Female Voice and Agency in Film Adaptations

A PhD Thesis

by

Coral Houtman

1st March 2003
Department of Film Studies
Rutherford College
University of Kent at Canterbury
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# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acknowledgements</th>
<th>ii</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER ONE: Methodology and Theory</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER TWO: Cultural Androgyny in <em>Don't Look Now</em></td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER THREE: Projections of Homophobia in <em>Strangers on a Train</em></td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER FOUR: Lacan's Theory of the Four Discourses and <em>The Sixth Sense</em></td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER FIVE: On Unfaithful Adaptations - <em>Live Flesh</em></td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER SIX Introduction: <em>Mrs Dalloway</em></td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER SIX Part One: Creating the “signifier of femaleness” - <em>Mrs Dalloway</em></td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER SIX Part Two: Performance and Agency in <em>Mrs Dalloway</em></td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chapter One: Appendix A: Forms of Enunciation in Novels and Films | 245 |
Chapter Three: Appendix A: Synopsis: Carol by Patricia Highsmith | 252 |
Chapter Three: Appendix B: Shot breakdowns for glasses sequences in *Strangers on a Train* | 263 |
Chapter Four: Appendix A: The Four Discourses applied to *Don't Look Now and Strangers on a Train* | 269 |
Chapter Six: Appendix A: *Mrs Dalloway* production details | 272 |
Chapter Six: Appendix B: Septimus and Post-traumatic Stress Disorder | 274 |
Chapter Six: Appendix C: Scene analysis and shot description for the end of Mrs Dalloway | 279 |
Chapter Six: Appendix D: Scene analysis and shot description for Septimus introjection of Evans as death drive. | 289 |
Chapter Six: Appendix E: Music for the end of *Mrs Dalloway* | 291 |

Bibliography | 295 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plate I 44 - 45 <em>Don't Look Now</em>. Opening scene.</th>
<th>Plate IX 145 - 146 <em>Live Flesh</em>. The ballad sequence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plate II 44 - 45 <em>Don't Look Now</em>. Laura fragmented, caught in images of the ‘imaginary’.</td>
<td>Plate X 146 - 147 <em>Live Flesh</em>. Victor breaks into Helena's flat. David gets shot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plate III 71 - 72 <em>Strangers on a Train</em>. Opening sequence</td>
<td>Plate XI 155 - 156 <em>Mrs Dalloway</em>. Opening sequence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plate IV 262 - 263 <em>Strangers on a Train</em>. Bruno kills Miriam</td>
<td>Plate XII 175 - 176 <em>Mrs Dalloway</em>. Trauma and its effect on the characters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plate V 264 - 265 <em>Strangers on a Train</em>. The tennis match</td>
<td>Plate XIII 278 - 279 <em>Mrs Dalloway</em>. The balcony sequence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plate VI 267 - 268 <em>Strangers on a Train</em>. Bruno faints at the party</td>
<td>Plate XIV 187 - 188 <em>Mrs Dalloway</em>. The Oppressors and the Oppressed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plate VII 102 - 103 <em>The Sixth Sense</em>. Various stills</td>
<td>Plate XV 225 - 226 <em>Mrs Dalloway</em>. Peter visits Clarissa at home.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the claim that women write differently from men, and employs a methodology which compares a range of film adaptations with the books from which they are taken.

The thesis explores the agency and voice of four novels and their film adaptations, using techniques derived from narrative analysis where "the implied author" is the agency responsible for the overall relationship of narration (story telling) to narrative (story) and is also the "voice" - the rhetoric of the text. Psychoanalysis forms a conceptual framework for exploring the performance of sexual difference in these works authored by women, but directed by men, and for investigating psychological thrillers, where issues of sexuality and desire are dramatised, particularly in relationship to death and the fear of obliteration. The thesis considers the 'gendering' of the texts - how they construe sexual difference, through fantasy and through desire. Lacan's discourse analysis enables a further investigation of the possibilities of hysterical agency driving the narrative; anxiety and uncertainty over gender and sexual difference driving the needs of the characters and the narration, and therefore, by implication, the real author or authors. It also discusses whether this hysteria is performed differently by men and women, due to their different subject positions, and thereby creates a potential link between the implied author of the text, and the gender of the real author(s).

The real author, the agent of the text, cannot, in this formulation, be regarded as either sovereign or unified. Rather, I theorise, following Althusser and the performative theory of Judith Butler, that authorial voice is an interpellation. That is, they are called up and placed into a network of norms and parameters where they assume the agency of authorship. Agency is therefore contingent and traumatic, and a text which creates a less causal and individualistic performance of narrative agency might also be able to explore the relationship of gender and sexual difference to agency without slipping into the Freudian flaw of making anatomy destiny. I consider Mrs. Dalloway, as a poetic, non-linear form, a multi-voiced and multi-determined narrative, which creates a very rich female portrait of its central protagonist and a self-consciously female narrative voice. In addressing the traumas and hysterias of sexual difference, and relating them to the analogous traumas created through the abuse of power in other realms of life, Mrs. Dalloway provides an alternative way of thinking about sexual difference, gender and agency, one that privileges creativity, reparation and the need to come to terms with trauma, whether one is male or female.

1 List of film adaptations and novels analysed in the thesis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Books (Authors)</th>
<th>Films (Directors)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Don't Look Now</td>
<td>Daphne du Maurier (1971)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strangers on a Train</td>
<td>Patricia Highsmith (1950)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Sixth Sense</td>
<td>Original Screenplay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mrs Dalloway</td>
<td>Virginia Woolf (1925)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**INTRODUCTION**

To recognize the ways in which we surround ourselves with our fictions is a step towards finding new ways for thinking of sexual difference as grounded in cultural and political reality without positing that reality - man or woman, for example - as somehow preexisting our thoughts and fictions.

Alice E. Jardine - *Gynesis*

This thesis will be an exploration of the creative fiction of women and men. It has a strong precedent in the critical work on female writing by Virginia Woolf, expressed in *A Room of One's Own* (1929), yet Woolf herself cleverly managed to evade the question of the differences between male and female writing throughout the hundred and something pages of her essay. Supplanting the question with a conviction that 'women must have money and a room of her own if she is to write fiction' she digressed around the topic illuminatingly without providing or prescribing an answer. Moreover, she is entertainingly candid about her inability to find an answer, not only to the differences in female writing, but even to the differences between men and women.

I have shirked the duty of coming to a conclusion upon the true nature of women.... what is a woman? I assure you, I don't know; I do not believe that you know; I do not believe that anybody can know until she has expressed herself in all the arts and professions open to human skill.

She looks towards literature - the arts and the professions - to find herself an answer, but instead discovers women's invisibility in a male dominated culture. She thus sets up a circular argument whereby the claim that men and women might be different from each other should be possible to explore through culture, but is made impossible by that culture which treats men and women differently, imposing upon them constricting and normative rules of gender. Woolf thereby refuses essentialist ideas of gender, instead establishing it as subject to materialist, social and psychological determinations. The circular argument does not lead to a conclusion, but rather to the successful exposition of a witty polemic arguing for women's equality and independence. With the benefit of one hundred years' feminist hindsight, I have no need to substantiate the claim that women should have a room of their own. Instead, I return to Woolf's question and wonder in what ways it might be addressed differently today. In the twentieth century women undoubtedly did express themselves in many of 'the arts and professions open to human skill', even if they were restricted in the opportunity fully to marshal the particular economic and artistic resources of film.
directing in the cinema. Yet, women's increased cultural visibility does not change the circularity of Woolf's argument, nor make it possible to distinguish biological from social and cultural determinants in the lives of men and women. It merely projects the "answer" further into a utopian future. The intrinsic and underlying problem - the mysterious and eternally unfathomable question of the differences of the sexes - remains unsolvable. I therefore address the question, not by looking for one definitive answer, but by asking how men and women themselves pose the question in their creative fictions.

Central to the thesis is the relationship between an author and their text, a relationship which has been considerably problematised by much current thinking on authorship. The relationship of authorial intention and authorial personality to the personality or outlook of the work is questionable and subject to many and complex determining factors, even though novel or film must necessarily be filtered through the sensibilities and the bodies of its author(s). The context of authorship determines the character of a text; the conditions of reception, the industrial, aesthetic, historical and institutional frameworks of production - all contribute together with the author, to create the specific cultural intervention of the work. In order to address these issues, this thesis adopts the view that acts of fiction (the novels and films studied) are displaced "speech acts", where the agent and the recipient(s) of the speech act are separated in time and place through the medium of writing or of film, and where narrative is the particular mode of speech deployed. The gender of the author, in this formulation, is part of a complex and imbricated network of determining factors. In studying film adaptations and the novels from which they are written, I will be able, therefore, to examine how this complex network operates; how the work of adaptation can be seen as the art of "creative compromise" - an engagement with restraints which operate ideologically and aesthetically across the texts. I look at the internal evidence for signs of gendered "voice" and "agency" in an inductive exploration of the texts before theorising the relationship of the author to their text. How does the implied author dramatise sexual difference? How does the text portray the relationship of gender to desire, to identity, to narrative?

Psychoanalysis provides a methodology to analyse the differences found in the texts which enables a non-essentialist study of the formation of sexuality and sexual difference in response to the
concrete others who form our desires and identities. It can be used to analyse the sexual and gendered relationships amongst the characters and between the characters and the narration, and to provide an insight into the text’s attitude to sexual difference and to gender.

The initial focus of my study is the category of the psychological thriller, where issues of sexuality and desire are dramatised, particularly in relationship to death and the fear of obliteration. The thrillers under consideration, whilst not strictly films noirs (only Strangers on a Train can be described as noir, historically and generically) conform to the concerns of the genre identified by Elizabeth Cowie whereby ‘American cinema finds for the first time a form in which to represent desire as something that not only renders the desiring subject helpless, but also propels him or her to destruction’.

This nexus of thematic material centred upon desire and danger is, as Cowie argues ‘equally a matter for men and women’, and both books and films are popular forms produced and consumed across gender divisions by men and women.

For centuries there have been women writers of all sorts whose writings have been almost totally read by other women, but mystery writing is a unique area of popular fiction in the widespread success of women writers, the widespread use of women as important characters and the widespread occurrence of male readers.

Thrillers thus belong to a genre where thematic concerns, authorship and reception is shared amongst men and women, and although women have not participated strongly in the direction of thriller films, they have collaborated as writers of the original stories and screenplays of the films. This shared area of concern enables me to explore how differences in treatment are manifest across gender, between male and female characters and male and female authors.

I shall show that these thrillers place sexual difference in question through the threat of death which they enact upon their characters. Characters threatened with death in thrillers do not know where this threat originates or how it operates, and the plot concerns their successful or failed attempt to counter the threat. Thus, thrillers present both an analogy with, and a demonstration of, the effects of trauma on subjectivity. Trauma, as a threat or a message which cannot be assimilated, forces the subject into a position where they are at the mercy of others in a world they no longer comprehend - that is, a position psychoanalysis terms ‘hysterical’. As our identity is constructed through others, a consequence of trauma
as a breakdown in our relationship with others is that identity comes under question, we no longer know who we are, and this crisis of identity includes our sexual identity. The psychoanalytic concept of hysteria enables us to understand the question of sexual difference which is raised and not answered in these films. The protagonists are forced through trauma into a hystericised position where they cannot be assured of the desire of their love objects and this lack of validation provokes a crisis in their sexuality. They interrogate the characters around them, and are in turn, interrogated by the narration, in order to find an answer to the hysterical question “What sex am I?”. I look at the way this question is posed in the literary thrillers Don’t Look Now, by Daphne du Maurier, and Strangers on a Train by Patricia Highsmith, and their adaptations into films directed by Nicholas Roeg, and Alfred Hitchcock respectively. How do the (male) protagonists look to their loved ones to shore up their fragile masculinity? How do they regard femininity and its role in providing a polar opposition to the masculinity they seek? How do the female characters relate to or embody the concepts of femininity sought by the men? How does the narration interrogate these issues - how does it judge its characters vis-à-vis sexuality/sexual difference? Thus, I look at the texts to see how sexual difference is figured and characterised in relationship to the female and male characters, in relationship to sexual orientation, and in relationship to the “voice” and “agency” of the implied author.

The hysterical question of the difference of the sexes gives rise to fantasies - conscious and unconscious, which appear symptomatised either in the body of the hysteric or in their relationship to the world presenting, for example, as a phobia or a problem with language. The hysteria of a text likewise appears in fantasy, or in symptomatic aspects of its style. I look at the thrillers to see how they might display symptoms of hysteria, and whether those symptoms are differently characterised in relationship to the female and male characters and in relationship to their sexual orientation. Using Lacan’s discourse analysis in relationship to a reading of the film The Sixth Sense, written and directed by M. Night Shyalaman, the thesis further explores the possibilities of hysterical agency driving the narrative of thrillers, driving the needs of the characters and the narration, and therefore, by implication, the real author or authors. It also discusses whether hysteria is performed differently by men and women, due to their different subject positions, and thereby creates a potential link between the implied author of the text, and the gender of the real author(s).
I look at *Live Flesh* written by Ruth Rendell, and the - unfaithful - film adaptation directed by Pedro Almódovar, in terms of intertextuality, and as an adaptation which changes genres and outlooks between book and film, only keeping a fragment of the narrative events in the original text. I show that Almódovar, whilst performing a radically different interpretation of sexual difference, and of tone to the book - Almódovar gives the film a happy ending - nevertheless preserves and enhances the novel’s abject character. Thus, like the hysterical discourse of the authors of the novels and films of *Don’t Look Now* and *Strangers on a Train*, Almódovar, through his interpretation and adaptation of *Live Flesh*, continues the psychoanalytic discursive relay which occurs between agent and other, author and recipient of a text.

Finally, I ask how a female author or authors, may produce a text which escapes from a hysterical performance of sexual difference, especially in a patriarchal world which is itself a symptom of that hysteria, and which oppresses men and women alike. Virginia Woolf in the novel of *Mrs Dalloway*, and the collaborative team behind the making of the film, succeed in creating what I call “a signifier of femaleness”. By this, I mean that the novel and film adaptation of *Mrs Dalloway* escape the literary/filmic consequences of what Lacan calls the ‘asymmetry of the signifier’ - the lack of a concept for femininity in the unconscious. Neither novel nor film conflate the portrayal of Clarissa Dalloway with a portrait of a non-coherent, aberrant or absent, femininity. Instead, by changing the very terms through which we understand dramatic character and through character, subjectivity and agency, *Mrs Dalloway*, both film and the novel, create a specifically female voice and a female centred narrative.

**Chapter Outlines**

In Chapter One I explain the overarching concepts to which the thesis refers:- the terms of *Voice* and *Agency* which provide the conceptual approach for enabling an investigation of the text and its relationship to the author(s); the choice of *Film Adaptation* as a methodology for a differential analysis of the *Narratives* of thriller novels written by women, and the films adapted from them by male directors within a patriarchal film industry: the adoption of the conceptual framework of psychoanalysis as a tool with which to explore the *Gender and Sexual Difference* of the texts: and the concept of *Performance* a
discussion of which I defer from this chapter to the second half of the thesis, where it is used in order to link the body of the author with their text, and to account for that particular author’s (or collaborative group of authors’) contribution to that text.

In Chapter One I argue that novels and films are displaced speech acts where the *voice* and *agency* of the text can be determined by exploring the various textual strategies employed by the narration. These strategies which determine the relationship of the narration of the text to its narrative include, but cannot be reduced to, the themes, the portrayal of the “voices” of the characters dramatised, of any narrator figures, and of the stylistic features of the work. They also include the “agency” of the characters: the choice of hero or heroine, the position of the characters in relation to action, and in relation to expression - how much we learn about the characters and gain access to their inner thoughts. I argue that these strategies betray the *voice* or attitude of the text towards the narrative, and also the *agency* of the text in manipulating the characters’ actions and internal worlds.

I explain my task of looking at the differential features of film adaptations - particularly of thrillers which have strong and generically simple plots - as a choice to explore the meta-language of narrative *voice* and *agency* which can be compared across the very different features of the media of film and the written word. I argue that the various tasks of adaptation force changes upon the adaptors - changes which are necessary but not sufficient to explain any changes in the textual *voice*. Any changes can therefore be explored both as specific solutions to problems in translation between the two media, and simultaneously as changes in *voice* which are thematic, stylistic, ideological. Using psychoanalysis, I ask how the texts are themselves *gendered* - that is, betray a particular attitude to gender. I argue that fictional, and particularly thriller texts are imbricated with fantasies about the nature of sexual difference, and that the “solutions” to those “questions” become manifest in the text in gendered attitudes to concepts of masculine and feminine.

The following two chapters are each case studies of thriller adaptations: *Don’t Look Now*, and *Strangers on a Train*. In order to distinguish when I am referring to the written sources and when I am
referring to the films I follow each text title with (N) for novel or novella, or (F) for film. Thus, *Don’t Look Now (N)* refers to the du Maurier novella and *Don’t Look Now (F)* to the Roeg film. Similarly, *Mrs Dalloway (N)* refers to Woolf’s original story and *Mrs Dalloway (F)* to the Marleen Gorris film. On occasions when both film and novel are being referenced the title will be followed by (N & F).

I look at the practical issues of adaptation in each adaptation and how the dramaturgy of the films can be seen as a gendered response to such problematics. The comparison of book and film versions allows me to pose several conceptual questions of the adaptations themselves. Each chapter therefore relates the overall themes and figuration of the texts, the similarities and contrasts between book and film, to the voice and agency of the implied author in order to explore in more general ways how the adaptations reveal their attitude to sexual difference. My interrogation of the texts seeks to determine the gendered voice of the texts through the voice of the implied author and the voices of the characters, and their agency through the differential treatment of the male and female characters.

Chapter Two explores the short story and film of *Don’t Look Now*. This chapter tests the claim of cultural androgyny, made separately by writer Daphne du Maurier and director Nicholas Roeg, against the text of the short story and the film. I note two significant narratological differences between the short story and the film: a) The short story is internally focalised through the central male character, John, and the other characters are portrayed only through his point of view, whereas in the film all the characters are physically embodied and present on the screen, and b) The death of John and Laura’s child - the major determining event of both short story and film - is presented as a memory within the short story, whereas it is dramatised at the start of the film. I discover that the short story deploys its particular technique of focalising through John in order to establish his paranoia and his uncertainty about the nature of femininity. Femininity is embodied, for John, in Laura, her instincts and her belief in the supernatural. John’s references to the death of his child are through his projection onto Laura - his imagination of how she feels - and thus constitute his own refusal to acknowledge his grief. John’s paranoia about Laura, his disavowal of his own instincts and emotions which he regards as feminine, lead him into the situations of danger which end in his death. The supernatural exists in the short story as uncanny - it is neither accepted nor
rejected as existing, but is a signifier of John’s unwillingness to trust outside the very narrow framework of
his own logic. I find the short story is thus a critique of excessive male rationality in the face of grief.

The film, although still externally focalised through John - following his narrative trajectory -
nevertheless grants the other characters a separate existence and point of view. This removes the film from
the task of investigating John’s paranoia, and, I shall argue, displaces the engine of the plot from John’s
disavowed grief onto femininity as an irrational and duplicitous force which leads John astray. The rather
silly and misled Laura, blind Heather and her sister, and the extra-sensory perception which both John and
Heather experience as true powers, are responsible for John’s downfall. John’s E.S.P can be understood, in
the film, as a hysterical conversion symptom provoked by the loss of his daughter. As a return of the
repressed appearing as the Lacanian “real” of the film and of John’s psyche, the E.S.P is a signifier of the
failure of sexual difference, of what is outside culture and language, acknowledged by the film in the
androgy nous, shockingly autoerotic figure of Heather, yet the film also narrativises it as introduced to the
story by Laura, and as implicated in her agency - it is only when John gives in to Laura’s beliefs and goes
against his own in finally succumbing to his E.S.P, that he is destroyed. Even death comes in the shape of a
female dwarf, reminiscent of the daughter whose death sparks the plot. The style of the film - its montage -
is used to evoke the feminine uncertainty which it finally condemns. Thus, the film reverses the male
critique of the short story, supplanting it by succumbing to John’s paranoia and dramatising a fascination
and fear of femininity as a death “beyond” and “outside” sexual difference.

Don’t Look Now (N and F) tropes femininity as extra-sensory-perception - the irrational and the
instinctual. Luce Irigaray considers the similar tropes of femininity in relationship to the dark and the
irrational in her critique of Western philosophy. I discuss her argument that the system of Western
rationality known as the Lacanian symbolic is in fact a male imaginary, in relation to its dramatisation in
the film, and the similar argument expressed in the short story. I also question du Maurier’s acceptance of
the importance of feminine intuition as Utopian, and compare it to Irigaray’s desire to make culturally
visible a femininity which accesses the instinctual without being overwhelmed by the death drive.
Chapter Three, on Strangers on a Train, is an exploration of the possibility that the voice of a text is not gendered in a simple or schematic way, but has its own idiosyncratic performance of sexual difference and sexual orientation. I see Strangers on a Train as an attempt to explore a homosexual/homoerotic relationship within a patriarchal culture which censored and repressed any attempt to express homosexuality, whether in fiction or in life. I ask how this repressed homosexuality is expressed, how the censorship in operation differently in both book and film creates a problematic homophobia but also opportunities for the creation of an interesting moral ambivalence in both texts. I argue that both texts express homosexuality by projecting an abject, internalised, unconscious relationship into social terms for which it is almost totally inappropriate. By this, I mean that the central characters Guy and Bruno are dramatised simultaneously as the contrasting psychic aspects of a single character, and as social beings. Bruno represents the id to Guy’s ego in a narcissistic fantasy which book and film also represent as a crime story between two men attracted to each other. Both film and book were written at a time of popular Freudianism, and Hitchcock was certainly psychoanalytically aware. I therefore look for the missing super-ego which I find in the book dramatised as Guy’s overactive conscience which makes him murder and then confess his murder, and in the film, as the virtuoso narration which exposes Bruno’s guilt from an all-seeing, all knowing perspective, which is also embodied in the prominent spectacles of the girls who tease Bruno with their sexuality.

Claude Lévi-Strauss revealed the structure of patriarchal kinship as the exchange of women amongst men. I argue that Strangers on a Train(N) presents an entertainingly obscene version of this social contract, whereby the male characters exchange the murder of women in order to create a male bond. This, I argue, establishes the novel’s critique of patriarchy as the enforcement of over-rigid heterosexual rules over marriage and money which are broken by the weak male protagonists. Yet the novel’s critique of patriarchy becomes imbricated with an unintentional homophobia in its depiction of the love between Guy and Bruno, as the consequence of “internal” censorship operating in the text: Strangers on a Train was Patricia Highsmith’s second novel, following a pseudonymously published and commercially unsuccessful novel about an openly lesbian relationship. Patricia Highsmith gained recognition under her own name and commercial success when she changed the gender of her gay protagonists to men and dramatised their love
through a story of crime. A consequence of this male centred approach makes their relationship tainted by their criminal desires, and also provides very little space for the voice or agency of the female character, Anne, who is viewed again, not predominantly in her own terms, but as mysterious and inaccessible to Guy.

Both Richard Dyer and Theodore Price have read the film as a latently homosexual film, but the film also has very obvious commercial imperatives to create a happy ending and an innocent hero for audience identification. I look at the dramaturgy of the film and how the narration establishes Guy as innocent. I investigate the guilt in the film as displaced onto the abject figure of Bruno - manifest as Bruno’s conversion hysteria - and onto Miriam, the victim of the murder. Feminine sexuality as enacted by Miriam and the effete Bruno is held responsible for the criminal deeds in the film, and is the agent of the action. However, the subtlety of the film’s narration, enacted through its tropes and its acting, also enables us to see Guy as morally tainted, and as one of Hitchcock’s archetypally ambivalent heroes. The female characters in the film are agents provoking action, and in the case of Barbara and Miriam, potential male castrators. Barbara, played by Pat Hitchcock, even has a privileged position inside the text, as authorial representative. The contrast between the active lively female agents of the film, and the shadowy and passive characters of the book, indicates that textual desire and its figuration cannot be simply reduced to binary issues of male or female, relating causally to the gender of the named author, but can be seen to be complex and psychologically unique to that text.

Chapter Four is a response to the findings of the case studies examined in chapters two and three in a hypothesis which connects the gender and sexual orientation within the text to the gender and sexual orientation of the author(s). The films and novels discussed earlier display varying degrees of cultural androgyny, in particular, showing great freedom in inhabiting characters of both genders. The subtlety and the complex portrayal of sexual and gender relationships within each text militates against imposing simple binaries of male/female, straight/gay upon them, as they perform unique relationships to sexual difference. Nevertheless, given a “certain tendency” in the female authored texts towards male critique and a similar but asymmetrical tendency in the male authored texts towards seeing female figures as potential castrators,
together with a proliferation in films and novels of the creation of hysterical characters, both male and female, it is worth investigating the possibility of a hysterical agency which connects the person of the author to the text. According to Lacan, hysterical agency moves through subjectivity and discourse - through an author and their text - seeking to answer the question “What Sex am I?”, and a hysterical fantasy will provide an answer according to the gender of the fantasist. Since hysterical agency is always seeking impossible reassurance from the Other and therefore becoming disappointed, the female hysteric will tend to disparage men, while the male hysteric who cannot locate the signifier for femininity will tend to disparage both men and women. Using the film *The Sixth Sense*, which is not itself an adaptation from a novel or short story, as exemplary of the therapeutic relationship between analyst and analysand, I explain and apply Lacan’s four psychoanalytic discourses to the film. In this way, I try to determine how it might be possible to apply the Four Discourses to characters and narration in a film. I then apply the Theory of the Four Discourses to *Don’t Look Now*, and *Strangers on a Train*, and find that applying it upholds my hypothesis about hysterical agency as an overall textual statement of attitude to sexual difference. In looking at the patterns of identification and desire within the texts, although these are labile and difficult to determine from moment to moment, I argue that the texts display the gendered subject positions of their authors when operating under the discourse of the hysteric. Thus, texts authored by men may display a disavowal of femininity, or the paranoia of obsessional neurosis when operating under the hysterical discourse. Texts authored by women display their hysteria differently; since, as Lacan argues, there is no signifier of “femininity”, women writers must adopt a masculine persona or a masquerade of femininity under the discourse of the hysteric. Both discourses are potentially useful as tools of political critique in their exploration of sexual difference, of love and of the relationship of self and other. However, I argue Lacan’s Theory of the Four Discourses also enables a theorization of writing which is not hysterical. Communication uses other discourses than those of the hysteric; the novels and films deploy the discourses of the master, of the university, of the analyst - all discourses which, although not gender neutral, foreground a non-gendered desire for knowledge, mastery and understanding. Thus it is possible for the female and male writer to escape from the impasse in which they are placed by the discourse of the hysteric. I thus counter a commonly held psychoanalytic view of the ‘impossibility of female writing’ by asserting the claim that women may write as “female” when they cease to write as “feminine” or as
“hysterical”. In addition, the application of the Four Discourses enables me to characterise patriarchy as the male discourse of the hysteric endorsed in economic, institutional and societal organisation characterised differently throughout various historical epochs, and thus able to be resisted as a symptom of culture rather than its full and ideal expression.

In Chapter Five the film of Live Flesh is explored as a bizarrely unfaithful adaptation of a modern gothic thriller which dispenses with the novel’s deaths - though adding some of its own - and turns it into a comedy of manners and a contemporary political allegory. This choice, not obviously determined by the enunciative demands of film as a medium of adaptation, I argue, is rather, an intertextual response to the original novel as imaginative source. Whereas the book is an exploration of a rapist and a murderer which whilst evincing sympathy for and empathy with him, nevertheless seeks to analyse and attribute responsibility for his aggression towards women, the film, according to Almodóvar’s own words is a story about ‘a mixed up boy with psychological problems, who suffers panic attacks and so on. A poor kid...’.

I argue that this difference in sexual thematics between novel and film echoes the similar turn in Don’t Look Now, so that a critique of patriarchal masculinity in the original story becomes a validation of the innocence of masculinity in the film. The texts are analysed through a consideration of their genre, to account for the differences in tone and style as well as theme in both. I show how the gothic framework of the novel enables the narration to explore what I analyse as its subject’s abjection, with analytic objectivity. Julia Kristeva’s concept of abjection as the pre-Oedipal crisis of the emerging subject provides a psychoanalytic framework for the analysis in this chapter, but I also draw upon Freud’s analysis of the uncanny. I explore how the various tropes of the gothic novel, particularly the trope of the uncanny double, enables the narration to build up a psychoanalytic portrait of Victor as suffering from a narcissistic crisis. This crisis, I infer from evidence in the text, is Victor’s inability to find a comfortable distance from his love objects - first his too distant parents and then his mother substitute Claire, and his subsequent descent into a pre-Oedipal and therefore pre-gendered rage. Victor’s abjection expresses itself in a similar manner to John’s grief in Don’t Look Now(F), as a psychosomatic, and hysterical conversion manifestation of his failed Oedipus complex. The device of the frame story, which changes focalisation from Victor to his victim David, and the use of Victor’s phobia about tortoises as a repeated motif, acts, I argue, to problematise this understanding of Victor as victim of his own unconscious urges, and to create a dialectic
for the reader whereby Victor is held morally responsible for his crimes nonetheless. The voice of the novel is thus conflicted, forcing the reader outwards from the text to a consideration of the mystery which makes Victor a rapist and killer and their own analysis of the relationship between personal responsibility and political/social forces.

The question which I ask of the film adaptation is what it actually preserves from the novel and how does it deploy this material for its own ends? I address this problem through a consideration of the film’s treatment of abjection, which it preserves as a central feature from the novel, but which is differently dramatised in the film, attributed to different characters and embued with different affect than in the novel. The central relationship which is preserved between Victor, David, and Elena (the film version of Claire), keeps David and Elena as surrogate parents for Victor, but changes the relationships between them. David loses his legitimacy as Victor’s surrogate father - he is both liar and adulterer - and thus Victor is able to claim Elena as his true love object. The film, in its rivalry between Victor and David over Elena, plays out a model of the relationship between men and women based upon a later stage of the Oedipus complex, where the caring but inaccessible mother is fought over by the father and the siblings. Abjection is located solely as the province of the (primal)father, leaving the mother/lover passive, and the son innocent. The narration celebrates the libidinous enjoyment of this homo-erotic rivalry and paternal conquest, duplicating this mise en scène of jealous rivalry across the text, in the subordinate but abjected characters of Sancho and Clara. The model of the overthrowing of a corrupt parental regime by an innocent son, is reproduced as the central political allegory of the film, acting as a referent to the death of Franco, and his replacement with innocent young Spanish democracy. The refusal of the narration to adopt a super-egoic stance to the events of the narrative (unlike the narrational position of distance and judgement of the book) enables the film’s voice to deploy its libidinous tone in the cause of political liberalism, a joyous expression of “Live and Let Live”.

I examine the representation of the female characters in the novel in relationship to the female characters in the film. The novel adopts a similar strategy to Don’t Look Now(N) in keeping the female characters observed only via the focalisation of the male character, Victor. Nevertheless, in Live Flesh(N)
the female characters of Victor's mother, Aunt Muriel and Claire, whilst having no voice as far as the narration is concerned, have power over Victor - they have the power to create or ruin his life. They act as enigmatic signifiers of femininity for Victor - he is unable to determine what they want or why they act in the way they do. The reader is unable to speculate about the female characters' desires or their motivations. In *Live Flesh*(*F*), however, as in *Don't Look Now*(*F*) or in fact any film with female characters, the women are embodied and are presented to us unmediated by interior focalisation. Almodóvar does not attempt to present the women as coherent characters, but dramatises them as objects of the male characters' desires. They exude a generalised maternal tenderness - emanating primarily in the offscreen love of Victor's own dead mother, but also embodied in both Elena and Clara - but as characters they are inconsistent and depthless. I ask whether this inconsistency is a feature of the post-modern address of the film, and whether this inconsistency is gender neutral, applying to the male and female characters equally. The film's refusal of the castration of the Oedipus complex, creates, I shall argue, a fable-like circularity and substitution in the trajectories of the male characters, and a disembodied conception of the maternal which is conflated with an inconsistent "femininity" embodied in the woman characters.

Chapter Six opens up questions about how the psychological construction of sexual difference and how the consequent hysteria can be seen in a social framework. For this reason I chose, not a thriller, but a drama which historicises and contextualises issues around trauma, hysteria and patriarchy. The film adaptation of *Mrs Dalloway* is an example of female authorship in the cinema and a text which offers its own analysis of the relationship between female voice, agency and patriarchy. Moreover, it is also a performative speech act in its own right, bringing a female and feminist discourse into the male dominated space of the cinematic institution. I look at how *Mrs Dalloway*’s narrative voice is created in the film, through the poetic montage, the characters, the creation of an external and internal world for the protagonist Clarissa. I argue that the creation of an internal voice for Clarissa through which she relates to her external environment, enables the film to portray her at the centre of a narrative and as an important psychic agent, even though, in accordance with social verisimilitude, she has very little social agency. I discuss to what extent Clarissa acts as a surrogate figure for the author, and I seek to show the textual strategies whereby this is achieved.
Chapter Six, Part II, uses Mrs Dalloway to construct a theoretical position vis-à-vis voice and agency as potential political, social and creative resistance to the forces of oppression which traumatise and hystericise us. The character doubling which parallels Clarissa to Septimus enables, I argue, an insight into the nature of our capacities to change the terms of our lives and how we live them. Septimus succumbs to the forces of oppression which have traumatised him, but Clarissa is, through her creativity, able to transcend them, and to change the context of her own life and those around her. Following the theoretical position outlined by Judith Butler in her theory of subjective performativity, I argue, in reference to Clarissa's moment of epiphany on her balcony, that she is able to sublimate the discourses which perform her, that these discourses undergo a psychic "turn" within her, and are produced as an excess or a resistance to the oppressive force of discourse and create an agency which is itself performative in its effects on those around her. Returning to ideas of the speech act, I argue that agency is not an act of sovereign will, but a performative iteration of discourse, affected by the conscious and unconscious intention of the subject and the context of the speech act. I therefore argue that fiction, whether in the making of films or the writing of novels is the creative iteration of discourse which displays the performative psychic agency of the author and is potentially liberating. Thus I argue for the function of art as creative sublimation and resistance to oppression, whether that be the oppression of patriarchy or any of the oppressions which currently rule us - the imperative of art as a political and personal performance.

2 Woolf, Virginia, A Room of One's Own (1929) (World's Classics: Oxford University Press, 1992) Edited by Morag Shiach. 4
3 Seán Burke, in The Death and Return of the Author: Criticism and Subjectivity in Barthes, Foucault and Derrida (Edinburgh University Press, 1998) provides a comprehensive account of the philosophical background to the problematising of authorship. Catherine Grant's article "www.auteur.com?" in Screen vol. 41 no 4 (2000) 101-108 looks at the consequences of these issues for Screen Studies. In the millennial edition of Screen, Grant surveys discourses of auteurism and shows that film discourse is increasingly organised around figures of authorship as economic and academic guarantors of meaning, despite the existence of accepted post-modern and poststructuralist critiques of auteurism. Grant argues this paradox as the effect of a desire for authorship which disavows the role of reception in producing meaning, and poses the disavowal as a problem for Screen Studies which needs interrogating.
4 Cowie, Elizabeth, “Film Noir and Women” from Shades of Noir: A Reader (London; New York: Verso, 1993), 148
5 Cowie 160
the woman novelist must be an hysteric. Hysteria is the woman’s simultaneous acceptance and refusal of the organisation of sexuality under patriarchal capitalism. It is simultaneously what a woman can do both to be feminine and to refuse femininity within patriarchal discourse. And I think that is exactly what the novel is; I do not believe that there is such a thing as female writing, a ‘woman’s voice’. There is the hysteric’s voice which is the woman’s masculine language (one has to speak ‘masculinely’ in a phallocentric world) talking about feminine experience.

Mitchell, Juliet Women the Longest Revolution: On Feminism, Literature and Psychoanalysis (Virago, 1984) 290

Pedro Almodóvar Almodóvar on Almodóvar, edited by Frédéric Strauss and translated by Yves Baignères, 150.
CHAPTER ONE:
Methodology and Theory

This chapter outlines the conceptual and methodological approach of the thesis. The conceptual questions addressed in this section centre upon authorship; the relationship of an author to their work, the nature of collaborative authorship in the field of film-making, the relationship of a text to its context of production and reception, and the relationship of a text to gender and sexual difference. Speech act theory acts as an approach which reveals films and novels to be ‘displaced speech acts’ - contractual arrangements between author and audience whereby the audience agree to suspend their disbelief in order to be “told a story”, a speech act which they receive displaced in time and place from its origin in the instance of authorship. This conceptual approach enables me to formulate authorial ‘voice’ and ‘agency’ as terms inherent within speech acts which connect speakers, however contingently, to the content of their speech. Narrative theory forms the conceptual apparatus deployed in order to explore the concepts of voice and agency from within the texts. Psychoanalysis as a further narrative tool, enables the concepts of voice and agency to be articulated in relationship to sexual difference and gender, hypothesizing a methodology for looking at judgement and desire within texts, and relating these to the formation of individual subjectivity, and its performance in the text of a film or novel. The comparative method of looking at the gendered ‘voice’ and ‘agency’ of an original novel and its film adaptation, is then a way of looking at different iterations or performances, where the content of a speech act becomes changed through the context of performance and the contributors to that performance. Some differences in ‘voice’ between novel and film may be directly attributable to individuals within the film-making process, where supporting arguments such as historical evidence, or consistency across an author’s oeuvre can be used to support claims of individual agency. However, other differences in ‘voice’ can only be delegated to the author and film-director who take overall artistic responsibility for the form of the text although they do not make every artistic decision. Some differences arise out of the totality of the speech act of which the text is a manifestation, and here, the institutional and aesthetic contexts of the literary thriller and the film form cannot be separated from the agency of the individual film-makers and novelists. It is, finally, this overall
framework - the context of authorship as well as the agency of the individual author themselves - which must be taken into consideration when relating the gender of a text to the gender of its authors.

**Voice and Agency**

Voice is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary in three ways: as a) ‘the sound formed in the larynx etc. and uttered by the mouth, esp. human utterance in speaking, shouting singing etc.’ b) ‘the use of the voice; utterance, esp. in spoken or written words (esp give voice)’ and c) ‘an agency by which an opinion is expressed’. This condensation of meanings around the voice links the content of the utterance to the speaker, and then through metonymy, enables the materiality of the voice to stand for the agency of the speaker or the utterance in its entirety. Thus, the voice becomes a metaphor for the individuality of the human subject as well as its authority and power. Voices carry the particular inflections of their speakers, their bodily traces - the stutter, the smoke-filled grain - and the preoccupations of the speakers held as content, as opinion, as style. Content cannot be separated from the bodily traces of the voice, and we believe that we can intuit or analyse ‘voice’ from what people say and from our encounters with them. Speech represents to other people, what the speaker ‘feels’ about the world - and there seems to be, thus, a metaphorical notion of ‘voice’ as a quality of human beings; a summary expression of the speaker's attitude to life at a point in time. Thus we conceive of a person’s voice as being their approach to life, an approach which forms in response to their life history, their experience, and which is changeable over time.

Voices carry the messages of speech, messages interpreted by listeners in a context where they become meaningful. The capacity to be listened to comes from the context of the speech act, from the institutional, political and personal authorisation granted to the speaker. Some people have greater institutional or political authority in contexts where power is unevenly spread. For example, parents are authorised through the structure of the family to discipline their children, whereas children are not authorised to discipline their parents. However, personal eloquence can change the context whereby we are authorised to speak - the child with something pertinent to say will be listened to by understanding parents; as the child grows up it will assume a greater authority, a greater capacity to be listened to. Thus, authorisation, the pertinence and rhetoric of speech, cannot be easily separated from the power and
authority granted to the speaker. The authorisation of being listened to comes both from the context of the speech act, from an empowerment to speak, and also from the content and expression of what is said. I shall call this authorisation, “agency” after its definition in the Oxford English Dictionary as:-

\[ a \text{ active operation; action (free agency)} \quad b \text{ intervening action; means (fertilized by the agency of insects)} \quad c \text{ action personified (an invisible agency).} \]

Agency, then, in my view, is both a precondition for speech, and also the rhetoric which creates a demand to be listened to. For example, as a non-linguist, I cannot express my voice in a foreign tongue, but granted a translator, I have the agency to speak, to express my voice. If, in addition, what I had to say was compelling to my listeners, my agency would grow, I would be asked to speak more often, my voice would be heard more clearly. Voice and agency are clearly imbricated with one another, as what falls into the domain of the meaningful is context dependent and context creating, power dependent and power creating. Nevertheless, to extend the example above, however well I gained my audience’s interest, I would still be speaking in a foreign tongue, errors of translation would inevitably occur, in my frustration I might raise the tone of my voice or make slips of the tongue. I might even not try to say what I want, but rather say what I know can be adequately translated. Thus my speech would be repressed, and return in the form of symptoms which change the character of my voice. In a recent BBC television biography of famous journalist and communicator John Diamond whose tongue had been removed as a treatment for throat cancer, Diamond wished to reply to a question of his wife with the response “Absolutely”. He knew in advance that he would be unable to make himself understood in the words of his choice, and so he replied “Yes”. His frustration at not being able to communicate in his own idiosyncratic way caused stress and repression. However, Diamond’s communication problems and the problems of translation into a foreign language are different in degree only to the language difficulties we all suffer. All communication can be thought of as an insertion (interpellation) into language where what is said creates the boundaries of what cannot be said, creating repression and symptomatic speech. Thus both rhetorical and symptomatic speech comprise our voices, and our particular qualities are due to their combination.

How can films and novels be seen as speech acts? Artistic expression whether through the medium of film or with words is not the same as speaking. The speech act is displaced from the literal
embodied person is displaced from the site and time of the reception of their speech. For example, a message left in a bottle for a milkman is a speech act performed by a person who would in other circumstances tell the milkman directly the content of their order. Similarly, a video or audio message sent to a wedding or celebration communicates a personal message across distance. These examples are not artistic or narrative but they may be considered as displaced speech acts. The quality of voice transmitted in each case is different: with the message, the only clue to voice is in the words and choice of words, the author’s “voice” being not the material vocal quality of what they utter, but what the written words indicate about that person. In a video or audio message, the sound of speech is reproduced technologically, and the receiver can therefore both hear the speaker's voice and also has the auditory and possibly visual clues to the speaker's attitude to their utterance. It is in this sense that a film or novel is a displaced speech act, an indirect communication between a speaker or set of speakers and his or her unknown readership/viewers.

Whether a speech act is direct or indirect has no bearing on whether the act of speech is narrative or artistic. It is perfectly possible for direct speech acts to be artistic or narrative. For example, singing and oral story-telling create narrative and artistic expression through the use of the voice. Thus narrative and artistic expression are particular forms of speech act, and if narrative and artistic expression is conveyed through writing or film-making, then these are equally displaced aesthetic and narrative speech acts. However, narrative and story-telling are, at the very least, exceptional examples of speech acts. In the positing of fictional worlds, and in the way that stories are constructed by the teller to be interpreted by the hearer but are not usually the direct collaboration in a conversation between teller and hearer, narrative speech acts are distanced from the simple acts of everyday speech. Nevertheless, Marie Maclean, in her study *Narrative as Performance: The Baudelairean Experiment* argue that this distance is illusory, merely an extension of the way we engage hearers in our accounts of our daily actions, whether real or fictional. Maclean's persuasive major argument is that narrative is a contract between teller and listener, binding them both into accepting a story and listening to it.

Indeed, it is in everyday vernacular narration that the effect of fiction, one of enhancement rather than radical change in the status of narration, may first be observed. We see the difference when we say not 'I will tell you the story', but cast off even the restrictions of the available choices from the referentiality of this world, and create
another possible world. We allow ourselves the full freedom of the narrative contract when we say ‘I will tell you a story’. This illocutionary act is, as I have said, a sort of performative, since it not only sets up a two-way contract between addresser and addressee, as all true speech acts do, but it also promises a performance and constitutes the hearers as audience. Implicit in every narrative performative is the double contract, ‘Listen, and I will tell you a story’.3

Thus, the narrative speech act is a “performative” - a speech which creates an effect - creating the fictional world at the same time as speaking of it, and it achieves this through an “illocution” - a demand for change or action - in this case, a setting up of contract between speaker and listener to grant the terms of the story.

Narrative films and novels are merely displaced examples of the performative ‘Listen, and I will tell you a story’. What kind of voice is it possible to intuit or to analyse from such displaced speech acts as novels and films? The act of traditional literary or film criticism - the teasing of content, theme and style from the narrative is just such a search for the voice of the narrative, the assumption that the work of art has something to “say” to us, that it is more than the presentation of a fictional world, but is the demonstration of a perspective on that world, a perspective that relates to our world. In verbal story-telling, the telling will vary with every instance, as well as the context of the telling and the nature of the audience, whereas with films and novels, the text is the same, but is presented to different audiences in very different contexts. There can be no one valid interpretation of a work, but only different readings of “voice” based on context and on the different audiences of any performance. Maclean refers to Louis Marin’s summing up of the role of the critic in interpreting - in this case, paintings - to come to a reasonable strategy for the location of voice as a negotiation of the problematic which sites it as generated by the rules of the text, but as different at each performance.

It seems to me that all studies of pictorial and literary texts are exposed to such a tension between the pole or theoretical and methodological generalization and that of unique and individual description, an opposition I might rephrase as that between the structure of messages in painting in general and the system of a pictorial text in particular. The concrete reading-viewing of a painting and the practical position of its reader-viewer thus have a two fold nature, a bi-dimensional constitution: on the one hand, competence, whose structure is constructed from the messages produced by codes and received by the viewer in the process of reading that particular painting as an example among many others or as a cluster of visual ‘quotations’ of several pictorial and extra-pictorial codes; on the other hand performance, whose system depends on that painting as a unique object of contemplation, which organizes it as an individual reading and is appropriate only for it in a unique situation of reception. The main problem such an approach encounters is the connection between these two dimensions, the determination of a level of analysis - and consequently a set of notions and relationships - intermediate between competence
A reading is, thus, always negotiated between these two positions, and is both historically determined and reliant on the cultural competence of the viewer/reader. In consequence, a reading of a text’s "voice" cannot be simply attributed to the thoughts or intentions of its author, but is always a performed interpretation, lying between reader and author. In what follows in this chapter, I outline the narratological tools upon which I depend to provide my cultural competence in analysing the voice of the novels and films under consideration, and the historical perspective of psychoanalysis and feminism which I bring performatively to these readings in order to find the gendering of their voice. First, however, I relate my theorisation of the text’s internal voice to the voice and agency of the actual author, and characterise the contingent relationship between the voice of the text, and the voice of the authors of novels and makers of films.

The Agency of the Speaker - Foucault’s ‘Place of the Author’.

To describe a formulation qua statement does not consist in analysing the relations between the author and what he says (or wanted to say, or said without wanting to); but in determining what position can and must be occupied by an individual if he is to be the subject of it. Michel Foucault thus expresses his exasperation with the traditional idea of authorial intention, returning us to a consideration of agency, albeit this time as structural position within the speech act. For Foucault, the author placed at the site of speech is an empty position, a conduit of speech rather than its source. The author is given from the position of the shifter “I” in the sentence, or that position through the implied positing of a subject in speech - e.g. “you” spoken in a sentence implies an “I” speaking it. To this structural position is given all the meaning and expression of the authorial statement, and this releases the actual embodied author from responsibility for intention. Foucault systematically analysed the nature of what he called the “statement”, and the “enunciative position” in his book The Archaeology of Knowledge, and his position is partly motivated by the sensible observation that each statement has a different relationship to its enunciative position, and is able to communicate different degrees of information about it. The task of finding the enunciative subject position obviously varies from statement to statement. Statements with shifters “I”, “you” etc. are clearly simple to interpret: even the list for the milkman
contains an implicit shifter - whilst listing milk, eggs, juice etc. the statement contains an implied preface, “I would like to order”, which indicates the subjective preferences, on the day concerned, of myself and my household. And yet, even the order for the milkman betrays the uncertainty for which Foucault’s sceptical methodology provides a useful approach. I can only order what the milkman may provide: the context of the statement is bound, there is no ambiguity about the content of the order; but there is an ambiguity about the nature of the “I” ordering, and it is impossible for the milkman to tell what is for me, and what is for my household. Thus the position of subjectivity of authorship for the list is not strictly an individual one and yet neither is it collaborative. I do not write such lists in collaboration, but am authorised by my household to write on their behalf. Thus, context always plays an important part in the creation of enunciative positions, the creation of a generic or institutional position of speech and then the insertion of an “author” into this position of speech. Yet, as Foucault determines, the context cannot be divorced from the particular statement and the author. Where does the influence of the author leave off and the workings of society and discourse begin? Foucault’s methodology, which creates an internal position for the author - the enunciative position - avoids this problem, and enables an analysis of what can be intrinsically determined from the text. Thus, I accept Foucault’s methodology, and look for the authorial voice as a subject position intrinsic to the text, whilst disputing his disavowal of, or disinterest in, individual subjectivity in the mechanism of authorship. This means that whatever an author thinks or feels about their work, expressed in their other writings, or in interviews, although potentially illuminating, is only relevant if it can be tested in relationship to the work itself, and stands in no way as authorisation.

The making of a film is in its group and institutional nature analogous to the list for the milkman. Not only is it a form of statement without direct shifters, where the position of the “I” has to be inferred from the whole of the statement, and is subject to different interpretations, but it is also a form of collaborative activity where artistic responsibility is hard and sometimes impossible to attribute to particular individuals. Creativity is devolved to all the film-makers, but the artistic responsibility is deferred to the director, and the financial responsibility to the producer. Beyond these influences and imbricated with them are the institutional, political and historical modes of production which obviously have important effects upon the work. Foucault’s concept of ‘the place of the author’ enables a recognition
that every statement is situated at the nexus of complex influences which cannot be disentangled, and that authorial voice is the manifestation of just such a complex nexus. Nevertheless, although this nexus of influences cannot be separated and a discrete authorial agency revealed, it is often possible to trace the effects of individual factors upon a text. The differential study of comparative statements reveals the operation of complex influences as variables which may be foregrounded against each other. For example, a study of the works of a single creative participant in a film - a director, a cameraperson, or even an editor - may be able to reveal the idiosyncrasies and concerns of that “author” by foregrounding them against the known institutional and historical frameworks of the works. In this study, the comparative statements are the novel or short story thriller, and the film adaptation. The collaborative and pragmatic frameworks are fairly different: the novelist possibly working alone “in a garret”, and the film-makers caught up in a network of contingencies - it is a well-known saying amongst film-makers that film-making is the art of creative compromise - and the medium of expression very different, the written word against the sound and image. Nevertheless, both novelist and film-makers are, to some degree, subject to similar institutional pressures: the pressures to publish, the pressures to conform to a genre, the pressures to operate within the strictures of societal demand, aesthetically and politically. In working on the novels in this thesis, therefore, I consider textual ‘voice’ as due to the influences of the particular author of the book, imbricated in their social and political circumstance. The films must be considered as a more collaborative effort where the creative differences may be due to all sorts of influences. Obviously there are different modes of film-making: the Hollywood Studio System, Independent Production, the Television Film, the Collective. Each of these systems have explicit power and responsibility structures, and parameters. The films considered in the thesis fall within the first three categories. In both the Hollywood Studio System and in Independent Production, the director is assumed to carry the artistic responsibility, and all the films selected conform to the “auteur” mode of production, the films being marketed through the director’s name. Furthermore, it is usually possible to ascertain what contribution was made to the film by particular individuals, and this may be a matter of historical record. For example, as a television film where traditionally, the writer and producer usually have more artistic involvement, *Mrs Dalloway* was initiated by the lead actress in the film and the adapter of the screenplay, thus producing a different balance of power to the director-led projects of Almodóvar or Hitchcock. Nevertheless, the auteur theory arose
precisely in response to the problematic of attributing artistic agency within the collaborative film-making process, and a delegated responsibility is not the same as a direct responsibility. For each analysis therefore, the consideration of the practical and institutional frameworks within which the film-makers and novelists operate, and the analysis of the relative contributions of the various craft functions to produce the texts, sites the context for authorship for each text and reveals the complex nexus within which each author operates.

