005) recognises the difficulty in measuring the effectiveness of the neighbourhood watch scheme and proposed a new approach to assess the efficacy of neighbourhood watch on enhancement of the relationship between the police and the community, the ability to improve feelings of safety and security and the ability to expand community involvement in wider crime prevention initiatives.

West Mercia Police have recently established a scheme through their Safer Roads Partnership called Community Speed Watch. The scheme involves training volunteers from
the community how to monitor the speeds of vehicles with approved, hand-held speed measurement devices. When vehicle speeds are found to be inappropriate, a letter is sent to the registered keeper by the police with the aim of encouraging them to reduce their speed when driving. The speed measurements recorded by the volunteers cannot be used as evidence to pursue a prosecution but it is assumed receiving a letter from the police and being ‘shamed’ by the community volunteers (who are often members of local council) will encourage people to conform to the speed limits. Lee Turner a Community Speed Watch volunteer stated the scheme is more effective on the routes used by local residents, rather than the routes used by people who do not live within the community (Respondent CS18, 2016). This would suggest this type of informal social control has more influence over the behaviour of fellow community members rather than outsiders.

Putnam (2000) identified declining ‘civic engagement’ and social capital to have a negative effect on the norms and networks that enable people to act collectively. Community crime prevention can assist with strengthening networks and social control mechanisms (Crawford, 2007). Informal social control can take place when a community has shared values and morals and shared expectations of what is considered to be acceptable or unacceptable behaviour. In the UK failing to clear up after your dog has fouled is now considered unacceptable behaviour, it is an example of how the community regulates behaviour within a public space. Within the last couple of decades the acceptance of dog fouling in public places has become socially unacceptable and now owners who do not clear up after their dog(s) are considered ‘irresponsible’ and could be fined (Webley and Siviter, 2000). The dog fouling example also demonstrates how society’s perspective of what they consider acceptable or unacceptable behaviour can change over time.

According to Garland (2001) it is important to build resilience into communities’ social fabric because cohesive, resilient communities are better placed to withstand and resist crime and violence. Cooperation and partnerships are of paramount importance for the achievement of safer communities. Whilst situational crime prevention aims to bring crime rates down, social crime prevention attempts to address some of the root causes of crime and ‘community safety’ is orientated towards increasing the public’s perception of safety.
A good example from the UK of utilising the community to assist with crime prevention (discussed earlier) is the ‘community patrol’ established in Merseyside in the UK. The success of this initiative was due to the close collaboration between the ‘community patrol’ and the police. Good communication allowed the ‘community patrol’ to deal with inconsequential incidences rather than the police having to respond, which resulted in limited police resources being used effectively (Hancock, 2001).

Building communities’ capacity to deal with crime means working to reduce the number of crime incidents and supporting communities to deal with the crimes that affect their community members. However, it is acknowledged that strengthening and building a strong rule of law is also very important to secure future security and this involves building trust in government institutions but it is recognised trust may be challenging to generate if there is a history of distrust, as there is in a country such as Kenya.

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2005) recognise the most effective means of preventing crime are through informal social controls. As stated by Kawachi et al. (1999) crime mirrors the quality of the social environment and as crime and disorder can diffuse social capital and cohesion it is important to strengthen them. Basic defences against crime are ‘eyes on the street’ so where there is little sense of community cohesion, the community will be vulnerable to criminality. Utilising community groups to prevent crime is a way of enhancing social cohesion and makes use of the resources available within the community. However, with limited oversight and accountability these community groups have the potential to transform into vigilante groups.

**Volunteers or vigilantes?**

While the rich and middle class can afford security provisions such as gated communities, the poor have to rely on other means (Livingston, 2013). In a context where there is an ineffective, corrupt, weak or repressive policing and justice system, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2011) believe the poor suffer disproportionately from crime and fear. It is therefore understandable that the poor chose to revert to, or in some situations are forced to rely on, vigilante groups to gain some form of protection.
The word vigilante is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary (2005, p. 1965) as ‘a member of a self-appointed group of citizens who undertake law enforcement in their community without legal authority’. From a UK perspective Johnston (1996) argues that participants of vigilantism are private citizens who engage voluntarily in a form of ‘autonomous citizenship’ which constitutes a social movement that does not have the state’s support. The movement involves planning and has intended victims (as opposed to random victims) that it uses, or threatens to use, force against. The aim of the group is to control crime or other social contraventions by offering assurances of security. During the London riots in 2011 a number of vigilante groups were established to protect their community from the rioters. These groups were formed because they felt the police were not doing enough to protect their communities from the rioters whose behaviour was outside of social norms and considered to be unacceptable (Gregory, 2011).

Kowalewski (2003) refers to vigilantism as the activities of private citizens, or government employees acting off-duty in a private capacity to suppress behaviour which is considered to differ significantly from the established social norms of the community. In the United States the explanation for the existence of vigilantes (or lynch mobs) has been identified as the lack of law enforcement institutions in the American ‘wild west’, leaving citizens with no alternative but to take the law into their own hands (Kowalewski, 2003). Vigilantism in Nigeria is referred to as a ‘self-help’ that is legitimised through popular dissatisfaction with the state to provide security. Vigilantism is increasingly regarded as a substitute for a police and legal system which is perceived to be inadequate, unwilling or inefficient in maintaining law and order (Kirschner, 2011).

**Security voids: high crime areas**

In high crime areas reference is often made to a security ‘void’ or ‘vacuum’ between the public and law enforcers of the state. Whilst some vigilante activities are a reaction to the state being largely absent in terms of security provision other groups that could be defined as vigilante groups are established with the support of the state. In post-apartheid South Africa Baker (2009) identified that vigilant policing was developed with the overt support of the state, although this has subsequently led to conflicts between ‘public’ policing and the agents of ‘private’ policing. It is recognised that vigilantes can be particularly dangerous
because, like paramilitary groups, they are willing to break the law to complete their tasks using physical force and intimidation at levels not normally used by the state.

Groups can often emerge within these ‘security voids’ with the purpose of preventing crime and develop their own strategies to deal with crime through defining their own ‘social norms’ and deciding what is acceptable and unacceptable behaviour. In Northern Ireland as the ‘troubles’ continued in the 1980s and 1990s paramilitary groups filled the policing vacuum (Monaghan, 2008). The paramilitary groups addressed security needs and maintained social order and control. They considered anti-social behaviour to be playing music too loudly, verbal abuse of elderly citizens and the dumping of rubbish. Punishment for breaking social norms varied depending on the social norm broken and could range from threats or warnings, public humiliation, beatings, exiling individuals or families, kneecapping, or in extreme cases execution (Monaghan, 2008). It was suggested some paramilitaries engaged in ‘punishment’ attacks as much to maintain discipline among their own members as to ‘police’ their areas (Silke, 1999).

There was a complex relationship between the paramilitary groups, the community and the police. Whilst the paramilitary groups upheld social order and were accepted by the community (sometimes even demanded) they still had to maintain their credibility amongst community members by meeting their demands to control crime and criminal activities (Cavanaugh, 2007). Cavanaugh (1997) suggests the community were not a passive entity in ‘the troubles’ and is of the opinion they were integral to the political violence in Northern Ireland. This signifies the importance, at that time, to build confidence and improve police-community relations. However, during this period it was also important for the paramilitary groups to maintain the divide between the community and security forces (Silke, 1999). Communities were discouraged from reporting or assisting the police with enquiries due to the perception that low level intelligence useful to the police would be exchanged for dropping charges against perpetrators (Knox, 2002).

Policing in Northern Ireland was closely linked to politics and this had a strong influence over people’s attitudes and interactions with the police. As the paramilitary groups became more politically engaged they realised they needed to remove themselves from what they
considered to be ‘community policing’. Although by doing this, they risked losing the political support they already had (plus the economic gain from gangster activities (Jennings, 1998)) but if they did not move away from the ‘community policing’ activities they knew they could limit their growth politically (Knox, 2002).

It has been implied that by attempting to police a divided community with a biased law enforcement, the law and order strategy adopted initially in Northern Ireland was flawed from the outset (Hillyard, 1983). This was particularly pertinent when part of the strategy was to specifically increase confidence in the police, and improve community-police relations between the Catholic population and the law enforcers (Hillyard, 1983). In order to create a police service that would be effective and accountable to both the law and the community it served, the Independent Commission on Policing (1999) (also known as the Patten report) strongly recommended the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) was equally composed of Catholic and Protestant police officers. The Patton report also identified the need to strengthen accountability through the creation of a partnership between the police and every local community. Recognising effective policing can only take place with the consent and involvement of the community, plus the need for policing to reflect and respond to the needs of the community, the Patton report recommended the establishment of Community Safety Partnerships (CSPs) throughout Northern Ireland (The Independent Commission on Policing, 1999). Subsequently, the community safety strategy for Northern Ireland (2012-2017) was produced with the vision of a safer, shared and cohesive Northern Ireland with less crime and anti-social behaviour, where people have confidence in the agencies that work on their behalf (Northern Ireland Assembly, 2012). The findings from Topping and Byrne’s (2016) recent research suggest that it is the community-based organisations, working on the ground with Loyalist and Republican communities who act as the guardians of unseen ‘community capital’ and safety. Topping and Byrne (2016) argue that the absence of such organisations would reduce security and stability in Northern Ireland.

**Policing the void**

In Chicago, the unacceptably high levels of gang violence being sustained over such a long period of time has been attributed to the cycle of police suppression and a legacy of
segregation. Greene and Pranis (2007) highlight that heavy-handed suppression efforts can strengthen gang cohesion and increase tensions between law enforcement and community members.

The repressive policing techniques adopted by many Central American governments to deal with gang related crime has been accused of contributing to gangs becoming more organized and violent. It has been suggested this was due to anti-gang initiatives focusing on law enforcers randomly targeting tattooed youth, rather than top gang leaders. However, as Ribando (2007) notes youth gangs are just one part of a broader crime problem in Central America, the situation also involves corrupt law enforcers, organized crime and drug cartels. For example, during a crackdown between 2003 and 2005 in Guatemala such a large number of police officers were dismissed for irregular or criminal activities, a joint military and police force had to be deployed in order to deal with the significant reduction in law enforcers at this time (Ribando, 2007).

Kirschner (2011) argues the phenomenon of vigilantism and gangs would not automatically disappear if the state adequately dealt with crime and violence because of the symbolic function of vigilante groups. Vigilante groups and gangs can offer young people (especially males) who do not have prospects for the future a sense of belonging and a context in which they can carry out what they consider to be meaningful tasks and earn an income. None of these may be available to vigilante members should the groups no longer exist.

A number of successful gang related crime prevention interventions, that have taken place in American cities have documented how youth gangs and violence were addressed using the principles of community policing and problem solving (Decker, 2003). Operation Ceasefire implemented in Boston in 1996 used a problem-solving initiative to address gun violence. The project adopted a multi-interagency working group, conducted original research into Boston’s youth violence problem and adopted an inter-agency strategy. The findings from an evaluation of Boston’s Operation Ceasefire found the intervention was associated with significant reductions in youth homicide victimisation, calls related to shots-fired and gun assault incidents in Boston (Braga et al., 2001). Although, there have been criticisms of the model when it has been replicated in other locations. According to
Green and Pranis (2007) when the model was implemented in Los Angeles and Indianapolis there was no evidence to suggest deterrence messages had changed the behaviour of gang members.

In order to tackle crime connected to gangs in America, The Justice Policy Institute is of the opinion the emphasis should not be placed on eradicating gangs (because they consider this to be an impossible task) but instead they recognise community safety to be the most effective approach (Greene and Pranis, 2007).

Community safety and community safety partnerships have been promoted as a crime prevention method to deal with security voids in high crime areas that have been filled by vigilantes, gangs or paramilitary groups. However, the challenge lies with channelling local enthusiasm appropriately, directing local resources available and navigating around politics. The topic of community safety will be discussed next.

### 2.5.4 Community safety: putting the community first

*The mobilisation of local knowledge is fundamental to the construction of just and democratic forms of security governance.*

(Johnston and Shearing, 2003, p. 140)

This section discusses the concept of community safety, it begins by covering the background to community safety and then how the concept has developed. Hughes and Rowe (2007) recommend exploring the community safety concept adopted in the United Kingdom (UK) as it provides broad lessons that can be transferred internationally. They define community safety in police terms as ‘local low-level policing often of incivilities and the fear of crime and disorder’ (Hughes and Rowe, 2007, p. 327). The UK has a long tradition of ‘consensus’ policing and applies the principle ‘the police are the public and the public are the police’. According to the Association of Chief Police Officers (2012) the ‘heart and soul’ of the British policing model is based on neighbourhood policing and the Peelian principles. The principles are founded on policing by consent due to the public perceiving the police to be legitimate, transparent and accountable. The UK has developed a distinctive approach to community safety involving statutory multi agency crime and
disorder reduction partnerships and the national neighbourhood policing programme. The UK policing vision 2025 states their mission is ‘to make communities feel safer by upholding the law fairly and firmly; preventing crime and anti-social behaviour; keeping peace; protecting and reassuring communities; investigating crime and bringing offenders to justice’ (APCC and NPCC, 2015, p. 4).

**Background to community safety**

Community crime prevention is based on the early work of the University of Chicago which sought to tackle aspects of social disorganisation which resulted in crime and delinquency. An early initiative to achieve this was the Chicago Area Project, which commenced in 1932. The Chicago Area Project attempted to resolve local problems, there was a strong belief that juvenile delinquency was due to the deterioration of conditions in neighbourhoods. Hence the project arranged recreational activities, improved the neighbourhood environment with the support of community members, provided informal guidance to gang members and collaborated with the police and teachers when youths were having problems at school or with the law (Schlossman and Sedlak, 1983).

**The development of community safety**

The publication of the Morgan Report (Home Office, 1991) in the UK recommended a move away from using the term ‘crime prevention’ towards the concept of ‘community safety’. Morgan considered ‘crime prevention’ to be too narrow and it allowed people to assume the police were solely responsible for fighting crime; Morgan believed dealing with crime was a much broader issue and involved partnerships from all sections of the community. It had also been recognised in the 1990’s there had been a rise in recorded crime but there were limited police resources to deal with the problems (Crawford, 1998) hence there was a need for a different approach. It has been suggested that the term ‘community’ within ‘community safety’ appeals to the individual perceptions of positive feelings and is associated with ‘openness’ and ‘integrative’ hence is generally viewed as positive and non-threatening (Cohen, 1985).

The Morgan Report stressed the importance of the role that communities should play in crime prevention strategies in the UK and sought to stimulate greater participation from
all members of the general public in the fight against crime (Home Office, 1991). The recommendations made within the report (Home Office, 1991) were not pursued by the Conservative government during the 1990’s, however, this changed when the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (Great Britain. Crime and Disorder Act, 1998) was introduced and statutory partnerships were incorporated, supporting the then British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s concept of being ‘tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime’. These partnerships are known as Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs) in England and Community Safety Partnerships (CSPs) in Wales. The CDRPs and CSPs required the police to enter into ‘joint working and collective responsibility’ arrangements with the community and other agencies to identify and respond to crime and disorder issues (Newburn, 2002). The partnerships were reinforced by section 17 of the legislation which imposed a statutory duty on agencies (such as the local authorities, police authorities, health authorities and fire authorities) to ‘do all that they reasonably can do to prevent crime and disorder in its area’. A key aspect was to introduce the multi-agency approach or what became known as the ‘partnership approach’. The role of these partnerships was to develop and implement a strategy for reducing crime and disorder in each district and unitary local authority in England and Wales. Applying the act required a change in policing philosophy and adopting different policing styles, such as community policing and problem orientated policing. The British government’s White Paper Building Communities, Beating Crime acknowledged the challenges and demonstrated their support to the new approach which included the provision of 24,000 PCSOs (Home Office, 2004).

In the early 2000’s when the police service in England and Wales broadened their remit wider than law enforcement and crime reduction, the National Reassurance Policing Programme (2003) was introduced. The objectives of the programme were to improve the public’s sense of security, reduce anti-social behaviour, improve confidence in policing and increase social capital and collective efficacy. This has subsequently led to the roll out of the Neighbourhood Policing Programme which has the purposes of tackling crime, the fear of crime and bringing the police closer to communities, through officers building lasting and trusted relationships with the communities they serve (Quinton and Tuffin, 2007). It was recognised that the community are in the best position to prioritise their needs and collaborate in identifying and developing solutions. The programme introduced PCSOs to
increase the visible presence on the street, and establish dedicated neighbourhood policing teams across the country. It was also identified that the community should be empowered to hold the police and others accountable for addressing acute and persistent problems related to crime and anti-social behaviour.

Crawford and Lister’s (2004) findings suggest that locally dedicated visible patrol personnel that engage and work with local communities can provide people with a stake in their own security, help foster ‘social cohesion’ and assist in the regeneration of areas. Rogers (2004) cautions that there is however a need to manage expectations of what local capacity can achieve. Making reference to PCSOs, Rogers (2004) states that whilst they offer a visible presence ‘on the streets’, they may have limited effectiveness as representatives of authority in the longer term due to their limited powers and duties.

Bright (1991) has been critical of the approach to empower communities in order to reduce crime. Whilst he acknowledges communities have a vital role to play he does not believe communities have the capacity, resources or authority to resolve crime and disorder. Bright (1991) is of the opinion that anti-crime and disorder community strategies are least common and least successful in areas where they are most needed, such as poor, high crime neighbourhoods.

Another challenge relating to community safety initiatives is that they cannot be ‘taken off the shelf and applied to all communities’. Each initiative requires an independent assessment to understand issues relating to crime and disorder specific to the locality, which results in different crime reduction agendas in different locations (Walklate, 2002). Whilst it is acknowledged one approach will not fit all and the initiatives require a unique approach, additional time and resources, this approach does ensure that the crime reduction strategies implemented in an area are appropriate and therefore more likely to be effective.

This approach appears to be useful for counterterrorism activities, Innes (2006) suggests that community intelligence and democratic policing are key to countering terrorism in the UK at the present time. Being a highly localised system the neighbourhood policing...
programme allows locally defined problems to be addressed and neighbourhood officers to be well placed to generate trust and collect intelligence. Neighbourhood officers are able to gain a better understanding of the make-up of different communities, the different social networks to which individuals and groups belong and the intra-community tensions that may exist. This position allows the police service to develop community resilience and preparedness activities to counter the risk. When introducing neighbourhood policing and attempting to improve the democratic style of policing Lowe and Innes (2012) state three main principles need to be considered; the community’s problems should become the neighbourhood policing priorities, informal social control should be incorporated within the policing approach and there should be local accountability of services and transparency of decision making.

It is acknowledged that the police cannot be everywhere and have limited resources and capacity (Sklansky, 2008). Whilst it is not possible for the police to always be present within society there is still a need for some form of ‘policing’ (Reiner, 2010) and as previously discussed ‘policing’ has evolved from the state having the monopoly of control over it (Stenning, 2000). As Loader (2000) notes, the pluralisation of policing has seen the shift away from the public police towards other public sector agencies, private sector contributors and communities. As a consequence of this, many new stakeholders have been introduced into the ‘extended’ community safety/policing family (Crawford and Lister, 2004).

The breadth of community safety and the additional range of actors now involved has received some scepticism (Crawford and Lister, 2004). The term ‘community safety’ has been criticised for being too broad because it could encompass all forms of safety issues within the community (Joyce, 2006). Edwards and Hughes (2005) highlight the downside to this, they identified how the increase in stakeholders has created competing interests and practitioners of community safety are now having to manoeuvre around political relationships at the local, regional and national level.

As this research focuses on Kenya, the broad concept of community safety is advantageous to capture the range of mechanisms involved with safety and security within the country,
such as the phenomenon that exists to fill the security void created by the absence of effective public policing. It is clearly evident that the relationship between the police and the public in Kenya are strained and needs to be improved (Republic of Kenya. National Task Force on Police Reforms, 2009). Community safety projects offer the scope to improve this relationship through collaboration in crime prevention initiatives, whilst also developing subtle informal social control mechanisms. Community safety encompasses both social and situational aspects of crime prevention, it is concerned with people, communities and organisations, as well as attempting to reduce crime and the fear of it (Home Office, 1991). Therefore, the community safety concept allows the research to consider community safety options from a citizen perspective. Before proceeding further it is important to clarify what a community is and how it is defined.

2.6 Defining a ‘community’

It is important to discuss the concept of community as it can encapsulate such a wide range of interpretations and issues such as identity and belonging, inclusion or exclusion, place and time and it can be considered both as a spatial and social phenomenon (Bell and Newby, 1971). Gusfield (1975) distinguished two main uses of the term community, the first related to the geographical concept of community such as a neighbourhood, town or city. The second related to ‘relational’ which referred to human relationships which do not necessarily have any reference to location. Although Gusfield (1975) acknowledged that the two were not mutually exclusive.

From a social science perspective Delanty (2003) identifies four broad ways that the term community has been applied. The first relates to sociologist’s and geographer’s concept of ‘community’ being considered as the social and spatial formation of small groups such as neighbourhoods, small towns or other spatial localities. The second refers to how the term is applied by anthropologists and cultural studies, whereby ‘community’ relates to ideas of belonging and differences, such as identity. Delanty (2003) relates the next application to a form of political mobilisation that prompts ‘communities of action’ to oppose such issues as social injustice. The final interpretation of ‘community’ relates to the rise in the global community. This considers issues of distance and co-presence which are linked to the
developments of diaspora and technologies like the internet which have facilitated long distance capabilities.

**Social and spatial localities**

Communities are often defined by government authorities based on the government’s geographical boundaries for administration purposes. Frankenberg (1966) would argue the importance of geographical boundaries when defining a person’s identity and how a community could be defined. However, the geographical areas defined by an authority may not always be how a community perceives their boundaries. Within Africa for example there are a number of nomadic communities (tribes) who do not recognise the international borders and roam between countries, like the Turkana in Kenya. Wellman and Leighton (1979) noted that people’s social networks usually extend beyond geographical boundaries and they believe that communities are actively constructed by their members, rather than simply by their locality.

**Cultural**

Taylor et al’s (2000) definition of a community is a more accurate description of an African tribe because it does not place an emphasis on geographical locations. According to Taylor et al (2000) when a group of people consider themselves to be a ‘community’ it implies that they have some common interest or bond which raises expectation of loyalty, support and affirmation. Members of a tribe share cultural traditions, customs and are likely to have some symbol to assert their communities’ identity. For example within the Turkana, a nomadic tribe found in both Kenya and South Sudan, traditional dress and ornaments are of vital importance and a significant part of their identity (Trillo, 2010).

**Communities of action and distance**

As stated by Delanty (2003) in the present day the term ‘community’ is also expressed in the context of an ‘online community’. Andrews (2002) would argue that a community is no longer defined as a physical place but a set of relationships where people interact for mutual benefit. There are however obvious differences between an ‘online community’ and a ‘locality community’, an ‘online community’ is a social network that is based on virtual communications rather than face to face interactions. In 2011 during the civil war
in Libya there was an interesting dynamic when ‘locality communities’ transitioned to become an ‘online community’ when they became displaced because of fighting. Critical information was shared through virtual communication regarding security and availability of critical services such as water supply and electricity. The information provided enabled members of the displaced ‘locality community’ to make informed decisions on when to return home with their families (Beaumont, 2011; Flood, 2011). This would support Livingstone et al.’s (2008) research which found a correlation between strong social networks and an attachment to geographical locations.

Delanty (2003) argues that the very essence of what makes ‘a community’ is within the acts of communication that occur between its members. From this perspective a place-community cannot readily be identified as a community at all, because such interaction is unlikely to involve all those who reside within any geographically and spatially defined place. It needs to be recognised that some individuals could belong to diverse communication-based communities, many of which are unlikely to terminate at any defined boundary. Whilst problematic from a sociological viewpoint, clustering a community using geographical parameters is important for purposes such as emergency planning and the emergency services, such as the police (Buckle, 1998).

There is a complexity in defining communities but it does not negate the fact that the geographical location of any particular group are potentially exposed to similar safety and security issues. This research will study residents from villages in the informal settlement of Kibera that are grouped into administrative wards. Kibera is a densely populated area that covers 2.5 kilometres squared, it is divided up into four administrative wards, with 14 villages in total. As this study is looking at safety and considering the police’s role in servicing the needs of citizens, a ‘community’ will be defined as a population residing within the geographical area of the administrative ward.

Defining boundaries to a community can provide protection which facilitates a shared understanding within a geographical location. The shared understanding allows people to feel there is a place for them in the community and consider it as a place they belong. A sense of belonging and identification can enable a common symbol system, which can in
turn assist with defining the boundaries of a community. A feeling of belonging and emotional safety leads to an individual investing in their community, leading to members feeling they have earned their membership within the community (McMillan and Chavis, 1986).

The ability to function competently within a community and have community resilience has been linked to individuals feeling a ‘sense of community’ (Glynn, 1981). McMillan and Chavis (1986) have recognised there are four components which are required for individuals to feel ‘a sense of community’; membership (sense of belonging or identification), having an influence within the group, feeling their needs will be met and rewarded, and finally having a shared emotional connection which will involve a shared history or participation. Putnam (2000) argues that a ‘sense of community’ and good community networks build social capital.

2.7 Social capital

Social capital is broadly defined as a function of social organisation which involves networks, norms, obligations, reciprocity and trust between citizens for mutual benefit (Lederman et al, 2002). A lack of social capital is often linked to the social disorganisation theory (see Shaw and McKay, 1942). Sampson and Groves (1989) describe social disorganisation as the ‘inability of a community structure to realise the common value of its residents and maintain social control’. It has been suggested that a community with low social capital is more inclined to have high crime rates and other social problems (Rosenfeld et al, 2001).

There are numerous ways to measure social capital but when referring to the social disorganisation theory and crime the key components of social capital are recognised as trust and civic engagement. Trust and civic engagement are linked with crime and violence through the mechanisms of social control. In a trustworthy social environment citizens are more inclined to assist others, have expectations that others would assist them and have similar beliefs in what is considered acceptable behaviour. When people trust one another, they can be reasonably confident that mutual obligations will be fulfilled and that social norms will be obeyed. Therefore in these situations community members are more likely
to work together and be better equipped for collective action (Wilkinson and Picket, 2010). Trust and civic engagement are usually mutually reinforcing, the more members of a community who participate in collective activities, the more likely they are to trust one another and this will lead to an increase in community members engaging with civic activities (Brehm and Rahn, 1997).

In contrast, when people are suspicious of others there will be a lack of trust and willingness to collaborate with one another. The heatwave in Chicago in 1995 is an example of how a lack of trust within a community resulted in unnecessary deaths. During the heatwave poor African Americans who lived in areas of low levels of trust and high levels of crime were afraid to open windows or doors, or leave their homes to go to the local cooling centres established by the local authorities. Neighbours did not check on their neighbours and as a consequence hundreds of elderly and vulnerable people died (Klinenberg, 2002).

In Bowling Alone Putnam (2000) documents the decline of Americans participation in politics, civic groups, religious organisations, trade unions and professional organisation as well as informal socialising. He uses the image of bowling, which was once a highly popular activity, organised in leagues that has now been reduced to Americans bowling alone. Putnam (2000) argues that active membership in community groups is decreasing and those that are ‘joining in’ are not participating in organisations that are important to create and maintain social capital.

One of the contentious issues in Bowling Alone is that Putnam cites television as the main culprit in the decline of social capital. He claims people were too busy watching television, which meant they had less time to socialise. Other factors responsible for the decline were noted as money, greater mobility which reduced local ties, people having busy lives and not having the time to partake in social activities and generational changes in values and behaviours related to civic engagement.

When communities experience violence over long periods of time there is an erosion of trust amongst members of the community. In all environments violence alters the social
networks and social interactions but traditional social networks are particularly disrupted in urban settings when there is rapid growth or where there is a high residential instability. In urban settings like Nairobi there is usually not the support that is present in rural areas. UNODC’s (2005) survey in Kenya identified that people were more likely to help each other in rural locations than in urban areas. In an urban setting there can be pressure to earn a living and often children take on the responsibility of financially supporting the family. In these situations parents can find it difficult to control or discipline their child and there becomes minimal parental or elderly authority to set limits on negative behaviour. It is therefore clear that the disruption of social networks has an impact on social control (World Bank, 2011).

Woolcock (2001) divides social capital into three different forms, bonding whereby strong social ties exist among groups of people that share similar values, interests and backgrounds; bridging which relates to bonds between different groups, for example between generations, cultural, ethnic or religious groups; or linking social capital that connects people to local service providers and resources. The example of Balsall Heath which will be discussed later is an interesting example of how improving ‘linking social capital’ reduced crime and transformed an area.

One of the criticisms of Putnam’s early work is that social capital was assumed to be a societal good whereas there are well documented studies where it can have negative effects on society. Halpern (2001) suggests that organised crime or gangs involve a social network which entails shared norms but they do not constitute a societal good, some scholars refer to this as ‘dark social capital’ (Putzel, 1997).

Kawachi et al. (1999) highlight the importance of social cohesion within a community. It is important to recognise that social capital and social cohesion are quite different. For example a criminal gang may provide social capital for its members but would not necessarily contribute to the level of cohesion within the community (Kawachi et al, 1999). In a situation where there is public disorder others can be encouraged to engage in inappropriate behaviour because there is a perception there will be a lack of consequences. This increases residents feeling of insecurity which undermines the trust
necessary for social control. A study conducted by the World Bank (2011) in Nairobi found that the majority of sexual attacks were taking place in public places within a victim’s neighbourhoods. This suggests a level of public tolerance within the community and a degree of impunity that would empower perpetrators to act in public spaces. When social capital is channelled towards the activities that serve the interests of a small group rather than supporting the collective interest Rubio (1997) refers to it as perverse social capital. He recognises that perverse social capital can have very negative repercussions across a community and beyond.

Crime has a complex relationship with social capital, whilst crime can weaken social capital by reducing trust amongst community members, it can also increase it through the formation of groups at the community level to fight crime (Lederman et al, 2002). When a community has social cohesion and informal social control it is considered by Sampson et al. (1997) to have community efficacy. The concept of collective action to deal with crime and collective efficacy will be discussed in more detail in the following section.

2.8 Community action

A community’s ability to deal with a hazard or risk has been measured by some scholars as a community’s resilience (Brown and Kulig, 1996; Kulig, 1999, 2000). Individual resilience requires someone to have protective factors and established coping mechanisms but as recognised by Kulig and Brown (1996) community resilience is a lot more complex. They see the distinction between individual and community resilience being the same as individual and collective action. Studies have shown that community action is actually about a social process that enables communities to address the risk of an external force. A collective of individuals does not take into account the dynamics and interactions between individuals, social cohesion (or lack of) and the effective use of resources. Collective action also requires supported leadership which is not required for individual action (Brown and Kulig, 1996; Kulig, 1999, 2000). Community action can be developed through a ‘sense of belonging’ and a ‘sense of community’ (Brown and Kulig, 1996; McMillan and Chavis, 1986).
In 2008 Kulig et al researched three communities in Canada, a community from a rural mining area, an agricultural community and an urban neighbourhood. The agricultural community was the only community involved in the study that demonstrated altruistic behaviour. Individual farm families would often assist other families with planting and harvest; and in times of tragedy or unexpected circumstances this support was intensified. This level of interdependency was not shown by the other two communities. Interestingly the agricultural community had the most homogenous backgrounds with similar education, religious affiliation, ethnicity and length of time spent in the community. Crawford and Evans (2012) point out that urban areas usually consist of a mixture of age groups, ethnicities and cultures and are rarely homogeneous. During the study participants from all three communities were asked to provide examples of challenges they had faced as a community. Representatives from the mining community were not able to provide any examples. Residents from the urban neighbourhood discussed how they had dealt with perceptions of stigma and difficulties when attempting to establish a community. The respondents from the agricultural community were able to provide numerous examples including the community’s response to the loss of community buildings due to fire and their success in defeating the proposed development of factory farming.

Bachrach and Zautra’s (1985) study near Phoenix in America looked at a community where a proposed hazardous waste facility was planned to be built. They found that increased efficacy amongst community members and sense of community led to problem-focused community action to deal with the ‘external threat’. Studies have recognised that a ‘sense of belonging’ to a place or community has a significant role in the resilience capacities of individuals and the whole community (Fraser et al., 2005; Macintyre et al., 2002; Sampson et al., 2002) including addressing crime related issues (Wedlock, 2006).

**Community cohesion and crime**

Through investigating the British Crime Survey Sampson and Groves (1989) identified a relationship between crime and community cohesion. They found that community cohesion was directly linked to a reduction in mugging, street crime and stranger violence. Wedlock’s (2006) analysis of the survey data from 2003 Home Office Citizenship Survey
found there was a decrease in crime as a ‘sense of community’ increased. The study identified five key factors of community cohesion:

1. **Sense of community** – people enjoy living in their community and neighbours look out for one another.
2. **Similar life opportunities** – access and treatment received by public services are equal amongst the local population.
3. **Respect for diversity** – ethnic differences are respected within the community.
4. **Political trust** – there is trust in local politicians and councillors and residents feel their views are represented.
5. **Sense of belonging** – ability to identify with the local neighbourhood and know people within the local area.

Kasarda and Janowitz’s (1974) theory states that high levels of attachment lead to local integration and the shared goal of keeping the neighbourhood safe. However, the findings from Wedlock’s study (2006) considers a ‘sense of community’ rather than a ‘sense of attachment’ to be the most important predictor for reducing crimes such as burglary from dwelling, theft of, and from motor vehicles. This suggests populations with a high turnover, which are often found in urban areas can still have a ‘sense of community’, without having a ‘sense of attachment’ and therefore have the potential for collective action against crime.

As discussed below, previous academic research has shown a link between social control as an aspect of community cohesion and decrease in violent crime. It was recognised through Wedlock’s (2006) study that two of the five key factors of community cohesion were measures of social control. The ‘sense of community’ factor contained aspects of social control, through questions related to whether people feel safe walking after dark, whether neighbours look out for each other, trust each other and pull together to improve the community. A ‘sense of belonging’ also has elements of social control or guardianship, for example whether respondents know many people in the area and feel that they belong to the neighbourhood, which implies an element of socialisation or being part of the neighbourhood.
Sampson and Raudenbush (1999) found that social control takes the form of people in cohesive neighbourhoods being prepared to pull together and intervene in deviant or criminal activities for the public good. They defined this type of collective efficacy as ‘cohesion amongst residents combined with shared expectations for the social control of public space’. They found that collective efficacy is associated with lower rates of crime and social disorder.

Using data from 15 different countries Lee (2000) found that the higher levels of social control or guardianship apparent in a cohesive community reduce the likelihood of becoming a victim of violent crime such as robbery and assault, regardless of socioeconomic status, lifestyle and neighbourhood characteristics. Hirschfield and Bowers (1997) defined social cohesion as levels of social control and ethnic heterogeneity. The results from their study suggest that even in disadvantaged areas levels of crime were significantly lower than expected where there were high levels of cohesion.

Conversely, Wiseman (2006) is of the opinion that the real foundations for resilience and healthy communities is long term investments in the core public infrastructure such as schools, hospital, health centres, housing, transport, parks and meeting places and states this should not be substituted for local community capacity.

Building community efficacy means working to reduce the number of crime incidents and supporting communities to deal with the crimes that affect their community members. Social capital has been identified as a positive factor for dealing with crime (Newman and Dale, 2005) however social vulnerabilities such as unemployment, access to education, social inequalities, the balance of ethnic groups and politics (as recognised by Wedlock (2006) study) are factors that will always have an influence.

For community action to meet and sustain the needs of the community Brown and Kulig (1996) stress the importance of communities relying on internal resources and human capabilities, rather than being dependent upon external resources. Cain (2000) believes that community safety initiatives are most effective when communities can generate their own resources but acknowledges this can be a challenge for poorer neighbourhoods.
The population of Kenya are exposed to significant social vulnerabilities, particularly the lower-income section of society. Kenya has been chosen as a case study for this research, an overview of the country will be covered next, followed by a discussion about the crime situation in Kenya and the capital city of Nairobi.
2.9 Kenya in context

Kenya has been chosen as a case study for this research due to its high crime rates and accessibility for the researcher. The World Bank (2011) refers to Kenya’s capital as one of the most crime-ridden cities in Africa. The crime situation in Kenya is exacerbated by high rates of poverty and an ineffective, corrupt and under resourced police force (UNODC, 2005). It is recognised that the poor are disproportionately affected by crime (OECD, 2011) therefore there is a need to explore existing coping mechanisms within lower income communities in Kenya and consider how these can be built upon to enable communities to improve their safety.

Kenya is located in East Africa and borders the countries of Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and has a coast line of 536km with the Indian Ocean. The country is made up of 47 different counties and its capital city is Nairobi.

Kenya has a population of 40 million people of which 40% are unemployed and 45.5% live below the poverty line. The population of Nairobi is three and half million and of this

Figure 1: Map of Kenya (CIA, 2014)
population 60% live in informal settlements (UNHABITAT, 2011). The Human Development Index 2015 ranks Kenya at 145 (out of a total of 188 countries) within the ‘low human development’ category. To put this in perspective, the UK is in the top category ‘very high human development’ ranked at number 14 (UNDP, 2015). There are 70 distinct ethnic groups in Kenya but the five largest groups make up 70% of the population, these are the Kikuyu (22%), Luhya (14%), Luo (13%), Kalenjin (12%) and the Kamba (11%). Kenya’s ethnic diversity and interethnic rivalries have been blamed for mass violence, particularly around elections (CIA, 2014).

Kenya’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is generated by three sectors, services (53.3%) agriculture (29.3%) and industry (17.4%). English and Kiswahili are the official languages of the country. The population are predominantly Christian (82.5%) with Muslims making up the next largest religious group (11.1%) and the remaining are made up of other religions. Kenya’s legal system consists of English common law, Islamic law and customary law (CIA, 2014; UNDP 2014).

Kenya gained independence on 12th December 1963, Jomo Kenyatta was the first Kenyan president following independence until his death in 1978 when he was succeeded by Daniel Moi. Between 1969 and 1982 the country had a de facto one party state when the Kenya African National Union (KANU) made itself the sole legal party in Kenya. Moi succumbed to internal and external pressure for political liberalisation in late 1991 but the opposition failed to remove KANU from power in the 1992 and 1997 elections, which were marred by violence and fraud but were believed to be the consensus of the general population.

Mwai Kibaki from the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) replaced Moi when he stepped down in the 2002 elections. Kibaki’s NARC coalition splintered in 2005 and the government defectors joined with KANU to form the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) which took over the government during a referendum in 2005, until Kibaki was re-elected in December 2007 which was surrounded by accusations of vote rigging and months of post-election violence in which over 1300 people were killed (Tranchant, 2013). African Union sponsored mediation led by Kofi Annan in February 2008, in his capacity as a member of the African
Union Panel of Eminent African Personalities, resulted in a power sharing accord, appointing Raila Odinga to the position of prime minister. A new constitution was approved in 2010, elections under the new constitution took place on 4th March 2013 and Uhuru Kenyatta (son of Kenya’s first president Jomo Kenyatta) was sworn into office as president on 9th April 2013. The next elections are scheduled for August 2017 (CIA, 2014).

There is a close correlation between violence and politics in Kenya. The disputed elections in 2007 were followed by deadly violence, resulting in the death of over 1300 Kenyans (Tranchant, 2013). During the post-election violence vigilante groups associated with different ethnic groups patrolled ‘their areas’ demanding to see identity cards, carrying out evictions and attacking the homes and business premises of individuals from different ethnic groups (Ruteere et al, 2013). According to the Waki report the police and military have historically been recruited along ethnic lines to protect the government in power, therefore in times of unrest it is highly likely that there will be a breakdown along ethnic lines (CIPEV, 2008).

Kenya’s development programme for the country for the period between 2008 and 2030 is known as Vision 2030. The objective of Vision 2030 is ‘to transform Kenya into a newly industrialising, middle income country providing high quality of life to all its citizens by 2030’ (Republic of Kenya, 2007, p. 1). Safety and security is one of the strategic areas of the Vision 2030 strategy document and is considered to be a major concern for the government of Kenya. The Kenya National Vision aims to provide ‘security of all persons and property’ and it is foreseen this will be achieved through promoting public-private sector cooperation, civilian and community involvement for improved safety/security and deepening policy, legal and institutional police reform for improved enforcement, among others (Republic of Kenya, 2007, p. 25).

In 2014 a number of terrorist attacks and massacres took place in Kenya, including the incident at Westgate shopping mall that received international media coverage (a case study of the response to the Westgate attack is discussed later in this chapter). The insecurity resulted in most European countries and the United States issuing travel advisories against their citizens travelling to Kenya (Gov.UK, 2014; United States
Department of State, 2014; Gridneff, 2014). It was assumed the decrease in tourism to Kenya would lead to reduced employment, which has implications for crime. Tourism forms part of the ‘services sector’, which is the largest sector that contributes to the GDP of the country (53.3%), hence insecurity within Kenya was expected to directly affect the country’s GDP and increase crime (Warah, 2014). The Economic survey 2016 produced by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics reported that lower earnings from the tourism sector impacted negatively on the exchange rate of the Kenyan shilling in 2015:

‘Tourism earnings went down to KSh 84.6 billion in 2015 compared to KSh 87.1 billion in 2014. Similarly, international visitor arrivals declined by 12.6 per cent from 1,350.4 thousand in 2014 to 1,180.5 thousand in 2015. The suppressed performance was on account of security concerns, particularly in the coastal region and restrictive travel advisories from some European source markets’.


2.9.1 Crime and Kenya

After independence in 1963, Kenya was considered to be among the most stable and peaceful democracies in Africa (Gimode, 2001). Several decades of economic decline, along with very rapid population growth are believed to have contributed to increased levels of poverty and inequality within the country. Crime and violence in Kenya is predominantly concentrated in the capital, Nairobi and other urban centres but in recent years it has spread and is now also affecting rural communities (Francis and Nyamongo, 2008).

There are varying degrees of impact caused from crime in Kenya. Crime has a direct human cost whether that is from death or injury, the cost of medical care, legal services and/or the psychological harm inflicted on a victim. At the community level it can lead to the deterioration in trust between the local population and the authorities. Crime and violence have also had an effect on the country’s economy, the Kenya Tourism Board estimates that the unfavourable travel advisories in recent years have cost the country nearly US$200 million (UNODC, 2005).

UNODC conducted a crime victimisation survey in 2010 throughout Kenya. The results of the survey demonstrated that respondents living in urban areas were frequently victims of
car-related crimes, while those living in rural areas were more exposed to the risk of theft of livestock, sexual offences and assaults. In rural areas Bevan (2009) observed that the Kenyan police were supplying almost 50% of ammunition that circulates illegally in Turkana North in order to provide the Turkana people with some defences against rival cattle raiders from neighbouring countries.

Kenya’s capital, Nairobi is known as ‘one of the most crime ridden cities in Africa’ (World Bank, 2011). Ruteere et al. (2013) provide four main explanations for the high rate of violence in Nairobi, failings in law and order, political disorder, unemployment and poverty, and inequality and lack of social services. The most common crime reported to the police in Nairobi and recorded by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) in 2008 (the most recently available statistics) was ‘stealing’ (Republic of Kenya. Kenya National Bureau Statistics, 2009). The World Bank’s (2011) study in Nairobi found that robbery and assault were the most common types of crimes. In the rural areas the type of crime most commonly reported to the police was assaults followed by stealing (Republic of Kenya. Kenya National Bureau Statistics, 2009). Between 2007 and 2012 85% of crimes reported in Kenya were committed by males (Republic of Kenya. Kenya National Bureau Statistics, 2012a). Victims appear to be more evenly spread between males and females, the World Bank’s (2011) study found that 53% of the victims were male and 47% female. The majority of crime and violence in Nairobi is concentrated in the city’s densely populated informal settlements (World Bank, 2011) (see figure 2 for a map of the informal settlements).

**Informal settlements**

According to the Kenyan National Bureau of Statistics (2010) Nairobi had an estimated population of 3.1 million in 2009, of which more than half of the city’s population reside in informal settlements, occupying less than 1% of Nairobi’s nine administrative divisions. The settlements have insecure land tenure, poor housing (mostly shacks) and a lack of public services such as water, electricity and sanitation. The lack of roads within the settlements results in residents accessing their dwelling through a warren of alleys. Approximately 70% of residents of Nairobi’s informal settlements live below the poverty line and live on less than US$42 per adult per month, excluding rent (World Bank, 2006). The dwellings are mostly illegal, sub-standard in quality, crowded but yet rents are high. The World Bank
(2006) found that most slum dwellers are rent-paying tenants to mostly absentee landlords who operate a highly profitable business through providing shelter to the poor. Nairobi’s slums provide low-quality but high-cost shelter.

Oxfam (2009) found that up to two thirds of the population residing in informal settlements in Nairobi reported that they do not feel safe. The World Bank’s (2006) study conducted in informal settlements in Nairobi found that 63% of households did not feel safe where they resided. Within the 12 months prior to the study at least one member of each household had experienced a criminal incident inside the settlement they resided.

Measuring and reporting crime
Ndung’u (2012) identifies there is limited official data on crime and victimisation available in Kenya. UNODC (2010) suggests there is a significant amount of under reporting of crime and violence in Kenya, therefore it is unlikely an accurate picture is known. The geographical span, remote locations throughout the country, plus the low ratio of police officers to members of the public are all factors likely to contribute to citizens having limited access to police officers. In 2004 the ratio of police to population was 1:1,150 compared to the United Nations recommended standard of 1:450 (CHRI and KHRC, 2006).

There are also challenges in Kenya for a crime to be officially recorded. A victim of a crime must physically report the incident in person to the police and then the police officer makes the decision whether the crime will be officially recorded or not. Some citizens are reluctant to report crimes as they are aware the police regularly take bribes not to follow up on cases or request money in order to pursue investigations. The Somali Kenyan respondents who took part in the study conducted by Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (2016) reported being too afraid to report crimes to the police for fear of having their identification documents confiscated. McEvoy (2012) believes because of these issues with reporting crime only a tiny fraction of sexual assaults are reported in Nairobi because they have to be considered extreme to even be acknowledged, let alone reported. The World Bank (2011) study in Nairobi identified that there were strong attitudes and values that permitted domestic violence. It is therefore fair to assume crimes
recorded by the police are very unlikely to illustrate a true reflection of actual crimes committed in Kenya.

Within England and Wales a crime survey is used to collect additional data other than police-recorded crime statistics. This includes crimes that have not been reported to the police or recorded by them. The crime survey, known as the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) assists with identifying those most at risk from different types of crime, which is used to design and inform crime prevention programmes. Within the UK it is generally agreed the CSEW is the best indicator of trends in crime over time. This is not only because it collects data that is absent from police statistics but because it is not affected by changes made to reporting patterns or police practices in recording crime. It therefore provides an important alternative to police-recorded crime statistics. The CSEW measures the amount of crime in England and Wales by asking people about crimes they have experienced in the previous year. It uses a sample size of nearly 50,000 so it is robust for assessing national trends and findings (Audit Commission, 2006). Although the CSEW has been criticised for not reflecting the changing nature of criminality. It has been suggested the omission of categories of such crimes as credit card fraud and internet scams has kept crime figures low (FitzGerald, 2014). FitzGerald (2014) believes this is because the police service have been expected to demonstrate a year-on-year reduction in crime, which has resulted in them developing a mind-set that is resistant to introducing new types of crimes because it would skew the results.

An individual’s perceptions of safety can be used as a measurement of security. However, when this is used consideration must be given to the fact perceptions of security can shift based on a changing context. For example a study that took place in Timor-Leste found that 89% of respondents considered their community to be relatively safe; even though the population had been subjected to extreme violence (at least 100,000 people were killed). The brutal violence was followed by periods of calm and it is assumed that the respondents were comparing the present peaceful situation to the past episodes of violence and in that respect considered their community to be safe (World Bank, 2011).
The prevalence and type of crime affecting a community in Kenya may be more accurately ascertained through gathering information from community members on crimes they have previously experienced within a set period of time. Although caution would need to be taken to differentiate individuals perception of the level of crime compared to actual crimes that have taken place. Information attained through this method would be more reliable if data is triangulated and validated.

In their recent study the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (2016) found that respondents from Nairobi unanimously identified local gangs and Kenyan security forces as their primary source of concern. Respondents reported low levels of trust in the police and made accusations of harassment, corruption, forced disappearances and extra-judicial killings. Perceptions of insecurity varied based on age and sex, female respondents were more likely to cite local gangs as their primary concern, while youth were more worried about police harassment.