Foucault's insistence on the enunciative position of a speech act rather than a direct correlation between the act and the person of an author nevertheless has another source in his thinking, one with which I am less happy. Foucault brings the statement back into the world of speech, of discourse and power where human subjectivity is an "effect" of that discourse and power. The now notorious "Death of the Author" heralded by Roland Barthes, has its origins in the belief that what we perceive as our own speech, is this "effect" of subjectivity, but that what we really say is not merely mediated through the forces of society which shape us, but actually created and determined by these forces. In The History of Sexuality: I, The Will to Knowledge and Discipline and Punish, Foucault demonstrated how power has the means to form and discipline our bodies through what he called "discourse", through creating our bodies as ever more visible and subject to norms of behaviour instilled through the different disciplines or "discourses" of medicine, the law, the military etc. His example of the Panopticon, the prison architecture inspired by the ideas of Jeremy Bentham in the mid-nineteenth century, where in the spirit of a "humane" Enlightenment ideal, prisoners were no longer chained, but subject to being overlooked at all moments by the prison guards who could see into a circumference of cells from their central tower. Thus their behaviour was not merely modified but constructed through this process as ever more visible and as conforming to or disobeying strict norms. For Foucault then, free-will is non-existent, we are driven by discourse, even in our rebellions. Joan Copjec in Read My Desire: Lacan against the Historicists articulates the problem of agency inherent in Foucault's position. According to Copjec, Foucault's determinist position arises from a belief that networks of power are 'immanent within society', and it is therefore impossible for resistance to arise transcending these discursive terms.

Strangely, Foucault seems to have turned inside out our point that in language is inscribed even its own negation. His belief that every form of negation or resistance may
eventually feed or be absorbed by the system of power it contests depends on his taking the point to mean that every negation must be stated. Thus the prohibition “you shall not do X” must spell out what X is, must incite us to think about X, to scrutinize ourselves and our neighbours to determine whether or not we are guilty of X. The statement puts into play what it would abolish; even the disavowal becomes an avowal. What Foucault seems to overlook is that form of negation which, while written in language, is nevertheless without content. This type of negation cannot, be definition, be absorbed by the system it contests. 10

Copjec, thus, brings forward the objection to Foucault’s work that we have already seen operate in the example of John Diamond - that it is the very inability to be fully interpellated that creates a desire outside the terms of discourse imposed upon the individual. Copjec urges the ‘analysts of culture to become literate in desire, to learn how to read what it inarticulable in cultural statements’. 11 Is it not this very desire which an art work, an act of fiction, attempts to articulate, desire manipulating the norms of fiction in order to reach a transcendent fictional world - the unique ‘voice’ of the text? I shall return to the idea of desire within the text later in this chapter, where I link it to psychoanalysis and to gender.

This thesis is about characterising the relationship between the “voice” of the text and the gendered, embodied, being or beings holding the pen/camera, and I certainly do not want to evacuate the place of the actual author as initiator of the speech act. Rather, by considering the author as imbricated within their social and historical context, and the “voice” of the text as the product of this imbrication, I attempt to reveal the desire of the text as historically, socially, and psychically ‘performed’ - that is, the instance of each text as a particular rendering of the various factors operating on it, in a unique configuration with the author acting as ‘agent’ of the speech act. By choosing female authors for the novels and short stories and male directors for the films, I will examine the effects of what I shall call ‘patriarchy’. Patriarchy I take to be the ideological effect of a male dominated economic and political structure which, I shall argue, works through novels and films alike, but is subject to cultural differences across different national identities and across time. Thus films and books may be subject to different forms of patriarchy, for example, the novel of Live Flesh set and written in an Anglo-Saxon culture has a very different relationship to patriarchy from the film adaptation, made and set in post-Franco Spain. Nevertheless, by looking at the novels of women who have been authorised to write thriller novels and comparing these with the film adaptations in a male dominated film industry which has traditionally not authorised women as
film directors, I believe it is possible to explore the effects of patriarchy on the different subject positions of men and women.

I have selected thrillers for this study because the thriller field is one where women writers have established a successful publication tradition, and where they are highly regarded by a genre audience of both men and women. Since Dorothy L. Sayers and Agatha Christie, women, particularly in the Anglo-American tradition, have become best selling authors, and continue to play a part in the thriller market equal to or greater than the influence of male thriller writers. The writers I have selected: Ruth Rendell, Patricia Highsmith, Daphne du Maurier, are representative of a larger class, including P.D. James, Patricia Cornwell, Sara Paretsky and many others, who continue to influence the genre through their writing. Yet thriller writing, whilst generic, is also marked by a high degree of individuality and authorship. Unlike, for example, Mills and Boon romances, thrillers are marketed through their authors and readers presumed to be able to recognise and be loyal to their favourite authors. There are recognisable “voices” expressed in these thrillers, albeit expressed in generic form. Hence, throughout film history, women have contributed to the film industry as writers of thrillers which have been adapted into films, and have thus expressed their creative “voices” in what is acknowledged to be a patriarchal film industry. They have rarely, and only recently, been granted the opportunity to direct their own films or films written by others and so, their voices have been subordinated to those of the male director and producer who assume overall artistic and financial responsibility for the film.

Comparison of Novel and Film: a Differential Method.

Christian Metz says, “Film tells us continuous stories; it “says” things that could be conveyed also in the language of words; yet it says them differently. There is a reason for the possibility as well as the necessity of adaptations”, and George Bluestone defines an essential difficulty in adapting books into films claiming that “between the percept of the visual image and the concept of the mental image lies the root difference between the two media”. The means available to a film - pictures, sounds, actors, editing, are very different from the words needed to narrate a novel, and extend different parameters of interpretation to the addressee of the narrative. In novels we are given verbal descriptions of objects and
Chapter One

characters and have the freedom to imagine them within the parameters of the description, whereas in films
actors are cast, objects are filmed, and our interpretive ability lies in our moral or aesthetic critique of what
we see. Books have narrators and yet narrative films are generally stories dramatised through the
characters without personalised narration. In addition, the institutional frameworks of both cultural forms
also create differences between them. For example, it is not possible for a two hour film to render the
complete narrative events of a two hundred page book. It would be theoretically possible for a long enough
film to narrate all the events of the novel, or for a film to translate accurately a portion of the events of the
novel, and equally theoretically possible for the film to find a way to inhabit the same quality of judgement
of the book, as these parameters are the same in book and film, nevertheless the practical "interference" of
the modes of narration in book and film create a problematic which it is often the film's task to surmount
(although not always - many films do not claim faithfulness to their originating novels). Brian McFarlane,
in his book on adaptation Novel to Film, adopts the distinction made by French structuralist critics between
énoncé and énonciation in order to apply what he calls enunciation to the media specific aspects of
narration in any particular narrative system.

(i) those elements of the original novel which are transferable because not tied to one or other
semiotic system -that is, essentially, narrative.

(ii) those which involve intricate processes of adaptation because their effects are closely tied to
the semiotic system in which they are manifested - that is enunciation

I follow McFarlane's helpful distinction so that enunciation becomes the specific narrating effects of a
particular medium, whilst narration remains the trans-media specific act of "story-telling". It is the
narrative, the trans-media specific act of "story-telling" that can be compared in the work of adaptation.
The comparative speech acts of novel or short story and film adaptation can be thus seen as ways of
comparing what I shall call the 'meta-language' of narrative across the two media, and across the historical
and aesthetic and authorial determinations of the two texts. The exploration of the differential enunciation
of the written word and the film makes what might seem a transparent process of narration, opaque - by
examining the techniques whereby the film transposes the enunciation of the book, it is possible not only to
find the differences in the meta-language of the different narratives in the books, but also the differences
the differences in 'voice' between the books and the films.
Earlier in this chapter, I have outlined a definition of ‘voice’ as an attitude or approach revealed in a speech act. How is this attitude to be found within fiction? I have already shown that fictional narrative can be seen merely as a particular type of speech act, a particular contract between teller and hearer. If correct, this way of looking at narrative reveals narrative “voice” as an attitude or approach to the story told. Thus, narrative voice is the relationship of narration (story telling) to narrative (story) within the text. The distinction between narration and narrative has a strong historical precedent, derived both from Victor Shklovsky’s Russian Formalist distinction between fabula (plot) and syuzhet (events of the story in chronological order) and the similar distinction between histoire (story) and discours (discourse) made by Christian Metz which he adapted for film from Émile Benveniste’s earlier work in linguistics. Edward Branigan, in Narrative Comprehension and Film seeks to show how we gain what Marin calls our competence, how we understand narrative as a hermeneutic organisation of information narrative is a perceptual activity that organizes data into a special pattern which represents and explains experience. More specifically, narrative is a way of organizing spatial and temporal data into a cause-effect chain of events with a beginning, middle, and end that embodies a judgement about the nature of the events as well as it demonstrates how it is possible to know, and hence to narrate, the events.

The distinction between narrative as the cause-effect chain of events and narration as the telling of those events embodying a judgement enables my definition of the “voice” of the text as the overall relationship of narration to narrative. However, although the components of narrative - the judgement, the narrative events and the cause-effect chains negotiating their telling - are the same in both novels and films, these media are quite different, and hence aspects of the narration are media specific and need to be adapted in order to be transferred across in adaptation.

Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan writes in Narrative Fiction: Contemporary Poetics ‘the author must be seen as a construct inferred and assembled from all the components of the text’ [my italics]. This construct is known as “the implied author”, and is similar in concept to Foucault’s idea of enunciative position as a subject position within the text. Considered together with the concept that the “implied author” is the overall relationship of narration to narrative, it should be possible to determine authorial “voice” and “agency” within films and novels. However, a further interesting feature of narrative complicates our understanding of the narrating of fictional texts, and that is the “voices” of the characters,
and our access to their "points of view". Narrative fiction creates fictional characters as well as fictional plots. In novels, the narration may assume the speech, thoughts and feelings of the characters, and in addition may comment upon those characters through the thoughts, speech - "voice" - of a narrator or of another character. In films, the characters are embodied by actors who speak, and access to their thoughts and feelings is usually more limited, but may be enabled through techniques of indirect narration. There is no figure personified as a narrator, but narration giving us access to character feelings, and also judging the characters, is assumed by the action of the camera, the mise en scène, or by the addition of character voice-over. Thus, in both novels and films, characters may be attributed individualised "voices" and "agency" which reveals their perspective on events in the story, and their abilities to act upon their perceptions. In addition, both books and films will have a narration which reveals the attitude of the "implied author" towards their characters. As the creation and portrayal of character is part of the overall narration, and as narrative voice is the relationship of narration to narrative, then, by extension, the "voice" of the "implied author" with respect to the characters will be the play of all the characters' voices and the attitude of the narration towards them.

The task of finding the voice and agency of the "implied author" is different in films and novels due to the different modes of enunciation in film and novel. Gerard Genette and Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan analyse the processes in the novel whereby narration works to create our views about the characters and the narrative while Edward Branigan and George M. Wilson analyse the processes whereby this is brought about in film. These techniques are very detailed and I shall not elaborate too fully on them here, because they are practical tools of criticism and I shall be exercising them in the analyses of the actual adaptations (Appendix A offers an account of what the significant features of narration are in books and films, and of their differences). I have drawn upon Genette's overall distinctions in order to gain a consensual understanding of terms which vary from narratologist to narratologist. The terms of Genette's narratology do no exist merely to determine the 'voice' of the implied author - they are more general terms covering the structuring of novels, but the operation of the implied author can be found in all the classes of Genette's narrative categorisation. Genette has three overall categories, 'tense', 'mood' and 'voice', within which multiple permutations of different narrative techniques are explored in depth. I indicate how the
operation of textual ‘voice’ may be determined within Genette’s narratology. However, authorial voice and agency are more than merely the skilful deployment of narratological categories: a complex and interesting text requires an engagement from the reader/viewer which acknowledges their complexity and unique character. In order to avoid the pitfalls of a formalism as a general theory, I have therefore followed George Wilson’s injunction to read each text individually, with attention to their particular enunciative strategies and the themes they pursue, in his words, to keep in play ‘a lively, reiterated sense of the holistic character of all interpretative work’.24 The key practical narratological tools I shall use here are the focalisation of character - the selective filtering whereby we are brought closer to the feelings and thoughts of some characters than others; the reliability of the narration, where it withholds information or gives us false information; and the figuration (imagery, tropes, repetitions) of both novels and films, for which Genette does not provide a category, as vital for an understanding of how authorial voice is giving us an insight into how we should think about the characters and the narrative. Additionally, in film figuration assumes, arguably, a greater importance than it does in novels, as it is capable, through mise en scène, through rhymes and repetitions, of giving us an insight into the feelings of the character.

The Performance of Sexual Difference and Gender

This chapter has, so far, explored the idea of ‘voice’ in two contexts; firstly, as the expression of an individual imbricated in their place and time in society, expressing not merely that imbrication but the repression constituted by, and the consequent desire which arises out of interpellation and, secondly, as the expression of a work of fiction, embodying in Edward Branigan words, a ‘judgement about the nature of the events’ in the narrative - a judgement about the characters and the world in which they relate. How can these ideas of ‘voice’ be used to articulate the relationship of the voice of the actual author to that expressed in the text, and particularly, to explore the relationship of gender to authorship and to voice in these texts? The thrillers studied foreground relationships between men and women, dramatising issues of love and trust amongst protagonists threatened by external or internal danger. I undertake a narratological analysis of these texts in order to reveal their ‘judgements’ about sexual difference and gender, and also explore the desires of the texts as these are manifest in the characters and the narration. Psychoanalysis has illuminated the relationship between individual subjectivity, gender and sexual difference, and I shall be
using psychoanalysis as a methodology to investigate how these relationships are portrayed within the thrillers. I shall, thus, be deploying psychoanalytic theory and technique in order to hear the gendered “voices” of these texts.

I take gender to be a term which refers to the social manifestation and expression of sexual difference. Although historically men and women may change in their roles, their dress, their gender attributes, throughout history we fall into categories of male and female as sexually different. Annette Kuhn describes how the function of gender transhistorically has been to set up a heterogeneous and determinate set of biological, physical, social, psychological and psychic constructs as a unitary fixed and unproblematic attribute of human subjectivity. 25

This definition of gender whilst having the advantage of following the conventional usage nevertheless is problematic because sexual difference, i.e. ‘the determinate set of biological differences’ quoted above, is subject to very different theorisations. Sexual difference may be characterised either as a biological given or as constructed in the process of gendering. For example, the Oedipus and Castration complexes of Freud theorise gendering as proceeding from a grounding of biological sexual difference in which the infant becomes aware of the “sexual difference” of their parents and, thus of their own, by the possession or absence of a penis. They then subsequently align themselves to a gender through their identification with one particular parent rather than another, and through the difference between perceiving a threat of castration from the father or perceiving having already been castrated like the mother. 26 Lacan modifies this account and escapes from biological determinism, only to fall within a linguistic determinism. Lacan wrote that, regardless of our individual train journeys through life, i.e. our very different upbringings and different biologies, we all pass through the doors marked “male” and “female”, i.e. we become gendered into the psychical binary of sexual difference, becoming men or women. 27 This, for Lacan is not merely the world of sexual difference, of gender, but also the world of language, law and structure, because through our acknowledgement and living in this binarisation of sexual difference we gain access to the concepts of order which structure all our relations with others. This realm of order, law and language is Lacan’s concept of the “Symbolic”. However, for Lacan, the penis/phallus is the only signifier of sexual difference within the Symbolic and is the signifier of masculinity. There is no signifier for femininity - the
infant subject to language cannot recognise the reproductive process or signifier of reproduction which is not yet formed in children. The penis/phallus therefore becomes the signifier of positivity in the forming Unconscious, and is used to establish both sexual difference and gender; and yet the signifier for femininity does not exist in the Unconscious or in culture. Gender in this formulation is never definitively established, but is forever claimed with anxiety. However, the Lacanian attempt to escape from biological determinism is not quite successful because despite Lacan’s attempt to link the phallus structurally with the asymmetry of the Oedipus complex for boys and girls through the place of the Oedipal father, the object of the mother’s desire and the object of a culture beyond the baby, the penis is, inevitably, still conflated with the phallus because of the assumption that it confers the phallus.

Judith Butler takes the social construction of sexual difference a stage further, following Foucault in arguing that there is no sexual difference without gender, and that both are formed as “products” of societal norms. For her, the bodily elements that appear to distinguish us as men and women are discursive categories, and for her even genetic attributes are questionable, and body parts form a continuum rather than a binary of male and female. Butler argues, further, that societal forces or norms operate throughout our lives, constantly producing, or as she puts it “performing” our genders. Our behaviour - our dress, the tenor and timbre of our speech, our enacted sexuality, our attitude to other men and women - is thus a manifestation of the “performance” continually produced in us by the norms of gender, rather than a developmental history which leads to a stable gendered identity. She states her argument at the beginning of Bodies that Matter: On the discursive limits of “Sex”

At stake in such a reformulation of the materiality of bodies will be the following: (1) the recasting of the matter of bodies as the effect of a dynamic of power, such that the matter of bodies will be indissociable from the regulatory norms that govern their materialization and the signification of those material effects; (2) the understanding of performativity not as the act by which a subject brings into being what she/he names, but, rather, as that reiterative power of discourse to produce the phenomena that it regulates and constrains; (3) the construal of “sex” no longer as a bodily given on which the construct of gender is artificially imposed, but as a cultural norm which governs the materialization of bodies; (4) a rethinking of the process by which a bodily norm is assumed, appropriated, taken on as not, strictly speaking, undergone by a subject, but rather that the subject, the speaking “I,” is formed by virtue of having gone through such a process of assuming a sex; and (5) a linking of this process of “assuming” a sex with the question of identification, and with the discursive means by which the heterosexual imperative enables certain sexed identifications and forecloses and/or disavows other identifications. This exclusionary matrix by which subjects are formed thus requires the
simultaneous production of a domain of abject beings, those who are not yet “subjects,”
but who form the constitutive outside to the domain of the subject... 28

If the relationship of biological sex to gender is finally undecidable, I nevertheless find aspects of each of
these analyses useful to this project.

Freud’s account, whilst deterministic and therefore unhelpful for a feminist politics of sexual
difference, provides a different Oedipal trajectory for men and women, women achieving gender with more
difficulty than men because women have to change the object of their love from their mother to their father,
and their drive from active to passive. In looking at the texts Don’t Look Now, Strangers on a Train and
Live Flesh, it may be possible to see which Oedipal path the characters tread, and postulate whether their
fragile hold on their sanity and sexuality may be more consonant with a female gendering.

Lacan’s theories enable two different and contrasting approaches. The first takes Lacan’s
argument, which is somewhat along the same lines as Freud’s, that women are “not-all” subject to sexual
difference, 29 but have access to a mystical spirituality outside and beyond sexual difference. This argument
is the site of contested theorising by feminist psychoanalytic critics, and has been seized by them for its
inherent possibilities of resistance. Thus Luce Irigaray and Julia Kristeva 30 have argued for access to poetic
speech as “proto-feminine”, a border to sexual difference which threatens its stability and its patriarchal
gender boundaries. The development of écriture feminine 31 as a female form of writing was designed to
take advantages of just such a borderline between the sensical and nonsensical in order to find the missing
signifier of femininity. Nevertheless, both Kristeva and Irigaray recognise in Lacan’s edict that there is no
‘beyond’ of sexual difference - ‘How return, other than by means of a special discourse, to a pre-
discursive reality’ 31 that this flirting with a feminine beyond of gender is also a flirtation with psychosis or
with death. This is Lacan’s realm of the “Real”, the Freudian death drive. Lacan follows Freud in arguing
that attempts to avoid the consequences of the Oedipus complex through repression or disavowal lead to
psychosis and illness. For Lacan, successful negotiation of the Oedipus complex, whether male or female,
is the entry into meaning, language and culture, as well as sexual difference, and must be accepted as a
condition of communication. Is there, perhaps, in the female authored novels an interest in the psychotic
and paranormal of the stories as an exploration of *écriture féminine* and a way of breaking out of a patriarchal mode of representation?

A different interpretation of Lacan’s ideas, however, forms the theoretical backbone of this thesis, and this interpretation lies in the idea that if there can be no absolute assumption of sexual difference then it must be as difficult for men to achieve gender as women, and gender is consequently an assumed and a contingent fiction. Lacan wrote ‘There is no sexual relation’, meaning that because there is no “femininity” within the symbolic we inevitably fail to achieve symbolic sexual difference. Therefore we supply our (mis)understanding of the nature of sexual difference, through the “Imaginary”. Each gender needs and uses the other for support, and each lover looks for an Imaginary support from their partner in order to cover over the failings in the “Symbolic”. I look at the characters’ psychotic or hysterical symptoms as examples of failed gender, and then at the voice and agency of the implied author - the textual attitude towards the male and female characters - equally as a hysterical symptom of failed sexual difference. How do the characters fail in their processes of achieving sexual difference, what has gone “wrong” in their Oedipus and Castration complexes? How do the characters embody concepts of femininity or masculinity and how does the attitude of narration treat such characters? How is femininity and masculinity troped in the texts? Do the differences in the textual attitudes to sexual difference betray a correlation with the genders of the authors? If so, I argue, these findings will support Lacan’s argument that the different subject positions which men and women assume as the result of their gendering - their different Oedipal trajectories - are responsible for the gendered symptoms which their neuroses/psychoses bring forth. Lacan writes that ‘Woman is the symptom [of man]’, and I argue through this thesis that the converse is also true, that ‘Man is the symptom of woman’. This theorisation means that gendering as such is not responsible for the differences between men and women and successful gendering brings women and men equally into the social, cultural and political world. However, the failures of gendering are responsible for hysterias which are differently characterised for men and women and which may be responsible for the different behaviours of the genders and the different power structures in society. The world of death and obliteration in the thrillers, I argue, sets up a hystericalisation of the characters whereby their different gendered characteristics can be determined. I return to this theorisation at the beginning of Chapter Four,
where I deploy Lacan's Theory of the Four Discourses to test this theory against the texts and to argue for a gendered hysterical agency operating through the texts and through the embodied author(s).

Judith Butler's theory of gender and sexual difference provides one possible justification for looking at the gender of the text. If gender is a "performative" attribute of human subjectivity, manifest as the response to societal norms, and producing thereby our sexual difference, then why should not a text manifest just such a performance of gender. As one of the many "iterations" which we make all our lives - all our interactions and statements being such "iterations" of discourse, a film or book may manifest the same kind of gendered iteration as we bring towards our clothes and our utterances generally. In Chapter Six, the discussion of the relationship between the embodied author and their society explores just such an idea of performativity. I theorise the author as a psychoanalytic, performative subject, according to the ideas of Judith Butler and authorial voice as displayed in performative iterations/speech acts, which have within them the possibility of transformative agency. Thus, I consider the film of Mrs Dalloway as a metaphor of the writing process.

**Narrative: Desire, Fantasy, and Identification**

Although I have characterised Lacan's theory of sexual difference as producing hysteria and neurosis as a consequence of the inevitable inability of the individual to achieve their gender, both hysteria and neurosis are manifestations of "fantasy", the conscious and unconscious activity which centres around the infant's speculation about the nature of its origins, and which figures the adult's unconscious throughout life. Importantly, the theory of fantasy is also a theory of narrative fiction, as the speculations of the subject are themselves narrative or scenic - they are the fantasmatic stagings of the subject's scenarios of desire.

Laplanche and Pontalis developed a Freudian influenced theory of fantasy in their article "Fantasy and the Origins of Sexuality". Laplanche and Pontalis view originary fantasies as being centred around questions of origin, of which there are fundamentally three:- 'the origin of the individual (primal scene), the origin of sexuality (seduction) and the origin of the difference between the sexes (castration).". Fantasy
making, they argue, is an auto-erotic activity, and it stems from the earliest stages of infancy when the absence of the mother creates both the withdrawal of cathexis onto the child, stimulating auto-erotic activity, and also a fantasy creating her return. In order to stem its anxiety the child is drawn to speculate and imagine scenarios which stage its desire:

By locating the origin of fantasy in the auto-eroticism, we have shown the connection between fantasy and desire. Fantasy, however, is not the object of desire, but its setting. In fantasy the subject does not pursue the object or its sign: he appears caught up himself in the sequence of images. He forms no representation of the desired object, but is himself represented as participating in the scene, he cannot be assigned any fixed place in it (hence the danger, in treatment, of interpretations which claim to do so).17

It is easy to see how fiction, where authors have to inhabit all the characters and the narration and have to imagine the mise en scène, can be allied to the production of fantasy. Laplanche and Pontalis suggest that the particular forms of originary fantasy are phylogenetic and passed through unconscious parental communication into the child. This makes the particular form of fantasy individual and idiosyncratic, but nevertheless a modulation on what become trans-historical and cultural myths. Each of us has our own fantasy which nevertheless relates to genres of myths. Seen in this light, the Oedipus and Castration stories are myths constructed around sexual difference but differently experienced and fantasised by us as individuals. The idea of fantasy can thus be incorporated with Lacan's concept of the impossibility of sexual difference, the structural symbolic difficulties which Lacan describes as the "asymmetry of the signifier", forming the ground for the child's speculations based on their own family history. Some of these scenes of desire and original fantasies can be seen quite clearly in the texts studied: the fantasy of seduction in Bruno's following Miriam into the tunnel of love in the film of Strangers on a Train, the fantasy of virgin birth played out at the beginning of the film of Live Flesh when Victor is born, like Jesus, under a star, and the castration fantasy when John is stabbed by the dwarf in Don't Look Now. In addition there are many other fantasies represented in these films, particularly fantasies of jealousy and sibling rivalry staged throughout the film of Live Flesh. I further relate the "voice" of the text to cultural as well as personal attitudes towards sexual difference and gender by following Laplanche and Pontalis in exploring these particular manifestations phylogenetically, as symptoms of particular cultural attitudes and parenting as well as through the symptomatology of particular failures in gendering.
Originary fantasies form the basic fantasy structure of the infant, but we continue to fantasise, consciously and unconsciously, throughout our lives. The process of creating a fantasy is a process of elaboration upon the original libidinous scenarios we set up for ourselves. Laplanche and Pontalis point out that in originary fantasies the identification of the subject is diffuse and perverse, spread through the fantasy, without necessarily being fixed in one particular character or place.

“A father seduces a daughter” might perhaps be the summarized version of the seduction fantasy. The indication here of the primary process is not the absence of organization, as is sometimes suggested, but the peculiar character of the structure, in that it is a scenario with multiple entries, in which nothing shows whether the subject will be immediately located as daughter, it can as well be fixed as father, or even in the term seduces.

However, this analysis of originary fantasies does imply its opposite in secondary fantasy and secondary elaboration, that fantasy is located in certain characters, in certain aspects of the syntax. Secondary daydreams are not necessarily like primary ones: as Laplanche and Pontalis point out, they may not equally inhabit all the characters, or they may only be felt in the syntax of the fantasy. The secondary fantasy of “A father seduces a daughter” will reflect the psychological formation of the subject, i.e. the fantasy will be imagined differently by a gendered man than by a gendered woman. In later life, the adult mixes unconscious and conscious fantasy to create different and individual scenarios:

It is with this in mind that Freud always held the model fantasy to be that reverie, that form of novelette, both stereotypical and infinitely variable, which the subject composes and relates to himself in a waking state.

Thus fantasy is linked to day-dreaming and popular fiction by a process whereby the fantasist creates verisimilitude from the fantasies - a cause-effect plot, a social setting, an aesthetic convention, etc. The pattern of gendered identifications we adopt in order to achieve sexual difference will, no doubt, be represented within the fantasy, the characters not endowed with exactly the same labile qualities of identification. The unconscious may not know sexual difference, but our elaborations and fictions become informed by our experience, and that experience informed by our adoption of sexual difference, our fantasies may become gendered.

The primal fantasies about origins which Laplanche and Pontalis cite are themselves attempts to understand the inconceivable, the impossible, the “gap” in representation known as primal trauma. The child’s fantasies can be seen as examples of what Freud referred to as deferred action (Nachträglichkeit) -
that is the fantasies are constructed in retrospect around this gap. For example, when the infant first fantasises in response to the (temporary) loss of the mother, the “gap” in the mother creates the child’s libido, turned upon the self in auto-eroticism and fantasy. The initial moments of sexuality are equally unnameable moments of loss or threat. The subsequent trauma of the Oedipus Complex sets up our fantasies about sexual difference as yet another moment of retrospective speculation. Although our fantasies accompany us throughout life as dreams, day-dreams, or as acts of fiction, fantasies are also manifest in what Lacan described as symptoms (described above). Freud believed that symptoms were the effect of repressed unconscious fantasies making themselves manifest on the patient’s body or in their behaviour. The symbolization of symptoms in such a way as to evade the censor of the patient’s ego system, is thus similar to the symptoms in a text which disguise the nature of the primal fantasy in secondary revision. Thus, Lacan’s formulation of the hysterical symptoms of the failure of sexual difference can equally be seen in the hysterical symptoms of the texts. Furthermore, given that the psychological thrillers actually dramatise trauma, in forms which deal with the threat of death or psychic annihilation the text may itself re-enact by deferred action (Nachträglichkeit) the traumas and fantasies of sexual difference.

The thriller novel and film text can thus be seen, as fantasy and as symptom, to display a performance of gender and sexual difference. Whose fantasy and symptom does the text display? Whose gender? The analysis thus returns to a consideration of the role of the agent of the speech act. In a novel it is easier to argue that the novelist must be the primary agent of the textual speech act - the desire of the text being their desire, the excess that is produced through their interpellation into the writing situation, the judgement of the text being their performative iteration of discourse they have received from elsewhere. In a film, this is considerably complicated by the intrinsically collaborative nature of film authorship. By looking at the changes in iteration between novel and film, I would argue that what comes under interrogation is the performative agency of the film-makers upon the original text of the writer, and this performative agency is the organisation and assembly of all the craft aspects of the film-making. Nevertheless, the director is the delegated agent of film authorship, and as with all other speech acts, the agent must bear the responsibility for their speech, even if it is inherited from elsewhere.
In the following chapters on *Don’t Look Now* and *Strangers on a Train* I discuss the particular performances of sexual difference in these texts and how the novels differ from the films.

2 Maclean, Marie, *Narrative as Performance: The Baudelairean Experiment* (Routledge, 1988)
3 Maclean 25
7 Foucault, Michel *The History of Sexuality: The Will to Knowledge, Volume 1* translated Robert Hurley (Penguin, 1996)
10 Copjec, 10
11 Copjec, 14
13 Bluestone, George *Novels into Film* (University of California Press: Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1957),
14 McFarlane, Brian *Novel to Film: An Introduction to the Theory of Adaptation* (Oxford University Press. New York 1996), 20
15 Metz *Film Language* 25. Metz notes that Benveniste, in *Problèmes de linguistique générale* (Paris, 1966, 130), defines discours in two ways. The first “broad” definition enables discours (spoken language) to be distinguished from langue (the language system) and the second opposes discours to histoire (“’impersonal’ narratives of all varieties’) and thus discours corresponds to what Benveniste calls the narrative. Metz decides that although narrative is definitely “histoire” in the “narrow” sense, it is nevertheless discourse in the “broader” sense and he therefore uses Benveniste’s definition in order to explore the nature of narrative as utterance - the “spoken” language of the film system.
16 Branigan, Edward *Narrative Comprehension and Film* (Routledge, 1992)
17 Branigan, 2
18 Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan *Narrative Fiction: Contemporary poetics* (Methuen, 1983), 87
19 I use the term actors inclusively, to mean both male and female actors
21 Rimmon-Kenan *Narrative Fiction: Contemporary poetics* (Methuen, 1983)
22 Branigan *Narrative Comprehension and Film* (Routledge, 1992)
24 Wilson, 203
Chapter One


34 I here do not use the distinction between “Fantasy” as conscious daydream and “Phantasy” as unconscious wish-fulfillment, made originally by James Strachey when translating the Standard Edition and followed by many subsequent Anglocentric theorists. Following Laplanche and Pontalis (see following section) I do not believe it possible to distinguish between conscious and unconscious fantasy in this way, seeing them as a continuum, and as a response to structure - the Symbolic.


36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.
CHAPTER TWO:

Cultural Androgyny in Don’t Look Now

And then the boy realised he had to grow up and not be a boy any longer, so he turned into a girl, and not an unattractive one at that, and the boy was locked in a box forever. D. du M. wrote her books, and had young men, and later a husband, and children, and a lover, and life was sometimes lovely and sometimes rather sad, but when she found Menabilly and lived in it alone, she opened up the box sometimes and let the phantom, who was neither girl nor boy but disembodied spirit, dance in the evening when there was no one to see.

Daphne du Maurier

While I was shooting Bad Timing, Art Garfunkel came up to me and said he realized he was really playing me. But I told him that was only part of it. I challenged him to decipher when I was wearing the trousers and when I was wearing the dress.

Nicholas Roeg

There is never complete contact...I think nature forbids that kind of connection between people. When it happens it's an aberration. You have to keep some kind of distance. You can get close, but you finally find you are trapped and alone.

Nicholas Roeg

This chapter will examine how the ambiguity in relation to gender expressed above by du Maurier and Roeg is manifest in Don’t Look Now (N & F). The short story and film adaptation question the nature of gender, positing a world where male and female co-exist within individuals in a bisexuality full of internal conflict, where sexual relationships are unfathomable, and where the world in which the characters exist is “mixed up”, a danger which both texts characterise as a mixture of male rationality and the female irrational. I will argue that Don’t Look Now dramatises sexual difference as a dangerous division, pervasive both within nature and within the psyche, inherent in both men and women. Yet this very bisexuality creates a mobility of identification within the texts, where male and female characters are treated with empathy. Although each text enacts this empathy differently, they both display the characteristics of androgyny through an understanding of the human psyche as conflicted, as needing love, as suffering from loss.

Freud adopted a belief in bisexuality from his association with Wilhelm Fleiss. This belief, at least at the beginning of Freud’s career, was that characteristics of “masculinity” and “femininity” are present in all individuals, and that these characteristics can be allied with other binary qualities of sexual life, for example activity/passivity. Later, he sees bisexuality as a capacity for identification with either sex, an ability in the unconscious to assume masculine and feminine subject positions and desires. In “Hysterical Phantasies and Their Relation to the Unconscious” he characterises hysteria as ‘the expression on the one hand of a masculine
unconscious sexual phantasy, and on the other of a feminine one. The hysterical acting out of inherent bisexuality is, for Freud, a result of the unconscious conflict of the two incompatible desires. He describes an instance where a patient “pressed her dress up against her body with one hand (as the woman), while she tried to tear it off with the other (as the man).” Is the act of writing; imagining male and female characters, inhabiting their worlds, identifying with their desires, a form of bisexual hysteria, and if so, is this the claim brought forward by du Maurier and Roeg? I explore in what ways Don’t Look Now can be said to dramatise that androgyny or bisexuality in the characters and the plot. I look at the enunciative strategies of short story and film in order to illuminate how the short story and film vary in their portrayal of sexual difference, even whilst both works endow their male and female characters with attributes which are textually figured as characteristic of the opposite sex. I seek to show how the different nuances in the treatment of femininity and masculinity in the short story and film are implicated in more general differences in the two texts, in the narrative violence of their story-telling and in their very different attitudes to the world of the occult and supernatural. Finally, I consider the adaptation of Don’t Look Now both for the way it illuminates the approach of a male director in a predominantly male dominated medium towards material written by a woman, and also for the way in which sexual difference is expressed through a respect and empathy for the opposite sex, and an awareness of the difficulty of that empathy.

The main story events of Don’t Look Now are, for the most part, faithfully preserved in the film, yet the manner of the telling is very different. In the previous chapter I introduced various terms of narrative analysis: story, plot, narrative, narration and enunciation but their application to an analysis of the texts of Don’t Look Now is far from straightforward. David Bordwell follows Victor Shklovsky in making a distinction between ‘story’ and ‘plot’. Bordwell defines the difference thus:

‘Story will refer to the events of the narrative in their presume spatial, temporal and causal relations. ‘Plot’ will refer to the totality of formal and stylistic materials in the film. The plot thus includes all the systems of the film; everything from a flashback structure and subjective point-of-view to minutiae of lighting, cutting and camera movement. The plot is, in effect, the film before us. The story is thus our mental construct, a structure of inferences we make on the basis of selected aspects of the plot. For example, the plot might present certain events out of chronological order; to understand the film we must be able to reconstruct that chronological, or story, order.’

Don’t Look Now (N) keeps events in chronological order, but because it has access to the thoughts of its central character John, enables him to have memories inscribed within the chronology. The film includes flashbacks, flashforwards, and also cuts forwards and backwards in time independently of the viewpoints of any one
character (during the sex scene). The film’s virtuoso time scheme and editing creates a very different plot from the short story. The various narrational techniques of the plot deliver the story as their effect, and these narrational techniques are complex and inter-determined. Yet this distinction made between story and plot is dangerous; taken to its extreme, it implies a mythic story which exists somewhere independent of the manner of the telling, whereas, perhaps, a more helpful way of looking at the story is that which is abstracted from the very powerful way the plot is guiding us to think about the story and the characters. As Bordwell implies above, the process of viewing a film is a cognitive process, one where we make inferences and conclusions from the data with which we are presented, and therefore, the film - or novel - can only exist as an emergent property of the text, in interaction between the viewer and the text. This principle implicitly underlies the making and acceptance of film adaptations. We “recognise” a quality about the adaptation which we also obtain from the original book - what Bluestone calls the ‘mental concept’ (see chapter I, p26) - and it is this recognition which assures us that the film is an adaptation rather than a completely independent work. The enunciative techniques of the film and of the short story make any film adaptation necessarily very different from the original novel or short story. Differences in the film’s ‘plot’ may therefore be attempts by the film-makers to reach the ‘mental concepts’ of the book, attempts to preserve rather than change the story and the characters. In Don’t Look Now, the major enunciative change is that whilst the novella is internally focalised through the protagonist, John, the film does not access John’s feelings directly. Instead, its strategy is to convey John’s state of mind through its enunciative strategy, through flashbacks and flashforwards, through mise en scène, the rhyming and use of montage, the music, acting etc. which allows us to infer the internal states of the characters and to place our empathy. The internal focalisation through John creates another important effect in the novella; all the other characters are perceived only through John and the narration builds up an uncertainty as to their real motives and actions. In the film, the technique of creating this uncertainty is different - actors are embodied - and the film’s strategy creates narrative confusion and confusion about cause and effect, rather than confusion over character. The attempts to create the same ‘mental concept’ must, therefore, by necessity be imperfect; the story cannot be re-captured - but the attempt of the film to do so can be observed and analysed.

Loss in Don’t Look Now

In order to explore the differences between the two texts therefore, I have first looked at what I consider to be their shared concerns and how they are differently enunciated. In Don’t Look Now, I shall argue that both texts are united in their concern to portray the profound sense of loss which is produced upon the death of a
Plate I: 

Don't Look Now: Opening scene

"Don't Look Now"
Laura, from children in hospital.

Laura, cut off from children in hospital.

Laura shot same size and framing as sisters, as calm and self-possessed. Narration cuts to blind sisters from Laura to signal malevolence and to connect to Laura, hysterical with John, "unhysterical" with twins.

Laura meets blind Heather in the ladies'.
Don't Look Now: Laura leaves on the vaporetto.
child. This thematic concern is expressed differently but in both film and short story, loss is irreconcilable, leading only to death, and thus loss structures the narratives of both the short story and the film.

In the film the loss is expressed explicitly. The opening montage sequence (see Plate 1:1 - 4) where John and Laura lose their daughter shows John’s grief as time and space shattering: he cradles the small form of his drowned little girl in his arms over and over again in slow motion, as he brings her out of the water. As he stumbles and shouts in agony on the banks of the pond and tries in vain to resuscitate her, we see Laura emerging from behind French windows in order to witness the scene. The association of glass with Laura is pertinent. Her tight short scream of shock and grief is terminated by a cut to a power drill in Venice (a time cut to John and Laura’s Venice visit), explicitly directed by Roeg in order to show how Laura’s emotions are literally “cut off” by the death. In a slightly later scene, Laura is shown recovering in hospital with a glass screen between her and happy children playing in the ward next door (Plate II: 1), emphasising the inseparable barrier between Laura and her daughter, and perhaps also by association a glass barrier between Laura and John. However, the effect on John is even more devastating. His whole world is deformed, for him (as for his son riding his bike) glass has been shattered, blood which cannot be his but might be his son’s, mysteriously appears taking his daughter’s shape on a slide, his world is one of a frozen pond, where “nothing is what it seems”. The scene where John and Laura make love, intercut with them dressing afterwards, is suffused with the sadness of the afterwards moment, as if sex must by necessity lead to a moment of small death and a falling off of the union of two people into their intrinsic separateness. We even see their vulnerability - John’s nakedness beforehand when he is working, and Laura’s openness waiting for him whilst lying on the bed: their willingness to open up to each other, which fails when they clothe themselves. And yet, this intercutting of time, which is mirrored elsewhere in the film, is at its most condensed here, the time space is only a few minutes/hours, rather than days or months elsewhere, thus conveying the centrality of Laura and John’s relationship within the film, and to the theme of loss. The music (a variation of the child’s music at the beginning) plays through this scene, bleeding its sadness into the characters. When Laura leaves on the barge to visit her son, the filmed separation, at first through the glass windows of the barge and then slow matching tracking shots showing John and Laura getting progressively smaller, farther apart, and blocked by passing boats (Plate II: 2), seems almost caused by the music, echoing the child’s death, and the adults’ separation in their grief. Furthermore these two scenes are not shot from John’s point of view but are equally distributed in shot size and in power of gaze between John and Laura: in fact the parting scene finishes on a mid-shot of Laura, so we have access to her feelings in a story predominantly about
John. We sense the loss of Christine, an equal loss for both John and Laura and one which threatens to come between them.

In the short story the sense of loss is diffused throughout the narrative. Because the story is primarily internally focalised through John (Gerard Genette’s term for a type of narration which sees through the eyes of only one character and can express only their feelings) we only get John’s opinion on Laura’s feelings about Christine, their daughter.

Her voice, for the first time since they had come away, took on the old bubbling quality he loved, and the worried frown between her brows had vanished. At last, he thought, at last she’s beginning to get over it. If I can keep this going, if we can pick up the familiar routine of jokes shared on holiday and the home, the ridiculous fantasies about people at other tables, or staying in the hotel, or wandering in art galleries and churches, then everything will fall into place, life will become as it was before, the wound will heal, she will forget.

So, at the start of the story, Laura seems to be the one suffering from terrible grief. The narrator does not tell us anything about John’s feelings about Christine’s death, and this paralipsis (knowledge the narrator should deliver, but deliberately hides from the reader) is a significant omission, where we can read more than one possibility. When John witnesses the small girl running along the canals in Venice, he is glad that Laura did not see the girl and projects on to Laura feelings of grief and helplessness. We could believe these are feelings he feels but is trying to disavow.

She had seen none of it, for which he felt unspeakably thankful. The sight of a child, a little girl, in what must have been near danger, her fear that the scene he had just witnessed was in some way a sequel to the alarming cry, might have had a disastrous effect on her overwrought nerves.

How can Laura have come to the conclusion that the girl running was “in some way a sequel to the alarming cry” when she was not a witness to this moment? John’s thoughts and speculations, expressed through the narrator, show some unreliability. Also his action on following the “little girl” through sympathy, even at risk of the unknown, implies he had feelings for his daughter, which he is now projecting onto this “little girl”, a fear which is felt even in the tone of voice, the hesitancy of the narrator.

It could be coincidence, a child running from a drunken relative, and yet, and yet...His heart began thumping in his chest, instinct warning him to run himself, now, at once, back along the alley the way he had come - but what about the child? What was going to happen to the child?

However, because John’s feelings for his child are not expressed directly, other clues show his attitude to the dead daughter to be somewhat conflicted and ambiguous. When his son, Johnny succumbs to what might be a life threatening illness, John’s immediate reaction is somewhat casual, he argues against returning home
immediately, and his protestation that ‘he was as worried about Johnny as she was, though he wasn’t going to say so’ reads like petulance. His lack of awareness of Johnny’s danger may be a replay of his reaction towards his daughter’s earlier illness, a sign of coldness. Or it may be disavowal, an inability to confront his overwhelming grief and fear at losing yet another child. However, what we do know about John’s feelings relate to his mortifying grief and loss when Laura leaves to look after Johnny at prep school.

...Laura had climbed down the steps into the launch and was standing amongst the crowd of passengers, waving her hand, her scarlet coat a gay patch of colour amongst the more sober suiting of her companions. The launch tooted again and moved away from the landing-stage, and he stood there watching it, a sense of immense loss filling his heart (my italics). Then he turned and walked away, back to the hotel, back to the hotel, the bright day all about him desolate, unseen.

Note that Laura here is wearing the red coat. This means that the pixie coat of the dwarf is associated with Laura and therefore the dwarf in the short story is linked with both Laura and Christine, whereas in the film, the dwarf is connected only to John’s daughter. John’s overwhelming, unrequited love is for Laura. It could be that for John, Laura’s relationship with their daughter, both dead and alive is excluding and leaves no place for his love for Laura. When the doctor tells John that Laura will get over her loss, his reaction is one of exclusion, that Laura was never able to include Johnny and himself in her relationship with Christine, and in fact could narcissistically only love a helpless child who had not yet developed any individuality.

...'I know' John had said, 'but the girl meant everything. She always did, right from the start, I don’t know why. I suppose it was the difference in age. A boy of school age, and a tough one at that, is someone in his own right. Not a baby of five. Laura literally adored her. Johnny and I were nowhere (my italics).'

Laura’s belief in Christine’s presence in the afterworld is necessarily irritating to John because as John cannot believe, he has no faith, he is excluded from a relationship with Laura and Christine even through death. Thus, John’s feelings towards Christine include the pangs of jealousy; Christine, not even seen yet as a person ‘in her own right’ comes between himself and Laura, taking Laura’s love.

In the film John does not appear to be jealous of Laura’s relationship with Christine (why should he be, he’s the one with the visible relationship with Christine: we have seen him trying desperately to revive her), although he is made to feel guilty about her death. Laura reproaches John

You were the one to say ‘Let the children play if they want to’. You were the one who let her go near the pond.

However, her belief that Christine is still alive mocks John’s sense of grief, so that John has to constantly remind her of the finality of Christine’s death, ‘Laura, your daughter is dead, dead, dead, dead, dead’ and in his tone of
voice, and use of repetition, he expresses feelings which are absent in the short story. However, the film’s

dramatisation of John as guilty rather than jealous creates a blocked element in the narrative which then loses its

significance. Laura’s relationship with her son seems now a meaningless leftover from the short story. She

rushes urgently to him, but when he appears to be better, she does not even say goodbye, or embrace him in

order to return to John. The film needs Laura to return to Venice both to provide suspense for the last scenes -

will she get to John in time, and also because the film, unlike the short story, is not totally focalised through

John; we need to care about what happens to Laura both before and after John is killed. However, her failure to

reach John, to embrace him whilst he is dying, is the last of a series of failed embraces; she does not embrace the
dying Christine, she does not embrace Johnny and now, she does not embrace John, demonstrating how far like
the frozen pond she has become, and how much that embrace is needed by John, who dies a terrible and lonely
dead, and by Johnny, the next in the male line, who stands at the funeral with the same look of stiff-upper lipped
repression that was responsible for John’s downfall.

Psychopathology in Don’t Look Now

Laura and John react in very different ways to their loss, both in the short story and in the film. In
Don’t Look Now(N) we can know nothing about Laura’s true feelings as her grief is filtered through John’s point
of view. We nevertheless learn that John’s reactions throughout the story are those of paranoia and projection.

In Don’t Look Now(F) Laura becomes an independent character; she is embodied by an actress, Julie Christie,

and is a character with an existence outside John’s focalisation of her. The film portrays her response to her

grieving as irrational, hysterical and repressed - she wishes to deny her daughter’s death and therefore chooses to
believe Christine is alive as a ghost. This belief is dangerous and leads John to his death. John, however, is
portrayed by the film’s narration as well-balanced, out of his depth, but nevertheless a victim of the irrational
and the supernatural which kills him. The paranoia of the story is displaced in the film from John onto the body
of the film, which I will argue, can be seen as displaying the symptoms of what I shall call ‘conversion
hysteria’. John and Laura’s grief becomes manifest in the supernatural to which Laura looks for reassurance,
but which dupes John, invading his body as his own dangerous and misleading hysteria. If John’s extra-sensory
perception can thus be seen as a “symptom” of his grief, then his character, his psychopathology, has changed in
the transition from short story to film, as has Laura’s. I will attempt to show how these changes might relate to
sexual difference and the ways in which the texts portray men and women.
We came crying hither: Thou knowst the first time that we smell the air we wawl and cry....When we are born we cry that we are come to this great stage of fools.22

The sense of loss that John and Laura feel in Don’t Look Now is part of life: Shakespeare might argue that it first happens at birth, Melanie Klein at the removal of the mother’s breast, and Freud and Lacan at the Oedipus complex and the institution of the child into culture and society. Jacques Lacan’s analysis may be the most useful to consider because for him this loss is inseparable from the institution of sexual difference, and the gaining of language, all of which have implications in Don’t Look Now. Lacan’s theory of subjectivity centres on three orders or registers:- the ‘Real’, the ‘Imaginary’ and the ‘Symbolic’. These orders co-exist within us and structure our unconscious throughout our lives. Lacan argued that these orders are heterogeneous, applying different modes of understanding to our interrelationships and to our way of understanding the world. The different modes are, however, difficult to define for several reasons:- Lacan changed his concepts throughout his career and based them on a structural/linguistic re-interpretation of Freud, who himself underwent epistemological shifts and varied conceptualisations. In addition, Lacan presented most of his work as lectures and we come to know it through the difficult form of dictation taken by his students. Much of Lacan’s work is still not translated into English and, over the past thirty years of British psychoanalytic work, has also been subject to very different interpretation. The following, non-comprehensive, table therefore represents Lacan’s three orders in their relevance to the reading of these films and novels, thus:-

| Definition |
|------------------|------------------|
| **The Real** | The realm beyond or outside representation. It is ‘the domain of whatever subsists outside symbolization’.25 |
| | The Real is also materiality, anxiety, and trauma. It is ‘the essential object which isn’t an object any longer, but this something faced with which all words cease and all categories fail, the object of anxiety par excellence’.24 |
| **The Imaginary** | The realm of subjective alienation - ‘alienation is constitutive of the Imaginary order’.25 |
| | The order refers to behaviours which seek to deny the individual’s alienation in illusions of omnipotence, and in anger. Thus, Narcissism and Aggression belong to the Imaginary. The order is also that of fragmentation, illusion. Characteristics of the Imaginary are identification and fantasy. |
| **The Symbolic** | The order of structure, of language and the unconscious. Lacan also calls this the discourse of the OTHER, as it is imposed on the individual from without and is culture. |
| | The Symbolic is the order of the ‘signifier’, where language is meaningful through paradigmatic and syntagmatic, through the play of absence and presence. The Symbolic is also the realm of the exchange - ‘Lacan takes from Lévi-Strauss the idea that the social world is structured by certain laws which regulate kinship relations and the exchange of gifts’.26 |
| | The Symbolic governs desire rather than drive which is in the Real. |
Although the orders are structural, they are linked with developmental stages in the progression of the infant, where they originate, and where, for Lacan, they establish the individual's subjectivity, their relationship to the culture around them. The Symbolic is 'the precondition of language (the use of the three basic pronouns “I”/“you”/“he-she-it”), and it can be seen in the structure of the Oedipus complex itself'. The Symbolic is thus linked to the successful resolution of the Oedipus complex where the child is initiated into language and sexual difference by the introduction of “the third term”, the father (present or absent). The father breaks up the Imaginary dyad which binds the child to its mother in an illusory fantasy of omnipotence and impotence, by his presence and by his threat of castration. This threat of castration has to be accepted by the child for it to learn to defer its gratification, to displace its needs into desires, and to convert need into a reciprocal relationship with others embraced through language. The Imaginary is the nostalgic fantasy of union with the mother which the infant constructs from within the Symbolic. The child now has language and an unconscious constructed out of repressed Symbolic material, and from this Symbolic position fantasises an Imaginary power and omnipotence which gains its strength from the mother. Lacan illustrates the Imaginary in his developmental example of the mirror stage (6-18 months), where a child first mis-recognises itself in an image (this could be aural, tactile etc. as well as visual). The mother holds up the infant to the mirror, and the infant is 'lured' or 'captured' by the image which they see as having a unity and omnipotence which they as infants do not possess. There is thus an alienation between the child's experience of its own fragmented and powerless body and the body which seems united in the mirror. The Real is what lies outside language and representation, it is the drives, jouissance, the internal threat which this unsymbolizable material delivers to the infant psyche. Both the fantasies of the infant and their identifications are attempts to stave off the Real of their fear.