It is clearly evident the lack of accountability and transparency within the Kenyan police force significantly affects the amount and type of crime that is reported to the police. Formal social control mechanisms in Kenya and the application of democratic policing will be discussed in more detail below.

### 2.9.2 Policing in Kenya

Policing in East Africa is described by the CHRI (2007) as ‘regime policing’. This is due to the police’s use of excessive use of force, brutality, illegal arrests and detention, corruption, partiality, extra-judicial executions and abuse of process. Regime policing is the opposite style to democratic policing. Regime policing involves protecting and being answerable to the government rather than the citizens or the law. Police operating under the ethos of regime policing are responsible for controlling populations rather than protecting communities (Stenning, 2014).

The roots of the modern day Kenyan police force have come from the colonial period. During the colonial period the police were used to keep the British in power and to protect British trade interests. Senior and middle ranked police officers were imported from other
British colonies and were therefore extremely biased towards the ruling government of Kenya.

During the 1950’s there was a shift from colonial rule to independence through an attempt at applying a democratic model. Political turmoil and military coups followed the end of colonial rule, shaping the police and creating a brutal, hierarchical, centralised force which separated itself from the community. The fragile young democracy, post-independence, saw the benefits of a partisan police force and a regime police model causing a reversion to a policing approach that was used during the colonial period (CHRI, 2007).

Today it is still evident that the Kenyan police is aligned to regime policing rather than democratic policing (CHRI, 2007). A few examples are provided below along with a case study, to demonstrate how far removed the Kenyan police are from adhering to the basic democratic policing norms of serving citizens rather than the government, protecting human rights, being accountable to the law and being transparent in their activities.

*The Kenyan police and non-conformity to democratic policing norms*

On 15th June 2014 approximately 20 gunmen attacked Mpeketoni town in Lamu County on the Kenyan coast, resulting in over 60 people being killed. Kenyan police were accused of failing to protect the community of Mpeketoni, when they took over five hours to respond to an attack that took place in the location they were based, which they had prior intelligence would take place (Otenyo, 2014). Kenya’s President Uhuru Kenyatta acknowledged the ‘negligence and abdication of duty and responsibility’ of the police regarding the Mpeketoni attack (Namunane and Ongiri, 2014).

Human Rights Watch (2011) have produced a number of publications evidencing human rights abuses that have been committed by the Kenyan police. During the post-election violence in 2007 -2008 it was reported that police officers killed at least 405 people, injured over 500 and raped dozens of people but enjoy absolute impunity. On 13th December 2012 the Kenyan Department of Refugees Affairs (DRA) announced that 55,000 urban refugees were required to move to refugee camps in the north east and north west of Kenya. Following the government order to relocate urban refuges, there were reports of police
officers raping, beating, extorting money and indiscriminately detaining at least 1000 people (Human Rights Watch, 2013). Recommendations made by Human Rights Watch to the Deputy Inspector General of the Regular Police and Administration Police were to instruct the police to:

- **Stop rape, beatings and other unlawful violence against refugees, asylum seekers, and Somali Kenyans, some of which amount to acts of torture.**
- **Stop arbitrarily detaining refugees, asylum seekers, and Somali Kenyans, particularly in Pangani police station.**
- **Stop stealing and extorting money from refugees, asylum seekers and Somali Kenyans.**
- **Stop charging refugees, asylum seekers and Somali Kenyans with public order related offenses without any evidence**

(Human Rights Watch, 2013 p. 6)

A case study is provided on the next page about the Kenyan security forces response to the attack on Westgate shopping mall that took place on 21\textsuperscript{st} September 2013 in Nairobi. It highlights some of the gaps and challenges with the security services mentioned above.
Westgate case study

Around midday on 21st September 2013 four unidentified gunmen entered the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi and opened fire on members of the public within the shopping mall, resulting in at least 67 deaths. The victims of the attack were predominantly Kenyan but 19 of the victims were from other countries, making it an international incident with international media coverage. Initially there were reports that hostages had been taken by the attackers but it later transpired that no hostages were taken during the course of the incident. Al Shabaab claimed responsibility for the attack in retaliation for the presence of Kenya military troops in Somalia. Kenya’s president Uhuru Kenyatta announced that the mall was secure and the incident over at 1800hrs on Tuesday 24th September 2013 (KTN, 2013; K24, 2013; Howden, 2013a).

The response

Kenyan Police Service’s General Service Unit (GSU) who are trained to deal with hostage and siege situations were deployed to the incident and entered the mall on Saturday afternoon around 1500hrs. At 1600hrs Kenyan government officials decided to transfer the handling of the incident from the police to the military. Shortly after entering the mall one of the soldiers fired on the GSU and in a case of mistaken identity shot and killed one police officer and wounded the tactical team commander. In the confusion both the police and military personnel pulled out of the mall to tend to the casualties and re-group (Yorke, 2013).

The last confirmed sighting of the terrorists from the Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) footage within the mall was at 0054hrs on Sunday 22nd September, 12 hours after the attack began. There are mixed reports over what happened to the attackers (KTN, 2013). A week after the attack Major Emmanuel Chirchir a spokesperson for the Kenyan Defence Force (KDF) stated the four perpetrators had been killed during the attack, however others have speculated that the attackers were able to escape from the mall due to the security forces failing to maintain a secure cordon around the mall (Yorke, 2013).

Reports of KDF soldiers looting

On Wednesday 24th September shopkeepers returned to find their shops within the mall looted and cash that had been on the premises gone (Howden, 2013a). The media reported that soldiers had been looting during the siege, video footage from the CCTV cameras inside Westgate appeared on the internet showing soldiers stealing items and placing them into bags (The Telegraph, 2013). There was also footage from inside one of the restaurants showing empty beer and spirit bottles littering the tables where only Kenya security forces had any access during the siege (Howden, 2013a). On Monday 23rd September the Kenyan military fired a Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) into Westgate to ‘neutralise’ the terrorists. This caused a large fire and the partial collapse of the rear rooftop parking lot and two floors within Nakumatt supermarket, destroying a significant part of the mall (Yorke, 2013).

An Australian newspaper summarised the Westgate incident as “a story of chaos, confusion and corruption” (Seidel, 2013). A year later and an investigation into the Westgate incident had still not been carried out. The leader of the opposition party, Mr Odinga was quoted in The Nation newspaper as saying that it was “close to a year after Westgate, the gaps in our security exposed by the attack that killed 70 people and wounded hundreds others have not been closed. The government has inexplicably refused to form an inquiry ...” (Muriithi, 2014).
Sixteen months after the Westgate incident in the early hours of the morning on 2nd April 2015 Al-Shabaab attacked Garissa University, in the east of Kenya, and killed 148 people, mainly students. The Kenyan authorities were criticised for their slow response, journalists covering the story were able to drive the five hours between Nairobi and Garissa before the Kenyan security forces were even deployed (Respondent PS17, 2015). It later transpired the Kenyan police plane that was meant to fly the commandos from Nairobi to Garissa was being used by the police air-wing chief to transport his relatives back from holidaying in Mombasa. On the morning of the attack some students had been able to hide from the attackers and were able to text their parents into the afternoon but were sadly found by the attackers and killed before the commanders arrived at the University at 5pm. As far as the public are aware, the police air-wing chief has not been held accountable for the misuse of police resources, which undoubtedly resulted in the loss of lives due to the delayed arrival of the police response team (Mutiga, 2015).

Manning (2010) and Marenin (1998) both discuss the importance of police accountability and highlight how individual police officers must be held accountable for their actions, which is clearly not the case for the Kenyan police. McEvoy’s (2012) research in Nairobi found that police regularly accepted bribes from offenders, including rapists and even murderers to disrupt cases and halt prosecutions. The perception amongst the general population is that the police are corrupt, Transparency International’s study in 2013 found that 95% of respondents felt the police were corrupt. AfriCOG’s Citizen Perception Survey conducted in 2016 found the police service to be the most corrupt institution in Kenya, with 89% of Kenyans believing the police sometimes or always practiced corruption, whilst 74% indicated the police were always corrupt. Police legitimacy is highly important but only sporadic studies have been conducted in societies where there is widespread police corruption (Jackson et al, 2014). Jackson et al’s (2014) findings from their research in Lahore, Pakistan suggest that in contexts where the police have minimum effectiveness and lack integrity, police legitimacy may not just rely on the fairness of officers but also on their demonstrated ability to control crime and avoid corruption.

It is acknowledged that the police in Kenya are unsupported, under resourced and work in challenging circumstances. It is also noted that there are many people in government and
the police that are interested in keeping things the way they are for personal gain or power (CHRI, 2007). The lack of effectiveness of policing in Kenya is reflected by the large number of vigilante groups operating throughout the country. The fact that they exist reflects the need to fill a security void that is not being addressed by the security sector (Ngunyi and Katumanga, 2012).

Nevertheless, it is recognised that without transparent, democratic, accountable and effective police, democracies cannot function as they should, the basic human rights of people in the community are not protected and development is hindered (CHRI, 2007). For these reasons CHRI (2007) believe democratic policing should be promoted as an alternative to regime policing for Kenya.

2.9.3 Democratic policing in Kenya
Following the post-election violence in 2007 and 2008 the government of Kenya established the Commission of Inquiry on Post-Election Violence (also known as The Waki Commission) to investigate the clashes in Kenya following the disputed elections in 2007. The Waki Commission reviewed the conduct of the police before, during and after the 2007 elections and identified they failed to employ pre-emptive and preventative measures, they failed to respond appropriately to the situation and exacerbated the crisis through their behaviour (CIPEV, 2008).

Strong recommendations for police reform were documented within the Waki Commission, as it was felt that the level of post-election violence and destruction would have been significantly minimised if the police had responded in a professional, nonpartisan manner. This instigated president Kabaki to establish a National Task Force on Police Reforms in 2009. The task force undertook visits to Botswana, Sweden and the UK to learn about other police services, the task force’s report is known as the Ransley report (Republic of Kenya. National Task Force on Police Reforms, 2009). Recommendations within the Ransley report (Republic of Kenya. National Task Force on Police Reforms, 2009) were incorporated within the 2010 Kenyan constitution, which became the legal framework for developing the new policing institution architecture in Kenya. In terms of
scope and commitment of donor funding, Kenya’s police reform programme became the largest in Africa, after South Africa (Hope, 2015).

The recommendations made within the Ransley report are based on democratic policing principles. The report states that “in a democratic society, police must act with the support and trust of the people they serve. This will enable the police to engage with representatives of the community through this forum where key policing priorities and the Policing Plan are set” (p. 53). The demand for police accountability and civilian oversight of the police were highlighted as key issues. It was recognised that police officers need to take responsibility for the power that comes from being a police officer and be prepared to justify their decisions and actions. These two issues are vital mechanisms to ensure police actions are for the benefit of the public and trust and cooperation is built with the police. This is imperative in Kenya where it is acknowledged within the report that generally Kenyans regard the police as ineffective and have low levels of trust in them (Republic of Kenya. National Task Force on Police Reforms, 2009). The Task Force identified that accountability is paramount for the reform of the Kenyan police and based on their recommendation an Internal Affairs Unit (IAU) was established to ensure accountability within the police and a civilian oversight body called the Independent Policing Oversight Authority (IPOA) was established to deal with complaints against the police and ensure that justice and fairness is upheld.

The application of democratic policing needs to take into consideration the context and the societal constraints which shapes the design and power dynamics within the police structure and external pressures that are placed on the police. This enables an environment where other forms of policing can operate, such as vigilante groups and private security. A number of studies have documented the growth of private security firms in Kenya (Mkutu and Sabala, 2007; Abrahamsen and Williams, 2011; KIPPRA, 2010; Kaguru and Ombui, 2014). Therefore the implementation of democratic style policing needs to be appropriate for the political, policy and ‘policing’ context (Marenin, 1998).

Through democratic policing trust and confidence is built up between the police and the community, which results in a sense of safety within a community. In these environments
community members are more willing to share information with the police which will lead to the detection and prevention of crimes. With improved accountability and trust citizens are in a better position to place pressure on the police so they conform to international human rights standards, there is also the potential for more funding to be channelled into policing and therefore more resources available to use towards improving the service provided to the public.

The World Bank’s (2011) study found that the majority of residents of poor neighbourhoods in Nairobi were in favour of policing that was based on trust and coordination with community actors and groups. Another key recommendation made by the Task Force was that community policing would be one of the central pillars within the National policing policy (Republic of Kenya. National Task Force on Police Reforms, 2009). The application of community policing in Kenya will be discussed next.

2.9.4 Community policing in Kenya

The National Task Force on Police Reforms define Community policing as:

A collaborative effort by the police and the community that identifies problems of crime and disorder and involves all elements of the community in the search for a solution of these problems. This approach to policing is based on the assumption that the police alone cannot control crime, but require the active support of the community, to prevent, detect crime, reduce fear and crime and improve communication between the community and the police.


The documentation of a number of community policing projects implemented in Kenya in the late 1990s illustrated some of the challenges incurred whilst introducing community policing previously. In 1999 two community policing initiatives were implemented in Nairobi, Kenya, one in the Central Business District (also known as CBD) and the other in an informal settlement in Kangemi. Both of these projects highlighted the problems that can be encountered when there are different expectations and agendas amongst the parties involved in a community policing project.
The community policing project that was implemented in Kangemi informal settlement (known locally as a slum) by Kenyan Human Rights Commission involved the establishment of neighbourhood watch schemes and community-police liaison committees. The Kenyan Human Rights Commission’s objective for implementing the community policing project was to address crime and human rights abuses, in addition to this they saw it as a way of improving police-community relations. However, the issues of addressing human rights abuses and improving relations between the police and the community were contradictory. When Kenyan Human Rights Commission raised concerns about human rights abuses they only highlighted the conflicting approaches of the police and the commission which resulted in a lack of police interest and involvement in the project (Ruteere and Pommerolle, 2003).

The Nairobi Central Business District Association (NCBDA) project was established due to concerns amongst the business community with the inability of the police to deal with growing insecurity and the impact of crime on business activity. Challenges occurred within the project because different actors had very different objectives and expectations of community policing projects. The police perceived community policing as maintaining order; rather than improving trust, cooperation and accountability between the police and the community. Whereas the NCBDA saw it as a public-private partnership in which the community would define security needs and provide the police with the means needed to deal with their issues (Ruteere and Pommerolle, 2003).

Throughout the duration of the NCBDA project the relationship between the police and the business community was positive, the police benefited from desperately needed equipment and the refurbishment of the police living quarters; whilst the business community benefited from a safer environment to conduct business. However in addition to different actors having different objectives, the project only satisfied a selected part of the community. Other groups within the Central Business District community were marginalised and excluded. During the project period unlicensed hawkers, small business owners and taxi drivers all reported increased harassment by police and argued the project only increased police repression towards them. When implementing community policing projects and a specific group of beneficiaries provide resources or remunerations to the
police there will always be a conflict of interest and an in-balance of whose safety concerns within society should take precedence. This supports Wiser and Onwudiwe (2009) argument that it is difficult to implement community policing in highly divided communities. As with the example of South Africa if the affluent parts of the community are not satisfied with the security provided by the police they can pay to improve their situation, which ultimately neglects and fails to address the root causes of insecurity.

In Lanet Umoja, Nakuru, a peri-urban area of Kenya there is an example of community policing that is based on good communication and coordination with the community through the use of social media (Livingston, 2013). Chief Francis Kariuki uses twitter to report crime incidents occurring in his area of responsibility. As the majority of the community members do not have access to the internet, people can sign up and have the twitter messages sent to their mobile phones and receive them as text messages. The Chief sends messages to report missing people, burglaries taking place or a house that is on fire and provides the location, with the expectation neighbours will respond to assist (Livingston, 2013).

In Chief Kariuki’s opinion the use of social media has assisted with reducing crime. The Chief even believes that criminals follow him on twitter therefore this approach also acts as a deterrent when a crime in progress is reported as a message because the criminals may assume people will respond. The Chief also assists community members sell items, such as advertising the sale of a cow for someone who requires money to pay for school fees. Including this aspect to his twitter messages probably assists with generating interest from the public (Respondent PS8, 2014).

The Chief has shown leadership through establishing and managing this initiative. In the UK it would not be appropriate for the police to request the assistance of community members to apprehend a burglar but in the context of Kenya it is deemed acceptable. It would appear that this approach has improved collaboration between the police and community, increased ‘eyes on the street’, promoted collective action and improved social control.
Nyumbi Kumi
In an effort to improve security in Kenya the government announced a self-regulating initiative called Nyumbi Kumi in 2012, which has some similarities to neighbourhood watch. The initiative is intended to be a ‘simple’ idea of knowing your ten neighbours. The Kenyan News Agency’s (2012) press release stated “[residents] should seek to know what their neighbours are involved in, what they do to earn a living and how many people reside in one household. Village elders must know all the members of the nyumbi kumi clusters”. However the introduction of the initiative has been seen by some as an institutional failure of the police and a way of encouraging neighbours to spy on one another. Whilst the initiative has been announced it is still in its initial phase and has not yet been rolled out (Wamburi, 2013).

2.9.5 Preventing crime in Kenyan communities
The Kenyan government has recognised that in some locations in the country, community policing has been hijacked by youths who have formed vigilante groups under the pretext of providing security, but in fact have ended up contributing to a rise in insecurity (Kenyan News Agency, 2012). Vigilantism is a global phenomenon which cuts across urban and rural contexts in both developed and developing societies. In a situation where there are rising crime rates and a declining sense of security, residents initiate a variety of crime prevention efforts.

Vigilantism in urban Kenya
In Kenya’s capital, Nairobi vigilantes are accepted by residents as a response to the problem of urban insecurity and many would describe them to be a form of ‘community policing’, although it is unlikely the general public in Kenya would define community policing in the same way it is referred to within the literature (Friedmann, 1992; Skogan, 2004; Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1990). There is a public perception that the police condone or collude with the activities of vigilantes. Most of the vigilante groups are armed but the police do not arrest them for carrying weapons, even though it is known to the police that some of the vigilante groups are criminals who terrorise residents and undermine the legitimacy of the Kenyan police (Ngunyi and Katumanga, 2014).
Within informal settlements in Nairobi UNHABITAT (2011) recognise that local businesses are subjected to racketeering activities such as the extortion of money for the provision of ‘security’ and most business people admitted that this was a regular feature of ‘doing business’ in these locations. Although vigilante groups and other criminal gangs are responsible for extortion on many of the estates, police and other government officials have also been implicated. At the time of the research it was apparent that businesses from the informal settlement of Kibera still had to pay ‘security’ money otherwise the gangs who didn’t receive the security money targeted their businesses (Respondent PV1, 2014).

One of the principle reasons for the existence of urban vigilantes in Nairobi is to be found in public anxiety about the levels of crime within the city and perception of the incapacity of the police to tackle criminality effectively, however it is also very apparent that vigilante groups have been used for political means in Kenya. In 2002 Anderson examined increased vigilante activity between two rival groups in Nairobi (the Mungiki and Taliban) and their relationship within the political context in the run up to the general elections. On the night of 3rd March 2002 a massacre took place in Nairobi’s Kariobangi north estate. It is believed a gang of 200 to 300 members of the Mungiki group terrorised the residents of the estate where the Taliban group were present. The attack resulted in twenty residents being killed and a further 31 admitted to hospital with serious injuries. Following the attack there was speculation the police had taken inadequate steps to prevent the violence. Once the police finally arrived hours after the attack they were considered to be heavy handed, insensitive and incompetent at ‘rounding up’ suspects. There was suspicion that the massacre had been politically motivated and the group known as ‘Mungiki’ were protected by senior politicians and the violence had been orchestrated for political gains, and that the Mungiki even had recruits within ranks in the police. Kenyans interviewed as part of this study stated their fear of further politically motivated violence. It was stated vigilante groups had become a potent political weapon that is deployed in the struggle for votes. Unfortunately their prediction was right, in 2007 and 2008 the post-election violence was nationwide and resulted in over a thousand people losing their lives (Tranchant, 2013).
In 2002 the Commissioner of Police outlawed 18 named vigilante groups, including Mungiki and Taliban. All 18 groups were considered to have been controlled or mobilised for political interest, the groups were often referred to as ‘vigilantes for hire’. It has been suggested that Kenyan politicians maintain ‘private armies’ of ‘youth wingers’ the number of which are increased around the election periods (Anderson, 2002).

The success of outlawing named vigilante groups in Kenya is questionable given that Ngunyi and Katumanga’s (2012) research on gangs and militia groups in Kenya identified 238 militia groups in the 15 counties in which their study took place. Within Nairobi the main militia groups were found to be Mungiki, Taliban, Kamjesh and Sungu Sungu, with the Mungiki being the most dominant group with a ‘crime share’ of 43%.

**Gangs and their link to terrorism in Kenya**

Ngunyi and Katumanga (2012) suggest there is a relationship between gangs, the police and terrorist groups in Kenya. They suggest that radicalised gangs are not a result of the police being absent but because of police abstinence. This is where the police are present but refuse to act because they are either partakers in crime or are overwhelmed by criminals. They estimated that one out of every four police officers work in collaboration with gangs or militia groups.

It is argued that the reason the terrorist group Al Shabaab has such a presence in Kenya is because of ‘rented terrorism’ (Ngunyi and Katumanga, 2012); Al Shabaab are able to ‘rent’ members from local militia and criminal gangs to carry out terrorist acts. They believe if the local gangs were dealt with, the threat posed by Al Shabaab in Kenya would be significantly reduced. During 2014 a number of terrorist attacks took place in Nairobi, in the form of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) detonating on buses (Ombati, 2014) and in a market (The Associated Press, 2014). None of these attacks were claimed by an organisation, which would suggest the attacks were not (directly) carried out by Al Shabaab as they are known to claim responsibility for their terrorist attacks (BBC, 2014; Respondent PS11, 2015) including the high profile attack on Westgate shopping centre in Nairobi (BBC, 2013).
Following their study Ngunyi and Katumanga (2012) made two recommendations in order to deal with the gang crisis in Kenya. They stated the police and gangs are intertwined and therefore you must deal with the police before you can resolve the issue with gangs (this also includes links to terrorist activities). There is currently a security vacuum which is filled by vigilante groups. One of their suggestions is for youths who are recruited in the vigilante groups to be utilised to provide security, attached to the Nyumbi Kumi government initiative.

**Social control in rural Kenya**

In rural areas within East Africa vigilante groups are common amongst pastoralist communities. They are generally established in response to high levels of cattle theft and related violence. Some of these groups are organised independently by cooperating villages but some have the support from the state (Fleisher, 2000). Baker (2009) notes that in the rural areas of sub-Saharan Africa where the reach of the state is limited, many communities fall back on their own mechanisms for protection and safety. Pastoralists from Kenya had coping mechanisms for times of extreme scarcity, which included mobility into other areas, alliances and agreements with other groups and raiding (Mkutu, 2006).

In the pastoralist communities along the Kenya-Ugandan border cattle raiders usually attack in groups of up to five hundred people, sometimes even thousands, outnumbering the security forces. This border area is overflowing with weapons which, although not the cause of the conflict but exacerbate it (Mkutu, 2006). Kowalewski (1991) cited in Suzara (1993) is of the opinion rural vigilante groups are likely to be more violent than urban vigilante groups because they are more distant from the scrutiny of human rights organisations.

In the ethnic clashes of 1992 in Western Kenya, there was some evidence that communities may have been armed by the state. In the past 20 years Kenya has also experienced flows of arms mainly from countries in conflict bordering the pastoral areas. Insecurity has triggered further arming of communities, sometimes with official support or complicity. Arms may also originate from legal sources, such as official security forces and militias armed for the defence of the community (Mkutu, 2006).
In 1948 the Kenyan Police Reserves (KPRs) were formed to assist the regular Kenyan police maintain law and order. There are some parallels that can be drawn between the purpose of establishing PCSOs and Special Constables in the UK and KPRs. The KPRs now only exist in rural areas of Kenya, where they are utilised as a form of ‘community patrol’ to deal with cattle theft and related violence. The government has provided weapons to KPR who fall under the control of the police and district commissioners. The KPRs are used on a voluntary basis with no allowances or benefits and are provided with minimal training (Mkutu, 2006). Even though they are generally seen positively by the community as they are a visible community security force, they could also be described in certain situations as a vigilante group due to the lack of control and oversight by the police.

The KPR are a legal civilian force mandated and armed by the state to protect members’ own communities that fall outside the reach of regular security forces. Such an option may be attractive to governments. On the one hand, it is cheaper than deploying a full police or military force and the KPRs have the advantage of having local knowledge and being able to withstand local conditions. However, there are difficulties in overseeing and controlling such a force and the loyalties of its members may not be entirely clear. Importantly, by arming non-state actors the state concedes its monopoly over the use of force, which may threaten state stability in many ways.

It has been recognised that the KPR have been a key element in the fight against insecurity, tackling insurgency and cattle rustlers from the neighbouring countries. The KPR have a good knowledge of the areas in which they are operating, which helps them to predict when and where raids will take place. They are well motivated because they are protecting their own cattle and communities. The KPR appear to have significant support from the community due to them being a visible community security force and the system also allows offenders to be punished through traditional methods so community members feel they see justice (Mkutu, 2006).

However, it has been suggested that it is easy for KPRs to be compromised, guns issued to the reservists are frequently hired out or used in banditry and raiding. This undermines the security they are supposed to protect. In 2003 600 KPRs were disarmed in Tana River due
to corruption and misuse of arms in their custody. It was considered they had become a threat to national security instead of defending it. Oversight of the KPRs in Tana River had been neglected and the number of KPRs was not known even though weapons, ammunition and radios had been issued to the reservists by the police (Mkutu, 2006).

A study conducted in 2013 found that community members had mixed opinions about the value of KPRs. It was recognised they provide an important first response to insecurity in remote communities where there is a heavy reliance on their local knowledge and ability to operate in harsh climates and cover difficult terrain and to provide security against resource based conflicts and cattle raiding. However they are also a source of insecurity through firearms misuse, poor training and lack of accountability (Mkutu and Wandera, 2013).

It is alleged KPRs are encouraged by the police to ‘provide for themselves’ by working as paid guards and escorts. The younger KPRs are particularly tempted by the financial reward for conducting private security work. Also at times politicians recruit KPRs for their personal needs. However, the use of government issued arms for private profit is illegal under Kenyan law. It has been suggested that a lack of oversight or governing structure, the economic pressure of earning an income, firearms misuse and criminal behaviour of the KPR is exacerbating tensions in Kenya’s remote rural regions. Although there is a new police act, which will make provision for KPRs to receive ‘such pay and allowances’ that are provided to a police officer of corresponding rank and seniority but this is awaiting parliamentary approval (Mkutu and Wandera, 2013).

Uganda established a similar group to the KPRs in 1992 as a result of the deteriorating security situation in the rural area of Karamoja but the government chose to financially compensate members of the group. A local community security force was organised from the armed locals, known as ‘warriors’. They were given the responsibility of tracking raided cattle, answering alarms and securing roads. Members of this force came to be known as ‘the vigilantes’. President Museveni gave his support for ‘the vigilantes’ and placed them under the authority of the national army, the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF). ‘The vigilantes’ were trained and equipped by the government and were paid 10,000 Ugandan
shillings ($6.50) per month which increased to 30,000 Ugandan Shillings ($19.50) per month in 1995. Due to their success in improving the security situation, by the end of 1993 ‘the vigilantes’ had gained full community support. ‘The vigilantes’ would return raided cattle, stolen property and sometimes even money to the rightful owner. This was unlike the official security forces who were corrupt and stole cattle from the local population. However, when ‘the vigilantes’ stopped being paid they reverted to being warriors, cattle raiding and carrying out banditry but this time they were better trained and equipped (Mikutu, 2006).

Payment of the KPRs could reduce the likelihood of them finding alternative means to gain financial rewards with the use of their weapons, however the situation in Uganda demonstrates that the KPRs are likely to revert to alternative means to gain an income should their pay be stopped. This highlights that further consideration may be required in order for the KPRs to be a sustainable approach to dealing with rural crime. The topic of dealing with crime in Kenya will be discussed next.

2.10 Dealing with crime in Kenya

In societies where there is an absence of a police service and a lack of a viable system for justice the public will begin to rely on other means of regulating behaviour and people will develop mechanisms to cope with crime (World Bank, 2011). This can take the form of adopting individual coping mechanisms such as to avoid walking in certain areas or through community collective action which can range from community groups ‘policing’ below the state in an effort to improve security, to collective violence in response to criminals.

2.10.1 Individual coping mechanisms

The World Bank conducted a study in 2011 of five cities around the world (Nairobi, Cali in Colombia, Fortaleza in Brazil, Dili in Timor-Leste and Soleil in Haiti) to assess community responses to urban violence. The results from their study found that there was a general inability for communities involved in their research to come together for collective action, resulting in more individual strategies. Individual coping mechanisms identified during the research included ‘doing nothing’ for example in Haiti they recognised ‘keeping silent’ as a coping mechanism. Due to the breakdown of trust between neighbours and institutions
some respondents considered engaging in collective action to be too risky compared to the perceived benefits. Many people were of the opinion that there was nothing they could do to avoid violence. Their lack of hope correlated with the limited police capacity and lack of presence within the communities. All respondents from the five different cities described the police to be repressive, inefficient, corrupt and/or biased. However when asked what would make their community safer, over half of all respondents said they wanted to see a stronger police presence.

A common strategy to avoid victimisation would appear to be avoiding or limiting mobility in particular areas to certain hours or specific areas that are deemed relatively secure. The literature would suggest this is the case for residents from the informal settlement Kibera in Nairobi where this research took place. Residents try to return home before it gets dark, the alternative is to pay a ‘youth’ to provide ‘security’ to walk you through the slum to your home. If you do not pay a youth for security you are likely to be mugged on your way home, with the offender(s) potentially being the same youth you would have paid to provide security (UNHABITAT, 2011). In the World Bank’s study nearly fifty percent of the Nairobi respondents’ limited travel to certain hours (World Bank, 2011).

Another individual coping strategy involves situational crime prevention, such as investing in security infrastructure for the home, like locks, gates or improved lighting. In some incidences people will take precautions even further by acquiring weapons. Purchasing a weapon was noted as a coping mechanism for community members in the informal settlements of Mathare and Korogocho in Nairobi (Respondent CS11, 2014).

When individuals feel unsafe they will curtail their interactions with potentially dangerous places and withdraw into areas that they perceive to be safe or safer. These reactions are functional for the individual because it makes them feel safer and reduces the likelihood of them becoming a victim of crime. They are however likely to be deterred from interacting with people within their neighbourhood and the needs of the community are unlikely to be met (Jackson and Gray, 2010). Fear leads to avoidance of areas and people, when citizens chose to avoid specific areas it is a clear indicator that there is a need for an
intervention. Often the lack of collective coping mechanisms is reflected by the built environment.

The physical design of buildings, street layout, landscaping and lighting of neighbourhoods has an effect on communities and crime prevention. Within the Dadaab refugee camp in northern Kenya a street lighting project has been introduced because it is believed improving lighting will decrease the number of sexual assaults carried out on women from the camp (Karimi, 2013). Urban designers and planners have recognised that ‘eyes on the street’ are basic defences against crime and believe socially-based mechanisms (social cohesion) are more effective than hardware like gates (Blakely and Snyder, 1997; Coleman, 1985). It is argued in an urban environment without good street lighting, police patrols or safe places to meet, people are not able to come together. If there are no areas where people can mix in public spaces there will be a negative impact on trust and social capital (World Bank, 2011).

2.10.2 Community collective action

In the informal settlement of Dandora a local community group called the Mustard Seed project have created a ‘model’ court (small gated community) through support from The Awesome Foundation. One aspect of the project was to create open spaces where the community could interact. They created two clean open spaces, one of which is used as a children’s play area with play facilities and another that is used as a communal space for residents to relax. The project used community volunteers to clean up the areas; they unblocked drains, removed garbage lying around the compound, levelled off the ground (that was previously used to dump garbage) and seeded it. A perimeter fence was also constructed around the court with a steel gate to manage access. Following the transformation of the court, residents are now willing to contribute a small amount of money each month to employ three youths from the area who provide security in the court at night and maintain the cleanliness on the grounds (The Awesome Foundation, 2014). Through mobilising community volunteers for collective action to clean up their area and make it more secure, the community are more likely to appreciate the area and be conscious about keeping it clean and secure. Another positive aspect of the project is that it has created employment for youths from within the community. Young people who have
a stake in their community and have a sense of belonging are less likely to commit an offence in it than those that don’t (Nacro, 2012).

One of the issues raised by the Nairobi respondents from the World Bank (2011) study was that they expressed disappointment with the village chiefs and elders to address key causes of conflict. In an urban setting due to transient populations and the breakdown of community structures, traditional networks and processes are often diluted or lost and therefore don’t have the influence they have in rural areas. The extent of Nairobi being a transient population is reflected by the fact that 80% of Nairobi’s population live in rented accommodation and those that will be in a position to be able to afford a property are more likely to do so in their home area where they were brought up (Anyanba, 2014).

An example from South Sudan shows how strong leadership can initiate community action to improve safety. Following the civil war (1983-2005) the community of Faraksika in Warrap State had over thirty mortars (bombs) scattered around it. Due to Faraksika being remote the community agreed they couldn’t wait for experienced bomb disposal teams to be deployed to the remote area to remove the dangerous items because of the risk they posed to the community and particularly the children. The Payam Administrator mobilised the men within Faraksika to dig a large pit, collect the mortars and place them inside the pit. He then informed the whole community they must stay away from the pit (UNMAS Sudan, 2008). This is obviously not a practice that would be promoted as there could have been fatal consequences but it is an interesting example of collective action to improve safety, initiated by a community leader.

In Kenya, activities to address crime and violence span an array of governmental and Community Based Organisations (CBOs), yet while some programmes have demonstrated success there remains a serious lack of coordination at the national level. In addition, the responsibility for dealing with crime and violence are still considered to be the responsibility of the police and justice sectors, which has inevitably limited the support for initiatives that could address the broader structural, social and environmental drivers. Experience of effective programmes demonstrates there needs to be the support and
investment of multiple sectors, coordination across multiple layers of the government and the community need to be empowered (World Bank, 2011).

As recognised by The Morgan report in the UK (Home Office, 1991) and the National Task Force on Police Reforms in Kenya (Republic of Kenya, 2009) the police cannot deal with crime alone and need to work with partners; likewise community action groups addressing issues related to crime also need to work with partners. Nacro (2012) a charity dedicated to reducing crime and reoffending in communities in England and Wales believe that ‘crime is everyone’s problem [therefore] everyone has to be part of the solution’. Nacro sees the importance of working with the wider community such as employers, community groups and the voluntary sector as well as the offenders.

**2.10.3 Dealing with deviance**

In the absence of a viable system of justice, whether formal or traditional, people rely on other means of regulating behaviour, such as collective violence. One form of this is community action against those who violate social norms, although instead of spontaneous action (i.e. mob justice) that can result in acts of brutality there is the potential to explore formal or traditional systems that empower communities to ensure justice is carried out. Communities where the KPR are operating in rural Kenya were generally supportive about them because the communities felt justice was carried out through traditional methods implemented by the KPR and they fulfilled a social control role.

The sociologist Donald Black (1976) recognised when the law is weak or absent other means of social control can arise, such as collective violence. Black (1976) states the greater the relational distance between parties involved in a dispute, the greater the likelihood and severity of collective violence. Black refers to relational distance in terms of engagement, the nature of the relationship and the degree to which people participate in one another’s lives.

In Kenya collective violence is known as mob justice and appears to be a coping mechanism used to deal with criminals and crime. Within the informal settlements it is considered to
be more effective method than relying on poor policing and the justice system (World Bank, 2011). Mob justice is also perceived to act as a deterrent to potential criminals. While individuals may not be capable of brutalities, mobs are. Typically the larger the size of a mob the more likely individuals are willing to lose self-awareness and engage in dangerous behaviour as they will have anonymity. When people do not believe their behaviour can be traced back to them they are more likely to break social norms (Mosongo, 2014).

However, collective violence will not necessarily be reacting to fair or accurate information and as a consequence, innocent people can be victimised or even killed. In Newport, Wales in 2000 a mob vandalised the house of a paediatrician who they mistook to be a paedophile through getting the professional title confused with the word paedophile (Allison, 2000).

It is argued that as long as there is bribery and corruption in Kenya, nothing will stop the public from taking justice into their own hands and stoning, lynching and necklacing will remain a form of justice; once a mob is in action the police are usually incapable of controlling and stopping them. With the slow court processes and bribery being the norm in Kenya, mob justice is considered to be the easier and faster way of dealing with suspected criminals (Mosongo, 2014).

In England and Wales community payback schemes are considered as a way that the community can feel that they have seen justice being done. Communities can also witness offenders giving something back to the community in compensation for the crime they have committed. Instead of being given a prison sentence in England and Wales for a crime like damaging property an offender may be placed on a community payback scheme whereby they are required to remove graffiti. Nacro (2012) believe this is a way offenders can be integrated back into their community, where they can rebuild ties with family, friends and the wider community and develop relationships that do not relate to criminal activities. Youth at risk of offending in Mathare and Korogocho in Nairobi, who took part in Danish De-mining Group’s pilot study on armed violence reduction, discussed how they lacked strong connections with family or leaders but were close to their peers who they could smoke with and who accepted them for who they are (Respondent CS11, 2014). These youth probably lack family mentors and only socialise with friends who are also at
risk of engaging in criminal activities, Warr (2005) refers to this relationship as ‘sticky friends’. Hence rebuilding ties with family and their wider community would be important for them to identify with role models whose influence will discourage the youths from offending. However, it could be argued that the attempt to reintegrate offenders back into their community could also have negative affects whereby it is highlighted to the community that the individual has committed a crime and the individual may always be seen by the community in this way and not be accepted by them. The type of crime that had been committed by the offender would also influence a community’s acceptance.

Nacro (2012) argue that traditional and regulated community pay back schemes can be effective. They state that instead of the London rioters in 2011 being given short term prison sentences it would have been a more effective ‘punishment’ for them to be issued with tasks within the communities that were affected by the rioting. Being on the community ‘pay back’ scheme would have meant that they could not ignore the impact their actions had on victims and the communities as a whole.

A type of community pay back scheme could have a role in Kenya at this time due to the current lack of confidence in the police and justice system. However, successful schemes would need to be regulated and have transparent and accountable oversight. In the Kenyan setting it would be more appropriate in a rural context than an urban setting where social ties and traditional structures have weakened.

‘Traditional’ gacaca courts were established in Rwanda following the genocide that occurred in 1994. The gacaca courts were initiated by the government but were community-led processes and held at the community level. Whilst there is substantial critique about how effective the courts were, Clark (2014) believes they served as a useful arena that allowed the community to openly engage in public discussions about the genocide and were able to resolve conflicts within the community. Some of Clark’s interviewees stated they felt it was their personal obligation to say what happened during the genocide and answer questions that friends and neighbours may have. Another factor that community members chose to participate in the gacaca process was to locate the bodies of family
members, which was very important to them. Therefore the gacaca courts allowed open
discussion about the genocide and probably facilitated a form of closure for some.

*Summary of coping mechanisms*
Coping mechanisms to deal with crimes can appear in various forms. Protection
mechanisms can be developed on an individual level for example through situational crime
prevention when someone choses to improve the physical security of their residence, or
they chose to avoid areas, or decide to just ‘keep quiet’ about issues that affect them or
their community. Individual protection mechanisms can however be counterproductive to
establishing collective efficacy because individual coping mechanisms generally remove
people from places and discourage interactions between people, which will inevitably have
an impact on trust and social capital.

Community efficacy is more likely to result in successful collective action if there is
leadership and a structure within the community, and some form of network or
partnership external to the community so individuals are supported and do not operate in
isolation or outside of the law. Communities assume that members will live within a set of
social norms but when someone operates outside of these norms there is an expectation
that these individuals are dealt with accordingly and therefore the community requires a
means of regulating behaviour in line with social norms, whether this is through formal or
informal social control mechanisms, or a combination of them.

This research will consider the regulation of deviant behaviour within the context of the
informal settlement of Kibera in Nairobi. Kibera and the crime situation within the informal
settlement will be covered next.

2.11 Case study of Kibera
This research took place in the informal settlement of Kibera, one of Nairobi’s largest
informal settlements. Kibera was selected for this study because it is has a high crime rate
and it is populated by lower-income citizens who are highly vulnerable to becoming victims
of crime but have limited resources to improve their safety. Figure 2 on the next page
displays the location of Kibera and other informal settlements in Nairobi.
Population of Kibera

Kibera emerged in 1912 when a group of former soldiers from the Nubian community were granted temporary rights to settle on a small area of forest, this is where its name originates from, in Nubian language Kibera means forest. Over time, more and more people from different tribes settled in Kibera. At the time of the research Kibera was dominated by the Luo tribe but all the major Kenyan ethnic groups were represented. After the post-election violence some residents chose to move to live in the same area as people from their tribe, this has resulted in some parts of Kibera being ethnically concentrated. Kibera is located approximately five kilometres away from the city centre, it is a densely populated area covering 2.5 kilometres squared.
There have been inconsistencies over the population size of Kibera, estimates have varied from around one million to 200,000, 200,000 being the latest government statistics gathered from the 2009 census (Republic of Kenya. Kenya National Bureau Statistics, 2010). The one million figure appeared at the time of the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP) in 2004 (a joint project between UN-HABITAT and the government of Kenya) following which Kibera became known as one of the largest slums in Africa (UNHABITAT, 2007). It has been suggested that these potentially inflated figures worked in favour of the slum upgrading projects and non-governmental organisations approaching donors for funds to implement projects in Kibera, hence the figures were never disputed (Warah, 2010). Later in 2009, using mapping techniques MapKibera (2010) estimated the population of Kibera to be between 220,000 and 250,000, a similar figure to the official government estimates. Despite an accurate population figure not being known, it is clear that Kenya is facing rapid urbanisation which will lead to a significant growth in informal settlements. Urbanisation in Kenya is a result of population growth as well as rural-urban migration. Kibera is made up of a lower-income, transient population. A high proportion of which are youths and the majority are unemployed. Those that work are usually engaged in casual work or labour (UNHABITAT, 2007).

The majority of land upon which Kibera is situated is owned by the Kenyan government but the settlement is not officially acknowledged. Informal settlements were excluded...
from city authority planning and budgeting processes. This resulted in the informal settlements being denied essential services usually provided by the government such as water supply, sanitation, electricity, garbage collections, health services, education, access roads and transport. As the government has been unable to adequately provide these services, residents have been forced to rely on private facilities and gangs for service provision and public transport routes (Amnesty International, 2009). In the case of water, residents were often paying eight times what other Nairobi residents were paying (Oxfam, 2009). Mutahi’s research (2011a) identifies that the gangs operating in Nairobi can oscillate between service and security providers, mobilisers for politicians and criminal outfits.

Crime and violence in Nairobi’s informal settlements
A study of crime in urban slums in Kenya which included Kibera found that 98.8% of respondents had witnessed crime being committed in the last three months of the study period. The main crimes noted during this time were robbery, stealing and burglary (SRIC, 2014). Felson (2002) points out, poorer people tend to carry more cash relative to their income than middle class people. Therefore they provide more suitable crime targets compared to their income.

The African Population and Health Research Centre (APHRC) conducted a ‘Cross-sectional slum survey in Nairobi’ during 2002 and then a survey in 2012. In 2012 residents highlighted an increased concern about insecurity, lack of police stations and an absence of law enforcement. The survey findings found that gunshot wounds had increased and attributed to a higher number of deaths. Whilst security wasn’t mentioned in 2002 as a challenge, 12.5% of respondents raised it as a challenge in the 2012 survey. This could indicate that resident’s perceptions of security had deteriorated between 2002 and 2012 (Mberu, 2014). It is however worth noting that the post-election violence occurred in 2007 and 2008, the period in between the two surveys and that ‘slum dwellers’ were the worst affected by this violence. The next election after the disputed 2007 elections was due to take place in 2013 and it is likely people were apprehensive about election violence occurring again when they took part in the survey in 2012.
2.12 Summary of the literature review

The literature recognises the concept of ‘policing’ has expanded beyond the monopoly of the ‘public police’ and now incorporates a wide range of security systems, including community safety initiatives (Stenning, 2000). However, even with the pluralisation of ‘policing’ it is still clearly understood that the mandate for ‘policing’ is controlled by the state (Hough, 2007).

Democratic policing has been recommended for the Kenyan police, with community policing being a central pillar within the national policing policy (CHRI, 2007; Republic of Kenya, 2009). Manning (2010) and Marenin (1998) highlight the importance of police accountability and transparency for a police organisation adopting democratic policing norms. The legitimacy of the police is believed to directly correlate with the public’s willingness to cooperate and trust the police (Sunshine and Tyler, 2003). The intention of this approach is to build trust and confidence between the Kenyan police and the public, creating an environment where community members are more willing to share information with the police and improve community safety.

The World Bank’s (2011) study acknowledged that residents in Nairobi are favourable to policing that is based on trust and coordination with the community. As Friedmann (1992) states the ‘community’ within ‘community policing’ assumes that policing is not done to it but with it. It is important for any police service to liaise with the community and other partners but in the case of Kenya where resources and capacity are particularly limited it is even more important. The complete crime situation is not known in Kenya due to the poor reporting and recording of crimes, which could currently be attributed to the lack of procedural justice within the police and justice system (Hope, 2015). Without having an accurate picture of the crime situation in Kenya there are knowledge gaps about criminality and therefore a challenge to effectively deal with crime.

Whilst community policing or community safety initiatives can be initiated from the police they can also be applied through a bottom-up approach in the form of private security, for those that can afford it and informal social control mechanisms, such as vigilante groups or community safety initiatives (Stenning, 2000). Cohesive and resilient communities are
believed to be better placed to withstand and resist crime and violence (Garland, 2001). Reiner (2010) considers informal social control mechanisms to be the most effective method for crime prevention. It has been suggested that a community with high social capital is more inclined to have low crime rates (Rosenfeld et al, 2001). However crime and social capital have a complex relationship, in one respect crime can weaken social capital through reducing trust amongst community members but it can also increase social capital through the formation of community groups and networks (Ledermann et al, 2002; Putnam, 2000).

Academic research has demonstrated a link between community cohesion, social control and a decrease in crime (Wedlock, 2006; Lee, 2000; Sampson and Raudenbush, 1999; Sampson and Groves, 1989). When a community has social cohesion and informal control there appears to be a framework of rules for behaviour that assists the community’s capacity to control and prevent crime. Reiner (2010) and UNODC (2005) state that in areas where there is little sense of community they are more vulnerable to criminality, therefore they promote supporting and developing informal social control mechanisms because they are considered to be the most effective means of preventing crime. It is proposed community safety could improve within lower-income areas of Nairobi if there was collective efficacy (Sampson and Raudenbush, 1999) and community action which operated in collaboration with formal social control mechanisms that are procedurally fair.

This study will consider criminality and its impact on the lower-income population of Kibera in Nairobi. Within the context of crime prevention it will critically examine formal and informal social control mechanisms present within the informal settlement. The research methods used to undertake this exploration will be set out in the next chapter.
Chapter 3: Methodology

3.1 Introduction

This research explored criminality in lower-income neighbourhoods in Nairobi, Kenya and the influence formal and informal social control mechanisms have on ‘policing’ from a citizen and community perspective. This chapter will explore the type of methodology applied to undertake this inquiry. It will begin by considering the philosophical underpinnings of the research before progressing to discuss the qualitative approach adopted, plus the methods and the sample population used for the study. Ethical issues relating to the research are considered, along with a discussion about how the data generated was validated. The chapter will then cover how the data was analysed and limitations to the study before concluding with reflections from the researcher.

*You never really understand a person until you consider things from his point of view ... until you climb into his skin and walk around in it.*

(Lee, 1988, p. 30)

3.2 Philosophical position

The philosophical underpinnings to this research considered the way in which people shape the world and how ‘human agency’ characterises the world in which we live. Social reality is subjective, it is constructed and interpreted by people rather than something that exists objectively. In order for the researcher to probe the intricate nature of the social world and gain an understanding of the social phenomena qualitative research methods were applied that collected descriptive information in the form of words and text, rather than numerical data.

There are numerous issues to take into consideration when undertaking research from this philosophical position. It is important to acknowledge that because those being researched are human beings, rather than material objects, they have the capacity to change their behaviour when they are aware they are the focus of a study. Researchers are also part of the world they are investigating, this means the research will always be influenced by the values and expectations of those undertaking the study, and therefore it is not possible for explanations of the social world to be objective. For these reasons, social researchers need
to acknowledge their research will not be objective and appreciate there are alternative versions of reality and the truth (Denscombe, 2010).