Lacan argues, in summary, that the Symbolic, outside which there is no meaning, therefore structures the content of the Imaginary, and both the Imaginary and the Real can be seen as failures in the Symbolic. What is repressed from the Symbolic returns in the Real, via hallucinations, dreams. The Imaginary is therefore the symptomatic attempt to convert the Real to the Symbolic. What can be seen in both texts of Don't Look Now is the way that the Real of the death of Christine is manifest in various symptoms in both John and Laura, and even in the mise-en-scene of the film itself.
If we assume that John is stuck in his moment of loss, his "mirror phase", he is stuck in a recognition and mis-recognition of himself.

This [mirror] image is a fiction because it conceals, or freezes, the infant's lack of motor coordination and the fragmentation of its drives. But it is salutary for the child, since it gives it the first sense of a coherent identity in which it can recognise itself. For Lacan, however, this is already a fantasy - the very image which places the child divides its identity into two. Furthermore, that moment only has meaning in relation to the presence and look of the mother who guarantees its reality for the child...she grants an image to the child, which her presence instantly deflects. Holding the child is, therefore, to be understood not only as a containing, but as a process of referring, which fractures the unity it seems to offer.29

In Don't Look Now (N) John's Imaginary identifications and fantasies centre around Laura, upon whom John depends to prop up his unstable ego. His paranoia and his projection are symptoms of a dependence on Laura in a dyad which excludes the rest of the world. He veers between his Imaginary ability to be everything for Laura - to be able to rescue her from her grief at the beginning of the story when he tries to joke her out of her loss - and the sense of helplessness and despair he feels alone in Venice when he walks away from the departing Laura 'back to the Hotel, the bright day all about him, desolate, unseen'.30 He thus mirrors the pre-Oedipal child who similarly veers between feelings of omnipotence and impotence.

John's grief, the loss of his daughter, is repressed from the Symbolic. He doesn't own up to his grief or his loss, and instead projects it outside himself, in paranoid fantasies, that lead to his death. John seems to suffer from the "paranoid-schizoid position" postulated by Melanie Klein

in which the individual deals with his innate destructive impulses by (a) SPLITTING both his EGO and his OBJECT-REPRESENTATIONS into GOOD and BAD parts, and (b) projecting his destructive impulses on to the bad object by whom he feels persecuted. According to Klein, the paranoid-schizoid position constitutes the infant's first attempt to master its DEATH INSTINCT.31

John makes the twins into his BAD OBJECTS on to which he projects his bad feelings. The opening titles take on meaning in reflecting John's paranoia.

'Don't Look Now,' John said to his wife, 'but there are a couple of old girls two tables away who are trying to hypnotise me.'32

"Don't Look Now" means "don't look, in case you get caught looking" and also "someone is looking at you intending harm". Laura and John then play their game of guessing the secret lives of the "old girls" (related both to projection and also to creative writing - it would be interesting to speculate how far, for du Maurier, creative writing was an act of alienation). However, John seems to take this game far more seriously than Laura, and continues it. When Laura seems to have disappeared to talk to the girls for a long time, John begins fantasising about them in a way that is both disturbed, and an odd reversal of what the true situation might be.
Laura, he thought, glancing at his watch, is being a hell of a time. Ten minutes at least. Something to tease her about, anyway. He began to plan to form the joke would take. How the old dolly had stripped to her smalls, suggesting that Laura should do likewise. And then the manager had burst in upon them both, exclaiming in horror, the reputation of the restaurant damaged, the hint that unpleasant consequences might follow unless...The whole exercise turning out to be a plant, and exercise in blackmail. He and Laura and the twins taken in a police launch back to Venice for questioning.  

But the arrest, the trip to the police station, all this happens to the twins because John makes it happen, when he reports the disappearance of his wife. Thus, the fears and projections of paranoia are visited on the paranoid: John wishes someone is out to get him, and they are (in the shape of the dwarf) but not in the way he thinks. The game, and John's paranoid fantasies keep returning in a more horrifying form. After a moment in a church where John is unable to feel the comfort of faith that Laura feels when looking at an image of the Virgin Mary, John again has a paranoid moment, and projects his bad feelings onto the twins. 

The twins were standing there, the blind one still holding on to her sister's arm, her sightless eyes fixed firmly upon him. He felt himself held, unable to move, and an impending sense of doom, of tragedy, came upon him. His whole being sagged, as it were, in apathy, and he thought, 'This is the end, there is no escape, no future.'  

John later half believes that Laura has arranged to meet the sisters at a restaurant when this is plainly a coincidence, and it would be possible to see the vision of Laura on the vaporetto as John's descent from a neurotic paranoid disorder to full scale psychosis. (Unlike the film, where the vision of Laura on the funeral barge, although from John's POV, is one we do not question, in the short story we do not share John's vision and are able to question whether he really sees Laura at his funeral, or is hallucinating). His thoughts at this moment provoke even his realisation that he might be becoming paranoid. 

A terrible foreboding nagged at him that somehow this was prearranged, that Laura had never intended to catch the aircraft, that last night in the restaurant she had made an assignation with the sisters. Oh God, he thought, that's impossible, I'm going paranoiac....Yet why, why? No more likely the encounter at the airport was fortuitous, and for some incredible reason they had persuaded Laura not to board the aircraft, even prevented her from doing so, trotting out one of their psychic visions, that the aircraft would crash, that she must return with them to Venice.  

However, John's paranoia and his projections are also tied to his "instinct". He instinctively knows his way around Venice and relies on his "instinct" to find his way. At the end, John mistakes his powers of projection, completely unreliable and ultimately fatal, for his "intuition", when he mistakenly believes that "the little girl" is in danger. 

This is it, he thought, the fellow's after her again, and with a flash of intuition he connected the two events, the child's terror then and now, and the murders reported in the newspapers, supposedly the work of some madman.
The paranoid-schizoid position is described psychoanalytically as a failure of "the third term", i.e. a failure in the Oedipus complex and in the Symbolic. Lacan is not exactly clear about what it is about the Oedipal crisis that fails in the case of paranoia - the Other/the "third term" becomes threatening, not as a structure but an Imaginary and malevolent presence. What is a failure in the Symbolic to accept castration and loss as part of oneself is also the failure to recognise failure and loss in the Other. The loss of a loved one, in John's case, Christine, is however enough to precipitate a failure in the Symbolic. If one's loved ones and carers fail in their duty of care by dying, by leaving the bereaved abruptly and without consolation, then the Symbolic ceases to become a defence against death, against the Real. In the short story of Don't Look Now, John's projection onto the outside world of the hostility which he himself feels, demonstrates that the Symbolic castration of the Oedipal moment carries an additional charge for him in the terror he feels around him when Christine dies.

In Don't Look Now(F), the style of the film itself suggests the image of the "mirror phase" and the Imaginary. The style "mirrors" John's fragmentation and lack of focus, by representing the symptoms of John's dis-ease in the mise en scène, whilst portraying John's behaviour as free from the paranoia and dependence on Laura dramatised in the short story. In the short story the lacuna, John's inability to understand his feelings, leads to his death. His last words "Oh God, what a bloody silly way to die" implies a self-irony, and yet still a lack of knowledge, because it is John's actions and thoughts that have led him to follow the dwarf, and put himself in jeopardy. In the film, this lack of knowledge, John's Imaginary set of identifications and fantasies is displaced onto the world of the film itself, where 'nothing is what it seems'- where space and time are presented as fragmentary. Geoffey Nowell Smith argues that melodrama is like 'conversion hysteria' and that films display hysterical symptoms displaced from the plot or the characters onto the mise en scène.

The 'return of the repressed' takes place, not in conscious discourse, but displaced onto the body of the patient. In the melodrama, where there is always material which cannot be expressed in discourse or in the actions of the characters furthering the designs of the plot, a conversion can take place into the body of the text.37

This hysterical mirroring of John's fragmentations occurs not only in the rhyming opening montage scene (the book John has written and which Laura is reading is called "Towards a Fragmentation of Space"), but also in the bizarre framing. For example, the strange figure of the lavatory attendant when this person never figures in the narrative, the framing and foregrounding the brooch of one of the sisters when we cannot make out what it is (it later turns out to be a mermaid, a potent symbol of a creature in love with death and lost to her earthly husband).
John's loss is even figured as montage which creates spatial confusion, with rapid shots of Venice, birds flying, flashes of running, of red, of shutters closing against him, the montage creating a potent signifier of danger.

Dylan Evans writes about the evolution in Lacan's theory of 'repudiation' thus:

In 1954, when Lacan first turns to the Freudian concept of Verwerfung (translated as 'repudiation' in the Standard Edition) in his search for a specific mechanism for psychosis, it is not clear exactly what is repudiated; it can be castration that is repudiated, or speech itself (S1,53) or 'the genital plane' (S1,58). Lacan finds a solution to the problem at the end of 1957, when he proposes the idea that is the NAME-OF-THE-FATHER (a fundamental signifier) that is the object of foreclosure. 38

That John cannot get past his loss and find a meaningful way of dealing with his grief places the world of language, of rationality (the language of the father) in jeopardy for him. In the short story, this grief is manifest in his Imaginary, in his paranoid fantasies and his identifications. His hallucination - his sight of Laura on the vaporetto can be seen as the return of his repressed grief in the Real, but this single episode of John's vision is ambiguous; the film marks it as "fantastic", as Todorov 39 has defined it: neither definitively supernatural nor natural. In the film, John's "foreclosure" of the Symbolic returns in the Real of his symptoms of true second sight. He has second sight as his daughter dies; he spills his glass, sees the stain on the slide, and rushes out, but not in time to save her. He thus has second sight even at the beginning of the film but as an audience we are not sure whether this second sight is instituted by the death of his daughter, or whether the death merely brings a latent hysteria to expression. In either case, the trauma of Christine's death can be seen to precipitate John's hysterical symptoms as narratively significant to his behaviour. John's hysteria may be part of his developmental psychic structure but it becomes foregrounded and active with the death of Christine.

In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, when Freud described the child's game with the cotton reel, what he identified in that game was a process of pure repetition which revolved around the object as lost. Freud termed this the death drive. 40

If the Imaginary response to trauma, to the Real, is fantasy and identification, then the Symbolic response to trauma is the death drive, which structures anxiety into repetition, a play of absence and presence. It is this Symbolic response which is foregrounded in the film of Don't Look Now. John's game of "fort/da" is very clear. Not only is the scene with the dwarf a replay of the death of Christine (not only in the red coat worn by both characters, but also in the dwarf's gestures: his thrusts with the knife mirroring Christine throwing her ball) but throughout the film narrates John re-enacting this moment. He tries to find Laura when she is at the seance with the mysterious twins, but gets lost, knocks on the wrong door and is pursued in a threatening manner by a
man in a red dressing gown. Similarly, John returns from having seen the image of a mourning Laura on the vaporetto, and confronts the hotel manager, who waves a cut-throat razor at him, in exactly the way that Christine throws the ball, and the dwarf stabs him. John simply cannot recover from his moment of loss and the film is constantly replaying it.

Demand always 'bears on something other than the satisfaction which it calls for' (MP, p 80), and each time the demand of the child is answered by the satisfaction of its needs, so this 'something other' is relegated to the place of its original impossibility. Lacan terms this 'desire'.

In seeking the dwarf, John's "desire" is seeking for the union with his daughter we have seen when he cradles the drowned girl in his arms at the beginning, in the shape of his daughter, outlined in blood on the slide, in the same shape inscribed on the map of Venice behind the Police Inspector's desk. Since desire is impossible, perhaps it is in death that it can be satisfied (and indeed we do get a visual hint of this in the film, which at the moment of John's death, flashes back through his life, and includes images of Christine both alive and dead).

Is it John's hysteria or the film's which is enacted in this repetition, this textual fort/da? John is certainly not aware of his repetitive behaviour, it is only the narration which emphasises repetition and death through the repetition and rhyming in the mise-en-scene - figuration missing from the short story. The film enacts John's repetition in another example of its stylistic hysteria, and by displacing it, depicts John as well-balanced, stable, the victim of forces outside himself. The short story dramatises John's paranoia as responsible for his death, his projection of his feelings onto others, his instinct for danger disavowed and projected onto the dwarf he mistakes for a little girl. However, in the film, John is not psychopathologised. Instead the film narrates John as both innocent and psychologically well balanced: there is no critique of his behaviour, but he is shown to be deceived by the duplicity of his second sight, by the mistaken simple mindedness of Laura and by the blind woman. My understanding of the film in portraying John as suffering from hysteria is based on a psychoanalytic reading which the film itself does not make. The transformation of John's paranoia in the short story to hysteria in the film is one which the film can be said to perform "unconsciously".

The "difference" between John and Laura

Language and language difficulties are foregrounded in Don't Look Now. Not only is there a difficulty for John and Laura of speaking emotionally, and finding words to speak their loss, but there is the literal difficulty of them finding their way around Venice, and around the alien language of Italian. Laura does not
speak Italian at all, and John’s Italian completely lets him down when he has lost Laura. (The audience are alienated too, there are no subtitles). The Oedipal moment is thought to be where we first learn language and when we are in a situation where language fails us, perhaps we are thrown back into pre-Oedipal struggles in the Real or the Imaginary. It is in the struggle for language, that Laura reacts quite differently from John and where she finds some comfort that enables her to deal with her grief over Christine. Laura’s loss is as great as John’s if not greater. However, she accepts Symbolic castration, her death instinct and learns to deal with her grief: she ‘becomes whole again’ by an act akin to that of the infant gaining language; she uses what she knows at some level is an illusion, to believe that Christine is happy in the afterlife. In the film, she even acknowledges that her belief that Christine is alive but elsewhere is not a true belief but a useful fiction.

Laura  Christine is still with us.
John  Christine is dead, Laura
Laura  I know, I know that. I mean...those two old sisters, the reason they kept staring at us is they could see Christine. And she was laughing.

Nevertheless, it could well be asked, what is the difference between Laura’s substitution above, and John’s substitution of the dwarf for his child, except that John’s is more dangerous? Is she not as caught in the Imaginary, an illusory world, as John? However, although Laura’s belief in Christine’s survival is strictly speaking an illusion, “imaginary” in the commonsense terminology of the word, her reaction is mature and accepting. Laura’s substitution is a tacit acknowledgment that Christine is no longer alive, whereas John’s refusal of grief and loss is a foreclosure. Unlike John, who unconsciously goes on looking for Christine, until he finds her, in death, Laura’s disavowal satisfies her, she can displace her desire. The Symbolic nature of her belief is akin to language, and language is the tool with which we both express our needs, and enter a social world. Like a child who gives up their demand and learns to express desire through language, Laura gives up her unconscious demand for Christine so that she can desire her Symbolically, as a desire she can displace. In his interpersonal relationships, John is autonomous and self-enclosed whilst Laura creates connections, shows her interdependence on other human beings. She, at least, makes contact with the twins and has some kind of two way relationship with them, whereas John seems totally isolated (the predominance of shots of him sitting in cafés drinking whisky). Thus, in Lacanian terms, Laura (at least in the short story) could be described as belonging in the Symbolic - ‘the order of language’ whereas John is stuck in the Imaginary - the state ‘of the ego and its identifications’.
In order to achieve Symbolic relations the individual has to, according to Lacan, encounter and accept, the "third term" of the Oedipal drama. "The Imaginary economy only has a meaning and we only have a relation to it in so far as it is inscribed in a Symbolic order which imposes a ternary relation," which means that the subject has to recognise that the desire of the mother lies elsewhere, not only in love for the father (and vice-versa), but outside the mother/child dyad. It is in the resolution of the Oedipus complex that sexual difference becomes instituted, and for woman this is a more difficult process. Lacan says "In the psyche there is nothing by which the subject may situate himself as a male or female being." Gender is a Symbolic function, not a biologically essential distinction between male and female. However, the satisfactory resolution of the Oedipus complex for a woman is very different from that of a man, because as she becomes instituted into the Symbolic, the woman becomes defined only by negative terms, she becomes not a woman, but a "not-man", an object of exchange for men, not a subject in her own right, the heroine of her own story.

How does the successful resolution of the Oedipus complex produce Symbolic castration in both sexes, and yet a different subject/object position in relationship to language and culture by men and women? Lacan, in an extremely difficult argument, theorises the "phallus" in the three orders - Real, Imaginary, and Symbolic, and argues that all three are implicated in the adoption of sexual difference and the establishment of the Symbolic. The child at first imagines the mother, the site of plenitude as having an elusive something, the Imaginary phallus the child desires. With the introduction of the "third term" (the father), the child sees that the mother does not give her full attention to them, but desires the father. The child seeks to 'satisfy his/her desire by identifying with the phallus or the phallic mother'. The introduction of the "third term", i.e. the father, or other adults in the mother's life, forces the child to give up the Imaginary phallus.

What we meet as an accident in the child's development is alone linked to the fact that the child does not find himself or herself alone in front of the mother, and that the phallus forbids the child the satisfaction of his or her own desire, which is the desire to be the exclusive desire of the mother.

Children of both sexes thus have to give up the Imaginary phallus, to become Symbolically castrated. Thus the parents' relationship is vital to the child to show that both parents are also Symbolically castrated, that is they reciprocate their desire for each other - they show their vulnerability. However, this Symbolic exchange is overlayed by the infant's recognition of sexual difference. The child notices in the father his different genital organisation, his penis in the Real, and through the Oedipus complex, recognises the phallus as symbolized by the penis. Since the mother does not have an equivalent symbol of femininity she is therefore "lacking". As
Lacan says, ‘strictly speaking there is no symbolization of woman’s sex as such...the phallus is a symbol to which there is no correspondent, no equivalent. It’s a matter of dissymmetry in the signifier’. The boy child has a “phallus” and can thus enter the Symbolic a speaking subject. However, the girl child, does not have a “phallus”, and if she enters the Symbolic, it is either then in a position of symbolising that “lack” or by taking on a male position, entering language as a speaking male.

That the woman should be inscribed in an order of exchange of which she is the object, is what makes for the fundamentally conflictual, and, I would say, insoluble, character of her position: the Symbolic order literally submits her, it transcends her...There is for her something insurmountable, something unacceptable, in the fact of being placed as an object in a Symbolic order to which, at the same time, she is subjected just as much as the man.

Lacan argues that as the result of the intolerable position of women in the Symbolic, women partially refuse the entry into the Symbolic. Women do not completely submit to the Oedipus complex, they are “not-all”, and they have access to a specifically feminine jouissance which goes ‘beyond the phallus’. This jouissance - libidinal enjoyment - is a mystical quality, beyond sexuality, about which they know nothing. Thus, Lacan postulates that qualities which have been culturally coded as female - female intuition, empathy, instinct - are just this jouissance. These qualities cannot be rationalised in the world of the Symbolic and are thus part of the beyond of the phallus to which women have access, because of their necessary partial disavowal of castration. Thus, Lacan theorises a place for the Real in the “instinct” of the woman. He thereby psychoanalytically locates the historically pervasive association of women with both instinct and madness/otherness, and shows how this jouissance beyond the symbolisable, is nevertheless culturally valorised as either feminine intuition, or demonised as feminine danger.

In *Don’t Look Now*, this jouissance - the Real - is differently characterised in the film and the short story; in the short story as potentially benign feminine instinct, and in the film as extra-sensory perception which is definitely attributed to a feminine treachery. In the short story, it is valorised as Laura’s instinct, a feminine quality that John possesses as his possible second sight, but which he ignores or disavows to uphold a false rationality, a masculine paranoia. Thus, in the short story Laura, in accepting the vision of Christine in the afterlife, takes up the position of the Symbolic, and is the character who accepts the loss of her daughter as an adult. Nevertheless, as a woman, Laura cannot completely accept Oedipal castration and completely adopt the position of object in the Symbolic. Her instinct can be seen psychoanalytically as her partial disavowal of castration, her feminine jouissance, her “not-all” which is much truer than John’s rationality; she cannot find her way through Venice - the sense of direction which John claims for himself is traditionally coded as male, and yet
he still gets lost - but she knows that the twins are fundamentally benign, and if John were to trust Laura and the twins, he would have put himself out of danger. John, instead, refuses his loss of his daughter, and refuses his instincts, which repressed, return as his dependence upon on Laura as guarantor of his survival, his paranoid ‘Imaginary’ projections, which leads to death. The danger and treachery of John’s position is due to his over rationalist disavowal of Laura’s instincts, figured as feminine within the story, and to his disregard for his ESP which is figured as a feminine quality both within himself and without, in the world of the short story, which he ignores at his peril.

The film, however, reverses John and Laura’s reaction to the death of Christine. Laura’s belief in the existence of Christine is marked in the film, not as an act of Symbolic acceptance, albeit one marked by disavowal (Laura knows very well that Christine is dead, as well as dreaming she is alive). Instead, Laura is caught in what the film characterises as an Imaginary, illusory, and dangerous belief in Christine’s survival. It is Laura who is instituted in front of a mirror where she confronts an alienated image of herself, shown literally, when Laura is first talking to the twins in the gents’ lavatory; the images of her are fractured, she is splintered into several images, creating incomplete eyelines between herself and the other characters, thus showing the difficulty of human contact (Plate II: 1). She no longer has what Lacan characterised as supplementary jouissance, she does not have the correct instincts to protect John or herself, but leads him into danger. Instead she manifests symptoms of hysteria herself as a refusal of castration and the Symbolic - ‘Normal sexuality is, therefore strictly an ordering, one which the hysteric refuses (falls ill). The characterisation of Laura as hysterical does stem from the short story, but only as John’s rationalising and reductive opinion. In Don’t Look Now (N) Laura is repeatedly described in relation to hysteria:- hysterically suppressing giggles, having “overwrought nerves”, or not having hysteria when John would expect her to (returning from first seeing the twins). However, what we know about Laura herself does not indicate this. In a moment of “narrative paralepsis” where the narrator gives us more information about Laura, and her feelings, than John can possibly know, even to the point of changing focalisation to be momentarily in Laura’s point of view, we learn nothing more about Laura. She seems to be the archetypal non-speaking woman, the object of sexual difference. When John suggests that that the danger warning of the two women, and the arrival of the telegram telling of Johnny’s sickness is coincidence, ‘Laura was convinced otherwise, but intuitively she knew it was best to keep her feelings to herself’. Laura’s belief system may be bizarre, but in terms of the story itself, it is her beliefs that turn out to be true; she sees danger for John in Venice, and she is right. In Don’t Look Now (F) however, Nicholas
Roeg and his collaborators, in their attempt to adapt from the short story’s focalisation through John and the paralepsis of Laura, to the film externally focalised both through John and through Laura, realise her hysteria as an attribute of her own character and not a projection of John’s. When she is shown on her own or with the women, she is depicted as predominantly sane, but when she is with John she is portrayed as slightly hysterical. When Laura meets the women outside the church John is renovating, she and the blind woman (Heather) are framed on two sides of an iron grill. This grill separates Laura from the possible weirdness of the women. However, she continues a very normal conversation with them, shot in simple reverses, and significantly, she is much more of a listener than a talker. She continues to talk to them on a park bench, and her emotional honesty is expressed in the directness with which she answers their questions, her equality with them in terms of shot size, and also the stability of the three shot which frames them (she is sitting with her arm on the back of the park bench), and her simple and touching acting (Plate II: 1). When she finds John, she completely changes. The pair walk across a vulnerably wide expanse of space in a panning long shot. John walks much more quickly than Laura, and therefore she has to skip and run in order to catch him up, whilst also talking to him in a rather rushed and frantic manner. Julie Christie improvises this scene and her dialogue comes across as slightly maudlin partly because she’s directed physically trying and failing to catch up with Sutherland, and partly because she is too direct in her dialogue. The dialogue speaks the “sub-text”, i.e. it represents in words the emotions and desires of the character, in what would usually have been conveyed through more oblique but revealing dialogue.

Laura: I’m trying very hard to hang on to myself, and to forget about what happened...get rid of this emptiness...it’s been with me like some pain, and finally, finally, through these two women I’ve discovered how...they disapprove of mumbo jumbo too, they used those very words.

When she says that the old ladies are going to try and contact Laura, Roeg cuts away, with a very authorial technique (i.e. the cut is not motivated by any of the character’s actions or points of view) to show the women cackling in a witch-like cabal (Plate II: 1). This immediately undercuts Laura’s validity. John tells her off, and she responds at first in a flippant way to John and then builds up to blame him for Christine’s death. This seems like a hysterical reaction, especially when John then acts in a very reasonable manner, not becoming defensive, not responding, just calling Laura a “crazy woman” in a tolerant way. However, as we have seen from both the story and the film, it is he who suffers from repetition “reminiscences”, from an ability to speak his loss, and therefore he is the “hysteric” in the film, and the “paranoiac” in the short story. John refuses to enter the Symbolic and Laura’s hysteria is a displacement from him. As in the excellent essay by Tania Modleski, where she demonstrates that Stefan, the feminised hero of Letter from an Unknown Woman, is the true hysteric of the
film, because he lives his life through Lisa, 'The woman and her emotional life is what the man has repressed, and...he is doomed to keep suffering his fate without ever having known it'. Likewise, John allows Laura to do all the feeling for him, and yet refuses to acknowledge her feelings, and his repression and hysteria force him to suffer from repetition.

**John's “second sight” as the Real or as a “female Imaginary”?**

I have postulated that perhaps John’s “second sight” is some leftover of his failed attempt to negotiate his way into the Symbolic; it is, perhaps, part of his failure in sexual difference, his failure to become a “proper man”. It exists in the realm of death, of that which cannot be symbolised or gendered, the Real, but is figured, in both short story and film, in different ways, as a ‘feminine’ quality attributable to women and hysterical men. And if we look at the people with whom he shares his gift, Heather and by extension her sister Wendy, they are also “failures” of gender. They are described by Laura in the short story as ‘male twins in drag’ , and by John as potential lesbians: this, admittedly, is focused through John’s warped point of view - but why should he come up with this particular image? In the film the “old girls” go into the gents’ by mistake, and during the seance Heather has a moment of shocking auto-eroticism where she fondles her breasts and brings herself to a kind of “orgasm” in trance, in the presence of her sister and Laura - a female cabal. Like the witches in *Macbeth* to whom ‘fair is foul, and foul is fair’ these women are hags, because they mix up the world as we understand it, they mix up gender and they mix up the Symbolic. John’s visions, whether attributable to a psychotic Real in John’s psyche or a psychotic Real in the supernatural, are outside gender, in the world of the bisexual or a-sexual hags. The sudden shock where the figure in the red coat reveals itself not to be John’s innocent pre-pubescent daughter, but a libidinously asexual or bisexual hag in the form of the dwarf, reveals the hideous, non-gendered primal sexuality of the Real. ESP emerges as a failure of gendering which occurs, both inside John and in the world portrayed by the film, because of a disavowal of castration, and both short story and film demonstrate this through their portrayal of the characters as bisexual, as mixtures of masculine and feminine. However, the film and story differently binarise and value these masculine and feminine qualities, represented both within the characters and without as masculine rationality and the feminine supernatural. The disavowal of castration is liberating in the short story, because it is a trope of a ‘feminine’ truth which is repressed and disavowed by the masculinist society represented by John. In the film, this disavowal is dangerous - its existence within John, Laura and the twins as hysteria, and as the principle of femininity incarnate is as a universal violence and force for disintegration and a trope which “blames” all ills on femininity.
Thus, in the short story, we do not easily know whether John’s “second sight” is narratively benign or demonic. Second sight acts, instead, as a function of the fantastic, where the narrative can be interpreted as either supernaturally motivated or as having a rational causation in John’s psychosis. The only second sight that John experiences in the short story is to see Laura on the vaporetto, but this may be an illusion: it creates a hiatus in the story so that John stays in Venice and is murdered; it cannot be unequivocally attributed to a working of the marvellous, the supernatural. If it is a supernatural vision, and the short story does not rule this out, then even here, it is not figured as totally malevolent. John’s repression of his own feelings, his feeling of loss which Laura’s absence provokes, ‘the ever-nagging pain’, his fear of her death which prompts him to despair - ‘Let Venice be engulfed’ are provoked by his belief that Laura and perhaps Johnny are dead, a belief which stems from his “vision”. Nevertheless, the narration has dramatised his paranoia and projection throughout the story, and it is this projection and identification which is his Imaginary response to the Real of the hallucination which kills him, and not the hallucination itself. He projects his feelings onto Laura and onto the little girl in the coloured coat, and this projection motivates him to ignore the signs of danger, not the supernatural visions themselves.

The treatment of second sight, and of the Real, which is thus manifest in the short story can be seen as a proto-feminist rebellion - an attempt to insert a femininity into a Symbolic world which cannot recognise it. Indeed, du Maurier’s text can be seen to ally itself with the aesthetics of recent French feminists critics, such as Luce Irigaray and Hélène Cixous, who have attempted to create feminine writing - écriture féminine - by inserting in what they believe is a male Symbolic, the fragmented potential of what they call a “feminine Imaginary”. Could the Real of John’s ESP contain a femininity which the “dissymmetry of the signifier” in the Symbolic denies. This concept is actually very questionable - Lacan says there is no way back from the Symbolic where only masculinity is represented, into a prediscursive femininity:

> How return, other than by means of a special discourse, to a pre-discursive reality? [there is no] place prior to the law which is available and can be retrieved. And there is no feminine outside language.

However, Luce Irigaray has used the idea of the Imaginary to posit a radical intervention into “discursive reality”, a way in which a “potential feminine” can be brought into the Symbolic in order to transform gender relations. Her ‘female Imaginary’ is a site not where the feminine exists, but at least where what is repressed in the construction of sexual difference has some fragmentary form.
Chapter Two

the rejection, the exclusion of a female Imaginary certainly puts woman in the position of experiencing herself only fragmentarily, in the little-structured margins of a dominant ideology, as waste, or excess, what is left of a mirror invested by the (masculine) "subject" to reflect himself... But if the female Imaginary were to deploy itself, if it could bring itself into play otherwise than scraps, uncollected debris, would it represent itself, even so, in the form of one universe?  

Cixous creates further resonances with *Don't Look Now* (N) by her attempt to posit the silenced and repressed ‘feminine’ as enabling women to ‘foresee the unforeseeable’. However, if we are to think that the radical Imaginary if it can be presented, could change the way we are constructed by sexual difference, our “gender-performance”, it would be absurd to think this can be achieved by “second sight” or “extra-sensory-perception”. The Real is psychotic, it is death, and it therefore should not be elided with the Imaginary, even if this is a feminine Imaginary. “Second sight” is merely a trope, a metaphor for something outside the Symbolic, something attached to women, which is not normally allowed to speak. Nevertheless, Irigaray marshals a more convincing argument, more applicable to the treatment of ESP. in *Don't Look Now* (N). She argues that what we experience as the Symbolic - the world of language and culture, is actually not neutral, but masculine, and the male Imaginary of logic and rationality masquerades as a universal. John in repressing his ESP., in disregarding it for a false position of logic, is actually repressing the feminine. Margaret Whitford in summarizing Irigaray says to say that rationality is male is to argue that it has a certain structure, that the subject of enunciation which subtends the rational discourse is constructed in a certain way, through repression of the feminine.

In the short story John’s ESP is not made directly responsible for his death. It is his inability to understand it that leads to his death; he fails to see the significance of Laura on the vaporetto, to read it outside his experience as ESP. and take notice of it, and when he sees the little girl in the pixie coat, he does not have an experience of second sight, and does not mistake her for Christine, but empathises with her as if she were his daughter. In perhaps the most important change of the film, John actually believes that the little girl in the red Mac is his daughter, and he therefore believes in his ESP, and is therefore led astray by this duplicitous ‘feminine’.

**ESP in the film. The “feminine trap”**.

In *Don't Look Now* (F) the role of the superrational and John’s second sight is considerably expanded upon. The title, instead of referring to a slightly paranoid game, is now an injunction not to delve too deeply into matters of the occult or the beyond. The camera zooms into the pond where Christine is to die, the rain falls on the surface, which is glassy and impenetrable. In inverted commas, the title is superimposed over the image, both
telling us not to look, and tempting us to do just that (Plate 1:1). Thereafter reflected images signal danger: Heather (often seen in mirrors) looking out of the screen at us through sightless eyes, reflected in a kind of diabolic triptych in the mirror of the gents’ lavatory, John looking for Laura, walking through Venice’s deserted hotels with their highly polished reflections, and most of all Christine’s red coat, reflected in the water at the beginning, which is later the red coat of the dwarf. However, the status of John’s gift is not clear: is his “ESP” responsible for his death or is his failure to understand this irrational side of himself the cause of his death? At first it would appear that the latter explanation is the one the film is encouraging. If John had reacted quickly enough to his moment of instinct at the beginning of the film, he might have saved Christine. If he had taken Heather and Wendy’s advice and left Venice, he would still have been alive. If he had understood the nature of the vision of Laura on the vaporetto, and realised she was on a funeral barge… And most of all, if he had realised that the final image of the little girl was not one of “ESP”, but that of the dwarf, he would have been saved. However, this understanding would have had to be rational, and thus John is caught in a paradox, an impossible bind. The film is brought to a violence in its storytelling by re-establishing the old relationship between the occult and trickery. Like the three witches in Macbeth who prophesy accurately but deceptively, Heather and Wendy (and by implication, Laura) unwittingly cause John’s death. Heather’s insistence on Christine’s presence eventually causes John to act on her belief, and the film’s condensation of the image of the red coat first worn by Christine, and then by the dwarf, means that John is doomed to misrecognise this image. The twins function in the film as a meta-narrative, another level of story, which John’s story has to follow in order to reach its destiny.

Let us not forget, after all, that if Oedipus can do what every man, so they say, goes only so far as wishing to do, it is because an oracle told in advance that one day he would kill his father and marry his mother: without the oracle, no exile, thus incognito, thus no parricide and no incest. The oracle in Oedipus the King is a meta-diegetic narrative in the future tense, the mere uttering of which will throw into gear the “infernal machine” capable of carrying it out. This is not a prophecy that comes true; it is a trap in the form of a narrative, a trap that “takes”.

Thus the potential valorisation of the irrational, of John’s feminine or ungendered side, is incorporated in a story of a man killed by irrational women, furthermore as Laura is deeply implicated, irrational women who fail to love him enough, and who leave him because they have a more meaningful relationship with the dead. This violence is also brought to the film at the level of style and structure. In addition, this feminine duplicity is instituted within John as his supernatural sense, so that he is undermined by femininity from both without and within.
Roeg is wonderfully free with his editing strategies: his use of rhyme, his use of parallel/action cutting in the opening montage, and of cutting forward and backwards in time, and in particular his playing with the logic of the eyeline match. For example, where John looks at events that have happened elsewhere or may be about to happen, his reverse shots do not revert back to him, but are linked inextricably to the blind woman, Heather. For example, in the scene in the restaurant, after Laura has taken a speck out of Wendy’s eye, Heather smiles, facing the mirror (and us out of the screen). John then looks into the forbidden waters of the canal (the shot mirrors the opening shot of the pond). A flashback follows, showing Laura and John leaving their house in the rain (possibly for Christine’s funeral, possibly to go to Venice), and another shot of the empty rainy pond, which then returns to the blind eyes of Heather. We are not quite sure, therefore if it is Heather’s vision we are seeing, or John’s or both. The effect of Roeg’s strategy was well understood, even upon the release of Don’t Look Now. Michael Dempsey describes it in a review thus:

But Roeg’s montage does not say that two shots are connected: It says that they might be. Eisenstein’s editing aims for certainty: Roeg’s for uncertainty. With Roeg, A plus B does not equal C: It may equal D or Q or nothing, and plus may be minus. When his rapid juxtapositions outrun our ability to sort them out, we tumble into an uncertainty that, in the hands of a hack, would be merely cheap, but that in his, becomes genuinely metaphysical.

Somehow, this freedom must be bound. The needs of a commercially successful horror film and perhaps an intrinsic desire to escape anarchy make the story grip like a vice. The film constant places John in danger (the falling scaffolding, the heights at which he restores statues). It builds up suspense by intercutting shots of Heather’s sightless eyes to signal John’s danger: when Laura leads him towards believing his own supernatural gifts and later when he is running through the dark mist-ridden passages of Venice following the small form in the red coat, and finally whilst he is struggling in his final gasps for life. A metaphysics of danger is conveyed by the film’s fragmented intercutting of Heather and her sister at moments of danger and dissolution, juxtaposed with the benign but impotent paternal presence of the Catholic Church, embodied by the Cardinal. The Cardinal is unable to prevent John’s fall, and later, as John follows the red clad figure, the Cardinal wakes as if from a nightmare. The camera zooms from him sitting up in bed, to the red night-light - a commemorative light - and this sets up a rhyme with the dwarf, but a rhyme which shows the failure of “goodness”, the Church, God, to oppose the evil about to happen. If we look at the large structures of the film there are a series of metaphors, absent from the short story, leading us through the film and binding us emotionally to the story. For example, one set of images is built around around ice/water/glass/the breaking of boundaries and another around red/blood/sexuality/rebirth (the shape of the stain on the slide) and these images build up rhymes and associations throughout the entire film. However, the overall structure, a shot reverse shot suture writ large, also compels us
with its violence. John’s daughter dies. John looks beyond the surface to the beyond. John dies, killed by an image of his daughter. The symmetry is aw(e)ful.

Conclusion

This “bringing to violence” of the film may account for the short story’s different critical reception. The Penguin edition of the Daphne du Maurier stories has a small subtitle reading ‘That unique du Maurier blend of the subtle and the sinister’, and there is a sense that the reviewers of the film find it more dramatic and suspenseful than the book’s ‘pleasantly ghostly mystery’, and even read into the original short story a melodrama they find in the film. Michael Dempsey describes the film’s ‘creaky plot […] derived from a short story by Daphne du Maurier, who specializes in romantic sludge’. Two of these critics unconsciously falsify their readings of the short story, stating that it is in the film that the element of faith and the priest is added, whereas this element is already present in the short story. In the short story Laura not only has faith - the scene where she gains comfort from the Madonna contrasts in the film with the male priest saying that God has forgotten about his creatures - but the short story also throws light on John’s failure to come to terms with his Oedipal relationship, his absent father. The short story tropes the feminine Imaginary as positive, as intuition, instinct, faith. Laura’s faith is in a female religious image. Nevertheless, the film is still very faithful to the short story. Perhaps in the lacunae and ellipses of Roeg and du Maurier’s collaboration on Don’t Look Now there is a possibility for a place for feminine speaking, or at least a place for identification beyond and outside gender.

Daphne du Maurier recognised the quality of the adaptation when she wrote to Nicholas Roeg:

Dear Mr. Roeg, I watched your film of my story and your John and Laura reminded me so much of a young couple I saw in Torcello having lunch together. They looked so handsome and beautiful and yet they seemed to have a terrible problem and I watched them with sadness. The young man tried to cheer his wife up but to no avail and it struck me perhaps that their child had died of meningitis...”

Daphne du Maurier, in her typically elliptical manner is here showing how life feeds into art, and vice-versa in a continuing process. Roeg’s version of her book can now be used to illuminate observed behaviour back in the social world. Furthermore, Du Maurier is recognising and thanking Roeg for preserving something in the film which du Maurier herself recognises as being faithful to her book. This “something” is the joint problem of a couple - their sadness, their love and their loss - and it is this empathy for human beings, independent of their gender, which, as well as the bisexuality of the characters in Don’t Look Now, creates the cultural androgyny of the work. In Don’t Look Now I would suggest that ‘nothing is what it seems’ because gender is a construction, and there is more potential in human beings than ever comes to fruition. And the film and short story of Don’t
Look Now creates the potential of thinking about sexual difference in less imprisoning and binary terms through the use of the “imagination” of the people working on it, through Daphne du Maurier, and Nicholas Roeg, and perhaps this is the use we may put to the term “radical Imaginary”.

This first study has demonstrated a bisexuality in John, the protagonist of Don’t Look Now (F & N). It has shown how this bisexuality has been differently treated in novella and film, the novella celebrating the instinctual and the feminine within John and within the world of the story, whilst the film has portrayed the feminine as dangerous and psychotic. Both Daphne du Maurier and Nicholas Roeg envisage their imagination as writers as being bisexual and able to inhabit both their female and male characters and Don’t Look Now (F & N) demonstrates this imaginative inhabiting of the characters to a remarkable degree. Nevertheless, whilst du Maurier’s novel sees femininity as a positive quality, the film sees it as negative and hostile. Thus there is a correlation between the female gender of the novel’s author and the performance of sexual difference in the novel, and equally a correlation between the male director and predominantly male crew of the film and the film’s own performance of sexual difference which celebrates masculinity as rational and femininity as chaos.

1 Forster, Margaret Daphne du Maurier (Chatto and Windus Ltd. 1993). Letter to Eleanor Doubleday, 222.
3 Lanza, 156.
4 see What does a Woman Want? by Serge André, (Other Press, NY, 1999) trans. Susan Fairfield, pp27 -43, for a humorous account of the relationship between Freud and Fleiss, and the influence of Fleiss’ paranoid and bizarre ideas on Freud’s formative ideas. André argues that Freud had to escape from the paranoid clutches of Fleiss’ belief in the existence of “a sexual relation”, i.e. an absolute belief in the differences between masculinity and femininity, in order to found his own discipline of psychoanalysis.
6 Freud “Hysterical Phantasies and Their Relation to the Unconscious”, 94.
7 Shklovsky’s definition is different from Bordwell’s in stressing the Russian Formalist concept of defamiliarization. For Shklovsky, the plot ‘represents the distinctive way in which “the story” is made strange, creatively deformed and defamiliarized’ [Brian McFarlane, Novel to Film 23].
8 Bordwell, David, Staiger, Janet, and Thompson Kristin The Classical Hollywood Cinema (Routledge, 1994)
9 I here use Brian McFarlane’s distinction between narrative and enunciation. After a useful precis of the way the terms developed from Russian Formalism and Linguistics, he distinguishes them thus:-
   (i) those elements of the original novel which are transferable because not tied to one or other semiotic system - that is, essentially, narrative.
   (ii) those which involve intricate processes of adaptation because their effects are closely tied to the semiotic system in which they are manifested - that is enunciation.
10 Interview with Nicholas Roeg by Tom Milne and Penelope Houston, in Sight and Sound Winter 1973-4.
   That was in the script: ‘short scream’ and the cut to the drill. That’s what I asked Julie for: ‘Make it a short scream!’ At the same time she tore a piece of her hair out. This had happened to a friend of mine, a similar shock, and instant shock. I wanted Julie to have that look, to take it in instantly.
12 Genette, Gerard Narrative Discourse, 189 - 211.
14 Genette, Gerard Narrative Discourse, 195
Conversion hysteria was a nineteenth century diagnosis developed by Freud and Breuer building on the previous work of Jean-Martin Charcot with hysterics at La Salpetrière. The case studies of Dora, of Anna O, were formative in the development of psychoanalysis as a discipline. Disturbances of speech, of breathing, of movement of the limbs which had no clear neurological or physical explanation were attributed to conversion hysteria, where repressed sexual desires were expressed in bodily symbolism which could be traced back to originally censored wishes.


Shakespeare, William King Lear Act IV Scene VI


Although I have described Lacan's theories here as developmental, I would like to stress that they are structural, they are not necessarily stages of development in chronological order. The model is psychoanalytic not psychological. Thus they still operate in adult life, and in the life of characters, e.g. John and Laura.

The essential difference here is that whereas a psychological model is developmental and chronological, a psychoanalytic model is structural; though 'stages' may be identified, there is no suggestion that they coincide with, or are necessarily observable in the stages of development. Whatever pre-Oedipal means, it does not refer to a developmental stage like learning to walk or speak. Psychoanalytic theory employs a number of different sequences; for example oral/anal/genital: auto-eroticism/narcissism/object-choice; paranoid-schizoid position/depressive position; autism/symbiosis/separation/individuation; Imaginary/Symbolic. They are derived, not from observations of child development, but from clinical situations, and are ways of conceptualizing structures of the mind.

Margaret Whitford, Luce Irigaray: Philosophy in the Feminine (Routledge London: 1991), 76.

Rose, Jacqueline Female Sexuality, 36.

Rose, Jacqueline Female Sexuality, 30.

du Maurier, Daphne Don't Look Now, 30.


du Maurier, Daphne Don't Look Now, 7.

du Maurier, Daphne Don't Look Now, 11.

du Maurier, Daphne Don't Look Now, 14.

du Maurier, Daphne Don't Look Now, 36.

du Maurier, Daphne Don't Look Now, 54.

Nowell-Smith, Geoffray "Minelli and Melodrama" from Home is Where the Heart is: Studies in Melodrama and the Woman's Film, edited by Christine Gledhill (BFI Publishing 1987)

Todorov, Svetan, The Fantastic: A Structural Approach to a Literary Genre (Cornell University Press, 1975), 25. Todorov defines the uncertainty of the fantastic thus:

In a world which is indeed our world, the one we know...there occurs an event which cannot be explained by the laws of this same familiar world. The person who experiences the event must opt for one of two possible solutions: either he is the victim of an illusion of the senses, of a product of the imagination-- and the laws of the world then remain what they are; or else the event has indeed taken place, it is an integral part of reality--but then this reality is controlled by laws unknown to us.

Allan Scott and Christ Bryant. Don’t Look Now (Sight and Sound Jan 1977), 31. I quote from the script rather than the film, because the statements are very similar. Julie Christie paraphrases and improvises some other lines but the general content is the same.


Lacan, 141.


The man also suffers, the rigid boundaries of sexual differences punishing for men as well.

Lacan SII 304-5 . Quoted from Jacqueline Rose Female Sexuality, 45.

Lacan, Jacques, S20, 69 Quoted in Dylan Evans An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis

Lacan, Jacques, S20, 71. Quoted in Dylan Evans An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis

Rose, Jacqueline Female Sexuality, 28.


du Maurier, Daphne Don’t Look Now, 7.

Shakespeare, William Macbeth.

du Maurier, Daphne Don’t Look Now, 40.

du Maurier, Daphne Don’t Look Now, 41.


Irigaray, Luce The Sex Which is Not One, 30. Quoted from Ewa Plonowska Ziarek’s Toward a Radical Female Imaginary: Temporality and Embodiment in Irigaray’s Ethics in Diacritics Vol 28 Spring 60 - 75.

Cixous, Hélène, “The Laugh of the Medusa”, 256.

I am aware here that Irigaray feels that Lacan’s concept of the phallus its itself a metaphor which is part of the patriarchal Symbolic, because of Lacan’s elision of phallus and penis. She prefers to see the potential of the metonymy in the relationship of women to women, which she tropes in the image of two lips touching.

But if [women’s] aim were simply to reverse the order of things, even suppose this to be possible, history would repeat itself in the long run, would revert to sameness: to phallocratism. It would leave room neither for women’s sexuality, nor for women’s Imaginary, nor for women’s language to take (their) place.

Irigaray, Luce This Sex Which Is Not One 33. From Margaret Whitford. Luce Irigaray: Philosophy in the Feminine, 84-88 chapter entitled The same, the semblance and the other, 101-122 and chapter entitles Women and/or the social contract. 169-191.


Dempsey, Michael Film Quarterly (New York) Spring, 41.

du Maurier, Daphne. Don’t Look Now Title Page


Dempsey, Michael Film Quarterly (New York: Spring, 1973), 39


Sanderson, Mark Don’t Look Now (BFI Modern Classics), 80. Note that one of the aspects of the film which is dramatised more violently than the short story is Christina’s death, which in the book is caused by meningitis, but is made visual and dramatic in the film by being turned into drowning.

Don’t Look Now (F). Dir. Nicholas Roeg
CHAPTER THREE:

Projections of Homophobia in *Strangers on a Train*

Truffaut: Whether it’s Guy or Bruno, it’s obviously a single personality split in two.

Hitchcock: That’s right. Though Bruno has killed Guy’s wife, for Guy it’s just as if he had committed the murder himself. As for Bruno, he’s clearly a psychopath.¹

But love and hate, he thought now, good and evil, lived side by side in the human heart, and not merely in differing proportions in one man and the next, but all good and all evil. One had merely to look for a little of either to find it all, and one merely had to scratch the surface. All things had opposites close...Nothing could be without its opposite that was bound up with it...Each was what the other had not chosen to be, the cast-off self, what he thought he hated but perhaps in reality loved...there was that duality permeating nature...Two people in each person. There’s always a person exactly the opposite of you, like the unseen part of you, somewhere in the world and he waits in ambush.²

The complex manicheism of *Strangers on a Train* leads us to be implicated in a sense of guilt, perhaps even a sense of original sin, which we share with Guy when Miriam is murdered in accordance with his secret wishes but without his conscious will. If the characters within *Strangers on a Train* have elements of good and evil constantly in flux within them, then the audience/reader may be alerted also to their own admixture of good and evil and be able to identify with these elements on screen. The film and the book treat Guy’s guilt in different ways:- in the book Guy murders Bruno’s father, a crime equal to the murder of Miriam, to atone for his guilt, but the film makes him innocent of actual crime to make him guilty of ‘thought crime’ and therefore morally culpable as he enjoys the proceeds of Miriam’s murder by marrying Anne. However, both film and book dramatise the co-existence within the individual of good and evil through the Gothic technique of doubling - Hitchcock taking this doubling to a playful formal extreme, as Donald Spoto notices:

There are two respectable and influential fathers, two women with eyeglasses, and two women at a party who delight in thinking up ways of committing the perfect crime. There are two sets of two detectives in two cities, two little boys at the two trips to the fairground, two old men at the carousel, two boyfriends accompanying the woman about to be murdered, and two Hitchcocks in the film. The director, who at first had wanted to make his cameo in the Mellon Library or as a passenger on the train, finally decided to appear with the double of his own large form - carrying a double bass fiddle.³

However, the central doubling common to both book and film, is the relationship between Bruno and Guy, Bruno standing for Guy’s repressed interior, his hidden wishes and desires. This representation of a person, split into two component parts and portrayed as two characters, has repercussions for the film/book in creating a
consistent fictional world where the characters are also individuals with their own motivations and their own necessary sense of completeness. Thus there is a tension in both film and book in the simultaneous depiction of the inner working of a psyche in crisis and the portrait of a coherent social world created in order to justify a causally motivated narrative. This tension can be seen in the depiction of Bruno, coded with 1950s connotations of homosexuality, in the homoerotic quality of the relationship between Bruno and Guy, and in the fears of femininity displayed differently in the book and the film. I shall be exploring this tension within the fictional world, seen not only as representing the constituent parts of a particular psyche, but also as the interaction of individuals within a social framework, and the consequent disavowals made possible and necessary within *Strangers on a Train*. I go on to examine these disavowals in the context of the institutional and societal demands for compulsory heterosexuality within Hollywood at the time. The chapter thus becomes an exploration of each text's performance of sexuality and sexual difference in the context of external/self imposed constraints such as the taboo on the representation of lesbianism (experienced by Highsmith when beginning her publishing career), or the demand for a Hollywood “happy ending” performed, albeit subversively, by the film.

**The Film and the Book**

The book and the film of *Strangers on a Train* portray Guy and Bruno as, respectively, the ego and the id of a single psyche and simultaneously separate people, with their own characterisation and motivations. Since their characterisation and relationship is identical in film and novel, I shall therefore refer to the portrayal of these characters as they appear in the film. Because the scenes which establish the relationship between Bruno and Guy are faithfully transcribed from book to film - the scene on the train lifts most of its dialogue from the novel, and the murder of Miriam is carried out in a very similar way in the film and the book, even down to the detail of the song ‘The Strawberry Blonde’ which appears on the film’s soundtrack, I shall refer to the later, film version in order to avoid unnecessary duplication. However, the crucial plot change between the film and the book, creating in Guy a hero incapable of murder with whom the audience can identify, has repercussions both for Guy and Bruno, for their relationships with women, and for the world of the film/novel. After establishing the shared topos of book and film, I shall therefore look at these differences. I shall explore the way that the super-ego and guilt are dealt with differently in book and film, the film becoming an almost psychotic fantasy of the disavowal of lack, castration, and guilt whereas the novel is a neurotic and nostalgic repetition of loss. In the film, Bruno’s guilt is not acknowledged by him but is exposed to the other characters through his hysterical
Strangers on a Train. Opening sequence

Shot 1. Still 1

Shot 1. Still 2

Shot 1. Still 3

Shot 1. Still 4

Shot 1. Still 5

Shot 1. Still 6

Shot 1. Still 7

Shot 1. Still 8

Shot 2. Still 1

Shot 2. Still 2

Shot 2. Still 3

Shot 2. Still 4

Shot 2. Still 5

Shot 2. Still 6

Shot 2. Still 7

Shot 2. Still 8
Plate III:

Shot 8: Still 16
Shot 7: Still 15
Shot 7: Still 14
Shot 6: Still 13
Shot 5: Still 12
Shot 4: Still 11
Shot 3: Still 10
Shot 2: Still 9

Page 11: 2
symptoms, provoked by the dangerous desiring looks of the female characters. In the book, guilt is assumed by Guy, leaving the female characters as passive and neutral figures onto whom Guy projects his own overbearing or neglectful maternal objects.

The Establishment of the Characters of Guy and Bruno.

The film starts with an almost neutral shot of the taxi rank at the railway station where Bruno and Guy are to have their fateful meeting, above which are superimposed the titles (Plate III: 1 - 2). There is an arch in the distance, which is flooded with daylight - the taxi rank is very dark - and Dmitri Tiomkin’s music is darkly romantic. The mood is troubled, perhaps we are to look for light at the end of the tunnel. The titles finish and a taxi draws up from screen left, whereupon the music changes to a comic, slightly jazzy theme as a porter opens the door of the taxi and withdraws a suitcase. Then a pair of feet encased in two-tone shoes emerge from the taxi with a flourish and walk in a determined direction, followed by the porter and the luggage (Plate III: Shot 1: Stills 1 - 6). The style of music, the stylishness of the feet and the choice of tight close-up might lead us to believe that the feet belong to someone like Fred Astaire and there is a little frisson of excitement that, perhaps, we are being led towards romance. In a mirroring shot, another taxi draws up (this time from screen right), another porter removes some tennis racquets and a suitcase, and another set of male feet, this time more soberly shod, emerges from the taxi and walks in the opposite direction (Plate III: Shot 2: Stills 7 - 9). Nothing is conveyed in the following shots to change our expectations of romance and, in a short montage, we are shown the two sets of feet mirroring each other and following the same paths until they are bound to meet (Plate III: Shots 3 - 6: Stills 10 - 13). As both sets of feet disappear down the station platform, Hitchcock cuts to a view of rails from a moving train and the points at which the railway tracks merge and separate (Plate III: Shot 8: Still 16). The feet finally meet when Guy’s feet accidentally knock Bruno’s in the train bar (Plate III: Shots 9 - 12: Stills 17 - 22). In this ‘brief encounter’, this mini-encapsulation of the film which will follow, several things are slightly odd, or strange. First, the two people on converging paths are men; given the romantic tone, and the known phallic symbolism of trains (e.g. the last shot in North by Northwest of the train going into the tunnel signifying sex between Cary Grant and Eve Marie Saint), one might expect them to be a man and a woman. Second, we only see their feet, their bodies are ‘cut off’ in a disavowal; the elements of bodies that have thought, sexual desire, feelings, what we might call ‘soul’, are absent, and what we see is pure ‘drive’ - the direction of the feet, and ‘personality’ - the difference between two-tone shots and brogues. Third, the abrupt change of tone between the titles and the feet shows another level of disavowal; this story will be dark and sinister, about the
recesses of the human mind, and yet it will be light hearted and romantic, and we need not take it too seriously. In good classical manner, the feet, once shown, must be re-used - like the gun which once planted has eventually to be shown going off. There can be no redundant element. Guy’s feet, shown later fragiley encased in tennis shoes, are the sign of his phallic insufficiency, leading the police to recognise and tail him at the railway station. The feet are shown three times: once in Guy and Bruno’s first meeting, where they belong to the “strangers” who will meet on the train (see Plate III), once observed by Guy when pursuing Bruno to the fairground, where they parody Bruno and Guy’s first meeting, and finally, in a comic parody in the film’s closing moments, when Guy bumps into a vicar and retreats from the encounter (Theodor Price suggests this is either an innocent encounter or a potentially homosexual threat - the vicar signifying effeminacy, a man who does not sleep with women). There is something schematic about filming these feet, it is a very pleasing pattern, and shows the doubling of the characters of Bruno and Guy, and even the split within Bruno - his two tone shoes prefigure his later battle with his own repression: he faints when confronted with Barbara’s (Pat Hitchcock) glasses which remind him of his murder of Miriam. However, it is a pattern of fantasy, the sets of feet standing for two agents of the fantasy, the lack of bodies and faces suggesting a solipsistic and internal universe, the metonymy/synecdoche suggesting the displacement of a dream or at least a daydream.

If this opening sequence suggests the levels of complexity and overdetermination in the film and creates a homoerotic charge, it does not, as yet, establish Bruno as Guy’s unconscious or repressed self. Bruno is established as Guy’s repressed inner self, both on the level of the script/the original novel and subtly through aspects of the film’s mise en scène. This doubling is not continuously present throughout the film, but can be felt most strongly in the central section of the film, from the murder of Miriam, through Bruno’s confrontation with Guy in the dark outside Guy’s apartment, up to Guy’s confession to Anne about his involvement in Miriam’s murder. Bruno expresses Guy’s secret and repressed wish to murder Miriam. On the train, Bruno seems to know Guy’s hidden thoughts, ostensibly from reading gossip columns, although there is no way he could actually know this information without being Guy’s uncanny double. He knows Guy wishes to divorce Miriam and marry Anne, he knows that Guy is a social climber and is marrying into Anne’s family in order to gain a career in politics, and when he suggests ‘Just suppose, just suppose, you want to murder your wife’ and indicates to Guy a way of accomplishing this - ‘I’ll do your murder, if you will do mine’, Guy at first demurs ‘Forgive me, but I thought that murder was illegal’ but later replies ‘Sure, Bruno sure. I like all your theories’ which although a repudiation, is one phrased in such terms that it could be an affirmation, and indeed Bruno
Chapter Three

takes it as such. In the two shot in the bar, where Bruno first invades Guy’s space, and then talks to him about his private life, the shadow of venetian blinds fall across his face, in a noir effect which is absent from the reverse shot of Guy, and he therefore could be Guy’s shadow. At the train station, when Guy is on the phone to Anne, telling her about Miriam’s refusal to accept a divorce, he shouts over the noise of a passing train that he ‘could strangle her’ and there is a cut to a close up of Bruno’s hands in strangling position, as his mother manicures them. This seems to imply that Bruno is Guy’s psychic representative, his hidden thoughts, and indeed the narration then follows Bruno until he accomplishes the killing, thus taking the wish directly to its fulfilment. The equation of Guy with light, with the summer of the tennis match, and Bruno with darkness, although not absolutely rigidly carried out, conveys a feeling of being carried with Bruno further into the unconscious, an unconscious that he sucks Guy into and from which Guy must escape. The murder of Miriam, carried out at night, is saturated with the condensed imagery of a dream (see Plate IV: 1 - 3). Bruno is on a journey, into the Tunnel of Love, both a symbol of interiority, the unconscious, and a vagina dentata - remembering what Freud said in his essay ‘The “Uncanny”’ about the mother’s genitals being the sight of ultimate uncanniness: ‘whenever a man dreams of a place or a country and says to himself, while he is still dreaming: “this place is familiar to me, I’ve been here before”, we may interpret the place as being his mother’s genitals or her body’. In shadow play, he witnesses a kind of primal scene, Miriam flirting with the two young men and screaming with pleasure, and when he strangles Miriam, there is a displacement of his libidinous energy onto the sizzling fairground which he sees out of the corner of his eye and which is shown in long shot across the lake. He drags Guy into his dark world when he confronts Guy at his apartment with Miriam’s broken glasses, the evidence of his killing. Guy, trapped behind the bars of the garden gates, is separated from the open door of his apartment, flooded with light. Even when the phone rings, Guy, with Bruno between him and his home, is almost paralysed; the phone rings continuously throughout the scene without being answered. From now on, Guy is tainted by guilt, and he is now seen in half-shadow, contemplating murder, a revolver in front of him, deciding whether to reciprocally murder Bruno’s father. As Hennessey, the policeman says about him ‘He doesn’t trust anybody - not even himself’. Only when Guy has confessed to Anne, and confronts Bruno in Bruno’s home, can Guy come back into the light, and even here, he is menaced by the uncanny appearance of Bruno, a dark spot, wearing a dark suit, posed threateningly in front of the Senate Building, site of Guy’s dearest wish for professional success. Nevertheless, Guy chases Bruno from his dark places, forcing him into the light, and making Bruno wait at the fairground in the ominous and visible twilight for night to fall, and for Bruno to plant the cigarette lighter that will falsely implicate Guy in the murder.
In my discussion of *Live Flesh* (see Chapter Five), I will explore how the Gothic treatment of the double in some ways duplicates the discourse of psychoanalysis, relating it to Freud’s notion of the ‘Uncanny’ and Julia Kristeva’s concept of the ‘abject’ found in her book *The Powers of Horror.* In *Strangers on a Train,* Bruno is established as Guy’s repressed and darker self, in a way that has a precedent within the history of Gothic and is also consistent with psychoanalytic or Freudian theory. In Robert Louis Stevenson’s *Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde* (1886), Mr Hyde is Dr Jekyll’s id, coming out at night to wreak havoc on the city, and when he begins to invade the daylight, starting to eject Dr Jekyll from his position in control of his body. Similarly, in the novel *Dracula* (Bram Stoker, 1897) and the film *Nosferatu* (Murnau, 1922), which Hitchcock might have seen when working at UFA in 1924, the eponymous anti-hero dies in contact with the daylight. There is clearly a difference between those novels/films which contain the murderous unconscious within the same body like *Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde* and *Live Flesh,* and those which split them into separate individuals: in the case of *Dracula,* Dracula represents the repressed libido of the entire community, and in *Strangers on a Train,* Bruno represents the id to Guy’s ego. By the early 1950’s, films such as Siodmak’s *The Dark Mirror* (1946) and Hitchcock’s own *Spellbound* (1945) had already popularised the new discipline of psychoanalysis, and concepts such as the ego, the id, and the unconscious would have been within public consciousness.

The id constitutes the instinctual pole of the personality; its contents, as an expression of the instincts, are unconscious, a portion of them being hereditary and innate, a portion repressed and acquired.

From the economic point of view, the id for Freud is the prime reservoir of psychical energy; from the dynamic point of view, it conflicts with the ego and the super-ego - which, genetically speaking, are diversifications of the id.

Bruno not only embodies Guy’s repressed and unconscious wish to kill Miriam; his tie, with its strange pattern of mythical scorpion/crab/insect, shows him as a site of poisonous libidinous energy. Bruno’s murderous thoughts recognise no social imperative, or even the reality of any other person. Situated in mid-Oedipal crisis, Bruno wishes to kill his father, but has no qualms about this, or the murder of Miriam - ‘Some people would be better off dead’. However, part of the attractiveness of Bruno is that he has no qualms - the way he pops the balloon of the little boy at the fair with his cigarette is both comic and sinister. He does not, as Lacan would say ‘give way on his desire’.

Bruno: I’ve got a theory that you should do everything before you die. Have you ever driven a car, blindfolded at one hundred and fifty miles an hour... I did. I flew in a jet plane too...And I’m going to make a reservation on the first rocket to the moon.
Robert Walker, who plays Bruno, exhibits much more physical and nervous energy than Farley Granger, playing Guy. In the railway carriage, Bruno sprawls across the seat, feet up towards the camera, his hands working in gestures of strangulation, speaking in exclamatory tones - ‘my father, he hates me!’ whilst Guy sits bolt upright, and replies to Bruno’s stream of conversation with the occasional monosyllable. When Guy leaves the carriage, accidently or unconsciously forgetting his cigarette lighter, Bruno relaxes surrounded by the detritus of the meal he and Guy have been eating, a chaotic image of unfettered drive. He is also the libidinal and instinctive pole to Guy’s rather repressed, uptight personality. It is not altogether surprising that Bruno, as store of libidinous energy, does not have to work for a living, but lives off an inheritance from his father, which he believes is far too inadequate for his needs.

Freud argues that the ego primarily provides the body image

...in each individual there is a coherent organisation of mental processes; and we call this his ego. It is to this ego that consciousness is attached; the ego controls the approaches to motility - that is to the discharge of excitations into the external world; it is the mental agency which supervises all its own constituent processes, and which goes to sleep at night... and it is, perhaps, a happy choice that Guy is shown in the film as a tennis player, (in the book, he is an architect, which creates a different discourse about work in film and book). Moreover, his role in mediating between Bruno, the police, and the rest of the world - the public political world of his father-in-law and the personal world of Anne and Barbara - mirrors the operation of the ego, in mediating between the other agencies within the psyche - the id and the superego - and the outside world.

The ego is not located between the id and the superego, but is the frontier between them and the external world. The dangerous and exciting world of the real, comprising other people, social institutions, and so forth, on one side, and an equally treacherous domain, on the other - the internal world of instinctual drives, the libido with its vicissitudes, and the death drive - make that frontier creature, the ego, a site of incessant material negotiation between them.

In the film, this negotiation is reflected in the mise en scène, both in the use of light and dark (see earlier for discussion) and in the early part of the film where Guy is constantly filmed with a glass barrier between himself and the world. In the train, the countryside goes by outside Guy’s window, although Bruno’s attention stops him from looking at it. Captive with Miriam in her record shop - separated from the outside world by two sets of windows, in a glass booth separated from the other customers and employees who can see his conflict with Miriam, but cannot hear it - he fails to satisfactorily resolve his divorce. At the station Guy telephones Anne from a call box, the glass partition barely protecting Guy from the sound of the overhead train which masks the expression of his murderous desire to kill Miriam. In Strangers on a Train (N), this negotiation between ego, id,
superego, and outside world is handled slightly differently. Guy is unable to turn Bruno in to the police. An almost unaccountable, irrational, guilt on his part causing him reciprocally to murder Bruno’s father can be accounted for if he is actually protecting part of himself, in the shape of Bruno, from exposure. Thus, the tantalising pleasure of reading Highsmith’s novels, where people behave in irrational ways, arising from psychic conflict. Her biographer Russell Harrison has termed this “irritation”, linking it with Kafka and Sartre in its existential power.

This irritation arises in the reader’s struggle to escape identification with the passive protagonists and the enormous self-control they must exercise. Why doesn’t Guy Haines just refuse Bruno’s demands? The power such situations exert on the reader and derives from the frustration we feel between our “natural” desire for the character to act, to assert himself, and our recognition that one doesn’t give in to one’s emotions in this way. Here Highsmith most closely replicates the responses that Kafka’s texts produce. Highsmith’s frustrated characters (and readers) may legitimately be compared to Kafka’s famously frustrated K’s. Yet, although the feeling is the same, the cause differs significantly. Kafka’s protagonists are caught in a web of bureaucratic control, Highsmith’s in private and self-imposed constraints... The frustrations of Kafka’s stories and novels were the product of society, responses to the increasing bureaucratic tradition of modern social life, to the objective world, and, in the last analysis, to history. Highsmith, too, reflects her times, but in a much more mediated manner. 11

The ego is bound to the id as a love object - it is described as the product of identifications culminating in the formation, within the personality, of a love-object cathected by the id', 12 and Freud describes the relationship between the ego and the id, as a one way romance. The ego behaves like the physician during an analytic treatment: it offers itself, with the attention it pays to the real world, as a libidinal object to the id, and aims at attaching the id’s libido to itself. It is not only a helper to the id; it is also a submissive slave who courts his master’s love. Whenever possible, it tries to remain on good terms with the id; it clothes the id’s Ucs. commands with its Pcs. rationalizations; it pretends that the id is showing obedience to the admonitions of reality, even when in fact it is remaining obstinate and unyielding; it disguises the id’s conflicts with reality and, if possible, its conflicts with the super-ego too. 13

whereas the id has no means of showing the ego either love or hate. It cannot say what it wants; it has achieved no unified will. Eros and the death instinct struggle within it. 14

The behaviour of the ego and id here is just like the behaviour of Guy and Bruno! In Strangers on a Train(N) the bond between the two men is made explicitly erotic, with both men at some point declaring, or at least examining, their love for the other; Guy speculating, after killing Bruno’s father ‘Hadn’t he known Bruno was like himself? Or why had he liked Bruno? He loved Bruno.’; Guy worried at his wedding ‘The wedding seemed the worst act of treachery he could commit’; 16 and Bruno entertaining the thought, after Guy’s marriage, that ‘If he could strangle Ann, too, then Guy and he could really be together’. 17 Bruno’s behaviour though, like that of the id, is much less self-knowing, and the way he inflicts himself on Guy - ‘Guy, you know I like you’ - is often more like bullying and hate. Bruno himself knows that he is incapable of love, and their relationship is
about the mutual dependency forced on each man through the crime of the other, and narcissistic identification. Bruno identifies with Guy and wants his successful life, both professionally, and in his ability to love Anne. Guy is Bruno’s ego-ideal - He would like to be like Guy, wishing that Guy were with him at the murder, or that Guy could understand his motivations.

He sat on the edge of his seat and wished Guy were opposite him again. But Guy would try to stop him, he know; Guy wouldn’t understand how much he wanted to do it or how easy it was. But for Christ’s sake, he ought to understand how useful! 18

This can be seen as Bruno looking for a more satisfying father substitute, to replace the one who ‘hates him’, but it could also be seen as an auto-erotic, narcissistic relationship within the psyche composed of Bruno and Guy. In *Strangers on a Train (F)* this auto-eroticism is manifest at the level of the mise en scène. The frisson of the touching feet, at the start of the film, the slightly erotic quality of Bruno’s confrontation with Guy over the murder - the hushed voices, the proximity of faces. When Guy punches Bruno and knocks him out at the party, and then tidies him up, re-fastening his tie, the shots are direct POV shots which are shot as if Guy and Bruno are the same man: in fact the screen briefly goes black between the punch and Bruno’s reaction. Even the denouement at the fairground, where Bruno and Guy are fighting for their lives, carries a charge of auto-eroticism. The libidinous speed of the racing carousel, the phallic symbolism of the pounding horses, and the little boy, filmed in close up, who momentarily becomes the object of his mother’s concern, condenses images of eroticism, and also regression - the little boy seems to stand for Bruno and Guy - and their primary narcissistic need to be saved by ‘mother’. Richard Dyer 19 and Theodore Price 20 have read *Strangers on a Train (F)* as a latently homosexual film, with the homo-eroticism emerging as ‘the return of the repressed’ in these scenes. Dyer sees the scene, in the film but not in the book, where Guy goes to visit Bruno’s father, but finds Bruno in bed waiting for him as the dramatisation of a latent homosexual wish, in that its dramatic redundancy can argue nothing else. Robin Wood’s 21 persuasive argument that this scene is important in showing Guy morally responsible for crime and for potentially killing Bruno’s father does not contradict the extraordinary lengths the film goes to - the false suspense with the house, and the dog slavering in slow motion - in order to engineer this meeting with Bruno in bed. Price sees the final scene on the fairground as a latent dramatisation of anal rape.

We get a close-up of the horse’s terrifying eyes and teeth, traditional dream-and-fantasy symbols for the phallus, just as the horse itself is a traditional mythic symbol of phallic aggressiveness in general. So that analytically (dream-and-fantasy like) the impression is of the aggressive Walker attempting to commit homosexual rape upon the supine Farley. 22

However, I would argue that this reading of homo-eroticism, which can be explained as ‘repressed’ in the light of the homophobic discourses of the time, and the way that the film recuperates Guy into the heterosexual world
with his marriage to Anne, is also strongly supported by the way *Strangers on a Train* 'individualises' Bruno, coding him as a homosexual psychopath. This 'socialising' of Bruno contributes to the homophobic discourse by rationalising an auto-erotic relationship in homosexual terms. Thus the model of homosexuality in *Strangers on a Train* is based on the projection of an abject, internalised, unconscious relationship into social terms for which it is almost totally inappropriate. It is also possible that *Strangers on a Train* exemplifies a weakness with Freud's original formulations on the nature of homosexuality. He argues that homosexual object choice is just that, and that heterosexual object choice is by no means natural or easy. He even remarks that 'It is well known that a good number of homosexuals are characterized by a special development of their social instinctual impulses and by their devotion to the interests of the community' which is a bit like saying 'Some of my best friends are homosexuals, but...'. By allying homosexuality so closely with narcissistic object choice and with identification with the same-sex parent, thus avoiding/disavowing the full implications of the Oedipus complex, Freud allows for a topos of homophobia which perceives homosexuality as nothing but the activities of amoral, libidinous narcissists.

Elizabeth Cowie, in *Representing the Woman: Cinema and Psychoanalysis*, basing her analysis on Freud's *Creative Writers and Day-Dreaming*, makes a very clear case for the cinema as public fantasy, an acceptable form of public day dreaming, created for us initially by the 'creative writer' or film director, where primal fantasies (those common fantasies which are about our origins, and the origins of sexual difference, e.g. the primal scene, the Oedipal drama), are worked over in original ways in order to create a coherent fictional world, by 'secondary revision', a world which is nevertheless also formed through fantasy, and bears the traces of that fantasy.

It is secondary revision which imposes a logic and order on the fantasy scenario, whereas in the unconscious the fantasy scenario has no time periods, or rather, its time is simultaneity. And, while ambitious and erotic wishes are both fulfilled, whether in dreams of sleep or consciousness, censorship and secondary revision will intervene; in various ways, more or less, the fantasies are tailored to and address 'reality' - in the sense of Lacan's symbolic, a domain of prohibition, and in the sense of 'reality-testing' and actualised social relations. Fantasy is therefore a privileged terrain on which social reality and the unconscious are engaged in a figuring with intertwines them both.

Secondary revision in a film would be the creation of a well structured story and convincing characters, which would embed the imagery of the primary fantasy within a form of coherence and verisimilitude. What is original and complicating about *Strangers on a Train* is that this operation is figured within the text by the use of Bruno as Guy's unconscious, and part of the secondary revision is therefore the creation of Bruno and Guy as
individual characters, which makes it appear more visible and more foregrounded than it might be in a more naturalised text. However, as Cowie makes clear, the act of secondary revision is still informed by the same fantasy that informs the primary process, the same processes that construct Bruno and Guy as psychical agents, constructs them as social personalities. Therefore the two planes of *Strangers on a Train* co-exist simultaneously and are impossible to disentangle from each other. That Bruno exists on a psychic level as an id, but on a social level as a psychopath, is both explicable and typical of Hitchcock. After all, what is a psychopath but a person who cannot control his id, and who enacts what should be repressed upon the world. In the film, one particular scene labels Bruno as a psychopath. He loses contact with reality. When he tells Guy’s future father-in-law and the embodiment of law in the film, his plans for harnessing the life force, he says ‘It’ll make atomic power look like the horse and buggy’. He also converses on his ability to see for ‘millions of miles’ and the father-in-law later remarks to Guy that he has ‘an unusual personality’, and that he ‘thought he was a bit weird when he arrived’. The path the film follows, from being initially about Guy, to becoming more and more about Bruno, repeats the pattern that Raymond Bellour discovered in *Psycho* where the neurotic character - Marion in *Psycho*, Guy in *Strangers on a Train* - is supplanted in the interest of the film by the psychotic character - Norman in *Psycho*. Bruno in *Strangers on a Train*. However, when Bruno’s id-like characteristics are writ large, and the secondary revision inscribes him as a social being, what emerges in both film and book is the kind of stock iconography of the homosexual which Richard Dyer identifies in the films noirs which he charts and which I reproduce below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Film</th>
<th>Characters</th>
<th>Traits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Maltese Falcon</td>
<td>Cairo</td>
<td>Fastidious dress, crimped hair, perfume</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strangers on a Train</td>
<td>Bruno</td>
<td>Fastidious dress, manicured nails</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laura</td>
<td>Waldo</td>
<td>Fastidious dress, love of art, bitchy wit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farewell My Lovely (1944)</td>
<td>Lindsay</td>
<td>Fastidious dress, knowledge of clothes, jewellery, perfume.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farewell My Lovely (1976)</td>
<td>Lindsay</td>
<td>(same)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brute Force</td>
<td>Captain Munsey</td>
<td>Fastidious dress, love of art, music</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.J.</td>
<td>Quel</td>
<td>Gaudy clothes, fussy hairstyle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rope</td>
<td>Brandon, Philip</td>
<td>Fastidious dress, love of art, music, cuisine.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are further qualities in *Strangers on a Train* which inscribe Bruno as a gay man: he is a mother’s boy, and in the book he even travels with his mother on a yacht called ‘The Fairy Prince’. But as Dyer points out what is significant about the iconography is that it is not explicitly sexual. Gays are thus defined by everything but the very thing that makes us different;
and in *Strangers on a Train*, the traits which characterise Bruno as a perverse and effeminate homosexual are the same traits which characterise the perverse qualities of the id. As the id is partly repressed unconscious and partly un symbolised material (the real), it belongs in the realms of the genderless or pre-gendered, and it is therefore unsurprising that Bruno is portrayed as effeminate, a failure of gendering. Bruno does not need to earn his living; in the novel he drinks to excess, and in both book and film he is indulged by his mother. Whilst these qualities are explicable in terms of the id being the source of libido in the personality, and therefore wealthy in the economy of the psyche, as a social phenomenon Bruno's lack of industry and his sponging are conventional signs of effeminacy and decadence (Dyer associates luxury in film noir with the femme fatale or with the perverse male homosexual, the image of corruption). Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick links this kind of portrayal of homosexuality (which she finds elsewhere in Gothic literature in *Confessions of a Justified Sinner* by James Hogg) with a myth, a discourse of the cultural imaginary, which interpellates the bourgeois individual to alienation under capitalism and to the family by creating an image of the old, unalienated aristocracy, as weak and collapsed (e.g. Bruno’s drinking) and the bourgeois as unalienated, creating the fruits of his labour by his own agency. In *Strangers on a Train* the work that Guy does as an architect, building both a hospital and then a bridge, conforms exactly to this ideal of unalienated man. However, he is unable to achieve this constructive act of ‘order’, of ‘building’, because of the chaotic and harmful nature of the social order, the symbolic, in which he lives and to which he contributes: the only way he can get out of his legally binding but poisonous marriage is to kill. In the film matters are both more simple and more corrupt. Guy’s transition from tennis ace to politician is itself an acknowledgement of the corruption of the symbolic order, his strategic marriage into Anne’s political dynasty confirms this, as does his father-in-law’s concern, when Guy is under suspicion of murder, not to obtain the truth but to protect his own back by hypocritically suggesting that Guy works on his own, away from the Senate, for a few days ‘for your own sake’.

The perverse homosocial bond set up between Bruno and Guy in *Strangers on a Train* is a parodic and exaggerated form of the symbolic order which so punishes and restricts the lives of its characters. Unlike Levi-Strauss’s idea of women being the object of exchange through marriage in patriarchal society (discussed in my chapter on *Live Flesh*), Bruno and Guy enact the novel concept of ‘the killing of a woman’ being the object of exchange - although in *Strangers on a Train* Guy also kills Bruno’s father. This killing is shown in less detail than the murder of Miriam. It happens later, and Guy does not meet Bruno’s father until the deed. This is not only a dramatisation of the misogyny inherent in the ‘normal’ homosocial bond, but enacts that misogyny in the
text. It is interesting that the bond between the men cannot be expressed, because of its criminality, as 'healthy male bonding', but must be made into a tortuous homoerotic relationship. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick asserts that 'homophobia directed by men against men is misogynist, and perhaps transhistorically so', although she makes an important distinction between homophobia and homosexuality, arguing that the former is heterosexual, which is also true of Strangers on a Train, as it recuperates any homoeroticism within a strong heterosexual topos. The cruelty of the symbolic in Strangers on a Train which creates this dialogue of misogyny and homophobia is a phenomenon which could have a number of possible explanations: in the persona of 'Hitchcock' or 'Highsmith' as implied authors; or in the post-war political climate. Although these explanations can only be speculative, they seem useful in relating the world of Strangers on a Train to the world from which it emerged. Film noir emerged as a post-war phenomenon, and Kaja Silverman argues that in the early post-war period, there was a crisis of masculinity, reflecting the trauma of war and of the return to peace, where men's 'phallus' - their belief in their symbolic power in the world - was split from their 'penis' - their anatomical difference from women - and they felt themselves to be powerless in the world. She explores this in relation to three early post-war films which are not noirs: The Best Years of Our Lives (William Wyler, 1946), It's a Wonderful Life (Frank Capra, 1946) and The Guilt of Janet Ames (Henry Levin, 1947), and discovers in their stories male heroes who are 'castrated', unable to enter the symbolic, and they have to be bullied, either by the female characters in the films, or by the narration, in order to take up their place in what might be very poor options in the social world. She argues that, in It's a Wonderful Life, George is bullied into carrying on his unfulfilling life in Bedford Falls through the divine intervention of angels and the film's narrational investment in the Christian ethic of self-sacrifice. In Strangers on a Train, Guy's passiveness, his inability to negotiate the symbolic of his divorce without the criminal help of Bruno, and the lack of any true homosociality in the film/book, do seem to point to a masculine crisis. However, looking at another contemporaneous work of Patricia Highsmith, a different, but not conflicting, hypothesis seems possible. In Carol, first published under a pseudonym two years after Strangers on a Train, Highsmith portrays a lesbian relationship in a novel completely free of homophobia. Therese, a lonely and artistic girl with no family, begins an affair with Carol, an older sophisticated woman separated from her husband and with a young daughter. Their relationship is nearly ruined whilst on a driving holiday, when Carol's homophobic husband sets a spy on them to establish their lesbianism and therefore to permanently gain custody of Carol's daughter, and estrange Carol from her for ever. Carol chooses Therese over her daughter, and the novel establishes the possibility of a happy lesbian relationship against all odds. The female homosexual and homosocial bonds in this novel are not poisonous, as they are in Strangers on a Train. The poison comes
from outside, from the world of Carol’s husband and his detective; and it seems unarguable that it is something about patriarchy and the world of men which Highsmith finds corrupting and imprisoning, not homosexuality as such. 32

Differences between the Novel and the Film: Happy Endings:

The Super-ego and its relationship to Femininity.

The novel and film of *Strangers on a Train* proceed in tandem until Bruno’s revelation to Guy of his part in Miriam’s murder. Thereafter the book and the film diverge quite markedly. In the book, Guy, beset by guilt and worried for his rather fragile relationship with Anne, kills Bruno’s father as his reciprocal murder. Bruno is drawn out into the open: his increasingly erratic behaviour, due to alcoholism and loneliness, his desire to treat Guy and Anne as a surrogate family, causes the police to suspect both him and Guy of the murders. Bruno’s obvious death wish eventually causes him to accidentally drown whilst on a boat trip with Guy and Anne: Guy dives into the freezing water to try and save him. Guy, released from his tortuous bond with Bruno, nevertheless feels guilty that Bruno has taken all the blame. Increasingly aware that the world will not punish him, he confesses his crime to Miriam’s ex-lover, but is overheard and captured by the police who have long been secretly on his trail. In the film, Bruno exposes his guilt first to Barbara and through her to Anne, through his bizarre behaviour at the party: he notices that Barbara’s glasses are just like those of the murdered Miriam, and his party game of ‘how to create the perfect murder’ (archetypally Hitchcockian - cf the games played by Charley’s father and next door neighbour in *Shadow of a Doubt* (1943)) played with two old society women, turns into unconscious murderous strangling, whereupon Bruno faints. Thereafter, and upon Guy sharing his difficulties with Anne, the film becomes a chase to make sure Bruno does not plant the murder of Miriam on Guy. Robin Wood considers the film’s ending ‘a major lapse in artistic integrity’ which ‘has its roots in (Hitchcock’s) fears of the effect of so morally dubious a “hero” on box office response.’ 33 I am not so sure, because the film creates a certain subtlety, in allowing for Guy’s moral culpability without his actually having to commit a crime. It also creates a set of relationships - Guy with Anne, Anne with Barbara, Guy with Barbara - that are open, unlike the novel’s complete lack of trust between all the characters. However, Guy is therefore a hero who is not ‘castrated’, who manages to have his cake and eat it, and in *Strangers on a Train* (F) it is Bruno alone who suffers the consequences of Miriam’s killing. The novel builds up a complex relationship between Bruno and Guy, based on guilt and identification, that is lost in the film, and also creates a consistency between the homosocial relationships and the heterosexual ones, which are marked by the same unstable fluctuations of
desire and dependency; whereas the film initiates a different relationship between the men and women, where the desires and goals of the characters are clear, where guilt is clearly centred on one character - Bruno - and where the threatening nature of female desire is a significant element.

The Novel - further ego-splitting

In *Strangers on a Train* (*N*), although Bruno does act as Guy's id until Miriam's killing, there are further complications in their relationships over the duration of the story, as well as a greater complexity given to each character's motivation and psychopathology. In exploring Guy's fundamentally irrational response towards Bruno's killing of Miriam and its culmination in his murder of Bruno's father, the novel enacts the 'irritation' to which Russell Harrison draws attention, enabling the reader to wish for the more rational outcome of Guy turning Bruno over to the police, whilst recognising the compelling interpersonal psychological motivations which force Guy to go along with Bruno, even to the extent of becoming a murderer. Guy at the beginning of the novel turns down an architectural job designing the Palmyra Hotel, because he cannot bear the idea of a pregnant Miriam following him to Palm Beach and showing him up through her cheapness and lack of education. She is the 'symbol of the failure of his youth' and Guy already has lack of self-worth which he cannot account for but which has always been present, causing him to flirt with failure and be unconvinced of his own successes.

There was inside him, like a flaw in a jewel, not visible on the surface, a fear and anticipation of failure that he had never been able to mend. At times, in high school and college, when he had allowed himself to fail examinations that he might have passed; as when he married Miriam, he thought, against the will of both their families and all their friends... All of Guy's relationships are marked by a lack of confidence and a vacillation between feeling loved and expressing love and feeling abandoned and hopeless. His relationship with Miriam mirrors the pre-Oedipal powerlessness of an infant with its mother. He meets her in the old High School grounds, a place of nostalgia and loss, he veers wildly in his estimation of her - someone he once loved, he now hates with a vengeance that Anne calls 'childish' - and he mistakes her miscarriage for an abortion. He has, in the past, made her pregnant, and her rejection of his baby, through her miscarriage torments him and throws him into an infantile sense of desolation. He lets his own behaviour become self-destructive in order to punish Miriam, and turns down the job which could make his career. However, he does not seem to learn from his relationship with Miriam, and his relationship with Anne is equally anguished, dependent, and lacking in self-worth. Throughout the novel he constantly debates whether Anne loves him or not, whether she prefers her car (p166); and yet later (p177) is...
unable to declare his private thoughts that ‘she is the sun in my dark forest’. His first thoughts on discovering Bruno guilty of murdering Miriam are to confide in Anne, but he finds himself unable to do so in case he will not be forgiven, and makes up excuses in order not to have to tell her.

But he knew he could not tell Anne about Bruno until he was sure. He could not begin...But it troubled him the rest of the night that he had not told Anne about Bruno. It was not the horror that he wished to spare her. He felt it was some sense of personal guilt that he himself could not bear. 36

He is looking for absolution from Anne, knowing she cannot possibly offer it. In this way, he has such a narcissistic wound, perhaps no ego-ideal - it is impossible for him to be offered reassurance, but he longs to ‘merge his life with hers’ (p118) and sink himself into a pre-Oedipal world where loss no longer exists. He commits the murder in order to ease his terrible tension, but therefore loses any chance to be able to confess to Anne, for her to become ‘his glass of reality’. He acts like the criminals portrayed in Freud’s The Ego and The Id, although Guy, unlike Freud’s criminals, is fully aware of his guilt.

It was a surprise to find that an increase in this Ucs. sense of guilt can turn people into criminals. But it is undoubtedly a fact. In many criminals, especially youthful ones, it is possible to detect a very powerful sense of guilt which existed before the crime, and is therefore not its result but its motive. It is as if it was a relief to be able to fasten this unconscious sense of guilt on to something real and immediate. 7

This implies that Guy’s super-ego is unnaturally strong, and that he is undergoing some reaction akin to melancholia or depression. Since this melancholia or mourning relates to every woman with whom Guy has a relationship, including his own mother - to whom Guy cannot relate after his marriage to Miriam because he has lost the joy of youth - it might imply that Guy’s lack of self worth is connected to an inadequately resolved Oedipus complex, one marked by a too severe or a too lenient intervention from his father or his mother.

Kristeva, writing in The Power of Horror suggests Two seemingly contradictory causes bring about the narcissistic crisis that provides, along with its truth, a view of the abject. Too much strictness on the part of the Other, confused with the One and the Law. The lapse of the Other, which shows through the breakdown of objects of desire. In both instances, the abject appears in order to uphold “I” within the Other. The abject is the violence of mourning for an “object” that has always already been lost. The abject shatters the wall of repression and its judgements. It takes the ego back to its source on the abominable limits from which, in order to be, the ego has broken away - it assigns it a source in the non-ego, drive, and death. 8

Guy’s father is dead, his over-active super-ego and his inability to find independence in his relationship with the women he loves might be explained by the absence of an effective father figure. Although his relationship with people and his lack of self-worth and melancholy imply a pre-Oedipal longing, they also imply a brutal and violent Oedipal resolution. The super-ego is created as a result of the resolution of the Oedipus complex and is an internalisation of those object choices which have to be repressed in a successful Oedipal transition.
The super-ego is, however, not simply a residue of the earliest object-choices of the id; it also
represents an energetic reaction-formation against those choices. Its relation to the ego is not
exhausted by the precept: ‘You ought to be like this (like your father). It also comprises the
prohibition: ‘You may not be like this (like your father) - that is, you may not do all that he
does; some things are his prerogative’. This double aspect of the ego ideal derives from the
face that the ego ideal had the task of repressing the Oedipus complex; indeed, it is to that
revolutionary event that it owes its existence.39

Guy’s guilt is a response to his over-active super-ego which leads him into criminal activities in order to assuage
its powerfully cruel demands. Bruno acts as a brutal and primal father figure for Guy, an ego-ideal who forces
Guy to murder. When he first meets Bruno, Guy confides in him, he ‘reveals the best of himself’ (p28) to this
stranger who, perhaps, can understand him better than a friend. Guy comes to identify with Bruno, with the
ambiguities of identification that arise with the Oedipal rivalry of father and son. Guy hates Bruno but he also
comes unaccountably to like him, to recognise Bruno within himself. Bruno ‘was destroying Guy’s courage to
love’ (p125), and at first Guy tries to fight him. He writes a note to send Bruno away, he even fights him at the
back of Anne’s house. This dark grappling with Bruno in the forest, a typical literary and filmic setting for
indicating the unconscious, is narratively unmotivated. It has no cause and no effect, but it nevertheless changes
Guy so that he seriously contemplates murder. It is as if, at this moment, he introjects Bruno and thereafter he
regards him as part of himself. After he murders Bruno’s father, Guy realises
he had not wanted to do it, he thought. It had not been his will. It had been Bruno’s will,
working through him.

Indeed, shortly after the murder, Guy has a dream where he is again grappling with Bruno, and Guy asks him
who he is, to whom Bruno replies ‘You’.40 During the period surrounding the murder, both immediately before,
when Bruno is blackmailing Guy, and after, at the wedding, Bruno appears to Guy in several uncanny
impersonations:- on the pavement, introducing himself to Guy and Anne (p104), in the forest (p116), and even at
Guy’s wedding (p174), where Guy spots Bruno’s face in the crowd and feels about to faint. This ‘uncanniness’,
also presented in the film in the shots of Bruno at the capital building and at the tennis match, is a clear
indication of how closely Bruno relates to Guy and how they are psychically linked. Bruno’s eyes, which appear
like the diamonds in his tie pin, sharp objects burrowing into Guy, further reinforce the sense of the all powerful
‘Other’ who is watching Guy from a position of power and seeing into his guilt, a motif which is also picked up
by the film and expanded upon, making sight and guilt and desire inextricably linked. However, the murder of
Bruno’s father actually binds Guy and Bruno together in a way which reveals the affection and positive
identification between them as well as the hatred. Guy comes to like Bruno, to accept Bruno’s taste and his gifts,
for example the tie, and to be able to go out to lunch and sailing with Bruno. Bruno becomes the person who
does know the whole of Guy and who accepts him. Guy comes to ‘feel well-disposed towards Bruno, as he
sometimes did by night, but never until now by day’ (p186). When Bruno drowns, Guy feels desolate at having
placed all the blame on Bruno for their joint crimes and overwhelmed with guilt, gives himself away. When
Gerard finally catches up with Guy, he is grateful for finally finding an external father figure who will externalise
his punishing super-ego, and who by embodying guilt for Guy will free him from his oppressive internal
struggle.

If Guy’s relationship to Bruno is comprised of both hate and love, then Bruno’s relationship to Guy is
even more characterised by these emotions, showing his reciprocal identification with Guy. Guy is a father
figure for Bruno, whom Bruno chooses both as love object, and to identify with. In killing Miriam, Bruno is
both enacting a negative Oedipus complex, in that he is choosing Guy as a father figure to whom he is erotically
attached, and simultaneously foreclosing completely on the Oedipus complex, by figurally murdering his mother
- in the shape of Miriam - who is the rival for Guy’s attentions, whilst also, more conventionally, murdering his
real father to ‘marry’ his mother, or at least get his hands on her money. The ambivalence and richness of
Bruno’s double re-enactment of the Oedipal drama, in his murder of Miriam on behalf of Guy and in his murder
of his father, explains his lack of super-ego. In the book he is complete id and the novel also characterises his
love-hate relationship with Guy as a relationship so strong that Guy’s rejection of him causes him to disintegrate.

Freud indicates that the Oedipus complex is by no means simple and is fraught with difficulties

Closer study usually discloses the more complete Oedipus complex, which is twofold, positive
and negative, and is due to the bisexuality originally present in children: that is to say, a boy
has not merely an ambivalent attitude towards his father and an affectionate feminine object-
choice towards his mother, but at the same time he also behaves like a girl and displays an
affectionate feminine attitude to his father and a corresponding jealousy and hostility towards
his mother. It is this complicating element introduced by bisexuality that makes it so difficult
to obtain a clear view of the facts in connection with the earliest object-choices and
identifications, and still more difficult to describe them intelligibly. It may even be that the
ambivalence displayed in the relations to the parents should be attributed entirely to
bisexuality and that it is not, as I have represented above, developed out of identification in
consequence of rivalry. 41

It is important to state unequivocally that Bruno’s homosexuality/bisexuality is unconnected psychologically
with his foreclosure, his murder, and his portrayal as a psychopath: this is a connection enacted by the text, and
the homophobia thus displayed is by no means determined by verisimilitude, by the need to explain Bruno’s
murderous madness as connected with homosexuality. However, Bruno seems to have all these identifications
and object-choices. His mother is a love object, she is both not available to him because of her promiscuity and
yet always available to him, nursing him, caring for him, youthful and desirable.
Dully, with a wistful realization that much would happen before he saw them again, he watched his mother's legs flex as she tightened her stockings. The slim lines of her legs always gave him a life, made him proud. His mother had the best-looking legs he had ever seen on anyone, no matter what age. Ziegfeld had picked her, and hadn't Ziegfeld known his stuff? But she had married right back into the kind of life she had run away from. He was going to liberate her soon, and she didn't know it.42

By violating the Oedipal taboo and killing his father, Bruno does get his mother, but as with Guy, she is already lost to him and the pleasure in the planning and execution of the crime is no longer available to Bruno once he does have his mother to himself. She ages, and Bruno realises that in gaining his aim he has actually lost it.

He touched the puffed shoulder of his mother's dressing-gown, but he thought of Rutledge Overbeck at dinner tonight, and let his hand drop. He was sure his mother was having an affair with him. She went to see him too much at his studio in Silver Springs, and she stayed too long. He didn't want to admit it, but why shouldn't he when it was under his nose? It was the first affair, and his father was dead so why shouldn't she, but why did she have to pick such a jerk? Her eyes looked darker now, in the shaded room. He hadn't improved since the days after his father's death. She was going to be like this, Bruno realized now, stay like this, never be young again the way he liked her.43

But Bruno, like Guy, never really had his mother's love. Bruno, because of his mother's promiscuity, and Guy, because his lack of narcissism, have always already lost the love they are seeking. Bruno's enactment of foreclosure, through the murder of his father, only releases his death drive, allowing him to drink himself into apoplexy. This behaviour is similar to that of John's feminine ESP in Don't Look Now, and Victor's tetanus and paralysis in Live Flesh (see chapter 5), traits which externalise the internal hysteria of these characters upon their bodies and make them impotent. Hitchcock literalises this dramatised "hysteria" in the film by giving Bruno a hysterical episode at the party where the sight of Babs's spectacles makes him faint.

Bruno's negative Oedipus complex, and his psychopathic and infantile re-enactment of this drama so that he is the victor and his 'mother', Miriam, the victim, creates the engine of the plot in both book and film, and also creates the depth of hatred and love that Bruno feels for Guy, and which Guy finds so oppressive. The phone calls from Bruno to Guy, even before the murders, where Bruno gets tearful and petulant at Guy's rejection (p45), the contract that Bruno undertakes without permission from Guy to kill Miriam, the obsessive trailing of Guy and the intrusion into his life; these are all indications of the approval Bruno needs from Guy, which is a mixture of his identification with Guy and his quest for a male love object. Although Miriam's murder is not committed altruistically - Bruno gains both a hold over Guy, to make him reciprocally kill his father, and also gains the satisfaction of killing a promiscuous woman and, therefore, of wreaking revenge on his mother - there is a strong sense that Bruno is murdering on behalf of Guy, in order to please him and in order to offer himself to Guy as a love object. Guy's letter of rejection to Bruno after the first murder (p100) is enough to
provoke Bruno into blackmailing Guy into murder, not only for Bruno to achieve the aim of murdering his own father, but also to draw Guy into a reciprocal relationship with him based on mutual murder. The book that Bruno keeps from Guy - Plato’s *Republic* - not only incriminates Guy but establishes him as ego-ideal for Bruno, someone whose ethics Bruno can aspire to. However, when Bruno cannot gain Guy’s respect and love, he can only bring him down to his level. The gifts that Bruno gives Guy - an alligator bill fold with gold corners and the initials G.D.H. engraved on it (p126), the tie that Guy realises is a declaration of love (‘He might have been Bruno’s lover, he thought suddenly, to whom Bruno had brought a present, a peace offering.’ (p187) - are two edged, the former delivered with the gun which Guy is to use for the killing. Gifts from Bruno are usually accompanied by demands that Guy demonstrate his love for him and threats to expose Guy’s guilt. Guy realises that Bruno hates him, ‘that he’d love to kill me too’ (p111), but after Guy murders Bruno’s father, Bruno regards him gratefully and uncritically, as a child might his all-powerful father. Thus, towards the end of the novel, Bruno can contemplate killing Anne in order to get closer to Guy (p228); but also his final act, drowning accidentally or suicidally, can almost be seen as a kind of perverse recognition of his achievement in getting close to Guy. Bruno makes a ranting speech praising his great friendship with Guy, then sings ‘The foggy foggy dew’, a song about a man who tries to keep his love from death - the foggy dew - but nevertheless loses her and goes on living with his son on his own until his own death. This mirrors both the killing that he has enacted for Guy and also his own relationship with Guy. Perhaps he sacrifices himself so that Guy need not take the blame for the murders; or perhaps, having achieved the ultimate bonding with Guy over the death of Miriam and his father, there is nowhere else for Bruno to go but to his death.

This complexity of Guy’s relationship to Bruno seems to me to problematise the relationship between homo-eroticism, homosocial bonding and homophobia displayed in the book. Whereas the film, with its heterosexual ending places itself as heterosexual and contains the homo-erotic as a hidden subtext, or as a dialogue about homophobia, the book seems to examine the relationship between the two men as one which is impossible, and yet in some way desirable. Without the murders, Guy and Bruno should be able to have a satisfactory homosocial bond - it is criminality which stops them, the world of the Symbolic which does not allow a painless uncorrupted homosocial bond to happen and which punishes it with death.
The Film - the Placing of Guilt.