The aim of this study was to critically analyse community safety initiatives as an approach to crime prevention in lower-income Nairobi, Kenya. This research was conducted over a period of four years between 2013 and 2017 and had the following objectives:

- To critically examine criminality and its impact upon the community of Kibera.
- Critically evaluate formal social control within the community of Kibera.
- Critically explore informal responses to crime and criminality by the community of Kibera.

Crime, social control and community safety are aspects of social life. Qualitative methodology has been used extensively to study crime and deviance and is recognised to be appropriate for this field (Brookman et al., 1999). For some crimes such as fraud, Pithouse (1999) would argue that it is the only methodology that is suited to understand the subtle world of social identity, meaning and interaction upon which the crime is constructed. To understand the lived realities of crime, deviance and social control Cromwell (2010) states you need to get out there and talk to the people who really know about it. A qualitative, multi-method approach was adopted for this study to ensure rich and diverse data was collated. Different perspectives were considered through using both a macro and micro approach to the methodology, which also acted as a triangulation and cross checking device.

3.3 Research approach

Community members experience crime and security issues from an individualist perspective in everyday situations at the local level. It is apparent there is an absence of law enforcement from the state in Kenya (Mberu, 2014; Bevan, 2009) and in situations where protection from the police is unreliable, communities and individuals develop their own coping mechanisms. This can be in the form of living within gated communities for the more affluent or for poorer communities establishing community based safety initiatives or the formation of vigilante groups. In some situations there may also be citizen led
methods for dealing with perpetrators of crime, such as collective violence, rather than relying on the security forces. This study aimed to capture coping mechanisms at the local level hence the requirement for this study to be conducted using the micro theory. Lemanski (2012) recognises there is a gap between the global security agenda and the situation for citizens at the local level and argues that the focus on policy and solutions is linked to reliance on large institutional strategies rather than community based local level security responses. Therefore whilst it is acknowledged the macro theory is important there is often a lack of focus on the local level in terms of everyday and individualised insecurity experiences and strategies. Analysis of the micro-environment is important when studying individuals and everyday life. Although, Purcell (2006) makes a cautionary argument not to get into the ‘local trap’ and overstate ‘the local’ whilst ignoring the wider contributing factors. Hence this study considered both micro and macro theory in order to capture the lived experiences from the community and individual perspective, whilst taking into account the broader threats to community safety.

**Macro theory**

The methodologies used for the micro theory established a clear perspective of the community members ‘place in the world,’ but did not necessarily provide a full explanation of how their safety is affected by external factors such as politics, socio-economic environment, government structures and policing. It was important to understand how the micro situation was influenced by the macro.

Therefore, for this study, it was also imperative to consider the macro approach, so that the social systems and structures that influenced the participant’s situation could be analysed. This was established through interviews with key informants, who provided various ‘outside’ perspectives.

As Sayer (1999) points out, when the two approaches of macro and micro theory are utilised in research they can be synthesised and multiple points of discussion can be incorporated. Brown and Dyson (2005) recognise the need to consider people’s actions as a consequence of wider influences and constraints. However, they also identify the importance of investigating the intentions and actions of people at an individual level in
order to understand what is going on in terms of personal interaction and the intentionality of people.

Micro theory
A micro theory approach was used to thoroughly understand the situation of the participants involved in the study. In order to adopt this approach qualitative research was appropriate because the data collection involved personal and sensitive information. Graham (1997) believes a study of people must involve recognition of humans as emotive beings and not numbers or statistics.

Through understanding the intricacies of the participants lives, the researcher was able to understand their perception of safety from their point of view, including the number and type of incidents they are affected by. According to Holloway and Hubbard (2001), the inclusion of human experience allows a richer picture of knowledge to be attained. Focus group discussions and in-depth interviews were adopted to accomplish this. Through these methods the participants were given the scope to provide expression of feeling as well as thought, which other approaches, such as quantitative, would have failed to achieve. Tuan (1977) believes that the ability to know how others see and think has the capacity to encompass a greater depth of knowledge. Ascertaining the views of community members from different villages, different sexes and age perspectives allowed a range of realities to be represented.

The methods used to gather data for the micro approach were focus groups for the community viewpoint, in-depth interviews for the individual perspective and the diary method to understand the criminality situation at the village level. As previously discussed crime is not necessarily reflected through official statistics reported by the police throughout the world but especially in a country like Kenya. The diaries were also utilised to improve the researcher’s understanding of crime incidents in the researched area and how it affected community members.
Understanding the crime situation

It is recognised that crime statistics do not necessarily explain the causes and consequences of crime and therefore they do not automatically assist with informing appropriate prevention strategies (Gilgen and Tracey, 2011). However, crime statistics can support crime prevention interventions linked to situational crime prevention, for example alley-gates. In England and Wales the CSEW is considered to be the best indicator of crime because it takes into account crimes that are not reported to the police. This information can then be used to inform the design of crime prevention programme as it identifies individuals and groups most at risk from specific crimes (Audit Commission, 2006). Although, as acknowledged in the previous chapter there are still problems and flaws with the CSEW (FitzGerald, 2014).

As discussed earlier, Kenyan crime statistics are unlikely to illustrate a clear picture of crime. This highlights the importance of triangulating crime statistics gathered by the police with information from a community perspective, in an attempt to validate data. It was apparent that the prevalence and type of crime affecting a community in Kenya is more accurately ascertained through gathering information from community members on their perception of crime and actual crimes they have experienced, through using qualitative methods (International Alert, 2016).

Elements of the approach used for the CSEW were therefore applied to this research. During focus groups and in-depth interviews participants were asked to refer back to crimes that have occurred recently within their community and were also asked about their perception of safety within their community. When discussing an individual’s perceptions of safety caution was taken to acknowledge that perceptions of security will shift depending on the current circumstances. The Institute for Security Studies’ (ISS) conducted research on the integrity of the 2013 general elections in Kenya and found that Kenyans perceptions were easily influenced from secondary sources such as the media, friends, family and politicians, but their perceptions were not necessarily the reality of the situation (Schulz-Herzenberg et al, 2015).
In order to understand the crime situation that was occurring in Kibera at the time of the research the diary method was used. Considering crime from different perspectives at the community level allowed the researcher to triangulate information gathered from the community, taking into account individual’s sense of safety whilst avoiding ambiguity in the reality of the safety situation.

3.4 Adopting a multi-method approach
Following the literature review the fieldwork commenced in Nairobi. Four methods were adopted to collate the data required for the study; semi-structured key informant interviews, diary method, in-depth interviews and focus groups in addition to these weekly meetings with village elders from Kibera were attended. These methods were employed for this research for complimentary purposes. The different qualitative techniques used for the multi-method approach assisted the researcher with validating information and triangulating data. The phases of the study can be seen in appendix 1.

3.4.1 The sample population
Key informants required for the macro perspective of the study were initially identified through the literature review, institutions, organisations, conferences and lectures; followed by the snowballing technique. Interviewees were asked to refer other people or policing or community safety projects that would be relevant and may be willing to partake in the study, thus leading to a snowballing effect. In order to gain further insight and knowledge on the characteristics of a successful community safety project, advice was sought from experts within the UK and based on their recommendations a number of what Patton (2002) refers to as information-rich, ‘critical cases’ were explored and key informants relevant to the projects were interviewed.

The sample population needed for the micro perspective were selected based on the criteria selection (discussed in detail next). Once the locations had been identified measures were put in place to gain credible access to the community and representatives within it through ‘gatekeepers’. The major advantage of this form of purposeful sampling is that it substantially increases the likelihood of locating the desired individuals in the population, in this study residents from the geographical areas being researched were
targeted.

**Purposeful sampling**

Purposeful sampling can be useful in situations where probability sampling may be undesirable, such as this research. It is recognised that purposive sampling is well suited to the qualitative research process (Flick, 2008).

Patton (1990) describes a number of sampling strategies that serve purposes other than representativeness or randomness. The importance for these type of strategies relies on selecting ‘information-rich’ cases from which you can specifically learn about issues that are important to the study. In nonprobability sampling, there is no expectation that each unit has an equal chance of being included in the sample. As purposeful sampling examines selected cases in greater depth the sample size is usually smaller than probability samples. Since the sample does not intend to represent the population, as the focus is on the specific rather than the general, findings should not be generalised for the whole population.

This study took place in four purposively selected communities. The study areas were identified through the literature review and interviews with key informants. OECD (2011) believe the poor suffer disproportionately from crime and fear. Therefore the criteria for selection of the communities was where there was a perceived high rate of crime and low income earning, which was determined using the average annual income in Kenya from the Human Development Index (HDI). In addition to adding to academic knowledge it is hoped this research will provide those researched, the ‘insiders’ with a stronger voice (David and Sutton, 2011).

**Insider and outsider perspectives**

The status of a researcher is often referred to as either an ‘insider’ or an ‘outsider’ in relation to the phenomenon being studied or the participants who are taking part in the research. It is often assumed an ‘insider’ has easier access and is better placed to ask more pertinent questions and interpret nonverbal communications, which subsequently results in a more authentic account and understanding of the phenomenon. Whilst this may be the case in some research situations, it is acknowledged that these ‘insider’ advantages
could also have negative implications. ‘Insiders’ have been accused of being biased or too close to the research phenomenon. Whereas an ‘outsider’ who is less familiar with the context is likely to be more curious and therefore willing to (knowingly or unknowingly) raise taboo subjects, such as child abuse in the case of this research. An ‘outsider’ could also be perceived by research participants to be more impartial than an ‘insider’ in terms of sub-groups or in the Kenyan context not affiliated with a particular tribe.

Some scholars would suggest the positions of ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ are too simplistic and are of the opinion there is fluidity between the two positions. Brown (1996) discusses four types of research investigators for ‘policing’, Inside Insiders, Outside Insiders, Inside Outsiders and Outside Outsiders. Referring to Inside Insiders as police officers or police civilians undertaking research within their own force, Outside Insiders who would have intimate inside knowledge but operate outside of the police, Inside Outsiders are research professionals working within a police organisation and Outside Outsiders who are professional academics conducting research on the police on behalf of an organisation external to the police. Innes (2010) differentiates research relating to policing as, research by the police (‘insider’), research on the police (‘outsider’), research for the police (cross over between an ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’) and research with the police (a collaboration between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’). In order for an ‘outsider’ to conduct their research and access the group or community they would like to study, they may require assistance from what is known as a ‘gatekeeper’.

Access and gatekeepers

Often researchers have to negotiate access by securing permission from ‘gatekeepers’, in certain situations without the permission of a gatekeeper it is unlikely that access will be permitted. Jupp (2006) cautions that there may be a need for the gatekeeper to be convinced of the research in order to allow the researcher access and the study to take place. Therefore understanding the gatekeepers’ frame of reference is critical for negotiating and maintaining access, plus ensuing the credibility of the research (Devers and Frankel, 2000).
When conducting research in a formal setting or organisation identifying a suitable person to be a gatekeeper can be reasonably straightforward. However, identifying an appropriate individual in an informal setting can be more challenging. Jupp (2006) suggests a key characteristic of a gatekeeper is their position within the group or community and their control or influence over other potential research participants. In informal settings such as this study, deferring to the local authority or administration to gain access may appear to be the most convenient and appropriate choice or in some situations the only option. However, it is worth acknowledging that these individuals are usually in a position of power and may have an ulterior motive in their interest in the research and could potentially influence the study from the access they permit or facilitate. As Devers and Frankel (2000) point out in certain circumstances a researcher may need to consider distancing themselves from the gatekeeper when conducting the data collection.

For this study key contacts were introduced to the researcher from different lower-income areas of Nairobi, including the informal settlements of Kawangware and Kibera. During the relationship building phase of the research meetings took place with various contacts within their own community, as this was the most convenient for them. It became apparent during this initial stage of the research that arranging meetings was more successful when organised via telephone calls rather than via email, even though most individuals had email on their phones. One of the challenges encountered during the data collection related to access, this is discussed next.

**Challenges relating to access**

Contacts had been established in Kawangare through the researcher assisting the East Africa Cricket and Character Foundation (EACF) with their baseline survey in January and February 2015. In early 2015 a teacher from a primary school within the informal settlement introduced the researcher to a group of women from an area of Kawangware called Kabiro who had expressed an interest in taking part in the research. It became apparent during the initial meetings that the women found the topic of community safety very sensitive and were uncomfortable discussing the subject unless a member of the local authority was present. It was evident that the women were concerned about upsetting the local administration and believed meeting in groups of six or more people for focus group
discussions would require a permit from the village chief. It was possible the women were misinterpreting the new Security Bill (2014) or this was a lasting affect from the Moi era, where a license from the chief had to be obtained for more than six people to have a meeting. Other research discussing a similar topic in Kenya have incurred similar challenges (CHRIPS and APCOF, 2014). The women from Kabrio stipulated they were only willing to be part of the research if a member of the local administration could be present, the discussions took place in a ‘formal centre’ that would need to be hired and they were paid for attending.

This highlighted three significant issues, the researcher needed to be aware the topic of community safety might be considered sensitive to some, it could not be assumed that all residents of lower-income areas would be comfortable discussing the subject without the local administration being present and there was a need to navigate around the remuneration expectation from participants. It was clearly apparent the researcher was considered a complete ‘outsider’ by the community members in Kabiro as they felt the need to make discussions formal and involve the administration.

The researcher decided not to pursue the study any further with the ladies from Kabiro as it was considered the data would be skewed by the expectation of remunerations and the political interference and bias from the direct involvement of representatives from the local authority. It was evident the women had an element of fear towards the administration, therefore there was also concern the women would not be open and honest during discussions in the presence of the administration. Interestingly, political interference was noted by a key informant to be the reason a community policing project on the outskirts of Nairobi failed (Respondent CS3, 2015).

Case study location: Kibera

Key contacts within the informal settlement of Kibera, where the research took place, were predominantly gained through a personal friend of the researcher who had worked in Kibera for an international Non-Government Organisation (NGO) for over ten years. Some of these contacts became gatekeepers for the researcher, others were identified through the snow-balling effect, contacts of contacts or meeting individuals at conferences or
lectures that took place in Nairobi.

Different gatekeepers were used to access the different wards of Kibera and different target groups within the population. One of the gatekeepers had founded an organisation to assist elderly people in Kibera called the Lavie Foundation based in Kianda village, Sarang’ombe. The Lavie Foundation enabled the researcher access to elders from all villages within Kibera. The foundation’s weekly Thursday morning meetings were attended throughout the period of the field work. In order to facilitate access to younger people the founder of the Lavie Foundation introduced the researcher to a young lady who resided in Kianda village who had connections with the youth within Sarang’ombe ward.

A gatekeeper for Lani Saba ward resided in Mashimoni village and was introduced to the researcher at a conference at the British Institute in East Africa by a fellow researcher. This gatekeeper established and managed a women’s organisation in Kibera and was a well-respected member of the community.

Gate keepers were carefully selected and were all residents of the wards that were being studied. The researcher felt it was important to use residents from the specific wards as they were known in the community and others in the area could see who the researcher as an ‘outsider’ was connected with. This meant individuals were more willing to be open to talk to the researcher, plus the gatekeepers could easily facilitate meetings through their contacts. It is believed using a Kenyan who was not a resident of Kibera as a ‘gatekeeper’ would not have been as effective because they would have also been considered an ‘outsider’ and raised suspicion amongst residents. One of the females from the focus groups stated “the only reason I am talking to you is because [the gate keeper] has asked me to”. Prior to beginning the data collection the researcher was introduced to the sub-chief of the area, during the meeting he acknowledged the gate keeper was “a good person who does a lot of good for the community”, acknowledging his acceptance and approval of the gatekeeper.

Having trusted and respected gatekeepers and contacts was crucial to this research and was highly significant to the researcher’s access to certain groups and individuals. In July
2015 an organisation supporting rape victims invited the researcher to attend a private and confidential meeting with individuals from Kibera who had been raped or gang raped by police officers during the post-election violence. This included both females and males. Being invited to attend this meeting placed the researcher in an exceptional position of identifying and accessing this group of individuals. The meeting location also provided a trusted setting, whereby interviewees were comfortable to discuss the matter because the gathering had been organised by Grace Agenda. Attendees trusted the organisation because there was a mutual understanding between the attendees and the founder of Grace Agenda whose objective for establishing the organisation was to create a support forum for rape victims from the post-election violence, having herself endured a traumatic experience under these circumstances.

In Kenya there is enormous stigma towards males who are raped, as one victim stated “people assume you will have been turned [become gay]”. Homosexuality is illegal in Kenya and there is a huge amount of homophobia, as condemned by President Obama during his visit to Kenya in July 2015 (Lee and Vogt, 2015). The issue of being raped (or gang raped) by the police is highly sensitive but for males, the matter is a complete taboo subject. The men who were part of the meeting, spoke of how they chose not to seek medical attention at the hospital after they had been raped, instead they preferred to receive basic first aid from their neighbours to minimise any additional attention and further humiliation. On this occasion it was favourable for the researcher to be an ‘outsider’ to gain access to these individuals because they are unlikely to have been comfortable discussing the incident with a researcher who was considered to be an ‘insider’ due to a lack of trust in ‘insiders’ breaking confidentiality or anonymity, particularly with the risk of information being disclosed to the police, which could have severe consequences. It is believed the researcher’s positionality assisted the relationship with rape victims. Through being ‘western’, female and an ‘outsider’ it may have been assumed the researcher was better informed about rape (and especially male rape) incidents and would therefore be less judgemental towards rape victims, regardless of their sex. Discussing sensitive topics is covered in more detail next.
Sex, gender and age considerations

The impact of crime and violence has different implications in regards to sex and age. Globally young males are the most common perpetrators and victims of armed attacks (OECD, 2009). A study that looked at homicides by age and sex of perpetrator comparing England and Wales with Chicago found that most homicides are committed by young men aged between 15 and 35 years (Cronin, 1991 cited in Wilkinson and Picket, 2010). Although, females also suffer as direct victims and are more at risk of sexual or gender-based violence. Females, particularly in an African context are more likely to become carers of victims and can often find themselves in a position where they are the sole provider for the family (OECD, 2009).

Males and females can be exposed to different crimes and given the sensitive nature of some offences like sexual assaults, people may be more willing to discuss these crimes (if at all) amongst the same sex and a similar age group. Men and women may be more vulnerable to become victims of crimes at different times and places, for example females may be prone to be attacked while walking home late at night, whereas men may be at risk of being assaulted in bars.

Chan and Rigakos (2002) argue that women’s fear of crime is derived from engaging in their daily routine practices that place them in situations where they are exposed to risks such as harassment, intimidation and/or assault. Women negotiate the risk of personal harm in the context of knowing that their assailant will most probably be male, while men generally do not consider women in the same regard. Whilst gender is not the sole pre condition of risk taking Chan and Rigakos (2002) recognise it to be part of the formulations for calculating risk along with race and class politics.

Gender roles and responsibilities will result in males and females moving and frequenting different locations and therefore be exposed to different spaces, people and criminal activities. This is the same for different age groups, for example it would be unusual for a teenager to associate themselves with the same social groups as adults or elderly people. Youths may also be cautious about the information they share in front of adults. In order to capture these varied experiences, as recommended by Morgan (1997) different focus
groups were conducted for men, women, young men and young women and the researcher ensured there was a gender and age balance amongst the residents who took part in the diary method and in-depth interviews. Participants were more likely to share their experiences amongst their peers, plus they also need to be provided with the opportunity to talk as opposed to discussions being dominated by influential community members or elders.

In Kenya there are several definitions for ‘youth’ which are dependent on the context and purpose in which they are used. The various definitions use different age groups within the age range of 15 to 35 years. The United Nations define youth in Kenya as being ‘individuals between the ages of 15 and 24 years’ (UNDP, 2013). For this research those considered to be representatives of the younger adult population were all aged in their 20s and under Kenyan law are considered adults, therefore consent was not required or sought from their parents, only the participants. Children were not included in the sample for this study.

3.5 Method overview
This section will discuss methods used for the macro and micro approach, and the various policing and community safety initiatives identified throughout the research.

3.5.1 Macro approach: key informant interviews
Semi-structured interviews were used to gain information and data from key informants on the Kenyan police, security, community policing, crime, victims, perpetrators, protection issues and community safety. A total of fifty key informant interviews were conducted throughout the duration of this study, a breakdown of the interviews per theme can be found in table 1 overleaf. The interviews usually took place at their place of work, face to face and each lasted approximately one hour. During discussions the participants were asked to refer to their organisations point of view as opposed to their own personal opinions.
### Table 1: Categories of key informant interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Number of key informant respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policing &amp; security</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection issues &amp; victims of crime</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community safety</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>50</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Information from key informants on the topics of the Kenyan police, the police reform process, community policing, crime and security occurred through interviewing representatives from the British High Commission (BHC) in Kenya, Department for International Development (DFID), relevant agencies from the United Nations (UN), Kenyan police officers who are actively engaged in community policing, police officers responsible for policing both of the research sites in Kibera, local administration representatives in Kibera, Kenyan and international journalists, members of the national Community Policing Task Force and representatives from Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA), The Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies (CHRIPS), Kenyan National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR), Kenyan Defence Force (KDF), security officers and community activists.

Data was predominantly gathered on protection issues, perpetrators and victims of crime from key informants through representatives from medical facilities within Kibera, school teachers and relevant organisations, both international and local, such as International Justice Mission (IJM), Awareness Against Human Trafficking (HAART), Grace Agenda, MapKibera, Kibera Women’s Peace Forum (KWPF) and various other women’s groups in Kibera.

Key informants that provided information relating to community safety included Kenyan academics, government experts, representatives from United Nations Human Settlements Programme’s (UNHABITAT) Safer Cities Programme and representatives from various policing and community safety projects both in Kenya and the UK. The researcher also attended open days and visited policing and community safety projects in Kenya and the UK. Experts in the UK were consulted in order to identify ‘critical cases’ that were ‘information rich’ (Patton, 2002) in order to gain insight and knowledge on the
characteristics of what were considered to be successful policing and community safety projects.

Semi-structured interviews offered the researcher a degree of flexibility, the style of the interview could be adapted depending on the key informant in order to extract the appropriate information and react to responses provided. This provided the interviewer with a degree of control to steer the interview (Nachmia and Nachmia, 1996). Corbin and Morse (2003) suggest that whilst semi-structured interviews allow the researcher to determine the structure of the interview and agenda, the participant will control the amount of information provided in responses. It is important for the researcher to be aware of this because the participants could chose to withhold important information if the relevant questions are not asked in the appropriate way or the respondent could divert the interview if they have an ulterior motive.

Ramos (1989) refers to semi-structured interviews as interactions where researchers and interviewees come together to create a context of ‘conversational intimacy’ in which participants feel comfortable ‘telling their story’. Interviews also allow for the opportunity for clarification to be sought immediately because of their interpersonal nature. Liebling (2001) stresses the importance of having empathy during the interview process and having the capacity to feel, relate and become ‘involved’.

There are however, disadvantages to conducting interviews as they have cost and time implications. These include travel expenses and the time involved to travel to locations and conduct interviews, which other methods like postal questionnaires do not require. Postal questionnaires were not an option for this research due to the unreliability of the postal system in Kenya but more importantly they were considered inappropriate method due to the respondents needing to trust the researcher to share sensitive information.

Interviews allow the opportunity for richer data to be obtained and respondent rates are generally higher than other methods such as questionnaires. The higher respondent rates are likely due to the interviewer having the opportunity to have empathy with the research participant and have what Ramos (1989) calls ‘conversational intimacy’.
The researcher had concerns about using a digital device to record interviews and focus groups. Taking into account some participants concerns over security and the sensitivities surrounding the topics, it was decided tape recorders could have been counter-productive because participants may not have felt comfortable speaking candidly knowing they were being recorded. For these reasons it was decided that recording interviews in a notebook outweighed the disadvantages, which were potentially missing information, or the researcher having to prioritise what information she considered to be important at the time because the interview was not being recorded verbatim (McIntyre, 2005). As Gravelle (2014) points out in some circumstances paper notes can be the most appropriate way to capture data, although he recognises that writing long extracts can be off putting for the respondent and disrupt the flow of the interview. Although, this disruption can be minimised through using short hand or short notes and using abbreviations. At times the researcher found that a pause to make short notes, at an appropriate time, assisted both the interviewer and interviewee gather their thoughts and for the interviewer on occasions provoked new lines of inquiry. Interview notes were always transcribed by the researcher within 24 hours of the interview to minimise the potential for information being lost.

3.5.2 Micro approach: research at the individual and community level

Meetings took place with all gate keepers prior to any interaction with the participants from the communities being researched. The study’s aim and objectives were discussed and gate keepers were provided with ‘study information sheets’ and an example of a consent form, these can be found in appendix 4. The criteria for participants that were required for the different methods and the selection process was explained and agreed with the gatekeeper along with the time commitments expected from participants, the meeting location, confidentiality and anonymity.

The methods used to gather data at the community level were focus group discussions and at the individual level, in-depth interviews and the diary method was used. An overview of the locations where the micro research methods were implemented in Kibera are displayed within table 2 below.
Table 2: Locations where the micro research methods were implemented

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research method</th>
<th>Focus groups</th>
<th>Diary method</th>
<th>Interviews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lani Saba Ward</strong></td>
<td>A total of four: men, women, young men and young women</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>8 key informant interviews took place with residents from Lani Saba Ward (3 male and 5 female). A list of all key informant interviews can be found in appendix 2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Community level)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashimoni village</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 participants (one male and one female)</td>
<td>2 in-depth interviews (one male and one female)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soweto East village</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 female</td>
<td>1 in-depth interview (female)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lani Saba village</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 male</td>
<td>1 in-depth interview (male)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sarang’ombe Ward</strong></td>
<td>A total of four: men, women, young men and young women</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>6 key informant interviews took place with residents from Sarang’ombe (4 male and 2 female). A list of all key informant interviews can be found in appendix 2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Community level)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olympic village</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 male</td>
<td>1 in-depth interview (male)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soweto West village</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 female</td>
<td>1 in-depth interview (female)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayani village</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 male</td>
<td>1 in-depth interview (male)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kianda village</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 female</td>
<td>1 in-depth interview (female)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Diary method**

As recognised by Ruteere et al (2013), beyond official crime statistics, which are inaccurate and unreliable, there is minimal data on crimes that are being committed in Nairobi’s lower-income neighbourhoods. Therefore in order to understand the crime situation occurring in Kibera at the time of the research, a trusted resident from each village within Sarang’ombe and Lani Saba ward were provided with a notebook and asked to keep a diary to record known crimes within their village over a period of a week. Participants were informed not to follow up on any incidents, or put themselves in any potential danger; they were asked to only record crimes they heard about or witnessed within their village.

Two males and two females from each ward took part, resulting in a total of eight diaries being completed. The participants who completed the diaries were carefully selected in collaboration with the relevant gatekeeper, taking into account a gender balance, being literate, having the ability to write in English and individuals considered to be reliable to record information correctly. Each participant was provided with a notebook and asked to record the crimes they were aware of that occurred within their village over the period of
one week. For each entry, participants were asked to include information on the type(s) of crime, time and day of the week the crime occurred and the characteristics of victims and perpetrators involved in each incident, if known. The researcher re-visited each of the participants after the data collection period to retrieve the notebook and discuss the entries made, then the researcher used deductive framework analysis to analyse the information recorded. The information collected by each of the residents who took part in the diary methodology is displayed within the framework used for the analysis in Appendix 7.

The diary method allowed a ‘raw account’ of incidents that were taking place within the village to be recorded by an ‘insider’ who had access to neighbours and information that would not have been as accessible to the researcher if they had been present to collect the data, being an ‘outsider’. This also applied to gaining access to the information recorded in the police occurrence books, police officers were willing to share this information with local residents but were reluctant to provide this information directly to the researcher. Therefore the researcher had to rely on residents to assist with obtaining information from the police occurrence books.

Gray et al. (2011) believe an advantage of using a diary method reduces the potential for recall errors when you compare it to an individual being interviewed a period of time after events occur. For this reason they believe the diary method increases the validity and reliability of the data. Some participants also shared photographic images with the researcher to support the information they provided through the diary method.

It is recognised the incidents recorded in the dairies would not be accurate due to the reliability upon a third party to be objective, plus the residents were not present in their village for the whole time during the reporting period, some were only present during the night time as they worked elsewhere during the day. Therefore all incidents that actually occurred are unlikely to have been recorded in the diary.

From a UK perspective Gray et al. (2011) query whether the diary method of recording crime incidents is appropriate in the situation where there is a significant time lapse
between incidents. They suggest the vast majority of people (in the UK) do not experience crime on a frequent enough basis to warrant the use of diary method. This however is not the case in Kibera where crime is a daily occurrence, over the period of one week in the village of Soweto East over 20 robbery victims (mainly of armed robbery) and three attempted rapes were recorded. In this context the diary method proved to be highly useful to capture the data. The information recorded within the diaries acted as a catalyst during the follow up interviews and facilitated rich discussions.

It is acknowledged there are challenges associated with this method. However, the information recorded in the diaries was discussed at length with the participant who recorded the incidents during a one-to-one in-depth interview and the incidents recorded were triangulated with incidents recorded in the police’s occurrence books, interviews with officers, information received during the weekly Kibera update meetings, media reports and information gathered from residents participating in the focus groups. This provided an informed understanding of what crime was occurring in Kibera at the time of the study.

**In-depth interviews**

The diary method was complimented by conducting in-depth interviews with the residents who completed the diaries. This included a representative from each village, two males and two female residents from each ward. The in-depth interviews allowed the researcher to understand the crime situation in each of the villages, explore each individual’s experiences and identify individual coping mechanisms and any community responses to crime.

The methodology adopted in qualitative research generally use less structured interviews, whereas positivists favour structured interviews because they are standardised, respondents are exposed to the same questions and stimulus, and the data can be quantified. Interpretive researchers tend to be sceptical of structured interviews for the same reasons for which they are critical of questionnaires. It is argued that closed questions or pre-coded answers devalue the experience of the respondent because it is assumed the respondent has had one of the specified experiences, and if not the
respondent may perceive this to mean there is not an interest in them because the researcher has already defined what they feel is important. It could be claimed in this situation that the researcher is imposing their view of the world on the respondent, rather than exploring the social reality of the interviewee (Mcneil and Chapman, 2005).

There is no guarantee that what people say in interviews is a true account of what they actually do. People are quite capable of saying one thing and doing another. Interviews do not allow the researcher to directly observe people in their everyday environments. However, this type of interview allows the researcher the flexibility to explore responses and follow up on questions to verify information. Qualitative interviews usually have a smaller sample, which means that more time can be spent with respondents and therefore more in-depth knowledge can be sought. It could be argued that this would increase the validity of the research findings because the respondent may feel more comfortable with the interview situation and be more willing to get at sensitive information. Mcneil and Chapman (2005) suggest the use of verbatim quotations and descriptions can support the validity of the research.

In-depth interviews can uncover the details of the interviewee's experience that would be undisclosed in other methods, such as a questionnaire. In Darlington's (1996) study of women who had been sexually abused she found that a lack of constraints on the order in which topics were covered or the duration they talked about a subject led to some participants volunteering that other forms of abuse such as verbal abuse and childhood putdowns had had more impact on them than the sexual abuse. Darlington's (1996) study demonstrated that in-depth interviews can delve into areas unanticipated at the outset. Some scholars, however warn that this has the potential for the researcher to focus more on the most sensational element of a study.

All interviews involve interaction and this inevitably means that those who take part in them are attaching meanings or interpretations to what they see going on in them. It is important that the interviewer’s values, attitudes and opinions do not influence the respondent’s answers. The interviewee may be able to tell the interviewer’s opinion from the way the question is asked, their facial expression or tone in their voice. This may result
in the interviewer ‘leading’ the respondent to a response that reflects the researcher’s attitudes and expectations. The interviewer may stereotype the interviewee or label the interviewee as a certain ‘type’ based on their age, social class, personality, demeanour, environment and assume a particular ‘type’ of person will think and behave in a certain manner. The status of the interviewer could be interpreted as threatening by the respondent, in light of this interviewers have been known to go to great lengths to try and reduce status differences by sharing information about their own lives and why they have an interest in the subject (Thompson, 1995).

This study took place with participants from lower income backgrounds who reside in areas where residents often rely upon non-state protection or vigilante groups who may not operate legally, or they may develop individual coping mechanisms that are illegal. When the methods were developed for this research consideration had to be given to these issues and therefore the methodology had to take into account appropriate methods where participants would feel comfortable to disclose this type of information and a trusting relationship could be developed between the researcher and the researched. In this context a method that did not have face to face contact, personal interactions and a degree of flexibility would have been inappropriate.

The in-depth interviews took place after the researcher and interviewee had met a few times to ensure a level of trust had been established between the researcher and responder prior to the interview. The interviews took place on a one-to-one basis, to allow sensitive information to be shared and discussed. The duration of the in-depth interviews was approximately one hour and took place in private, usually at the respondent’s place of business or the office or compound of the affiliated organisation.

Prior to data collection an interview guide was developed from the research framework (see appendix 5) which had been designed from the literature review that outlined the main topics the researcher wanted to cover, but it was appreciated these were flexible regarding the phrasing of the questions and the order in which they were asked. The in-depth interviews covered similar topics that were discussed in the group discussions but focused on the specific village the respondent resided. The interviews covered all of the
category of questions Patton (1990) suggests should be included in a qualitative interview; demographic data, experience such as their interactions and relationship with the police, opinions on how crime prevention could be improved, feelings related to being (or becoming) a victim of crime, knowledge about their neighbourhood and community safety initiatives like Nyumbi kumi, and sensory questions relating to witnessing offences or hearing about crimes that have been committed in their neighbourhood. These interviews were also used as an opportunity to talk through the crimes recorded in the diaries and enabled the incidents to be clarified and expanded upon. Another method of collecting good qualitative data is focus groups.

Focus groups
Marketing research has been using the methodology of focus groups for a long time but only within the last couple of decades have they gained popularity as a research method within the health and the social science fields. In basic terms, focus groups could be described as informal discussion amongst a group of selected individuals about a particular topic.

Focus groups allow the researcher to gain access to diverse understandings and capture the knowledge and attitudes of individuals which is often difficult to access by more orthodox methods, such as surveys and questionnaires (Liamputtong, 2011). They are particularly suitable for exploring issues where complex patterns of behaviour and motivations are evident and enables researchers to explore ‘the gap between what people say and what they do’ (Conradson, 2005 p. 131). They are often adopted for eliciting community viewpoints and understanding community dynamics. They provide a more rapid and fruitful way for working with communities rather than other methods such as in-depth interviewing or ethnographic methods (Lloyd-Evans, 2006). For these reasons focus groups were selected as an appropriate method to gather information from the community’s perspective.

Past research has confirmed that focus groups are beneficial to a researcher who wishes to explore sensitive topics, in a non-personal or threatening manner. As Preston-Whyte (2003) states, focus groups enable participants to define the situation in their own
terms, whilst highlighting important points relating to perceptions, beliefs and attitudes. Focus groups are a unique and effective modality for capturing in-depth data about a topic of interest determined by the researcher (Morgan, 1997). Brink’s (2001) research demonstrated that group discussions can provoke information from various aspects of individual’s lives.

As recognised by Madriz (2003) they are useful for studying socially marginalised groups, understanding community dynamics and eliciting feedback on sensitive issues. During this research this was evident from the information gathered on a vigilante group and their mutually beneficial relationship with the local administration, which is unlikely to have been mentioned or explored through other methods. As discussed earlier, due to the sensitivity of the subject and to retain participant’s trust, the researcher made the decision not to tape record the discussions.

Most disadvantages raised about focus groups are in relation to group dynamics, suggesting discussions can be dominated by individuals or ideas within the group and group dynamics can influence the attitudes of individuals participating (Vander Laenen, 2015). Attempts to minimise this were made through the composition of the groups having similar characteristics. Whilst it is important for the facilitator to be aware of the group dynamics, and the various personalities within the group Cyr (2016) points out that the actual group and the interactions can be utilised to generate different types of data.

Focus groups have been criticised by some academics for only offering a shallow understanding of an issue compared to that obtained from one to one interviews (Krueger and Casey, 2009). It has been suggested that personal information and experiences may not be shared during group discussions, especially when the topic is considered too personal and sensitive (Liamputtong, 2011) but as Madriz (2003) recognises group discussions can actually facilitate access to individuals who may not be comfortable having one to one interactions about sensitive topics, it has also been identified that discussing traumatic experiences as part of a study, in the right context, with the appropriate individuals, with guaranteed confidentiality can have therapeutic effects (Corbin and Morse, 2003).
Cobb (2011) believes the quality of the data captured from the participants will be dependent on how knowledgeable they are on the subject. Rothwell et al. (2016) propose knowledge and accuracy of information can be improved through providing participants with information or education, such as a presentation on the discussion topic, prior to the focus groups commencing. Although it could be suggested that through aiding participants to be ‘better informed’ you are creating bias to the discussion (Rothwell et al., 2016). The researcher did not feel it was necessary or applicable to ‘better inform’ participants of this study given that the data being gathered was about the participant’s ‘lived experience’ and the information they were expected to contribute was based on their experiences and views.

Some researchers find the lack of control over the direction of the interaction a challenge (Bristol and Fern, 2003) whilst other researchers would argue the flexibility that allows the interactions to take place adds depth to the information obtained, and stimulates ideas amongst the participants. Through a group of individuals discussing a set of questions centred on a particular topic or set of topics, conversations can be generated that uncover individual opinions regarding a particular issue. This enabled the researcher to collect multiple individual reactions simultaneously (Carey and Smith, 1994). Accessing a group of research participants at one time could therefore be considered a cheap and efficient method of gathering data (Bryman, 2008).

It has been suggested that group discussions balance the presence of the researcher and the power dynamics between the researcher and the researched. However, there is always the issue of reflexivity. As a social researcher, the researcher is part of the social world they are studying and have their own way of interpreting the world (Denscombe, 2010). Haynes (2012) highlights the importance of researchers reflecting critically on their role in the research process and identify where their interpretation of events and data differs from that of their participants. Reflecting back to the focus groups, the topic of what was considered to be the ‘worst’ crime was covered. The males spoke of violent robberies and murder, the responses from female participants were similar but they also included rape of women. Prior to the group discussions the researcher had conducted the literature review, a number of key informant interviews, collected and analysed the incident data
from the diary method on incidents occurring in Kibera and conducted in-depth interviews with experts on the topic from Kenya. It was clearly evident from this data that there were exceptionally high rates of child rape in Kibera but this wasn’t raised as an ‘issue’ or mentioned by participants as one of the ‘worst’ crimes until the researcher specifically asked probing questions on the topic.

It is recognised that the positionality of the researcher, being British, female, who has had different life experiences and different culture references, would have significantly influenced her position on the issue and openness to discuss the topic, especially as she was not part of the community where these incidents are alleged to have occurred. As Madriz (2003) states focus groups ‘create data from multiple voices’ and even through this issue was initially avoided by participants and raised for discussion by the researcher, the participants were open to discussing the subject and the responses provided were their opinions and point of view. Going back to Conradson’s (2005) point, in this research the focus groups assisted with exploring the gap between what people say (or don’t say in this case) and what actually happens. The issue of child abuse was also mentioned by the researcher as a form of quality management of the information received from other sources. Whilst it is acknowledged the researcher influenced the discussions, it is apparent this issue may have been overlooked if the researcher had not had prior knowledge gained through the other methods. This demonstrates one of the benefits of a mixed method approach and the usefulness of triangulating the information gathered from the various methods.

With guidance from the researcher the ‘gatekeepers’ identified a representative sample from their respective ward, who had shared social and cultural experiences. The criteria for participants and the selection process was discussed, explained and agreed with the ‘gatekeeper’ during meetings that took place prior to any interaction with the community. The researcher ensured participants were taking place in the research voluntarily, as opposed to being coerced or influenced to take part. Prior to all focus groups commencing the research was explained to the group and each participant was provided with the ‘study information sheet’ (for focus groups), which they were given time to read and ask any questions. Following this, consent forms were handed out and participants were asked to
sign them once they had read and agreed to take part in the discussion. Four focus groups took place in each ward, hence a total of eight focus groups were facilitated. As per focus group protocol each group consisted of between five and ten individuals (Krueger and Casey, 2009), a total of 48 participants took part in these discussions.

Morgan (1997) states that men and women are likely to perceive the topic of discussion differently and recommends separate focus groups for men and women. Bearing this in mind consideration was also given to other factors, such as age, leading the researcher to arrange focus groups separately with young men, men, young women and women in each ward. In Lani Saba the group of young men were all aged in their 20s, some were students, others were engaging in ‘business’ and one earnt a living through washing clothes. The group of men were aged in their 30s and 40s and all referred to themselves as ‘business men’ apart from one who was a security guard. The young women who took part in the group discussions were all in their 20s and on the National Youth Scheme, the group of women were aged either in their 40s or 50s and all considered themselves to be ‘business women’.

In Sarang’ombe ward the young men were all in their 20s, a couple were students, a number were unemployed and one worked on waste management. The older group of men and women were part of the Lavie Foundation and aged in their 60s, who stated they earnt a living through ‘business’. The young women were aged between 19 and 25 years, most were not working and lived with their parents but one young lady was a hair dresser and another stated she received money from her boyfriend.

The focus groups generated rich data by exploring the issues of importance to the group and allowed the researcher to understand the local context quickly. The discussions covered the themes of community cohesion, the participants’ opinion of the crime situation within their community, victims and perpetrators, reporting crime, individual and community coping mechanisms, collective efficacy, community safety initiatives/projects and the community’s relationship with the police.
Collective efficacy and informal social control were explored through participants’ perceptions of whether neighbours would intervene when problems arise and incidents occur (Sampson et al., 1997). Their responses are believed to have been informed by communications with fellow neighbours about crime in the community and direct observations on how neighbours have responded to deviant behaviour in the past (Matsueda and Drakulich, 2016).

Democratic policing and procedural justice was also a theme covered during focus groups. This involved discussing the relationship between participants, their community and the police. Through using guiding questions, information was gathered in a non-threatening manner from the resident’s perspective. Information was captured on their opinions about the police, the level of trust in the police and cynicism towards the law (Sunshine and Tyler, 2003). Lots of personal stories involving recent interactions with the police and friend’s experiences were generated and shared. Community policing or community safety initiatives present within the researched areas (their communities) were discussed during focus groups and opinions on their perceived effectiveness were provided by participants.

**Locality and time of research**

The locality of the focus groups always took place in the respective ward and in private, either in the gate keeper’s living area, or at the affiliated organisation’s office or compound. All discussions took place during the day but timings varied depending upon what was convenient for participants. The researcher was mindful not to intrude on family commitments, lectures or ‘business’. All focus groups were facilitated in English and therefore a translator was not required.
3.5.3 Policing and community safety initiatives

Data gathered from both the macro and micro approaches, plus the literature review provided the researcher with a variety of policing and community safety initiatives to analyse and explore their effectiveness at preventing crime. For this analysis policing and community safety projects were differentiated by how they were initiated and the approach in which they were implemented. A project initiated by the state (potentially in collaboration with an external organisation) and implemented from a top down approach was considered to be a policing project, whereas a project initiated by the community from a bottom up approach was considered to be a community safety project, although a community safety project could still be implemented in collaboration with the police.

A total of ten policing and community safety initiatives were included in the study. Eight of the ten projects were implemented in Kenya and the remaining two were from the UK. The two UK community safety initiatives were used as ‘critical cases’ (Patton, 2002) to gain further insight and knowledge on the characteristics required for a project to be successful. The UK projects were recommended to the researcher by an expert, West Midlands Police’s Community Consultation and Engagement Officer as examples of successful projects implemented within the force area. Whilst acknowledging Wisler and Onwudiwe’s (2009) point that importing and applying policing practices from different cultures and history are likely to fail, the review of the two UK projects was not to consider if they could be applied in Kenya but to use the ‘critical cases’ to assist with the analysis and identification of components that contribute towards successful policing and community safety initiatives that prevent crime. The ten projects included in the study are listed in table 3 overleaf, along with a brief explanation about each of the initiatives.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name and description of initiative</th>
<th>Location of implementation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Crisis Response Development Foundation (CRDF)</td>
<td>Various locations in Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CRDF have established six community patrol projects in partnership with the government of Kenya and the community in various locations in Kenya. The concept is based upon the provision of a patrol vehicle and a driver who facilitates the police officers to carry out their policing duties. The project enables the police to respond to incidents reported within their operational policing area, carry out policing patrols and duties in line with democratic policing norms. A further description of the project can be found in 5.5.1.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Usalama Forum</td>
<td>Kisii, Kenya</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Usalama Forum developed a community safety project with the boda boda riders (motorbike taxis) and the local traffic police in Kisii.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Kibera Women’s Peace Forum</td>
<td>Kibera, Nairobi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The group Kibera Women’s Peace Forum (KWPF) consists of women from all tribes living in Kibera. KWPF report violence cases to the administration and support children who have reported sexual abuse.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Community patrol</td>
<td>Kibera, Nairobi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Due to the high rate of robberies occurring in Soweto East, Kibera and the lack of response from the police, the community decided to establish a volunteer group of male residents who patrols at night.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Nairobi Central Business District Association</td>
<td>Business district of Nairobi</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>The Nairobi Central Business District Association (NCBDA) project was established by six businessmen in 1997 because there were concerns amongst the business community with the police’s inability to deal with growing insecurity and the impact crime was having on business activity in the Central Business District (CBD) of Nairobi.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Community policing project (human rights)</td>
<td>Kangemi, Nairobi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kenyan Human Rights Commission (KHRC) established a community policing project in Kangemi informal settlement. The project involved the establishment of neighbourhood watch schemes and community-police liaison committees.</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Nyumi Kumi</td>
<td>Proposed for the whole of Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In an effort to improve security the Kenyan government announced a self-regulating ‘community policing’ initiative called Nyumi Kumi. The initiative is intended to be a ‘simple’ idea of knowing your ten neighbours.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Saferworld’s community policing project</td>
<td>Kibera, Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Saferworld’s community based policing project was implemented in collaboration with PeaceNet. The project aimed to improve relations between the police and the communities, and to enable them to work together to find solutions to community safety concerns.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Balsall Heath Forum</td>
<td>Balsall Heath, UK</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Between the 1960s and 1990s Balsall Heath was known as ‘the largest open-air brothel in the UK’. In the early 1990s residents and representatives from faith and voluntary organisations organised a campaign called ‘Building a Better Balsall Heath’. Together, they changed the image of the area, reduced crime, through forming and representing the local voice to the authorities.</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>KIKIT</td>
<td>Sparkbrook, UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KIKIT was started in Sparkbrook in 2002/2003 by a former drug addict from the area. The project is now considered to be specialists in community-based drug and alcohol support services to Black, Minority, Ethnic (BME) groups.</td>
<td></td>
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</table>
After researching each of the initiatives, they were analysed. The framework analysis used for this part of the study was informed by the literature review and the initial findings from the research. The detailed analysis for each of the separate initiatives can be found in appendix 9.

The criteria used to assess the policing and community safety initiatives were:

- Collective efficacy (Sampson and Raudenbush, 1999).
- A drive from the community for the project (Brown and Kulig, 1996; Atkinson, 2004).
- Subtle informal social control to regulate potential deviant behaviour of law enforcers (Reiner, 2000).

The success of the policing and community safety initiatives was measured by:

- The sustainability of the project.
- A reduction in crime.
- Procedural justice of police officers improved within the project area.
- Evidence of safety being improved, or perceived to have improved by residents.

If a project had achieved the purpose for which it was established or if necessary, the project became self-sufficient, it was considered to be ‘sustainable’. A reduction in crime in the project implementation area (and time period) was used as an indicator of the success of the project and any evidence that safety had improved as a result of the project was taken into consideration. Due to crime rates and statistics being unreliable, inaccurate and unavailable a useful measurement to include in this review was resident’s perception of whether safety had improved or not as a result of the project.
3.6 Ethical issues

Due to the sensitive nature of the topic, many ethical issues arose during the research. Concerns relating to expectations of remuneration, confidentiality, gaining consent and the positionality and the power dynamics between the researcher and the researched had to be considered.

**Informed consent**

The Economic and Social Research Council (2010) state ‘informed consent entails giving sufficient information about the research and ensuring that there is no explicit or implicit coercion so that prospective participants can make an informed and free decision on their possible involvement’. For this study two information-informed consent forms were produced. One was designed for individuals partaking in the focus groups, diary method and in-depth interviews (see appendix 4.1) and a second for key informant interviews (see appendix 4.2). Both information-informed consent forms can be found in appendix 4.