If the book places the guilt within Guy and also dramatises the super-ego as Guy's, but externalised for him alternately by Bruno and Gerard, the film refuses this placement. In making Guy innocent and in creating a happy ending where he gains Anne and his political career without any loss, there is nowhere for the super-ego to appear or for guilt to be displayed, and it therefore returns as a symptom in the film, displaced onto Bruno's hystericised body and perhaps also onto the two women Miriam and Barbara (Babs), who wear such prominent spectacles. Bruno cannot feel any guilt, at least consciously, as he is a creature of such libidinous enjoyment that the possibility of him becoming a tortured character would severely alter the tone of the film and destroy the audience's enjoyment of Bruno's villainy. However, Miriam's murder does affect him. It comes back to haunt him in the shape of the spectacles. The spectacles connote two different and conflicting things about the women who wear them: that they are short sighted and cannot see things, and simultaneously that they can see all too well, their sight is corrected by the thick pebble glass, they have four eyes instead of two. The casting of Hitchcock's daughter, Patricia, cannot be accidental in all this, and it is possible that she is here in the text as a director surrogate, an 'author figure' who sees all, and is the person who recognises that Bruno is responsible for a crime, that he wants to kill her. The spectacles are also further complicated in that they are connected in Strangers on a Train (F) with desire. Blatantly desiring women wear them and look threateningly out of them, and yet they signify a lack of desire for Bruno: Dorothy Parker's adage 'Boy's don't make passes at girl's who wear glasses' is very appropriate, because Bruno does not desire Miriam or Babs but despises them for their desire of him, and perhaps this is the way that the women seem to be short sighted. The film inscribes the glasses within its very individual narration, which builds towards Bruno's unconscious guilt, the dinner party where Bruno faints, confronted with the spectacles and their knowledge of his secret desires and deeds. (Appendix B contains the dialogue, shot list, and stills which accompany these sequences). The glasses first gain their importance at the fair, where Bruno has followed Miriam and her friends. Miriam is at the hot-dog stand, consuming her ice-cream in a provocative and prurient manner, her lascivious look at Bruno establishing her as subject of desire, and Bruno as her object, as well as the other way around (Plate IV:1). At the strong-man game where 'you can win a Kewpie Doll' if you make the weight hit the bell by hitting it with a hammer, we see Bruno in the background and the camera pulls focus to a medium close up of Miriam looking around for him, whereupon he suddenly and uncannily appears next to her (Plate IV:2). Miriam's desire is driving Bruno on, as can be seen very clearly when she keeps looking at him on the carousel. When he murders Miriam, Bruno shines the light from Guy's cigarette lighter in Miriam's face to identify her, and the flame is reflected in the glasses.
The glasses are knocked off, and in a bravura shot - Hitchcock constructed an enormous distorting lens to accomplish this ‘framing’ - the killing is seen reflected in the glasses (Plate IV:3). Like a Victorian silhouette, erotic, romantic and dreadful, we see the full length outline of Bruno strangling Miriam. It is a ‘God’s eye’ point of view shot, because no one, except the implied author or the audience, can be seeing it. It therefore puts the viewer in the place of judgement and ‘the Big Other’ waiting to ‘castrate’ Bruno. Yet it is connected metonymically with Miriam because it is through her glasses that we are looking, and metaphorically with Bruno because the image, the silhouette, is itself so romantic and represents not only what he is doing to Miriam, but also what he thinks about it as a perverse romantic act. It is an example of what Slavoj Žižek, in his book *Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan through Popular Culture*, identifies as the intrusion into the Hitchcockian world of the ‘real’, the ‘point de capiton’ (quilting point), the navel of the film-dream, which gives meaning to the rest but which cannot be truly analysed; which points to the original trauma, and which somehow sticks out of the film like a ‘sore thumb’. The glasses return (Plate V:1 - 2), now worn by Barbara, and now they embody all the meanings that they carried before. When Bruno and Barbara meet at the tennis match, it is Barbara who desires to meet Bruno and who asks Guy who the ‘interesting Frenchman is’; and it is also Barbara who is responsible for flirting with the policemen at the later match, enabling Guy to get away. When the reflection of the lighter appears in Barbara’s glasses and the music from the fair (‘The Strawberry Blonde’), appears on the soundtrack, marking the shot as Bruno’s point of view shot of Barbara, we experience Bruno’s shock and his sudden overwhelming memory of the murder. His near collapse at the table, head in hands, shows how profoundly Barbara’s appearance has reminded him of the crime. However, we do not see Barbara from Bruno’s optical point of view. The shot is cheated, converted from an ordinary matching reverse so that Miriam looks into the lens of the camera. The camera is positioned not from where Bruno looks but from where Anne is sitting; she has introduced us into the scene, is the focal point for how it has been organised and it is her looks that have defined the geography. The conflation of Bruno’s point of view and the shot taken from Anne’s seated position creates a distance between Bruno’s emotional point of view, and the audience’s. This slightly ironic distance both heightens the drama of the moment, making Miriam’s look stand out, and also gives us somewhere to judge this moment from, separately from Bruno. Again this is repeated and heightened, when Bruno strangling the Judge’s wife in jest, spots Barbara again looking at him with desire (Plate IV: 1 - 2). Again the point of view shot is rigged, this time by an eye-line cheat which creates Bruno’s POV as a geographically incorrect but emotionally correct frontal close-up of Miriam (see Appendix B), lighter and flame reflected in her glasses. ‘Strawberry Blonde’ plays on the soundtrack recapitulating Miriam’s strangling in Bruno’s head. He
loses the sense of where he is and re-enacts the strangling of Miriam on the old lady, fainting with tension and unconscious guilt. The piece of the 'real', the glasses, brings with it other associations: Bruno and Miriam's pleasure, Bruno's guilt; his super-ego sits in judgement on him making him aware of what he actually has done wrong. Similarly, the other 'point de capiton' the cigarette lighter, through its exchange and its metonymic connection from Guy to Anne, (the motif of the two crossed tennis racquets) to its connection with Bruno and with Miriam's dead body, incriminates Bruno from a position of 'The Big Other'. When Bruno dies after the carousel accident, the camera pans down to his hand revealing the cigarette lighter which will prove Guy's innocence. But somehow, this 'authorial' pan, not yet connected to the point of view of any of the other characters, seems to embody Bruno's unconscious. As he dies, his hand opens, and he reveals what he has been hiding all along.

If guilt and super-ego are either absent in the characters of Bruno and Guy, or at least extremely well hidden, displaced onto Bruno's hysteria, there are no other characters in the film where they are represented or externalised. The policemen who represent the law are ineffectual and chase the wrong man. Anne's father, who represents the law of 'Realpolitik', is crafty and without morals, concerned only with the appearance of innocence. Perhaps the only figures of true law and super-egoic injunction are the 'Tunnel of Love' man who recognises Bruno as the killer and the old man who crawls under the mechanism of the carousel to rescue the riders. This implies that the film is somehow not Oedipal, or is disavowing the Oedipus complex. Looking at the fate of Guy, who ends up with no loss, having committed a crime - at least in his head, there is definitely a disavowal in the film, which could mean that guilt and super-ego are not present. However, as Žižek asserts, Hitchcock's films are very phallic, even in the 'points du capiton' which stick out, and the way that the women's desire seems to be about to castrate Bruno supports this thesis. The film portrays Bruno with a different psychopathology than he has in the novel: In Strangers on a Train (F), Bruno has not already lost his mother's love, he has it in plenitude, but his mother is metaphorically short sighted, stupid, and unable to see his evil and threaten him with castration. In her painting, with its wild staring gaze, she is unable to recognise either the portrait that Bruno sees of his phallic father, or what we, as an audience, recognise as a portrait of Bruno himself. Instead, her reaction is anodyne and indulgent, seeing the painting as a portrait of the gentle St. Francis. She is in no position to discipline Bruno, and his father is remote. The only super-egoic punishment therefore of Bruno's foreclosure of the Oedipus complex (his murder of Miriam) appears in the spectacled eyes of Barbara.
Narration in *Strangers on a Train (N) and (F)*

There are subtle differences about the way the film and novel narrate their stories. The novel is focalised through several characters, Guy, Bruno, Guy’s mother, Anne and Gerard. However, this focalisation exists not to create an overarching moral framework but almost to do away with one. Through hearing Guy’s and Bruno’s thoughts, and others’ thoughts about them, we are led to a sympathy, particularly for Guy but also for Bruno. Gerard expresses for the reader, the sympathetic attitude we are supposed to bring to the characters.

Mind you, I don’t say Guy Haines did it of his own free will. He was made to do it for Charles’ unsolicited favour of freeing him of his wife. Charles hates women....But even Charles is human. He was too interested in Guy Haines to leave him alone afterwards. And Guy Haines was too frightened to do anything about it. Yes...Haines was coerced. How terribly probably no one will ever know. 48

However, the most remarkable part of the narration in the novel is the ‘irritation’ with which Highsmith creates suspense. We don’t ask “What will happen next”, and in fact what happens next has an inexorable logic due to the unconscious needs of the characters. Rather, we gasp in exasperation as Guy refuses to do what is logical - tell Anne, tell the police, release himself from his burden. This creates an identification with Guy similar to those relationships he has with the other characters in the novel, an identification which includes affection and annoyance with him. Thus the characters who experience problems with establishing distance and separation from each other in the novel, are mirrored by the uncertain reactions of the reader towards the characters.

The film also plays with focalising through several characters, and in a similar way to the book, creates a sympathy for all the characters, including Bruno, who becomes the most interesting character and the most troubled. However, Hitchcock’s suspense is slightly different from Highsmith’s. He does create a tension about what is going to happen next, through the constant parallel action. The whole film, from the introduction of the pairs of feet, is shot in parallel action, building to the climax where Bruno loses Guy’s cigarette lighter down the drain as Guy is heading towards him, followed by the police. This intercutting creates a constant tension and anticipation which is only resolved with Bruno’s death. However, instead of creating ‘irritation’, the film simplifies, and goes for the logical solution. Guy does tell Anne, he does tell the police, and his activity towards the end is the logical one of chasing Bruno until he can establish his innocence. However, this rationalisation of Guy by no means creates a simplistic film or narration. Guy still carries his moral guilt, although he is not physically culpable, and Hitchcock establishes a richness of narration which implicates not only Bruno and Guy, but also the audience. The intrusion of the ‘Real’, apparent in the glasses and the cigarette lighter, can be seen elsewhere in the virtuoso and challenging film-making. This draws attention to itself, thus creating an ironic
position from which we can both enter the film and judge it from a distance. The tennis match, where Bruno
appears uncannily immobile whilst all the other spectators move their heads from side to side, is an example of
this. We know this is not verisimilitude, and yet it seems so psychologically true that we get both a comic and a
horrible shock. The carousel, which spins at an insane and unrealistic, provokes a fetishistic reaction “I
know very well...but”, allowing us, perhaps, something similar to the ‘irritation’ we experience in the novel,
where we are completely absorbed in the story and yet know it to be entertainment.

The Feminine in Strangers on a Train (N) and (F)

I have argued that one difference between Strangers on a Train (N) and Strangers on a Train (F) is the
different attitude of Guy and Bruno to women. In the book, women are already lost to the men. Something in
their pre-Oedipal pasts has placed them as un-phallic, and never able to gain the love they need. In the film, this
attitude changes to a phallic disavowal: Guy does not undergo phallic loss, and Bruno disavows it by murder and
then subsequent hysteria. This seems to be repeating the pattern in Don’t Look Now where in the book John
suffers from a narcissistic crisis where he is incapable of feeling loved by Laura and where in the film, the
Oedipus complex is disavowed and John becomes a victim of feminine malevolence, embodied by the dwarf. It
seems to me to be possible that this pattern is somehow connected with female writing (particularly works
written before the Women’s Liberation Movement, in a society where women’s activity was frowned upon), as
perhaps the Oedipal pattern described in the book conforms more to a resolution of the Oedipus Complex of a
girl, where she finds, at the intervention of the father, that neither she nor her mother have the phallus. This
sense of loss stays with the girl throughout life and often creates a tortured love-hate mother daughter
relationship, because neither of them have access to the power and public participation that the NAME-OF-
THE-FATHER lends the boy. Strangers on a Train (N) is written centred around male characters and Patricia
Highsmith wrote in Plotting and Writing Suspense Fiction

women are not so active as men, and not so daring. I realise that their activities need not be
physical ones and that as motivating forces they may well be ahead of the men, but I tend to
think of women as being pushed by people and circumstances instead of pushing, and more apt
to say, “I can’t” than “I will” or “I’m going to”. 49

This comment does seem to bear out the novel which treats the women as reactants in Guy and Bruno’s story
rather than as agents determining events. However, in the film, women do become agents. Barbara, who bears
the desire that so ‘unmans’ Bruno, uncovers Bruno’s guilty secret and enables Anne, who has more information
about Miriam’s connection to the glasses, to work out the link between Bruno and Miriam’s murder. Also Anne,
who is not burdened by the film with desire - her relationship with Guy seems almost boringly lacking in
eroticism - takes over as the central character after Guy discovers that Bruno has murdered Miriam. The film
becomes increasingly focalised through Anne - at the tennis party, she is the figure around which the geography
is structured, by her looks we know where everyone is - and this is continued at the party, where her looks link
Bruno and Guy, Bruno and her father, and Bruno and Barbara. She has a mini *Suspicion*-like Gothic story
devoted to herself, based on her initial suspicion of Guy - is he a murderer? - and her visit to Bruno's house to
plead on Guy's behalf, focalises the story on her, and generates interest in her confused emotions about Guy’s
potential guilt, or Bruno's evil, and her decision about what to do, which Hitchcock signifies through a close-up
of her face. She also seems to take up Bruno's function in the novel as Guy’s externalised guilt; a guilt which
would otherwise disappear from the film. When she forces Guy to confess that Bruno killed Miriam, the scene is
outside her apartment, at night, staged very similarly to the scene where Bruno presents Guy with Miriam’s
glasses, proving his involvement. Anne becomes Guy's good ego-ideal, instead of Bruno, who is his worst self.
It seems that the penalty for allowing women to become part of the symbolic, to become agents, and cease to be
feminine 'gaps', is that they then embody a castrating threat towards the men, causing hysterical gender panic.

**Conclusion:**

The “Implied Author” and the performance of sexual difference

The case studies of *Don’t Look Now* and *Strangers on a Train* have yielded readings which
demonstrate that each text enacts a unique and idiosyncratic performance of sexual difference and sexuality. I
have sought to demonstrate that these readings are based on a close analysis which uses psychoanalysis to reveal
the characters' approach to sexual difference and the narration's attitude towards these characters. Thus, the
analyses reveal the “implied author” as an enunciating position which inevitably articulates an attitude towards
male and female characters, desire, sexuality and sexual difference itself. This is the voice of the text vis-à-vis
sexual difference. A connection has not yet been established between the implied author and any embodied
persons who work on the artistic production of novel or film. Nevertheless, such a performance of sexual
difference which is both conscious and unconscious would seem to emanate from a person or persons, or at the
very least, be a speech act of a “person-like” order. In order to explore the relationship of the implied author as
sexual agent and subject of sexual difference, I will thus return to a consideration of the speech act to ask about
the agency of the text and to ask about the role of the subject, receiver and context. Using Lacan’s theory of
“The Four Discourses” I will look at the implied author as agent of discourse. Lacan used the concept of “The
Four Discourses” to theorise the role of the unconscious and the split subject in the speech act. The role of the
unconscious in asking the classic questions “What Sex am I?” and “Am I Alive or Dead?” reveals it as an agency which can be active in novels and films, particularly in thrillers which are preoccupied with these questions in their plots and characters. As understood through Lacan’s theory, the individual performance of sexual difference manifest in Don’t Look Now and Strangers on a Train reveals the texts as interrogating these questions from a specifically gendered position and also reveals a connection between the gender of the implied author and the gender of the embodied author(s) of the texts.

1 Truffaut, François Hitchcock by Truffaut: The definitive study (Paladin, Revised Edition 1986), 293.
2 Highsmith, Patricia Strangers on a Train (1950), (Penguin, 1974), 163.
4 Highsmith published Strangers on a Train after her first novel, a lesbian romance called Carol, was published under a pseudonym. I consider Highsmith’s self censorship in relationship to the representation of lesbianism in more detail later in this chapter.
6 Freud, Sigmund “The Uncanny” (S.E., Vol XVII, 1919), 245.
9 Freud, Sigmund “The Ego and the Id” (S.E. XIX, 1923), 17.
12 Laplanche and Pontalis The Language of Psychoanalysis.
13 Freud, Sigmund “The Ego and the Id”, 56.
14 Freud, Sigmund “The Ego and the Id”, 59.
15 Highsmith, Patricia Strangers on a Train, 157.
16 Highsmith, Patricia Strangers on a Train, 204.
17 Highsmith, Patricia Strangers on a Train, 274.
18 Patricia Highsmith Strangers on a Train, 60.
20 Price Hitchcock and Homosexuality, 26.
22 Price Hitchcock and Homosexuality, 25.
23 Freud, Sigmund “Some Neurotic Mechanisms in Jealousy, Paranoia and Homosexuality” (S.E. IX, 1924), 232.
24 Cowie, Elizabeth Representing the Woman: Cinema and Psychoanalysis (MacMillan Press, 1994), 139.
31 Highsmith, Patricia Carol (Penguin 1984).
32 I enclose a synopsis of Carol as Appendix A, to demonstrate the straightforward critique of patriarchy portrayed in the book.
33 Wood Hitchcock’s Films Revisited, 96.
34 Highsmith, Patricia *Strangers on a Train*, 37.
35 Highsmith, Patricia *Strangers on a Train*, 37.
36 Highsmith, Patricia *Strangers on a Train*, 86.
37 Freud “The Ego and The Id”, 52.
39 Freud “The Ego and The Id”, 34.
40 Highsmith, Patricia *Strangers on a Train*, 164.
41 Freud “The Ego and The Id”, 33.
42 Highsmith, Patricia *Strangers on a Train*, 57.
43 Highsmith, Patricia *Strangers on a Train*, 204.
46 Bruno’s super-ego in *Strangers on a Train* (F) does not manifest itself, as Freud describes in *The Ego and the Id*, as an aural command to do something, or refrain from doing something, but as Hitchcock’s god-like observer, judging Bruno without his knowledge.
47 Žižek, Slavoj *Looking Awry*, 88.
48 Highsmith, Patricia *Strangers on a Train*, 223.
CHAPTER FOUR:

Lacan's Theory of the Four Discourses and The Sixth Sense

The discussions of Don't Look Now and Strangers on a Train have investigated the characters, narrative and narration of each film and novel to explore how they portray sexual difference and sexuality. Each text has a particular conceptualisation of sexual difference which is manifest in the characters and the narration, and which I have subjected to psychoanalytic analysis. What has emerged from the discussion has been a concern across the texts with the question of sexual difference, and the portrayal of hysterical or hystericised characters. Although each text displays a unique performance of sexuality and sexual difference, there is a movement from critique of the male characters in the female written books to a parallel but asymmetrical hystericising critique of the female characters in the male directed films. Thus the claim that men 'write' differently from women is supported by the analyses. In this chapter I examine the psychoanalytic theoretical framework which supports these differences, but which explains them not as differences of gender but in terms of the breakdown of gender in differently expressed male and female hysteria. How might Lacan's Theory of the Four Discourses and in particular his concept of the Discourse of the Hysteric help us to understand the hysteria in Don't Look Now and Strangers on a Train? In the first part of this chapter, I explain Lacan's Theory of the Four Discourses illustrating it with reference to the film The Sixth Sense (M. Night Shyalaman, 1999). The Sixth Sense is an example which enables me to demonstrate Lacan's discourse theory, and is itself not an adaptation but based on an original screenplay by male writer/director Shyalaman. My analysis will therefore not attempt to explore the gendered performance of sexual difference in the film, but will attempt to read the film through Lacan's discourse theory and illuminate both the theory and the film. The film analysis will be followed by a discussion of how the Four Discourses might add to an understanding of gendered authorship in relationship to the hysteria found in the film adaptations of the thrillers already considered. This discussion will also lead me to a consideration of how hysteria, as a discourse produced through authorship, intervenes in the relay of these texts, emerging as a production of the relationship of writer and adapter, and writer/director and spectator.
Applying Lacan’s Theory of the Four Discourses to *The Sixth Sense*

Lacan’s four discourses were primarily designed as tools for understanding the process of the psychoanalytic session. They comprise a model of how analysts and analysands may take up different subject positions in the session and how these positions illuminate both what is being conveyed through the communication between analyst and analysand and also what is being repressed, what fails to be communicated, and what is at stake for the individuals communicating in this particular way. The Four Discourses also enable a political analysis of the act of communication between two people and of the relationship between that and the psychoanalytic condition of a particular individual. They can therefore be applied in all circumstances, not just that of the psychoanalytic session. The discourses comprise the four types of social bond which can and are taken up by all people at some time. They do not indicate pathological conditions, but rather tendencies, particular approaches towards others, towards oneself, and towards knowledge, which may be weighted in particular individuals towards one discourse rather than another. The Four Discourses are the Discourse of the Master, the Discourse of the University, the Discourse of the Hysteric, and the Discourse of the Analyst. In order to explain how they work, it is necessary to explain how they all relate to Lacan’s model of communication, and then to each other. I shall do this using as an example the film *The Sixth Sense*. The film is about the relationship between a psychologist, Malcolm Crowe (Bruce Willis), and a troubled boy, Cole Sear (Haley Joel Osment), who believes that he can communicate with the dead. In the course of treating the boy, the psychologist relieves the boy’s anxiety by encouraging him to listen to the desires of the ghosts he encounters and to carry out their wishes as far as possible. At first believing that the ghosts are manifestations of the boy’s unconscious, the psychologist comes eventually to believe that the ghosts are real, and is finally helped by the boy to discover that he himself is dead. This revelation enables him to exorcise his unresolved relationship with his still living wife and return to the dead in peace. The film uncannily mirrors Lacan’s Four Discourses and relates them closely to Lacan’s own thematic concerns – the relationship between people and language, language and communication, language and desire.
Lacan introduced the concept of the Four Discourses in 1972-3, in Seminar 20, and whilst the Seminar has only recently been translated into English, the Four Discourses have for some time been the subject of explanatory books and articles, which apply them to matters of culture and psychoanalysis. According to Dylan Evans, Lacan defined Discourse as a “social bond constituted in language”, and used the term to stress the “trans-individual nature of language”. He has a basic model of communication into which the Four Discourses fall, and he writes this as the equation

\[
\begin{align*}
\uparrow & \quad \text{The agent} & \quad \rightarrow & \quad \text{The other} \\
\text{truth} & \quad // & \quad \text{production}
\end{align*}
\]

This equation expresses not the success of communication but its inevitable failure. This is not because content cannot be communicated between human beings but because human interaction contains a surplus which is communicated regardless of what we want to communicate. Thus, what we say includes more than what we “say”. Paul Verhaeghe explains this seeming paradox by explaining that if communication were successful we would all stop talking, there would be no need to go on trying to communicate with each other, and that it is because we don’t understand each other that we go on talking. It is this psychoanalytic insight, and the space it leaves for the human subject, which distinguishes this model from a purely linguistic analysis of the speech act.

On the top line are the two people engaged in the communication – the agent, who speaks, and the other, who listens. In a two way conversation, the conversationalists may change positions in the equation, but not necessarily in an obvious or symmetrical way; and Lacan’s Discourse theory enables us to understand the nature of the relay of these changes between communicants. Underneath the lines are the hidden values at stake in the communication. So, the agent speaks, but he/she is not a “sovereign” subject, in command of his/her own thoughts but the Lacanian split subject, castrated through their use of a trans-individual language which speaks them, but inevitably mis-speaks them. The agent tries to speak their hidden truth emanating from the unconscious, but this can never be expressed in words and always acts as a motivation which elusively travels ahead of the communication. Therefore the “agency” of the agent is an illusion. Lacan calls the agent a “semblance”, a phony, and the truth is both the unconscious of the agent and the inevitable failure of the split subject to integrate with language and with Discourse. As the arrows
indicate, the Discourse travels in a broken circle, from truth, at its start, to production at its end. The effect of the communication is to produce something in the other, but this production, the effect of the agency of the speaker, cannot be the product of the “truth” which starts the chain, because the speech act will inevitably be a failure. The truth cannot be communicated by the agent to the other, and therefore the production will be something which is a misunderstanding of the agency of the subject. The example Verhaeghe gives is of a father who tells his son “to work hard at school, and as a result he produces one failure after another”. This example shows that the position of production in the equation would also be the position of the repressed split subject of the other. If the son produces one failure after another, this is not only due to the father as split subject, unable to communicate his desire to the son to do well, but also due to the son as split subject, where the father’s communication causes a split in the son, a castration. This result does not produce the desire of the son, but produces another communication - “failure” - where the son is mis-represented to himself, as well as to the father. The diagram in this case would move in both directions, creating an oscillation, a standing wave, where both father and son reinforce their failure to produce proof of their love for each other.

Lacan’s original equation, therefore, shows the incompatibility of one person’s truth with the other’s, and the clearest example that Lacan gives of this incompatibility between people is the relation between lovers. When Lacan writes that “there is no sexual relation”, he means not only that the sexuality is not inscribed into the symbolic and is a fantasmatic relation, but also that there is no way of one partner proving his/her love to the other, or demanding back that proof. And the most complete version of Lacan’s equation contains the inscription of this failure, both between the agent and the other and between truth and production, thus:-

impossibility

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\uparrow
truth \quad \text{impossibility} \\
\downarrow
\end{array}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\uparrow
\text{The agent} \quad \rightarrow \quad \text{The other}
\downarrow
\end{array}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\uparrow
\text{production} \\
\downarrow
\end{array}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\uparrow
\text{truth} \\
\downarrow
\end{array}
\]
So far, I have been discussing Lacan’s equation of communication and the inevitable failure of communication within it. However, the failure is different in each of the different Four Discourses. Lacan provides algorithms, terms which he has developed elsewhere in his theories and which are superimposed upon the equation always in the same order, but starting from different places in the equation. The algorithms are:

- $S_1 = \text{the Master signifier}$
- $S_2 = \text{knowledge (savoir)}$
- $S = \text{the subject}$
- $a = \text{surplus enjoyment}$

In each Discourse different terms are placed in the position of repressed truth, and in the place of production, in the place of the agent and the other, and therefore there are different places for impossibility and inability, different aspects of Discourse get repressed or fail to be communicated with the different Four Discourses.

The Discourse of the Master

The Discourse of the Master is the Discourse which most closely maps onto the equation of communication, and is shown thus:

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
\text{impossibility} & \text{\textbullet} & \text{\textbullet} \\
\uparrow & S_1 & \rightarrow & S_2 \\
\downarrow & S & \text{//} & a
\end{array}
\]

\text{inability}

In the place of the agent is the Master signifier ($S_1$). The Master signifier represents two things. It is the signifier that represents the subject. It is the “I” that enables the subject to be represented in speech, and is therefore a unified representative which represses the split subject. It is also the Master signifier in that it is “point du capiton”, a quilting point, a guarantee of meaning for the rest of the signifying chain. It is the function of the leader or ruler who makes a decision, perhaps in war, perhaps between competing claims
Plate VII:

The Sixth Sense

1. Malcolm plays "guess the problem" with Cole (stills 1 - 3)

2. Cole on his own. At the mercy of the "Praying Mantis" (stills 4 - 5)

3. Malcolm plays "guess the problem"

4. Cole employs Discourse of the Hysteric, when seeing "dead people" (stills 6 - 8)

5. 6 - 8. Malcolm plays "guess the problem"

10. Malcolm offers Cole the Discourse of the Analyst, reassuring him and enabling him to find out he is dead. (12 - 14)

12. Cole offers Malcolm the Discourse of the Master, reassuring him and enabling Malcolm to surmount his trauma and find out what the ghosts want is.

11. Malcolm offers Cole the stone (10 - 11) out of the stone.
and potential solutions, whose guarantee as leader enables that decision to be followed. Slavoj Žižek cites the example of Winston Churchill

In the very last pages of his monumental *Second World War*, Winston Churchill ponders the enigma of a political decision: after the specialists (economic and military analysts, psychologists, meteorologists...) propose their multiple, elaborated, and refined analyses, somebody must assume the simple and for that reason most difficult act of transposing this complex multitude – where for every reason *for* there are two reasons *against*, and vice versa – into a simple "Yes" or "No" – we shall attack, we continue to wait...This gesture that can never be fully grounded in reasons, is that of a Master.8

In the place of the other is knowledge (S₂), which can be thought of as the chain of signifiers necessary to create meaning, but whose meaning is guaranteed by (S₁). S₂ can therefore be thought of in Hegelian terms, as the slave to S₁'s Master, labouring on his/her behalf and guaranteeing the Master existence through the slave's knowledge and acquiescence. It is also the model of the father and child, the Oedipus complex, enacted through the discipline of the father (S₁) and the guarantee of the father's power through knowledge, (S₂). It is in this version that the other terms in the equation become most meaningful. The split subject ($) is repressed under the Name of the Father, the signerifier that signifies the authority of the father to the child. Surplus enjoyment (a) is produced by the child. This surplus enjoyment (a) is both the Hegelian/ Marxist surplus production which gets appropriated by the Master as profit and also, psychoanalytically, Lacan's objet petit (a) the symbolic precipitate of castration which is a signerifier of the human being's original loss of plenitude and their desire to regain it, which propels us to desire rather than drive. The objet petit (a) is potentially an access to the death drive, the real, and our defense from it, as the obscure object of desire. The surplus enjoyment produced in the Oedipus complex is the desire to kill the father, hence the son who keeps failing his exams. As the barrier of impossibility separates the split subject of the father and the surplus desire of the son, this desire can never be acknowledged by the father. The father, repressing his own surplus desire, cannot recognise it in the son.

It was the film *The Sixth Sense*, in its dramatisation of the Oedipus complex and the psychoanalytic situation, which enabled me to understand the Four Discourses. In the film, the Master Discourse is enounced by the film in its narration and at moments in the Discourse of the character of the psychologist, Malcolm Crowe (Bruce Willis). The narration of the film shows us - mostly - what we believe to be true in the story. We take on trust that the film-makers are enacting the Master Discourse,
placing in front of us their vision, and this vision produces in us a surplus affect (a), which the film-makers attempt to marshal through their control of the narrative and narration. The film, in fact, has a “shock” ending, where the audience discover at the same time as Malcolm that he has been a ghost all along. This ending reveals that what we have been subjected to has been unreliable narration, a narration which leads us to misinterpret the events we are watching. However, this revelation, this “shock” ending only works, only convinces, because the film-makers up to this point speak the Master Discourse to evince our trust. Meanwhile, they endeavour to eliminate any traces of the split in their collective “authorial” personality, eliminating any unconscious slips or mistakes which expose the making of the film, and which might enable us to guess the ending ahead of time. Within the film’s diegesis and the characters’ own discourse, the Master Discourse is rare, and actually quite difficult to identify. Cole’s mother, Lynn (Toni Collette), tries to use the discourse to challenge Cole’s behaviour, and to make him behave himself. The surplus affect (a) of this challenge is that Cole’s ghosts, his “visitors”, intervene to make matters worse, to throw objects around the kitchen, and to ensure that Cole’s grandmother’s brooch appears to have been stolen by Cole. Because Cole’s ghosts, his (a) refuse Lynn’s authority as mother, it appears that Cole also refuses it. Lynn therefore cannot assume the Master signifier, and her split subject ($) comes into the place where authority should be and she finds it hard to keep her control. Malcolm seldom appears to use the Discourse of the Master, and yet his gravitas, his ability to take responsibility for Cole’s condition, to accept Cole looking to him for reassurance, makes his adoption, at least momentarily, of the Master Discourse at a key moment in the film, part of his successful treatment of Cole. Malcolm accepts Cole’s need for a father figure - a person “supposed to know” - and offers himself as father surrogate. The guarantee Malcolm offers is both his transference relationship to the boy and his status as a psychologist, a head-doctor, a Master signifier of his ability to heal. The product which is produced by this encounter is both consistent with the objet petit (a) of the boy, as Oedipal figure and as patient. As Oedipal son, Cole acts in the school play as King Arthur. A reassuring look between him and Malcolm occurs, and he is able to perform and to pull the sword out of the stone. He is therefore able to demonstrate phallic Mastery as well as entering the symbolic (The Court of King Arthur) with authority. He is also able to show up the child who has been bullying him, who is a “would be” actor and whom he outperforms. Cole is now able to function as a capable human being, but the excess (a) can be seen in Cole’s (and the film-makers’
investment in the Oedipal fantasy of Mastery and phallicism embodied in the Arthurian legend and in the competitive success against his rival, the other young actor. When Malcolm takes responsibility and tells Cole to listen and obey his ghosts, he finally puts Cole to work, producing both the intended result - Cole’s cure, and its unintended by-product: Cole also cures the problems of the ghosts and becomes a psychotherapist to the undead, including eventually Malcolm. However, Malcolm's communications to Cole are not, even at this moment, mainly those of the Master Discourse, but include the other three Discourses. He does not rely on his status as a psychologist to order Cole or to impose a Master signifier upon him. He makes no demand of Cole. Rather, he uses the Discourse of the University (see below) to enter onto a journey with Cole that will produce the knowledge to cure both Cole and himself. As a surrogate “transference” rather than real father figure, he is also offering Cole his own desire to be fathered, and his Oedipal Mastery can therefore also be seen as an example of the Discourse of the Analyst. In the course of his relationship with Cole, Malcolm gains Cole’s trust, and this exercise of trust includes revealing his own insecurities ($) - his failure to cure his previous patient, and his search for the truth (S₂) which can cure Cole (a) through the use of knowledge. This is the Hysterical Discourse. Over the course of the film Malcolm’s therapy is complicated and his discourse, as I shall demonstrate, is mainly that of the University, and the Hysteric. The narrative surprise and value of the film is that the Discourse of the Analyst which might naturally be expected to be inhabited by Malcolm in the place of agent is actually reversed, Cole acting as analyst to Malcolm.

The Discourse of the University.

If all the terms of the Master Discourse are rotated anti-clockwise, by one quarter, the equation for the Discourse of the University is produced.

\[
\begin{align*}
\downarrow & \quad \downarrow \\
\text{impossibility} & \\
S₂ & \rightarrow a \\
S₁ & // \\
\text{inability} & \\
\text{inability} & \\
\end{align*}
\]

In the position of the agent is now knowledge, supported in its validity by the suppressed power of the Master signifier, under the bar. Verhaeghe gives the example of Lacan himself relying on Freud as a
Master signifier, his return to Freud guaranteeing his knowledge⁹. As this equation shows S, as the hidden source of power behind knowledge, it essentially exposes the political nature of knowledge, which can only ever be relative, supported by some kind of ideological stance. Because the pursuit of knowledge never actually leads to wisdom but only to the knowledge that one needs to know more, in the position of the other is (a), which in this case is the unknowable object of academic study. The product of the pursuit of knowledge is precisely the humility in the face of the unknowability of the world faced by the true student, hence $. In The Sixth Sense, I have argued that Malcolm uses the Discourse of the University, i.e. his psychoanalytic knowledge and experience, to find out about Cole (later he and Cole enter into a shared Discourse of the University to find out about the ghosts), and therefore Cole becomes objet (a) for Malcolm. This is perhaps a special case of the Discourse of the University, of a person occupying (a), although it no doubt occurs in all psychoanalysis where the analyst is trying to diagnose the analysand. The complication is that the production ($) is both knowledge that Malcolm learns about himself and the knowledge that Cole produces about him, which is again placed in the position of the other, and becomes (a), the surplus object of knowledge for which he must again search for a solution. For example, Malcolm visits Cole in his flat, and plays a mind reading game with him in order to try and gain the boy’s trust. The rules of this game are that Malcolm will tell Cole something he has deduced about him, and if Malcolm is correct, Cole will take one step forward, and if Malcolm is wrong, Cole will step backwards. At first Malcolm’s deductions prove correct - Cole does have a secret, which he doesn’t want to tell Malcolm - but eventually Malcolm overstretches himself, making guesses about Cole that are inaccurate. He finds out what he does not know, and is faced with his own inadequacy ($) in the face of Cole’s problems, as the boy retreats out of the room away from him. However, he also finds out some information about Cole; that far from being an exemplary schoolboy, well behaved and studious, Cole is extremely disturbed, and has been drawing pictures of men with screwdrivers through their necks, upsetting his mother and his schoolteachers. This then becomes his next dilemma, the next (a), the problem he must solve. However, there is also another product of this encounter, which is Cole’s knowledge. Cole learns from the game about Malcolm, and tells him “You are a nice man, but you can’t help me”.¹⁰ Cole’s response can be thought of as an exercise of the Hysterical Discourse (discussed below), where Cole looks to Malcolm for an impossible answer and is then disappointed with the only answer Malcolm can give. However, it is also
possible to interpret Cole’s reaction in a more positive light: Cole telling Malcolm that he does not trust his knowledge ($S_2$), but he trusts him as split subject ($S$), he is a “nice man”. Cole does not wish to undermine Malcolm as master, but still wishes to accept his authority. This again, is the Discourse of the University, because it relies on Mastery under the left hand bar to guarantee it, but does not enforce mastery as agency. Malcolm’s task is to take Cole’s liking for him, his accepting of his ($S$), and turn this into a Master signifier, so that Cole will accept his knowledge and advice as well, and come to trust him. This he does later in the film, by telling Cole the secret of his sadness and revealing his past failure with his previous patient, thus creating enough trust for Cole to reciprocate and reveal his own secret. Malcolm tells Cole about his $S$, which is his inability to cure his last patient. However, he does not put $S$ in the place of agency - this would create the Discourse of the Hysteric, demanding a solution from the other. He narrates his split subjectivity, presenting the information in a calm way, within the Discourse of the University, not asking Cole to solve his problems for him, but presenting his secret so that is knowledge for Cole, guaranteed by Malcolm’s position as Master signifier, under the line of the equation, so that Malcolm can be trusted. For Cole, Malcolm’s secret appears as his own surplus enjoyment ($a$). If Malcolm has a secret which he can reveal, and can show his vulnerability without destroying himself, then Cole can also reveal his secret without being destroyed.

In this short scene, it is possible to see how complex the interaction between two people might be, and how it might be impossible to reduce the Discourse to one particular type, or even perhaps to analyse it. However, over the film as a whole, it is possible to see how Malcolm’s Discourse towards Cole is largely the Discourse of the University. The film is a case of “physician, heal thyself”, and Malcolm’s exploration of the mystery of Cole leads to his knowledge that he is actually not all powerful, a human being with agency. He is actually a ghost, his split subjectivity arising from the unresolved tensions and problems he has left on dying. Only by resolving these unresolved tensions and problems can he gain peace and achieve symbolic death.
Discourse of the Hysteric.

A quarter turn clockwise of the terms in the Discourse of the Master leads to the Discourse of the Hysteric.

\[ \text{impossibility} \]

\[ \uparrow \quad \underline{S} \quad \rightarrow \quad S_1 \]

\[ \underline{a} \quad // \quad \underline{S_2} \quad \downarrow \]

\[ \text{inability} \]

This Discourse can, perhaps, be best understood with reference to hysteria, but it is important to understand that although linked, the Discourse of the Hysteric is by no means synonymous with hysteria: hysterics can communicate in other discourses, and non-hysterics can communicate in the Discourse of the Hysteric. In the position of the agent is the split subject. In the case of the hysteric, this would be their symptom, a somatic display of psychological distress, or perhaps just an unresolvable problem. However, the true agency which speaks the Hysteric’s Discourse is the subject’s desire (a), hidden under the bar. The split subject is the Oedipal subject who has achieved speech through castration. The loss of plenitude, of potential, which has come about through speech and through the taking up of a position on one side or another of the sexual divide, becomes repressed, forms the unconscious; and because the subject can only communicate through language, object petit (a) becomes a sliding metonymy of desire destined never to be fulfilled, but ever related to the primal moment, the trauma where this desire was created. This is why Lacan called the object (a) “the object-cause of desire”. The Discourse of the hysteric places the split subject (S) in the position of agency, and demands the object-cause of that split from the Master signifier, or the other in that position. Thus the Master signifier is the signifier which causes the split, representing the authority of society and language which the subject must obey. The hysteric at the position of agency demands that the other will reconstitute his/her subjectivity as whole, and will know the object-cause of their desire. An example of this might be the parent who disciplines the child without the child knowing why, and therefore the child demands unconditional love from the parent, which the parent cannot supply because they do not know the cause-object of the child’s desire. Cole asks several times of his mother whether she sees him as a freak, and hidden beneath this question is the demand that she loves him, bad
behaviour and all... His mother, replies “Of course I don’t think you’re a freak. Look at my face. Can I think anything bad about you?” However, her face clearly betrays signs of her doubt, her inability to support Cole in his bad behaviour with her uncritical and total love. It is impossible for the person in the position of $S_1$ to support the hysteric, they can only offer practical help to solve the hysteric’s problem, a solution which leads to knowledge $S_2$ in the position of production. They cannot provide them with the petit object (a), because they cannot know what it is and because they are themselves a divided subject. Thus, the knowledge obtained by the Discourse of the Hysteric is not only the knowledge which is provided by the other as Master signifier, feeding the hysteric knowledge in order to help them but it is also the failings of the other, their split. The hysteric always hystericises the other, questioning away the other’s authority. This happens frequently in The Sixth Sense, not only to Cole’s mother, but also to the teacher, who becomes exposed as a childhood stutterer when he tries to confront Cole and correct him. The effect of the Discourse of the Hysteric, which is to undermine the Master signifier, gives it power as a political discourse, or a discourse of rebellion. Verhaeghe draws attention to the way that revolutions obey the Discourse of the Hysteric, how people construct a hero and then destroy him. This is why revolutions tend to be endless, replacing one tyrant with another. Nevertheless, the dispossessed, those who feel they cannot speak with the authority of the Master signifier, may resort to the Discourse of the Hysteric to gain political ends, and this has certainly been true of women throughout history.

The Discourse of the Hysteric is the discourse of the child as agent in the Oedipal drama, and the particular insights of exploring this discourse are that the subject’s basic fantasy becomes exposed and, as Lacan says, “takes part in the conversation”. Unlike the Master Discourse, where $S // a$, and the Master’s hidden subjectivity is completely incompatible with his/her fantasy which is suppressed, in the Discourse of the hysteric the subject’s fantasy comes to the fore. The question that the child asks to solve the inscrutability of the adults’ desires is the basic question “What am I for you?” The terror of the adult’s unknown desire is what allies the situation of children with that of neurotics. Colette Soler eloquently cites Lacan’s parable of the preying mantis.

Imagine a giant female praying mantis approaching you while you are wearing a mask without knowing which kind of mask you are wearing? If you happen to be wearing the mask of a male praying mantis without knowing it, you have a reason to feel angst... If you are face to face with this praying mantis and you are wearing a mask
without knowing what the mask is, you will feel angst because you don’t know what you are...The obsessional and the hysteric are at this precise limit.  

These are the terrifying issues which put children at the risk of parental desire and neurotics at the risk of the unknowable desire of the other, which may be sexual or merely just consuming. Lacan describes the hysteric as negotiating these questions through interrogating paternal law, asking her father, the other, these questions about herself, “What sex am I”?, “Am I or might I not be”? However, it is usually thought that the hysteric predominantly asks the question “What sex am I”, whereas the obsessional neurotic predominantly asks the question “Am I or might I not be?” Both Lacan and Freud considered hysteria and obsessional neurosis linked, brother and sister neurosis, where obsessional neurosis is a dialect of hysteria. This explanation of the Master signifier, which appears to the neurotic as an all-powerful primal force, would account for the similarity. The gendering of hysteria and obsessional neurosis, women predominantly suffering from the former and men from the latter, was first observed by Freud and was one of the most important early clinical observations of psychology.

Sexual experiences of early childhood have the same significance in the aetiology of obsessional neurosis as they have in that of hysteria. Here, however, it is no longer a question of sexual passivity but acts of aggression carried out with pleasure and of pleasurable participation in sexual acts - that is to say, of sexual activity. This difference in the aetiological circumstances is bound up with the fact that obsessional neurosis shows a visible preference for the male sex. In all my cases of obsessional neurosis, moreover, I have found a substratum of hysterical symptoms which could be traced back to a scene of sexual passivity that preceded the pleasurable action.

Colette Soler explains the preference of women for inflecting this question in the direction of “What sex am I?” and for men, the question inflected as “Am I or am I not?” through Lacan’s observation that where there is no signifier of femininity in the unconscious, the non-existent binary of masculine/feminine becomes represented in fantasy by a signifier of masculinity as activity, and femininity as lack, as passivity. Lacan’s thesis is that there is a prohibited signifier for masculinity, the phallus, which is a signifier that no one man can take up, through threat of castration, but an impossible signifier for femininity, which inscribes it outside the symbolic, hence the famous phrase “Women are not-all”. Lacan’s contradictory and paradoxical formulae of ‘sexuation’, which he expresses in Seminar XX Encore, and which are explained in depth in Joan Copjec’s Read My Desire where neither side of the equation of masculinity or femininity adds up to an inhabitable definition, explains for Soler why women might be more anxious about the question of their sex, when there is no positive signifier of it and so they might not know what
“mask” they are wearing for the praying mantis; whereas men tend to be more worried about the general question of their existence. Joan Copjec, in her complex argument, further theorises a gendered approach to law and culture whereby women have a different superegoic relationship to men. Female ethics is, from this argument, non-exclusionary but not limitless, whilst male ethics is that of the rule and the exception. Taking Lacan’s controversial pronouncement not as an essential condition of men and women in society, but as a determination of the impossibility of sexual difference in the unconscious, this conceptualisation of hysteria and obsessional neurosis becomes an acute analysis of the condition of men and women in a phallocentric society. The discourses of hysteria and obsessional neurosis - because they are ways of avoiding psychosis, of maintaining communication, however flawed - provide strategies of coping with the exigencies of power and its abuses within society as it is currently constructed. Furthermore, because everyone suffers from a degree of neurosis - true socialisation is impossible - and because this neurosis might be unequally distributed symptomatically between men and women, it might be possible to explore aspects of gender through these discourses.

In *The Sixth Sense*, the discourses of hysteria and obsessional neurosis are inhabited respectively by Cole and Malcolm. Cole is, for most of the film, balanced between psychosis (the manifestation of his ghosts as hallucinations in reality), and neurosis (his inability to fit in at school and his behavioural problems). He has no father to whom he can relate, his biological father having left home, symbolically endowing him with a pair of spectacles with no lenses and a watch which does not work. Cole has no protection against the primal forces of his ghostly world and of the material world he finds it so hard to cope with. He has to confront Soler’s praying mantis wearing a mask, and not knowing what that mask is. When he is first confronted by the ghosts, they address him as Master, thus hystericising him. He has no idea what they want from him, and he is driven into a state of hysterical terror because he does not know how to ask. He knows that they want him for some reason, and his terror only provokes further visitations by the ghosts. The symptom $ that he presents towards the other characters in the film is his consequent distress and misbehaviour caused through these encounters. At school he does not know what is wanted from him either. The teacher, giving a lecture about the history of Philadelphia and the school room, solicits knowledge from the class. Cole finds that the knowledge he provides, his secret knowledge (a),
that the schoolhouse used to be the site of hangings, is not the knowledge that is required, and he is thrown into hysteria, and into producing even more knowledge, against his wishes, as a hysterical symptom, about his teacher’s stutter. This provokes further trouble. With everyone but Malcolm, Cole provokes anxiety, challenges their Mastery, but gains no help with his problems. Nevertheless, the film does not frame Cole’s question as explicitly sexualised, as “Am I a Man or a Woman?” but rather as a generalised hysterical question - “What am I for the Other?”

The Discourse of Obsessional Neurosis does not occupy the same equation as that of the hysteric, and Lacan made no equation for it specifically. This is because, although hysteria and obsessional neurosis are closely linked disorders, the obsessional neurotic does not interrogate the master signifier - he identifies with him as dead. There is therefore a certain degree of disavowal about the discourse of the obsessional neurotic, who might believe he is having a communication when he is not. The writers of “Discourse Structure and Subject Structure in Neurosis” argue that the obsessional neurotic uses the Discourse of the Master, but his position as Master signifier is that of a dead Master signifier, therefore protecting himself from risk. However, where the other is concerned, the obsessional neurotic makes no demands and therefore cannot use the Master Discourse.

\[
\begin{array}{cccc}
\text{impossibility} \\
\uparrow \\
\text{dead } S_1 & \rightarrow & S_2 \\
\downarrow \\
S & \rightarrow & a \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]

inability

This is precisely the position of Malcolm in relation to his wife and to the other living people in the film. He is a classic obsessional neurotic, not knowing whether he is dead or alive, but he does not have to confront this problem because he suppresses it and convinces himself that he is conversing with others, although their replies do not really apply to him. The main characteristic of the obsessional neurotic, that of gaining jouissance from the accumulation of knowledge, of facts - the character traits of what is popularly derided as the ‘nerd’ or the ‘anorak’ - is characterised by an earlier Lacanian equation or
matheme $A \leftarrow [a, a', a"...a"]^{30}$ which shows that the obsessional neurotic is permanently displacing his fantasy, his excess enjoyment, and he does this through the deadening of his own impulses. Thus Malcolm with his wife goes through the gestures of following his daily patterns: he goes down to the cellar, he meets her on her anniversary. He follows the habits of an obsessional neurotic, and these allay his anxiety and never allow him to question why his wife never replies to him, or whether perhaps, he could be dead. Instead he builds up information about her potential lover and spies on them, displaying his jealousy, but also his guilt and impotence: he knows he has lost her to this other man, and he is the outsider throwing stones through the window. However, because there is no discourse of the obsessional neurotic, it is hard to further characterise Malcolm's discourse with his wife because there is no product, no communication. Malcolm’s discourse with Cole is likewise marked by obsessional neurosis. He does not demand from Cole what the other ghosts demand - namely that Cole solves his murder. He does not demand what the other living characters demand - that he behave himself. This is why Cole can accept his help and use him as a conduit to understanding the ghosts. Nevertheless, as psychoanalyst, Malcolm does demand something from Cole - he demands that Cole needs him, and this demand is the demand of the hysteric.

The Discourse of the Hysteric posits an interesting possibility for the question of narration in the film, of whether or not the form of the thriller, the mystery, is actually a hysterical discourse. In a thriller, the film places its split ($) in the position of agency. It poses a question to the viewer, a hermeneutic which is actually motivated by a trauma (a), hidden under the bar, and as a result, the viewer tries to find the solution, the key to the problem, but never does in a successful thriller, because the successful thriller delays this revelation until the denouement, providing shocks, hystericising the viewer. The surprise revelation reinstates the Master Discourse, and the end result for the viewer is then (a), catharsis and relief. A more radical form of $ appearing in the position of agency in a film might be an avant-garde film, where the meaning needs to be determined by the viewer, but cannot be, and therefore provokes an alienated reaction, or an awareness of the device. However, this kind of film might rather be tending towards a psychotic or perverse relationship with the viewer, one where the normal standards of discourse are suspended, and the viewer is provoked to examine their own reactions in order to reflect upon their own
desire. The film would then be adopting the Discourse of the Analyst (see below) in order to provoke a hysterical and then desiring position from the viewer.

**The Discourse of the Analyst.**

The final discourse is the Discourse of the Analyst, which can be found by rotating the Discourse of the Hysteric clockwise by another quarter turn.

\[
\text{impossibility} \\
\uparrow \\
a \longrightarrow \rightarrow \\
S_2 \\
// \\
S_1 \\
\downarrow \\
\text{inability}
\]

In this discourse, which is also the discourse of the pervert, objet (a) is offered to the subject in the position of the agent. The analyst knows what object they are for the other, and offers this object to them. This somewhat paradoxical idea seems to work only if the analyst suppresses their own knowledge of the other, allowing the other to find it out for him/herself. This could be described as the classical psychotherapeutic position of analyst as listener, not adviser. The analyst becomes the person onto whom the analysand projects all their feelings and identifications. The analyst therefore becomes the analysand’s surplus (a), and through the careful questioning of the analyst, the analysand becomes aware of what s/he is doing, and what motivates his or her behaviour, what determines the Master signifier. In *The Sixth Sense* Cole acts as exemplary psychoanalyst for Malcolm. He acts as Malcolm’s surplus object (a). He reminds him of his previous failure with Vincent, and he allows Malcolm another chance to relive the psychoanalytic experience, to come this time to the correct diagnosis, to cure the boy and to redeem himself. He also knows that Malcolm is dead, but he hides this knowledge, only providing Malcolm with a clue, a technique. Cole suggests to Malcolm that he might try talking to his wife (Anna) whilst she is asleep, and then she will be able to communicate with him. This act of talking to Anna produces Malcolm’s Master signifier. He gains the confirmation of her love for him, and realises that he is clinging to a lost love for her. The wedding ring falls from his finger and on looking at the ring still on Anna’s finger Malcolm realises that he has been dead all along. This is perfect psychoanalytic technique. Without actually telling him, Cole has
managed to hystericise Malcolm, to turn him from the discourse of obsessional neurosis to that of hysteria, and to make him realise that what has been motivating him all along has been that he is a ghost.

How useful are the Four Discourses for an understanding of gendered authorship?