Both study information sheets covered the following topics, purpose of the research, type of research, voluntary participation, research procedures, duration, risks, benefits of the research, the issue of no reimbursements, confidentiality, dissemination of the findings, right to refuse or withdraw from the study and who to contact should they have any questions or complaints.

Potential participants from the communities where the research took place were provided with the relevant information sheet, by the gatekeeper a couple of days before the research took place. The researcher then explained the study to them and they were given the opportunity to discuss the research and their involvement in the study. All participants who consented to be involved in the research were asked to sign a consent sheet. Participants were informed they could withdraw their involvement at any time, and were made aware that they could refuse to discuss any issue, or answer any question. All participants who took place in this study were adults, therefore parental consent was not an issue that needed to be considered. Participants were informed that all identities would remain confidential and anonymous. Key informants were also advised that even though
the data they provided would be utilised for the research, their identities would remain anonymous but if consented to, their position and name of organisation would be cited.

**Sensitive topics**

A number of sensitive topics were covered during the research. Perhaps the most sensitive issue discussed was when the researcher was present at the meeting arranged by Grace Agenda for victims who had been raped by police officers during the post-election violence. The participants attended the support meeting with Grace Agenda with the prior knowledge of the agenda and willingness to participate in discussions. Some scholars have expressed concern about the potential harm arising to participants when researching sensitive matters (Smith, 1992; Rew et al, 1993) but other researchers’ experience have found that respondents reacted positively, and in some cases have been grateful for the experience because they may have a limited number of people they feel they can share ‘their story’ with (Corbin and Morse, 2003). According to Kvale (1984) the act of talking with another person that shares a common interest, is genuinely interested in your viewpoint, and who is not critical can be richly rewarding experience. In the final phase of the Grace Agenda meeting, or as Corbin and Morse (2003) refer to it ‘phase of emergence’, discussions were shifted to a less intense, more generic topic before finishing. After the discussion had been completed the researcher and representatives from Grace Agenda remained in the meeting hall for approximately 30 minutes having friendly chats with the attendees to ensure there was support available for anyone who may have needed it. As stated by Smith (1992, p. 102) ‘to interview and then leave someone in emotional distress without adequate support or safeguards is morally wrong’.

All participants consented to take part in the research but were informed they could withdraw their participation at any time without giving any reason. Throughout the data collection period the researcher was very mindful not to cause the participants harm or any further trauma. However, Corbin and Morse (2003) acknowledge that the distress of discussing a traumatic event can be counterbalanced by the therapeutic effects of being able to talk to a non-judgemental person and perhaps even to gain some insight and closure on resolved issues. Although, it cannot be assumed that this would be the case with
all people but these individuals would be less likely to volunteer to be involved in discussions (Corbin and Morse, 2003).

Remunerations
The issue of remuneration was a difficult dilemma to overcome. It was acknowledged that within Kenyan society, a white, western researcher, gaining information from a lower income group, would be expected to pay participants. Many non-governmental organisations have ‘accepted’ this predicament, and have gone to the extent of paying participants to attend workshops or take part in research (Respondent PV1 2015; Respondent PV2, 2015; Respondent CS7, 2015). However, the researcher was aware that payment might have affected the data provided and complicated the power dynamics further with participants.

As mentioned, during the field work the researcher encountered a challenge when attempting to access one community because there was an expectation the researcher would pay for access, and financially compensate those participating in the research. It has been suggested that corruption is ingrained within Kenyan culture, as Wrong (2014, p. 324) noted from comments made by Kenyans, ‘everyone is corrupt in Kenya, even grandmothers’. Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe was quoted expressing concern about Zimbabwe becoming “like Nigeria and Kenya, where you have to reach into your pocket to get anything done” (Some, 2014). Even though there is often an expectation within Kenyan culture for individuals, particularly an outsider, to pay for ‘services’ or ‘access’ the researcher chose not to pay any remunerations to assist with the facilitation of the research, as it had the potential to create bias and inaccuracy to the research findings. Although, this made the field work more challenging and may have limited the research sites to only where credible contacts were known. The researcher is of the opinion if payment had been made to gain access, there was the potential for circumstances to be manipulated or corrupted to provide the researcher with what was perceived to be expected in return for the payment. However, it was recognised that participants were giving their time to the research. Therefore, whenever possible the researcher reciprocated by sharing information about other relevant community safety projects, or assisting with networking.
It is believed the researcher was able to navigate the remuneration issue because the gatekeepers had been referred and recommended through a credible contact who had worked closely with the various individuals for the previous ten years. Due to this strong connection and the individuals being civic minded there was an understanding from the outset that remunerations were not required or going to be paid. However, it is important to note this would not necessarily be the same for a researcher new to Kenya who had limited access to contacts and a time pressure to complete the field work in.

**Positionality**

It would be virtually impossible for a researcher to be completely objective, as all researchers will take their own ‘frame of reference’ to a study. Our own understanding is a precondition of our own research (May, 1993). As a researcher you will never be neutral, Liebling (2001) explores the question of ‘whose side are we on’ as the researcher. Different data collectors or data analysers will come to varying conclusions, even if they have similar data. May (1993) states, that as researchers we need to understand and acknowledge these influences in our own thinking and that of society, and understand how it may affect our research. The positionality of all researchers irrespective of their culture, age, gender or life experiences will affect the outcome of any study. As a white, British, female who has lived in East Africa for the past ten years, the positionality of the researcher is likely to have influenced the results of this research.

Living in Nairobi prior to the fieldwork commencing allowed the researcher to conduct detailed preparation prior to the data collection. During 2014 the researcher attended various conferences and seminars in Nairobi to familiarise herself with the context. Through attending conferences such as the ‘Global alliance on armed violence’, ‘Building the city: planning, participation and practice in East Africa’ and ‘A story of the urban poor: launching the 2012 Nairobi cross-sectional slum survey’ the researcher was able to consider how other studies had conducted research in lower-income areas of Nairobi and the challenges they had encountered.

Attending the conferences also allowed the researcher to begin networking and identify organisations that may be pertinent to the study, then explore if they had relevant
literature or whether it would be beneficial to start following them on social media. After being introduced to Dr Mkutu, Associate Professor at United States International University (USIU) the researcher was invited to present at the ‘Crime and violence prevention training programme’ held at the Kenya School of Government, on a community safety project she had designed and implemented in Somalia. This gave the researcher unusual access to county government representatives from all over Kenya, and allowed her to be privy to open discussions about security issues and policing from all over Kenya.

The researcher also met with various residents from different informal settlements in Nairobi, prior to the fieldwork. These meetings assisted with planning the practical aspects of conducting the research, which included identifying the most appropriate approaches to take in terms of access, selecting the specific study sites and identifying credible gatekeepers for the study sites who would be well received and trusted by the community.

The preparation phase of the study made the researcher reflect on her positionality and consider how it could influence the research process. The preparation informed and assisted with shaping the approach used to undertake the fieldwork. For example, it was during the planning meetings that the researcher decided not to use a tape recorder during interviews and focus group discussions. Whilst using a recording device would have made data collection and recording easier for the researcher there was concern over how it would be perceived by research participants, as it became apparent during these planning meetings how sensitive the topic was considered to be amongst some residents of informal settlements in Nairobi.

**Power dynamics**

There are other dimensions which also need to be considered that are ‘hidden from view’, such as the power relationships. Some researchers believe the balance of power tends to be in favour of the researcher (Thompson, 1995). Thompson (1995) discusses how many interviewers go to great lengths to reduce status differences by sharing information about their own lives and why they have an interest in the subject. It was evident that there were power dynamics between the researcher, ‘gatekeepers’ and the participants. On many occasions the researcher was asked questions that insinuated that the ‘the researcher was
in the know’. As a consequence of the power relationship, the responders may have modified their answers according to social norms or to their perceptions of the interviewer’s expectations.

Corbin and Morse (2002) believe there is a reciprocity between the researcher and participant, with each gaining something from the experience but they are of the opinion with qualitative research the balance of power is actually in the hands of participants. During this study the researcher noticed a shift in power dynamics when the researcher was inside Kibera. This was particularly noticeable when conducting the research in Lani Saba ward, where the researcher was dependent upon the gatekeeper to physically navigate the maze of paths through the informal settlement to visit the various research participants in the different villages of the ward. The researcher was also reliant on the gatekeepers to facilitate access back to the participants who had agreed, been briefed and provided with diaries to record the crime incidents within their village. The researcher was mindful the gatekeeper would have been aware that a certain amount of time and investment had been made by the researcher and needed their assistance and endorsement (Jupp, 2006) to retrieve the diaries from within Kibera and conduct follow up interviews. The ‘insiders’ also had access to information and knowledge that the researcher as an ‘outsider’ was not permitted, such as information within the police occurrence book at the police posts.

Confidentiality and anonymity
The researcher recognised that the confidentiality of participants and data collected during the research project was essential. Any personal information was encoded and anonymised. Participants were assigned a reference code rather than being referred to by their name. The codes were configured by abbreviating the method, location and the characteristics of the group being researched, and when relevant the number of the participant present during that specific data gathering method.

For example the code used for the focus group in Lani Saba ward with men was coded by FGLM, FG=Focus Group, L=Lani Saba ward, M=Male and then the number allocated to the participant present at the focus group. Therefore a unique code for a male participant in
The focus group in Lani Saba ward would be FGLM1 (with the number ranging between 1 and 6).

The code used for the respondent who completed the diary and took part in the in-depth interview from Kianda village in Sarang’ombe ward was allocated the code DISKYF, this decodes to D=Diary, I=Interview, S=Sarang’ome ward, K=Kianda village, YF=Young Female. The database of respondents and their corresponding codes can be found in appendix 2, for key informants, and appendix 3 for focus group and in-depth interview participants.

The identities of all participants remained confidential and anonymous. In the case of key informants they were advised that even though the data they provide may be utilised for the research, their identities would remain anonymous but if consented to, their position and name of organisation would be cited. The list of key informants who were interviewed are displayed in appendix 2.

Even though the researcher ensured there was complete anonymity and confidentiality of research participants and the information they provided, it was acknowledged there was a risk that participants could share points raised during the group discussions, which unfortunately the researcher was unable to prevent. The researcher tried to mitigate the risk by explaining to all focus groups participants that what was said in the group should remain confidential. This potential issue was highlighted to all focus group participants verbally prior to participation and it was explained on the study information sheet relevant for focus group participants.

On a few occasions during the weekly meetings held with elders from Kibera at the Lavie Foundation a translator was required. A volunteer from the Lavie Foundation assisted with translating their discussions from Kiswahili to English. In incidences where the study was mentioned in this forum the translator was reminded about the sensitivities of the study and they were asked not to discuss the study with anyone other than the researcher.

The study information sheet highlighted to participants that taking part in the research could potentially draw attention to them and as a consequence they could be asked
questions by other community members. This potential issue was minimised by conducting the group discussions and in-depth interviews in a private location out of view and audible range from other members of the community. This was also the case for key informant interviews, they were conducted in private, at their place of work but out of audible range from colleagues.

3.7 Validity and reliability

Triangulation

Applying a multi-method approach assisted with validating the research findings. Through triangulating a number of different data sources, obtained through the various methods allowed different accounts of events and information to be cross-checked. Denzin (1994) suggests that triangulation can occur in two forms. The method of triangulation which involves different strategies within one method, for example with a survey using different scales to measure the same empirical unit. Or between method triangulation, which involves different methods, examining a single phenomenon. It is suggested that this form of triangulation can enable researchers to carry out a ‘self-checking’ function, increasing the researcher’s confidence in the results. A multi-method approach can also improve validity because one method’s weakness can be complimented by strengths of another method (Morgan, 1997). Each method in this research was used to check the validity of data generated from other sources and methods.

Credibility

During the field work in Kibera the researcher engaged with the research sites over the period of three months, making at least four visits to the informal settlement every week during the data collection period. This ensured the researcher developed trusted relationships and gained an enriched understanding of the context within Kibera. As recommended by Mcneil and Chapman (2005) quotations and descriptions gathered throughout the field work have been used in the documentation of this study to provide a rich description of the setting being studied.

Whilst conducting interviews and focus group discussions the researcher shared with the audience her understanding of key issues that had emerged during the interaction. This
ensured her understanding was accurate and clarity could be sought, when required. The researcher recognised the order of questions and points for discussion was significant during the interactions, in order to avoid leading or influencing the research participants. For example during focus groups, participants were asked to share their opinions of crime prevention methods, community policing and community safety initiatives that were present within their community. It was important to ask their opinions prior to mentioning the government initiative Nyumbi Kumi. This was because people are generally suspicious of Nyumbi Kumi and may have been cautious when discussing it because it is a government initiative, and therefore could potentially have skewed their opinions about community safety.

The gate keepers who assisted the researcher with access and identification of the research participants in Kibera were all credible individuals who were engaged in community work or civic affairs. They had all been recommended and introduced to the researcher from highly credible contacts. Their and the participants sincerity and civic motivation to be involved in the study was demonstrated through their willingness to assist or take part in the research without receiving any remuneration, which can often be a challenge in Kenya (Wrong, 2014). As the individuals selected to take part in the research were considered to be reliable by the gatekeeper and were willing to take part voluntarily, without personal gain, it is felt their involvement in the research had an element of authenticity.

*Dependability and confirmability*

On completion of the data collection in Nairobi the preliminary research findings were presented during PhD forum meetings and at a number of public conferences organised at the British Institute in East Africa in Nairobi, which research participants were invited to attend. Between 2014 and 2016 the researcher presented different stages of the study during the PhD meetings. This included the research questions, methods, decisions, research data and the findings. The different aspects of the study were critiqued by researchers based in Kenya who understood the context and the topic. This provided, as Lincoln and Guba (1985) would describe as an ‘audit’ of the research and established ‘confirmability’ of the research process. Presenting and discussing the findings at the public conferences at the British Institute in East Africa in front of an audience which included
research participants, academics and practitioners in the field being studied, acted as a validation process for the research data. (See section 7.5 for the list of conference presentations and articles published arising from this study).

3.8 Data analysis

The analysis of the data for this study began during the transcription phase and became an on-going process. One of the challenges of qualitative analysis lies in making sense of massive amounts of data. This involves reducing the volume of raw information, sifting through trivia from significance, identifying significant patterns and constructing a framework for communicating the essence of what the data reveals (Huberman and Miles, 1994). Taking into consideration the criticisms of interpretive research, it is acknowledged the findings from this study will not be objective but this study has ensured a systematic and rigorous research process was applied.

All data generated from the different qualitative methodological tools were analysed using framework analysis with the assistance of NVivo software. As Kenneth (2000) recognises, framework analysis is a versatile tool that can be utilised for analysing a variety of methods. The findings for this research were analysed using the grounded theory approach (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Glaser and Strauss (1994) demonstrated how concepts can be built through conducting qualitative research. They state that as the cycle of data collection, analysis, concept building, testing and reformulation takes place, eventually a point of saturation will be reached whereby the concepts are able to predict the situation they seek to theorise. Although, realistically it is unlikely that any theory will be able to predict all scenarios and situations and therefore when a researcher is using the grounded theory approach they need to be aware that they will need to make a decision when the theory is considered to be valid (or not) within the time scale and resources available for the study. Grounded theory complements the characteristic of qualitative research through allowing a fluid relationship between data collection and data analysis.

The procedure for analysing data using a ‘framework’ involved identifying, coding and categorising the paragraphs or sentences within the text from material or transcriptions into themes, then grouping and interpreting the data incorporated within the particular
theme. In the case of this study, the research objectives provided the initial structure in which the data was themed. The interview and discussion templates were developed from an analytical framework (see appendix 5) which were broadly based on these themes and assisted with starting the analysis. For example, the themes used to collect data during the focus group discussions were:

*General information on the community*

*To critically examine criminality in Kibera:*
- Identify the type of crime community members are exposed to
- Who the perceived victims and perpetrators of crime are in the community
- To assess from the community perspective the prevalence of crime
- The impacts of crime on different groups within their community

*Critically evaluate formal social control within Kibera:*
- Assess if and how communities deal with crime

*Critically explore informal responses to crime in Kibera:*
- Identify coping mechanisms developed by individuals and communities (and police) to deal with crime.

The methodological approaches applied during data collection allowed responders to discuss the themes interchangeably, which later assisted with data analysis through discovering ‘relationships’ and developing explanations for the data (Huberman and Miles, 1994).

*Transcribing*

The data generated from transcribing the different sources allowed the data to be considered from an individual source perspective before cross-case analysis took place using framework analysis when the data collection had been completed. At the community (micro) level data collection was organised so that field work was completed in one community before data collection commenced in the second community. This enabled the
researcher to complete the transcription of all sources (from the different methods) relevant to the specific community, independently of each other.

Whilst the researcher transcribed and organised all of the fieldwork notes from interviews and focus group discussions, it provided the researcher with the opportunity to get immersed in the data. Patton (1990) states this can be a useful transition between field work and full analysis and allows the researcher to get a feel for the cumulative data as a whole. The consistency of the researcher ‘framing’ the data ensured that the material was reliably categorised, plus it was apparent that tabulating the results facilitated the task of identifying reoccurring data, which clearly enhanced the reliability of the material.

*Diary method*

The crime data gathered through the diary method was analysed using a deductive analysis framework. The themes correlated with the structure the research participants were encouraged to use when recording incidents in their diaries. Hence, the type of crimes, occurrence, time and day of the week incidents were occurring, plus the characteristics of victims and offenders were compared across the villages. This information was analysed further and cross referenced with the data generated from the in-depth interviews.

*Key informant interviews, in-depth interviews and focus groups*

Each interview and discussion was read through a number of times, prior to, and after transcribing to become familiar with the overall picture of the data and fundamental meaning of experiences. Then each manuscript was scanned for themes and repeated ideas or statements (Brunard, 1991). Irrelevant material which, Brunard (1991) refers to as ‘dross’, were identified and excluded from the analysis. This involved some bias because the researcher made subjective decisions on what was considered to be relevant material, or not. However, irrelevant material was kept in mind and at the end of data analysis it was re-visited to ascertain if it was actually relevant to the overall picture that had emerged from the data. Patton (1990) highlights that qualitative inquiry depends, at every stage, on the skills, training, insights, and capabilities of the inquirer. Therefore qualitative analysis ultimately depends on the analytical intellect and style of the researcher. Patton suggests
the human factor is the great strength but can be the fundamental weakness of qualitative inquiry and analysis.

Once main themes began to emerge from the data a category system was developed. Initially, as many categories as possible were generated and material of relevance were linked accordingly. Then the number of categories were reduced by merging similar categories Brunard (1991) refers to this as the ‘collapsing stage’.

**Policing and community safety initiatives**

Data gathered on policing and community safety projects were collated for each specific project and then a descriptive narrative was written on each of the projects. So for example in the case of Crisis Response Development Foundation (CRDF), the narrative was written based on information collated from the numerous interviews conducted with the Director of CRDF, the field notes from when the researcher visited the project that CRDF established in Lemelepo on the outskirts of Nairobi, the interviews that took place with representatives of the Lemelepo Community Policing Project (LCPP) committee, an interview conducted with a police officer based at the nearby police post and a news article on the project. Where relevant, some narratives written on the policing and community safety projects have been incorporated into the findings of the research.

The grounded theory approach was used to analyse the narratives written for each of the projects, including the two ‘critical cases’ (Patton, 2002) from the UK. The themes identified through this analysis, combined with the analysis and initial findings of the data collected through the other methods plus the literature informed the framework developed to analyse the policing and community safety projects. The key literature that informed the analysis can be seen in table 4 overleaf, which displays the framework used to analyse the policing and community safety projects. The detailed analysis of each of the projects can be found in appendix 9.
Table 4: Framework used to analyse the policing and community safety initiatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project criteria</th>
<th>Present Yes/No</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collective efficacy (Sampson &amp; Raudenbush, 1999)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community driven (initiation) (Brown &amp; Kulig, 1996)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership (Brown &amp; Kulig, 1996)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource mobilisation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtle informal social control over regulating the police’s behaviour (Reiner, 2000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Success or failure (measured)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduction in crime?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedural justice of police officers improved in project area</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence of safety being, or perceived by residents to have improved?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As qualitative analysis is an ongoing and a dynamic process, during the analysis and writing up phase the researcher often referred back to the original manuscripts to ensure data had been interpreted correctly and within the right context.

3.8.1 Data management and storage

The researcher kept clear and accurate records of all procedures followed during the research project, in order to demonstrate the correct research practice was followed.

The processing of data complied with the Data Protection Act (1998) and abided to the following principles:

- Data was processed fairly and lawfully.
- Data was obtained for the purposes of the study only.
- Information gathered was accurate and relevant to the study.
- Data was processed in accordance with the subject rights under the act (i.e. not to cause damage or distress).
- Data not kept longer than necessary.
Primary data was stored in the researcher’s office, which only the researcher had access to and was locked when it was not being used. All field notes were typed up within 24 hours of the field work taking place and scanned copies of the data recorded in diaries was stored on the researcher’s laptop. This meant the researcher had an electronic copy of all the data collected as well as the originals. Data was only managed by the researcher and was stored on the researcher’s laptop (which was password protected) and backed up remotely on IDrive, which encrypts stored data. This ensured that only the researcher had access to all of the data.

3.9 Limitations to the study

Crime recording

It is acknowledged the data collected on crime incidents in this study is not a true reflection of actual crimes that were committed during the research period. The diary method was used to collect data on crime incidents within each of the villages within the period of a week but, as discussed previously, this method posed a number of limitations such as relying upon a third party to be objective when recording incidents and participants not being present in the village for the duration of the recording period.

The researcher was able to access data on crimes recorded by the police through interviews and crime incidents recorded in the police occurrence books but the researcher could only obtain this information through a third party, the gatekeepers. Therefore the reliability of this data could be questioned, however data collected on crime incidents through all these methods were triangulated, along with official crime statistics produced by the Kenya National Bureau for Statistics (KNBS).

Due to cultural differences and participants’ perceptions of what they consider to be a crime the researcher is aware that certain types of crime would either have been underreported or not recorded at all. Domestic violence is an example of such a crime. Due to attitudes and values that permit domestic violence in Kenya (World Bank, 2011; McEvoy, 2012), the fact that most domestic disputes are dealt with by the village chief and the approach used for this study (being focused at the community level rather than household), it is highly likely this crime would have been omitted in the data and the research findings.
However, it is worth noting that the aim of this research was not to determine the incident rate of crime in Kibera. The information gained on crime incidents was used to gain a better understanding of the situation in regards to crimes occurring, the risks posed to residents and coping mechanisms developed in response to the risks they were exposed to.

The limitations of a qualitative study
Critics of the qualitative paradigm argue that both its small sample size and its reliance on interpretative epistemologies compromises its objectivity (Campbell and Stanley, 1966). It is claimed that researchers will always need to view their data from their ‘frame of reference’ and that because of the data’s situated nature, it is unreplicable as a study. As existing knowledge will always influence the way researchers see things ‘first hand’, Denscombe (2010) suggests a ‘second order’ account is provided by the researcher’s analysis of a ‘first-order’ reality. It is difficult to compare, contrast or combine the findings from qualitative research because the analysis is reliant on the interpretation of the researcher, rather than a universal system of analysis. However, researchers can improve the quality of qualitative research by enhancing their reflexivity i.e. reflecting critically on their role in the research process and highlighting specifically where their interpretation of events and data differs from that of their participants (Haynes, 2012). It can also be argued that because this study focuses on community safety in Nairobi from a lower-income citizen’s perspective that it is precisely this complex social reality that needs to be understood and that can only really be approached from a qualitative stance.

This research, like most qualitative research, does not claim statistical generalisation and therefore lacks some degree of external validity, although its findings may still be relevant and pertinent to other areas. The purpose of this study was to gain an in-depth, and therefore context specific, understanding of the crime situation in a lower-income area of Nairobi, in order to consider crime prevention approaches that could be appropriate for that specific area. This study could be seen to be assessing two things, community safety, which has general characteristics, and how this model is operationalized in a highly specific context.
Sample

Taking into consideration the time and resource constraints, and the purpose of the study it was decided not to include children within the study sample. Including children within the sample would have provided a different perspective on crime and safety in Kibera but it was recognised including this group would have involved a different research approach to adults and required further, ethical considerations relating to conducting research with children (Greig et al, 2007). The researcher felt it was not necessary for this study to include children based on the information required to explore the research question.

3.10 Researcher’s safety: field work

As the study involved some lone working, the researcher consulted the University of South Wales’ ‘lone working policy’ and took into consideration the issues raised within the policy. Prior to conducting the field work the researcher had had previous experience of conducting assessments and surveys independently, as a lone researcher in a number of foreign countries such as Southern Tunisia, Sierra Leone, Burundi, Myanmar and South Sudan. A number of security and safety courses had also been undertaken, such as ‘Humanitarian practice and security and communication’ with Register for Engineers in Disaster Relief and ‘Sudan field specific security training’ with the United Nations Department for Safety and Security.

In terms of general safety and security whilst in Kenya, the researcher was on the ‘Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) safety information’ alert emails. These alerts contained information on any incidents that have occurred in Kenya relating to employees of humanitarian organisations. The emails were collated and managed by the NGO forum in Kenya. The researcher also received timely security alerts via text messages from the United Nations if there were security issues in Nairobi or Kenya. The researcher also collaborated with contacts and organisations and sought on-going security advice from relevant contacts prior to conducting field work. The researcher has experience of living and working in Kenya and was aware of the correct individuals and organisations to contact should a security incident occur. For example United Nations Department for Safety and Security, security officers within organisations and Kenyan contacts.
Being a member of the British Institute in Eastern Africa and their PhD forum gave the researcher access to fellow researchers in Nairobi and the benefit of consulting academics who had experience of conducting research in Kenya. The forum was made up of both international and Kenyan researchers who met on a regular basis. During the meetings the researcher was able to share and discuss the design of the study, prior to field work commencing and seek advice from fellow researchers. This included sharing information on safety and security whilst conducting field work.

During field work the researcher kept in regular contact via mobile phone throughout the day with key individuals, informing them about her whereabouts, the duration of time she would spend in each specified location and the expected time of return from the field work. Whilst moving around Nairobi to attend key informant interviews the researcher used a reputable taxi company. As the field work took place in Kenya remote supervision was provided from the researcher’s supervisor via regular emails and skype calls.

3.11 Reflections

Status

Thompson’s (1995) comment about researcher’s going to great lengths to try and reduce status differences between them and research participants has made the researcher reflect on how much she modified her behaviour and actions, in an attempt to reduce her status and ultimately the way she was perceived by research participants who resided in the informal settlement. When conducting the field work with lower-income residents, the researcher made a significant effort not to display signs of wealth. The researcher always walked to the field site so she was observed arriving on foot, casual clothes were worn, without jewellery and no any items of monetary worth were carried. The mobile phone used for the research was a basic plastic phone, significantly less sophisticated and expensive than the phones owned by many of the residents involved in the research from Kibera. The researcher made a purpose of not carrying cash whilst conducting field work so she could not be seen to display any signs of wealth through ‘flashing cash’ around or purchasing items that could have been perceived by the participants as luxurious.
During the field work the researcher ensured she was up to date on current affairs in Kenya through reading Kenyan newspapers on a daily basis and following social media sites that reported on incidents and news relating to Kibera so she was in a position to join in with topical discussions or initiate them with research participants. The researcher would often mention the period of time she had lived in Kenya and worked in East Africa and made reference to landmarks and various locations in the city to demonstrate her local knowledge of Nairobi. This allowed the researcher to create common ground and attempt to reduce the ‘insider’-‘outsider’ gap between the research participants and the researcher.

Remaining ‘in the field’
The researcher remained based in Kenya for a year and a half after the field work had been formally completed. This proved convenient and beneficial for the purpose of following up. As Patton (1990) identified, key informants were able to be re-contacted to clarify ambiguities found during the analysis or gain deeper responses. This situation was beneficial for enriching data and for clarifying information but there was also a drawback to this situation. Whilst in Kenya the researcher continued to collect data through liaising with contacts, attending seminars and reading media reports. This is likely to have caused some distraction from focusing on the analysis of data that had already been collected. This was something the researcher had to be aware of and try to control exposure to in order not to prolong the data collection at the detriment of the data analysis.

3.12 Methodology summary
The philosophical underpinnings of the methodologies adopted ensured rich and diverse data was collated through qualitative means. These methods included semi-structured key informant interviews, focus group discussions, diary method and in-depth interviews. The macro and micro approaches allowed both the ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ perspectives be considered; in addition to acting as a triangulation and cross checking devise.

The data captured using the diary method provides an understanding of the type and frequency of crimes occurring within Kibera, who the perpetrators are and the victims they target. Protection mechanisms and informal social control methods developed by
residents to deal with, and prevent crime within their neighbourhood were identified through the focus group discussions and in-depth interviews. These methods also allowed the researcher to explore the residents’ experiences with the police and their perception of police legitimacy. Policing and community safety initiatives and their effectiveness were discussed both at the micro and macro level. Personal accounts relating to interactions with the police and issues related to community safety were generated and have been documented within the next couple of chapters.

The information obtained through the four methods used in this study were all analysed using framework analysis with the assistance of NVivo software. The results and analysis of the data will be discussed in the following chapters.
Chapter 4: Crime and protection mechanisms in the Nairobi context

This chapter provides an overview of the context of crime and criminality within the informal settlement of Kibera, Nairobi and the protection mechanisms developed by the lower-income residents. Particular attention will be given to the village of Soweto East where there appears to be a significantly high rate of crime. The absence of formal social control mechanisms within Kibera and their perceived lack of legitimacy has apparently created a security void that is filled by a variety of actors and various informal social control mechanisms. This includes various crime prevention strategies that have been woven into the social fabric of Kibera, which will be critically analysed regarding their effectiveness throughout the chapter.

4.1 Crime in Kibera

Kibera is made up of 14 villages which are grouped into administrative wards. This research took place in two wards, Lani Saba and Sarang’ombe. Lani Saba ward is made up of three villages, Soweto East, Lani Saba and Mashimoni. They are located on the east side of the informal settlement, with all three villages located directly along the south side of the railway line. Soweto East has a notoriously high rate of crime compared to the other villages that were included in this research (Namale, 2013). This will be explored in more detail later on in this chapter. Sarang’ombe ward has four villages, Olympic, Ayani, Kianda and Soweto West, all located on the west side of Kibera and at the time of the research could be accessed by the only existing road within the settlement, Kibera Drive (see figure 4). From the data gathered during this study the residents of these wards were most at risk of crimes such as robbery, burglary, stealing through deception and sexual offences.
Appendix 7 illustrates the crimes recorded by residents who took part in the diary methodology. Participants recorded crimes that occurred within their village over the period of a week. The data within the table is not an accurate representation of the crime that occurred during that period due to the reliance on a third party to record the data accurately and honestly, the residents not being continuously present within their village, plus it is also apparent that some respondents had more enthusiasm than others to record data. However, acknowledging the inaccuracies, the table provides a perspective on the type and rate of crimes occurring within the informal settlement. The common crimes identified during the research period will be discussed next along with any coping mechanisms and crime prevention approaches adopted for the different crimes.

4.1.1 Robbery, stealing and burglary

The laws of Kenya are defined by the ‘Penal Code’. The Kenyan penal code defines robbery as:

*Any person who steals anything, and, at or immediately before or immediately after the time of stealing it, uses or threatens to use actual violence to any person or property in order to obtain or retain the thing stolen or to prevent or overcome resistance to its being stolen or retained, is guilty of the felony termed robbery.*

This study identified a high rate of robberies taking place in Kibera which poses a daily threat to residents. Robberies are more likely to occur during the night or early hours of the morning, apart from in the village of Soweto East where robberies occur at any time. Residents walking out of Kibera in the early hours of the morning (around 4am) are usually on their way to the market to purchase items from the suppliers and robbers know these individuals will be carrying cash. Rates of robbery incidents increase over Friday and Saturdays, when it is known casual workers and labourers receive their weekly wage. One female elder stated that robbery “... happens every day but on Saturday it is worse when people have money”. This was also the findings of the research conducted by MapKibera in 2010. The offenders committing robberies are typically young males who operate in groups, usually carrying weapons such as knives, rungus (wooden club or baton) and/or guns. The guns are not always real but it is difficult for victims to distinguish the difference, especially when it is dark. The narrative below provided by a female participant illustrates her amazement that she was not robbed or attacked when she recently walked through Kibera at night, without paying for an ‘escort’:

*One day I was escorting my children to the bus stop down town as they were going to Western [province of Kenya] but the bus came late. It was 2240hrs and I was at the bus stage and needed to get home. I started walking [through Kibera] and a man started to follow me and said “how are you?” and “I want to escort you home”. When I got to the ground [football pitch] I saw seven men there, I started talking to myself and praying as I was walking. When I got home my daughters were amazed [that I hadn’t been attacked] and asked “how did you come?” and I replied “god came with me”*  

(Respondent FGLF1, 2015)

A small local health facility in Mashimoni village, Lani Saba ward (located in the north east of Kibera) treats at least two victims of robbery a night who have sustained cuts or stab wounds caused by pangas (machetes) or knives. The number of robbery victims treated by this small health facility demonstrates the high rate of robberies that are occurring in a small area of Kibera on a daily basis. It is important to note that these figures only take into account victims who required medical treatment after a robbery and were in close proximity to the small health facility located in Mashimoni village. Staff at the health facility stated that robbery victims who sought medical attention are never in a position to pay for their treatment because their money is always stolen. Targeting victims when they are
most likely to be in possession of cash would strongly suggest that perpetrators were motivated for the ‘reward’ of cash.

4.1.2 Housebreaking and burglary

The Kenyan penal code defines housebreaking and burglary as:

(1) Any person who
(a) breaks and enters any building, tent or vessel used as a human dwelling with intent to commit a felony therein; or
(b) having entered any building, tent or vessel used as a human dwelling with intent to commit a felony therein, or having committed a felony in any such building, tent or vessel, breaks out thereof, is guilty of the felony termed housebreaking and is liable to imprisonment for seven years.

(2) If the offence is committed in the night, it is termed burglary, and the offender is liable to imprisonment for ten years.


Housebreaking and burglaries are quite common in Kibera but they are more likely to be committed when items of value are known to be present, or someone has a disagreement with the occupier and either carries out the burglary or pays a gang member to do it. Such an incident was captured during the data collection, whereby ‘youths’ were hired to visit an ex-girlfriend’s new husband and ‘teach him a lesson’. The victim was assaulted in his home and his TV and other electrical items were stolen but he chose not to report the incident to the police.

Generally a dwelling in Kibera only consists of one room that functions as a kitchen, living area and a bedroom, the communal wash areas and latrines are located outside of the dwellings. The dwellings have a wooden door which is locked with a padlock. Dwellings are attached together, those that are attached in a line often have a communal entrance, which can have a padlocked gate made out of a metal sheet. Although, many of these gates were damaged during the post-election violence and have not been repaired. Forcing entry into the dwellings through flimsy gates and padlocked doors would not be difficult and therefore the structures do not offer residents much protection from intruders.

It is clear why residents prefer not to keep money within their dwellings as there is a high chance of it being stolen or destroyed. A few elders spoke of how their grandchildren had
stolen their ‘home bank’ (money hidden in the dwelling). Fire is also a significant risk within
the informal settlement due to the illegal electricity connections, faulty wiring and close
layout of the structures. When fire breaks out it can destroy a number of houses in one go.
Residents are aware of these risks and for these reason prefer not to keep valuable items
within the home.

Protection mechanisms against burglary
A business woman who resides in Soweto East has a number of strategies to minimise the
risk of being burgled. She does not take money or any stock home with her and she avoids
talking about work, especially how much she earns. If she is asked how business is going
she tells people “business is bad”. She doesn’t invite visitors into her home because “if you
tell the mother of a thief that you have money, you’ll be attacked” and “a wife of a thief
can scour the area looking for things like TVs” hence “you don’t want to show people what
you have in the house”. She believes “it’s good to avoid friendships” in the area she lives
(Respondent DILSEF, 2015).

To ensure businesses are not burgled business people pay ‘youths’ to ‘protect’ their plot
and stock at night. Businesses along the railway line in Lani Saba have to pay Khs 20 per
night, Khs 140 per week (£1) “but if you don’t pay them, your stock would be gone”. As one
participant put it “you use a thief to stop a thief” (Respondent DILMF, 2015).

4.1.3 Stealing by deception
The Kenyan penal code defines stealing as:

A person who fraudulently and without claim of right takes anything capable of
being stolen, or fraudulently converts to the use of any person, other than the
general or special owner thereof, any property, is said to steal that thing or property.


Stealing by deception is a common crime Kibera, criminals usually target vulnerable
individuals. A number of examples were shared by women during focus group discussions
who had been deceived out of money when they had visited Kibera law court to pay bail
money to have their sons released from custody. The women explained conmen dressed
as business men pretend to be lawyers outside the law court and target vulnerable individuals, often mothers, claiming to be able to assist. A number of mothers who took part in focus groups had been deceived through this method, losing money ranging between Khs 15,000 to Khs 25,000 (£105 and £180). One female respondent described her experience:

My son was in court last year, a man approached me and was aware I had a case at court. He told me to bring Khs 15,000 and he’d go to the prosecutor and then told me “you can go with your son”. Then he went with the money and I didn’t see him again.

(Respondent FGLF2, 2015)

4.1.4 Protection mechanisms

Residents adopt a number of protection mechanisms or strategies to reduce the risk of becoming a victim of crime. An example of a method used to prevent becoming a victim of robbery is to pay members of protection rackets or vigilante groups to act as an escort whilst walking through the settlement at night. An escort through Kibera can charge between Khs 50 – 150 (30p - £1) which not everyone can afford. Residents know there is a high probability they will be mugged when walking through Kibera, particularly when it is dark and if offenders believe they have cash or items worth stealing that could be sold for cash. The geographical layout of Kibera mean that pedestrians are forced to walk through the dense labyrinth of interconnecting paths within the informal settlement, which facilitates a favourable environment for robbers to easily target victims with the knowledge they are unlikely to get caught (Coleman and Moynihan, 1996).

Self-protection mechanisms vary depending on age, elders discussed returning home early to reduce their risk of victimisation but acknowledged “… if they [criminals] know you have something, they could come to your house” (Respondent DISSWF, 2015). An elderly female noted the area she lives in is insecure, she is scared to use the toilet at night because they are located outside. A strategy used by all individuals, irrespective of age or sex was to pretend not to see an incident, you “look the other way” or “… stay mum” for your own safety.
If you see someone being attacked you look the other way and pretend you didn’t see anything. If you look you are told “be busy with what you are doing”, you don’t assist, you look the other way.

(Respondent FGSF1, 2015)

Respondents explained that people have been killed in the past for accusing others of being thieves, so it is a lot safer not to have any involvement.

Some younger female residents took the approach of ‘be-friending’ known offenders. One female participant explained how she arrived in Nairobi from another area of Kenya the morning of the interview and described how she had been forced to walk through the settlement around 0430hrs. Whilst she was walking through Kibera a group of youths appeared, she recognised one of the young men within the gang and called out his name, after which the group disappeared. She stated she always makes a point of talking to this individual because she feels it is safer for her to know someone who is part of a gang. However, the other young ladies who were part of the discussion strongly advised against this because they had been warned by ‘friends’ that if their name is called out when they are with the gang, they could be forced to kill them. The young ladies did however agree that it can be useful to name someone who is part of a gang if you are troubled by a ‘thug’ because there is a chance you will be left alone as a result of your association.

An alternative collective protection mechanism is to walk in groups, with the rational there is ‘safety in numbers’ and as a group you will hopefully be considered a less suitable target. However, this is not always a deterrent to offenders, especially when they have weapons. Keeping a weapon in your home is a method used by residents of Kibera but there are mixed opinions about whether neighbours would intervene when a robbery was taking place. Members of the community are more likely to respond to an incident if there are others responding. A male respondent provided the below account of an attempted robbery that was prevented as a result of collective action:

The group walked along the [only] path that leads out by the DO’s [District Officer’s] office. The path has lots of corners along it and small paths that thieves can escape down. We were met by approximately 10 males aged 13 to 18 years who had got off a matatu [public transport] coming back from partying in town. The offenders
had knives, rungus [wooden thick stick] and a toy gun. When the group were approached one of the women started shouting which alerted the local residents. Most residents keep a weapon in their homes, panga or rungu, so when they heard the shouts the residents came out carrying their weapons which made the offenders run away.

(Respondent DILMM, 2015)

Collective violence

It is apparent that collective violence is utilised as a method of informal social control against thieves. This is likely due to the significant security gap within Kibera and cynicism towards the law and justice system plus a lack of trust in general towards formal social control mechanisms amongst residents. Instead of a protracted process that is not trusted, residents feel they have limited options to deal with criminals and prefer instant justice. Mob justice is a common occurrence in Kenya but particularly within informal settlements (World Bank, 2011; Mosongo, 2014). As one resident from Kibera put it “mob justice is very common, it’s how people deal with insecurity” (Respondent PV7, 2015). A common form of punishment delivered during mob justice is known as ‘necklacing’, this involves “beat[ing] them up, put a tyre [around them] and paraffin and burn him” (Respondent FGLYF1, 2015).

During the research period there were numerous incidents of spontaneous mob justice reported to the researcher, which were all verified through a number of local sources. When discussing how a thief is dealt with if they are caught by a mob one respondent explained “if the residents catch that person they burn him alive” (Respondent FGLYF1, 2015). A neighbour to one respondent from Lani Saba had caught a burglar trying to steal his TV the previous week “my neighbour caught him and then they [neighbours] burnt him [to death]”. When asked whether the police were aware of the incident she responded “the police took his body to the mortuary” but it was clear the police did not investigate the incident in any way, when asked if the police interviewed the neighbour the respondent replied “the police didn’t do anything to the neighbour” (Respondent FGLYF2, 2015).

Residents can use methods to regulate the behaviour of their neighbours, parents can be notified if their child is engaging in deviant behaviour and warned if it continues “the youth
[will] beat or kill them” (Respondent DILMM, 2015). Mothers of youth who engage in criminal activities can often be stigmatised by members of the community, in some cases they can be driven from a community or forced to send their children either ‘up-country’ (rural home area) or to another area of Nairobi. Some offenders will often relocate themselves in situations where they are known to be wanted for a crime. A number of examples were provided whereby police officers have threatened mothers that they either send their children ‘up-country’ or next time they are caught, they’ll be shot and killed. One respondent recalled a well-known police officer known by the nickname ‘Machonne’ who would frequently visit the mothers’ of criminals in 2014 to warn them, “sometimes he would even give them the fare to send them up country, if they didn’t change he would just kill them” (Respondent FGLYM1, 2015).

A respondent from Sarang’ombe ward recalled a recent incident where one man noticed another man was wearing his trousers “he was a thief, they started to beat him, they wanted to burn him but I told them no, if you want to kill him do it in another area, we don’t want police or government around here” (Respondent DISKYF, 2015). The respondents comment highlights the blasé attitude towards ‘necklacing’ a person who had allegedly stolen a pair of trousers, it also emphasises how infrequent it is for the police to be present in the area and their presence is not desired, suggesting at this time there is preference to ‘informal’ violent social control rather than formal social control.

It was pointed out to the researcher that those that carry out mob justice may not be solely motivated to address deviant behaviour. Health workers at a health facility in Lani Saba explained how mobs often appear when a pedestrian has been knocked over by a boda boda (motorbike taxi). These accidents occur frequently because the boda boda’s ride along the highly congested narrow tracks of Kibera, used by pedestrians. When these incidents occur the mob often use it as an excuse to steal cash or items of worth from the motorbike rider but then insist the rider takes the injured pedestrian to the clinic and takes responsibility for any payment required for treatment.

The police officers based at the police post in Lani Saba acknowledged spontaneous mob justice was common in Kibera, particularly in Mashimoni village, making reference to
Mashimoni he stated “the people are a bit hostile”. The police officer believed mob justice occurred because members of the public felt the law was too lenient “you get three years for stealing, they [residents of Kibera] feel that is unfair”. The police officer did not agree with mob justice he referred to it as being “more like mob injustice” and stated that “laws should be followed” (Respondent PS9, 2015).

4.1.5 Soweto East

The village of Soweto East is notorious for being a dangerous place where there is a high probability you will be robbed or raped (Namale, 2013). A river cuts across Soweto East, which means there is only one path you can take to use the bridge to cross the river. Offenders know that people walking through the area have to use the bridge and as it is a choke point it is an ideal spot to target pedestrians “you have to take the bridge, because it’s the only path and you fear being thrown off the bridge into the river” (Respondent DILSEF, 2015). Power cuts occur frequently in the area and when there is power the offenders often cut the wires to ensure there is darkness. The dark is advantageous for offenders because they are not detected before an incident or recognised during an attack.

During the eight nights when crime was recorded in the village of Soweto East (the recorder was away working during the day), robberies occurred every evening apart from the two nights when there was torrential rain, which caused flooding to the extent crossing the area required wading through water up to your waist. During the six nights when robberies occurred there were a total of 20 robbery victims just within the village of Soweto East and three of these individuals were also victims of attempted rape. The attempted rapes were intervened by the community volunteer patrol group from Soweto East.

On a Saturday evening, when it was known casual labourers had been paid the below incident occurred. The account was witnessed and recorded by a resident in Soweto East:

*It was like an operation, I had just arrived in the house when it started. Whoever passed over the bridge was searched, the victims were men, women, even old women. The only way to pass was over the bridge and it was as if the offenders knew people had money they were carrying guns, knives and a strong cane and threatened victims to hand over everything they had. They operated in full force to*
scare the volunteers. It’s true the volunteers feared them because of the guns and they all ran away ... they were shooting up in the air to warn off the volunteers to make sure they weren’t interrupted. They obviously knew there was money.

(Respondent DILSEF, 2015)

The volunteer patrol group was established in March 2015 in response to the high rate of robberies occurring in Soweto East and the lack of response from the police. “The community are frustrated because the police know who the criminals are but the parents are rich and can afford to pay bribes to prevent their children from being arrested or get them released” (Respondent DILSEF, 2015).

Approximately 100 households each contributed Khs100 (£0.65) towards the volunteer patrol, for them to purchase weapons such as knives, long sticks and pangas (machetes) plus torches and whistles. The torches are useful because the patrol takes place at night and the whistles are used to alert the rest of the community if an incident occurs. There can be up to 15 volunteers patrolling at one time, all men. Understandably, retention of volunteers is challenging because the patrol are tackling armed offenders, whilst they only have wooden sticks and knives.

Despite this imbalance, the volunteers continue to intervene in robberies and attempt to stop incidents escalating. On occasions when the volunteers outnumber the offenders, the offenders have been forced to run away but intervening in incidents aggravates the offenders and they retaliate during the next meeting. The volunteer patrol has proven to have some success but they are at a significant disadvantage and risk, as one resident acknowledged “The volunteers are doing well to guard the area but all in vain, they don’t have guns” (Respondent DILSEF, 2015).

Police operations within Soweto East
The police are known to patrol Soweto East on rare occasions but if a serious incident occurs armed plain clothed officers can be seen in the area. However, residents are sceptical about police patrols “the more they come, the more they associate with criminals, they know them, they interact with them and [agree] when not to come” (Respondent
DILSEF, 2015). Police officers collaborating with criminals was one of the challenges Olusegun (2009) identified when community policing was being encouraged in Nigeria.

Offenders who are arrested will usually be seen out of custody the following day. Residents believe this is because offenders are released as soon as a bribe has been paid to the police officer either by them or their parents. It was suggested that reporting a crime to a police officer based outside Kibera can be more effective “If you report a crime in a different area then they are more likely to follow up, especially if you give some money” (Respondent DILSEF, 2015). These were the circumstances which resulted in a young man from Soweto East being buried on 9th May 2015. He was a known criminal to the police who covered Soweto East but he was never arrested. It was police officers who came from ‘outside’ who shot and killed him, “the police tricked him, to make him draw his weapon then they shot him”. The respondent explained sometimes “these ‘youths’ are transported to their grandmothers up country when people start complaining about them, some are killed by the police. They don’t survive long” (Respondent DILSEF, 2015).

Slum upgrading
Over fifteen years ago the government and UN-HABITAT agreed to start the slum upgrading programme, KENSUP, and implement the pilot project in Kibera’s Soweto East. Residents are of the opinion that once completed, KENSUP will significantly improve security within Soweto East (Respondent DILSEF 2015). The pilot involves the temporary relocation of 25,000 residents in batches to a transfer site while new housing units are built in Soweto East. On completion of the new houses, the identified residents should move into them subject to their ability to afford the costs of owning or renting the new units (Amnesty International, 2009).