The reading of The Sixth Sense which emerges from this analysis using Lacan’s Four Discourses produces the film as a remarkably coherent psychoanalytic narrative which is insightful about the process of analysis, and also aesthetically satisfying. This reading relies on interpreting the world of the ghosts as an alternate symbolic universe, a universe of communication, which both Cole and Malcolm need to join. Cole and Malcolm need to converse in the symbolic language of the dead and the living, and in order to do so, need to resolve their Oedipus complexes through therapy. Cole’s Oedipal trajectory is the reverse of Malcolm’s. Cole needs to join the symbolic of the dead, to understand their communications, in order to join the living, to take part in it and communicate effectively within it. Malcolm, on the other hand, needs to understand the discourse of the living and realise it is not addressed to him, that he is barred from it, in order to enter the world of the dead, about whose communication the living know nothing. The major revelation that this reading produces is that we have not primarily been watching Cole undergoing psychoanalysis, treated by Malcolm, but have actually been watching Malcolm undergoing psychoanalysis, treated by Cole. Without this analysis, and on a first viewing, the spectator would certainly be startled by the shocking revelation at the end of the film that Malcolm has been dead all along, but will not necessarily be aware that what brings on this revelation is Cole’s agency as an analyst, rather than merely Malcolm’s own pursuit of knowledge. The film is primarily focalised through Malcolm: we follow the story mostly through following Malcolm, although we see the ghosts through Cole’s eyes. Because of this, we cannot understand what Cole is feeling about Malcolm, although we have a fair idea about Malcolm’s thoughts about Cole, spoken into his dictaphone or written down in his case notes. The structural analysis revealed by applying the Four Discourses illuminates the characters’ agency, independent of the narration, and the agency of narration vis-à-vis the characters - i.e. why the narration needs to hold back Cole’s insights, and what discourse the narration seeks with the spectator. The discourses thus provide a way of demonstrating how both responsibility and desire are distributed amongst the characters and the narration. A “character
reading” of the same film would not necessarily achieve the same clarity: it might not reveal Cole as the psychoanalyst and agent he proves to be.

Another key insight of the application of Lacan’s Four Discourses is how the reading of *The Sixth Sense* has revealed discourse as relayed between agent and other, and how each discourse depends on both agent and other in the communication, and works in both directions. In circumstances of complex social and aesthetic interaction, discourse acts as a vehicle for the various agencies that Lacan identifies — i.e. hysteria, mastery, knowledge, and insight (the Analytic Discourse) — which are produced through the interaction, both as direct product and as unintended by-product. Thus, the hysteric produces knowledge, but also hysteria, in the other, and the other then has to take up one of the Four Discourses in their role as agent. Nevertheless, the relay of discourse is not merely infectious or determined — what discourse a person takes up depends on more than their immediate context, but on a complex performative which is their psychoanalytic subjectivity. Thus, there is a possibility not only of examining characters in relationship to each other and to the narration in a film or book, but also of exploring the relay between novel and film adaptation. It is thus possible to determine whether the book’s hysteria produces a hysteria in the film and how these hysterias are differently manifest or gendered. It also enables an exploration of how the Lacanian discourse employed by the text relates to the other determinants and contexts of textual production (historical, aesthetic, national). In this way, I shall attempt to explore the agency of the authors of the thrillers within this thesis, as psychoanalytic subjects of discourse, employed in the complex interaction which texts enact with their contexts.

The question of gendered agency is raised in *The Sixth Sense* through Malcolm’s typically male symptomatology of obsessional neurosis and Cole’s hysteria. In my analysis of *Mrs Dalloway* (Chapter Six) I discuss hysteria as a historically variable malady, one which is neither exclusive to women nor expressed in the same way across time. The paralysis and conversion hysteria of the nineteenth century is superseded by the shell-shock of the early twentieth and the post-traumatic stress disorder of the late twentieth century. The First World War created a generation of shell-shock victims and a new way of seeing hysteria as suffered by men and women alike. Thus different symptomatology is not, of itself, a sign
of differences between the genders. Women and men alike may suffer from obsessional neurosis or hysteria. Where the Four Discourses are helpful for an understanding of gender is that the equation for the Discourse of the Hysteric operates differently for men and women: different genders occupy the position of the Other, the receiver of discourse. Lacan's equation of sexuation explains how men and women take up an asymmetrical position towards the symbolic, and this asymmetry is displayed in the Discourse of the Hysteric:- for men, in the position of the Other is Woman (the representative of mysterious femininity), but for Woman, in the position of Other is both Man and Woman (woman are strangers to both femininity which does not exist in the symbolic, and Men who are the Other Sex). In this way it is possible to see how the Discourse of the Hysteric as employed by female writers might be different from the Discourse of the Hysteric applied by male writers, and to look at the relay between them.

Applying the Four Discourses to Thrillers

It is argued above that the Discourse of Hysteria problematises the relationship between the subject and their experience of sexual difference, raising the question "What Sex am I?" By looking at this discourse as it appears in Don't Look Now (N & F) and Strangers on a Train (N & F), I shall first demonstrate how the particular subjects of the texts - the characters, the narration - ask this particular question. I will then ask whether the Other in these texts is addressed as a man or a woman, and suggest that the Discourse of the Hysteric can be read asymmetrically with woman being the Other of the films, and both man and woman being the Other of the books. I look at the relay in these texts and how the Discourse of the Hysteric is passed from character to character and between the characters and the narration (see Chapter 4: Appendix A, for a table of the characters and their discourse in both films). What I am identifying as discourses in Lacan's sense are distributed amongst the characters and the narration in less obvious ways than has been demonstrated with the analysis of The Sixth Sense. Nevertheless, the texts display several common features, and interestingly these features correlate with the gender of the authors of the texts.

In Don't Look Now (N), John is the character asking the hysterical question. His primary narrative question - "Is my daughter alive or dead?" - is related to the question addressed by the obsessional
neurotic, and given John's paranoia and fear of the unknown is consonant with Lacan's attribution of paranoia as fear of the primal father. John's eventual fate also prompts the spectator to ask of him whether he will be dead or alive at the end of the film - we are in fear for him. However, the traumatic death of Christine is also the spur for John's latent narrative/hysterical question which can be phrased in the form "Does Laura love me or not?" or even "Will Laura abandon me?" The breakdown of John and Laura's marriage in the face of their grief, and Laura's subsequent ability to find comfort in her supernatural beliefs, propels John into an attempt to identify with Laura's desire. Whilst Laura is grieving and fragile, John is able to identify with her and project onto her his own feelings of grief. However, when Laura finds her own Master signifier in Heather's heavenly vision of Christine and is no longer hysterical, John feels desolate and isolated in his beliefs. When Laura further assumes the Master Discourse, leaving to tend their sick son, John is prey to the malignancy of his projected world, unable to determine what his vision of Laura on the Vaporetto means, or what the primal supernatural world demands of him.

Who is the Other addressed by the hysterical discourse of the narration in the novel? I have argued above that John's Other is Laura, implacable and distant to John in his grief. However, the Big Other of *Don't Look Now* (F) must also surely be the world of the supernatural, the world of the feminine and instinct that are incorporated in John's bisexuality and which he disavows. It is this conflation of Laura and her instincts which guide her around Venice with the 'real' of the supernatural which John fears as primal and which creates John's Other as femininity per se. However, the narration does not share in John's paranoia. Instead it observes and critiques John with an attitude that encompasses at least a small element of the hysterical question. John is a character who cannot be looked up to as a Master by the narration, he is a failed Master. His own final self-realisation, "Oh God, what a bloody silly way to die", surely reflects the narrational approach. The hysteric first elevates the Other to Master placing her own desire as question, but this castrates the master resulting in the hysterical losing respect for him. Is this what du Maurier in her short story is doing, examining a fallen idol? If so, does John's hysterical discourse address du Maurier as Master prompting her to respond with such an empathetically critical attitude to his plight? Du Maurier's cross-gendered identification with John is only an example of every writer's duty to
write both male and female characters, but her attitude towards him reveals something of how identification works in writing, particularly in writing characters of different genders.

The film of *Don’t Look Now* (*F*) can be seen as part of this chain - a discursive response to the short story. In the relay between book and film, between du Maurier and Roeg, the address of the characters changes. John no longer seeks validation from Laura, and now Laura pleads with John for his support. Laura faints publicly and hysterically in the restaurant. Laura disavows Christine’s death by envisaging her as alive and “smiling”, and leads John into danger. Meanwhile, the film hysterically replays Christine’s death through the mise en scène which shows John chasing and being chased by the figure in red - whether this is the dwarf or the hotel concierge in his red dressing gown. The narrative/hysterical question is now addressed by both John and the narration to the Big Other of the supernatural and of a malevolent femininity. The film repeatedly intercuts Heather and her blind/all seeing eyes to create suspense, and this strategy in effect creates the question of the narration “What do you want from me?”, which is addressed to Heather/the supernatural by the implied author/implied spectator. Unlike the novel, where we are able to take a distance from John, in the film we are projected into John’s position and feel his terror at the real. Thus, I would argue that the film continues the relay of the Discourse of the Hysteric, finding a response to the critique of John by making him innocent and displacing the hysteria elsewhere, onto Laura and onto the supernatural.

In *Strangers on a Train* (*N & F*), several remarkable features of the analysis emerge. Bruno, whom I have previously symptomatised in terms of the novel/film’s plot and characterisation as suffering from conversion hysteria, does not employ the Discourse of the Hysteric. Instead, he blackmails Guy, using the Discourse of the Analyst/Pervert, and thus, any hysterical discourse is not applied to Guy but relates to the other characters in the text and to the viewer, i.e. his parents, Miriam and Barbara. To the extent that Bruno uses his bond of blackmail either to look up to Guy, or denigrate him, the discourse serves the aim of the hysteric in looking to the other for reassurance. However, his blackmail and his knowledge of Guy’s special object of desire (the death of Miriam) places him as analyst/pervert to Guy’s hysteric. Nevertheless, Bruno’s discourse does hystericise Guy and provokes in him a relay whereby he
asks the hysterical question of Anne. Guy knows what Bruno wants - Bruno takes up the place of Guy’s primal father - and Guy has to murder, to have jouissance, in order to appease him. However, in this process, Anne (particularly in the novel) becomes the mysterious feminine who demands Guy knows not what. Guy, like John in Don’t Look Now (N & F), asks the classic hysterical question of Anne “Will she/has she abandoned me?” and his drive to confess is, at least in part, a question/response to Anne. However, as in Don’t Look Now (N & F), the other notable feature of Strangers on a Train (N & F) is the way that the novel’s treatment of the female characters is altered in the film adaptation. From the novel’s portrayal of female characters as being passive or absent in their love, the film makes them castrating, and agents of the hysterical discourse. Miriam is a blackmailer in both book and film, thereby being the agent in the Discourse of the pervert/analyst, offering Guy a divorce for money. She is also a hysteric in both book and film, identifying with Guy’s desires for divorce and making them her own desires so that she can gain materially from their satisfaction. However, in the film both she and Barbara wear the spectacles that hystericise Bruno. In a completely new subplot it is Miriam and Barbara’s desire, represented by the glasses that hystericise Bruno. Miriam is conscious of her effect on Bruno, but Barbara is quite unaware of the effect of her spectacles until Bruno faints, and this virtuoso directorial touch creates them as subjects in a way that the novel avoids. Anne, enigmatic in the novel and a symbol of unknown femininity becomes an agent in the film, one who is able to take on the mantle of the Discourse of the Master and the University: an action heroine, although in her “female noir” subplot when she visits Bruno, she asks the Hysterical question - “What do you want of me/of Guy?” Thus, although the effect of the film is to create interesting female characters where they did not exist in the novel, the discursive relay in Strangers on a Train between book and film, as with Don’t Look Now, displaces the hysteria of its heroes in the novel onto the phallic hystericising females.

Can the Discourse of the Hysteric be applied to the implied and real authors of the texts? If the novels by female authors critique the male protagonists as obsessional neurotics/hysterics, and posit femininity as unknowable for both men and women, then it may be seen as the female gendered discourse of the Hysteric.
The split subject of the author, if the female constructs $S_1$ as masculine, addresses the father as Master. Thus the female writer chooses a hero to worship and also undermines them. The desire of the hysterics (a) underwrites the agency of the author, the question of ‘What Sex am I’, and the knowledge produced ($S_2$), which undermines the male hero but finds no answer to the question of femininity. Although this discourse is by no means the only one in the novels explored, its existence in all the female authored texts as a major element of the thematic and stylistic concerns of this thrillers indicates a female slant to the textual discursive structure.

The male authored texts also disclose the Discourse of the Hysteric, this time gendered as male.

Here, the male author ($) interrogates both male and female characters in the narrative. ($S_1$) is both the father figures that predominate in the texts - David in *Live Flesh*, Guy’s father-in-law and Bruno’s father in *Strangers on a Train* (F), the God that allows Christine to be killed in *Don’t Look Now* (F) and also the female characters: Laura in *Don’t Look Now* (F), Elena in *Live Flesh* (F) (see chapter 5), Anne in *Strangers on a Train* (F). Females and femininity are the Others, the $S_1$ of men, who need to interrogate them as well as their own father figures to find the secret of sexuality. Interestingly, the films place the central male protagonists as free of this form of interrogation: perhaps the heroes are surrogate authors and thus free from investigation. Only Hitchcock interrogates his characters - both Bruno and Guy contaminating each other with moral, if not actual, guilt.

**Conclusion**
This chapter and my exploration of Lacan’s theory of the Four Discourses has demonstrated the possibility of gendered agency in writing and directing. It has explained how to theorise the findings from the previous chapters on *Don’t Look Now* and *Strangers on a Train*, that men portray a different performance of sexual difference from women in their narrative speech acts. It has shown that although the performance of sexual difference is unique to each person, there is an asymmetry in the performance between men and women which can be seen as a product of the different gendering of the sexes, and can therefore be used as a tool of analysis to determine whether the text has been “spoken” by a man or a woman as agent of the speech act.

In addition, Lacan’s discourse theory has enabled me to understand the relay which takes place between book and film and how the film-maker(s) respond through their own hysterical discourse to the hysterical discourse in the novel. The film-makers in this situation are recipients of one speech act - the novel - and agents in the next - the film adaptation. However faithfully they try to adapt a book, they are bound to be influenced by the implied criticism of men in women’s novels and Lacan theorises how their response becomes manifest in the films. However, what Lacan demonstrates is that the response of the film-makers is at least partially unconscious. They may not be aware of the critique in the novel or even their “turned” versions in the film. Film-makers have to grapple with the polysemic character of the book and the change of form from book to film. Their skill in adaptation is to be aware as much as possible of the rich possibilities of the book but they are unlikely to be aware of the subtle differences which have been uncovered in the previous chapters of this thesis. Thus their unconscious performance of the hysterical discourse is one way in which they find the discourse of women unacceptable and either change it into their own versions or possibly even suppress it and deny it access to the public realm.

The collaborative and group nature of film authorship obviously prevents an absolutely vectorised one-to-one relationship between the discourse within the text - the discourse of the implied author - and the discourse of the real author. Nevertheless, if an author is considered as a performer of discourse, both in the Foucaultian sense as manipulator of the speech acts of power, and in the stricter Lacanian sense, then the effects of the individual author can be seen within the text, albeit imbricated with other influences -
ideological, aesthetic or pragmatic. The author - writer or film director - negotiates the various influences upon them to take responsibility for the text, and by looking at the differential features of both novels and the film adaptations from which they are taken, the discourse of the gendered author can be distinguished or heard amongst all the other discourses operating in the text.

In the following chapter, on Live Flesh, I look at the text as heterogeneous discourse, and at adaptation as an example of intertextuality which may result in what I call an “unfaithful” adaptation. In this pluralistic context, I argue, it is still possible to see the author as discourse – as organisation of the various elements of the text - and as psychoanalytic performer in dialogue with the discourses operating in their social or aesthetic context. This dialogue produces not inevitable duplication, a generic play, but in Live Flesh an unexpected transformation which nevertheless can be attributed to the agency of the author, as gendered psychoanalytic performer.

2 Evans An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis, 44.
3 Evans An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis. Taken from Jacques Lacan (S20, 21).
4 Evans An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis, 44.
6 Verhaeghe, 83.
7 The point du capiton is thus the subjective link which makes psychoanalytic “sense” of all the signifiers, and within the individual it is their unconscious fantasy - the navel of the dream - which is how Žižek uses the term to find the Hitchcockian “points du capiton” in Strangers on a Train.
9 Verhaeghe, 95.
10 The Sixth Sense, (M. Night Shyalaman, 1999, USA).
11 Lacan, Jacques “Encore” (S20) Quoted in Dylan Evans A Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis, 125.
12 The Sixth Sense, (M. Night Shyalaman, 1999, USA).
13 Verhaeghe, 93.
17 Lacan, Jacques “Encore” (S20), 74.
18 Copjec, Joan, Read my Desire: Lacan against the Historicists (October Books Imprint, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1994). The four equations as Copjec translates them are:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>There is at least one $x$ that is not submitted to the phallic function</th>
<th>There is not one $x$ that is not submitted to the phallic function</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All $x$'s are (every $x$ is) submitted to the phallic function</td>
<td>Not all (not every) $x$ is submitted to the phallic function</td>
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21 du Maurier, Daphne *Don’t Look Now*, 55.
CHAPTER FIVE:

On Unfaithful Adaptations - *Live Flesh*

Victor, the young man who shoots Fleetwood by accident, is a rapist in the book. I didn’t like this idea so I simply turned him into a mixed up boy with psychological problems, who suffers panic attacks and so on. A poor kid...¹

With *Live Flesh*, Pedro Almodóvar takes a novel by Ruth Rendell about a rapist/murderer and the consequences of his behaviour, and changes it into a film about an innocent adrift in a world of corruption and decay. The films of *Don’t Look Now* and *Strangers on a Train*, although deviating in several ways from their source novels, nevertheless retain the same characters, the same genre and tone, the same central events. Almodóvar, in *Live Flesh*, changes the genre, the characters, the style, and invests the film with an optimism about male sexuality and love which is entirely missing in the novel. I wish in this chapter to explore *Live Flesh* as an “unfaithful” adaptation, to ask what makes the experience of viewing it so different from reading the book and what motivates the adaptation, the latent material in the book which is carried across to the film.

Almodóvar follows in a long tradition of “auteur” directors making film adaptations which are a commentary on or deconstruction of the original works - e.g. Welles’s version of Shakespeare’s *Henry IV* trilogy, *Chimes at Midnight* - or an analogy, a considerable departure from the original novel, in order to create a completely different artwork. From *Sabotage* to *The Birds*, Alfred Hitchcock made adaptations that were very loosely connected to their books:- in *The Birds*, according to the screenwriter Evan Hunter, Hitchcock retained the title of Daphne du Maurier’s short story and threw the contents away to start again. A framework for describing the various relationships of adaptations to fidelity has been articulated by Michael Klein together with Gillian Parker. They argue for three categories

(first) fidelity to the main thrust of the narrative; (second, the approach which ) retains the core of the structure of the narrative while significantly reinterpreting or in some cases, deconstructing the source text: (and third, regarding) the source merely as raw material, as simply the occasion for an original work.⁴

Films may fall into a spectrum between the extremes of these categories. *Live Flesh*, much like the above mentioned films of Welles and Hitchcock, falls into category three, and in attempting to create a coherent work of art frees itself from the necessity to be true to the spirit or the letter of the original Rendell book. However, whilst this helpful categorisation enables *Live Flesh* not to be dismissed out of hand as a ‘bad’ adaptation, it does not explain how or why the film is so different from the book, what elements of the book inspired the film, and how these common elements are integrated (or not) in book and film. It is heavily reliant on the voice of the
director ‘author’ to tell us that the adaptation is a free one, and it also fails to take into account the role of the
reader/viewer in constructing meaning from the book or the film. A more sophisticated approach to this
problematic area of an adaptation’s ‘faithfulness’ has been taken through the concept of intertextuality, of texts
being comprised of many inherited discourses which the text has employed as a resource, and address
themselves to viewers/readers in a multiplicity of ways. As Christopher Orr writes

Within this critical context [i.e. of intertextuality], the issue is not whether the adapted film is
faithful to its source, but rather how the choice of a specific source and how the approach to
that source serves the film’s ideology.5

The play of different discourses across the film creates multiple readings, and at a basic level enables the film to
be meaningful. The particular intertextuality provided by Ruth Rendell’s original novel creates a specific set of
meanings, and by looking at discourses in novel and film it may be possible to discover something about the
adaptation that throws light on the operation of those discourses aesthetically and ideologically. By following
Christopher Orr and seeing the novel as a ‘resource’ for the film, I hope to show not only how the novel serves
‘the film’s ideology’ but also the elements in the novel that excite the film-makers and those which the film
eschews and changes. The film of Live Flesh is not only a very different iteration of material from the novel, it
is also contextually different: whilst Ruth Rendell’s story was written and is set in London in the early
Thatcherite period, the film is written and set in post-Franco Spain and roots itself in a very different culture.
Thus, unlike Don’t Look Now and Strangers on a Train, closely related culturally and temporally to their source
novels, the novel and film of Live Flesh cannot be said to be speech acts with similar cultural and historical
contexts. The novel is to some extent a meditation on the spirit of acquisition and class resentment in England at
the time, whereas Almodóvar’s Live Flesh, I shall argue, is a joyous allegory of the defeat of fascism by
democracy. The differences in the performance of history and culture in these texts can neither be attributed to
the individual authors alone, nor can these differences bypass the authors’ own inflections of history. Thus in
Live Flesh (N & F) the discourses of history are imbricated in the authors’ idiosyncratic performances of the
story. However, by looking at the adaptation intertextually, I seek to cast light upon the psychological
similarities and differences between novel and film, and thereby relate matters of cultural and artistic difference
to the treatment of sexual difference and gender, and in turn explore the ideological use to which Almodóvar
puts Rendell’s text. I shall argue that the novel explores the ‘abjection’ of the pre-Oedipal relationship of child
and mother, and that it does so through a coherent set of codes which broadly fall into a genre called
contemporary Gothic. The film, however, interrogates the moment in the Oedipus complex when father and son
are rivals for the mother’s affections, and it does this by enacting scenarios which return to and repeat this
moment in different configurations in a playful post-modern way. Both texts thus centre on ‘abjection’ but whereas the novel explores abjection as a symptom of a societal destructiveness that has to be eliminated, the film uses abjection as a spirit of liberation, creating the conditions for the overthrow of, and liberation from, repression. Thus, although the novel, as in the other thrillers, resorts to a depiction of its protagonist’s hysteria, the film deploys a looser sense of abjection to escape from the repression of the Franco era.

Adaptation as intertext

Robert Stam, in his article “Dialogics of Adaptation” takes Orr’s thesis further, using intertextuality to argue for the validity of judging adaptations ideologically and aesthetically. Using Bakhtin’s concept of the “dialogic text”, Stam argues that a literary text is at the site of multifarious and complex speech interactions, what Bakhtin calls “the differentiated unity of the epoch’s entire culture”, and contains the traces of its various influences as genres - series of dialogues, literary and non-literary, generated from the “powerful deep currents of power”. A film adaptation is thus a further response to the text from which is comes, and will, due to its different historical and aesthetic circumstances, inevitably select or foreground some generic elements above others.

The source text forms a dense informational network, a series of verbal cues that the adapting film text can then take up, amplify, ignore, subvert or transform. The film adaptation of a novel performs these transformations according to the protocols of a distinct medium, absorbing and altering the genres and intertexts available through the grids of ambient discourses and ideologies, and mediated by a series of filters: studio style, ideological fashion, political constraints, auteurist predilections, charismatic stars, economic advantage or disadvantage, and evolving technology. The film hypertext, in this sense, is transformational almost in the Chomskyian sense of a “generative grammar” of adaptation, with the difference that these cross-media operations are infinitely more unpredictable and multifarious than they would be were it a matter of “natural language”.

Thus, Stam replaces the concept of “fidelity” to the text with one of “translation” or even “transformation”. However, he does not eschew the value we place on a film’s not “betraying” its source, or on our reading of the source. The unfaithful adaptation is not the one which alters the codes and genres of the text, as this is always necessary, but the one which does not preserve our “phantasmatic relationship with the original”, and so becomes a Kleinian “bad object”. I will argue that this is what happens precisely in Live Flesh, which through changing genre, characters and outcome, also changes its own psychological concerns and figuration. In this way, our own phantasmatic relationship to the text is also changed, and what we experience is a different film.
Ruth Rendell’s *Live Flesh* allows us to share the point of view of Victor, a psychotic young man who during the course of the novel commits attempted murder, rape and murder. Simultaneously encouraging our empathy for Victor and also narrating a moral framework through which his actions are seen and judged, *Live Flesh* examines aspects of Victor’s psyche, which we would rather not own to but which by experiencing through empathetic identification we are able to place within human experience rather than disavow or disown.

having imaginatively inhabited the tortured mind of the evil character [readers] see the potential of such evil in all minds, and experiencing compassion for it through an understanding of its psychological causes, they can no longer look on good and evil as absolute or as forces outside the human psyche.\(^9\)

Although *Live Flesh* is a realist psychological thriller - it has the hallmarks of its genre, recognisable locations and time period, transparent style, coherent characters - it adopts the topos of the Gothic novel in order to place us within the mind of a transgressor, a rapist, a man outside the limits of society. David Punter in his study of Gothic, *The Literature of Terror*,\(^{10}\) acknowledges the diversity of Gothic forms and the way that Gothic has strayed and expanded since its original inception in the eighteenth century with such novels as *The Mysteries of Udolpho* (Anne Radcliffe, 1797) or *The Castle of Otranto* (Horace Walpole, 1764), through nineteenth century classics such as *Dracula* (Bram Stoker, 1897), *Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde* (Robert Louis Stevenson, 1886), to the female Gothic *Wuthering Heights* (Emily Bronté, 1847), *Jane Eyre* (Charlotte Bronté, 1846), *Frankenstein* (Mary Shelley, 1818), *Rebecca* (Daphne du Maurier, 1938), to such diverse and modern versions as *American Psycho* (Bret Easton Ellis, 1991), *Cape Fear* (Martin Scorsese, 1991), and *Interview with a Vampire* (Anne Rice, 1976). Gothic need no longer be about haunted castles and the supernatural, but can incorporate its exploration of fears and mysteries within the everyday, as it does in *Live Flesh* and, to a lesser degree, in the other thrillers considered in this thesis, *Don’t Look Now, Strangers on a Train*, and *The Sixth Sense*. In his search for some overarching coherence which could apply to these diverse texts, Punter notes that they are ‘paranoiac’: the ‘implicated’ reader is “placed in a situation of ambiguity with regard to fears within the text” whilst “the attribution of persecution remains uncertain and the reader is invited to share in the doubts and uncertainties which pervade the apparent story.”\(^{11}\) Punter finds a definition for contemporary Gothic that *Live Flesh* surely exemplifies:

What is, perhaps, most distinctive about contemporary Gothic is the way in which it has followed the tradition of not merely describing but inhabiting the distorted forms of life, social and psychic, which follow from the attempted recollection of primal damage.\(^{12}\)
We experience Victor's paranoid perceptions of the world from inside his head, and we explore with him the effect of the primal, narcissistic wound which causes him to lose control of himself, to explode with a rage he does not understand and which leads to tragedy and death.

We never really know Victor suffers from, and even he speculates about the origin of his psychopathology as a rapist:

He had asked himself too why the child of happily married middle-class parents, whose childhood had been for the most part uneventful and contented, should have needed to make motiveless unreasoning attacks on women...Sometimes he thought of them as symptoms of some disease he had caught, for they could not have been inherited nor yet brought into being by ill-usage or neglect when he was young.  

Rendell cleverly refuses to give a pat explanation for his behaviour, pointing us towards partial solutions: the lack of love which Victor feels from a mother who is wholly absorbed in her relationship with Victor's father, a phobia about tortoises gained in conjunction with Victor's seeing the 'primal scene', his parents making love. But these 'solutions' in themselves fail to account for Victor's behaviour, his pathological anger and loss of control, and only lead deeper into a gap in Victor's nature, a void which never gets filled through the course of the novel. Rendell dramatises this gap using the Gothic trope of the 'Uncanny' double. Like Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde, or M (Fritz Lang, 1931), Victor is inhabited by another self, of whom he knows little and who does all his evil deeds, so that Victor need not take responsibility so that as readers we can empathise with someone who is not responsible for his actions. When cornered into shooting David, 'Panic came over him like a kind of electric suit, fitting him like a second skin, prickling him all over, crawling on him, tingling and sending into his hand an impulse that pulled that trigger and fired that gun', and

Yet, speaking for himself, personally, he knew that the acts of rape he had performed had been beyond his control, had had nothing to do with his will, had been as involuntary and as distinct from any decision or purpose of his own as his firing the gun at Fleetwood. Did that mean he was mad when he did these things or at least not responsible for his actions?

The title Live Flesh is very apt: it describes a tremor, a palsy, which is out of the control of the sufferer's body, and it is very appropriate that Victor's nervous twitch goes to the very essence of his being and is responsible for his death from tetanus - a fatal twitch. However, Victor's double does more than inhabit his body: there is an 'Uncanny' sense of coincidence about the places in which Victor finds himself in the novel, which implies the possible workings of Victor's unconscious, a 'return of the repressed' driving Victor towards his inevitable fate. Victor has a hunch that he wants to go and live in Epping. He is thinking about this when he sees a newspaper photograph of a man on a horse 'and it seemed as if fate was pointing the way', but when he actually gets there
he realises that David and Clare coincidentally live in nearby Theydon Bois. This prompts Victor to get in touch with David, which he has wanted to do anyway. A further overdetermination of coincidence occurs when Victor realises that he had committed his most serious rape in Epping Forest some years before, and he re-enacts this rape to his cost, for this time the girl he is raping fatally stabs him with a shard of mirror - a moment of dramatic irony, as a mirror is exactly what Victor is unable to hold up to himself. Similar coincidences occur in other aspects of the story: Victor realises that Juppy's shop is near the site of the siege, Victor mentions shooting the girl in 'the lower spine' without intending to do so and then accidentally shoots David in exactly the same place. Although it is possible that these coincidences are not connected with Victor's psyche, his unconscious, they create an uncanny feeling, a feeling that Victor is being led by fate, and that the reader, along with Victor, is being drawn down a path whose outcome can only be gruesome. Although we often feel that Victor is a passive character, reacting to chance events rather than initiating them, this may be an effect of his "uncanny" - his unconscious driving his actions in a very active direction. In 'The "Uncanny"' Freud writes:

The theme of the 'double' has been very thoroughly treated by Otto Rank. He has gone into the connections which the 'double' has with reflections in mirrors, with shadows, with guardian spirits, with the belief in the soul and with the fear of death; but he also lets in a flood of light on the surprising evolution of the idea. For the 'double' was originally an insurance against the destruction of the ego, and 'energetic denial of the power of death', as Rank says; and probably the 'immortal' soul was the first 'double' of the body. This invention of doubling as a preservation against extinction has its counterpart in the language of dreams, which is fond of representing castration by a doubling or multiplication of a genital symbol. The same desire led the Ancient Egyptians to develop the art of making images of the dead in lasting materials. Such ideas, however, have sprung from the soil of unbounded self-love, from the primary narcissism which dominates the mind of the child and of primitive man. But when this stage has been surmounted, the 'double' reverses its aspect. From having been an assurance of immortality, it becomes the uncanny harbinger of death. 17

Victor has some wound to his ego formation, his death drive predominates, and in an attempt to get to a point of stasis, of safety, Victor merely has a compulsion to repeat, and to repeat those things which lead not to Eros but to Thanatos. He is forever covering old territory, revisiting the haunts of his youth - even the social worker places him near his parents' old home. He tries to replay his role with his parents, this time attempting to change the outcome by trying to win his surrogate mother, Clare, from her over close relationship with his surrogate father, David. But he fails again. The rape he commits at the end of the novel is in the same place as one he had committed ten years previously. In fact, the drama of Victor's death is remarkably internalised, and driven by him alone. No one kills him: the police, although about to catch him, are not responsible for his death. David, unlike the typical Oedipal father, does not come after Victor to castrate him. Only the wound from his attempted rape victim injures him, and even here, it is because of his failure to clean the wound properly that he contracts tetanus and dies.
Whilst Freud cites the Uncanny in experiences where ‘infantile complexes which have been repressed are once more revived by some impression, or when primitive beliefs which have been surmounted seem once more to be confirmed’, he also implies that it is possible for the Uncanny to have its source in the earliest moments of the child’s life, in its relation with its mother:

It often happens that neurotic men declare that they feel there is something uncanny about the female genital organs. This unheimlich place, however, is the entrance to the former Heim [home] of all human beings, to the place where each of us lived once upon a time and in the beginning.

Julia Kristeva, in her book *The Powers of Horror* explores the horrors associated with the pre-Oedipal abject relationship either with an overprotective swamping mother or with a neglectful mother which can make their way into adulthood if there is a failure in the successful resolution of the Oedipus complex and if the father, the bringer of the symbolic, somehow fails to bring the child to a successful separation from the mother. These symptoms, like those of the Uncanny, make themselves felt in Gothic fiction, in the violence of events, in the criminality of characters, in the concern over gender, and in tropes concerning the boundaries of identity. In *Live Flesh*, not only are Gothic tropes often those of abjection, but the abject plays itself out in the story of Victor, his failure to find an object of desire, and his drive towards death.

Victor’s psychopathology shares many characteristics of a ‘borderline’ patient suffering a crisis of ‘abjection’ characterised in Kristeva’s study:

A massive and sudden emergence of uncanniness, which, familiar as it might have been in an opaque and forgotten life, now harries me as radically separate, loathsome. Not me. Not that. But not nothing, either. A “something” that I do not recognize as a thing. A weight of meaninglessness, about which there is nothing insignificant, and which crushes me. On the edge of non-existence and hallucination, of a reality that, if I acknowledge it, annihilates me. There, abject and abjection are my safe-guards. The primers of my culture.

Victor’s feelings of destitution when he finds out that David did not taunt him about the fake gun - his responsibility for crippling David, his feelings of rage and impotence when condemned by his aunt and rejected by Clare, the violent rages which cause him to rape - all these are signs of Victor’s inner void, a narcissistic wound he tries to ward off through the abject, through killing and rape.

The abject is the border where the infant tries to differentiate itself from the world, from what is ‘I’ and what is ‘not I’. It is excrement, it is food loathing, at its extreme it is a ‘corpse’ which reminds the subject of the borders between life and death. It comes about when the infant, trained in the use of the ‘clean and proper’ body
by the (M)other - what goes in, what comes out - introjects the (M)other, who becomes the child's super-ego, and who then dictates to the unwilling child what is abject on the child's behalf. Kristeva gives a good example of the skin of the milk, which her parents offer her, and which she cannot recognise as herself. She ingests it, and then vomits it out: it becomes part of her body as she ejects it from her body.

That order, that glance, that voice, that gesture, which enact the law for my frightened body, constitute and bring about an effect and not yet a sign. I speak to it in vain in order to exclude it from what will no longer be, for myself, a world that can be assimilated. Obviously, I am only like someone else: mimetic logic of the advent of the ego, objects and signs. But when I seek (myself), lose (myself), or experience jouissance - then "I" is heterogeneous. Discomfort, unease, dizziness stemming from an ambiguity that, through the violence of a revolt against, demarcates a space out of which signs and objects arise. Thus braided, woven, ambivalent flux marks out a territory that I can call my own because the Other, having dwelt in me as alter ego, points it out to me through loathing.

I pointed out in Chapter Three that Kristeva diagnoses over-strict parenting or neglect as the cause of the narcissistic crisis out of which abjection arises; and in Victor's case, neglect is the obvious candidate. His mother's overwhelming love for his father, which excludes Victor, stops him from adequately forming boundaries for his own identity and he is thus overwhelmed by loathing. Victor himself remembers how angry he was as a child, when his parents told him about a time before he existed, and he is overwhelmed by hatred and loathing. Victor's parents never gave him a sense of identity, a sense of existing; and the cancelled birthday party, which his mother was too fraught to throw for him, is symptomatic of Victor's mother's own (phallic) insecurity in the face of the symbolic - she is too insecure to give Victor a chance to adequately separate from her. Although in no way explaining the extreme nature of Victor's disturbance, it is consistent that parental neglect makes Victor take out his fear and loathing on his mother surrogates, the women he rapes. However, these rapes are more than mere misogyny, because Victor carries them out in fear, when in crisis, rejected by his girlfriend or by Clare. They are abject because they are attempts by Victor to salvage his fragile sense of himself:

Victor was angry and full of energy and now he was afraid, because he asked himself what could become of this anger, how could he live with it? What happened to you if anger conquered you? Then he saw the girl in the forest.

When Victor kills Muriel, he does so because she treats him as abject, as worse than evil, as a non-person who is not worthy of her money or her love. However, immediately before he attacks her she reminds him of his mother, but of a mother who represents death and decay, false teeth, dust, a decaying cake. Kristeva links the abject to the death drive. The abject 'takes the ego back to its source on the abominable limits from which, in order to be, the ego has broken away - it assigns it a source in the non-ego, drive and death'. Presumably, because the abject is not an object, not part of the symbolic, it is also part of what Lacan calls the 'Real'.
Victor's double, the part of his unconscious which commits the rapes and shoots David, belongs in the real, the area of Victor's psyche beyond gender distinction, beyond imagination, outside the ego, and outside language.

The narcissistic crisis that Kristeva classifies as abjection is also the failure of the drive to find an object. Thus it returns to itself, and to death. Victor's failure to find a drive can be found, both in the different way Clare and he view their relationship and in his phobia over tortoises. When he has made love to Clare and she rejects him to go back to David, she is surprised that he can be in love with her: he has only met her 'five or six times', he says that he fell in love with her at first sight. Both Clare and the reader know this to be impossible, because we have witnessed their first meeting when Clare lost her temper with Victor and Victor thought she was a hideous hag. As Clare suggests, there is an element of fantasy/hallucination in Victor's love for her. With Victor's phobia over tortoises, a psychological explanation for this might be Kristeva's explanation that the phobia is a creation of a phantom object:

...there is added a drive dimension (heralded by fear) that has an anaphoric indexing value, pointing to something else, to some non-thing, to something unknowable. The phobic object is in that sense the hallucination of nothing.

The tortoise with its legs and head which emerge and retreat into its shell can be likened to human waste. Thus Victor's phobia is a horrified response to his abject infantile obsession of playing at procreation and his attempt to control the bodily process his mother has no power over. Victor first becomes phobic when he witnesses the 'primal scene' of his parents' love-making. Kristeva suggests that the creation of the phobic object is connected with the inadequate resolution of the Oedipus complex, in that the father does not completely introduce the child into the symbolic and into the world of Law. Victor never has a chance to have an Oedipus complex: his mother is always in the way, hanging on to his father, so there is never any chance of rivalry with his father for his mother's love. Thus, Victor looks to David to become an effective father figure. He looks up to him as an 'ego ideal', steals in order to impress him, and creates a false ego, man about town, in order to gain David's respect. However, he is confused as to David's status as possessing the phallus: because David is literally impotent after the shooting, Victor projects onto David an imaginary impotence, so that David seems impossibly weak. When Clare prefers David over Victor, Victor's abjection takes the form, of blaming not Clare but David, of finding in David the monstrous phallic father with whom Victor never had a chance of competing for his mother's love.

Victor has a problem with the boundaries of his identity, of where he ends. This is manifest in the novel in the strongest possible manner. Victor's inner psyche becomes progressively externalised on his body.
At first this is effected by Victor looking in mirrors, and seeing how his psychic state is either improving or deteriorating. When he comes out of prison and first looks at himself he can 'barely recognise himself' - a sure sign of the Uncanny - but later when he has just met David and Clare he sees himself in a shop window as sophisticated and debonair. However, more significantly, he develops the tic of 'Live Flesh' and when he commits the rape in Epping Forest the angry red wound on his chest represents the wound inside him. His catching tetanus puts him back into the infantile position of someone whose body will not obey him, and when he looks in the mirror not only does he receive back the image that Lacan constructed in the mirror phase, the image of someone who can see their limbs moving in the mirror without their volition, fragmented, but he also sees the death's head that Victor has become, death now eating him up from the outside as well the inside:

Constructed on the one hand by the incestuous desire of (for) his mother and on the other by an overly brutal separation from her, the borderline patient, even though he may be a fortified castle, is nevertheless an empty castle. The absence, or the failure, of paternal function to establish a unitary bent between subject and object, produces this strange configuration; an encompassment that is stifling (the container compressing the ego) and at the same time, draining (the want of an other, qua object, produces nullity in the place of the subject). If this description of a borderline patient accounts for Victor's problems, it also describes him. As a character he seems remarkably blank, an 'empty castle'. The blank space that should be his ego is incapable of providing Victor with the powers of introspection that would enable him to address his problems and save himself. Given that the reader is experiencing the story through Victor's eyes, the narration itself must provide the reader with sufficient insight to perceive what is happening to him. It does this by employing two common Gothic techniques:- the dream sequence, and the psychologising of physical space. In the dream sequence, the narration 'crosses the border' into Victor's psychological space, giving the reader Victor's dreams, expressions of his 'repressed' which the reader can experience and 'inhabit', sharing Victor's feelings of dread, but which also interpret Victor for the reader. For example, when Victor dreams of shooting David, but David has Victor's face, the narration can demonstrate that David is Victor's double and that Victor is also doubled internally, and engaged in a self-destructive battle with his own demons. After Victor has slept with Clare and had a non-committal telephone conversation, he dreams of rape:

...A woman was walking among the trees. She wore a long duster coat or mackintosh of black silk and over her head an embroidered black veil like a mantilla. When she saw Victor approaching she turned to look at him, standing in an attitude of pity, of yearning sympathy, with both hands clasped in front of her. Victor jumped out of the wheelchair, ran towards her and, seizing her in his arms, threw her to the ground and tore at her clothes. She wore a mass of petticoats, layers and layers of stiff lace petticoats, and he tried to rip them away, burrowing in the starched crackling stuff with his hands, pushing with his face, his nose, like a snuffling pig. There was nothing there, nothing beneath, no flesh, only a clothes prop of wooden sticks.
He tore off all the clothes, a wardrobe full, and the veil which was not one veil but two or three, a dozen, was of silky dusty black gauze, and underneath, under the last filmy layer, lay the photograph of Clare, her eyes looking up into his.27

This dream shows us, in classic Gothic fashion, that Clare is a non-object, an ‘empty’ object of desire for Victor, part of his psychotic failure, and again a signifier of death. However, it also condenses images of all the women in the novel into one little sequence:- the duster coat worn by Aunt Muriel, his Mother’s petticoats, Clare, even the rape of the girl on Epping Common which he has not yet committed. Thus, all the women are shown for Victor to be the same woman, and his abjection towards them is made clear. Also the dream, by being prescient and anticipating the later scene of rape, provides suspense and an intimation that the story is unlikely to end happily.

The dream sequences in Live Flesh acknowledge their Gothic heritage: Victor’s dream at the end of the novel, of the marriage of David and Clare, is an homage to Jane Eyre,28 where Clare’s face under the veil is replaced by Rosemary Stanley (the girl in the siege), paralleling the first Mrs Rochester’s trying on of the wedding veil on the eve of Jane Eyre’s wedding. The use of space, particularly houses, is equally Gothic in the novel, providing us with an insight into Victor’s psychological condition through their symbolic representation of his psyche. Like the ‘attic’ of childhood, or the ‘cellar’ of the unconscious, the spaces in Live Flesh provide a key to Victor’s behaviour. The house of the siege, with its window and billowing curtains, that Victor sees in his imagination from an angle which would have been impossible for him to see during the actual event, seems to connote a freedom, an escape that he cannot take. It also connotes the gaze, behind the curtains, the gaze of the Other, to whom Victor can never match up, in whose eyes he has failed. Muriel’s dusty, decaying house, redolent of Miss Havisham’s house in Great Expectations29 is a house symbolising maternal death, maternal emptiness. The symbols here are very evident: Victor steals the money from his Aunt’s purse; the mother’s genitals (purse) bring forth money (shit), which Victor at first mistakes for gold, using it to deceive David and Clare; but it turns to nothing, to paper, when he is a dying man. Victor’s theft of the money is itself a sign of the Gothic nature of the novel meeting Joanna Russ’s criterion of the ‘Modern Gothic’ which often turns out to be an immoral and usually criminal activity on somebody’s part centering around money and/or the Other Woman’s ghastly (usually sexual) misbehaviour.30

It is through the imbrication of Victor’s abjection with his need to impress, his need to have money and spend it (the smart clothes he cannot afford and the car, all to impress David and Clare, to obtain parental approval and love), that the novel is able to situate Victor’s situation politically as well as psychologically. The vastly
different worlds of Epping Forest, verdant and opulent, and Victor’s drab home life in Acton, externalise his inner state of emptiness, whilst also demonstrating a class-ridden world where the privileged live in verdant tree-lined avenues and enjoy their experiences in colour, whilst the poor live drab colourless lives:

...(he) sat by the window, looking hopelessly out over Acton. It was dawn, pearl-grey and misty, the swell of traffic noise mounting already, birds starting to sing. All the gardens he could see were filled with small trees coming into leaf and flowers, green and white and pink, so that a muslin-pale haze of colour lay like a thick printed cloth over earth and brick and stone. Hating the human race, Victor thought with an anger that made him clench his fists how all these householders were so mean and grudging that they wouldn’t even plant a tree unless it was a fruit tree they could get something out of.

Why had his life been passed in these dreary suburbs? He had never lived anywhere interesting or different, though there were plenty of interesting places he had passed through on his way to the airports at Heathrow and Gatwick and Luton and Stansted. Victor describes the world of Acton, where he had grown up, as ‘motherland and fatherland alright’, seeing in it the kind of meanness which he needs to escape, and flees through crime to the dream of plenty and generosity which David and Clare represent.

*Live Flesh* is not merely an horrific ‘ride’ with Victor through his experience. Rendell shows us that Victor is not just a Gothic monster. Clare calls him ‘loveable’ and ‘vulnerable’, and in his search for love and his childish expectations for immediate gratification, he shows a redeemable and positive side. When he makes love to Clare and finds her reaching out towards him, and in his guilt over David’s shooting, he has moments of empathy that give us hope for him. We want him to succeed, to find someone he loves and become a normal person, but this is a hopelessly optimistic outcome, and we know that Victor cannot escape his fate.

The narration, unlike that of some Gothic tales which celebrate their misogyny (the film *Basic Instinct* [Paul Verhoeven, 1992] for example), does not share in Victor’s abjection, his abuse of women, but seeks to place this misogyny and primal hatred within a framework where it is clearly seen to be unacceptable:

An unshakable adherence to Prohibition and Law is necessary if that perverse interspace of abjection is to be hemmed in and thrust aside. Religion, Morality, Law. Obviously always arbitrary, more or less; unfailingly oppressive, rather more than less, laboriously prevailing, more and more so. Rendell is not quite so relentless in her narration as this quotation suggests: indeed she creates an incompetent and arrogant representative of the Law in David’s boss, Spencer, who could be said to inaugurate the action through his insensitivity, his treatment of Victor as both impotent - taunting him with carrying a fake gun - and abject, worthless, by using random names to address him. However, an element of order in Rendell’s clear,
transparent style, as well as her punitive narrative - leading to Victor's inevitable, but horrible death - place the narration as voice of the Symbolic, the Name of the Father, but as spoken in the name of protection of women. As we have already seen, Gothic tropes and psychological patterns frequently duplicate each other in the Gothic novel, and have the same significance:

The similarities between the Freudian model of the psyche and the conventions of Gothic fiction are best understood as parallel expressions of an Enlightenment frame of mind... The very word 'Enlightenment' creates a necessity for darkness; to celebrate, even to recognize the known implies that there must be mysteries also. As Michel Foucault has repeatedly shown, Enlightenment thought characteristically ordered and organized by creating institutions to enforce distinctions between society and its other, whether it resides in madness, illness, criminality, or sexuality. Like the haunted Gothic castle, the Freudian discourse of the self creates the haunted, dark, mysterious space even as it attempts to organize or control it.34

Rendell's coolly rational story provides the space to examine Victor's 'abjection', and it does so primarily through a common Gothic device, the frame story. Although the frame story is by no means exclusive to Gothic, Jacqueline Howard notes its frequent occurrence in such works as Melmoth the Wanderer (Charles Robert Maturin, 1820), Frankenstein and Wuthering Heights (Emily Brontë, 1847). The outer chapters of Live Flesh are focalised not through Victor but through David: we receive a picture of Victor and the events of the novel from another perspective and so are able to judge Victor's behaviour and have an ironic and ethical attitude towards it. Perhaps the most important function of the focalisation of the opening chapter is to allow us to experience David's shooting through his own eyes. Our empathetic identification is with David. He is an innocent man trying to do his job to the best of his abilities and when he is shot, we cannot help but take our memories of his experience with us through the rest of the novel and see Victor's excuses as so much hypocritical self-justification. We are privileged by the narration, with the 'empathy' that Victor, as a psychotic, just does not have. However, we also see Victor's behaviour, brutish and cruel, from the outside:

The voice, which was deep and low, yet colourless - a voice which gave Fleetwood the impression it wasn't used much or was always used economically - turned cold. It spoke of terrible things with indifference. 'I shan't kill her. I'll shoot her from the back, in the lower spine'.35

When David is shot in the lower spine, we know the cruelty of the man who committed this crime. Throughout the rest of the novel, we also gain clues from the narration about the distance between Victor's thoughts and his actual deeds. When he steals the money from his Aunt, he thinks that he is only stealing from her because she cut him out of her will, and that therefore he is entitled to her money. However, we know from the narrative that Victor starts stealing before Aunt Muriel cuts him out of the will.
The use of the frame story, moreover, does not just condemn Victor, but creates an oscillation between the empathy we feel for Victor, created throughout the story, and the moral evil he commits. When the frame story resumes at the end of the novel and David and Clare talk about the dead Victor, David mentions the picture that he saw before being shot, an Edward Lear lithograph of a turtle, and we realise that although Victor's crime was psychologically motivated, it was a mystery which no character understands. Victor shot David because he saw his phobic object on the wall. In this condensed image, the ethical framework of the novel is displayed. Not only is it impossible to see the whole picture - one person's perspective is bound to be partial, and therefore Victor's behaviour must always be a mystery - but also Victor's responsibility for his actions is his, but not his alone: the chance events that led to his crimes were not chance but manifestations of himself: he stole the gun, he kidnapped the girl, he is responsible. However, his psychopathology, the accident of his upbringing, is responsible for his crimes, and therefore also the responsibility of the wider society.

Sexual Difference in the Novel.

It is now becoming a critical commonplace that one of the important features of Gothic is that it was in its inception a 'women's fiction', written by and for women, and this is true. It is no accident that many of the most important Gothic writers of the last two centuries - Radcliffe, Mary Shelley, Dinesen, Carter - have been women; nor is it an accident that many of the male writers associated with Gothic - Lewis, Collins, Wilde, Stoker, Lovecraft - display in their works and in their lives a tangential relation to socialised masculine norms; nor, again, is it an accident that in Gothic occur some of the finest acts of female impersonation in literature - in Collins, in Le Fanu, in Henry James, perhaps (bizarrely) in Banks. By the dominant male-oriented ethos of Western society, it is preferred that love and sexuality display only an affirmative side: to the Gothic writers, they are the products and visible outcroppings of darker forces, and thus the Gothics persist in trying to come to grips with their alternative forms - incest, sexual violence, rape - and in questioning the absolute nature of sex roles. By dealing with sexual violence and rape, Live Flesh obviously addresses the 'darker forces' of sexuality. Rendell examines the relationship between male sexuality and violence. Victor quotes a line he has heard reported by a psychiatrist that 'rape is not a sexual act, it is an act of aggression'. The novel then dramatises this thesis. However, the exploration Rendell provides is more sophisticated than the 'liberal feminist' thesis outlined. By situating Victor's violence in his pre-Oedipal, abject personality formation, she suggests that Victor's violence is related to his gender formation, and that gender is a social construction, formed through the interaction of self and society.