In 2015 phase one houses had been constructed and were ready for residents (group A - the first batch) to be relocated back in Soweto East and move into the new buildings - nine years after the process started - but this had not happened and residents were unsure whether the second batch of residents from Soweto East would be relocated, to enable the next set of units to be built. Unfortunately the project has been marred by corruption and politics (Fernandez and Calas, 2011). At the time of the research rumours were
circulating amongst residents that the slum upgrading apartments had been sold off to ‘big men’. This had been the general feeling of residents interviewed by Amnesty International in 2009, who predicted the upgrading project would end up enriching the rich and ‘big people’ (Amnesty International, 2009). If and when the project is finally completed, residents believe it has the potential to improve security.

4.1.6 Security void: vigilante groups

Encounters with the police is a source of insecurity, rather than security for residents of Kibera (Ruteere et al., 2013). This is a significant factor that appears to lead residents to rely on vigilante groups for security, or dealing with offenders. A Researcher Fellow at The Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies (known as CHRIPS) considers a group in Kenya to be a vigilante group when they take the law into their own hands. Members of the vigilante groups are predominantly young males, he is of the opinion that attendance of a group is very fluid, there is no loyalty to one group or another, their motivation is purely financial “they just follow the money”. In Kenya’s informal settlements the Researcher Fellow found there are reporting systems depending upon the crime committed, crimes other than rape and murder are reported to the vigilante groups, whilst murder and rape would be considered an issue for the police, if it was reported (Respondent PS6, 2015). However, Danish De-mining Group found that “in the cases of an attempted rape, it may be reported to the police but if they don’t do anything the ‘tight gangs’ will hunt the offender down and potentially burn them” (Respondent CS11, 2014).

The CHRIPS Research Fellow describes the relationship between the police and the gangs as ‘symbiotic’ whereby there is a financial and information exchange. The vigilante group who were active in Sarang’ombe ward at the time of the research are known as Mabani (Respondent CS11, 2014). They work in collaboration with the Chief and act as his body guards. One respondent described their complex relationship with security “it’s a double edged sword, they [Mabani] steal and prevent … They are the Chief’s spies and work with the police at night” (Respondent FGSYM3, 2015). Mabani also have complicated political affiliations, whilst they provide security for the Chief, who is the local government representative, during the riots in June 2015 they protested against the National Youth Service (NYS) scheme (which was creating employment in Kibera) and burnt down all the
facilities (such as schools and toilets) that had been constructed by the NYS, which had been supported and funded by the current government. Some of the vigilante groups run protection rackets and control access to public utilities as well as public transport routes but are available for ‘hire’ for political purposes or benefit. According to residents some of the vigilante groups in Kibera remained dormant at the time of the research but they are expected to revive around the election period.

As recognised by Ruteere et al (2013) much of the violence in the informal settlements is carried out by criminal organisations often linked to complicated political struggles. In an effort to curb gang activity, the Kenyan government enacted the Prevention of Organised Crimes Act in 2010. However the high prevalence of active gangs and vigilante groups, especially around the election period, questions the effectiveness of the act and the lack of incentive to implement it.

In Atta-Asamoah’s (2015) East Africa report for the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) on ‘The nature and drivers of insecurity in Kenya’, he argues that the activities of internal armed groups within Kenya pose a greater threat to the population than the radical Islamist group Al-Shabaab, who have claimed a number of terrorist attacks in Kenya within the last couple of years. Atta-Asamoah’s (2015) paper documents an increase in vigilante group activities and associated fatalities around elections and states that the groups are usually employed by political and economic elites to intimidate particular sections of the population for political gains.

Vigilante groups present in Kibera have a complex relationship with law enforcers and have periods of ‘employment’ from politicians (Atta-Asamoah, 2015). Therefore the vigilante groups oscillate between having the support of ‘state’ actors, whether that be law enforcers, politicians or local chiefs, to operating outside of the ‘state’s’ support and engaging in illegal activities.

Informal approaches to crime control in Kibera appear to be entwined with formal approaches to crime prevention. Therefore there is a need to acknowledge and critically analyse the various crime prevention methods. Situational crime prevention is often
considered as an approach for attempting to mitigate against crimes such as robbery, stealing and burglary, this method will be discussed in more detail next.

4.2 Situational crime prevention

The concept of situational crime prevention has the potential to reduce the risk of crimes such as robbery, theft and burglary from occurring through ‘designing out’ crime and reducing opportunities for potential criminals (Clarke, 1980). Lack of surveillance, anonymity and ease of escape were factors Coleman (1985) identified as facilitators of crime, which she focused on when redesigning public-sector housing estates in the UK. The methods of situational crime prevention present in Kibera will be considered in the following section. The installation of street lights, construction of roads through the informal settlement and the slum upgrading project in Soweto East will be discussed and considered within the context of situational crime prevention in Kibera.

4.2.1 Designing out crime: installation of street lights

In December 2014 Nairobi City Council launched a street lighting project in Kibera (Adan, 2014). Participants involved in this research believed the street lights had improved security within Kibera. Young girls from Kibera who took part in MapKibera’s (2010) research identified well-lit places as ‘safe areas’. In March 2015 The Star newspaper reported how residents of Kibera have benefited from the street lights, the article included a story about a young man who earns a living from a small food kiosk. Discussing the situation before the lights were installed he stated "here you would have been mugged. This place was inhabitable at night ... nowadays I sell samosas worth Sh3,000 [£20.69] every day because I open until 11pm. Previously I used to sell between 7pm and 8pm and could only manage about Sh1,000 [£6.90] on a good day" (Okulo, 2015). This article suggests resident’s sense of security has increased and people are comfortable to stay out later at night, resulting in an increase in earning potential for local traders.

However, the effectiveness of street lights is dependent on surveillance provided by members of the public and the street lights working. A number of responders stated that when there is power for the street lights offenders often cut the wires so they are less likely to be identified. This situation occurs frequently in Soweto East and a bend close to Ayani
village known as ‘black corner’. As one police officer noted, street lights have been installed on ‘black corner’ but “the wires are cut or the bulbs are removed” (Respondent PS10, 2015). Another issue highlighted by residents is that the street lights are only effective before 10pm, when people were around. This would suggest the street lights are having an influence on reducing robberies due to potential offenders modifying their behaviour because of the threat of ‘being seen’ (Armitage, 2002).

4.2.2 Designing out crime: road construction

At the time of the field work in 2015, plans had been made to build roads through Kibera and in some locations they had started. Building some of the roads involved knocking down dwellings and businesses, which had caused controversy. Although the majority of the land in Kibera is owned by the Kenyan government and any structures built on government land within Kibera have technically been built illegally (Amnesty International, 2009). One of the explanations given for lack of police presence in Kibera was due to the police fearing to conduct foot patrols. A resident from Lani Saba village interviewed by Amnesty International for their report ‘The unseen Majority: Nairobi’s two million slum-dwellers’ was quoted saying “... the lack of proper access roads contributes to widespread insecurity and high crime rates ... the police and security patrols are significantly hampered by roads ... the police are usually resistant to come here because they say there are no roads” (Amnesty International, 2009, p. 11).

It was anticipated that the construction of roads would improve security in Kibera because access would be re-established for both vehicles and pedestrians. The roads would mean that pedestrians would not be forced to walk through the dense labyrinth of interconnecting paths within Kibera, which facilitated a favourable environment for robbers to easily target victims with the knowledge they were unlikely to get caught (Coleman and Moynihan, 1996). The roads would also provide vehicle access for police patrols to be conducted and allow access for other emergency service vehicles. The construction of roads would facilitate natural surveillance and provide pedestrians with alternative choices to gain access to the settlement.
4.2.3 Designing out crime: slum up-grading project

It is assumed the slum upgrading project will reduce the number of incidents of robberies. If and when the slum upgrading project is finally completed, residents believe it will improve security through the creation of ‘defensible space’ (Newman, 1972). Permanent roads will be constructed, alternative access routes will be created and light from the apartments will improve visibility in Soweto East during the evenings. The power dynamics between ‘landlords’ (of the shacks not the land) and the ‘tenants’ will change because the parents’ of offenders will no longer be receiving rent from fellow residents. They will therefore have less influence and expendable cash; which is currently supporting deviant behaviour through the purchase of guns and paying bribes to the police to prevent offenders from being arrested or prosecuted. It is however worth noting that the ‘landlords’ and their families are considered residents of Soweto East, so they are also entitled to benefit from the slum upgrading project and will remain residents.

High rates of sexual abuse of children in Kibera has been well documented (AllAfrica, 2004; UNICEF et al, 2012; Saidi, et al, 2008; MapKibera, 2010). This was also the findings from this study and will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter. A medical doctor who practices in Kibera believes one of the contributing factors for the high incidents of child abuse is linked to the high population density and the layout of dwellings within the settlement. The change in the layout of the dwellings in Soweto East from shacks to hard structured apartment blocks with self-contained flats has the potential to minimise the risk of child abuse occurring through restricting or minimising access to children.

4.2.4 Target hardening

The doors to dwellings in Kibera are usually secured with a small padlock. Where dwellings have gates to a communal entrance, a padlock is sometimes used to lock the gate but many were vandalised during the post-election violence and residents have not replaced them. Placing a padlock on the door to the dwelling prevents opportunist burglars but it would not prevent a forced entry. Considering the majority of residents in Kibera reside in flimsy structures (most are shacks) it was not worthwhile or cost effective to invest in target hardening any more substantial than a padlock on the entry door to the dwelling. It is therefore understandable why people are concerned about keeping money within their
dwellings as there is a high probability of it being stolen or destroyed. A few elders spoke of how their grandchildren had stolen their ‘home bank’ from within their home. Fire is also a significant risk within the informal settlement due to the illegal electricity connections, faulty wiring and close layout of the structures. Residents are aware of these risks and for these reasons prefer not to keep valuable items within their dwellings.

Shops located in Soweto East are at high risk of being targeted for robberies carried out by armed gangs. Shop keepers have adapted the design of their premises, so only one customer can physically fit in the shop and the view of the shop keeper is obstructed so they cannot be seen by an offender and therefore cannot be directly threatened with a weapon. Although these target hardening methods will not completely prevent shops from being targeted, they have made the shop a harder target to carry out a robbery. It is evident robbers in Kibera are looking for a cash ‘reward’ or items they can sell to acquire cash, therefore a method of crime prevention would be to remove the ‘reward’, which is what the mobile money facility, M-PESA provides.

4.2.5 Removing the reward: mobile banking
Kibera has a lower-income, transient population who migrate to Nairobi to earn money. Most residents have a responsibility to ‘send money home’ to support the extended family who reside in a rural area of Kenya. This was recognised during the pilot phase of M-PESA and when launched, it was marketed as a way to ‘send money home’.

M-PESA is a safe mobile banking facility established to enable Kenyans to ‘bank’ using their mobile phone. M-PESA is an SMS-based transfer system that allows individuals to deposit, send and withdraw money from one of the 90,000 M-PESA outlets located throughout the country. The ‘M’ within the name is an abbreviation for mobile and ‘pesa’ in Swahili means money. M-PESA was developed by Vodafone through funding from DFID and trialled in collaboration with the Kenyan operator, Safaricom in 2005. It was established initially as a facility for customers to receive and re-pay a small loan using a mobile phone but during the pilot phase it became evident the system was being used to send and receive money (Hughes and Lonie, 2007).
Safaricom officially introduced M-PESA into the Kenyan market in March 2007, targeting the unbanked, prepaid segment of the population. In 2012 the Communications Commission of Kenya recorded over 19 million mobile money transfer service users (Republic of Kenya, 2012b). M-PESA offers Kenyans with a secure, cheap and convenient way to store or transfer money. This is particularly significant for lower-income Kenyans who seldom have alternative affordable banking options and incur high costs when transferring money by other methods. It is often difficult for lower-income Kenyans to be considered for a bank account as they cannot always guarantee the monthly bank charges because they do not have a steady income.

M-PESA now facilitates numerous financial services such as checking balances, making deposits, withdrawals, transferring money (both nationally and internationally) and phone credit. To access these services, individuals must register at one of the retail agent outlets. Cash that is deposited (or transferred) is reflected as e-money in a virtual account that is managed by Safaricom. Once an account is established all transactions can be conducted via a mobile phone, which is ‘access controlled’ by a pin number. The pin has to be entered into the phone for every transaction made, a follow up text message is sent for every transaction made. Proof of identification is required for transactions taking place at a retail agent outlet and the transaction number is verified by the user with the agent, making M-PESA transactions safe and secure. If a mobile phone is physically lost or stolen (and the pin number has been protected) Safaricom will reimburse or transfer the cash within the M-PESA account.
Morawczynski and Miscione (2008) conducted research on the use of M-PESA in Kibera between September and December 2007. At the time of their research they found that respondents had reservations about Kenyan banks being involved in ‘tribal politics’ but members of the public trusted M-PESA because of its affiliation to Safaricom. This research took place around the time of the post-election violence and during that period Michael Joseph was the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) for Safaricom, who was South African and therefore he did not belong to a Kenyan tribe and hence would not have any tribal alliance. During their study Morawczynski and Miscione (2008) found that more deposits were being made than withdrawals. Although large deposits were being made, M-PESA users would make several withdrawals, suggesting that the service was also being used for storing money as well as a method to transfer money ‘back home’.

Residents of Kibera are known to store money under their mattress in ‘home banks’. The majority of working residents from Kibera are engaged in casual work or labour and are
usually paid in cash. M-PESA provides an opportunity for employers to pay wages in a safe and accountable way as M-PESA provides proof of payment and it also means that the employee’s wages are stored in a safe location. The NYS that employs youth from Kibera to clean garbage, construct toilets and trenches pays the weekly wage via M-PESA. M-PESA has reduced the amount of cash people need to carry on their person or store within their dwelling, cash only needs to be withdrawn from M-PESA as and when it is required. Carrying or storing small amounts of cash minimises the risk of losing money through being robbed or burgled and it decreases the (cash) ‘reward’ for offenders (Clarke, 1992).

Although very popular, M-PESA is not used for all financial transactions. A business lady who sells household items in Lani Saba explained she does not accept M-PESA payments from customers because it is not cost effective with the transaction fees she would incur for each item sold via M-PESA. Another issue raised about M-PESA was regarding withdrawing money, residents stated they were cautious when withdrawing cash from M-PESA outlets. There are however, options of withdrawing cash from M-PESA outlets that are located within secure malls on the outskirts of Kibera but it is appreciated this may not always be convenient for residents to use.

4.2.6 Crime displacement
Some displacement of crime can be attributed to M-PESA because offenders are confident M-PESA outlets (where cash is deposited and withdrawn) will have money, whereas before they became M-PESA outlets the cash stored at the outlet was unknown and therefore less attractive to armed robbers because they could not be guaranteed a worthwhile ‘reward’ (Clarke and Mayhew, 1980). Criminal access to M-PESA accounts usually occurs through fraudulent means, often by deceiving the account holder to share their details and pin number, as one respondent recalled happened to her. For many residents of Kibera M-PESA will be the first time they have had an account which uses a pin number for ‘access control’ and therefore they would be vulnerable to deception. During the research residents of Kibera did not report being threatened to share their M-PESA details and pin number during robberies. Robberies on pedestrians in Kibera are usually ‘snatch and grab’ and the offender leaves the scene quickly, this is likely due to fear of collective violence against them (Mutahi, 2011b; Plural Security Insights, 2016). However, there is anecdotal
evidence to suggest M-PESA pin numbers and money from M-PESA accounts are being obtained during car-jacking and kidnappings. Although, this is not a new phenomenon, these crimes are likely to occur anyway and the pin numbers for bank cards were, and continue to be demanded during car-jacking and kidnappings (Mathenge-Murigu, 2013; Maina, 2016). However, those who own or travel in private vehicles are more at risk of car-jacking or kidnapping compared to residents of Kibera whose main mode of transport will be on foot or public transport.

4.2.7 Crime reduction and M-PESA

It was evident from analysing the crimes recorded during the research period that robbers are clearly motivated by a ‘cash reward’. Robberies are taking place when it is known people have cash because “they want money”. Due to the lack of crime statistics available as a result of under reporting to the police and a lack of recording by officers when crimes are reported to them, it is very difficult to use crime statistics to demonstrate M-PESA has led to a reduction in robbery, stealing and burglary. However, Mutiga (2014) writing in The New York Times is of the opinion M-PESA has ‘hobbled crime by substituting cash for pin-secured virtual accounts’ and anecdotally residents in Kibera feel that it has reduced the chances of becoming a victim of crime. When lower-income individuals are paid their wages through M-PESA they only withdraw the money from their M-PESA account as and when cash is required, minimising the risk of losing their wages through crime. In a society that is typically cash based M-PESA provides a trusted and affordable banking option for the lower income population. The 157 authorised M-PESA agents present within Kibera demonstrates the high demand and usage of M-PESA within the informal settlement (Safaricom, 2011). M-PESA minimises the amount of cash individuals need to carry on their person both locally and whilst travelling back to their home area, and it offers an alternative to ‘home banks’, so residents don’t need to store money in their dwellings where it can be stolen easily.

In addition to stealing, robbery and burglary this study also identified a high incidence rate of sexual offences occurring within Kibera. Whilst there are methods of situational crime prevention that can deter potential sex offenders, such as rape alarms and CCTV, or
projects like the slum up-grading project previously mentioned, it is proposed a broader perspective on crime prevention needs to be taken for sexual offences.

4.3 Sexual offences

An area of contention in Kenya at this time is the ambiguity surrounding legal definitions of sexual offences within the penal code (Republic of Kenya, 2014; Respondent PS5, 2015). The findings from a nationwide survey conducted in 2010 (in collaboration with the Kenya National Bureau of statistics) indicated that violence and sexual violence against children is a serious ongoing issue in Kenya. The survey found that three out of ten young female respondents and nearly two out of every ten young males had experienced at least one case of sexual violence prior to the age of 18 years (UNICEF et al, 2012).

During their nationwide survey the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) et al (2012, p. 5) defined sexual violence and exploitation against children as:

*Including all forms of sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children. This encompasses a range of offences, including completed non-consensual sex acts (i.e. rape), attempted non-consensual sex acts, abusive sexual contact (i.e. unwanted touching), and noncontact sexual abuse (e.g. threatened sexual violence, exhibitionism, verbal sexual harassment). This also includes the inducement or coercion of a child to engage in any unlawful or psychological harmful sexual activity; the exploitative use of children in prostitution or other unlawful sexual practices; and the exploitative use of children in pornographic performances and materials.*

According to AllAfrica (2004) a girl or woman is raped in Kenya every 30 minutes. Sexual and gender based violence is permitted within relationships in Kenya and sex is considered a private issue (Saidi et al, 2008; World Bank, 2011) hence domestic and sexual violence within relationships are not usually discussed. Whilst sexual offences were recorded during the data collection of this research, it is likely there are aspects of sexual and gender based violence, such as domestic violence that will not have been captured during this study.

MapKibera’s research in 2010 identified and mapped ‘safe’ and ‘unsafe’ spaces for young girls in Kibera. Churches, schools, community centres, youth centres and well-lit areas were considered to be safe spaces. They identified funeral parties as places where young girls were at high risk of violence; this was because young girls who cannot afford to travel to
town to attend discos and clubs opt to dance at funeral parties during the night in Kibera (MapKibera, 2010; Respondent PV4, 2015). The data collected during this study identified significantly high rates of sexual offences within Kibera. One respondent explained:

*When the youth have money from mugging, they go and party and look for women. They get drunk and the next thing is they think they should have a lady, they can rape the lady they find.*

(Respondent DILMM, 2015)

During the period when crime incidents were captured through the diary method two incidents of child rape were recorded within Lani Saba ward. The accounts of these two incidents are shared below:

**Incident 1**

The first incident involved an offender enticing a 6 year old girl into his house and then raping her. When residents became aware of the incident a mob entered the house, beat up the alleged offender and dragged him to the police post in Lani Saba. A young female participant who took part in one of the focus group discussions explained:

*Some wives are up-country, so the men may end up raping neighbours children. They lure them with food. Very common with those who are night guards, during the day they are home. Give them [the child] Ksh 10 [7p] to go and get chips, then rape them. Tell them to come back tomorrow and they’ll get more chips. When parents come home in the evening they are tired and don’t ask the child what happened during the day, they’re tired and go to bed. The children are shy to talk about it so only find out when the child is pregnant.*

(Respondent FGLYF6, 2015)

**Incident 2**

In Soweto East a case was recorded where a father had allegedly raped his 10 year old daughter, whilst his wife, and the mother of the child was away. The daughter reported the incident to the police but on her return the mother intervened and claimed the daughter was lying and the case was not pursued any further. The individual who recorded the incident believed the husband was the breadwinner for the family and therefore it was assumed the mother decided she would prefer to have the husband around and bringing
money in for the family rather than have the police pursue the allegation which could result in the husband going to jail.

During one focus group female participants discussed how children can be at risk of being raped by males living in the same house, including their own father “a man who has children living in the house and wife has been up country may have sex with his children but it wouldn’t be discussed between the wife and husband if the father impregnated his child” (Respondent FGLF2, 2015). A doctor interviewed from a health clinic in Sarang’ombe ward confirmed the high rate of sexual abuse taking place within Kibera. The week prior to being interviewed he had provided medical assistance to a 12 year old who had been raped by her uncle. From his experience the doctor believed most child rape cases are committed by close relatives or neighbours.

**Reporting**

A friend of a respondent from Kianda village had been raped the previous week, and although the victim knew the identity of the offender she chose not to report the incident, or seek medical assistance. It is well known amongst respondents that police officers will take bribes from rapists to drop cases, this was also the findings from the study conducted by McEvoy (2012) in Kibera.

In addition to police accepting bribes from offenders, respondents discussed other challenges involved in reporting rape cases. In relation to a case where a father rapes his child respondents talked about how “sex is private therefore mother/wife may be ashamed to report it [rape of their child] to the police. They may be judged, they could be blamed for not satisfying the husband” (Respondent FGLYF1, 2015) others talked about the challenges of being threatened by offenders “witnesses can be victimised, people know where you live” (Respondent FGLYF72, 2015). In some cases mothers will accept bribes from offenders in order to drop cases.

**Lack of guardianship**

A lot of accommodation within Kibera consists of only one small room, which holds a bed, hot plates (for cooking) and possibly a bench. When provided, the bathing area and toilets
are communal. In cases where toilets are not provided ‘flying toilets’ may be used as an alternative method of disposal for their human waste (defecate in a plastic bag and then throw it) (News24, 2013). A family will often live in the same room, so due to the cramped living conditions when children reach the age of 12 years they are encouraged to move out and find their own accommodation with their siblings or friends, or move in with their grandparents. Supervision of children in Kibera is generally minimal, even when they live with their parents due to people working long hours. When they stay with their grandparents, there is an expectation the grandchildren will provide financially for the family, therefore they have limited influence over the children and when children live alone with friends or siblings there is little to no ‘guardianship’.

Due to children being poor and often unsupervised they are easily enticed by small goodies like sweets or small amounts of money. A representative from KWPF identified this to be a significant problem, she spoke of how children are often left unsupervised because parents spend long hours at work trying to earn enough money to support the family ‘... and in the process children get spoilt. Children are being cheated “I’ll buy you chips, or I’ll give you money”’ (Respondent PV6, 2015).

**Protection mechanisms**

Getting home early was recognised as an important strategy to minimise the risk of being raped. “I try and avoid being raped by getting home early and avoid going out to have fun” (Respondent FGLF1, 2015). When travelling back to Nairobi from ‘upcountry’ (outside of Nairobi) and they are in a position to afford to, the ladies stated they would prefer to stay in a hotel in town rather than attempt to access Kibera during the night. One of the female respondents feels her physical build works in her favour “because of my stature people often think I am a male, only on special occasions would I wear a dress... another good idea is to make friends and socialise with thugs” (Respondent FGLF2, 2015).

**Sexual violence during the post-election violence**

In 2011 Human Rights Watch documented that police officers killed at least 405 people, injured over 500 and raped dozens of women and girls during the post-election violence but allegedly enjoy absolute impunity. The organisation Grace Agenda was established to
create a support forum for rape victims from the post-election violence. In July 2015 the researcher was invited to join a private and confidential meeting the Grace Agenda had arranged with victims from Kibera and Dandora who had been raped by police officers during the post-election violence. During this meeting 35 new cases were identified, five of which were male victims.

The Grace Agenda was following up on these cases because the vetting process of police officers had started as part of the police reform (this is discussed in more detail in the following chapter). Hence it was an opportunity to raise complaints and identify perpetrators who were still serving as police officers. Unfortunately the identification of offending officers will be difficult because officers have nicknames in the informal settlements and their real names are not known, plus some of the offending officers were wearing their riot gear when they raped people, hence it would be unlikely they would be recognised again. Another issue is that police officers were deployed to Nairobi from other areas of the country in response to the post-election violence and there was a lack of command and control over the police officers, so even if a time and location of a rape was accurate there is no record or method of proving which police officers were operational in the location at the time of the offence. It is therefore highly likely that the police officers who carried out these atrocities will continue to enjoy impunity and carry on working as police officers ‘serving’ the public.

*Reporting*

Female victims sought medical treatment at Kenyatta hospital but the male victims who were interviewed chose to opt to receive first aid from their neighbours rather than go to hospital due to the homophobic attitudes in Kenya (Lee and Vogt, 2015) and the stigma attached to a man being raped.

*It occurred on 9th February 2008 whilst I was walking down the street in Lani Saba. A group of GSU [General Service Unit] officers came towards me in riot gear, with helmets on. They were destroying everything, beating and stealing, then I was gang raped by the GSU officers. I went to my neighbours for medical treatment and they gave me first aid. I didn’t report the incident.*

(Respondent PV10, 2015)
None of the male rape victims who were present at the Grace Agenda meeting had reported their incident to the police. Some of the women had attempted to report their cases to the police but none of them were successful. As one female victim recalled “I tried to report my rape case at Kilimani police station, the police told me there were too many cases, go away and come back two weeks after. It took me an hour to walk there”. The lady never returned to the police station to report the incident “I didn’t go, my body was too weak. Didn’t want to walk again. I was admitted to hospital for two weeks” (Respondent PV11, 2015).

**Gender based desks within police stations**

It is clearly evident victims are reluctant to report sexual violence to the police due to fear, the perceived corruption of the police and their resistance to carry out investigations. Although the Sexual Offences Act and the Kenya Constitution 2010 stipulate the police and government should offer post-violence support to the victims of sexual violence. In 2004 gender-based violence desks were set up in some police stations to fast track and enhance reporting of sexual violence and rape.

The gender-based violence desks within police stations are a good concept but need to be improved significantly. In 2014 an anecdotal account was provided to the researcher about a lady who was sexually assaulted whilst admitted in a hospital in Nairobi by a male member of staff. The incident was reported within a couple of hours by the victim’s friend to the gender-based desk officer at Kilimani police station. The officer refused to travel to the hospital, which is only one kilometre away from the police station and continued to refuse even when a taxi was offered for her to use. The gender officer stated the victim, who was still admitted in hospital, had to report the incident in person at the police station. The police woman was not at all concerned with the victim’s welfare, or the fact that the offender was still working at the hospital and would likely re-offend against vulnerable women admitted at the hospital (Respondent PV2, 2015).

Ombwori (2009) and 4GenderJustice (2013) recommend that both male and female specialised officers should be available at gender desks within police stations, who have received specialised training. They state the desks need to be accessible to members of the
public but located in private and secure settings. Other areas they identify that need to be improved are the police investigations regarding sexual offences and knowledge of referral systems. However, in order to strengthen the gender based violence desks, financial support is also required. Consideration could also be given to partnering with external organisations such as non-government and community based organisations. The Director of Grace Agenda believes gender based desks within police stations would be far more effective if they were attended by volunteers who are experienced in dealing with sexual offence cases. The volunteers could then work in collaboration with the police officers. Her argument is that victims would be dealt with by compassionate and adequately trained individuals, rather than rely on the police who at this time have limited resources, experience and enthusiasm to provide this service. At this time there is no indication to suggest that the gender desks have been a success (Ombwori, 2009; 4GenderJustice, 2013; Respondent PV2, 2015).

The public’s lack of confidence in the police to deal with sexual offences adequately is understandable given the sexual violence that is committed by police officers with complete impunity. When discussing reporting rape to the police, female respondents stated that “if you report rape, you’ll be questioned “what were you doing there?” and “how come you were the only one raped?” (Respondent FGLF4, 2015). Respondents also stated how the police officers ask rape victims to ‘bring’ witnesses to the police station to corroborate their story. The women who took part in the research preferred to seek assistance from independent protection organisations, as explained by one respondent “it is better to go to CVAW [Culturally Justified Violence Against Women] than the police or Chief because they will be bribed” (Respondent PV11, 2015).

4.3.1 Informal protection organisations assisting victims of sexual offences

*Kibera Women’s Peace Forum*

The group KWPF was established in 2008 by Jane Anyango during the post-election violence, which had created tensions amongst different tribes. After a 14 year old girl was shot and killed by police in Kibera, Jane decided to protest and within a couple of hours she had mobilised 200 women from all different tribes, as Jane states “as women we were united” while the violence around the elections was orchestrated to be divided along tribal
lines (Respondent PV5, 2015). The forum has since grown and continues to grow, every Saturday women from their respective villages within Kibera meet up. The women meet to discuss what has been happening within their communities over the previous week and act as a support network for one another. On one occasion when the researcher was present during a KWPF meeting in Makina village, the women were making a financial contribution to a recently widowed member of the group, each member was contributing Khs 200 (£1.40).

KWPF report cases of violence to the administration and support children who have reported sexual abuse. In May 2015 KWPF were following six ‘defilement’ (rape) cases in Kibera law courts, all of the victims were under 10 years old. In all of these cases the alleged offenders had been charged with ‘attempted defilement’ even though KWPF believed there was enough evidence for the alleged offenders to be charged with ‘defilement’. Jane believes this occurs because of corruption “the police claim they don’t have enough evidence but it is the alleged offender ‘negotiating’ for a lower charge with the police officer dealing with their case” (Respondent PV5, 2015).

Unfortunately, corruption plagues the criminal justice system in Kenya and it is not uncommon for cases to be thrown out of court due to individuals within the system being ‘bought off’ to disrupt cases. For this reason KWPF sees the importance of following cases. In the past in situations where a case is not considered fairly administered the women have protested. This occurred in November 2014 when the case of a 6 year old child being raped by her neighbour was being heard at Kibera Law Court.

The hearing had been adjourned claiming there was no evidence but they were trying to cover it up. The perpetrator had been let out on a bond of Khs 5000 (£35). As a group we knew there was evidence from the hospital and the police but when the case was in court evidence had got lost, we knew the perpetrator or perpetrator’s lawyer was bribing the prosecutor. All the women from KWPF went to watch the case and ended up demonstrating, demanding that the case was judged fairly.

(Respondent PV6, 2015)

As well as staging a demonstration KWPF also informed the media about this case and eventually it took place fairly and the perpetrator was convicted for 15 years. When asked
how the presence of the women from KWPF affected the court case one of the women from the group stated “the women were many, we made sure we attended court, even when they made the timings difficult. We also involved the media in the case” (Respondent PV6, 2015).

Jane and KWPF have supported an Australian lady who was gang raped in Nairobi in 2006. During the first three years of the case she was directly cross-examined by her attackers, the case was restarted from scratch eight times and there were 18 different prosecutors and eight different magistrates. The court case lasted seven and half years, after being warned by the police at the beginning ‘no one wins rape cases in Kenya’. Her attackers were eventually sentenced to life imprisonment although they were found guilty of violent robbery not rape because violent robbery is considered to be a more serious crime (Respondent PV5, 2015; Davey, 2015).

**Mathare Youth Sports Association**

Another organisation supporting rape victims is the Mathare Youth Sports Association (MYSA). MYSA is a self-help youth sports and community development organisation based in another large informal settlement in Nairobi called Mathare. MYSA has over 21, 000 boys and girls actively participating in its football leagues but the project has a wider scope. One of the community outreach services provided by MYSA is a Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV) programme. MYSA staff follow up on SGBV cases within the sixteen zones the project covers within Mathare and refers cases onto relevant partners. Rape cases are usually referred to either Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) or Mama Lucy hospital for medical assistance and provision of a P3 report, which is the medical report required to pursue a criminal case. Obtaining a P3 form from medical professionals can be a challenge in itself. Women from Kibera explained “getting a P3 form is hard, unless you sleep there” (Respondent FGLF2, 2015) another lady explained “they will only take ten people at a time and those that have money bribe to be seen first. People have waited six months to get a P3” (Respondent FGLF1, 2015). This highlights the importance of this process being facilitated and supported through referrals from MYSA. Cases involving sexual abuse of children are referred to IJM who can provide legal assistance to prosecute cases. MYSA provides a trusted, accessible reporting mechanism and has the capacity and contacts to
refer victims for medical and legal assistance and support. The collaboration of these organisations has the potential to bridge the gaps and curtail the flaws that often disrupt procedural justice and legal proceedings in Kenya and allows victims the opportunity for their case to be dealt with fairly.

*International Justice Mission*

In addition to MYSA, cases are referred to IJM Kenya through Community Based Organisations, hospitals and the police. Once they agree to take on a case the client (the victim) is supported throughout the whole process, which will take years, this includes attending court whenever the client is required and provision of ‘after care’. After care is based on the specific needs of the client and may involve paying rent, assisting the family to move house, if the child is potentially at risk, or the provision of counselling. IJM Kenya only have the capacity to cover Kiambu and Nairobi County and unfortunately due to the high number of cases they receive, they do not have the resources to deal with all of the cases referred to them within the two counties. For this reason they usually only take on very needy cases, where the family cannot afford to pursue the case in court. IJM have a range of expertise, their employees include qualified lawyers, social workers, investigators and counsellors. They also facilitate training on justice system transformation; such as training prosecutors how to deal with child victims and how the police should conduct interviews with children.

The protection organisations discussed within this section provide assistance to victims of crime but they also have the capacity to be preventative within the concept of social crime prevention.

**4.4 Social and community crime prevention in Kibera**

Social crime prevention addresses the ‘root causes’ of crime (Hirschi, 1969) whilst community crime prevention focuses on establishing surveillance systems that are supported by informal social control mechanisms (Reiner, 2010). It is apparent there is an overlap between social and community crime prevention in Kibera through initiatives that link social cohesion and improving ‘eyes on the street’, plus strengthening community safety initiatives. In the case of Kibera the concept of social crime prevention has been
explored from the perspective of family structures and values (Hirschi, 1969), employment (Hirschi, 1969) and social cohesion (Wedlock, 2006).

**Family structures and values**

A Head Teacher from a primary school located within the settlement highlighted that “the children come from a slum area and they are disadvantaged. Some don’t have parents, live alone and have bad peers. Some have drunk parents who have no morals, hence many children come from homes that don’t have any morals”. The Head Teacher identified “not being honest” as a serious issue with the students and explained “in most cases they just lie. They will often damage [school] property so they can sell it for scrap metal” (Respondent PV14, 2015).

Youth in Kibera are strongly influenced by peer pressure, this is exacerbated by youth spending most of their time with their peers and having minimal or no parental guidance. Youth who engage in crime usually have disposable cash and often purchase a gun. A gun is symbolic, it enhances your status within the informal settlements and facilitates access into groups who engage in serious crime, such as car-jackings and kidnappings.

> People with guns are respected, others want to be on good terms with people with guns because they are powerful. They could often be gang leaders who are chosen to be part of the gang because they have a gun.

(Respondent CS11, 2014)

As previously mentioned, in addition to providing status vigilante groups and criminal gangs also offer a financial incentive, which is very appealing to young people who have limited employment opportunities (Anderson, 2002; Mutahi, 2011b).

**Employment**

As Hirschi (1969) highlighted large amounts of structured time spent in socially approved activities reduces the time available for deviance. The NYS initiative employs youth from Kibera to clean garbage and construct toilets and trenches, which addresses issues present in Kibera like sanitation. The youth are provided with gloves, gumboots, dusk masks to
carry out their task and T-shirts so they can be identified as being part of the initiative. Thus it could be suggested that an individual who is actively engaged in employment in an activity such as the NYS scheme in Kibera means they have less time and opportunity to engage in deviant activities.

During the field work in Kibera there was a unanimous view that the NYS pilot initiative (that provided work for the youth in Kibera) had positive implications. The NYS website claims that the ‘general crime rate has gone down by ninety percent’ in Kibera because of the NYS initiative (NYS, 2015). One lady from Lani Saba pointed out during a focus group “NYS has really helped us because it tires them [youth from Kibera] out by night”. The scheme keeps ‘youth’ active during the day and provides them with a reliable income that covers their living expenses, resulting in them being less motivated to engage in deviant behaviour during the night, which is when most robberies are taking place. One female respondent who is part of the NYS initiative explained how the guaranteed weekly income of Khs 1658 (£11.40) from NYS provides for her and her son:

Two weeks of the NYS salary covers the rent, one week of the salary covers food stuff and the fourth week provides money to buy clothes for my son. Then there may be a small amount left over after all the expenses.

(Respondent PV15, 2015)

The weekly payment is made via M-PESA (mobile money) which means the transaction of the money is safe, rather than receiving cash at a time and place potentially known to thieves. The money can also be stored securely on their mobile phone, which is highly beneficial in the absence of bank accounts.

A female participant is of the opinion that prior to the scheme “… girls were involved in prostitution and men were stealing but NYS has reduced crime” (Respondent PV15, 2015). Occupying youth through the NYS also means they are less accessible to be hired to carrying out deviant behaviour as explained by one Kibera resident below. His account is in relation to everyday violence but it is also applicable to youth being available for political violence in exchange for a financial reward:
... they were idle and unemployed. When there were arguments, youth would be hired to beat someone up. They’d be paid Khs 2000 (£14) to beat someone up.

(Respondent DILMM, 2015)

This was a pilot project in Kibera that was due to last six months, from January to June 2015. There were concerns amongst residents that the project would finish on 30th June 2015 and crime would increase again. However, in June 2015 it was announced the initiative in Kibera would be extended to June 2016. Although the initiative appeared to be having positive outcomes, unfortunately is very political in Kibera, as the account below indicates:

The situation has improved since the government have come in and the youth are working ... the NYS scheme which has employed youth and made the youth busy and avoids them from smuggling [drug dealing] and burglary.

(Respondent DILMM, 2015)

For the last couple of decades the majority of Kibera’s population have supported Raila Odinga from the opposition party, Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) (Wanga and Achuka, 2013). It has been suggested that introducing the NYS initiative in Kibera increased popularity for the current government amongst Kibera residents. Some have implied that this was the government’s strategy all along and this was why Kibera was selected for the pilot project.

In June 2015 allegations were made by the opposition party, ODM, accusing Ann Waiguru, the Devolution Cabinet Secretary in charge of the NYS scheme of corruption and responsible for the disappearance of Khs 791 million (£5.6 million) of NYS funds (Mosoku, 2015; Ombati, 2016). On 21st June 2015 NYS beneficiaries demonstrated in Nairobi in support of Ms Waiguru and the NYS initiative. The following day members of the Mabani vigilante group, who are present in Sarang’ombe ward and believed to be aligned to Raila Odinga (Wanga and Achuka, 2013) rioted in Kibera and burnt down toilets and any facilities built by the NYS initiative that were benefiting residents. Unfortunately the NYS initiative in Kibera is plagued by politics and what appears to be a scheme that provides employment
opportunities for the lower income population and as a consequence reduces crime, will inevitably be overshadowed and destroyed by politics.

**Social disorganisation**

It would appear politics exacerbates an already fragmented population present within the informal settlement. When Kibera residents are in a financial position to, they move to reside on the outskirts of Kibera where rent is more expensive than inside the settlement but it is more secure (Respondent PV5, 2015; Respondent PS14, 2015). As Kibera is not a formal residential area and the land belongs to the government there is an element of uncertainty over the existence of the settlement. The road construction taking place in Kibera is evidence of that, the government legally destroyed any dwellings that were located along the routes they intend to build roads. This uncertainty contributes to resident’s lack of belonging, social disorganisation and is likely to have an influence on their lack of motivation to transform the settlement.

An example of a socially disorganised community transforming itself is provided in appendix 8. The Balsall Heath Forum was one of the ‘critical cases’ (Patton, 2002) from the UK that the researcher studied, following the recommendation by West Midlands Police’s Community Consultation and Engagement Officer as an example of a successful community safety project. The Balsall Heath Forum was also used in the analysis of community safety initiatives, which can be found in appendix 9.

The success of changing Balsall Heath has been attributed to collective action and buy-in from the community and their desire to make a difference (Respondent CS15, 2015). The example of the Balsall Heath Forum supports the findings from a number of studies which identify links between community cohesion and a decrease in crime (Sampson and Groves, 1989; Wedlock, 2006). Wedlock’s (2006) research (although UK focused) also suggests that an area like Kibera, with a transient population can still have a ‘sense of community’ without having a ‘sense of attachment’.

From the arrangement of the dwellings in Kibera it could be assumed residents would ‘know their neighbour’ because the layout of the accommodation is so close to one
another and there are often communal aspects to the accommodation such as the entrance and bathing facilities but this is not always the case. Many residents of Kibera work long hours, work shifts and only return to their dwellings to wash and sleep, therefore, as many of the respondents pointed out as a resident of Kibera you don’t necessarily know your neighbour. Tom Kagwe (2015) from IPOA had a clear message during the Open Forum on Police Reforms and Police Vetting in Kenya “My suggestion is ‘make Nairobi home’, we treat Nairobi as a passing place but we won’t change anything, need to count it as your home. Let’s own Nairobi”.

Knowing your neighbour

The self-regulating ‘community policing’ initiative, Nyumbi Kumi is essentially about ‘knowing your neighbours’. The initiative (adopted from Tanzania) was announced by the government in 2012 but had not been implemented in the two wards of Kibera where the research took place in 2015. There are mixed feelings from respondents about how effective they believe the initiative will be. One male respondent believes it “will improve community safety by knowing the ten people living on your plot. It will be possible to know the job they are doing, the time you are coming and going; and be able to identify strangers” (Respondent DILMM, 2015). A female respondent is less optimistic and foresees risks involved in sharing information about known criminals, she stated it is “going to be a risk, people keep quiet. You’ll be killed if you’re living with the wrong person” (Respondent FGLF4, 2015). Another young lady expressed difficulties with being able to physically meet with her neighbours, as she has not met her current neighbour as he works long hours. A business lady and single mother of two from Kibera who took part in the research reiterated this point “I leave the house at 7am and return at 7pm, I work seven days a week so no time for that [Nyumbi Kumi]” (Respondent DILSEF, 2015). There are also reservations and suspicion amongst residents about the cluster representative being nominated by the chief rather than being appointed by the households within the cluster. This is because cluster representative is responsible for knowing who lives within the cluster and reporting concerns to the chief. If approached in the correct manner, Nyumbi kumi could encourage social cohesion as was evidenced from the Kirkholt project implemented in the UK. Over the three years the project was implemented the rate of burglary decreased by 75% and interestingly one component of the project was ‘cocoon neighbourhood watch’, which
involved informal surveillance from six adjoining houses to a recently burgled premise (Forrester et al, 1988; 1990). However, in Kenya, at the time of data collection Nyumbi Kumi was generally perceived by residents of Kibera and the public as an approach being used by the government to spy on members of the public (Wamburi, 2013). Nyumbi Kumi has been included within the analysis of the policing and community safety initiatives and can be found in appendix 9.

4.5 Summary
The findings from this research suggest that residents are at high risk of becoming victims of robbery, stealing, burglary (both housebreaks and commercial) and rape. Residents of Kibera have adopted protective coping mechanisms such as not walking at night, paying for ‘protection’ if they have to walk late at night, or walk in a group if it is early in the morning to minimise the risk of being a victim of robbery and rape. Young female residents ‘be-friend’ offenders as a technique to minimise the risk of becoming a victim of crime. Business owners pay ‘youth’ to provide security to their businesses within the settlement during the night to reduce the chances of being burgled.

Situational crime prevention approaches such as the installation of street lights has improved surveillance within the settlement at night and residents believe they have had an influence on reducing crime. Kibera is currently only accessible on foot but the government has started to build roads into the settlement. Future projects proposed for Kibera such as the road construction and the slum-upgrading project have the potential to contribute towards ‘designing out’ crime. According to research participants and the analysis of the crimes recorded in the diaries during the field work, robbers appear to be motivated by a ‘cash reward’. The mobile banking application, M-PESA offers lower-income Kenyans with a secure, cheap and convenient way to store or transfer money. M-PESA therefore provides residents with the opportunity to ‘remove the reward’ of cash from potential offenders.

From the social crime prevention perspective the pilot NYS scheme has created employment in Kibera and residents believe it has had a positive effect on reducing crime but the continuation of the scheme is complicated due to political interferences. It is
suggested a breakdown in family structures and values, a lack of guardianship and social cohesion all contribute to an environment that enables criminality. Kibera’s socially disorganised neighbourhoods would significantly benefit from collective efficacy being improved (Sampson and Raudenbush, 1999). Whilst an element of collective efficacy is likely to be required for a community safety project to be initiated (as illustrated in figure 7), once it has been established it can perpetuate and develop collective efficacy further.
The apparent lack of presence and legitimacy of the police within the settlement has created a security void that is occupied by vigilante groups and protection rackets. The absence of formal mechanisms has forced residents to use alternative means to regulate deviant behaviour. There are a number of informal protection organisations offering assistance to victims of sexual violence and abuse within Kibera and some like KWPF are also in a position to impose informal social control mechanisms. In Kibera collective violence is a common form of informal social control, it is considered by residents to be more effective than relying on poor policing and allowing offenders not to be brought to justice. It is a favoured approach because it means there are consequences for the offender, as many question the legitimacy of the criminal justice system.

The residents of Kibera appear to lack trust and confidence in formal social control mechanisms. Procedural justice within the Kenyan police and their relationship with lower-income Kenyan citizens will be discussed next along with exploring how deviant behaviour could be regulated through community safety initiatives.
Chapter 5: Policing, power and regulating deviance

This chapter will explore the encounters that lower-income Nairobi residents have had with the police and their perception of police legitimacy. It is well documented that Kenyans generally regard the police as ineffective and have low levels of trust in them (Republic of Kenya. National Task Force on Police Reforms, 2009). The investigation of the post-election violence in 2007 and 2008 by the Waki Commission instigated the reform of the police in Kenya, they identified comprehensive internal and external accountability mechanisms were key to ensuring that the police become more professional and more respectful of human rights (CIPEV, 2008).

Whilst attempts are being made to improve police accountability and transparency there still remains a substantial disconnect between the police and public and therefore alternative forms of ‘policing’ are pertinent within Kenyan society. After considering police legitimacy this chapter will move on to consider the findings from the critical analysis of the various community policing and community safety initiatives that have been cited throughout the paper. The discussion will include whether they can play a role in improving social control mechanisms to regulate deviant behaviour.

5.1 Police legitimacy

To explore procedural justice within the Kenyan police this study drew upon Sunshine and Tyler’s (2003) legitimacy scale. The legitimacy scale uses the principle components of trust in the police, obligation to obey and cynicism towards the law (Sunshine and Tyler, 2003). Whilst in western countries, such as the UK there is an assumption that obeying police directives are based on a sense of obligation and shared moral values with the police service, this is not necessary the case in a country like Kenya (Tankebe, 2009). In the context of Kenya members of the public can be subjected to abuse, torture and arrest if they do not follow police directives, even if those directives are illegal (McEvoy, 2012; Human Rights Watch 2011). For this reason ‘obligation to obey’ has not been included as a component for consideration for police legitimacy as part of the research as it is felt ‘obligation to obey’ police directives is not an option for Kenyan citizens but mandatory if they want to avoid abuse and harassment from the police.
Trust in the police

It is clearly evident that respondents who took part in the research are hesitant to report crimes to the police and most stated they do not trust them “by the time you report, there is a thief here, by the time the police come they’ll have had money from the thief and the thief will come for me” (Respondent FGLYM5, 2015). Some individuals believe that criminals are renting weapons and items from the police to carry out crimes. “No one trusts the police. You can’t even know if it is a real police because they have access to police uniforms” (Respondent FGSM4, 2015). People are also reluctant to report a crime to the police because there will not be any action:

Even if you report, they don’t do anything. I was attacked three weeks ago by a rasta man. I was with my friend coming from a party at 11pm in Ayanyi. They beat me and wanted my phone, which they took. I know the guy who attacked me so I reported it to the police. The police said ‘leave that man alone, he’s a dangerous man and we’re going to sort him’. But it was obvious that man had already been to the police and paid a bribe. Before I went to the police he bribed the police. The police officer did not write anything down in his occurrence book.

(Respondent FGSYF5, 2015)

Another respondent stated “it is very difficult to trust the police, I can say they are eating together [with the thugs]. The thugs will give the police something” (Respondent FGLYM4, 2015). Due to the relationship between the police officers and the criminals many of the residents believe they will have more success with the police perusing a case if they report a crime in a different area “if you report a crime in a different area then they are more likely to follow up, especially if you give some money” (Respondent DILSEF, 2015). “Once a thief [the police] knows a thief they want time alone so they can collaborate. The police work together with the thieves” (Respondent FGSYM3, 2015). Michella Wrong (2009) highlights the extent of corruption in Kenya in her book ‘It’s our turn to eat’. The discussion about corruption and the apparent ‘bribe culture’ within the police will be continued within the next section.

Cynicism towards the law and the justice system

During a public meeting in 2015 Wanga (2015) from Usalama Forum asked a pertinent question, he inquired whether “the police [are] charged with protecting civilians or
criminals?” Interactions between residents of Kibera who took part in the research and the police were on the whole negative, residents, both young, old, male and female, do not have a positive opinion of the police or the legal system. A young male resident recounted:

*Police came yesterday, they came to scare me. I was at my relative’s funeral doing the collection. The police came over and told me ‘time to sleep – time was over’ but it wasn’t, I had my permit … They come and harass you, yesterday they put a gun to me and told me to sleep. Yesterday I smelt my grave.*

(Respondent FGSYM3, 2015)

One young man recalled “*I was walking at night last week around 8.30pm, I was going to a funeral. The police stopped me and started harassing me. They took my wallet and said Khs 1500 [£10.50] was too much to be carrying on me. They took my money, slapped me on the face and kicked me before leaving*” (Respondent FGSYM4, 2015).

Respondents were of the opinion that the police are more concerned about their personal gains, rather than acting in the interest of members of the public “*if there is someone dying here and someone selling chang’aa*² [illegal brew] over there, they’d [the police] prefer to go to the chang’aa to get money from them” (Respondent FGSM5, 2015). The police know they are guaranteed to receive a bribe from chang’aa brewers because they have cash available (having sold chang’aa) and will be keen to get rid of the police so they can continue to sell chang’aa to their customers. Respondents feel there is no interest from the police to deal with incidents of crime “*if you’re robbed and a police officer is next to you, he’ll tell you to go and report it to the police station*” (Respondent FGSM4, 2015) the nearest being Kilimani police station, which is nearly an hour’s walk away.

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¹ Alcoholic drink distilled from grains like millet, maize and sorghum. Its production and distribution is controlled in many cases by criminal gangs. The drink sometimes has other substances like jet fuel, embalming fluid or battery acid added to it. The government legalised the traditional home-brew in 2010 but under the condition it must be manufactured, distributed and sold in glass bottles and retailers must display health warning signs.
Community-police relations

During the Open Forum on Police Reform and Police Vetting in Kenya during 2015 a male resident from Mathare (informal settlement in Nairobi) spoke of how police officers should not be stationed for more than three years in the same location. He was aware of officers who had been deployed in the same area for more than eight years but had failed to engage with the community “we have so much information we can give the police, we can give them all the details, they just need to come to the ground”.

This was also the situation in Kibera, when residents were asked what could be done to make them feel safer, accessibility of police officers was raised as an issue, a respondent stated “if someone broke into my house I would not think about calling the police because I need someone who can react at that moment” (Respondent DILSEF, 2015). A participant explained how security could be improved if “… you made a call and police responded, [and] the street lights are replaced” (Respondent PS15, 2015).

It was identified it would be beneficial if the “police moved from their barracks and were present within the community” (Respondent CS10, 2015) as explained by a resident “the public often want to give information but the police are not receptive to the information. The police need to be friendly and then they will learn from the public” (Respondent PS15, 2015). The participant went on to explain “the reception received when in a police station should be friendly. If you walk into a police station they will ask “what’s your problem?” and “who are you?” But it shouldn’t be like this, it should be a friendly place” (Respondent PS15, 2015).

It is evident that there is an absence of a police presence within Kibera and the police are not easily accessible to the residents of Kibera. Residents believed police presence within Kibera would improve security however, “being friendly with the community means transparency and openness between the police and the community … [but] on the other side police need to be fair with the community, people are afraid of the uniform …” (Respondent FGLYM3, 2015). There is currently a complete lack of trust “I would feel safe if those in the security sector were efficient, reliable institutions and there was no corruption and you could rely on them” (Respondent PS15, 2015). The presence of the
police patrolling within Kibera was minimal, one young man explained the exception when there is a police presence “when there is a celebration because they’ll know they’ll get something” (Respondent FGLYM3, 2015).

The police officers based at the police posts covering Kibera are all from outside Nairobi and return to their families and home area when they were not working, as one officer pointed out “there is nothing for me in Nairobi so why would I stay here?” (Respondent PS10, 2015). This suggests there is a lack of representation of the population within the police who cover the settlement. The situation in Garrissa in north eastern Kenya (discussed later) highlights the importance of police in Kenya being representative of the population they serve. During the whole period of the data collection period within Kibera uniformed police officers were never seen patrolling in Kibera, they were only seen at the police posts. The researcher’s field notes recorded only seeing plain clothed officers within Kibera ‘raiding’ a chang’aa (illegal brew) den in Kianda. They were observed walking the chang’aa consumers away in handcuffs, carrying a 20 litre jerry can of chang’aa (in the opposite direction to the nearest police post) leaving the vendor of the chang’aa running after them. The researcher was informed by one of the gatekeepers, who was present at the time that the vendor was chasing after the officers so she could pay them a bribe in order to retrieve her 20 litre jerry can of chang’aa but the gatekeeper believed she would have no interest in paying a bribe to have her customers released from the police.

*Police oversight*

IPOA has been established as an independent body that provides oversight of the police but it is clear they are operating in a very difficult and complex environment. IPOA are crucial in reforming the Kenyan police and are responsible for the transition process from the police moving from a ‘force’ to an accountable and trusted service. IPOA was established by an Act of Parliament (under the Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 147, Act No 35) and have constitutional powers, however a number of key stakeholders raised concerns that even though IPOA have been written into the constitution they need to be careful not to “step on sensitive toes” because they are funded by the government and could be dissolved by them. Although this would mean challenging the constitution in order to change it, some believe this could be possible. IPOA have already received
negative press within the Kenyan media, trying to discredit them claiming IPOA are against the government (Mabonga, 2015).

As part of the police reform a vetting process is taking place, Section 7(2) and (3) of the National Police Service Act states that the National Police Service Commission (NPSC) is mandated to vet all officers and employees within the police service. The vetting process involves all police officers’ being evaluated for their suitability and competency. The NPSC are ultimately responsible for the process but IPOA have had some oversight over the process. The public have significant reservations about the vetting process due to the lack of feedback being made available to the public and the abrupt resignation of three vetting panel members at the end of 2015. IPOA’s involvement in overseeing the vetting process has been criticised and it appears the whole process has (at the time of writing) not done anything to improve public confidence in the police (Nyamori, 2015).

It is hoped in the future IPOA will exists as a safeguard against police misconduct and advance respect for human rights. However, at this time the majority of the general public are not aware they can report police misconduct to IPOA (Kagwe, 2015). During IPOA’s three years of existence their focus has been on establishing the office in the capital. Now the Nairobi office is functioning they plan to introduce awareness campaigns targeting the general public on IPOA’s roles and responsibility (Kagwe, 2015).

Police structure, resources and duty of care
The reluctance of police officers to deal with incidents could be exacerbated by the confusion caused between the Administrative Police and the Kenya Police Service’s roles and responsibilities. The Ransley report identified a duplication and overlap of policing responsibilities and functions between the two units due to the parallel command structures. Recommendations were made within the Ransley report to harmonise the command and control structures of the two units in an effort to minimise confusion (Republic of Kenya. National Task Force on Police Reforms, 2009). Article 243 of the 2010 constitution and the National Police Service Act, 2011 established the National Police Service as a single service, which now consists of the Kenya Police Service and the

It is however evident that there is still conflict between the two units, they continue to function as two different entities, issue conflicting orders, focus on self-preservation and there is widespread mistrust and rivalry between the two units (Hope, 2015; IPOA, 2014). According to Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) there have been a number of disagreements between the two units, resulting in officers from one unit shooting and killing officers from the other unit (Respondent PS3, 2015).

**Resources and capacity**

The police oversight body IPOA and other organisations have raised concerns about the number of police officers within Kenya being below the UN recommendations of 1 officer to 450 members of the public (Kagwe, 2015; CHRI and KHRC, 2006). The Kenyan police are reluctant to disclose the exact number of police officers to the public because they consider the information to be sensitive and a potential security risk (Respondent PS5, 2015). The officers interviewed for this research were meant to work eight hour shifts but this rarely happens due to a lack of availability of officers and therefore the officers usually work 24 hour shifts. The low number of officers is then exacerbated by the distribution of officers. Police officers are often assigned to jobs outside of their remit, for example providing close protection to Members of Parliament (MP), guarding MP’s houses (some MPs have up to seven police officers protecting them), guarding banks or working with private security companies (Respondent PS5, 2015). There are a higher number of officers patrolling in affluent residential areas, compared to informal settlements and significantly more officers in urban areas compared to vulnerable rural areas. NTV reporter Dennis Okari produced a documentary called ‘Serve and suffer: On the fringes of Boni forest, brave Kenya officers protect us despite great odds’. The documentary uses the example of Boni forest to illustrate the challenging circumstances some police officers have to work in. Boni forest borders with Somalia, the forest is 160km in diameter and is known to be inhabited by Al Shaabab militants. Bodhe police post is located in the middle of the forest, it is the only police post that covers the whole forest and operates with only 20% of the police capacity it should be allocated. The officers posted at Bodhei are afraid to use the buildings
to sleep in or as an office for fear of being ambushed, so the buildings are only used for storage. They don’t have clean drinking water and food is difficult to access (NTV, 2015).

During a conference in Nairobi, IPOA highlighted an issue relating to the mental health of operational officers within the service. IPOA stated that recommendations had been made for a unit within the police to be established to carry out psychological testing of police officers but this recommendation, at the time of writing, had not been implemented. As a result, the service continues to deploy armed officers whose mental health is dubious, which poses challenges for colleagues and can be hazardous (or potentially lethal) for members of the public (Kagwe, 2015).

Personal or professional development opportunities for officers is very limited and is only offered to a few senior officers when funding is available from donors (see the NPSC website: NPSC, 2016). If police officers wish to further their education they have to pay for their own studies (Respondent PS4, 2015; Respondent PS8, 2014). Often supervisors are resistant to their officers pursuing studies because they fear their position could be threatened. As some supervisors only have a basic education they can be intimidated by educated colleagues and have been known to re-deploy officers wishing to further their studies to areas where there are no education institutions (Respondent PS4, 2015).

The Ransley report (Republic of Kenya. National Task Force on Police Reforms, 2009, p. 131) also recommended that the police salaries should be improved. It was recognised that the low salaries paid to officers contributes to them being ‘predisposed to corruption, lethargy and inefficiency in the execution of their duties’. Whilst it was acknowledged that better pay would not directly translate to lower levels of corruption, it would make the officers question losing a reasonably well-paid job over misconduct or poor performance.

5.2 Police and the bribe culture
Abuse of power and misconduct by the police in Kenya is well known and documented. It frequently occurs in the form of refusal to record complaints, extorting money and demanding bribes (CHRIPS and APCOF, 2014). Within the Kenyan police the bribe culture is however more complex than demanding bribes only for personal gain. When a member
of the Community Policing Task Force met with junior police officers in July 2015, one of the issues raised was the expectation of supervisors to collect bribes on their behalf. The junior officers suggested they should be disciplined by a member of the National Police Commission rather than their supervisors. They justified this by stating if they had a disagreement with their supervisor they would be posted to a location where bribes were difficult to obtain, like guarding a bank rather than a road block. The consequences of this are that the individual’s revenue potential is significantly reduced and it makes it difficult to reach the targets set by supervisors. Having their line managers being responsible for discipline places the officers in a vulnerable position. If they refuse to collect bribes then their supervisor will discipline them for ‘insubordination’ without having to justify the reason, only stating they disobeyed orders or they will make up allegations against the police officer (Respondent PS4, 2015). This resonates with Bradford and Quinton’s (2014) argument that procedural justice can be just as important within policing organisations and is broader than the public perceptions of police procedural justice.

Usalama Forum conducted research with boda boda riders (motorbike taxis) in Kisii in 2014 and found that each rider was budgeting Khs 1000 (£7) a day to pay in bribes to police officers. In Kisii there are over 10,000 boda bodas and therefore they estimate the police in Kisii could potentially earn Khs10 million (£68,400) per day from bribes extorted from boda bodas alone (Respondent CS8, 2015).

Usalama Forum developed a community safety project with the boda boda riders in Kisii. Part of the project involved the traffic police from the local police station being invited to conduct training for the boda boda riders. Not only did the training educate the boda boda riders about the traffic laws and regulations, it facilitated a mutual understanding between both parties. The boda boda riders knew they needed to adhere to the regulations in order to avoid bribes or being arrested and the police officers knew they could not extort bribes from the riders when they had not broken the law because it had been their own colleagues who had educated the riders about the law (Respondent CS8, 2015).

At the main boarding site in Kisii a chairman was introduced who checks all boda bodas leaving the site with a passenger are legal and records what time they depart and their
destination. The system is an attempt to reduce the number of accidents, crime, plus the
potential for the boda boda riders having to pay bribes. Usalama Forum believe the project
reduces crime because the whereabouts of the riders are known, hence when a crime is
committed the police can be informed of the whereabouts of riders, which can assist the
police but also protect the riders. It also acts as a safety mechanism for the riders as many
have been found dead, having transported criminals; but if the boda boda’s depart from
the boarding site the riders and the passengers are known so they can be traced,
minimising the risk of riders being in danger. Part of the project included training the boda
boda riders about investing money, rather than spending all their earnings, potentially on
illegal activities (such as drugs or purchasing weapons). The riders were taught how to
apply for a savings account and establish a micro-savings group (also known as a
cooperative or a Chama) (Respondent CS8, 2015).

Being informed about the traffic laws by the same police officers who could arrest or extort
bribes from you could make people less cynical about the law and law enforcers and
encourage people to obey the law. Through members of the public being empowered with
the knowledge of what is right and wrong, they can make informed decision on whether
they break the law or not. Should they choose to be law abiding they have the knowledge
to challenge corrupt officers who may attempt to bribe riders for fictitious offences. This
facilitates an environment that is less vulnerable to corruption and has the potential to
promote a more trusting relationship between the police and boda boda riders because
there is a mutual understanding of the law.

5.3 Criminal justice system

It is often alleged that impunity in Kenya is rife and offenders can pay bribes for the police
to disrupt investigations or prosecutors not to pursue cases (McEvoy, 2012). It was
suggested that sometimes complainants will settle matters out of court for a fee and that
it is well known that it is more cost effective for an offender to settle with the victim (or
their relatives) out of court (Respondent PV9, 2015). It is believed this results in cases being
pushed as close to the court date as possible in order for the victim to negotiate the highest
settlement (Respondent PV9, 2015). It would appear getting a criminal case to court in
Kenya is a lengthy and challenging process that requires manoeuvring multiple hurdles and that is before the court process has to be navigated (Respondent PV9, 2015; Davey, 2015).

Witnesses are allegedly intimidated regularly and often refuse to give evidence for fear of their safety. Attending court can be very disruptive and witnesses who are in employment may be worried about losing their job if they are frequently absent, “I wouldn’t want to have to go to court 10 times, most people can’t afford the time and money. It can be so disruptive, you could lose your job over it” (Respondent PV9, 2015). The Director of Aftercare for the International Justice Mission in Kenya, is responsible for supporting families through the court process. She explained how challenging it can be “you can end up going to court for two years and you haven’t even testified yet – when a child is involved and you have the Magistrate not appearing in court, the accused claiming they are not ready, and each adjournment of a case can be four months, people get tired” (Respondent PV9, 2015). She felt the court process had improved in recent years but cases were still taking between two and three years to get through court but a police conviction would usually take, somewhere between three and four years. “The police know the weaknesses in the system and so they can beat it. Before a case against a police officer would take between five and ten years, it was really bad but it is improving” (Respondent PV9, 2015).

Lack of alternative options

Community members do not have the confidence in the police or the justice system for a suspect or a case to be dealt with fairly. There are serious consequences if the police provide the names of witnesses/informants to suspects. The suspects are likely to retaliate and people are afraid they could be killed. This was a common fear amongst participants, as illustrated by one respondent who was a member of the community committee, meaning he had a higher status within the community compared to the average resident:

_There was a time when the community committee wrote the names of suspects in a book and handed it to the police and asked them to investigate quietly but they called the individuals they knew on list to inform them we had given them the list of names._

(Respondent PV15, 2015)
It is therefore understandable why community members may prefer to rely on alternative justice “I can go to a police station but the thug will know. I’d prefer the community to get him” (Respondent FGLYM4, 2015). Some were also cautious about being framed by offenders and the police “sometimes you can report to the police, maybe the thief will make up a story that sets me up with the police” (Respondent FGLYM4, 2015), “Once they [offenders] find out that you reported, you put yourself in danger” (Respondent FGLYM3, 2015) or “sometimes the police just attack you without a reason, they just suspect you” (Respondent FGLYM1, 2015).

The Chief Justice is aware of the challenges facing the criminal justice system and is currently exploring alternative systems to release the backlog within the system. There are plans to integrate the traditional practices within the criminal justice system, which could assist with relieving some of the congestion currently within the courts. However, in order for this to be a success local leaders need to be adequately trained (Respondent PV9, 2015). Those involved in the traditional structures have already started to be included in the training facilitated at the Judicial Training Institute in Kiambu (Respondent PS3, 2015).

5.4 Extra-judicial killings

There are many complexities involved in dealing with security in Kenya, the police working in collaboration with criminals, being reluctant to investigate crimes, referring victims to other police stations and accepting bribes from offenders. It was suggested by some respondents that the other local authority representatives also exacerbate the security situation, “in terms of security the biggest problem is the Chief and Assistant. Chief calls the criminals and is ‘compromised’ they are paid a bribe. For each crime they do, they pay a ‘tax’ but don’t react” (Respondent DISSWF, 2015). On the occasions when police officers followed up on offenders they are seen favourably amongst residents, even when this involved extra-judicial killings.

Frustrations with the criminal justice system could explain the endorsement of mob justice and extra-judicial killings. However, it is acknowledged that extra-judicial killings are not endorsed by all lower-income citizens, there are groups actively protesting against extra-
judicial killings. The production of the film We’re not dogs documenting extra judicial killings in Mathare’s informal settlement is evidence of this (We’re Not Dogs, 2016).

When discussing the police’s role in preventing crime many people responded by stating “when they see them [criminals], kill them” and were of the opinion that “police killing people has made security better” (Respondent DILMM, 2015). One respondent recalled “there was one guy [police officer] who was brought to Kibera in 2014, when he heard about a thug he would visit their parents and discuss. Sometimes he would even give them the fare to send them up country, if they didn’t change he would just kill them” (Respondent FGLYM1, 2015).

Police officers taking the law into their own hands and killing alleged offenders was talked about positively and endorsed, as conveyed by one respondent “there was one good police officer who used to kill thieves” he went on to explain “but people whose kids are thieves went to high ranking officers, having collected money from the other parents of the thieves and got the officer transferred” (Respondent FGSM5 2015). In this situation an officer who was perceived by the community as ‘good’ because he killed alleged criminals, was transferred by senior officers because they accepted bribes to move him.

As Olusegun (2009) identified in Nigeria, increased liaison between the police and certain members of the community can perpetuate crime. Therefore some residents feel assistance from officers stationed in other locations can prove to be more effective because they are not ‘close’ to the criminals. “Sometime last month CID[s] [who do not usually operate in Kibera] shot and killed some of them. They killed them because they were armed with guns. They were shot dead within Soweto West and buried”. The respondent went on to defend the police officers’ actions “the police first came and gave them a warning “stop snatching” they [offenders] were warned before they [the police] acted” (Respondent DISSWF, 2015). Other respondents reiterated this point “the police go and speak to the parents [first] some parents decide to send their children to the rural area at this point as the police say ‘when we come across him again, we’ll kill him’” (Respondent DILMM, 2015). It was acknowledged by some that killing alleged offenders was not a long term solution and was a short sighted way of dealing with the issue because “the problem
is when they shoot one criminal they are now recruiting young boys into that role. It is the seniors in crime who recruit them” (Respondent DISSWF, 2015). These comments indicate, as Rogers (2015) points out, the police often tend to focus on the marginalised in society. Extra-judicial killings is a huge issue that falls under the responsibility of IPOA and NSPC. In 2015 IPOA reviewed a complaint that two students were unlawfully shot and killed in Nairobi by an off duty police officer. The police officer claimed he shot the students because they were involved in a mugging. However, IPOA’s investigation did not find any evidence of this and recommended to the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) that the police constable should be charged with murder. The DPP concurred with IPOA’s recommendation and ordered for the constable to be charged with murder (IPOA, 2015). Whilst this is a significant achievement and an example of IPOA’s potential to investigate reports of misconduct by police officers, this is certainly not an isolated incident, multiple similar cases have been documented in 2015 and 2016 (Ali and Mirodan, 2015). It appears that this case had previously been investigated as part of a documentary made and broadcast by Al Jazeera, which may have influenced and permitted IPOA to pursue its own investigation.

The UN Basic Principles on the ‘Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials’ clearly state that the use of firearms should only be used when there is grave or imminent threat of death or serious injury. Principle 9 of the ‘UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms’ states:

Law enforcement officials shall not use firearms against persons except in self-defence or defence of others against the imminent threat of death or serious injury, to prevent the perpetration of a particularly serious crime involving grave threat to life, to arrest a person presenting such a danger and resisting their authority, or to prevent his or her escape, and only when less extreme means are insufficient to achieve these objectives. In any event, intentional lethal use of firearms may only be made when strictly unavoidable in order to protect life.

(OHCHR, 1990)

The principles also state that under international law, governments are obliged to bring to justice people who have been identified as having participated in extra-judicial executions
and other unlawful killings (OHCHR, 1990). Unfortunately this does not seem to be occurring in Kenya, police officers appear to have complete immunity.

In July 2016 four police officers were charged with the murders of lawyer Willie Kimani, his client Josephat Mwenda and their taxi driver Joseph Muiruri. If the police officers are found guilty, this case demonstrates the level of impunity Kenyan police officers believe they have. On 23rd June 2016 International Justice Mission’s lawyer Willie Kimani accompanied his client Josephat Mwenda to court regarding a trial about police abuse of power. Shortly after leaving the courthouse the two men and their taxi driver were kidnapped. The remains of their bodies, which had been tortured were found on 1st July 2016 in Ol-Donyo Sabuk river. It has been suggested that the police officer whom Mwenda had made the initial complaint against was involved in the abduction and murder of the three men (BBC, 2016; Burke, 2016; Gisesa, 2016).

As stated by International Justice Mission on their website “tragically, Willie, Josephat and Joseph represent just three of the thousands of innocent Kenyans who have suffered under police abuse of power” (IJM, 2016). This case, however, involved individuals who had a certain level of status due to Willie Kimani, being employed by an international justice organisation who have strong international support and human rights networks, but even in these circumstances the perpetrators still felt they would have impunity and get away with abduction, torture and murder. In an online article Amnesty International (2016) state the situation is “a cause for alarm over the state of human rights and rule of law in Kenya, especially in the face of reports suggesting that police officers were involved”.

The legality and politics surrounding extra-judicial killings carried out by police officers, or even the report of ‘death squads’ existing within the police service (Al Jazeera, 2014) will not be explored further at this time. Instead, focus in the following chapter will be given to the public’s ‘acceptance’ or endorsement of police officers to carry out such acts. It is interesting to try and understand how on one hand the general public demand procedural justice and legitimacy from the police but on the other hand they are willing to accept and endorse the police to carry out extra-judicial killings of suspects.
5.5 Policing from the bottom-up

The police reform process in Kenya has brought about a number of improvements to encourage democratic policing principles, but despite these improvements challenges still exist with political interference, corruption, excessive use of force and torture, extra-judicial killings and a lack of effective oversight and accountability. It is also evident that there is a lack of commitment for reform and oversight of the police by members of the government and senior police officers (CHRI, 2014; Alston, 2009). Acknowledging these constraints, the limited resources available to the police and the recommendations made within the Ransley report (Republic of Kenya. National Task Force on Police Reforms, 2009) that community policing should be a central pillar of policing within Kenya, it is important to consider alternative methods of ‘policing’, in addition to the ‘public police’. An example of a community safety project that is considered to be successful in Kenya is described below, this is followed by discussing the analysis of policing and community safety initiatives that have been mentioned throughout this paper. The analysis of the projects aimed to identify key components required for a successful initiative for crime prevention, including their effectiveness for regulating deviant behaviour.

5.5.1 Crisis Response Development Foundation

The Crisis Response Development Foundation (CRDF) have established partnerships with the government of Kenya and the community in various locations in Kenya, including an area on the outskirts of Nairobi in a community called Lemelepo, a number of projects around Nanyuki in the Mount Kenya region and in Kilifi, on the Kenyan coast. The first project was implemented in 2005 and the concept has continued to be developed over the subsequent years. Through the provision of a patrol vehicle and a driver the project assists the police officers to carry out their policing duties. The project enables the police to respond to incidents reported within their operational policing area and carry out policing patrols. The concept of CRDF’s community based project was developed by the CRDF Director, whose experience as a police reservist between 1989 and 2004 informed the design of the project to mitigate the issues and challenges within the Kenyan police.
Project setup

The projects are established on request from the community and only with the agreement and permission of senior police officers responsible for policing the area. CRDF provides the project with a patrol vehicle, a driver and a mobile phone. The driver is recruited from within the community where the project is implemented and is responsible to the community via the committee. The phone is used as a ‘hotline’ phone number which can be used to call and report incidents. The patrol vehicle is fitted with a Global Positioning System (GPS) tracker and a speed governor; these two pieces of technology enable the vehicle’s location to be known at all times and the speed of the vehicle to be regulated, in order to prevent accidents occurring from over speeding. Through collaboration with the airtime supplier Safaricom the GPS location of the phone (and the driver) is also always known. The local police management team are shown how to monitor the vehicle tracking system and manage the speed regulator, with the hope their knowledge of the systems will encourage the police to apply the same technology within their own systems. Prior to the project starting CRDF and the police agree on their responsibilities and how the project will be implemented, however CRDF are never involved with the management of the police officers, this is solely the responsibility of the police.

The challenges of resources available to the police officers (CHRI, 2007) is overcome through the provision of the patrol vehicle and a civilian driver. When an incident occurs community members usually prefer to call the ‘hotline’ number which is operated by the driver rather than the police directly. As the driver manages and takes responsibility for the ‘hotline’, it always has phone credit and will always be answered. In each area the phone numbers chosen for the ‘hotline’ number are always easy to remember i.e. the number for LCPP is 0722123321, 0722 is the mobile prefix numbers which are followed by 123321. The patrol vehicle is located where it is accessible to the police within the community, for example a police patrol base. In some cases where a police patrol post has not been present within the community, CRDF have funded its establishment to facilitate a permanent police presence in the area.

Figure 6 on the next page is a schematic illustration of how the CRDF project functions. Further explanation of the diagram is contained within the text beneath figure 6.
Figure 6: CRDF project

Key:

Arrows from CRDF
This represents the input provided by CRDF. This includes:
1. Approval and buy-in from senior police officers.
2. Provision of a vehicle, driver and phone with GPS tracking devices in the vehicle and phone (these are provided to assist the police officers to fulfil their responsibilities).
3. Support and capacity building provided to the establishment and running of a committee who manage the project resources (vehicle, driver etc.).

Thick solid circular arrows
This illustrates the cycle involved in responding to incidents. A member of the community reports an incident through the hotline number (phone attached to the driver/vehicle), then the police respond with assistance of the vehicle and driver. At the end of a shift the driver is responsible for providing a report on all patrols and incidents responded to during the shift. This report is text to all relevant senior officers in the area, CRDF and the committee. The reports ensure there is accountability, transparency and oversight of the police and their resources.

Images on the right of figure 6
Group of business looking figures represents the community committee who take over the management of the CRDF resources and the project, creating oversight and sustainability of the project. Through the support of CRDF as a committee they gain the confidence to raise any concerns with senior officers.

The arrows between the senior officers and the committee illustrates improved communication. This communication includes reporting any malpractice of police officers including corruption and bribery (see the two figures middle right with a cross through it).

The top right figure with a black cross through it represents community members placing less emphasis on paying for private security companies and preferring to contribute to paying towards the community policing project (i.e. the salary for the driver, maintenance and fuel required for the vehicle) due to it being more efficient, effective and reliable.
A project area is the same geographical area covered by the local chief (local authority representative) and therefore the same operational area as the local police, for Lemelepo per shift two police officers cover an area with approximately 2000 houses. When the community patrol is called to an incident the driver sends a text message to the CRDF Director and the Station Commander, the patrol aims to have a ten minute response time. On arrival at an incident the driver continues to provide an on-going update on where the unit is, to ensure there is accountability. At the end of each shift the driver is responsible for submitting a report via text message. The report is sent to the Divisional Police Commander, Station Commander, Administrative Chief, the County Commissioner (or sub-county) and CRDF management. The report contains information on the time of deployments, police officers present, incidents attended and areas that were patrolled. During patrols the driver also has to visit various askaris (security guards) and watchmen within the patrol area, recording the time and individual they meet with. A written report is then produced at the end of each month.

Management

An important part of the CRDF concept is to minimise the visible presence of CRDF and promote the communities ownership and management of the project; this is ensured through the establishment of a committee within the community. Each committee is known by a name that identifies the project to a geographical area and have the words ‘community’ and ‘project’ included to symbolise assistance for the community. The committee consists of around six people, a chairperson, vice chairperson, secretary, vice secretary, treasurer and an administrator who are all volunteers from the local community. The patrol vehicle is donated to the community and the committee are responsible for managing it. The committee are encouraged to make the project financially sustainable from donation from community members in order to pay for the monthly costs of the project such as, the salary of the driver, maintenance and operational costs of the vehicle.

In Lemelepo the committee and police reported that security has significantly improved. Based on incidents recorded in the ‘occurrence book’ (the book where the police officers record reported crime) crime has reduced by 80 to 90% since the project started three years ago. The main crimes being reported to the police at present are internal issues, such
as house helps/cleaners stealing from their employers. In some areas where the project has been implemented, some community members have decided to stop paying for private security firms to guard their residence and have chosen to contribute towards the community patrol instead as they consider it to be more efficient, effective, reliable and have more trust in the project. For example one resident in Lemelepo was paying a private security firm Khs 11,000 a month (£76) for security, Khs 6000 (£41) for static guards and Khs 5000 (£35) for an alarm, which alerted a response team. However, if you raised the alarm for potentially armed intruders, the private company would take one hour to respond as they had to drive to Ongata Rongai to collect armed police offices before responding to the incident. It was well known this process would take over an hour, offenders knew this and in the past there have been cases where intruders had enough time to cut iron bars on windows to gain access to homes. The CRDF project allows community members to develop trust with the police, which is not possible with the private security personnel, as they are often the ‘insiders’ who provide information to enable a crime to be committed.

Challenges and limitations

One of the challenges faced by the project is financial contributions from all residents. Although the project is for the benefit of all residents, some individuals have the attitude “my neighbour contributes so I don’t need to”. Miethe (1991) refers to residents who benefit from crime prevention measures and community safety projects implemented and organised by others as ‘free riders’.

The community patrol vehicle is the most effective visual representation of the whole project to both the community and the police. The patrol vehicles are all white 4x4 Nissan Patrols with ‘community patrol’ written on the side in black letters. The philosophy behind the project is based around the patrol vehicle and therefore whilst it has proven to be successful in areas accessible by roads it may be difficult to apply the project in areas where there is limited, or no access for vehicles, like informal settlements. Although, the access issue for Kibera should be improved when the road construction has been completed. Sustainability of the project may also be challenging in lower-income areas where
affordable financial contributions towards the operational cost of the project may be significantly lower than middle-income communities.

**Implications**

Whilst the CRDF project has not been evaluated officially it has been positively reviewed by the Cabinet of Internal Security and received an award by the National Police Service in December 2014. The project in Lemelepo has demonstrated a reduction in crime, through having transparent and accountable operational and management systems which ensures a professional police response to an incident within 10 minutes. This has led to improved relations, trust and communication between the community and the police. The ‘community patrol’ vehicle, owned and managed by the community it serves provides unbiased access to effective police services. The CRDF concept acts as a subtle catalyst towards establishing socially acceptable policing practices.

Given the acknowledged success and support of the project by the Cabinet of Internal Security and the National Police Service, this project has the potential to be implemented in communities accessible by road throughout Kenya, where there is community efficacy, the project is driven by the community and there is resource mobilisation.

**5.5.2 Community safety: Elements of a successful crime prevention initiative**

From the distinction used between policing and community safety projects in the analysis of the ten projects (see appendix 9) it was evident that ‘community safety projects’ were more likely to be effective at preventing crime, compared to policing projects. This would strongly suggest projects initiated by the community and implemented from a bottom-up approach were more likely to be successful.

A key issue relating to insecurity in Nairobi appears to be corruption and a lack of procedural justice by the police (Hope, 2015). A lack of trust and confidence may also be a contributing factor for the policing projects to have been less effective, because they were initiated by the state and implemented using a top down approach by the police or the government (in the case of Nyumbi Kumi). It is also worth querying whether a project
implemented by the police would knowingly incorporate mechanisms to regulate their own behaviour. This was considered to be one of the main causes why the KHRC community policing project failed (Ruteere & Pommerolle, 2003). It is recognised that the public are more willing to cooperate and support the police when they are considered to be legitimate (Sunshine and Tyler, 2003). It is apparent that procedural justice is a pivotal issue when attempting to improve community – police relations in Kenya, therefore procedural justice was considered to be an important factor to include in the analysis of the community safety initiatives.

Community collective action to initiate a community safety project demonstrates a level of collective efficacy within a community. Nearly all of the community safety projects that were considered to be effective, were driven by the community. It was clearly evident that a project was more likely to succeed if it was led by a member (or members) of the community as opposed to an individual or organisation external to the community, as identified by Brown and Kulig (1996).

The sustainability of a project appears to be linked to collective efficacy and resources. If there is a shared expectation and an investment of resources, whether that is time, money or items it would suggest that residents want to deal with the issue and therefore the project is more likely to be sustainable (if required) and succeed. Community safety initiatives appeared to be more successful when resources were mobilised from within the community, rather than relying on, or in the case of the Saferworld project demanding, resources from outside. In the case of the CRDF project initial start-up resources were required externally but they were handed over to the community under an agreement they would be managed and maintained by the community through them mobilising their own resources. When resources are generated or maintained by the community it demonstrates an investment and therefore motivation to ensure the project succeeds to meet the community’s needs and expectations (Cain, 2000). However, as Cain (2000) identifies this can be a challenge for poorer neighbourhoods, particularly in a country like Kenya. This was identified as one of the limitations of the CRDF project along with requiring vehicle access for the project to be implemented.
5.6 Summary

According to the findings from this research the police are not viewed as legitimate by the residents of Kibera (Sunshine and Tyler, 2003). Residents are reluctant to share information due to the fear of being falsely accused of offences or reprisal from criminals.

Residents are of the opinion the police are working in collaboration with criminals and therefore operate in their favour rather than the general public. There was a common belief amongst Kibera residents that there is an absence of the police, both their physical presence and the access to law enforcers who are willing to investigate crimes. Police officers appear to be unequally distributed throughout the city, in favour of the more affluent neighbourhoods and for the benefit of the rich and powerful (Respondent PS5, 2015). It is acknowledged the Kenyan police are faced with a number of challenges and limited resources but this should not completely impede their ability to conduct patrols and carrying out their duties (CHRI, 2007). It is apparent that when police officers are present in Kibera it often results in extortion of money or extra-judicial killings.

Following the recommendations made by the National Task Force on Police Reforms (2009) the IAU was established to improve internal accountability and IPOA for independent oversight of the Kenyan police. However, it would appear there are enormous obstructions, particularly for IPOA, for them to fulfil their role (Hope, 2015; Mabonga, 2015).

The continued lack of trust in the police and cynicism towards the criminal justice system highlights the importance of considering alternative forms of ‘policing’ to prevent crime. The analysis of the policing and community safety initiatives would suggest a key element that needs to be included relates to procedural justice. The initiatives that were found to be successful had subtle informal social control mechanisms to regulate the behaviour of law enforcers. The components that are believed to be required for an effective crime prevention project in lower-income areas of Nairobi are illustrated in figure 7. The findings from the analysis of the policing and community safety initiatives are explored further throughout the next chapter.
Chapter 6: Policing the police

The analysis of the research findings suggest that the safety of lower income communities in Nairobi can be improved through the implementation of community safety projects. However, in order for the initiatives to be a success the community requires an element of collective efficacy, leadership and the ability to mobilise resources from within the community. The community safety initiatives need to introduce or develop subtle informal social control mechanisms to regulate the behaviour of the police and subsequently the public. These mechanisms need to encourage the police officers to act procedurally fair when administering formal social control methods with members of the public. Figure 7 below illustrates the components required for a community safety project to be successful. The components are discussed in more detail and explored further throughout the chapter.

Figure 7: Illustrates components required for a successful community safety project

(Source: Author, 2016)
6.1 Collective efficacy

According to Sampson and Raudenbush (1999) there are lower rates of crime where there is social cohesion amongst neighbours, combined with their willingness to intervene using informal social control methods, on behalf of the common good. They define this as collective efficacy. When considering Wedlock’s (2006) measurements for social cohesion (sense of community, similar life opportunities, respect for diversity, political trust and sense of belonging) the residents of Lani Saba and Sarang’ombe wards within Kibera significantly lack social cohesion. This is most likely due to Kibera being a highly transient population, having tribal segregation exacerbated as a result of the post-election violence in 2007 and 2008, a lack of belonging, plus a general sense of feeling unsafe and distrust for others within the informal settlement, including a lack of trust in the local administration (chiefs) and the police. The lack of social cohesion and belonging clearly has an implication on crime in Kibera. This was illustrated during an explanation provided by a resident about why witnesses are not willing to support investigations “there is a ‘don’t care’ [attitude] because the person [victim] doesn’t come from their home area. People stay quiet because they don’t know where to start [and they believe] as long as [they’re] not being affected, [they] don’t care” (Respondent PV1, 2015).

Conforming to society’s norms

For Hirschi (1969) the extent of the social bonds that tie an individual to society determines whether or not people will follow society’s rules and values. The findings from this research in Kibera infers that due to the cramped living space, children from 12 years old are strongly encouraged by their parents or guardians to find and finance alternative accommodation. Those that reside with their guardians within the informal settlement are often left for long periods without any supervision as guardians have to spend long hours working to earn a living. Female interviewees from KWPF and doctors expressed concern at the high rate of child sexual abuse within the informal settlement and attributed this largely to children being left unsupervised and therefore they were easily accessible and vulnerable to offenders. In Nairobi the World Bank (2011) recognised that there can be pressure to earn a living and often children take on the responsibility of financially supporting the family or themselves. In these situations parents or guardians can find it difficult to control or discipline their child and there becomes minimal parental or authoritative figures to set
limits on negative or deviance behaviour. It is evident that the disruption to attachment, supportive and social networks has an impact on social control in Nairobi (World Bank, 2011; Hirschi, 1969).

Youths at high risk of offending in Mathare and Korogocho (other informal settlements in Nairobi), who took part in Danish Deming Group’s pilot study discussed how they lacked strong ties with family or leaders but were close to their peers (Respondent CS11, 2014). These youths lacked family mentors and only socialised with friends who were also at risk of (or were) engaging in criminal activities. As the literature suggests rebuilding ties with family and the wider community could assist with strengthening informal social control through providing role models whose influence could discourage the youth from offending.

Objectives of sports organisations like MYSA (football) and EACF (cricket) operating in informal settlements in Nairobi is to provide the youth with recreational interests, which keep them busy but also a key component of the projects are to develop character and provide role models.

However, at the Stockholm Criminology Symposium Hirschi (2016) critiqued his own social control theory by identifying that the provision of recreational activities does not necessarily prevent deviant behaviour, when one considers the amount of time recreational activities take up in an individual’s week compared to the small amount of time it takes to commit a crime. Wikstrom (2016) suggested that recreational activities could also facilitate opportunities for individuals to meet others whom they could commit deviant behaviour with. So whilst these activities could improve social capital, they have the potential to be ‘perverse’ or ‘dark’ social capital (Rubio, 1997). However the sports organisations who were included in this research offered more than providing recreational activities for young people in Nairobi. In addition to MYSA having 26,420 football players (including 6000 girls) playing in 120 leagues in 2015, they had outreach projects within the communities in and around the informal settlement of Mathare, increasing the number of beneficiaries to 30,000. The outreach projects included HIV/AIDS prevention, child rights and protection, ‘shootback’ photography, performing arts and they established libraries and study halls within the informal settlement. They also offered scholarships to beneficiaries through a point system, whereby points were awarded based on the number
of hours volunteered in support of MYSA. These projects offered young people with opportunities, training and supportive mechanisms to report deviant behaviour such as sexual offences through their networks and partnerships (Respondent CS5, 2015). The EACF specifically addressed character development and the cricket coaches are considered by the youth to be role models, who are from similar backgrounds. The attachment and ties developed between one coach (Respondent PV13, 2016) and her students led to the coach preventing a 14 year old girl from engaging in the misuse of drugs and prostitution. Through the trusted relationship that had developed between the cricket coach and the students the coach was made aware of the young girl’s situation by her peers. Due to the coach understanding the context, having local knowledge and contacts she was able to rescue the young lady from the situation and return her home to her mother. A few months later the young lady took the exam for the Kenya Certificate of Primary Education (KCPE) and received one of the top marks in her school, which has enabled her to progress to the next level of education (Respondent PV13, 2016). Widom (2016) talks about the importance of graduation with your school year and how the ‘socialisation of graduation’ can reduce the risk of young people engaging in deviant behaviour.

The findings from this research support Hirsch’s (2016) latest discussion that recreational activities will not necessarily reduce deviant behaviour. However when recreational activities are supported within a structure that clearly defines acceptable behaviour it can improve attachments and ties, and increase social capital through improving trust and civic engagement. This was recognised when MYSA and its founder Bob Munro won the international award ‘Play the Game 2015’. The International Director for Play the Game acknowledged:

*MYSA has created a sustainable framework for the use of sport to promote social progress, environmental protection, education, individual self-esteem, team spirit, health protection including HIV/AIDS awareness ... Bob Munro may be the chairman and main catalyst of this development, but it is the youth of Mathare who ensures that this vision is becoming reality under harsh living conditions, marked by poverty, violence, shootings and crime.*

(Andersen, 2015)
Informal social control

Even with a lack of social cohesion in Kibera there are elements of informal social control that exist amongst residents through organisations like KWPF and in the form of collective violence (or mob justice). KWPF are an example of how the civic engagement of a group of women in Kibera attempt to regulate deviant behaviour. KWPF comprises of women who have shared values and expectation for social norms within their residential area, irrespective of tribe, age and their ‘home area’. The women support one another in times of need, there is mutual trust and expectation that others within the group would assist in times of need. Through informal social control mechanisms KWPF ensure that deviant acts are dealt with procedurally fairly and appropriately by the police and the justice system. KWPF demonstrate how the formation of a group at the community level can fight crime (Lederman et al., 2002) and that collective action is possible within a socially disorganised area of concentrated disadvantage, when personal ties are strong (Sampson et al., 1997).

There is a significant security void within Kibera and cynicism towards the law and justice system amongst residents. Instead of a protracted process that is not trusted, residents of Kibera feel they have limited options to deal with criminals and prefer instant justice through mob justice. Black’s (1976) work identified collective violence as a form of social control that can arise when the law is weak or absent, irrespective of whether there is social cohesion or not. As a male from Lani Saba stated “when people get tired then there will be mob justice ...” (Respondent FGLYM3, 2015). The potential for collective violence is significantly higher within informal settlements in Nairobi compared to other locations in the city. Therefore it is clear that a form of ‘social contract’ has been established amongst the residents of informal settlements, whereby they have their own ‘rules’ and ‘norms’ to deal with deviant behaviour (Wikstrom, 2016). Interestingly, these ‘rules’ and ‘norms’ sanction collective violence against an alleged thief of a mobile phone or a handbag but not against a rapist. Mob justice occurs spontaneously in Kibera and those who partake in mob justice do not necessarily know one another. In this situation three of four components from Hirschi’s (1969) social control theory are absent (or unknown to the individuals involved), because it is questionable whether they would share any attachment, commitment or involvement factors. However, there must be a shared belief that the
behaviour of the individual they are targeting is not acceptable and that appears to be enough for the individuals to engage in this social control method.

Senechal de la Roche (1996) discusses how regular contact in a workplace, organisation or generally within the neighbourhood increases intimacy, he argues that this makes collective violence less likely. However, most employment for residents of Kibera is outside of the settlement, children who are lucky enough to go to school are more likely to attend a government school outside of Kibera because an attendance fee is not charged for primary schools, unlike the privately run schools operating within Kibera. Therefore residents don’t necessarily share the connection of schools or work and as people work long hours they are unlikely to share recreational activities with their neighbours, plus they have limited or no disposable cash available for social activities. In some cases residents have not even met their neighbour.

There are a lack of consequences for carrying out mob justice and extra-judicial killings within the informal settlements in Nairobi. The residents stated the police do not conduct investigations after a death is caused from collective violence. The police may remove the body and take it to the mortuary but no questions will be asked about the incident and because collective violence is generally ‘endorsed’ by the community in Kibera it is unlikely a complaint would be made by residents.

6.2 Procedural justice
The acceptance of community members in carrying out collective violence, may also explain why extra-judicial killings carried out by ‘law enforcers’ are endorsed and accepted by residents of informal settlements.

History and culture of extra-judicial killings in Kenya
Within Kenyan history there is a legacy of extra-judicial killings carried out by the police. During the 1970s and 1980s there was a larger-than-life lawman who served as a police reservist in Nairobi called Patrick Shaw; who was also known as ‘Romeo 9’ (his call sign) and ‘the crime buster’. Jonathan Spangler is researching the life of Patrick Shaw for a book
and documentary. In his online article in the Daily Nation Smith (2013) stated that Pat Shaw “killed Nairobi’s most notorious gangsters and hundreds of others. He was probably the most prolific, if not the most unorthodox, lawman that ever lived”. Even though Pat Shaw died (of a heart attack) in February 1988 and was only a police reservist (as opposed to a salaried full time serving police officer) he remains a Nairobi legend amongst the generations that were alive during that period. Mothers used to threaten their children by saying “be good, or Pat Shaw’s gonna get you” (Smith, 2013; Spangler, 2015). In his book ‘Inside the British Police’ Holdaway (1983) discusses how the British police would often use folktales and stories as a method to maintain their status.

Pat Shaw was a very distinctive man, he was exceptionally large in build, white and British. He had joined the British Colonial Agricultural Service and moved to Kenya in 1955 to work as an Agricultural Officer. However, Pat Shaw was not famous because he was distinctive or that he killed criminals - killing criminals during that time was common practice for police officers - it was because Pat Shaw was considered to be ‘Kenya’s most dreaded cop’ as he had killed so many criminals and for this he was highly respected by senior ranking officers (Spangler, 2015). Before he killed criminals he was known for warning them to leave Nairobi otherwise next time he caught them they would be executed (Spangler, 2015). Interestingly this still appears to be the approach used by ‘good’ police officers before they kill alleged offenders. The legend of Pat Shaw illustrates the history of extra-judicial killings within the Kenyan police and may partly explain the present day acceptance of extra-judicial killings and collective violence against criminals.

Research on police deadly force in Jamaica, Argentina and Brazil concluded that the frequent use of police deadly force is explained by the perceived threat of crime towards the lower-income population combined with public support for law-enforcers use of extreme social control measures (Chevingy, 1990). In Salvador, Brazil Chevingy (1990) found that because lower-income residents were fearful of crime and were dissatisfied with the response from the police, residents demanded increased protection from the police and supported their aggressive control tactics. Unlike the wealthier residents, they

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2 A pseudonym used by Spangler
lacked the financial resources to improve their own security and did not have the influence and status to apply pressure to the police into providing better security.