However, an examination of masculinity does not necessarily throw any light on femininity or feminine writing. It could be argued that by showing us Victor's murderous intentions towards his mother, Rendell is...
dramatising what Irigaray describes as the repressed crisis in the history of patriarchy, the murder of the matriarch. But here lies a problem in representation; in dramatising the murder of the matriarch, the dramatisation is in danger of re-enacting the crime and the misogyny it is trying to expose and destroy.

Rendell’s defence against this is her highly symbolic narration, which allows us to see that rape and murder are wrong, and that rape and murder of the mother is a problem caused by men, not provoked by women. However, Irigaray’s matriarch is not only murdered culturally but, as Lacan has demonstrated, linguistically also. Speaking from the symbolic, from the place of the ‘Name of the Father’ means that Rendell has to reproduce that symbolic, where women are characterised by their lack of a phallus, their ‘not all’. The women in *Live Flesh* are all characterised through and for Victor, they are Victor’s surrogate mothers. In adopting the symbolic language of narration as patriarchal, Rendell can find no place for the female, and no definition of the female that is outside male definition. However, Clare, in her very ambiguity, the sketchiness with which she is drawn, does seem to have some agency of her own. We never know why she chooses David over Victor, but this very gap, this Irigayan lacuna, enables us to see Clare as separate from Victor, a woman of mystery, perhaps, but a woman able to make up her own mind.

Lacan’s discourse theory has enabled me to understanding female writing, not only as the “écriture feminine” of the French feminists, but also as the hysterically inflected writing of women which critiques men. Rendell might be said to be writing ‘as a woman’, not because she focalises around women and women’s stories but because she critiques patriarchy and male hysteria. Victor’s character, like John’s in *Don’t Look Now* and Bruno’s in *Strangers on a Train*, is constructed with a degree of dualism and an element of the Real which is outside gender formation, untouched by the Oedipus complex, bisexual and hysterical:

If prohibition creates the ‘fundamental divide’ of sexuality, and if this ‘divide’ is shown to be duplicitous precisely because of the artificiality of its division, then there must be a division that resists division, a psychic doubleness or inherent bisexuality that comes to undermine every effort of severing.  

Thus although Victor’s double manifests itself in ‘abjection’ and in violence towards women, it is not gendered, and is outside the symbolic. Kristeva says that the boundary between the abject and the non-abject supplants that of the boundary between gender and appears instead of it: ‘The pure/impure opposition represents (when it does not function as metaphor) the striving for identity, a difference. It appears instead of sexual difference’.  

Victor’s behaviour is that of violence towards women, he is driven by his death drive, his non-gendered Real which perhaps belongs to us all. However, like the other female writers, Rendell does not trope this bisexuality
as duplicitous femininity but keeps it unknown and unknowable. Thus, her performance of sexual difference in 
the novel is consistent with her super-egoic narration - she does not blame femininity or women for the troubles 
of society. The male adapters have, so far, deployed the hysterical discourse in order to reverse this ‘female’ 
position. In the relay of intertextuality that comprises an adaptation, they are hystericised by the female writers, 
and in turn hystericise the female/feminised characters in the films, making their heroes innocent. Almodóvar, as 
we shall see, does turn Victor into an innocent, but does not hystericise the female characters. In his radical 
change to the novel, he displaces the guilt onto the father/brother figures in his own “family melodrama”.

**Live Flesh - The Adaptation.**

Almodóvar’s film version of *Live Flesh* is certainly not Gothic, and it is not about the psychopathology 
of a serial rapist and murderer. The repercussions of changing Victor into a ‘mixed up boy with 
psychological problems, who suffers panic attacks and so on. A poor kid...’ create both a central character who 
is an innocent abroad in a world of corruption, and a change of style from the interior examination of Victor’s 
psychology to a chamber drama where the interactions between the characters form the basis for our 
identifications with the film. That the novel of *Live Flesh* impressed itself on Almodóvar is indisputable: he 
made two versions of it, the earlier version exists as *Kika* (1993):

* Kika comes from the first chapter of Ruth Rendell’s *Live Flesh*. I liked it a lot and wrote my 
own version which was completely different and eventually led to *Kika*. There are many 
genres present in *Kika*, but in a much more dangerous mix than in my other films. It’s like a 
poisonous sweet. Three quarters of the film is sugared almond, the rest is pure venom.  

The analogy between ‘sugared almond’ and ‘venom’ is quite apt, because in adapting *Live Flesh* Almodóvar 
seems both attracted by the elements of the abject in the novel and repelled by them. Abjection remains in his 
various drafts of *Live Flesh*, but unlike the novel, which contains the abject through the super-egoic narration, 
abjection in the film is treated in a very different way - valorised, even celebrated, but pushed to the periphery of 
the narrative, away from contaminating the hero and heroine and placed in the service of the villain. In the case 
of *Kika* the abject version of Victor is placed in a comic scenario and a comic character, Paul, whose function it 
is to drive the engine of the plot. Kika, the innocent heroine, is raped by Paul, watched by her impotent and 
voyeuristic husband, who videos the rape, setting off a chain of events whereby through the exchange and use of 
the video, Kika comes to know that her husband and her husband’s father - her lover - are ‘false’ and have 
betrayed her. Structurally, the source of abjection, the video-tape, becomes a source of cleansing, the production 
of a ‘clean and proper’ body for Kika and for the film. In a reversal from the book, the abject becomes
celebrated as a sign, in Kristevan terms, of infantile control over the Mother and the disciplinary world, or even a sign of the infant producing something out of his body which will clean the Mother and eject the Father, the object of the Mother’s affections, as an ‘unclean’ object. The celebration of the abject is also manifest visually in the film. As Paul starts to rape Kika she is still asleep whilst he inserts a segment of orange into her private parts and then eats it - surely an unusual exploration of the boundaries between food and the body! After the rape, Paul, who has not ‘finished’ when interrupted by the police, runs to the balcony, masturbates and ejaculates into the face of Andrea, a journalist, waiting below. In aesthetic slow motion, the sperm floats through the air and then hits her smiling upturned face. Almodóvar does not contain this ‘abjection’ through a moral framework but rather uses laughter - the comedy of Kika becoming bored, of Paul becoming heavy, of the rape becoming interminable and domesticated - in order to disavow the rape and any consequences it may have for Kika.

*) Live Flesh adopts very similar strategies to Kika towards abjection, though it is darker in tone and also more subtle in its treatment of those boundaries that create the limit of the subject and the abject response. Visually there is less celebration of abjection - Victor’s birth on the bus (Plate VIII:1 - 3) is accompanied by the graphic demonstration of his mother’s waters breaking in a medium-shot. But even this is distanced by Almodóvar immediately cutting away to a very distant shot of the bus, seen from high up in the night sky of Madrid. Both David when about to make love to Elena, and Victor whilst making love to Clara for the first time, look up at the female sexual organs, as if either to ascertain their origin, or the structure of sexual difference. However, thematically and narratively the abject is part of a different scenario. Thematically it emerges as part of a struggle for the ‘mother’ figure in the text, a later Oedipal conflict occurring between son and father, or between brothers, which reveals (‘hidden’ underneath), the original ‘overvaluation’ of the mother and the inability to find a stable relationship of dependency/independence. It is manifest as the jealousy of characters such as Sancho and David, as the overvaluation of the mother displayed by Victor, and in various scenarios of ‘breaking and entering’ where Victor enters Elena’s space without her permission, in the siege, and later at the school where unknown to Elena he takes a job. However, because Almodóvar makes Victor innocent, a ‘mixed up boy’, the moral and narrative effects of such abjection cannot be seen in his behaviour - his dream of revenge is not carried out destructively, and his ‘breaking and entering’ is seen as justified, non-violent, assertiveness in order to ‘gain the girl’. The criminal and destructive effects of abjection are relegated to the periphery of the story and the characters, to the relationship between Sancho and Clara, from whence they reach out to drive the plot. Sancho and Clara’s love-hate relationship is marked by Sancho’s pathological jealousy and by Clara’s
unfaithfulness. However, they seem to need each other: Sancho refuses to give Clara her freedom, even though she makes him miserable. Clara, until the end of the film, never really makes a bid for freedom - she goes back to Sancho when David has been shot; and although she is clearly frightened of Sancho, she still tolerates his abuse. The suffocating nature of their relationship marks an inability to define the boundary of the self and to break away from maternal influence, and Sancho's irrational and destructive jealousy is its abject symptom.

Sancho's jealousy is responsible for inaugurating the plot, for engineering events so that Victor shoots David. Clara and Sancho's battle to the death at the end of the film, their violent shooting of each other, like the rape in Kika, also purifies and cleanses the hero and heroine, enabling them innocently to pursue their objects of desire. David becomes 'infected' by Sancho’s jealousy, and in informing Sancho of Clara and Victor's affair (an act of underhand cunning as David expects Sancho to kill Victor), and he becomes guilty like Sancho, and unworthy of Elena's love. Thus, at the end of the film, Victor's rival is exposed as corrupt, disposed of, and Victor and Elena are left together, free and without guilt.

The film's attitude towards abjection is far from condemnatory. It is interesting that the sex scene between the two innocent young lovers, Victor and Elena, is quite boring and banal compared to the love making of Victor and Clara (his surrogate mother) or the relationship between Sancho and Clara. And although Victor is supposed to be 'innocent' he still has his fair share of 'abjection'; but that 'abjection' is celebrated rather than condemned. The 'siege' where Victor sneaks into Elena’s apartment is really an attempted rape (Plate X:1 - 3). He has gained entry by force and duplicity, but Victor is not punished by the narration. He is affirmed as innocent: even at the start we can see that the shooting is an accident, and we later find out that Sancho committed the crime. His desire to rape is displaced onto the television screen, where an old horror film is showing a wax dummy being dismembered and then ‘dissolved’ in an oven. Only Elena is totally innocent.

Envisaged by Almodóvar

She’s the kind of person born to do good. For her it’s a compulsive need. Making love to a paraplegic doesn’t particularly excite her, but since she’s a woman who cannot conceive of attraction outside her desire to do good, she can only express herself in a relationship with someone handicapped.42

This is a big change from Rendell’s character, Clare. Clare is ambiguous and is certainly not innocent: she could easily be using Victor when she sleeps with him, gaining sexual satisfaction with no intention of emotional commitment; and she certainly has desire, but she also has agency, and is not driven by other people or events. Elena has a sense of guilt which has no source. She believes herself responsible for Victor’s prison sentence,
and only seduces Victor when she finds he is innocent, because she feels guilty. However, she is freed from her sense of guilt by Victor, who gives her a sense of desire she can never have with David. Unlike Clare in the novel, she seems to have no agency of her own and is a completely reactive character. She is also an inconsistent character, changing from a blond-wigged drug addict with a phallic attraction for guns and an aggressive, disinterested attitude towards Victor to a suffering innocent for Victor to redeem. Instead of being jealous, when she finds the photograph of Victor and Clara that David is using to betray Victor, she is only protective of Victor. Her character is completely determined by the needs of the plot.

The inconsistency of characterisation in *Live Flesh* is actually a symptom of its operation of desire, where one narrative fantasy or figure is replaced by another. *Live Flesh* is less concerned with creating a seamless realist narrative, a ‘complete’ secondary revision, than with staging scenarios of desire, fantasies where certain figures get repeated and re-configured. Almost like a set of musical variations, these figures are played across different groups of people in different scenes. Their significance is less their coherent narrative or even their psychological meaning, but their emotional charge, their ‘affect’. The narration that Almodóvar constructs around these figures creates both a sense of coherence through the use of symbol fairy tale and voice over and also ‘bleeds’ the affect, the emotion, on to all the characters, creating fruitful ambiguities, with the use of offscreen displaced diegetic sound, music, and particularly song. Thus, Elena’s unmotivated change of character from blond to brunette, dangerous to safe, betokens her roles in two different fantasies: the first, where she is an unattainable and already corrupted object of desire and rivalry for the three men, David, Sancho and Victor, and the second, where she needs to be the attainable innocent goal for Victor’s romantic fantasy of gaining the girl. The narration smooths over this inconsistency by allowing for five years to have elapsed in the interim, and by allowing her change of character to be rationalised through her relationship to David: perhaps by caring for a paraplegic hero, she has become a caring person. The narration also provides and enables her change in role. By taking Victor’s words of condolence in the cemetery, “I will always be near” and replaying them in voice over, with slight echo, when Elena is preparing for a bath with David, she changes from a woman capable of hating Victor and threatening him with a gun to a someone who has desire for Victor. The voice over, moreover, creates an ambiguous and poignant ‘affect’: because we do not exactly know to whom it applies, it becomes both Victor’s and Elena’s desire and therefore links them formally and emotionally.
Live Flesh Opening Scene: Victor born as bastard son of Franco presented as an allegory of the Christmas story.
Poor little thing.

- Home, take Rits.

It doesn't have a name.

'Cause we don't need one.

Keep your hands to yourself occasionally.

These high heels will kill me.

You have to get it all out.

Don't worry, I won't hurt you.

I didn't want to get on.

We're on our way!

Very good! Keep going!

Leak,better, so much better!

It's a boy!
Hold him tight, you're very weak. Don't drop him.
The most prominent recurring fantasy in *Live Flesh* is the rivalry of two or more men over one woman. This figure is tessellated across the body of the film, becoming generated in different sets of characters, and even represented in the overarching allegorical structure. Its function is not purely structural, but consists of the play across the various positions in the fantasy, and of the ‘affects’ engendered in the figures of desire, jealousy, loss, maternal protection and love, male bonding. It can be Oedipal, the father and son fighting over the mother, or it can represent the rivalry of siblings. For example, the figuration between Sancho, Clara, and David at the beginning of the film is interesting, in that it seems that Sancho’s jealousy over Clara, his ‘abjection’, actually produces a rival in David. Whilst Sancho is talking to Clara on the car phone and apologising for his previous night’s domestic violence, David and Sancho are driving underneath her balcony. David looks up at the balcony and we see his desiring look up at Elena. If the contiguous images are read as causal ones, and if we do not know about David’s already established relationship with Clara, then Sancho’s telephone conversation appears to motivate David’s look of desire. Similarly, the allegorical metaphor framing the film that Victor is a ‘son of Spain’ born to redeem it from the decadent rule of Franco is an image of father-son rivalry, and is also figured in the text as a rivalry provoked by jealousy and repression (see Plate VIII). Over the opening title cards, highlighted in red (for blood, for jealousy), a voice over declares Franco’s State of Emergency. Outside at night, a man is putting up a Christmas illumination of a star. A scream interrupting the silence can be heard and the camera cranes towards the illuminated window of a Madrid apartment. Simultaneously a radio announces that disturbances of the public peace have been occurring regularly and in an organised fashion in the last several months, prompting government action. In the Madrid brothel, the Madam finds out that one of her girls is pregnant, about to give birth to Victor. If these contiguous images and sounds are read as narratively connected, the decadent regime of Franco can be seen as producing the ‘insurrection’, and through the abject battle for control, also as ‘producing’ Victor. The scream which interrupts Franco’s curfew violently heralds Victor’s birth and his battling entry into life. However, Victor is made innocent of this violence: by metaphor he is made into a Christ-like figure, born under the star at Christmas on a bus (in a manger), and he is even compared to a statue which his mother likens to a fallen angel. Victor’s filial rivalry with Franco, and his innocence, set up a narrative expectation that he will, through the course of the film, rid society of Franco’s corrupting paternal influence and supplant it with freedom and honesty: when talking to his new-born son, Victor is able to show the boy a much better society than he was born into. Victor achieves this by challenging and defeating the corruption of his surrogate father figures, David and Sancho. However, although this revolutionary overthrow of the corrupt father may be politically desirable, it is nevertheless a
psychological impossibility, and a disavowal of the Oedipus complex. In the successful resolution of the Oedipus complex, the father’s threat of castration works to introduce the son to the symbolic, the Law, and also to enable the boy to break free from his mother’s influence and find another love object. In *Live Flesh*, this disavowal is anarchically liberating, there is a strong sense of ‘anything goes’ in the way the characters sleep and fight with each other: they follow their desires but are not punished for them by the narrative. Even Sancho is allowed his jealousy: his death is noble, expressed in homage to *Duel in the Sun* as a legitimate and logical outcome to his love for Clara. Sancho follows his desire.

Disavowal is also marked in Victor’s relationship with the women in the film. Victor finds his love object, not through the rejection of his (surrogate) mother, Clara - she calls him ‘my son’ - but by sleeping with her. She teaches him about sex, and he learns enough to successfully woo Elena, who is also marked as a surrogate mother by metonymy - her address card is amongst Victor’s memorabilia of his mother. Victor’s real mother is absent - dying or dead for most of the film - but even with her there is an element of disavowal, or at least, of transgressive desire. In prison, Victor writes to his mother, telling her of his progress, his hard work, his bible study. She replies telling him of her cancer, and that she is going to leave him the house in her will. In a typical figural gesture, several images are condensed in this scene, producing an ‘affect’: the letters overlap, as if Victor and his Mother are having a conversation and their voices ‘blend’ in a harmony of desire. A pan across Victor’s belongings shows pictures and letters from his mother, a bible, and Elena’s address card, blending his love objects; and there is a displaced image of Victor’s sexuality - in the foreground of the prison cell, a man is seen masturbating, creating a sexual scenario between Victor and his offscreen Mother.

If the conquest by the son of the father can only be achieved through disavowal, and if the traversal of the Oedipus complex creates its own strong narrative, then Victor’s defeat of David is accomplished by narrative sleight of hand. In the tessellation of the figures of father/son rivalry that occur in *Live Flesh*, David and Victor swap the roles of father and son, and also become siblings, so that Victor’s defeat of David becomes possible. Although David is fairly clearly marked as bearer of the Law, a hero up on a hoarding, possessor of Elena, he never really possesses her. When he confronts Victor, he is incapable of confronting him with the phallus, as he is morally as well as literally castrated. In a figure of male rivalry, David confronts Victor in his shack and threatens him to make him leave Elena alone. Victor is exercising, doing press-ups, demonstrating his superior physical strength, and he blocks David’s threat, drawing attention to David’s castration: ‘What can you do, tell
Plate IX:

**Live Flesh, the ballad sequence.**

...they've killed my dog...

...they've killed my dog...

A deer among the frozen trees...

The deer...

We're the prisoners of a sick block...

She's the only one who matters...

Here lies the city of dreams...

...it was so happy when the sun...

...it was so happy when the sun...

...it was so happy when the sun...

Here lies the city of dreams...

Here lies the city of dreams...

The deer...

Here lies the city of dreams...

Here lies the city of dreams...

...it was so happy when the sun...
me, What can you do?’. However, his true power against David is that Victor has not attempted to seduce Elena, and that David is showing jealousy prematurely and does not have Elena’s love. Aware of Victor’s superior power, David punches Victor in the balls, and then diffuses the situation by drawing attention to a ‘goal’ scored on a television football match, creating a moment of male bonding between himself and Victor.

In Freud’s essay *Some Neurotic Mechanisms in Jealousy, Paranoia and Homosexuality* Freud argues that jealousy has associations with both homosexuality and sibling rivalry. He describes the formula ‘I do not love him, she loves him’ as a defence against a ‘particularly strong homosexual impulse’: that is, jealousy may be an expression of the closeness of feeling of the rivals fighting over the woman. This is certainly born out in *Live Flesh*, both in the male bonding of Victor and David and the relationship between David and Sancho, where David, despite having been a rival with Sancho over Clara and having been shot by him, still bandages Sancho’s wounds whilst telling Sancho of his betrayal by Clara with Victor. An early narrative figure (Plate IX: 1 - 3) places Sancho, Victor and David as siblings, fighting over women but somehow being the sons of the same mother. A traditional Spanish song, sung by a woman, tells the story of the singer’s dog, killed for chasing ‘a deer among the green rockrose’. This accompanies the images which introduce us to the adult male characters. Whilst David and Sancho patrol the night streets in their radio car, looking out on the local low-life, Victor is introduced as a pizza delivery boy, stealing money from the safe of his employer; and through a complex juxtaposition of shots with the song on the soundtrack, Victor, Sancho and David are identified as the ‘dog’ of the song and also, by implication, as the children of the ‘mother’ singing on the soundtrack. Sancho and David on patrol are sheepdogs protecting the ‘flock’: Sancho remarks ‘Dogs, look at the lambs we have to protect’, but Victor is also clearly the singer’s dog, as he is first seen on his moped, accompanying the lyrics ‘You’ll never find another dog like my dog’. However, Sancho is also marked out as the ‘wolf’, the threat to the other siblings, both through the lyrics which accompany his image (‘There wasn’t a wolf who would come near the lambs on the riverbank’) and also through his cynical dialogue, his disgust for the ordinary people on the street, one of whom is Victor. The song is immediately followed by Sancho’s revelation to David that Clara is having an affair, and that Sancho is prepared to kill either Clara or the man concerned. This further associates Sancho with the killer of the dog: we know he is going to attempt to kill someone, and the two people he damages are David, whom he shoots, and Victor whom he puts in prison, both of them the singer’s ‘dog’. The use of the song as metaphor sets up narrative expectations - we know someone will be ‘killed’. It also tells us how to think about the characters: Victor and David as innocent ‘dogs’, Elena as the ‘deer’, Sancho as the ‘wolf’
Plate X: 1

Live Flesh - Victor breaks into Helena's flat. David gets shot.

Victor enters Hall

Elena watches television

Returns to Elena

Elena talks to Victor

Hot balcony

The kiss that links Elena with Victor's mother.

Elena - Like Sancho talks to Elena at

Victor enters flat

Live Flesh - Victor breaks into Helena's flat. David gets shot.

Elena talks to Helena

Victor rides the free bus until he

Victor-like Sancho, talks to Elena at

Victor breaks into Helena's flat. David gets shot.
Elena: "Let's go!"

Victor: "Victor!"

David and Sancho raise their guns.

Elena: "Tell me, girl!"

Victor: "What's your name?"

David and Sancho see Victor and Elena fighting.
SANCHO GRASPS THE GUN AND SHOOTS DAVID.
and allows the characters to be substitutable for each other in basically the same scenario. Clara becomes the 'deer' for Sancho and David and Elena becomes the 'deer' for Victor, David and Sancho, David becomes the 'dog' for Clara, Victor becomes the 'dog' for Elena - in a series of displacements where the function of the character and their role in the scenario is more important than any particular character traits they might have. Together with this, there is an extremely mobile inhabiting of the different emotional points of view of the characters. The song imbues all the characters with the same sad, nostalgic significance, placing them in the same emotional space and drawing attention to the story which links them. At the siege, the climax is an extremely subjective slow motion shot, which nevertheless occupies no one's point of view, and is therefore subjective for everyone in the scene. David manages to persuade Victor to lower his gun, and Elena moves over in slow motion to behind where David is standing, in a slow motion track which ends over Victor's shoulder, emphasising that he has lost Elena. David and Elena look at each other, a look of desire passes between them. Then as the camera, still moving, arrives at Sancho, it speeds up to normal speed, and Sancho leaps on Victor struggling for the gun, implying that he has seen the intricate moves of exchange and desire, and has exploited them for his own ends. The linking of the characters' subjectivity in one shot, emphasises that the film occupies all the positions of its fantasy, and that the fantasy is in the particular staging of the characters, in their mise en scène (see Plate X for accompanying stills).

Part of the mise en scène of the film's desire is the passivity of the hero, and also the impossible distance of the object of desire. The female figure is often not visible, but 'acousmatic'. The acousmatic is a term used by Michel Chion in his book *Audio-Vision: Sound on Screen* to describe an offscreen voice which has more imaginative power precisely because the viewer is not stuck with a fixed visual image. His example is the terrifying mother in *Psycho* whom we hear before we see. In *Live Flesh*, the mother is often acousmatic, an offscreen voice as in the song or in Victor's mother's letters. This creates the figure as omnipotent and nostalgic, the mother of childhood, but also as unattainable. However, this unattainability also creates pleasure and desire, hence all the shots of desiring male characters looking at their loved ones through glass, or separated by height. David and Sancho look up with desire at Clara in the window of her balcony, watering her plants, their slowly moving car tracking their desire. Victor, similarly, sees Elena up on her balcony, unattainable, and must sneak into her flat in order to see her. When Victor first finds Elena again, he is separated from her by the crowds at the funeral, and again when he makes his way to her school he spends time looking through the window at her teaching, unobserved except by one small girl. This distance and passivity is reflected in Victor's
fantasy which forms his motivation for the film. Because Elena had accused him of being a bad lover, a 'jerk off', he will learn how to make love, make passionate love to her, 'split her in two', leave her, and then she will beg him to come back, which he will refuse to do. This fantasy, although very similar to the classic 'boy meets girl, boy loses girl, boy gains girl' fantasy, is marked by its passivity. When Elena learns of Victor's innocence and comes to talk to him on the bench outside the school, he does not try to seduce her, but goes to work in a fish factory. He waits until she comes to his bedroom and takes all her clothes off and seduces him. Victor does undergo a typical 'epic' male trial in order to win Elena - i.e. he learns how to make love, by being taught by Clara - but actually he is quite passive in his interaction with Elena. She comes to him because of her knowledge that Sancho shot David, that Victor was innocent, and not through any action of Victor's. Victor is set up by the narration as a classic fairy tale hero: he even gets a 'magic' bus pass, but he never uses it in order to gain his 'goal', to get to Elena or to win her love, he merely rides around the city on the bus, using his ride as a delaying tactic before breaking into Elena's flat. Also, because Victor is made innocent by the narration, he does not enact the whole of his fantasy himself. His desire for revenge is quieted when Elena reveals she knows he did not shoot David, and when he makes love to her, he does not leave her, but they become a couple. The revenge is displaced onto Sancho and Clara, whose relationship is one where Clara is forever rejecting Sancho, no matter how often he begs her; and onto David, who refuses to take back Elena because she pities him.

**Sexual Difference in the Film**

The two overarching stories in the film of *Live Flesh* - the story of how Victor wins Elena and the story of how Victor defeats his father figures, both metaphorical (Franco), and narrative (David and Sancho), instituting a better world for the son - creates an allegory of sexual and political freedom in the new Spanish democracy. The circular trope of the Christmas story, with Victor born under a star and with the innocent couple giving birth on another Christmas Eve whilst their surrogate family - the school - celebrate over the model of Jesus's crib and manger, creates a metaphorical closure for the story whereby the jealousy and abjection of the characters is evacuated, along with David's exile outside Spain and placed outside Victor's close family circle. Nevertheless, the film has very little to do with the structure of the novel: its Oedipal construction of masculinity and its maternal saint/whore fantasy seems to have very little to say to, or about, actual women. The use of women as objects of exchange, the female characters' lack of consistency, their lack of agency, all point to a certain insensitivity within the film towards women as people or to feminist sexual politics. However, the disavowal of the father, and his defeat in the story, is a transgressive refusal of 'the Law', and the film, in its
rebellion, its amoral refusal to judge its characters, and its use of the sound track to show the desires of more than one character simultaneously, creates an aesthetic of freedom and liberating energy. In the texture of the film, in the mise en scène, in the desire of the characters for impossible union, their inability to separate sufficiently, there exists a more universal experience, a pre-gendered experience that women and men share, and the art with which Almodóvar plays with these mises-en-scene creates a visual and aural pleasure which has little to do with the actual plot.

**Conclusion**

Nicholas Roeg, in *Don't Look Now* (*F*), managed to preserve the structure of the short story, to retain emotionally the narrative trajectory of John's life, the 'feminine' side of his character, even to create a way of inhabiting the interior lives of the characters of the short story. He did this by using images, by using a flashback of a child's death to find a valid way of transferring the first person narration of the short story to the more neutral telling of the film, and to a great extent to preserve the psychological structures of the short story. Hitchcock, in *Strangers on a Train* (*F*), managed both to eliminate Guy's guilt, and preserve it as an element of ambivalence within the film. Almodóvar's version of *Live Flesh*, is almost completely different from the novel and is a very free adaptation. I have argued that, instead of picking up on the hysteria in Rendell's novel, Almodóvar is intrigued and captivated by the book's abject possibilities, dramatising and expanding upon these in the film. It is obviously not possible to generalise from this that male directors are either faithful or unfaithful in their adaptations, or that all male directors are hystericised by the female voice of the writers with whom they intertextually converse. Perhaps, like the Tolstoy statement about family life which starts *War and Peace*, all faithful adaptations are alike, but unfaithful adaptations are unlike in their own fashion. *Live Flesh* (*F*) is an adaptation which shows how a multiplicity of influences and conditions can be accommodated in a film which can still become an autonomous and self-contained work. There is no sense of deformation in the film - its plot and characters have a consistency and logic that need no reference to the novel in order to be complete. It shifts time and space across countries, across genres, even its positive tone is completely different from the novel's pessimism. Somehow the codes of the film still manage to interact in a productive manner even though they have veered tangentially away from those in the novel. Perhaps the film is able to marshal its codes to create such a different fantasy from the book precisely because it is free of hysterical agency. However, the psychoanalytic concentration on abjection and on jealousy may come from a cultural history in Spain and the Latin countries, which have tended to value dramas of jealousy and passion. The dance forms of the tango and paso doble, the bullfight, dramas and operas which act as archetypes such as Bizet's *Carmen* with its Spanish
setting, constitute a genre which has its own performance of sexual difference. This generic effect can be seen in *Live Flesh* (F) in the reference to *Duel in the Sun*. Sancho and Clara die in a parody of the death of the characters played Gregory Peck and Jennifer Jones in the earlier Hollywood western, itself a markedly "latin" influenced film. This melodramatic "latin" genre is itself a macho genre and yet one might still expect it to be differently interpreted by men and women as they differently interpret their culture. As in the thriller, women creators might perform sexual difference differently from men and have a different scale of values within a culturally accepted norm. Nevertheless, in *Live Flesh* the macho aesthetic is "turned" to celebrate Victor’s passivity, to celebrate abjection and to celebrate democracy in what has been seen critically as a "queer aesthetic". It is here that the film-makers have performed their agency. Thus the creators of *Live Flesh* are its agents however imbricated the film is in its culture. They are at the enunciating position able to bring together all the diverse influences and intertexts (including the Rendell novel) and the text’s desire must therefore be seen as theirs. Given that Almodóvar is the delegated “author” of *Live Flesh* and is a powerful enough institutional figure to create his own production company and to hire his own team, the enunciating position may be reasonably delegated to him. Directing is then the act of craft needed to marshal the diverse dialogics of the text and the diverse desires of the contributors to the film and make them into a coherent framework.

From the previous chapters, I have discovered that where a book written by a woman has been adapted by a predominantly male film industry, the writer’s attitude to her male and female characters has been subverted and changed in the film. This relay of discourse inevitably leads to the deforming or silencing of female voices, and this suppression and repression to a cultural hystericisation of those voices. In Chapter Six, I look at how this hystericisation can be countered by a psychoanalytic working through which itself creates an agency which demands to be heard and how the work of Virginia Woolf, in *Mrs Dalloway* (N) and the film adaptation, provide an example of such a working through as cultural intervention, as work of art.
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3 Hunter, Evan. Me and Hitch (Faber and Faber, 1996).
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11 Punter, David The Literature of Terror, 183.
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14 Rendell, Ruth Live Flesh, 28.
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16 Rendell, Ruth Live Flesh, 92.
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21 Kristeva, Julia The Powers of Horror, 2.
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23 Rendell, Ruth Live Flesh, 226.
24 Rendell, Ruth Live Flesh, 55.
25 Rendell, Ruth Live Flesh, 49.
26 Rendell, Ruth Live Flesh, 213.
27 Brontë, Charlotte Jane Eyre(1846).
28 Dickens, Charles Great Expectations (1860).
29 Joanna Russ, Somebody’s Trying to Kill Me and I Think It’s My Husband’ Quoted from Avril Horner and Sue Zlosnik Daphne du Maurier, 100.
30 Rendell, Ruth Live Flesh, 76.
31 Rendell, Ruth Live Flesh, 22.
32 Rendell, Ruth Live Flesh, 22.
33 Kristeva, Julia The Powers of Horror, 42.
35 Rendell, Ruth Live Flesh, 81.
36 Punter, David The Literature of Terror, 191.
37 Rendell, Ruth Live Flesh, 81.
38 Butler, Judith Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (London: Routledge, 1990), 45.
39 Kristeva. The Powers of Horror, 82.
40 Almodóvar, Pedro Almodóvar on Almodóvar, 150.
41 Almodóvar, Pedro Almodóvar on Almodóvar, 124.
42 Almodóvar, Pedro Almodóvar on Almodóvar, 150.
43 Freud, Sigmund “Some Neurotic Mechanisms in Jealousy, Paranoia and Homosexuality” (S.E. Vol IX).
The branding of Almodóvar as a “queer” film-maker stems from his own biography and the marketing of his earlier films which played with ideas of transvestism and queerness and has also been comprehensively written about in Paul Julian Smith’s *Desire Unlimited; The Cinema of Pedro Almodóvar* (Verso 1994).
CHAPTER SIX: Introduction

Mrs Dalloway

In the previous four chapters I have looked at thrillers as portraying sexual difference and sexuality under threat from trauma which comes from both outside and within the characters. I have argued that men and women establish sexual difference only with great difficulty, and that these texts dramatise this difficulty. The fragile establishment of sexual difference, I have argued, creates hysteria where, in the attempt to find out the answer to the question “What Sex am I?”, the individual looks to the Other for the answer, alternately worshipping and denigrating the opposite sex. I have considered that this hysteria is differently performed by men and women due to their asymmetrical subject positions vis-à-vis sexual difference, and that the texts represent this symptomatology of hysteria as it is represented in the different creative writing of men and women. In this chapter and the next, through an analysis of Mrs Dalloway (Marlene Gorris, 1998) based on the novel written by Virginia Woolf in 1924 and crewed by a predominantly female team,¹ I show how the hysteria inseparable from the assumption of sexual difference is imbricated within an abusive and non-egalitarian patriarchal culture. I argue that patriarchy is itself a hysterical discourse oppressing men and women alike, and show how the working through of trauma may create a more equal, fair and kind society. My argument will be to show that patriarchy’s silencing of voices - in particular the female authorial voice - can be fought by the working through of trauma, and that this working through is itself creative and reparative.

Mrs Dalloway is an example of contemporary female authorship and agency within the cinema as a predominantly female authored film. It is also an exploration of the problematics of authorship (or more strictly - female agency) within a patriarchal environment. Both film and novel dramatise issues of subjectivity, agency and voice in ways which illuminate the treatment of these issues in relationship to the thrillers I have already considered, although I shall be considering the film as the primary text for my analysis. My thesis here is that there is a congruence of each text - the book and the film are each self-consciously female interventions in their chosen media. Mrs Dalloway is not a thriller but a drama which
historicises and contextualises the issues I have been exploring around gender, hysteria and authorship. I will therefore be using the text of film and book, not to create an analysis which looks at the differences between the two, but looking at it as a performance of, and an insight into, female voice and agency. The narration of both texts blends the thoughts and memories of a group of tangentially connected characters with their social interactions on a particular day, exploring the relationship between interpersonal relationships - friendships, social and power relationships - and the inner lives of the characters, their desires and needs, their immediate sensations and responses, their psychological outlooks. Thus a model of subjectivity as performative, interacting with and being moulded by others, is enacted by *Mrs Dalloway*. Moreover, as a consequence of the particular model of subjectivity employed in *Mrs Dalloway*, female subjectivity is released from its reduction to the merely psychic components of sexual difference, as the hysterical projection of femininity as lack or threat, and onto the women characters. *Mrs Dalloway*, in its eponymous central character, Clarissa, creates what I propose as “a signifier of femaleness” - a female character seen in her political, social and psychological context, who is sustained through the narrative as fully human, more than just an inscription of femininity.

*Mrs Dalloway* has another aspect, however. I shall argue that the film and the novel are also interested in a broader social/political analysis. They dramatises the debilitating effect of the misuse of power on individuals, male and female alike, inhibiting their “voices” - the full expression of their subjectivities, and paralysing them as social agents. The voice of the narration, its aesthetic and ethical outlook, is achieved through the juxtaposition of the characters and their narratives. The story of Septimus, the shell-shocked soldier who kills himself in order to avoid being committed to a mental hospital, is juxtaposed with the story of Clarissa’s day, her party, and how she comes to terms with the traumatic events of her past. Clarissa’s creativity, her ability to use the story of Septimus to work through her own feelings, and her efforts to repair the world which she finds so dangerous, become the ethics of the film as a whole, which finds, in human empathy and creativity, a weapon against the bullying discourses of society, and their embodiments in thoughtless or cruel individuals. Thus, *Mrs Dalloway* sets up the possibility of fighting the hysterical and hystericising discourse of patriarchy, not through an equivalent female hysteria but through a process of working through, a psychoanalytic and social process of understanding and repair.
How does the film dramatise the issues outlined above? In order to explore the voice and agency of the narration in portraying the "voice" and "agency" of the characters, I propose to split this chapter into two parts. Part I is a consideration of the dramatic form of Mrs Dalloway and how narrative voice and agency are deployed to build a portrait of Clarissa and the other characters. Part II is a discussion of how voice and agency are conceptualised thematically in Mrs Dalloway, as social/political/psychological meanings in the film: how the film's dramatisation of trauma and the overcoming of trauma through intersubjective empathy, and sublimation is an argument for the exercise of personal voice and agency to defeat and surmount oppression.

1 See Appendix 1 for a more detailed outline of the various crew details, and short production history.
Mrs Dalloway: Opening Sequence.
CHAPTER SIX: Part One

Dramatic form in *Mrs Dalloway*

The film builds a series of juxtapositions, rhymes and contrasts between the characters and contrasts between the characters and their memories, and these juxtapositions create complex chains of associations in the viewer. The themes of the film are implicit in these associations, embedded throughout the film, rather like a stick of seaside rock which has the word "Blackpool" stamped indelibly throughout its length. Yet they are also cumulative, gaining refinements and further ramifications through the buildup of images and their conjunction. The narration builds a series of social relationships, relationships that occur between a diverse set of characters on a day in London, a set of mini-narratives which accumulate around Clarissa and her own narrative. Through a series of flashbacks, it also creates the perspectives of the characters, their subjectivity, their character voice. Below follows a close analysis of the opening of the film, showing the establishment of patterns of juxtaposition and their synthesis into an implicit statement of some of the themes of the film.

The film starts with an archetypal scene from the First World War. In the trenches, an unidentified young soldier, approached in a slow tracking mid-shot through the fog of shell-fire, shouts frantically to a fellow soldier who we do not see - "Evans, don't come!" [Plate XI: shot 1]. The camera cuts to what we presume is the young soldier's point of view of no-man's land, a shell explodes in the foreground, blowing apart soil, and presumably bodies [shot 2]. However, once the smoke has dispersed the camera continues to track in at the same angle towards the young man as in shot 1. We thus share the soldier's emotional point of view, whilst also looking at him. The young soldier reacts to the explosion, sinking momentarily beneath the trench, and then looks aghast towards the explosion [shot 2 (shot 1 contd.)]. We deduce from the young soldier's reaction that the unseen Evans has been killed. The camera films his weary reactions in slow motion. On the sound track, along with the wistful, slightly enigmatic, theme on piano and violin which has accompanied the scene, the sounds of gunfire and warfare are slowed down and distorted, giving us access to the young man's subjectivity, as well as marking the scene as a possible memory. In a condensed minute of screen time we are presented with all the information we will need to know about the young man's psychological state, whilst also being confronted with a narrative enigma which has yet to be
resolved. The young man fails to prevent the death of his comrade, but this death, I shall argue, will be read as somehow symbolically also his own. We do not see Evans, and the intensity and significance of the experience is projected on the young soldier's face. Yet we do not know the young man's name or his significance in a film entitled Mrs Dalloway. Matters do not immediately become clearer. Smoke wipes out the image, and the camera then match dissolves to the white of Clarissa Dalloway's net curtains as she looks in the mirror in her peaceful bedroom - which a subtitle tells us is five years later - still accompanied by the same musical theme [shot 3]. We may recognise Clarissa as the Mrs Dalloway of the title, but what is her connection to the young man, and how is her story connected to the war? Perhaps he is her son, and she is thinking about him? (We later learn that Clarissa has no prior connection with the young man.) Dressed in a blue-grey summer coat which perfectly coordinates with the quiet grey of her bedroom, and with her yellow feather hat, a dash of colour and vibrancy in her otherwise completely tasteful sobriety, she looks at herself in the mirror, preparing to go out, but also musing on fate: “Those ruffians the gods shan’t have it all their own way, the gods who never lose a chance of hurting, thwarting, spoiling human lives, are seriously put out if, all the same, you behave like a lady”. The reference to the cruelty of the gods certainly seems to connect to the previous war scene, but the five years' time delay and Clarissa's actions in dressing seem to undercut a direct narrative connection and to imply a thematic, metaphorical, rather than a causal link to the scene of war and death. The end of Clarissa's statement, her defiant intention to behave “like a lady” again creates an enigma. What might Clarissa mean by this, and how does it relate to fighting the Gods who create war? As the camera pulls out, Clarissa is framed in long shot so that she appears doubled through the symmetry of her reflection in the full-length mirror, the light from the window illuminating both herself and her image. This is a moment of contemplation, self-reflection, showing how “the cruelties of the world” affect Clarissa, who is threatened with hurt, and whose defence is to behave like a ‘lady’. Clarissa elegantly descends the staircase of the airy townhouse, every inch a lady, and yet her thoughts convey the tension and effort this costs: “Of course, now I think there are no gods, there’s no one to blame. It’s so very dangerous to live for only one day” [shot 4, MCU Clarissa descending]. The mixture of her personal and intimate voice-over and the objective distanced way in which she is filmed gives a mildly ironic impression of Clarissa, an impression which she herself echoes in her slightly self-mocking address. She enters the dining room, where her young maidservant is cleaning glasses and, exchanging friendly words about the
details of the day, smiles in a gesture, childlike in its mixture of reserve and excitement - "What a day, what a day, Lucy, for my party". [shot 5, 6 and 7. MS reverses on Clarissa and Lucy]. An enigma is suddenly resolved. Whatever danger Clarissa fears is challenged by her giving a party. She will dispel the dark gloom of the war by living life to the full. She will put a yellow feather in her hat to set off the grey of her clothes and the grey in her hair. Yet the party also threatens Clarissa’s happiness: it might go wrong, because “it’s so dangerous to live for only one day”. Clarissa goes down the hallway [shot 8 MS Clarissa].

As she opens the front door [shot 8, MCU Clarissa] and emerges into the outside world, [shot 9 Action match, MCU Clarissa] we see the excitement on her face as her voice-over registers her thoughts: “What a lark”. The camera cuts with an action match to a similar framing of a young woman flinging open a set of French windows and emerging, as Clarissa’s voice continues - “What a plunge”, and then the young woman repeats exactly these words - “What a plunge”, aloud to herself [shot 10 MS Clarissa], and runs joyously out into the gardens of a large country house [shot 11, Wide crane shot]. Clarissa runs through gardens towards us, whilst camera pulls up and out. Through the action match, and through the voicing by the young woman of Clarissa’s interior monologue, we realise that she is Clarissa in her youth: and yet this is no simple flashback. The action of emerging over a threshold - across the doors, through the French windows - unites old and young Clarissa in a gesture, a bid for freedom, so that as well as acting as a flashback, the juxtaposition of these images poses a series of connotations that create, for the viewer, an impression of Clarissa’s consciousness. We may infer thus that her excitement about her forthcoming party leads her to project herself back into her youth. As well as remembering her first venture across the threshold of life, Clarissa becomes Young Clarissa, she is inhabited by her younger self and feels the same joy as she did when young. The camera cuts back to see the mature Clarissa walking down the road [shot 14], reinforcing the contrast between her youthful freedom of movement and liberated covering of space and the sedate and conventional older self she has become. The film is a meditation on aging, as well as an exploration of the relationship between the war and Mrs Dalloway.

I have described the opening moments of Mrs Dalloway in order to demonstrate the subtlety of the film’s narration, its associative yet undemonstrative mode. What the narration has set up in this exposition are clear thematic strands, questions brought up through the juxtapositions, such as the relationship of war
and death to "behaving like a lady", ageing and youth, and an idea of romance in Clarissa's party. Whether these themes will all be separate or will impinge on each other has yet to be determined by the rest of the film. It has established Clarissa's subjectivity through her voice-over and through the device of the flashback - which is more than a pure flashback but unites two time periods and two actresses in one dramatic sensibility. We have a sense both of what Clarissa is thinking and feeling, and also of her accumulated history, her past living within her present. The narration has, to a lesser extent, established a subjectivity for the young man. The slow motion, the distorted soundtrack, and the way we see the young man but not his friend, enable us to understand what the young soldier is feeling. The film organises its character voices as a multi-vocality, where we gain access to different characters' perceptions and to their different perspectives on life. In addition, placing Septimus and Clarissa in juxtaposition creates the beginnings of a series of parallel actions or narrative strands, which nevertheless also appear to be causally connected. The juxtaposition encourages the viewer to look for a literal connection between Clarissa and Septimus, especially as Clarissa's thoughts about the "cruelty of the gods" seem to connect so directly with the previous scene, but withhold until later the information needed resolve this enigma. There is an ambiguity and a tenuousness which is later reinforced by the traumatic and contingent encounter between Clarissa and Septimus at the florist, and even later when Septimus's death is reported to Clarissa as the death of an unknown war veteran. However, the viewer is also prompted by the juxtaposition to read the conjunction of Septimus and Clarissa as a metaphor, to read the scene where Septimus fails to prevent Evans's death as emblematic of the First World War as a whole, where soldiers saw their comrades killed, and to read Clarissa's fear of the Gods as the subsequent effects of the war on a devastated generation. The juxtaposition acts retrospectively as a simile, because we later discover that Clarissa's fear is related to her whole life and reached its apotheosis at Bourton when she had to choose whom to marry. We therefore ask what Clarissa's fear has to do with Septimus's trauma, and whether there is something psychologically connecting the two characters, who appear to be living very different lives under different circumstances. Finally, and again through the montage, the narration creates an ambiguity with regard to whether the film is internally focalised through Clarissa. Was she really thinking of the young man at the front, when standing at her bedroom mirror? Or was the narration juxtaposing the scenes outside Clarissa's consciousness for the viewer to make their own connections between Septimus and Clarissa? The use of this type of
ambiguity will continue throughout Mrs Dalloway, eliding the thoughts of Clarissa with those of the narration, and therefore, at key moments of the film, creating her as the voice of the narration, so that at those moments she seems to filter the whole narrative world of the film, to have the subjectivity of the film, in other words, to seem to have a voice "of her own".

These opening scenes establish what I shall call the poetic, associative mode of the narration. The film has not yet started to unfold, to develop the strands of character subjectivity, narrative and imagery across its entirety. The montage creates a chain of associations which is not delimitable, and which can only be constructed by the viewer through inference, through the active "reading" of the text. Through montage, the narration maps out the characters’ relationships to each other: it begins to lend them their different perspectives and thoughts - their “voices” - and arranges them in such a way as to create the film’s narrative voice, orchestrating the characters different “voices” and creating narrative, thematic and poetic associations between them.

In describing the juxtapositions of Mrs Dalloway as poetic I am relying on Formalist linguistic concepts, particularly Roman Jakobson’s definition of poetry. Jakobson’s theory is based on Ferdinand de Saussure’s concept of the linguistic sign, which consists of a signifier and a signified. The signifier is the word, in particular, its sound, which indicates the concept or signified which it stands in for. For example:

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\text{arbre} \quad \text{\quad} \quad \text{\quad} (\text{concept } \text{ tree})
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The relationship between the signifier and the signified is arbitrary, conventional, based on the syntagmatic axis of addition (i.e. the sentence structure) and the paradigmatic axis of substitution (i.e. the class of words which tree might belong to, for example, branch, root, etc.) In “Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic Disturbances” (1956), Jakobson distinguishes two types of language use, metonymic and metaphoric. Metonymic connections are the combinative connections which allow for the syntagmatic build up of sentences, and rely on a stable relationship between signifier and signified. Jakobson finds a
The preponderance of this type of connection in nineteenth century literature, which uses detail and synecdoche to create realism (he also finds it in popular cinema through the camera's use of part of the human body to signify the whole, for example the close up). Metaphoric substitution, for Jakobson, is the root of poetic thinking, and lies on the paradigmatic axis of sentence structure. The ability to find sets of words which can fill the same space in a sentence creates the potential which allows one word to stand in for another, one concept for another. In poetry, the rhythmic and rhyme structure enables words to become metaphoric in this way, connotatively building up associations and metaphors which enrich or make fresh (i.e. loosen the relationship of the signifier to the signified) the meaning or usage of that word:

Since poetry is focused upon the sign, and pragmatical prose primarily on the referent, tropes and figures were studied mainly as poetic devices. The principle of similarity underlies poetry; the metrical parallelism of lines or the phonic equivalence of rhyming words prompts the question of semantic similarity and contrast; there exist, for instance, grammatical and antigrammatical but never agrammatical rhymes. Prose, on the contrary, is forwarded essentially by contiguity. Thus for poetry, metaphor, and for prose, metonymy - is the line of least resistance...

In 1981, Christian Metz further qualified Jakobson's ideas and elaborated how they apply to film. In "Metaphor/Metonymy or the Imaginary Referent," Metz argues for a structural similarity between metaphor and metonymy as tropes revealing the processes of the unconscious. Metonymy and metaphor operate both to censor and to bring to light the operation of primary processes, i.e. the drives, and are metalinguistic figures which enable access to the unconscious to be glimpsed as both the failure and the operation of the secondary process (or secondary revision). The analogy between film and dream complicates, but does not invalidate, Jakobson's analysis. Instead, Metz creates a further set of finer distinctions within Jakobson's categories, by distinguishing metaphor and metonymy as operating at the level of reference, whereas syntagm and paradigm operate at the level of discourse. Thus, Metz's schema is as follows:-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Similarity</th>
<th>Contiguity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discursive level</td>
<td>Paradigm</td>
<td>Syntagm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referential level</td>
<td>Metaphor</td>
<td>Metonymy^5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Unlike written or spoken language film has no “double articulation”, i.e. no discrete units of language at the level of the phoneme, but instead operates as a photographic representation of reality, syntagmatic in nature: each shot follows the previous shot, and sequences build in temporality (24 frames a second) to create the filmic totality. Cinema is, then, essentially contiguous, prone to metonymic rather than metaphoric constructions: it is more common to find a part representing the whole in a film than a comparison of two entirely separate images which stand in for each other, and yet the metonymy of the cinema frequently works at a higher level, as a further metaphor. The examples given by Constance Penley illustrate this particular feature of film figuration: a directly metaphorical sequence such as the juxtaposition of the bulls and the massacre of the workers in Eisenstein’s Strike (1924) is relatively rare, whereas the metonymic use of the little girl’s balloon, standing in for her murdered soul/body, in Fritz Lang’s M (1931) is a frequently used filmic device, and one which condenses into a further overall metaphor - the girl’s balloon comes to displace the girl herself. Thus film is prone to what Metz calls “overdetermination”, where the figuration becomes readable at different levels of signification, and metonymy is capable of being simultaneously metaphor, and vice-versa. However, implicit in Metz’s analysis is the immanence of the film figures of metonymy and metaphor. They do not exist inherently within the filmic text on a phonemic level, but can only be recognised/constructed by the viewer.