Facing endemic crime and a lack or absence of crime reduction resources and strategies Paes-Machado and Noronha (2002) study in Salvador, Brazil concluded that many residents approved of police abuse committed against ‘serious criminals’ in the neighbourhood. Residents adopted a ‘get tough on crime’ attitude and saw police brutality against ‘serious criminals’ as a necessary part of a ‘war on crime’. Paes-Machado and Noronha (2002) believe this suggests police abuse does not stem from police authority alone, but also from a larger belief system shared by citizens in which brutality is acceptable as long as it is directed against ‘bad people’. Although, in reality the situation provides the police with the opportunity to also abuse ‘good’ people and engage in corruption.

People tend to define ‘normal’ behaviour in terms of what they expect, what they are used to, and what they believe to be morally acceptable (Morris, 1976). What is considered to be acceptable within society will transfer into what the public will deem to be acceptable behaviour for police officers. Discussing the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) Harriot (2000, p. 64) remarked that ‘The JCF, like society, has become highly tolerant of most forms of corruption’. In Kenya where collective violence is not only accepted but endorsed and corruption is engrained within society and government institutions (Transparency International, 2013; AfriCOG, 2016) it is understandable how the tolerance and acceptance of this behaviour is transferred across to the Kenyan police.

When participants discussed cases of extra-judicial killings and mob justice they had witnessed, they were referring to a response to similar offences, which usually involved theft of a material item such as a handbag or a phone. The researcher was not made aware of any extra-judicial killings that were carried out in response to child abuse during the research period in Kibera. An incident mentioned in the previous chapter was the rape of a six year old in Lani Saba village. Participant DILLSYM (2015) reported that a mob responded by assaulting the alleged offender, then they handed him over to the police based at Lani Saba post (this incident was verified by a police officer based at Lani Saba police post). It is interesting that community members chose to deal with this situation in
this way because they must have had the same reservations and lack of trust in the police officers; as these are the same officers who respondents believe collude with criminals and the officers who accept bribes to release offenders or disrupt investigations. Therefore it is highly likely the suspect accused of raping the 6 year old girl would have been able to bribe the officers to be released and have the case dropped.

Attitudes towards the severity of crimes and acceptance of particular crimes may be a reflection of Kenyan law and sentencing. The five perpetrators who were eventually convicted of gang raping an Australian lady in Nairobi (discussed earlier within chapter four) were acquitted of rape charges but they were found guilty of violent robbery, which carries a higher sentence than rape in Kenya. The perpetrators were sentenced to death but as the death penalty has not been enforced since 1987 the sentence was automatically converted to life imprisonment (Davey, 2015). There has also been another case in the media recently where the perpetrators responsible for gang raping a 16 year old girl were given grass cutting as a punishment in Western Kenya (Howden, 2013b). Following a constitutional claim against the Kenyan government in May 2013 for failing to protect girls from being raped, Kenya’s High Court acknowledged the police’s failure to enforce existing rape laws, the High Court recognised this was a violation of domestic, regional, and human rights law (Equality Effect, 2016).

The billboard in figure 8 photographed in October 2016 illustrates the perceived need from human rights and protection organisations to raise awareness that raping a child is against the law and will result in a jail sentence. The message ‘if you rape a child ... you will face jail’, implies these organisations believe that either offenders are unaware that having sex with a child is a crime, consider it a crime but not something they would go to jail for, or feel they would be immune or could avoid jail by paying a bribe.
The International Justice Mission have qualified lawyers and social workers who support victims of child sexual abuse throughout the whole court process. Due to their involvement with the justice system they also facilitate training on justice system transformation. Every quarter Court User Committees meet all over the country to share their experiences of court. Attendees include magistrates, elders, chiefs, police and representatives from the Ministry of Education. The Director of Aftercare at International Justice Mission Kenya believes this platform could be utilised to raise awareness and begin to change attitudes about sexual abuse and particularly sexual abuse of children. The Director suggests that if the committee were more active they could change the attitudes of the chiefs and elders, who would then have an influence at the grass roots level. It is believed this approach would be far more effective than ‘outsiders’ attempting to raise awareness and change behaviour related to child sexual abuse (Respondent PV9, 2015).

6.3 Community policing
The Ransley report (Republic of Kenya. National Task Force on Police Reforms, 2009) identified that accountability is paramount for the reform of the Kenyan police and based on their recommendation the IAU was introduced within the National Police Service and
two oversight institutions, IPOA and NPSC were established are written into the 2010 constitution. They are mandated to deal with complaints against the police and ensure that justice and fairness is upheld. Another key recommendation was that community policing was one of the central pillars within the National policing policy, which is being facilitated by a Community Policing Task Force (Republic of Kenya. National Task Force on Police Reforms, 2009). The World Bank’s (2011) study found that the majority of residents in Nairobi were in favour of policing that was based on trust and coordination with community actors and groups. During the data collection, discussions took place with residents from Kibera about how the relationship between them and the police could be better. Most participants could not provide an explanation or see how the relationship could be improved unless corruption and the judicial system changed.

A representative of the Community Policing Task Force acknowledged that “in the past the police force has been used as a political tool and interaction hasn’t been good [between the police and members of the public]. This needs to be built on, actions not just words” (Respondent PS4, 2015). The task force is trying to build the relationship between communities and the police, they have been encouraging police officers to interact more with communities and participate in community activities like sports activities and civic awareness.

6.4 Community – police relations

When the Kenyan police are perceived by the general public as unreliable and the most corrupt institution in the country (Transparency International, 2013; AfriCOG, 2016) legitimising the relationship between the police and the community is a major challenge. Saferworld’s community policing project in Kenya is an example of the difficulties of trying to implement projects in collaboration with the Kenyan police. Saferworld faced constant challenges related to a lack of political will and corruption (Respondent CS7, 2015).

Community policing is usually applied when it is possible to build upon the relationship between the police and the public but this is clearly a significant challenge in Kenya. The Kenyan government portrays Nyumbi Kumi as an example of community policing. However it is perceived by the majority of the public to be, as Harcourt (2002) discusses, a method
for the state to advance control rather than an approach that intends to build a relationship between the community and the police (Wamburi, 2013). For this reason the success of Nyumbi Kumi in the future is debatable.

Bringing police forces closer to the community will, according to Friedmann (1992), strengthen the accountability of the police to the public. Although, residents from Kibera who took part in the research were of the opinion that rather than improving accountability, the more interaction the police have with the community the higher the probability the police will collude with criminals. They believe the more time officers spend in the informal settlement, the more opportunity they have to engage with criminals and collaborate in deviant behaviour. Olusegun (2009) had similar findings in Nigeria, through police officers having closer ties with community members opportunities were created for corrupt or unethical practices. The Ransley report (Republic of Kenya. National Task Force on Police Reforms, 2009, p. 131) suggested improving pay and conditions for police officers may reduce corruption within the organisation, although it was recognised this may not necessarily have a significant impact on lowering the levels of corruption, the argument was based on the assumption police officers may question losing a well-paid job. However, as explained by a member of the Community Policing Task Force, corruption is entrenched within the organisation and police officers face the predicament of being disciplined if they do not provide the appropriate amount of bribe money to their supervisors (Respondent PS4, 2015).

The police officers located at the police posts that cover Kibera are from different areas of the country. The officers do not have any attachment to the area or vested interest in the communities where they are operational. Kibera’s residents prefer to observe a ‘code of silence’ regarding criminal activities in the neighbourhood rather than sharing information and intelligence with the police. When community policing was implemented in France one of the factors identified that contributed to its failure were police officers being posted away from their home area and being rotated on a regular basis. It was recognised this was not compatible with officers developing relationships with the communities they were policing (Scher, 2010).
Japan takes quite a different attitude to community policing. According to the Japanese National Police Agency (2016) their approach has attracted worldwide attention and has been adopted in Singapore and Indonesia. Community police officers are often assigned to a Koban’s (police box) or Chuzaisho’s (residential police box) with their families. They are responsible for maintaining the safety of their respective areas by understanding the security situation and dealing with concerns from residents. As the officers are seconded with their families they become integrated within the community. This is one of the factors the National Police Agency (2016) has attributed to the success of Koban and Chuzaisho’s.

The case of Garissa would strongly suggest that deploying police officers to areas where they have a vested interest, could significantly improve police-community relations in Kenya. Garissa is the largest town in Kenya’s north east region and mainly populated by ethnic Somalis. Unsurprisingly, the human rights abuses committed by the police on Somalis has exacerbated the divide and mistrust between the Somali community and the Kenyan police. It has been well documented that Kenya’s security forces routinely carry out collective punishment on members of the Somali communities, based solely on their ethnic and religious affiliation (Human Rights Watch, 2013).

Following the terrorist attack on Garissa University in April 2015, which resulted in the death of 147 people, local leaders demanded that security commanders be from the area (Ombati, 2015). Mahmoud Saleh, was subsequently appointed as the new North Eastern Regional Coordinator and became responsible for all police operations in the north east of Kenya. During an interview Saleh highlighted pertinent issues that had eroded the relationship between the police and the community in Garissa “the problem we have is most of [the] security officials here...come from outside the region ... if you don’t know the culture and the language ...how do you communicate? How do you get information? How do you understand?” he went on to explain “I must win the hearts and minds of the community. They have gotten info and [have] nowhere to take it” (Zirulnick, 2016). Saleh relocated over 300 Kenyan-Somali police officers who were deployed throughout Kenya to Garissa (Zirulnick, 2016) and it has since been reported trust in the police has increased and the community have started to share useful and reliable intelligence (The Star, 2015). International Alert (2016) believe strengthening relationships is key to reducing violent
extremism in Kenya and one of the key recommendations in their report ‘we don’t trust anyone’ is to improve community policing with an approach that is more bottom-up, consultative and inclusive of the community.

Rogers and Robinson (2004) recognise the effectiveness of the police service can be improved through community engagement, when that involves building stronger communities through informal social controls, guardianship and information flows. In the UK context Innes (2006) argues that community intelligence and democratic policing are key to countering terrorism at the present time. West Midlands Police have identified the most effective way to access and build relationships with minority groups present in Sparkbrook, Birmingham is to work through a respected local partner who is trusted and part of the community. Working through KIKIT’s trusted networks within the community has proven to be particularly valuable to the police in relation to countering violent extremism. At the time of the researcher’s visit to the project in July 2015 the collaboration between the police and KIKIT had prevented two vulnerable individuals being recruited and traveling to Syria to fight on behalf of Islamic State (IS).

Resources and capacity

It is recognised that there are difficulties with implementing community policing in fragmented societies (Wisler and Onwudiwe 2009). Currently in Nairobi the distribution of police officers is not equal throughout the city, there is a higher presence of officers in the more affluent areas of the city and there is a significant absence of them within the lower-income areas of the informal settlements.

The Nairobi Central Business District Association project implemented and funded by the business community in the business district of Nairobi illustrates how the wealthier population can obtain biased access to effective policing, at a cost to the general public (Clapham, 1999). In Nairobi when the affluent are not satisfied with the security provided by the police or the state they can afford to pay to improve their situation, whether that be contributing money to equip and resource the police officers operating in their area, pay for the provision of security from a private company or reside and work within the safety of a gated community.
When community policing was introduced in South Africa Minaar (2009) recognised the legacy of distrust between the communities and the police led to a reluctance to work together. There was also the added complication of those who were financially benefiting from the proceeds of crime and illegal activities. There is a strong possibility this could also be the situation in Kenya. The growth of private security firms in Kenya has been well documented. It is highly profitable and the private security industry benefits from insecurity within the country and the ineffective law enforcement (Mkutu and Sabala, 2007; Abrahamsen and Williams, 2011; Kaguru and Ombui, 2014). Vigilante groups continue to take advantage of the security void even though 18 named vigilante groups were outlawed in 2002 (Anderson, 2002). They appear to operate freely in Kenya and some, like Mabani in Kibera actually work in collaboration with the local authority representatives. It has been suggested that vigilante groups are beneficial for the elite for political means, especially around the election period. This has been evident from Kenya’s history of election violence that is usually orchestrated through hiring vigilante groups (Anderson, 2002).

Community policing offers many opportunities for improving the delivery of the police service but as Ford and Morash (2002) acknowledge, the transformation process involved to adopt the community policing philosophy is very complex and is a long term process and requires commitment. Clapham (1999) is of the opinion that police forces of African States have been developed to benefit the ruling elite rather than the citizens of the state, and as a consequence policing is applied unfairly and there is no accountability to the public. Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux (1990) recognise that it is not conducive to introduce a community policing model into a police force that is designed to protect the state rather than engaging with the public.

Trojanowicz (1990) points out that community policing is a philosophy that needs be applied force wide and should be implemented by all police personnel. This requires time to develop the appropriate skills within personnel and the provision of adequate resources. It is acknowledged community policing can be expensive due to the large amount of resources required (Skogan, 2004) and this can be an additional obstacle when attempting
to implement community policing, especially within a police force that is already under-resourced and has limited capacity.

Discussing the current status of the police reform in Kenya Hope (2015, p. 91) explains ‘corruption, brutality, the sometimes senseless and wanton use of firearms, for example, are still rampant and are inconsistent with democratic policing’. Wisler and Onwudiwe (2009) believe when a state is distant, under-resourced, corrupt, weak or biased, police are likely to be ineffective and inefficient and their relationship with communities may be irreconcilable.

The lack of political will and high levels of corruption are hindering the police reform process in Kenya (Hope, 2015). The resistance to the reform means the Kenyan police continue to operate in a regime style rather than applying democratic policing. This has not improved the relationship between the public and the police and it is therefore questionable whether the Kenyan police are in a position to effectively adopt the community policing philosophy. At this time, whilst the police reform is still progressing it is suggested in order to improve the safety of lower-income communities in Nairobi alternative approaches, like community-driven safety projects should also be considered.

6.5 Community safety initiatives

Acknowledging the challenges with the Kenyan police, this research focused on community safety projects predominantly from a bottom-up approach. Involving residents in community safety projects can reduce costs through the community generating resources and volunteers (Skogan, 2004). Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux (1990) recognise that utilising community members and resources not only significantly reduces costs but has the additional benefit of involving people who have local knowledge and a vested interest in making the initiative a success. Projects initiated by the community allows them to identify their own issues and therefore take greater responsibility for crime control (Fielding, 2005). From the community safety projects included in this research it was evident that projects were more successful and sustainable when they were initiated through community action (Brown and Kulig, 1996). As the Chief Executive identified about the Balsall Heath Forum
successfully tackling the crime and disorder issues in Balsall Heath (UK) in the 1990s “the issue had to be dealt with from within” (Respondent CS15, 2015).

The challenges Saferworld faced whilst it implemented it’s community policing project in Kibera, with ‘volunteers’ demanding to be paid to attend meetings, demonstrates their lack of commitment to the project and the necessity for the community to own the project and have a vested interest in it, otherwise it is likely to fail as there is not a bottom-less pot of money that is available to pay the volunteers to continue to attend meetings and pay them for assisting with the project. It is suggested that as soon as the payments stop so will the ‘volunteers’.

Community action usually involves leadership and resource mobilisation, demonstrating a level of civic engagement and trust amongst community members (Brown and Kulig, 1996; Cain, 2000; Wilkinson and Picket, 2010). The Chief Executive of Balsall Heath Forum advises “you need to have people who want to make a difference and are willing to challenge things collectively” (Respondent CS15, 2015). Community safety projects are implemented with the purpose of maintaining a level of social control over deviant behaviour, whether that be through informal mechanisms or both formal and informal.

### 6.6 Regulating behaviour

In Kibera there are various forms of informal social control methods and community safety projects that regulate the behaviour of members of the public. Communities assume that neighbours will live within a set of social norms. When someone operates outside of these norms there is an expectation that these individuals are dealt with accordingly and therefore the community requires a means of regulating behaviour in line with social norms. In Kibera the regulation of behaviour varies depending upon who is ‘regulating’ the behaviour, what they consider to be the ‘social norm’ and their agenda. This differs amongst the various actors like those who were involved with vigilante groups, engaged in mob justice or are part of a community-based organisation. In the villages researched within Kibera the tolerance for robbery was noticeably lower in Mashimoni village. During the data collection there were a number of ‘mob justice’ incidences that resulted in the alleged offenders being killed.
The membership of KWPF represented all of the villages and ethnic groups present within Kibera. The women built social cohesion, developed bonding social capital (Woolcock, 2001) through civic engagement and provided support to one another. There was consensus amongst the women that children should not be sexually assaulted or raped. This is significant based on sexual abuse of a child within Kibera not always being acknowledged as a ‘crime’, or that incidents should be reported to the police or that a perpetrator should be held responsible. With this shared belief, the women from KWPF report and follow up on sexual abuse cases against children that they are aware of in Kibera. Their intention is to ensure a procedurally fair investigation and an impartial trial is conducted. It is also their aspiration that through their actions of being ‘capable guardians’ members of public are deterred from engaging in deviant behaviour.

A number of the other community safety projects that were analysed also had an element of ‘capable guardianship’ with the threat of being seen carrying the consequences of sanctions (Armitage, 2002). The chairman in Usalama’s boda boda project acted as a ‘capable guardian’ monitoring the movements of the boda boda riders and holding them accountable for their whereabouts. The boda boda riders were also more likely to obey the law knowing that there was a mutual, and informed understanding of the law between the police officers and the riders. It is suggested an increase in the public’s perception of police legitimacy encourages the public to obey the law (Sunshine and Tyler, 2003).

In the geographical areas where the CRDF projects were implemented there was a shared understanding amongst residents that the law would be respected. The expectation of residents was that people would conform to the law and those that didn’t would be held accountable for their actions and be dealt with fairly by the police. The CRDF project is a good example of how regulating police deviance and improving formal social control mechanisms through community safety projects can improve the public’s perception of improved legitimacy amongst law enforcers; and subsequently regulate deviant behaviour amongst the public. The police, residents and the occurrence (crime) book in the community of Lemelepo (where a CRDF project was implemented) all claimed crime had reduced by 80-90% since the beginning of the project. The perceived reduction in crime in
Lemelepo was reflected by residents no longer feeling the need to hire private security firms to protect their homes.

Recent cases documented within this paper have demonstrated the level of impunity felt amongst some Kenyan police officers (IPOA, 2015; We’re Not Dogs, 2016; Amnesty International, 2016; BBC, 2016; IJM, 2016), illustrating the drastic need to address the culture of impunity within the Kenyan police. This speaks to Bradford and Quinton’s (2014) argument that procedural justice is also important within a policing organisation. It is suggested that improving procedural justice within the Kenyan police service would have a positive influence on the public’s confidence in the organisation and its law enforcers. The consequences of which, would be that the public would be more likely to obey the law because they view the police to be legitimate (Sunshine and Tyler, 2003).

6.7 Regulating police deviance

The police are known by residents to engage in deviant behaviour, making residents mistrustful and fearful of them and thus reluctant to cooperate with them. If citizens report the activities of criminals, the police often leak their names to the criminals. Residents face possible mistreatment, including violence, by the police when reporting crimes as well as retaliation by criminals.

According to Reiner (2000) the most effective method to regulate potential deviance is through subtle, informal social controls. In the case of Kenya this applies as much to the police as it does to civilians. When the police deal with the public subtle informal social controls are required to regulate their actions and minimise the opportunities available to them to engage in deviant behaviour. The projects that were analysed as part of this research that were considered to be successful all had an element of subtle informal social control over the police’s actions and behaviour within the project implementation area.

CCTV can be a method to regulate behaviour through it acting as a ‘capable guardian’, the threat of ‘being seen’ encourages individuals to police their own behaviour (Armitage, 2002). During 1999 an experiment took place with the installation of CCTV in every cell in the custody suite in Kilburn, north London. The project was sold internally to the
Metropolitan Police as a means of preventing harm and providing protection to officers against malicious claims from those in custody. However, Newburn and Hayman (2002) noticed the introduction of the system regulated the behaviour of all those who entered into the custody suite, including police officers as they knew they were ‘being watched’. CCTV is being introduced in the city centre of Nairobi but a representative from the Kenyan Human Rights Commission raised concerns that some officers are adverse to the introduction of CCTV because they are worried about being caught on camera taking bribes or engaging in other deviant behaviour. As police officers are responsible for managing the CCTV, it has been suggested it works in their favour if the CCTV is not maintained and does not function (Kantai, 2015).

In order for CCTV in Nairobi to act as a ‘capable guardian’ and regulate police deviance, a control measure over the management of the system would need to be introduced by the police to ensure it functions and the footage that is captured is not tampered with. The example of the CCTV illustrates the necessity of having control mechanisms that regulate the behaviour of law enforcers in Kenya.

The community patrol established in Soweto East had an element of informal social control but it is hindered because the patrol are challenging criminals who are armed and use guns to threaten the patrol members. The patrol does not have the status or influence to regulate the police’s behaviour. It would appear the criminals have biased access to the police officers responsible for Soweto East and have the financial means to influence them. As one respondent commented the police “take care of people that give them money” (Respondent PS15, 2015). Unfortunately, it is suspected the project will not be sustainable because of the power dynamics and imbalances of those involved, plus the lack of regulation over the police officers responsible for Soweto East.

Clapham (1999) states that biased access to policing is one of the challenges of the pluralisation of policing, this was the reason the community policing project in Nairobi’s business district is believed to have failed (Ruteere and Pommerolle, 2003). A community safety project needs to be implemented equally and benefit all members of the public. When a specific group of beneficiaries provide resources or remunerations directly to the
police there will be a conflict of interest and the potential for an in-balance of whose safety concerns should take precedence. The CRDF project is an example of where all residents benefited from the project equally, even ‘free-rider’ (as Miethe (1991) refers to them) benefited, irrelevant of whether they contributed towards the project or not. This demonstrates the importance of policing being ‘fair’ to all, and being procedurally fair means providing the same service to all members of the public.

It was assumed informal social control over procedural justice of the police would be irrelevant for the ‘critical cases’ studied in the UK due the UK policing model being deeply rooted in the concept of democratic policing (ACPO, 2012). However, it became apparent that this component was not completely redundant, especially in the case of Balsall Heath. In the 1990’s residents from Balsall Heath felt there was resistance from the police and local authority to deal with the crime and disorder issues and lacked their support to address the issues. The residents realised that police officers, including senior officers, were among the curb crawlers in Balsall Heath “the police used to bring the girls chips and burgers and get services in return” (Respondent CS15, 2015). It was believed police officer’s personal interest in Balsall Heath contributed towards their resistance to change it. The project generated an element of subtle informal social control over the police officers’ actions and eventually the police became engaged and collaborated with residents to address the crime and disorder issues, Woolcock (2001) would refers to this as linking social capital being improved.

One of the control mechanisms used by residents involved recording the registration numbers of curb crawlers in Balsall Heath, including police officers, finding out their address (through one police officer who was willing to assist residents) and then writing letters to the wives of curb crawler’s informing them about their husband’s behaviour in Balsall Heath. Prior to the initiation of the project, the relationship between community members and the police was strained. This was as a result of the police having a lack of understanding about the multi-cultural population present in Balsall Heath, and a communication barrier due to some residents not being able to speak English. The relationship between the community and the police was improved through police officers in their probation being seconded to the Balsall Heath Forum. During the secondment the
officers learnt about the different cultures and practices of the ethnic groups present within the community and trust was developed between officers and residents.

At the time of the data collection in Kibera KWPF were following six child ‘defilement’ (rape) cases to try and ensure the police investigations were carried out fairly and the court cases were not corrupted. The women’s oversight over these cases is subtle, it involves the women following up on investigations and keeping a record of what evidence exists for the different cases. In incidences where investigations or court cases are considered not to be procedurally fair, or there are claims that specific evidence is not available, when it is, the women demand justifications and accountability. On occasions, when deemed necessary this can involve the women demonstrating and involving the media. The actions of KWPF will not prevent the crime of child abuse taking place but the oversight they can provide over investigations and the justice process at least puts some control mechanisms in place. It is hoped this would create some deterrent by making offenders, police officers and lawyers aware that they are ‘being watched’ and will be held accountable.

The boda boda (motorbike taxi) project is another example of informal social controls successfully regulating the behaviour of law enforcers and boda boda’s riders. Boda boda riders have been known to engage in, or transport those who engage in deviant behaviour and the police often target boda bodas for bribes because they carry cash. Informal social control is imposed by the chairman who is based at the boarding station (the taxi rank) regulating the boda boda’s behaviour through ensuring they comply with traffic laws and regulations as they leave the boarding station. The Chairman also provides ‘guardianship’ by monitoring their passengers and destinations. Recording their onward destinations as they depart the boarding stations means the boda boda riders are less likely to engage in deviant behaviour because their location is known but it also protects them from false allegations from the police. The boda boda riders are empowered with knowledge on traffic laws, which provides them with the confidence to challenge police officers, should they act procedurally unfair. It is however worth noting that with the rotation of police officers and movement of boda boda riders it may be necessary for trainings to occur on a regular basis to ensure the benefits of the project are sustained and not lost with the movement of those involved in the initial project.
Subtle informal social controls

To re-visit Jacob (1961) and Reiner’s (2010) work, both highlight the importance of subtle informal social control mechanisms through creating surveillance systems that are supported by the threat of sanctions to manage deviance. In Jacob’s (1961, p. 31-32) explanation she highlights the significance of the subtle aspect using the language ‘intricate’ and ‘almost unconscious’ when referring to the social control mechanisms.

The need for subtle informal social control over regulating police behaviour, rather than control mechanisms being obvious and forced on the police is demonstrated by the failings of the community policing project implemented by Kenya Human Rights Commission. The police became disengaged from the project when the Commission as an institution raised issues of human rights abuses carried out by police officers (Ruteere and Pommerolle, 2003). The objective of the Kenyan Human Rights Commission is to address human rights issues in Kenya and advocate against human rights abuses. In the past the police and the Commission have publicly clashed regarding allegations about abuse committed by police officers. When the community policing project was initiated the Kenyan Human Rights Commission they believed the project would be an opportunity to hold the police accountable for human rights violations but instead this exacerbated the tension between the two institutions and police officers refused to engage in the community policing project.

The culture within the Kenyan police allows police officers to be unaccountable for their actions and enjoy impunity (Hope, 2015). It is therefore not surprising that there would be internal resistance to change, especially when the proposed changes could interfere with officer’s privileges. For example, attempts to reduce bribery and corruption within the police ‘service’ could influence the amount of money attainable to police officers if the opportunities to extort bribes were minimised. It is suggested the authoritarian style, impunity and power within the police ‘service’ in Kenya produces law enforcer with a superior persona. This may be one of the reasons the police have been resistant to obvious control mechanisms that attempt to impose regulations on them (like the introduction of the CCTV and condemnations made by the Kenya Human Rights Commission) and appear to be more receptive to subtle informal social control.
The CRDF projects are specifically designed to ensure there is police accountability using subtle control mechanisms (see figure 6 for an illustration of the project and further explanation). The setup of the project means the police report simultaneously to their supervisors, the community (through the community committee) and CRDF for their time, use of resources and response to incidents. This has resulted in a reduction in bribes extorted or accepted by the police, and police officers acting procedurally fair whilst carrying out their duties within the project area.

Prior to the projects being implemented community members are usually cautious about reporting grievances at the police station because they are concerned they will be intimidated or arrested by police officers. Through the support and capacity building of CRDF and the intricate accountability measures put in place, the committee gain the confidence to raise any misconduct, wrong doing or any human rights violation conducted by the police to supervising officers. This improves communication between the community and the police, minimises the potential for corruption and improves community-police relations. In some locations, like Lemelepo on the outskirts of Nairobi, an office has been built for the committee. The office is located next to the police post to promote good communication and encourage collaboration between the community and the police. The accountability of the project operations is linked between the key stakeholders, who are the community members, the police, government administrators (County Commissioners and area chiefs) and the village elders.

Through the committee residents have the opportunity to voice their needs and concerns. This ensures that the needs of the citizens within the community are prioritised and the principles of the police are aligned with what Manning (2010) considers as democratic policing, matters such as being reactive to citizens’ complaints and concerns, the police being procedurally fair and constrained in dealing with citizens, and are equal in application of coercion to populations. The reduction of the use of private security would also suggest an increase in people’s perception of security and a narrowing of the security void within the project implementation area (Tranchant, 2013).
However, in Lemelepo the level of trust in the police officers and a lack of confidence in their response is still evident by the fact that the community members prefer to call the ‘hotline’ number to report incidents rather than the police directly. The reporting system of the community policing project ensures that not only the responding officers but their supervisors, their supervisors’ supervisors and local government officials are all aware of any incidents that are reported and how the incident is dealt with. As all the reports are transparent and are submitted officially to key stakeholders, at the same time via text messages, the responding officers know they have to be accountable for their actions. Without this control mechanism and the threat of sanctions, Kenyan police officers are known to take advantage of their lack of accountability and their impunity (Human Rights Watch, 2011).

In order to regulate police deviance subtle accountability measures need to be put in place that are not rejected or resisted by police officers, or the organisation. Once these mechanisms are in place an environment can be created that is unaccepting of police deviance that is reinforced by sanctions, should deviant behaviour be engaged in.

6.8 Summary
Adopting democratic policing principles and community policing have been recommended to Kenya as part of the police reform (Republic of Kenya. National Task Force on Police Reforms, 2009; OSCE, 2008). This requires the Kenyan police to become accountable, transparent, protect human rights, act procedurally fair and constrained when dealing with citizens and service the needs of civilians rather than the state (Bayley, 2001; Manning, 2010).

Community policing has the potential to develop positive relationship between the public and the police and consequently generate police legitimacy (Republic of Kenya. National Task Force on Police Reforms, 2009; Kelling and Moore, 1988; Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1990; Friedmann, 1992; Skogan et al, 1999; Rogers, 2006) but its application throughout a police ‘service’ that is in the process of transitioning from a regime policing context, where there is widespread corruption is highly challenging (Jackson et al, 2014; Johnson, 2000). At this time, it is suggested a broader approach to crime prevention should
be considered in order to improve the safety of lower-income residents of Nairobi. However, this approach will not necessarily yield immediate results. Change in cultural attitudes will require strong leadership and clear aims and objectives, coupled with the capacity to ‘weed out’ corrupt practices, whilst rewarding positive, community focused police activities.
Chapter 7: Conclusion

The purpose of this thesis was to critically analyse community safety initiatives as an approach to crime prevention in lower-income Nairobi, Kenya. As Cromwell (2010) states, in order to understand the lived realities of crime, deviance and social control you need to talk to the people that are affected by it. Hence to understand the phenomena occurring in Kibera qualitative research methods were applied to gain the resident’s perspective on the situation. It has been argued throughout the thesis that a community safety approach to crime prevention can effectively improve their safety. This chapter summarises how this task was undertaken and examines the implication of the findings. It concludes by discussing the significance of this study, suggestions for further research and provides a list of conference presentations and articles published as a result of this study.

7.1 Summary: response to research question

To critically analyse community safety initiatives as an approach to crime prevention in lower-income Nairobi, Kenya.

The concept of community safety has provided the scope to consider the diverse security dynamics, actors and social control mechanisms occurring within lower-income residential areas of Nairobi. The various stakeholders involved in ‘policing’ in Kenya require that it is studied within a broad ‘policing’ framework. This research found that five components were required for a community safety project to be successful to improve safety in lower-income areas of Nairobi, as illustrated in figure 9.
Collective efficacy amongst residents has the potential to create ‘eyes on the street’, mobilise resources and encourage informal social control mechanisms. Various academic research has demonstrated a clear link between social control as an aspect of community cohesion, and a decrease in crime (Sampson and Raudenbush, 1999; Lee, 2000; Hirschfield and Bowers, 1997; Wedlock, 2006). Generally residents from Kibera who were involved in this study did not display factors that suggest there is a ‘sense of community’ within their residential areas. The findings from this study supported Hirschfield and Bowers’ (1997) results because even though Kibera is a highly disadvantaged area, there is the potential for the community to have a positive influence on crime prevention, when social cohesion is built upon and bonding social capital is developed (Woolcock, 2001). This research also supports Reiner’s (2010) ideas of requiring subtle informal social control mechanisms to regulate deviant behaviour. In the context of Kenya, regulating the behaviour of the police is just as important as regulating the behaviour of the public.

Ideally the police should become accessible and integrated with communities to improve safety. Community engagement can assist with limited resources and capacity of the police, plus provide an indication of how committed and invested the community are to
improving their own safety. It is suggested that when projects are imposed on communities without requiring any investment from them, there is a high probability that the project will fail. Pino and Johnson (2011) recognise that citizen participation in decision-making processes assists with citizens’ perception about procedural fairness. The police’s performance in fighting crime and the fairness of the distribution of police resources has an influence on whether the police are viewed legitimate or not. Police officers acting procedurally fair strengthens formal social control mechanisms over members of the public, this subsequently increases the risk of being caught by law enforcers and sanctioned for wrong doing, which has positive implications for preventing crime and improving safety through a potential offender making a ‘rational choice’ whether to commit an offence or not (Clarke and Mayhew, 1980). The research question is discussed further by considering the three research objectives for this study below.

To critically examine criminality and its impact upon the community of Kibera.

Like previous studies (SRIC, 2014; MapKibera, 2010; World Bank, 2011) this research identified there is a significantly high rate of robbery, stealing, burglary and sexual offences within Kibera. Unemployment is high amongst residents, those that are employed are usually casual workers or labourers, who receive their wages in cash but have limited ‘banking’ options available to them. Robberies are more likely to occur during the night or early hours of the morning, although crime and particularly robbery can occur at any time. Residents walking out of Kibera in the early hours of the morning (around 4am) are usually traders on their way to the market to buy items from their suppliers and robbers know that these individuals will be carrying cash. Rates of robbery incidents increase over Friday and Saturdays, when it is known casual workers and labourers receive their weekly wage. This was also the findings of the research conducted by MapKibera (2010). Perpetrators of crime are usually young males, often operating in gangs looking for ‘cash rewards’.

Residents of Kibera have adopted a variety of protection mechanisms to deal with crime, such as returning home before it gets dark, ‘befriending’ offenders and paying youths involved in protection rackets for safe escort through the settlement, or for the protection of business premises. Collective responses to robbery, stealing and burglary are present as a result of a lack of law enforcement. Examples of these responses include collective
violence and community volunteer patrols. Whilst both of these represent forms of informal social control attempting to regulate deviance (Reiner, 2000) it is debatable how successful and sustainable these approaches are to reducing crime in Kibera. Basic target hardening methods, like locks on doors and padlocks on communal entrance gates are used, and some shop keepers have amended the layout of their shop to minimise access. However, as most dwellings and business premises are shacks within the settlement, the target hardening options are limited.

Other situational crime prevention approaches present in Kibera include the installation of street lights within the informal settlement which is believed to have improved security through increased surveillance. Considering Wiseman’s (2006) opinion that long term investments in public infrastructure are the real foundation for crime prevention, it is foreseen the slum-upgrading project in Soweto East (if it is completed) will improve security by improving lighting, surveillance and changing the power dynamics amongst residence through removing the ‘space’ for ‘slum-landlords’ to operate in the village. Access within Kibera is currently limited and is only accessible on foot but the government have started to build roads into the settlement which is hoped will improve the crime situation by increasing surveillance and access for police to conduct mobile patrols. Residents believe the NYS pilot scheme introduced by the government in Kibera, which provides employment to youth from Kibera has significantly reduced crime rates.

The mobile banking facility M-PESA offers Kenyans with a secure, cheap and convenient way to store or transfer money. It has been well documented that M-PESA is actively used by residents of Kibera to ‘store’ money (Morawczynski and Miscione, 2008) and ‘send money home’ (Hughes and Lonie, 2007). It is therefore suggested that M-PESA is a useful method for the lower-income population of Nairobi to remove the cash ‘reward’ from offenders who they are at high risk from (Clarke, 1997).

*Critically evaluate formal social control within the community of Kibera.*

The residents of Kibera lack trust and confidence in the police and the justice system. It is clearly evident that respondents who took part in the research that residents are hesitant to report crimes to the police. The endemic corruption in the Kenyan justice system grants
offenders impunity from their crimes with offenders often paying bribes to the police for the disruption of investigations or to prosecutors to affect or stall the pursuit of their cases (CHRI, 2014). The Kenyan police are well known for abusing their power, refusing to deal with complaints, extorting money and demanding bribes (CHRIPS and APCOF, 2014). A bribe culture is entrenched within the institution of the Kenyan police (Republic of Kenya. National Task Force on Police Reforms, 2009; Respondent PS4, 2015).

Challenges within the police have been acknowledged and the Kenyan police ‘force’ is currently going through a police reform. It is recognised that police officers need to take responsibility for the power that comes from being a law enforcer and they need to be held accountable for their actions. These two issues are fundamental to ensure police officers act on behalf of the public good, rather than on behalf of the state, so that trust and cooperation can be built between the police and the public (Bayley 2001; Manning, 2010). This is necessary in Kenya where it is well documented that generally Kenyans regard the police as ineffective and have low levels of trust in them (Republic of Kenya. National Task Force on Police Reforms, 2009). Oversight bodies such as the IPOA and IAU have been established to deal with complaints against the police and ensure that justice and fairness is upheld but they face enormous challenges. Highlighting the importance of developing alternative mechanisms that can also regulate police deviance.

**Critically explore informal responses to crime and criminality by the community of Kibera.**

As a consequence of a lack of procedural justice and the creation of a security void, community members within the informal settlement have developed alternative coping mechanisms to deal with crime in their area. In Kibera collective violence is a common form of informal social control mechanism used to deal with criminals. It is considered to be more effective than relying on poor policing which allows offenders to escape justice. Collective violence is a favoured approach because it means there are consequences for the offender, as many question the effectiveness and also the legitimacy of the law enforcers and criminal justice system.

The phenomenon of collective violence contradicts a number of theories including that of rational choice (Clarke and Mayhew, 1980) and social control (Hirschi, 1966). For example
a youth stealing a low value item (handbag or mobile phone) from a resident in Kibera during daylight hours is at high risk of being caught and subjected to extreme violence or even lynching by other members of the community. This decision to commit the crime cannot be considered rational when the potential risks would significantly outweigh the benefits. The social control involved in collective violence contradicts social control theory as only one of the four components (shared belief) is present. Furthermore, some would argue that as long as there is bribery and corruption in Kenya, nothing will stop the public from taking justice into their own hands (Mosongo, 2014).

Community safety projects offer the scope to improve the relationship between the police and the public (Home Office, 1991), whilst also developing subtle informal social control mechanisms (Reiner, 2010). The analysis of the ten community safety initiatives identified five components that are required for a project to be successful. The project needs to be driven from the community, there needs to be leadership and an element of collective efficacy from within the community, the ability and motivation to mobilise resources and subtle informal social control mechanisms to regulate the potential deviant behaviour of the public and the police (Reiner, 2010). Regulating police deviance should subsequently have a positive influence on formal social control and decrease deviant behaviour amongst members of the public.

7.2 Limitations of the research
Parameters had to be set for this study and as a consequence there are inevitably limitations to the research and particular topics. Even though in-depth qualitative research was undertaken in parts of Kibera, the full complex interactions between the various actors involved in security throughout the informal settlement was not captured. For example within Kibera the safety and security dynamics are very complicated and multifaceted, particularly as there are many vigilante groups operating. In 2011 Mutahi identified at least eight different vigilante groups operating in Kibera alone (Mutahi, 2011a). During the field work some of the groups were active but others were dormant and are expected to revive around the election period, when money becomes available. The gangs have different functions and oscillate between roles of security providers, inciting violence, controlling basic services and extorting money along public transport routes. In order to study the
various vigilante groups in Kibera the complex relationship between the individual members of the gang, their behaviour, their motivations, their functions, political affiliations, their relationship and interactions with the police and their influence over residents, would needed to have been investigated.

There are also different types of protection rackets operating within the settlement that were not included in this research, for example the Masai from Tanzania are paid to protect certain business premises during the night. They are allegedly in Kenya illegally and are difficult to access as they sleep and keep a very low profile during the day. The phenomenon of the security actors was not fully explored during this study. However, the focus of this research was on the residents of Kibera, the potential victims of crime, rather than the perpetrators. It would, however, be interesting to consider the topic of community safety from the perspective of vigilante groups and study the capacity they could offer to improve safety within informal settlements. This is a subject that Mutahi (2011) recommends should be investigated further.

The topic of extra-judicial killings has been discussed throughout this paper. The killings are recognised by community members in Kibera as a way of dealing with (alleged) offenders but police officers are not held accountable and do not face any consequences for carrying out the killings. Relatives of a victim are fearful of being threaten or falsely accused of offenses if they make a complaint. This is understandable given that police officers feel they have the authority to demand money from relatives of the victims of extra-judicial killings for each bullet used to kill them (We’re Not Dogs, 2016). Throughout this paper the discussion on the topic has been limited to the perspective of lower-income citizens. The legality and political implications surrounding extra-judicial killings carried out by police officers has not been explored, and neither has the ‘death squads’ that are alleged to exist within the Kenyan police (Al Jazeera, 2014).

7.3 Contribution to knowledge
This research has contributed to knowledge in two main areas. Recommendations have been made for responses to crime and violence in Nairobi’s poor neighbourhoods to be informed by community-level knowledge and expertise (Ruteere et al. 2013); but it has
been recognised that many of these efforts are undocumented and not known beyond the neighbourhoods (Ruteere et al. 2013; Mutahi, 2011a). It is hoped this research will contribute to the literature on existing community initiatives and responses to deal with crime in Nairobi’s lower-income neighbourhoods, where crime incidents are at the highest.

A key finding in this research relates to community safety initiatives being used to apply subtle informal social controls to regulate police behaviour, and therefore have a positive influence over police officers acting in a procedurally fair way. A core function of law enforcers is bringing the behaviour of members of the public into line with norms, rules and laws of society. However, the behaviour of police officers is a reflection of society and therefore actions and behaviour that is accepted and engrained within society, like collective violence and corruption, will be transferred across to the police (Harriot, 2000). This could explain why for example extra-judicial killings are generally endorsed by residents of Kibera and the extortion of bribes by the police is tolerated. This acceptance highlights the enormous challenges involved in attempting to change societies’ and the police’s attitudes and behaviours when trying to implement police reforms and introduce democratic policing norms.

Community safety initiatives can play a crucial role in supporting democratic policing reforms through acting as liaisons between the community and the police, and assist with developing social control mechanisms and building police legitimacy. This area of research could have wide implications when designing policing projects in countries where police forces lack procedural justice and there are high rates of corruption. This is particularly pertinent for police forces going through a police reform, whereby police deviance and corruption can significantly hinder the process. Applying a community safety approach can improve the perception of police legitimacy through gaining buy-in and support from the community, whilst subtly changing the behaviour of the police officers, if appropriate informal social control mechanisms are put in place.

The findings from this research have policy implications for the policing and security sector relating to the design and implementation of policing, community safety initiatives and the on-going police reform that is taking place in Kenya. However, it may also be worthwhile
to explore the scope community safety initiatives could have over police behaviour, in order to ascertain if their influence is temporary; or whether they could have a lasting impact on the police service.

7.4 Avenues for future research

There are a number of potentially fruitful avenues for future research building upon the findings from this thesis. Two possibilities will briefly be discussed below.

Firstly, police deviance damages the relationship between citizens and the police. Awareness of police deviance undermines the public’s acceptance of police power as legitimate. Poor perceptions of the police reduce the community’s willingness to assist or share information and intelligence. As a consequence of this, officers may form negative opinions about citizens and view them suspiciously. Police deviance creates a vicious cycle of distrust and alienation resulting in a failing in law enforcement and justice. Police legitimacy is highly important for shaping public support of the police and policing activities. There is a limited amount of academic literature available on police deviance and is an area that would benefit from further research (Pino and Johnson, 2011).

Secondly, an emerging insight from the empirical data was the role of subtle informal social controls applied or supported through community safety initiatives to regulate police deviance. A logical step to take this research forward would be to investigate this further. This study found that subtle rather than obvious social control mechanisms to regulate police behaviour was significant. Exploring what constitutes ‘subtle’ and clearly ascertaining what is effective in terms of subtle and non-subtle to regulate police deviance would be useful to investigate. Understanding how people, and in this case specifically the police, respond to different potential mechanisms of social control is important to policy makers, legal scholars and the academic field of social science (Tyler, 1990).
7.5 Conference presentations and articles arising from this study

**Article publications**


**Conference presentation**


## Appendix 1: Phases of the data collection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research method (data collection)</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Timescale (months) 2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key informant interviews</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diary method (village 1)</td>
<td>Lani Saba</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-depth interview (village 1)</td>
<td>Lani Saba</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diary method (village 2)</td>
<td>Lani Saba</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-depth interview (village 2)</td>
<td>Lani Saba</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diary method (village 3)</td>
<td>Lani Saba</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-depth interview (village 3)</td>
<td>Lani Saba</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diary method (village 4)</td>
<td>Lani Saba</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-depth interview (village 4)</td>
<td>Lani Saba</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus groups (x 4)</td>
<td>Lani Saba</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diary method (village 5)</td>
<td>Sarang’ombe</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-depth interview (village 5)</td>
<td>Sarang’ombe</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diary method (village 6)</td>
<td>Sarang’ombe</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-depth interview (village 6)</td>
<td>Sarang’ombe</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diary method (village 7)</td>
<td>Sarang’ombe</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-depth interview (village 7)</td>
<td>Sarang’ombe</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diary method (village 8)</td>
<td>Sarang’ombe</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-depth interview (village 8)</td>
<td>Sarang’ombe</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus groups (x 4)</td>
<td>Sarang’ombe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weekly meetings with elders</td>
<td>Kibera</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 2: Key informants and coding

### Key informant coding: policing and security

#### Policing and Security (PS): Key Informant Interview Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Interviewee details</th>
<th>Date of interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PS1</td>
<td>Dr John Morton, Deputy High Commissioner, British High Commission, Kenya</td>
<td>7th January 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS2</td>
<td>Juma Assiago, UNHABITAT Safer cities</td>
<td>7th May 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS4</td>
<td>Dr Douglas Kivoi, KIPPRA</td>
<td>1st July 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS5</td>
<td>Pamela Inoti, KIPPRA</td>
<td>19th June &amp; 3rd July 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS6</td>
<td>Patrick Mutahi, Researcher, CHRIPS</td>
<td>3rd July 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS7</td>
<td>Camilla Sugden, Conflict Advisor, DFID, Kenya</td>
<td>5th February 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS8</td>
<td>Chief Kariuki, police officer, Nakuru north</td>
<td>21st June 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS9</td>
<td>Police officer, Lani Saba post, Kibera</td>
<td>3rd June 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS10</td>
<td>Police officer, Ayani post, Kibera</td>
<td>19th July 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS11</td>
<td>Tom Maliti, Kenyan Journalist</td>
<td>15th October 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS12</td>
<td>Military Officer, Kenyan Defence Force</td>
<td>24th April 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS13</td>
<td>Mathew Harris, Security officer, Tullow, Kenya</td>
<td>14th November 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS14</td>
<td>Peter Obiero, Community Activist, Kibera</td>
<td>15th May 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS15</td>
<td>Tom Oketch, Founder of the Lavie Foundation, Kibera</td>
<td>16th May &amp; 18th June 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS16</td>
<td>Assistant Chief, Lani Saba, Kibera</td>
<td>20th May 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS17</td>
<td>Pete Martell, APF Journalist, East Africa</td>
<td>19th October 2015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Key informant coding: protection issues and victims of crime

#### Protection issues and victims of crime (PV): Key Informant Interview Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Interviewee details</th>
<th>Date of interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PV1</td>
<td>Founder, Kibera visionary women self-help (Kiviwosheg), Kibera</td>
<td>20th March 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PV2</td>
<td>Jaqy Mutere, Founder, Grace Agenda, Nairobi</td>
<td>8th July 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PV3</td>
<td>HAART Trainer, Nairobi</td>
<td>26th February 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PV4</td>
<td>Erica Hagan, Founder, MapKibera</td>
<td>25th June 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PV5</td>
<td>Jane Anyango, Founder, Kibera Womens Peace Forum (KWPF)</td>
<td>15th May 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PV6</td>
<td>Representative of KWPF, Makina group, Kibera</td>
<td>30th May 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PV7</td>
<td>Health worker/midwife, Freepal clinic, Kibera</td>
<td>20th May 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PV8</td>
<td>Doctor, Kianda medical clinic, Kibera</td>
<td>19th June 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PV9</td>
<td>Director of Aftercare, International Justice Mission (IJM), Nairobi, Kenya</td>
<td>2nd July 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PV10</td>
<td>Male rape victim (Grace Agenda)</td>
<td>8th July 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PV11</td>
<td>Female rape victim (Grace Agenda)</td>
<td>8th July 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PV12</td>
<td>Sara Norlén, Regional Health Advisor, Norwegian Red Cross – Representative of the Sexual &amp; Gender Based Violence Forum, Kenya</td>
<td>2nd October 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PV13</td>
<td>Cricket Coach, East African Cricket and character Foundation (EACF), Nairobi</td>
<td>9th March 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PV14</td>
<td>Head Teacher, Kawangware Primary School</td>
<td>11th February 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PV15</td>
<td>Young female rape victim (Grace Agenda)</td>
<td>8th July 2015</td>
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</table>
### Key informant coding: community safety

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Date of interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CS1</td>
<td>John Sutton, Executive Director, Crisis Response Development Foundation (CRDF)</td>
<td>15&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; January 2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>CS2</td>
<td>Esther Njambo, Treasurer, Lemelepo Community Policing Project (LCPP), Nairobi</td>
<td>17&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; April 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS3</td>
<td>Shadrick Wamutunga, Secretary, LCPP, Nairobi</td>
<td>17&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; April 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS4</td>
<td>Robert Munro, Founder, Mathare Youth Sports Association (MYSA), Nairobi</td>
<td>11&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; April 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS5</td>
<td>David Thiru, Executive Director, MYSA, Nairobi</td>
<td>11&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; April 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS6</td>
<td>Maqulate Onyango, Manager of Youth Rights, MYSA, Nairobi</td>
<td>11&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; April 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS7</td>
<td>James Ndungu, Saferworld, Nairobi</td>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt; October 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS8</td>
<td>Linda Omanya, Usalama Forum, Nairobi</td>
<td>14&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; October 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS9</td>
<td>Michael Warren, UNHABITAT, Nairobi</td>
<td>15&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; August 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS10</td>
<td>Dr Kennedy Mkutu, Associate Professor of International Relations, United States International University, Nairobi</td>
<td>16&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; October &amp; 13&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; November 2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>CS11</td>
<td>Urban AVR Officer, Danish De-mining Group (DDG) Kenya</td>
<td>26&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; June 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS12</td>
<td>Country Director, DDG Kenya</td>
<td>31&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; October 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS13</td>
<td>Irungu Houghton Founder, The Kilimani Foundation Project, Nairobi</td>
<td>26&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; October 2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>CS14</td>
<td>Mohammed Ashfaq, Programme Manager, KIKIT, Sparkbrook, UK</td>
<td>13&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; August 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS15</td>
<td>Abdulla Rehman, Chief Executive, Balsall Heath Forum (BHF), UK</td>
<td>13&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; August 2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>CS16</td>
<td>Chief Inspector Reakes-Williams, West Mercia Police, UK</td>
<td>27&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; August 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS17</td>
<td>Nicola Mahoney, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Safer Merthyr Tydfil, UK</td>
<td>24&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; August 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS18</td>
<td>Lee Turner, Community Speed Watch volunteer, UK</td>
<td>10&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; October 2016</td>
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</table>
### Appendix 3: Focus group, diary method and in-depth interview participants coding

**Respondent coding for focus group, diary method and in-depth interview participants**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Lani Saba (respondent coding)</th>
<th>Date(s)</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Sarang'ombe (respondent coding)</th>
<th>Date(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Focus groups</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>30-40s</td>
<td>FGLM1 FGLM2 FGLM3 FGLM4 FGLM5 FGLM6</td>
<td>3 June 2015</td>
<td>60s</td>
<td>FGSM1 FGSM2 FGSM3 FGSM4 FGSM5 FGSM6</td>
<td>21 May 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>40-50s</td>
<td>FGLF1 FGLF2 FGLF3 FGLF4 FGLF5 FGLF6</td>
<td>20 May 2015</td>
<td>60s</td>
<td>FGSF1 FGSF2 FGSF3 FGSF4 FGSF5 FGSF6</td>
<td>21 May 2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>Young male</td>
<td>20s</td>
<td></td>
<td>FGLYM1 FGLYM2 FGLYM3 FGLYM4 FGLYM5 FGLYM6</td>
<td>3 June 2015</td>
<td>20s</td>
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<td>6 June 2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>Young female</td>
<td>20s</td>
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<td>FGLYF1 FGLYF2 FGLYF3 FGLYF4 FGLYF5 FGLYF6</td>
<td>3 June 2015</td>
<td>19-25</td>
<td>FGSYF1 FGSYF2 FGSYF3 FGSYF4 FGSYF5 FGSYF6</td>
<td>19 June 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diary recording &amp; in-depth interviews</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>40s</td>
<td>DILMM (Mashimoni)</td>
<td>11-18 May/10 May 2015</td>
<td>60s</td>
<td>DISOM (Olympic)</td>
<td>28 May – 4 June 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>40s</td>
<td>DILSEF (Soweto East)</td>
<td>11-18 May/10 May 2015</td>
<td>60s</td>
<td>DISSWF (Soweto West)</td>
<td>28 May – 4 June 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>20s</td>
<td>DILLSYM (Lani Saba)</td>
<td>11-18 May/10 May 2015</td>
<td>30s</td>
<td>DISAYM (Ayani)</td>
<td>28 May – 4 June 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>20s</td>
<td>DILMF (Masimoni)</td>
<td>11-18 May/10 May 2015</td>
<td>20s</td>
<td>DISKYF (Kianda)</td>
<td>18 – 23 June 2015</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Appendix 4: Study information sheets and consent forms

4.1 Study information sheet and consent form: focus groups and in-depth interviews

This informed consent form is for community members who are willing to participate in research titled: ‘Building community safety: A comparative study between Kenya and the UK’.

Name of Principle Researcher: Louise Skilling
Name of University: University of South Wales, United Kingdom
Name of Supervisor: Professor Colin Rogers

My name is Louise Skilling, I am conducting research as part of my studies with the University of South Wales in the United Kingdom. I am doing research on what communities in Kenya can do for themselves to improve their security and safety. I am going to give you information and invite you to be part of this research. You do not have to decide straight away whether or not you will participate in the research, and please feel free to ask me at any time if you have any questions. If these documents contain words that you do not understand please ask me to stop and explain what they mean.

Purpose of the research
It is hoped this research will see if and how communities and their members deal with, or protect themselves against crime and violence. Questions will be asked about the type of crime that affects community members, who are usually the victims or perpetrators and what actions are taken in response to the crimes or violence. It is hoped that what is learned from this community can help others from different communities to improve their safety.

Type of Research
This research will involve your participation in a group discussion that will take about one hour, and possibly a one hour interview at a later stage following the discussion.

Voluntary Participation
Your participation in this research is entirely voluntary. It is your choice whether to participate or not.

Procedures
You are being asked to help me learn more about safety in your community and you are being invited to take part in this research project. If you accept, you will be asked to take part in a discussion with 5 to 7 other people from your community. This discussion will be guided by myself and begin by answering any questions the group have. Then I will ask questions about the crime that affects members of your community and if/how community members respond to them.

The discussion will take place within this community and no one else other than the people taking part in the discussion and myself will be present (unless a translator is required). One individual from the group will be asked if they would like to talk more
about the topics from the discussion and have an interview with just with the researcher.

If you agree, the discussion (and interview) may be tape recorded but the information recorded is confidential and no one else but the researcher will have access to the information and no one will be identified by name on the tape. After the discussion/interview the tape will be locked away in the researcher’s office and only the researcher will have access to it. The tape will then be destroyed after two weeks.

Some of the information provided during the discussion or interview may be used as part of my thesis (written document about the research) however the identity of those involved in the study will remain confidential and no one else except for myself will have access to this.

**Duration**

The research will take place over the next couple of days within your community but in total will take six months as I will be visiting three other communities and conducting interviews around Kenya. However the group discussions you will be part of (if you agree) will be held once and will take about one hour. Likewise the interview (which will only involve one individual from the discussion) will take place once and will also take about one hour.

**Risks**

You do not have to answer any questions or take part in the discussion or interview if you feel the question(s) are too personal or if talking about them makes you uncomfortable.

**Benefits**

Your participation will help me to understand more about how communities can improve their safety. Ideas from the research will be shared with the communities that take part in the research but also organisations implementing safety projects in Kenya. It is therefore hoped that the study will inform and improve future safety projects.

**Reimbursements**

You will not be provided with any incentive (i.e. money/remunerations) for taking part in this research.

**Confidentiality**

The research being done in the community may draw attention and if you participate you may be asked questions by other people. No information will be shared about you to anyone. The information collected from this research project will be kept private. Any information about you will have a number on it instead of your name. Only I will know what your number is and will lock that information away. It will not be shared with or given to anyone.

I will ask you and others in the group not to talk to people outside the group about what was said during the discussion. In other words, I will ask each of you to keep what was
said in the group confidential. You should know, however, that I cannot stop or prevent participants who were in the group from sharing things that should be confidential.

**Sharing the Results**
Some of the information provided during the discussion or interview may be used as part of my thesis (written document about the research) however nothing will be attributed to you by name. The knowledge gained from this research will be shared with you and your community before it is widely available to the public. Each participant will receive a summary of the results, following this the results will be published so that other interested people may learn from the research.

**Right to Refuse or Withdraw**
You do not have to take part in this research if you do not wish to do so. You may stop participating in the discussion (or interview) at any time that you wish. If you withdraw from the study your name will be removed from all the study files however any data collected up to your withdrawal will be kept. I will give you an opportunity at the end of the discussion/interview to review your remarks by providing you with a summary of the discussion/interview; you will then have the opportunity to modify or remove parts of the notes/recording if you do not agree with them or if you did not understand correctly.

**Who to Contact**
If you have any questions, you can ask them now or later. If you wish to ask questions later, you may contact myself: Louise Skilling Tel: 0702649564 Email: louise.skilling@southwales.ac.uk or my supervisor: Professor Colin Rogers Email: colin.rogers@southwales.ac.uk. Any complaints should be sent to the research supervisor, Professor Colin Rogers. This proposal has been reviewed and approved by Ethics Review Committee at the University of South Wales.
STUDY CONSENT FORM

Title of Project: Building community safety: A comparative study between Kenya and the UK.
Name of Researcher: Louise Skilling
Name of supervisor: Professor Colin Rogers

Please (initial/tick) all boxes

1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet dated [DATE] (version [VERSION NUMBER]) for the above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and have had these answered satisfactorily.

2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving any reason, without any consequence to myself.

3. I agree to the discussion/interview being tape recorded.

4. I agree to my anonymised data being used in study specific reports and subsequent articles that will appear in academic journals.

5. I agree to take part in the above study.

Name of Participant ___________________________ Date ________________ Signature ________________

Name of person - taking consent. ___________________________ Date ________________ Signature ________________

Signature of parent/guardian (if participant is under 18 years) ___________________________ Date ________________ Signature ________________
4.2 Study Information Sheet and consent form: key informant interviews

This informed consent form is for individuals who are willing to participate in research titled: ‘Building community safety: A comparative study between Kenya and the UK’.

Name of Principle Researcher: Louise Skilling
Name of University: University of South Wales, United Kingdom
Name of Supervisor: Professor Colin Rogers

My name is Louise Skilling, I am conducting research as part of my studies with the University of South Wales in the United Kingdom. I am doing research on what communities in Kenya can do for themselves to improve their security and safety. I am going to give you information and invite you to be part of this research. You do not have to decide straight away whether or not you will participate in the research, and please feel free to ask me at any time if you have any questions. If these documents contain words that you do not understand please ask me to stop and explain what they mean.

Purpose of the research
It is hoped this research will see if and how communities and their members deal with, or protect themselves against crime and violence. Questions will be asked about the type of crime that occurs in this area, who are the perceived victims and perpetrators and what actions are taken in response to the crimes or violence. It is hoped that what is learned from this study can inform future community safety projects.

Type of Research
This research will involve your participation in a one to one interview that will take approximately one hour.

Voluntary Participation
Your participation in this research is entirely voluntary. It is your choice whether to participate or not.

Procedures
You are being asked to help me learn more about community safety and you are being invited to take part in this research project. If you accept, you will be asked to take part in an interview with me. Some of the information provided during the interview may be used as part of my thesis (written document about the research) however the identity of those involved in the study will remain confidential and no one else except for myself will have access to this.

If you agree, the interview may be tape recorded but the information recorded is confidential and no one else but the researcher will have access to the information and no one will be identified by name on the tape. After the interview the tape will be locked away in the researcher’s office and only the researcher will have access to it. The tape will then be destroyed after two weeks.
Duration
The research will take a total of six months as I will be visiting four communities and conducting interviews around Kenya. However the interview you will be part of (if you agree) will be held once and will take about one hour.

Risks
You do not have to answer any questions or take part in the interview if you feel the question(s) are too personal or if talking about them makes you uncomfortable.

Benefits
Your participation will help me to understand more about how communities can improve their safety. Ideas from the research will be shared with the participants and communities that take part in the research but also organisations implementing safety projects in Kenya. It is therefore hoped that the study will inform and improve future safety projects.

Reimbursements
You will not be provided with any incentive (i.e. money/remunerations) for taking part in this research.

Confidentiality
The interview may draw attention and if you participate you may be asked questions by other people. No information will be shared about you to anyone. The information collected from this research project will be kept private. Any information about you will have a number on it instead of your name. Only I will know what your number is and will lock that information away. It will not be shared with or given to anyone.

Sharing the Results
Some of the information provided during the interview may be used as part of my thesis (written document about the research) however nothing will be attributed to you by name but if consented to, your position and name of organisation will be cited. The knowledge gained from this research will be shared with you before it is widely available to the public. Each participant will receive a summary of the results, following this the results will be published so that other interested people may learn from the research.

Right to Refuse or Withdraw
You do not have to take part in this research if you do not wish to do so. You may stop participating in the interview at any time that you wish. If you withdraw from the study your name will be removed from all the study files however any data collected up to your withdrawal will be kept. I will give you an opportunity at the end of the interview to review your remarks by providing you with a summary of the interview; you will then have the opportunity to modify or remove parts of the notes/recording if you do not agree with them or if you did not understand correctly.
Who to Contact

If you have any questions, you can ask them now or later. If you wish to ask questions later, you may contact myself: Louise Skilling Tel: 0702649564 Email: louise.skilling@southwales.ac.uk or my supervisor: Professor Colin Rogers Email: colin.rogers@southwales.ac.uk. Any complaints should be sent to the research supervisor, Professor Colin Rogers. This proposal has been reviewed and approved by Ethics Review Committee at the University of South Wales.
STUDY CONSENT FORM

Title of Project: Building community safety: A comparative study between Kenya and the UK.

Name of Researcher: Louise Skill

Name of supervisor: Professor Colin Rogers

Please (initial/tick) all boxes

1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet dated (version1) for the above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and have had these answered satisfactorily.

2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving any reason, without any consequence to myself.

3. I agree to the interview being tape recorded.

4. I agree to my anonymised data being used in study specific reports and subsequent articles that will appear in academic journals.

5. I agree to take part in the above study.

Name of Participant ___________________ Date ________________
Signature

_________________ Date __________________
Name of person - taking consent
Signature
## Appendix 5: Analytical framework

### Analytical framework: community level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Sources of data</th>
<th>Data collection methods</th>
<th>Theoretic underpinning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General information on the community</td>
<td>Who lives in the community? (nationality/tribe/age group) Nearest police post? Nearest health centre/facility?</td>
<td>Community members</td>
<td>FGD</td>
<td>None – background</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Do you enjoy living in your neighbourhood? Do you know your neighbour? Is there someone you could ask assistance from? Do you receive the same services/opportunity as others in your community? Would you walk alone through your neighbourhood at night?</td>
<td>Community members</td>
<td>FGD &amp; IDI</td>
<td>Social cohesion &amp; collective efficacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To critically examine criminality in Kibera: Identify the type of crime community members are exposed to.</td>
<td>Community members’ perception of what crime occurs in their community Crime records from local police (if possible to obtain) Local leaders’ perception of what crime occurs in their community.</td>
<td>Community members</td>
<td>FGD IDI Interviews</td>
<td>Community safety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To critically examine criminality in Kibera: Who the perceived victims and perpetrators of crime are in the community</td>
<td>Community members’ perception of who are the victims and perpetrators in their community (sex and age for different crimes). Crime records from local police (if possible to obtain) Local leaders’ perception of who are the victims and perpetrators in their community (sex and age). Type of injuries being treated as a result of crime. Time and profile of victims.</td>
<td>Community members</td>
<td>FGD In-depth interviews Diaries Interviews Incident occurrence book (police) Local leaders &amp; elders Interviews Meetings with elders Health workers working within facilities that are within the catchment area</td>
<td>Community safety / Social control</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### To critically examine criminality in Kibera: To assess from the community perspective the prevalence of crime

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Methods</th>
<th>Community safety</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What crimes have occurred within the community in the past week/10 days. Profile of victim and perpetrators and any other information related to the crime.</td>
<td>Community members</td>
<td>FGD, In-depth interviews, Diaries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What crimes have occurred within the community in the past year and how often - according to local leaders/elders?</td>
<td>Local leaders &amp; elders</td>
<td>Interviews, Weekly meetings with Lavie Foundation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have any of the participants been a victim of crime within the last year? If yes what and when?</td>
<td>Community members participating in the study</td>
<td>FGD, IDI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### To critically examine criminality in Kibera: The impacts of crime on different groups within their community

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Methods</th>
<th>Democratic policing / Procedural justice / Social control / Collective efficacy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Impact(^3) of crime on different groups from different perspectives</td>
<td>Separate FGDs with men, women, female youth, male youth and IDI</td>
<td>FGD &amp; IDI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opinions of CBOs within the area on what the impacts of crime have had on the community</td>
<td>CBO representatives operating within the communities</td>
<td>Interviews</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actions taken as a result of crime occurring in the community?</td>
<td>Community members</td>
<td>FGD &amp; IDI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scenario: What would a person do if they were robbed? What would happen if the offender was reported to the police? What would happen after being found guilty of a crime (court/community justice?)</td>
<td>Community members</td>
<td>FGD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Critically evaluate formal social control within Kibera: Assess if and how communities improve their resilience to crime

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Methods</th>
<th>Procedural justice / Police legitimacy/ Reporting mechanisms/ Community coping</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relationship with the police</td>
<td>Community members</td>
<td>FGD &amp; IDI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police’s relationship with community</td>
<td>Police</td>
<td>Interviews</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What happens when a crime is committed?</td>
<td>Community members</td>
<td>FGD &amp; IDI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is (all) crime reported to the police?</td>
<td>Community members &amp; police</td>
<td>FGD &amp; interviews</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^3\) The lasting or significant changes – positive or negative, intended or not – in people’s lives brought about by crime or violence.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Participant GROUPS</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What do you do to avoid being a victim of crime? (Community members)</td>
<td>Community members</td>
<td>FGDs &amp; IDI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What actions do community members take to reduce being a victim of crime? (Leaders/elders opinions)</td>
<td>Community leader/elders</td>
<td>Interviews, Weekly meetings with Lavie foundation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What actions do community members take to reduce being a victim of crime? (police officers opinions)</td>
<td>Police</td>
<td>Interviews</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How do people secure their homes? Have you taken any additional security measure to protect your home or family?</td>
<td>Community members</td>
<td>FGDs &amp; IDI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are there any community safety groups/initiatives in the community?</td>
<td>Community members</td>
<td>FGDs &amp; IDI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is there community policing in your community? What do the police do to prevent crime? How could cooperation between the police and the community be improved?</td>
<td>Community members</td>
<td>FGDs and IDI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will the Nyumbi Kumi assist with community safety?</td>
<td>Community members and community leaders</td>
<td>FGDs, IDI and interviews</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 6: Focus group guidelines
[Example from Sarang’ombe]

Name/age/reside/reside with/livelihood

Background
• Nearest police post/station?
• Nearest health centre/facility?
• Youth groups in the area?

Social cohesion
• Do you like living in your neighbourhood?
• Would your neighbour be someone you could ask help from?
• Would you walk alone in your neighbourhood at night?

Crime in the community
• What type of crime happens in the ward you live in?
• In the past week what crimes have occurred in the ward?
• Who do you think are the victims and offenders of these crimes? (sex and age for different crimes)
• Who is most affected by crime within the community?
• Has anyone in the ward taken any actions because of crime?
• What do you think about the NYS scheme?

Police and procedural justice
• Who provides security in Sarang’ombe?
• Do you see the police in your community?
• When was the last time you saw them in your community?
• What happens when a crime is committed?
• Are crimes reported to the police?
• What makes people victims of crime?
• What makes people less likely to be a victim of crime?
• What do the police do to prevent crime in the community?
• How could the relationship between the police and the youth be improved/made better?

Coping mechanisms
• Do any of the youth groups prevent crime? (if yes, how?)
• Are there any (other) community safety groups/initiatives in the community?
• Will Nyumbi Kumi improve safety in the community?
### Appendix 7: Diary entries

**Table: displaying the incidents recorded in diaries for the villages within Lani Saba ward**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Sunday</th>
<th>Monday</th>
<th>Tuesday</th>
<th>Wednesday</th>
<th>Thursday</th>
<th>Friday</th>
<th>Saturday</th>
<th>Sunday</th>
<th>Monday</th>
<th>Tuesday</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mashimoni</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>am: Nothing Recorded</td>
<td>11am: Attempted robbery by male leads to killing by mob justice</td>
<td>am: nothing recorded</td>
<td>am: nothing recorded</td>
<td>am: nothing recorded</td>
<td>am: nothing recorded</td>
<td>am: nothing recorded</td>
<td>am: nothing recorded</td>
<td>am: nothing recorded</td>
<td>am: nothing recorded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8pm: Burglary &amp; Assault by 2 male gang members aged approx 30</td>
<td>11pm: Robbery of female outside participant’s home</td>
<td>pm: nothing recorded</td>
<td>pm: nothing recorded</td>
<td>pm: nothing recorded</td>
<td>pm: nothing recorded</td>
<td>pm: nothing recorded</td>
<td>pm: nothing recorded</td>
<td>pm: nothing recorded</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>am: nothing recorded</td>
<td>am: nothing recorded</td>
<td>am: nothing recorded</td>
<td>am: nothing recorded</td>
<td>am: nothing recorded</td>
<td>am: nothing recorded</td>
<td>am: nothing recorded</td>
<td>am: nothing recorded</td>
<td>am: nothing recorded</td>
<td>am: nothing recorded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>pm: nothing recorded</td>
<td>pm: nothing recorded</td>
<td>pm: nothing recorded</td>
<td>pm: nothing recorded</td>
<td>pm: nothing recorded</td>
<td>pm: nothing recorded</td>
<td>pm: nothing recorded</td>
<td>pm: nothing recorded</td>
<td>pm: nothing recorded</td>
<td>pm: nothing recorded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lani Saba</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>6pm: Rape of girl child aged 6 years by 26 yr old male</td>
<td>10pm: Theft of a wheelbarrow by male aged 20yr</td>
<td>Heavy rain which made people stay at home. No incidents recorded.</td>
<td>am: nothing recorded</td>
<td>pm: nothing recorded</td>
<td>am: nothing recorded</td>
<td>pm: nothing recorded</td>
<td>am: nothing recorded</td>
<td>pm: nothing recorded</td>
<td>am: nothing recorded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>No data collected</td>
<td>No data collected</td>
<td>4.30pm: Armed robbery of male newspaper seller. Offenders were 3 males aged mid-20s.</td>
<td>am: nothing recorded</td>
<td>am: nothing recorded</td>
<td>am: nothing recorded</td>
<td>am: nothing recorded</td>
<td>am: nothing recorded</td>
<td>am: nothing recorded</td>
<td>am: nothing recorded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>pm: nothing recorded</td>
<td>10.30pm: Robbery, patrol volunteers threatened with guns &amp; assaulted by 5 males aged in 20s</td>
<td>Heavy rain flooded the area and cut off the bridge.</td>
<td>9.30pm: Armed robbery on male in mid 30s. Offenders were 2 males aged in their 20s.</td>
<td>7-8pm: Armed robbery involving multiple victims both males and females. 4 male offensders aged in mid-20s.</td>
<td>7-8pm: Armed robberies involving 3 victims. Offenders were 6 males aged in 20s.</td>
<td>Heavy rain flooded the area and cut off the bridge.</td>
<td>pm: armed robberies &amp; 3 attempted rapes involving 4 victims. Offenders were 3 men aged in their 30s who were interrupted by the community patrol.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village</td>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>Sunday</td>
<td>Monday</td>
<td>Tuesday</td>
<td>Wednesday</td>
<td>Thursday</td>
<td>Friday</td>
<td>Saturday</td>
<td>Sunday</td>
<td>Monday</td>
<td>Tuesday</td>
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<tr>
<td>---------</td>
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<td>--------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kianda</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>No data collected</td>
<td>No data collected</td>
<td>No data collected</td>
<td>am: nothing recorded</td>
<td>am: nothing recorded</td>
<td>am: nothing recorded</td>
<td>pm: attempted burglary by young male, interrupted by a mob, police intervened and removed offender.</td>
<td>Out of Nairobi</td>
<td>Out of Nairobi</td>
<td>Rioting in favour of NYS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olympic</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>pm: robbery, female victim aged 20 yrs. Offenders were teenage males.</td>
<td>am: nothing recorded</td>
<td>pm: nothing recorded</td>
<td>pm: nothing recorded</td>
<td>pm: nothing recorded</td>
<td>pm: nothing recorded</td>
<td>pm: nothing recorded</td>
<td>pm: nothing recorded</td>
<td>pm: nothing recorded</td>
<td>pm: nothing recorded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soweto West</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Neighbour’s ‘home bank’ was stolen by victim’s grandson.</td>
<td>am: nothing recorded</td>
<td>pm: aggravated robbery, offenders aged 13 to 18 yrs.</td>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>Robberies (robberies increase on a Saturday)</td>
<td>No data collected</td>
<td>No data collected</td>
<td>No data collected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayani</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>No data collected</td>
<td>am: nothing recorded</td>
<td>am: nothing recorded</td>
<td>am: nothing recorded</td>
<td>am: nothing recorded</td>
<td>am: nothing recorded</td>
<td>Cholera death</td>
<td>Sam: robbery observed, offender was a young male</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault - 2 males fighting with knives</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>pm: nothing recorded</td>
<td>pm: nothing recorded</td>
<td>pm: nothing recorded</td>
<td>pm: assault &amp; dispute between landlord &amp; tenant</td>
<td>pm: nothing recorded</td>
<td>pm: nothing recorded</td>
<td>Dead foetus found on rubbish dump</td>
<td>No data collected</td>
<td>No data collected</td>
<td>No data collected</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table: displaying the incidents recorded in diaries for the villages within Sarang’ombe ward.
Appendix 8: Case study of Balsall Health Forum

Balsall Heath in Birmingham, UK is an interesting example of how a highly socially disorganised area has become one of the few locations in the UK whereby residents have developed and written their own neighbourhood plan for the period 2015-2030 (Respondent CS15, 2015). Between the 1960s and 1990s Balsall Heath was known as ‘the largest open air brothel in the UK’, at one stage hosting over 450 prostitutes (Atkinson, 2004). Drug dealing and other criminal activities such as robberies and house break-ins went along with the prostitution in Balsall Heath to make it a dangerous and very unpleasant place to live.

During the 1950s and 1960s a lot of economic migrants from a variety of countries moved to Balsall Heath, many of whom could not speak English so they did not mix with the existing white population, other migrants (of different ethnic backgrounds) the police or the council. There was a lack of trust and civic engagement and as a consequence Balsall Heath became a fragmented community that lacked any form of social cohesion, collective efficacy and social control of public space (Sampson and Raudenbush, 1999).

Prior to 1994 the police covering Balsall Heath lacked an understanding of the different ethnic groups living in Balsall Heath. Rehman (Respondent CS15, 2015) one of the Founders and Chief Executive recalls prior to 1994 “if there was an Asian man walking on his own in his robe on his way to the mosque, he would be stopped and searched because they [the police] couldn’t tell the difference between an offender and a Muslim on their way to prayer at the mosque”.

The abduction of Samo Paull from Balsall Heath in December 1993, and later her murder became a trigger that motivated residents to make a stand and demand ‘our streets back’. In 1994 residents started to picket and began ‘street watch’. Rehman (2015) states that within six months of picketing crime rates dropped by 30% and the collective efforts of ‘street watch’ started to be recognised by the police and the council.

Trust and civic engagement are usually mutually reinforcing (Brehm & Rahn, 1997), the more residents participated in collective activities, the more they began to trust one another, which led to an increase in community members engaging with civic activities. In Balsall Heath ‘street watch’ gained momentum and developed into what is now the Balsall Heath Forum. The forum currently has two main areas of focus, crime and environment. The crime component is supported by neighbourhood wardens (covering all areas of Balsall Heath) who are linked to service providers. The environment component of the forum focuses on maintaining clean and pleasant surroundings within Balsall Heath. In an effort to improve police officers understanding of the different cultures and faiths represented amongst the community the forum used to host police officers for a month during their probation period.

In 2004 Atkinson documented the success of Balsall Heath as being:

- Elimination of street corner prostitution and significant reduction in crime.
- House prices growing faster than anywhere else in Birmingham.
- In 2003 Balsall Heath were runners up in the urban section of the national Britain in Bloom competition.
- Residents from different parts of the country and policy makers, including MP David Blunkett and Sir Bob Kerslake, have visited Balsall Heath Forum to learn from their success.
Appendix 9: Critical analysis of ten policing & community safety projects

**Project name:** The Crisis Response Development Foundation (CRDF)

**Summary:**
CRDF have established six community patrol projects in partnership with the government of Kenya and the community in various locations in Kenya, including an area on the outskirts of Nairobi in a community called Lemelepo, a number of projects around Nanyuki in the Mount Kenya region and in Kilifi, on the Kenyan coast. The concept is based upon the provision of a patrol vehicle and a driver who facilitates the police officers to carry out their policing duties. The project enables the police to respond to incidents reported within their operational policing area, carry out policing patrols and duties in line with democratic policing norms.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project criteria</th>
<th>Present Yes/No</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collective efficacy (Sampson &amp; Raudenbush, 1999)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Project initiation came from the community there was a shared expectation for social control of public space.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community driven (initiation) (Brown &amp; Kulig, 1996)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Community owned, managed and initiated (requested assistance).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership (Brown &amp; Kulig, 1996)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Committee established within the community and leader identified within the committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource mobilisation</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>CRDF supplied resources initially with the agreement the community would become self-sufficient so they can provide and maintain resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtle informal social control over regulating the police's behaviour (Reiner, 2000)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>This is the concept the project is based upon.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Success or failure**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Success or failure</th>
<th>Present Yes/No</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>The committee from the community manages the project and are responsible for generating resources. In 2016 all projects were operating independently without the support from senior management from CRDF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduction in crime?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>The community policing project has been positively reviewed by the Cabinet of Internal Security and received an award by the National Police Service in December 2014.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PJ of police officers improved in project area</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>There is a professional police response to an incident within 10 minutes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence of safety being, or perceived by residents to have improved?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>The project is designed specifically for the purpose of subtly encouraging procedural justice within the police.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Residents state crime has reduced, people are relying on the community patrol and less on private security firms.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Project name:** Usalama Forum – Boda bodas

**Summary:**
Usalama Forum developed a community safety project with the boda boda riders (motorbike taxis) in Kisii. Part of the project involved the traffic police from the local police station being invited to conduct training for the boda boda riders. Not only did the training educate the boda boda riders about the traffic laws and regulations, it facilitated a mutual understanding between both parties. The boda boda riders knew they needed to adhere to the regulations in order to avoid bribes or being arrested and the police officers knew they could not extort bribes from the riders when they had not broken the law because it had been their own colleagues who had educated the riders about the law (Respondent CS8, 2015).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project criteria</th>
<th>Present</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collective efficacy (Sampson &amp; Raudenbush, 1999)</td>
<td>Possibly</td>
<td>Potentially amongst the boda boda riders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community driven (initiation) (Brown &amp; Kulig, 1996)</td>
<td>Y/N</td>
<td>During the safety audit conducted by Usalama Forum Boda boda’s were considered vulnerable because it was suggested they engaged in crime and/or facilitated crime such as moving criminals from point to point or transporting child prostitutes. It was also recognised that they were exposed to police officers extorting bribes. Therefore those community member consulted during the safety audit identified a need to ‘control’ boda bodas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership (Brown &amp; Kulig, 1996)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>The chairman of the boda boda station.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources mobilised</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Although, training provided on traffic laws provided by the police.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtle informal social control over regulating the police’s behaviour (Reiner, 2000)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Traffic laws taught to the boda boda riders by the same police officers who could potentially extort bribes. The project also monitors the whereabouts of the boda boda riders, which provides them with protection when falsely accused but also holds them accountable.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Success or failure**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sustainability?</th>
<th>N/K</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reduction in crime?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PJ of police officers improved in project area</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence of safety being, or perceived by residents to have improved?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Not known. In order for the project to be sustainable re-fresher trainings may be required.
- Boda boda’s were budgeting on Khs 1000 (£7) per day to pay police officers bribes. It is assumed this has now been reduced.
- Police now know that Boda boda riders are aware of the traffic laws.
- The whereabouts of boda boda’s is now being monitored by the chairman at the boarding station, which protects them from false allegations but also places ‘guardianship’ over the boda bodas.
Project name: Kibera Women’s Peace Forum

Summary:
The group Kibera Women’s Peace Forum (KWPF) was established by Jane Anyango during the PEV in 2008. After a 14 year old girl was shot and killed by police in Kibera, Jane decided to protest and within a couple of hours she had mobilised 200 women from all different tribes. The forum has grown and continued after the PEV and now every Saturday women from their respective villages within Kibera meet up. The women meet to discuss what has been happening within their communities over the previous week and act as a support network for one another. KWPF report violence cases to the administration and support children who have reported sexual abuse. In May 2015 KWPF were following six ‘defilement’ (rape) cases in Kibera law courts, where the victims were all under 10 years old.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project criteria</th>
<th>Present</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collective efficacy</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>The women who are part of KWPF are a cohesive group and have shared expectations for acceptable and deviant behaviour, particularly in relation to SGBV.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community driven: initiation</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Initiated by a resident during the post-election (tribal) violence and mobilised fellow female residents from all tribes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Jane Anyango established and leads the group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource mobilisation</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>The women support one another within the group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtle informal social control over procedural justice (PJ) of the police (Reiner, 2000)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Support victims of crime, particularly children through police investigations and the court process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Success or failure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>The women provide a support network for one another, when needed. The group are planning to expand to include women from other informal settlements in Nairobi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduction in crime?</td>
<td>Potentially</td>
<td>Potentially KWPF could be considered a deterrent as they follow up on investigations and court cases to ensure there is fairness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PJ of police officers improved in project area</td>
<td>Potentially</td>
<td>Potentially relating to how they deal with cases that KWPF are involved with.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence of safety being, or perceived by residents to have improved?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>KWPF ensure (as much as they can) offenders are brought to justice.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Project name: Community patrol

Summary:
Due to the high rate of robberies occurring in Soweto East and the lack of response from the police, the community decided to establish a volunteer patrol in March 2015. Households within Soweto East contributed money so the volunteers were able to purchase weapons such as knives, long sticks and pangas (machetes) plus torches and whistles to carry out the patrol. The volunteer’s intention was to patrol every night, when it was possible when weather conditions and volunteer numbers permitted.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project criteria</th>
<th>Present Yes/No</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collective efficacy (Sampson &amp; Raudenbush, 1999)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>The community have come together to form the patrol and residents have contributed money so members of the patrol can have basic items to conduct patrols.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community driven (initiation/buy-in) (Brown &amp; Kulig, 1996)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>The patrol was initiated by the community in response to insecurity in the area and absence of the police.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership (Brown &amp; Kulig, 1996)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Organiser of the patrol.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources available</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes, but very limited as resources are based on a community collection from lower-income residents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtle informal social control over regulating the police’s behaviour (Reiner, 2000)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The police are believed to be taking bribes from the offenders.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Success or failure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The volunteers are placing themselves in very dangerous situations, it is unlikely they would like to continue to place themselves in such danger with little/no reward.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduction in crime?</td>
<td>Possibly</td>
<td>Short term means to address the high rate of robbery but not long term solution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PJ of police officers improved in project area</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The police are believed to be taking bribes from the offenders/offenders mother’s to ignore the illegal activity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence of safety being, or perceived by residents to have improved?</td>
<td>Not really</td>
<td>During the data collection the group prevented rapes and robberies from occurring, however the patrol did not prevent or stop robberies because offenders were armed with guns.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Project name: Nairobi Central Business District Association (NCBDA)

Summary:
The Nairobi Central Business District Association (NCBDA) project was established by six businessmen in 1997 because there were concerns amongst the business community with the police’s inability to deal with growing insecurity and the impact crime was having on business activity in the Central Business District (CBD) of Nairobi. Throughout the duration of the NCBDA project the relationship between the police and the business community was positive, the police benefited from desperately needed equipment and the refurbishment of living conditions for police officers; whilst the business community benefited from a safer environment to conduct business. However in addition to different actors having different objectives, the project only satisfied a selected part of the community (Ruteere & Pommerolle, 2003).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project criteria</th>
<th>Present</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collective efficacy</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Different actors had different objectives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community driven (initiation)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Bias towards the business community who were funding the project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership (Brown &amp; Kulig, 1996)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Through the six businessmen who were funding the project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources available</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Vehicle bought for the police in CBD, police station renovated and police booths established and exchange/learning visits to South Africa was paid for by The Ford Foundation and 20 police officers were sent to the UK for a two week course.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtle informal social control over regulating the police’s behaviour (Reiner, 2000)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The police perceived the project to require them to maintain order, in favour of the business community. The police had no desire to improve trust, cooperation and accountability between them and the community.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Success or failure

| Sustainability? | No     | The project has now finished and Kibera remains highly insecure.          |
| Reduction in crime? | N/K    | Visible outcomes were thirty nine police booths (information centres) that were placed within CBD and the surrounding area but their effectiveness was questionable because they were generally unstaffed and empty. |
| PJ of police officers improved in project area        | No     | Procedural justice was not equally applied. Hawkers were deliberately excluded from the project as they were considered best dealt with by Nairobi City Council askaris who were known to be exceedingly brutal towards hawkers. Small business owners, taxi drivers and hawkers believed the project brought police repression closer to them. It was suggested the police vehicle that was provided to the police through the project allowed the police to rake in more money from bribes every day. |
| Evidence of safety being, or perceived by residents to have improved? | Yes    | A safer environment was created for the business community but no one else. |
**Project name:** Nairobi community policing project (Kangemi)

**Summary:**
Kenyan Human Rights Commission (KHRC) established a community policing project in Kangemi informal settlement. The project involved the establishment of neighbourhood watch schemes and community-police liaison committees. The KHRC’s objective for implementing the community policing project was to address crime, human rights abuses and improve police-community relations. However, the issue of addressing human rights abuses and improving relations between the police and the community were contradictory. When KHRC raised concerns about human rights abuses they only highlighted the conflicting approaches of the two institutions which resulted in a lack of police interest and involvement in the project (Ruteere & Pommerolle, 2003).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project criteria</th>
<th>Present Yes/No</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collective efficacy (Sampson &amp; Raudenbush, 1999)</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>Unlikely.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community driven (initiation) (Brown &amp; Kulig, 1996)</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>Initiated by KHRC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership (Brown &amp; Kulig, 1996)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The project was led by KHRC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources mobilised</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>If resources were available they would have been provided by KHRC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtle informal social control over regulating the police's behaviour (Reiner, 2000)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Contradictory objectives. Tried to address human rights abuses with the police whilst working them, resulting in the police becoming disinterested in the project. This project highlights the importance of ‘subtle’ informal social control.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Success or failure**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Project has finished.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reduction in crime?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>KHRC tried to address human rights abuses, which only made the police disinterested in the project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PJ of police officers improved in project area</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence of safety being, or perceived by residents to have improved?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Project name:** Nyumi Kumi  
**Summary:** In an effort to improve security the Kenyan government announced an upgraded community policing in 2012 through a self-regulating initiative called Nyumbi Kumi. The initiative is intended to be a ‘simple’ idea of knowing your ten neighbours. However the introduction of the initiative has been seen by some as an institutional failure of the police and a way of encouraging neighbours to spy on one another. Whilst the initiative has been announced it is still in its initial phase and has not yet been rolled out (Wamburi, 2013).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project criteria</th>
<th>Present Yes/No</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collective efficacy (Sampson &amp; Raudenbush, 1999)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>This initiative is being imposed on residents, therefore no collective efficacy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community driven (initiation) (Brown &amp; Kulig, 1996)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>This is a government initiative being imposed on communities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership (Brown &amp; Kulig, 1996)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>The government appoints a leader for each group. This is controversial amongst some as they believe the leader should be appointed by the residents. There is suspicion of being spied on.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources mobilised</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No resources will be made available for the communities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtle informal social control over regulating the police’s behaviour (Reiner, 2000)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No none/foreseen.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Success or failure**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sustainability?</th>
<th>N/K</th>
<th>Still in the pilot phase/not started in most areas.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reduction in crime?</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>• At the time of writing the initiative was only being piloted and had not been initiated in majority of areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PJ of police officers improved in project area</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>• It is suggested it will provide ‘eyes and ears’ however general opinion is that it is a method of spying for the government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence of safety being, or perceived by residents to have improved?</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Project name: Saferworld’s community policing project

Summary:
Saferworld’s community-based policing project was implemented in collaboration with PeaceNet. The project aimed to improve relations between the police and the communities, and to enable them to work together to find solutions to community safety concerns.

The project included training and awareness raising on CBP for police officers and communities, the establishment of Community Safety and Information Centres, support for practical projects and anonymous information ‘drop-in’ boxes posted in each of the pilot sites in order to facilitate information exchange on community safety issues.

A task force was established that included community organisations, the Administration Police, Kenya Police, Kibera Provincial Administration, PeaceNet and Saferworld. The local strategy developed by the taskforce included creating a steering committee of key stakeholders such as community-based organisations, women, youth, elders, religious leaders, the Officer Commanding Police station from Kilimani and the officer in charge of the Administration Police in Kibera. PeaceNet provided secretariat and administrative services to the Steering Committee programme, while Saferworld provided financial and technical support. A joint police-community forum was established and met monthly to identify strategies to tackle crime in the area.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project criteria</th>
<th>Present</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collective efficacy (Sampson &amp; Raudenbush, 1999)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>There did not appear to have collective efficacy because ‘volunteers’ expected to be paid to attend meetings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community driven (initiation) (Brown &amp; Kulig, 1996)</td>
<td>Not really</td>
<td>‘Volunteers’ expecting to be paid to attend meetings suggests that the project did not have real buy-in from the community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources mobilised</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Resources were provided externally to the community by Saferworld and PeaceNet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtle informal social control over regulating the police’s behaviour (Reiner, 2000)</td>
<td>N/K</td>
<td>The CBP project was part of a police reform project, the CBP component attempted to work in collaboration with the police and gain their ‘buy-in’ however, the project did not have subtle informal social controls.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Success or failure

| Sustainability? | No | Request for payment shows the project will not continue once benefits/payment have stopped. |
| Reduction in crime? | N/K | The project report states “crime rates being reduced by up to 40% in one of the pilot sites”. However, this is sceptical based on crime rates not being accurate to begin with plus no further explanation/validation to this claim provided within the report. |
| PJ of police officers improved in project area | N/K | Saferworld’s Project Manager stated there were numerous challenges the main ones being the lack of political will and no genuine transformation for change within the Kenyan police. |
| Evidence of safety being, or perceived by residents to have improved? | N/K | |

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**Project name:** Balsall Heath Forum

**Summary:**
Between the 1960s and 1990s Balsall Heath was known as ‘the largest open air brothel in the UK’, at one stage hosting over 450 prostitutes. Drug dealing and other criminal activities such as robberies and house break-ins went along with the prostitution in Balsall Heath to make it a dangerous and very unpleasant place to live (Atkinson, 2004). In early 1990s residents and representatives from faith and voluntary organisations organised a campaign called ‘Building a Better Balsall Heath’. Together, they made progress in changing the image of the area, reducing crime, forming and representing the local voice to the authorities. Having achieved a number of successes they decided to become a Company Limited by Guarantee and to be called the Balsall Heath Forum. Balsall Heath is an example of a highly socially disorganised area transformed itself to become one of the few locations in the UK whereby residents have developed and written their own neighbourhood plan for the period 2015-2030 (Respondent CS15, 2015).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project criteria</th>
<th>Present Yes/No</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collective efficacy (Sampson &amp; Raudenbush, 1999)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Perfect example of how the residents changed a very diverse community to be cohesive and put social controls in place in public areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community driven (initiation) (Brown &amp; Kulig, 1996)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Initiated completely by the community and then involved police and local authority.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership (Brown &amp; Kulig, 1996)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Leadership from within the community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources mobilised</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Resources generated from within the community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtle informal social control over regulating the police’s behaviour (Reiner, 2000)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>The community did not feel they had the support from the police initially/before BHF. There were also allegations that police officers were engaging in illegal activities with prostitutes in Balsall Heath, resulting in community members recording vehicle licence number plates to identify who were kerb crawling.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Success or failure**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Prostitution and drugs are no longer an issue in Balsall Heath. However, the BHF is still operating and addressing other issues within the community and sourcing funding independently.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduction in crime?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>• Permanent removal of street corner prostitution and significant reduction in crime. • House prices grew faster than anywhere else in Birmingham in 2004. • In 2003 Balsall Heath were runners up in the urban section of the national Britain in Bloom competition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PJ of police officers improved in project area</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>• Residents from different parts of the country and policy makers (including MP David Blunkett and Sir Bob Kerslake) have visited Balsall Heath Forum to learn from their success.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Project name: KIKIT**

**Summary:**
KIKIT was started in Sparkbrook in 2002/2003 by a former drug addict from Sparkbrook. He initially provided advice and information about drugs to different groups of the population within Sparkbrook. The community then began to get involved having seen the success, offering families support to access the services required to assist drug users. In the early stages of establishing the project the budget was minimal, there was a heavy reliance on resources and skills offered from within the community. The pharmacy owners offered a shop rent free for two years and the building was refurbished by local trades people such as electricians and painters, who offered their time and skills free of charge.

In 2016 KIKIT Pathways to Recovery are specialists in community-based drug and alcohol support services to Black, Minority, Ethnic (BME) groups, and offer flexible support ranging from multilingual advice and information to culturally sensitive structured treatment programmes. Holistic support plans are developed with the aim of getting people off drugs, and where required addressing mental health issues and individuals housing situation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project criteria</th>
<th>Present Yes/No</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collective efficacy (Sampson &amp; Raudenbush, 1999)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Cohesive community wanting to address the substance misuse issue within the community and establish a referral mechanism for those in need.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community driven (initiation) (Brown &amp; Kulig, 1996)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>100% initiated by the community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership (Brown &amp; Kulig, 1996)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>From within the community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources mobilised</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Generated from within the community i.e. use of building for an office, local workman skills volunteered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtle informal social control over regulating the police’s behaviour (Reiner, 2000)</td>
<td>Possibly</td>
<td>Improving police relations with BME groups. Project identified gaps in service provision for substance abuses, which included the police’s involvement and treatment.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Success or failure**

| Sustainability? | Yes | Generated independent funding from different government sources, expanded areas of focus to include Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) and gang violence. |
| Reduction in crime? | Yes | • Yes, KIKIT offers a holistic approach addressing issues why a lot of substance mis-users/vulnerable individuals commit crime. |
| PJ of police officers improved in project area | Yes | • Yes, in that officers utilising existing culturally appropriate approaches and networks. |
| Evidence of safety being, or perceived by residents to have improved? | Yes | • Prevented two vulnerable individuals traveling to fight with Islamic State (IS) in Syria. |
References


Google maps (2016a) Arial view of the informal settlement of Kibera [Online]. Available at: https://www.google.co.uk/maps/place/Kibera,+Nairobi,+Kenya/@-1.3124627,36.7731474,6068m/data=!3m1!1e3!4m5!3m4!1s0x182f107d3ba89c15:0xefcf e2ec90115ed2!8m2!3d-1.3133048!4d36.7846436 (Accessed: 11 October 2016).

Google maps (2016b) Photographic map of Kibera [Online]. Available at: https://www.google.co.uk/maps/place/Kibera,+Nairobi,+Kenya/@-1.3124627,36.7731474,14z/data=!3m1!4b1!4m5!3m4!1s0x182f107d3ba89c15:0xefcfe2ec90115ed2!8m2!3d-1.3133048!4d36.7846436 (Accessed: 11 October 2016).


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