_Mrs Dalloway_ can be seen in the light of Jakobson’s definitions of metonymy and metaphor as akin to prose and poetry: the contiguous ordering of events into plot being the metonymic level and the use of flashback and juxtaposition as the metaphorical level of the plot. As Metz stressed, metaphor and metonymy exist simultaneously within a film, and it is through the overdetermination of the different levels operating in _Mrs Dalloway_ that plot, the immanent effects of multi-vocal character subjectivity, and the voice of the narration, its themes and preoccupations, are created. This conjunction is central to enabling an understanding of the poetic interrelationship created in _Mrs Dalloway._

_Mrs Dalloway_ consists of a series of narrative strands which interrelate in both metonymic and metaphoric modes. The strands are woven together to tell the story (the metonymic-contiguous level) of _Mrs Dalloway_, which takes place on a single summer’s day and evening. It is the day of Clarissa’s party, a
party she is throwing for her husband’s political friends - he is a prominent Member of Parliament - and for her own close friends, some of whom she has not seen since her youth. She spends the day in anticipation, preparing for the party, going to the florist to arrange flowers for the table display, sewing her evening gown, resting in order to preserve her fragile health - she has a heart condition - and also in reminiscence, contemplating her past. Throughout the day she has a series of encounters with other people who range from those she knows extremely well - such as members of her family, an old suitor, an old friend to contingent encounters with near strangers such as Miss Kilman (a friend of her daughter’s), and a momentary encounter with a total stranger, the shell-shocked war veteran, Septimus, whom she glimpses at the florist’s window and whose distress affects Clarissa, shocking her and imprinting Septimus on her memory. The narration of the film follows both Clarissa and her day, but also follows several of the other characters, setting up a multi-stranded narrative through a series of parallel actions and character flashbacks. These narrative strands are set both in the present and in the past. The strands in the present encompass the stories of other characters, such as Septimus, his wife Rezia, Miss Kilman, and characters even more marginal to Clarissa’s life such as Lady Bruton - a political operator who invites Clarissa’s husband, Richard, to lunch in order to enlist his help on her plans to help young people to emigrate to Canada - and Sir William Bradshaw, the neurologist whom Septimus consults during the day, and who arranges for his committal. The only direct encounter that Clarissa has that day with Lady Bruton and Sir William occurs because they are invited guests to her party. There is also a significant narrative strand in which Clarissa’s past, her youth spent at her family home at Bourton, is remembered both by herself and by those who share this past. At the party, all these narrative strands are brought together and concluded, filtered through Clarissa’s consciousness as she stands alone thinking at an open window in a darkened room away from the party. The conclusion of these narratives enables Clarissa to resolve her own personal narrative of how her past relates to her present and to be able to rejoin the party, satisfied that it is a success.

What are the various narratives that are so carefully interwoven? Below are the major narrative strands and their links through character and their resolutions at the party.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Narrative Strand</th>
<th>Resolution/conclusion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Clarissa’s day and her party. Her meetings with various people</td>
<td>The party is a success. The other</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
during the day, and her anxiety that the party should be a success. The party where her old friends turn up.

2 Septimus suffering from shell-shock due to his inability to save his friend Evans from being killed in battle within his view. The effect of Septimus’s shell-shock on his marriage to Rezia, his interview with Sir William Bradshaw. Sir William’s arrangement to commit Septimus to a mental home because he has threatened suicide, against Septimus’s and Rezia’s wishes. Septimus’s suicide.

3 Memories at Bourton, thirty years earlier, shared by Clarissa, her old suitor, Peter Walsh, her husband Richard, and her best friend, Sally. Clarissa’s tempestuous relationship with Peter, his need to possess her, and her disruption of Clarissa’s love for Sally. Clarissa’s meeting with Richard, and her decision to marry him. Clarissa’s rejection of Peter, and her subsequent attempt to keep Peter’s friendship, and include him in her boating outing.

4 Lady Bruton’s plans to help young people who cannot find work to emigrate to Canada.

5 Elizabeth Dalloway’s day. Her decision whether to defy her mother and go with Miss Kilman to see the Reverend Whitaker, or to disappoint Miss Kilman and go to her mother’s party. Miss Kilman’s attempt to persuade Elizabeth to stay with her.

What is demonstrated by this diagram is how contingent juxtaposition creates connections. Each narrative strand is intricately connected to the others. By placing Clarissa at the centre of a narrative web which flows outwards towards the peripheral characters, who then become unexpectedly connected, *Mrs Dalloway* enacts a human connectivity, a version of “Six Degrees of Separation”, the idea that any two people in the world can be linked together by a chain of no more than six people. For example, by
arranging for Hugh to introduce Sir William Bradshaw to Lady Bruton, the narration connects the story of Septimus to the story of Lady Bruton's emigration plans, and also connects the past at Bourton - Peter's condemnation of Hugh as shallow - with Hugh's present, as a political fixer, an oiler of the wheels of power. Concomitantly, the sense of responsibility for one another which this connectivity should engender is shown not to be operative within the world of the film. Septimus is kept insulated from the party and from the lives of the other characters, although his story implicates them in a kind of responsibility: they are only able to party because he has fought in the war for them, and died for them. Elizabeth, who goes past Septimus's flat on the bus, has no idea of his existence; and although Peter actually bumps into Septimus in Regent's Park, he does not know that the ambulance he praises for being part of modern technological progress is carrying away Septimus's corpse. Even Clarissa, who is affected by seeing Septimus earlier at the florist and remembers the encounter when she gets home, does not know that Septimus is the "young man" whose suicide Sir William Bradshaw reports to her. The narration links Septimus to Clarissa through their accidental meeting, and her creative use of his story enables her to see his death as a sacrifice, enabling her to embrace life. Yet the narration shows that, from the perspective of the society in which Clarissa belongs, Septimus is hidden from view, his life reduced to a simple problem which can be solved through exile, either to Canada or to the asylum where Sir William Bradshaw planned to send him. The narration, therefore, creates links between the narrative strands, and these links create associations and meanings for the viewer, meanings which may be implicit, inferred not from what is dramatised in the plot of the film but from montage, from the inter-relationship of all the elements of the film.

_Mrs Dalloway_'s multi-stranded narrative enables also a textual multi-vocality: the narration enables the viewer to imaginatively enter the thoughts and "voices" of several of the characters whilst pursuing their narratives. These "voices" also emerge from the metaphorical figuration in the film. The metonymic level enables the multi-stranded plot and the portrayal of a number of different character trajectories, a number of different character voices. The metaphorical - or in Metz's terms, the referential - level of the film is where poetic juxtaposition is experienced both by the character and the viewer that facilitates the depiction of character thoughts and feelings. In order to achieve this poetic/metaphorical access to what I shall call character subjectivity, the narration deploys a variety of techniques:- Clarissa's
voice-over, flashbacks remembered by Clarissa, Peter, Richard and Sally, direct point of view shots showing the traumatised reactions of Septimus, and occasionally also of Clarissa and Peter, and, more indirectly, the external focalisation through characters where they are shown undergoing moments of realisation or change. For example, even minor characters such as Miss Kilman are given moments of realisation when we gain access to their subjectivity through external focalisation. When Miss Kilman places her head on her hands after Elizabeth has decided not to accompany her to see the Reverend Whitaker, we can infer her thoughts and feelings. We know enough about her from her conversation with Elizabeth to realise that she is repressed and unhappy. We know she feels that she cannot afford pretty petticoats, that she voraciously devours cakes, that she has an appetite. We also know that she is possessive over Elizabeth, criticising her mother, and forcing Elizabeth to hide her face, and her feelings, under her hat, when she makes her excuses to leave. Elizabeth’s rejection of her is both inevitable, reinforcing Miss Kilman’s own poor self-image, her expectation of rejection - “I’m old, I’m ugly, but I don’t pity myself...I pity others more...” - and also desolating. The last two shots of the scene reveal Miss Kilman now deserted alone in the tea shop, surrounded by other diners. The portrait of Miss Kilman which has up to now been a comic caricature of the blue-stockings switches suddenly and momentarily to allow us to infer Miss Kilman’s feelings about facing a lonely and impoverished future. However, Mrs Dalloway dramatises the central characters’ voices through more than just through external focalisation, dramatising voice, rather, as the character’s subjective perspective on life, usually given as that character’s insight into their past, present, or future and shown through flashback or through montage. As we discover the narrative of the characters, we also share their attitudes towards their lives. Thus with Clarissa, Peter, Richard, and to a lesser extent Sally, as we learn what happened at Bourton thirty years previously we also learn how the characters regard that past. What I have labelled in the above diagram of parallel actions as narrative strand 3 is established as resulting from the accumulated flashbacks of Clarissa, Peter and Richard. Therefore strand 3 serves two functions. The first is to act as a relatively straightforward linear narrative of contiguous events one summer at Bourton, although this linearity is constructed by the viewer by inference: the viewer infers the flashback story from significant vignettes and poetic high moments in the lives of the characters. The second is to refract these events poetically through the minds of the characters thirty years later, narrating
their different perspectives on their past lives and giving us access to their voices, the attitudes which they continue to act out in the present.

Clarissa’s “voice”, her subjectivity, is at the heart of Mrs Dalloway, the poetic narration creating both a portrait of her inner world and a depiction of her interpersonal relationships. Her voice is an emergent quality of the text, the synthetic effect of the film’s montage, and it cannot easily be delimited or distinguished from the voices of the other characters or the voice of the film. The juxtapositions out of which Clarissa’s thoughts and motivations arise have connotations which reverberate, creating a richness of association which illuminates her subjectivity for the viewer. In addition, aspects of the other characters’ lives, come by association - comparison and contrast - to form Clarissa as an emergent portrait. The film’s poetic figuration creates Clarissa in counterpoint with the other characters, her memories and perceptions overlapping theirs; but it also establishes Clarissa’s voice as dominant in the hierarchy of character voices. Although the film is a character study of Clarissa as a woman of a particular time, class and vulnerability, at points she becomes a surrogate “implied author”, expressing and personifying the attitude of the film. She embodies, as a woman character, what I shall call the “signifier of femaleness” who appears to speak the film, her opinions confirming or reinforcing associations which the film has created elsewhere. Her presence in the film also figures the function of the actual author of the text, the body and mind through which sensations are turned into sense, experience into art.

In the novel, Woolf creates an overarching metaphor of Clarissa as a diamond, and perhaps this metaphor, whilst only implicit in the film, is still a useful way to think how Clarissa becomes focussed, absorbing, reflecting and refracting the other characters. Clarissa recognises her own diamond-like qualities here:

How many million times she had seen her face, and always with the same imperceptible contraction! She pursed her lips when she looked in the glass. It was to give her face point. That was her self-pointed, dartlike, definite. That was her self when some effort, some call on her to be her self, drew the parts together, she alone knew how different, how incompatible and composed so for the world only into one centre, one diamond, one woman who sat in her drawing-room and made a meeting-point, a radiancy no doubt in some dull lives...
The narration arranges for Clarissa to sit "in her drawing-room" making a "meeting point" for the novel, a "radiancy" for the characters who arrive at her party; and Woolf makes Clarissa's personality diamond like in its brittleness, its social surface, an attribute Peter condemns as superficiality. The novel passes through different views of Clarissa, from her own memories to those of her friends Peter, Sally and Richard, and the views of such acquaintances as Lady Bruton, creating a multi-faceted view of Clarissa as a shimmering image, a presence which Peter can only sum up in the final words of the book: "There she was". The characters reflect on Clarissa, and this creates Clarissa and the memories at Bourton as a trope of experience and memory per se, as qualities of life which are neither wholly objective nor subjective, but reflexive, immanent to both individuals and generations:

The compensation of growing old, Peter Walsh thought, coming out of Regent's Park, and holding his hat in his hand, was simply this; that the passions remain as strong as ever, but one has gained - at last! - the power of taking hold of experience, of turning it round, slowly, in the light. 9

As Clarissa is reflected through the views and memories of the other characters, she simultaneously refracts her experience through them. Woolf declares her intention in *Mrs Dalloway* to re-create the immediacy of experience, an immanence which cannot be reduced to a conventional depiction of dramatic character, "a centre" or a unified "self", but instead arises out of interaction with the world as a more labile and fluid sense of identity:

Examine for a moment an ordinary mind on an ordinary day. The mind receives a myriad impressions - trivial, fantastic, evanescent, or engraved with the sharpness of steel. From all sides they come, an incessant shower of innumerable atoms; and as they fall, as they shape themselves into the life of Monday or Tuesday, the accent falls differently from of old; the moment of importance came not here but there.....Life is not a series of gig lamps symmetrically arranged; but a luminous halo, a semi-transparent envelope surrounding us from the beginning of consciousness to the end. 10

Clarissa's reflections and reactions to her day, the poetic juxtapositions which Woolf writes as her stream of consciousness, are as much her "character" as the various views and perspectives of her that are filtered through her own perceptions and the perceptions of the other characters. Instead it might be possible to think of the depiction of Clarissa as a performative character, one where interiority is created through life experience and in turn reflects upon that life experience, again turning it into outward performance.
The film loses any explicit reference to the diamond, although there are several shots of Clarissa looking in the mirror as visual references to her creation of a self-image through reflection. It nevertheless deploys Woolf's narrative structure to illuminate the different facets of Clarissa's character as it is understood by herself and her friends. The flashbacks at Bourton show the characters' different views of Clarissa. Peter's memory is of Clarissa's snobbishness, her frozen class attitude, how much he loved her and loves her still, and how she rejected him for Richard and broke his heart. Clarissa recognises Peter's attitude and inwardly accuses herself when she first greets Peter at the party. Her voice-over - "He's criticising me, I know he is. Accusing me of being insincere...I'm humiliated...And now there's Peter wandering off. He thinks I'm absurd" - shows how Clarissa internalises Peter's criticism of her as her own.

Richard's memory is of Clarissa's generous equivocation over Peter, Peter's desperation and Clarissa's need to assuage this - her need to feel that her rejection of him will not lead to him hating her or to his own misery. Richard's remembers Clarissa standing on the river bank with him, having chosen him above Peter, trying to dissipate Peter's unhappiness by involving him in a race to make him feel included. Later, Clarissa repeats the same pattern of behaviour at the party, worried about Peter's reaction, trying to find him, extending her arms towards him, just as she did thirty years earlier in the library at Bourton, to recuperate his loss. Sally remembers Clarissa's generosity, her "always in white, her arms full of flowers", an image which evokes the many previous shots of the young Clarissa in her summer clothes running through the house and garden. These reflections are not restricted to her old Bourton friends, but also include Lady Bruton for whom Clarissa is a failure as a political wife: "MPs' wives really shouldn't get ill...I think you can always pull yourself together, mind over matter... Richard would have done a great deal better if he'd married a woman with less charm and more backbone."

Nevertheless, Clarissa is not only reflected through the eyes of the other characters, she also absorbs light and refracts it. She is depicted as Woolf's "semi-transparent envelope" filtering the experiences around her. The flashbacks to Bourton act simultaneously as the separate flashbacks of Peter, Richard, and Clarissa, illuminating their different subjectivities - their "voices" - and simultaneously as parallel action to the scenes in the present, telling the story of Clarissa's youth, her romantic life. This creates the effect of making the memories appear shared between the characters as if they are in a chain and
the task of remembering passes from one to another, yet also subsumes them into an overall consciousness which is finally our experience of Clarissa. The transitions between one character remembering and another are often made ambiguous, blurring the boundaries between them. So, for example, in the transition between Clarissa’s first flashback sequence and Peter’s there lies a whole scene in the present, where the viewer relates to both Clarissa and Peter and the flashback informs the subtext of the interaction between them. We see Clarissa’s flashback in which Clarissa and Peter are quarrelling. Clarissa complains about Peter’s possessiveness (“But Peter, you want so much of me. You leave me nothing to myself”), and Peter, who wants “us to be everything to each other”, stabs a tree with his penknife in frustration. This scene is immediately followed by Peter’s visit, now thirty years on, and in the association between the two scenes we learn that Peter still loves Clarissa, that she still loves him (her voice-over “It’s extraordinary how Peter can get me in this state just by coming here...”) but that Peter’s phallic aggression and possessiveness (he still plays with his penknife) has lost him Clarissa. She is now married to Richard, and her rejection has made Peter’s subsequent life, both professional and personal, seem a failure to him. The flashback actually gives us an insight into Peter’s bashful and emotionally tearful behaviour with Clarissa, and the flashback becomes as much an insight into his subjectivity as Clarissa’s. Therefore, when Peter thenceforward begins to remember, the scene becomes retrospectively also his flashback, so that the memory of the quarrel is a shared memory between himself and Clarissa.

The transition between Peter’s and Richard’s flashbacks of Bourton links the characters’ memories even more intricately. The film intersperses Clarissa remembering between the end of Peter’s first flashback and the beginning of Richard’s flashback. Peter’s flashback concludes with a memory of rowing on the lake at night with Peter miserably sitting opposite Richard and Clarissa and Clarissa singing a melancholy fisherman’s song. From the glances between Clarissa, Richard and Peter, and the body language - Clarissa leaning close to Richard - it is evident that Clarissa and Richard are becoming a couple, and that Peter is the outsider; but the evenness of the shot distribution, showing the reactions of all the characters, and the singing, blends them all together. Instead of book-ending Peter’s flashback by returning to a shot of him in the present, the camera cuts to Clarissa twirling her evening dress in the afternoon light in her drawing room. The effect of this change of focalisation is to create an impression that she and Peter
are simultaneously thinking about the same thing. In addition, when the film returns to the past, through Richard's flashback, only a very minor ellipsis in time has occurred. Richard helps Clarissa out of the boat, and she then hands Peter onto land. An emotional transition has happened because now Clarissa and Richard are reunited on the shore and Peter is in the boat glowering. Clarissa's gesture of helping Peter out of the boat - "Come on Peter, We'll race you to the top" - is an act of generosity towards the defeated suitor. The way the memory is shared between the three characters confirms the importance of the rowing trip for all of them, and means that they share a common past upon which they have different perspectives - Peter's regretful, Richard's grateful, and Clarissa's torn between the two men. Here, the free indirect discourse which leads us from the present into a character flashback returns to the present as the memories of another character, and when these memories become shared, as they are increasingly in *Mrs Dalloway*, this tends to give an impression that the past being shown is actually objective, that the events happened as they are portrayed in the film. And yet, the meanings given to these events are immanent, dependent on the context of the present and on the character doing the remembering. Thus, the flashbacks in *Mrs Dalloway* tend to operate in the opposite way from those in films such as *Laura* (Preminger, 1945) or *Rashomon* (Kurosawa, 1951), where memory is seen to vary according to individuals, and therefore flashbacks characterise the outlook of the character remembering. Rather the flashbacks infer a consensual and legitimate past around which characters have overlapping and shared perceptions.

As parallel action, the memories tell the story of Clarissa's decision - of her choice of Richard over Peter, and the consequences of this decision - and this strand is therefore externally focalised through her. Even on the rare occasions when Clarissa does not appear in the flashbacks, she is still the object of them, as for example when Sally and Peter sit on the garden wall talking about Clarissa's snobbery and her upbringing. Whilst young Clarissa is a shared memory of her older self and her friends, she is also a narrative agent, the protagonist of her own story, and the film figures this paradox through creating Clarissa's initial flashback as a metamorphosis into the young Clarissa.

When Clarissa opens her front door onto the street and the film match cuts to the younger Clarissa throwing open the French windows at Bourton, younger Clarissa is established as an autonomous character,
who from now on, will go her own way. Young Clarissa appears to “step out” from older Clarissa. This splitting of Clarissa into two becomes a way of rendering Clarissa’s interiority visible and spatial. The flashbacks, even those not focalised through her older self, become Clarissa’s internalisations of the past. By extension the “voices” of Clarissa’s friends become Clarissa’s own internal voices, her memories of the young Peter, Sally and Richard become part objects in her psyche, identifications which struggle for ascendancy or integration.

The flashbacks act as the reconfiguration of Clarissa’s psychic topography on the day that she gives her party. Clarissa’s battle to assess and integrate her lost loves most nearly represents the process of melancholy, which Judith Butler defines thus:

Melancholia describes a process by which an originally external object is lost, or an ideal is lost, and the refusal to break the attachment to such an object or ideal leads to the withdrawal of the object into the ego, and the setting up of an inner world in which a critical agency is split off from the ego and proceeds to take the ego as its object.... Thus the relation to the object reappears “in” the ego, not merely as a mental event or singular representation, but as a scene of self-beratement that reconfigures the topography of the ego, a fantasy of internal partition and judgement that comes to structure the representation of psychic life. 1

Clarissa, at the beginning of the film has lost her youth, which to her means she has lost her sense of self. Her voice-over muses - “Mrs Dalloway, Mrs Dalloway? I’m not even Clarissa anymore. No more marrying, no more having children, just Mrs Dalloway, Mrs. Richard Dalloway, who’s to give a party...”. Her calling up of memory, and even her attempt to recapture the joys of youth by having a party, are refusals to let go of that youth and to mourn its passing. In this context the montage creates juxtapositions which act as Clarissa’s “scene of self-beratement”, her “fantasy of internal partition and judgement”. Thus, whilst she is in the “tower” of her bedroom, reminding herself of her own mortality - “The sheet stretched, the bed narrow” - her memories are of Sally’s vitality: Sally rushing naked to the bathroom, Sally wanting to change the world. Sally’s flower arrangement at the dinner party comes to stand in for her, the flowers with their heads cut off floating in water, their life made especially vivid for one evening before they die, and Sally becomes an ego-ideal figure for Clarissa, the brave soul that Clarissa cannot be - a doomed but perfect love object.
The memories of Peter at Bourton can also be seen as a melancholy identification for Clarissa, forming an ambivalent part of her psyche. In Part II of this chapter I shall discuss Clarissa's kiss with Sally as Clarissa's psychological pre-history, a replay of Clarissa's Oedipal moment, her moment of castration. Here, I would like to demonstrate how, through the kiss, Peter comes to express Clarissa's doubt and guilt. Peter, here, does not stand in for the Oedipal father, bringing the child to an awareness of sociality through its awareness of the mutual love of mother and father. Peter's approach to the kiss is rather that of the jealous lover, his object Clarissa, so that after he has interrupted the kiss, his sarcasm indicates his disapproval: "Star gazing are we?". He takes no notice of Sally talking to his German friend about astronomy, but glares up at the stars, or stares at the equally furious Clarissa. Rather, he represents the disciplinary, prohibitive aspects of both parents, restricting Clarissa's desire and trying to impose an identity upon her. He is internalised as a mixture of Clarissa's ego-ideal and her super-ego, and is a figure of ambivalence and equivocation for Clarissa. Clarissa does not know if she loves him, as she tells Sally, but she is both concerned for his approval and unable or unwilling to act to get it. In an early flashback, Clarissa is gardening whilst Peter walks along a high wall trying to keep his balance, the camera covering their conversation in mid-shot reverses. The dialogue between them proceeds thus:

Peter: You'll marry a Prime Minister and stand at the top of the staircase. You'll give parties. You'll be the perfect hostess. You have the makings of a perfect hostess....You could do so much, be so much

Clarissa: What you want me to be...Life seems to me to be very dangerous

Peter: But one must live life dangerously.

Peter falls off the wall. The camera tracks with Clarissa as she runs along the length of the wall to see if Peter is alright. Peter pops up out smiling from the other side of the wall and Clarissa laughs.

Peter’s comment on Clarissa’s future has a prescience which might be due to Clarissa's own retrospection: that is, the flashback is a product of Clarissa’s thinking in the present, but Peter is depicted with a sharp insight that Clarissa still feels keenly. In the afternoon Clarissa expresses her lack of confidence when she tells her husband that “throwing parties is all I can do”. When she does stand at the top of the staircase welcoming her guests, her sense of shame is provoked by the sensation that Peter is watching her, like a superegoic figure, because she has fulfilled a destiny which he thinks is less than worthy. The camera
dramatises her sense of being observed. It shows Clarissa greeting her guests in medium shots on a normal lens and then heightens Clarissa’s sense of feeling “like a stake driven in at the top of the stairs” (expressed in voice-over) by filming her in increasing telephoto close-ups after Peter’s entrance. The film also cuts to Peter, far away across the room, in matching long lens shots. Nevertheless, in the flashback and in the other scenes with Peter, Clarissa does not dismiss his ambition for her as either inappropriate or irrelevant, but instead is transfixed by fear, the feeling that “life is very dangerous”. Rather, what Clarissa expresses in her behaviour towards Peter is a fear of annihilating him and an inability to let go of his criticism of her, so that marriage to Peter appears to be a life path which she has not taken, but feels that perhaps she should have.

The flashback where she holds out her arms to Peter in the library and then, after the boat trip, rescues him by suggesting the running race, returns to Clarissa twirling her evening dress in the afternoon light, as if she is nostalgically remembering the scene and remembering she had a choice between Richard and Peter. Later, when she finally rejects Peter, the scene is a flashback of Peter’s; but it assimilates itself nevertheless into Clarissa’s consciousness, a pathetic fallacy. Clarissa’s rejection destroys Peter and his tears are mirrored in the turning of the summer, of the sun to rain and thunder. Clarissa is avoiding Peter, so that Peter has to run after her and beg her to tell him, repeating “Just tell me the truth” three times. She responds to him with the consistency she has throughout, not rejecting his insights nor even his love, but saying that she cannot reach the standards he expects of her, and cannot give herself to him fully:

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Clarissa: You want so much of me Peter. I just can't do it. Throw everything away and go across the world with you. I'm just not brave in that way. And Richard...
Peter: And Richard will pamper you and keep you in a perfectly beautiful, safe, prison filled with elegant antique furniture. He'll make all the decisions for you, and you'll never have to think again.
Clarissa: You demand so much of me!
Peter: Because I love you for God's sake!
Clarissa: Richard will leave me room. Room to breathe.
Peter: Clarissa, he's a fool, an unimaginative dull fool.
Clarissa: You want too much from me. I just can't give it.
Peter: So, it's no use. This is the end.
Clarissa: I'm very sorry.
Peter: Clarissa, Clarissa, Clarissa
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Clarissa rejects Peter not because she rejects his values but because she feels his love as suffocating and possessive and is frightened of it. She turns away from the human potential she might achieve with Peter, both as a lover and as a thinking, perceiving human being, but not without regrets. The viewer sees that
Peter, although wrong about Richard - he is no fool - has anticipated Clarissa’s future life perfectly, and that she does live, largely, in a “beautiful, safe, prison”, because the viewer has already seen her in her bedroom, being forced to take a rest, protected by Richard from any influences or excitement. I have argued above that the film establishes that the memories become shared amongst the characters - they are always also part of Clarissa’s past - and that if Peter represents Clarissa’s ego-ideal/super-ego, then she is also aware of the nature of her choice and her sacrifice.

Richard has a simpler role in the flashbacks, one which is less an identification for Clarissa, i.e. not a lost object, but instead an extension of Clarissa, a love object upon which she leans, both in the past and the present, and relies upon to feel safe. Richard acts as Clarissa’s external, even prosthetic, ego, and enables her to negotiate her way in the world and also to negotiate between her conflicting inner feelings and the outside world. He does not appear much in the flashbacks, merely as the man who Clarissa will marry and who makes her feel safe. When, in the present, he sits her down because she is worried that the party will be a failure, and talks about Ellie Henderson, he manages to turn her fear, to make her remember why she makes parties - to “Give people one night that everything is enchanted, all the women seem beautiful, all the men handsome, and everyone is made to feel that they are amusing, and, yes, liked, and then go home thinking, what fun it was, what a wonderful evening, how good it is to be alive.” Richard does not need to say much: it is his demeanour, taking Clarissa over to sit down, smiling gently at her, and in particular listening to her, that turns around her mood. He laughs off her problems with Ellie Henderson, but respects what her parties and her lifestyle mean to her.

As with the flashbacks at Bourton, which come to be shared between the characters, the narration blurs the boundaries between Septimus’s and Clarissa’s consciousness. At the beginning we are presented with a scene in the trenches of the First World War where Septimus witnesses Evans’s death, closely followed by and juxtaposed with seeing Clarissa meditating in front of her bedroom mirror, her voice-over musing: “Those ruffians the gods shan’t have it all their own way, the gods who never lose a chance of hurting, thwarting, spoiling human lives, are seriously put out if, all the same, you behave like a lady”. Clarissa’s thoughts link the otherwise distinct scenes, as if the scene in the trenches might well be a memory
Plate XII:

Mrs Dalloway

Trauma and its effect on the characters.

Clarissa sees Septimus at the flower shop. She shares his shock at the car backfiring.

Clarissa looks at the flowers. She sees Septimus through the window.

The flower shop is broken by the sound of the car backfiring. Clarissa's reverie is broken by the sound of WW1 gunfire.

Septimus' close-up shows the sounds of the flower display.

The gunfire continues over the flowers. Sally's flower display is broken by the sound of the car backfiring.

Clarissa's reverie is broken by the sound of the car backfiring.
Plate XII:

Septimus sees Evans in Regent's Park.
Clarissa sees an image of Septimus from her bedroom.
The "kiss" interrupted by Peter.
Peter's trauma - losing Clarissa to Richard - on the boat.
or thought of her own. The film subsumes the war scene as part of her perception, as it also establishes her point of view through the presence of her voice-over and through her flashbacks. The narration continues internally focalised through Clarissa and bleeds into her confrontation with Septimus at the florists.

When Clarissa comes to see Septimus, although we have sudden access to his inner sensations, through hearing his hallucination of the wartime guns this hallucination momentarily becomes passed on to Clarissa (see Plate XII: 1). Clarissa is talking to the florist when the sound of a car backfiring outside causes her to react in shock, placing her hand on the florist's arm as she looks out of the window to see Septimus staring back. The camera performs an American cut straight into a telephoto close up of Septimus, who starts with fear, seemingly at the sounds of war, shell and gunfire which are suddenly heard on the soundtrack. This shot is established as Clarissa's optical point of view of Septimus, but it also conveys her shocked reaction, the camera brutally cutting in on her point of view shot from the same axis of vision, mimicking Clarissa's subjective response. This shot is intercut with its matching reverse on Clarissa inside the flower shop, with the sounds of gunfire missing. This short point of view exchange, a reversal of the conventional experience of the look and sounds being both subjective, leads us to infer if only for a moment that Clarissa is sharing Septimus's shellshock, that she can actually hear the shells. The film reinforces this impression by cutting back to the wide shot in the flower shop, whereupon the florist reassures Clarissa that "It was just a car backfiring" and Clarissa replies "Of course, that's what it was", thus suggesting at least an ambiguity about what she was hearing.

When Clarissa arrives home and goes up to her bedroom, she has a brief visual recall of the look of shock on Septimus's face which she had seen in the flower shop (Plate XII: 2). Septimus appears outside Clarissa's window, superimposed over trees, semi-transparent, and his appearance is therefore not a flashback but a projection of Clarissa's. Septimus's shock imposes itself upon Clarissa: the inference is not that he is someone with whom Clarissa has identified and who has therefore become an inner part of herself. Rather, Clarissa's shocked response to Septimus and her calling up of his image implies that her emotional recognition of his trauma arises from experiences of her own. At subsequent moments throughout the film, first in the contrast between Clarissa's timidity and Sally's rebellious flouting of convention and then in her
flashbacks with Peter, her choice of safety in choosing Richard, Clarissa shows a particular vulnerability, a fear of being overwhelmed or disintegrating in the face of pressure. Septimus stands as exemplar for Clarissa, a potentiality for horror that Clarissa protects herself against by her risk averse behaviour.

Once the brief encounter between Septimus and Clarissa is over, Septimus's story, like that of the young Clarissa, now continues independently of Clarissa's own story and the events of her day, until the party where his death is narrated to Clarissa by Sir William Bradshaw. I will argue in the next chapter that Clarissa's empathy for Septimus enables her to understand the nature of his mistreatment by Sir William Bradshaw and that her critical voice over expresses the attitude of the implied author. This empathy is not just an understanding of what Septimus is going through but a fully embodied, perceptual imagining. When, shocked, she goes to the empty room, she is able to imagine Septimus's dying moments: "up flashed the ground, and through him blundering and bruising went the rusty spike and he lay there with a thud, thud, thud in his brain, and then a suffocation of darkness". In imagining Septimus's death, Clarissa puts herself into his situation and imagines what jumping to death feels like, and in addition physiologically feels those sensations - the 'thud, thud, thud' conveying not just Septimus's heartbeat but presumably also Clarissa's, as she holds her hand to her chest. Elizabeth Abel writes "It is a critical commonplace that Clarissa receives from Septimus a cathartic, vicarious experience of death that releases her to experience life's pleasures more intensely"; but it is only through Clarissa's capacity for feeling empathy at a visceral level that this catharsis is possible. Thus, Clarissa embodies the sense of connectedness with other human beings that the film has established is missing in regard to the other characters; and this connectedness allows Clarissa to empathise with Septimus in her own potentiality for suicide - "I once threw a shilling into the Serpentine, but he's thrown his life away" - in order to overcome her own emotional fragility.

Septimus is a character on the point of disintegration, and the narration, by juxtaposing him with other characters in crisis, creates an effect which bleeds between him and the other characters, eliding his trauma with theirs. His hysteria is infectious, communicating itself to Clarissa and Peter when he encounters them, but it is also infectious figuratively, bringing the idea of trauma to Bourton, making the viewer perceive the traumatic in what might otherwise seem trivial in Peter and Clarissa's life. Septimus
first interrupts Clarissa, his reality intruding on her reverie whilst she is associating the flowers she will buy for her party with Sally and her table display at Bourton thirty years earlier (Plate XII:1). Clarissa’s association of flowers with Sally is made traumatic through its immediate juxtaposition with Septimus staring through the florist’s window. After Clarissa, resting in her bedroom, conjures up Septimus’s image, the film again juxtaposes Clarissa’s recollection with her memories of Sally in the past, their conversation about love - Clarissa does not know whether she loves Peter but agrees that she loves Sally. This repeated juxtaposition of Septimus and Sally creates suspense: what will happen to Sally? what tragedy will befall her and Clarissa? When the dénouement of Clarissa and Sally’s relationship is reached and Peter interrupts their kiss (Plate XII:2), then the obviousness and even the banality of the patriarchal strictures which force the girls into marriage and away from each other become, by association with Septimus, traumatising social structures, and the earlier parallel with Septimus infuses this moment with tragedy. The other moment at Bourton which is given traumatic status by being intercut with Septimus is the dinner party where Peter realises that Clarissa will marry Richard. Richard has only just been introduced: even Clarissa does not know his name and thinks he is called Wickham, but nevertheless Peter has a sensation that “Somebody’s just walked over my grave...She’s going to marry that man”. The camera cuts back from Peter’s flashback to him waking up in Regent’s Park. There is a short interchange between Septimus and Rezia, followed by Peter getting up from his seat and walking out of the park, only to be mistaken by Septimus for Evans. The film goes into slow motion as Septimus calls out to stop Evans, Rezia rushes over from where she has picked up a straying child and delivered it to its nurse, and Peter stops in his tracks, shocked. Septimus’s hysteria has been caught by the others. Nevertheless, Septimus’s shock also gets displaced onto Peter’s memorised moment of rejection. Thus, moments of loss, of Clarissa’s loss of Sally and Peter’s loss of Clarissa, become traumatic moments and because, as I have argued, the narration shares these memories between Clarissa and the other characters, they are also predominantly traumatic memories for Clarissa. Peter does not acknowledge his own trauma, as he fails to acknowledge Septimus, or to create any parallels between Septimus and his own life; whereas Clarissa’s capacity for empathy with Septimus is simultaneously her projection of the fearful and traumatic side of her personality and a recognition of her own capacity for fearfulness. It is Clarissa who manages to work her way through her memories to some
kind of resolution, whereas Peter through disavowal is left bemused at the mystery of his own unrequited love.

The memories of Bourton which encompass strands 1 and 3 (see diagram on page 159) stand as a counterpoint of voices, both external to Clarissa, the voices of her friends, but also an internal dialogue, her inner voices vying for attention. Septimus’s story (strand 2) acts as a counter-subject to the Bourton story, one that illuminates Clarissa’s inner psychic topography contrapuntally; but, like the memories of Bourton, it also has its own autonomy. Whilst the narratives of Clarissa, Peter, Sally and Richard, are interconnected through the memories of Bourton, Septimus has his own narrative, which like Clarissa’s story gains resonance and significance through its poetic relationship to the other stories but is nevertheless independent of them. Septimus’s story is of a man abused by his society, in war and peace, who dies almost unnoticed (the speeding ambulance which Peter fails to realise embodies the tragedy of Septimus’s death). This is the result of people’s inability or unwillingness to take responsibility for one another in the modern, anonymous, city. In this story, the relationship between Septimus and the other characters is dramatised as an external one, a social and political relation. However, figuratively Septimus also acts as an overarching metaphor for the film, creating an image of trauma or shock which is used as juxtaposition to draw attention to the moments of trauma in the lives of the other characters. Septimus’s story is intercut with moments which are formative moments of loss in the other characters’ lives, and the montage creates a discord which poetically highlights what is being lost for the characters. The relationships between Septimus and Clarissa and, to a lesser extent, between Septimus and Peter are still dramatised as external social, political, relations, but at these moments, internal psychological parallels are also drawn between the three characters, Septimus, Peter and Clarissa as they share the experiences of loss, even though their particular experiences are quite different.

By introducing Septimus before Clarissa, the narration establishes him and the image of his trauma as a poetic trope of war and the effects of war, and this trope signifies the destruction of a society and an individual. The opening scene of the film (discussed above) where we see Septimus shouting to Evans not to advance across the trenches has a rich set of potential contextual references, a century’s analyses and
depictions of the Great War. The film relies on our familiarity with images of the war reproduced from the
time: photographs, films and letters, war poems, films made in the aftermath of the war, such as All Quiet
on the Western Front (Lewis Milestone, 1930) and even modern depictions such as Blackadder Goes Forth
(Richard Curteis, Ben Elton, 1990). The smoke, Septimus behind the trench, the barbed wire, Evans
advancing and being blown up, all act as familiar knowledge about the war; the wholesale slaughter of
millions of young men, going “over the top” to certain death, the camaradie in the trenches, the
mismanagement by the generals and politicians.14 Septimus’s inability to prevent Evans’s death and his
subsequent hallucinations of Evans walking towards him provide the major poetic image of Septimus’s
shell-shock, his destroyed personality. The hallucination of Evans walking towards Septimus has more
concrete associations in the war poetry of Wilfred Owen and Siegfried Sassoon - the latter having the same
initials as Septimus Smith. In “Survivors”, written in October 1917, Sassoon described shell-shocked
soldiers thus:

These men with old, scared faces, learning to walk
They’ll soon forget their haunted nights; their cowed
Subjection to the ghosts of friends who died, -
Their dreams that drip with murder; and they’ll be proud
Of glorious war that shatter’d all their pride... 15

In Owen’s Strange Meeting (1918), the poet dreams of meeting his double, down a dark tunnel “...One
sprang up, and stared/With piteous recognition in fixed eyes...By his dead smile I knew we stood in Hell...
‘Strange friend,’ I said, ‘here is no cause to mourn’/ ‘None,’ said the other, ‘save the undone years/The
hopelessness. Whatever hope is yours/ was my life also.... I am the enemy you killed, my friend./I knew
you in this dark:...’.16 The uncanny, gothic tones of these poems convey the total destruction of any
societal instinct, the turning of life into ‘kill or be killed’, and also the personal nightmare of warfare
leading to the very annihilation of the self. The death of Evans is not seen, just represented by an explosion;
and the slow motion reaction of Septimus is an indication that he has identified with Evans, has introjected
him and will henceforth be haunted by death in the shape of Evans. As with Clarissa, this characterisation
of Septimus shows him as a victim of melancholy, this time unto death. Freud wrote that the identification
which happens with loss is an ambivalent one, the mourner projecting onto the dead person/object the
hostility and plaints which he/she feels in loss. Since the dead person is internalised as part of the
melancholic’s ego, it becomes a destructive force, threatening to annihilate the self:
If the love for the object - a love which cannot be given up though the object itself is given up - takes refuge in narcissistic identification, then the hate comes into operation on this substitutive object, abusing it, debasing it, making it suffer and deriving sadistic satisfaction from its suffering. The self-tormenting in melancholia, which is without doubt enjoyable, signifies, just like the corresponding phenomenon in obsessional neurosis, a satisfaction of trends of sadism and hate which relate to an object, and which have been turned around upon the subject’s own self...17

Septimus’s loss of Evans is so acute that Septimus internalises him as a figure of self-hatred who eventually destroys him. Septimus and his uncanny double, Evans, are forced to re-live this drama of annihilation within the obscenely contrasting background of a peacetime summer’s day (Plate XII:2), and juxtaposed against the party of Clarissa and her friends.

The final minutes of the film illustrate the way the voice of the implied author articulates Clarissa’s inner voice and the voices of the other characters to create, on film, what Peter described in the book as the effect of “holding experience up to the light”. This sequence forms a refrain, a filmic equivalent to the closing lines in the novel, when Clarissa comes into the room - “There she was” - acting as a summation of Clarissa at that moment, in her own eyes and in the eyes of her friends.18 When Clarissa leaves the party to look out of the open window, her thoughts about Septimus and his sacrifice, expressed in voice-over, are intercut with Sally and Peter’s conversation in the library about the events at Bourton and with the progress of the party in the ballroom - Richard dancing with his daughter. Interspersed between these scenes taking place in the immediate present are short flashbacks of scenes at Bourton, scenes the viewer has already seen, but which the characters are again remembering and putting into context. However, although the narration intercuts between the flashbacks and the characters in their different locales, the sequence is unified poetically: each scene links associatively and poetically with the previous and the following scene and beyond, to the body of the film. Clarissa’s self-reflexivity, her “thinking of Bourton all day”, is correlated with Sally and Peter’s memories of those same events and with the viewer’s memory, having seen the film. One aspect of the diamond-like qualities of Clarissa converges and conflates the external views of Clarissa and her own insightful voicing of the meaning of her life, so that, at this moment, she does become figured as a surrogate author. Her mind, her interiority, emerges in simultaneity with the viewer’s memory of the film. As she remembers, Sally and Peter also remember, and we remember with them, so that the
richness of the viewer’s own memories of the film adds levels of complexity and context to Clarissa’s thoughts expressed in her voice-over.

Conclusion

In summary, I have argued that the film establishes character subjectivity as a ‘semi-transparent envelope’ through which the characters inhabit the world of the film. It is not an isolated individual phenomenon, but is shown through the chain of associations built up through the film as interdependent, a feature of the characters’ interaction with each other and with experience recalled as memory. In *Mrs Dalloway* (*F & N*), characters do not merely serve to advance the plot nor even to convey the themes of the film but are shown in acts of reflection and self-reflection which enables them to be seen as characters with “voices”, attitudes and individualities shaped but not determined by their histories. Above all, Clarissa and her subjectivity - her interiority - is evoked, and her mind becomes an emergent feature of the film, created in comparison with and contrast to the portrayed world around her. Nevertheless, Clarissa’s subjectivity is not the voice of the film, it is only one of its “voices”, an effect of the discursive strategy of the film. The voice of the film is the total organisation of the text, the voice of the implied author, the voice of the film which has managed to place Clarissa at the centre of its narrative world, and create a portrait of her inner and intersubjective world. It is through the poetic montage that the text has deployed an agency which places Clarissa as protagonist and has created her as a fully female character. She is not the embodiment of an absent, enigmatic or dangerous “femininity” as with the women of the thrillers, nor is she a gothic heroine seeking after femininity through masquerade (*Jane Eyre* [Charlotte Brontë], *Rebecca* [Daphne du Maurier] or the film of *Blue Steel* [Kathryn Bigelow, 1990]. The portrayal of her simultaneous internal journey towards self-acceptance and her outward planning and executing of her party enables the narration to depict her as more than an object of hysterical fantasy and to foreground her as a psychological, social and political subject. In the following chapter I will explore how the book and film dramatise patriarchy as a hysterical and hystericising agency which oppresses the characters both male and female. Whilst Septimus succumbs to this oppression and commits suicide, Clarissa manages to “perform” herself in small acts of creativity and generosity so that she surmounts this oppression. I will examine how *Mrs
Dalloway (F & N) is exemplary in showing a way in which individuals may counter hystericising discourse and express their voices through creativity agency.

1 Roland Barthes refers to the process of active construction of a text by the reader, the meaning making which must be engaged in by the reader, when he talks of “The Death of the Author”. Barthes reinterprets the act of literature/writing as not constructed by the author, but by the receiver who builds up the necessary constructs and associations to make the text coherent. This act of interpretation is actually reflected in the practice of modernist writing which allows more ambiguity, and encourages the reader/viewer to work harder than they would do in a classical realist text to create the fictional world.

Barthes, Roland “The Death of the Author”... See also S/Z

2 Jakobson, Roman “Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic Disturbances” in Language in Literature trans. Krystyna Pomorska and Stephen Rudy (Harvard University Press, 1987) 95 - 121

3 Jakobson, 114.

4 Metz, Christian “Metaphor/Metonymy, or the Imaginary Referent” Camera Obscura: A Journal of Feminism and Film Theory. Vol 7, Spring 1981, 43 - 65. See also in same volume, Constance Penley’s “Introduction to ‘Metaphor/Metonymy, or the Imaginary Referent’ ” 7 - 30.


7 An idea which grew in popularity in the mid 1990’s introduced in a stage play by John Guare, and a subsequent film Six Degrees of Separation (Fred Schepisi, 1993)

8 Woolf, Virginia, Mrs Dalloway (Penguin Popular Classics, Great Britain, 1996), 42.

9 Woolf, Virginia, Mrs Dalloway (Penguin Popular Classics, Great Britain, 1996), 89.


13 Diana Fuss in Identification Papers (Routledge, 1995) chooses as the subject of her book, “the figuring (of) identification”, and bases her chapters on three different metaphors of hysteria: metaphors of falling, of ingestion, and of infection. Septimus’s hysteria as dramatised by the film would seem to fit into two of these categories. Septimus’s hysteria is infectious, both to the characters who react to it, and also to the narrative which deploys his image to infect the memories of Bourton. However, Septimus jumps to his death, and Clarissa re-imagines his suicide, thus creating a metaphor of falling.

14 For Virginia Woolf’s own analysis of the war and her association of macho attitudes leading to shell-shock, see Appendix B.

15 Sassoon, Siegfried, Collected Poems 1908 - 1956 (Faber and Faber, 1984)


18 Appendix C shows this analysis in detail, including a shot breakdown and stills illustrating the sequence (Plate XIII)
CHAPTER SIX PART TWO: 
Performance and Agency in Mrs Dalloway

At Clarissa’s party, Sir William Bradshaw and his wife talk to her of Septimus’s death. Sir William and Lady Bradshaw are filmed in progressively tighter close-ups centering on their mouths, their speech overlapping and becoming ever more oppressive. Clarissa, commenting in voice-over that Lady Bradshaw “looks like a sea-lion barking at me”, goes on to blame William Bradshaw for Septimus’s death - “A young man came to you on the edge of insanity and you forced his soul, made his life intolerable and he killed himself” - and loses her own power of speech, needing to be rescued by Richard. By juxtaposing Clarissa cowed by the hectoring voices of Sir William and Lady Bradshaw, with her analysis of Septimus’s death, the film argues that human capacity, the human “soul”, can be destroyed by the capacity of others’ voices, and that “voice” as a necessary expression of “soul” must not be suppressed by others. I shall now explore how concepts of voice and agency are psychological, social and political meanings within the thematics of the film. I shall show the film is an exploration of individual voice and agency as enabled or restricted in our interactions with other people and within the social/political framework of an oppressive patriarchy. Mrs Dalloway enacts a model of subjectivity which shows the individual as able to resist the forces of the patriarchal society threatening to overwhelm him or her, and I shall use this model to argue for female voice and agency as both a resistance to and a working through of oppressive discourse.

Judith Butler1 uses the concept of voice to convey the expression of groups discriminated against on the grounds of ethnicity or gender or sexuality, groups which by appropriating the words of oppression for themselves manage to express themselves and their culture. I will be drawing upon her concepts of voice and subjectivity throughout this chapter to define voice as the fullest possible expression of an individual’s subjectivity and agency in the contexts in which they find themselves. Voice and agency are potentially attributes of each of us as individuals, but our capacity to express our voices, to be heard and given due attention, is granted by others who provide the context for the individual’s action and speech. Voice as the expression of subjectivity is itself developed in interaction with others and can be thought of as
our performed ability to assimilate, assess and express our influences. Thus intersubjectivity, our relations with others, as well as intrasubjectivity, our reflexivity, imagination and perception, are crucial for the development of our own voices. We are both spoken by and speak discourse. Here I use the term discourse to mean those societal disciplines expressed through language and through the individual interactions which impart them to the subject. Our interpellation into the social world is, nonetheless, individual for each one of us, its successes and failures forming and performing our voices, our context for agency. Skill is our performative ability, therefore, not just to undertake and complete tasks - for example, to make films - but also our performative and creative capacity to live our lives to the best of our capacities within the constraints that our histories and our opportunities set out for us. For our voices to develop and become expressed, we need to be enabled by other people, and therefore the concomitant demand from us is that we also enable the agency of others' voices, or at the least do not restrict their expression. The failure of voice to express itself or to develop results in more than silence; it becomes manifest as hysteria, where the repressed voice is displaced and becomes symptomatised in destructive and self-destructive actions. At worst, the silencing of individual expression - freedom - can be psychically life threatening. Trauma can lead to disappearance of the individual's sense of self through panic and unconscious fear of annihilation, the loss of their ability to interact phenomenologically with the outside world, their capacity to enjoy it sensually and sensibly. The subtlety of *Mrs Dalloway* is in its dramatisation of subjectivity as performative, in its portrayal of those who can no longer command the terms of their own lives and those who surmount the obstacles of oppression and fear to conquer the demons that society creates in them. The film accepts the terms imposed by this understanding of performative subjectivity: that human empathy is required for everybody to be equally enfranchised through the use of their own voices.

*Mrs Dalloway* has a self-consciously feminist agenda, but its portrayal of the relationship between subjectivity, gender, and the social/political world is very nuanced and far removed from polemics. I have sought to demonstrate how Clarissa's interiority is dramatised through the film's poetic narration, which constructs her as the film's central character, despite her lack of social agency. Thus Clarissa is what I call a "signifier of femaleness". In arguing that the film depicts Clarissa's inner voice or voices, her subjectivity as performative, I am arguing that she is presented as an embodied, perceiving, thinking and
feeling human being regardless of her gender. The film nevertheless depicts Clarissa’s attributes as specifically female, the product of a non-essential gendering which is psychological, social and historical. Clarissa’s gender, like her subjectivity, is performed, her femaleness being her own response, unconscious and conscious, to the influences in her life, the discourses of gender in operation. The relationship between this gendering and Clarissa’s biological femininity is a problematic with which the film sensibly refuses to engage. Nevertheless, the film, through its paralleling of Septimus and Clarissa and their hysterical responses to very different societal pressures - Clarissa to enforced heterosexuality, and Septimus to the enforced cultural masculinity of battle - posits that gendering is a traumatic process, and that the discourses of gender are both restrictive and unfair. By creating asymmetrical class and gender oppression, patriarchy controls, and thereby also ‘panics’ and hystericonises those of its subjects who are unable to stand up to its bullying. In *Mrs Dalloway*, the corollary of this is that those characters who seem most oppressed are also the ones with the most insight into other people's conditions, the greatest empathy, and are even those who experience life most intensely. Rather than this being a celebration of victimhood and an account of mental illness as heightened perception, I believe the film is arguing that it is our acknowledgement, our ability to work through as well as to feel trauma, which lends people the capacity for empathy and creativity. People vary in their sensitivity to trauma and in the amount of tragedy in their lives, but no-one is exempt - trauma is part of the human condition. The film portrays those least sensitive to it, such as Sir William Bradshaw and Lady Bruton, as also the biggest bullies and ideologues. The film does not argue for a causal link between suffering and sensitivity to others. Richard, perhaps the film’s socially most well-adapted character, who seems to be in tune with the film’s patriarchal world, is also the kindest. Instead, the film suggests that effective subjective performativity is sensitive to others, as well as effective personally. Clarissa and Septimus, as well as Peter and even Miss Kilman, are personally sensitive, potentially empathetic beings. However, their hysteria and their lack of agency under patriarchy unwittingly causes them to harm themselves. Clarissa’s working through of her emotions, her creativity, pushes her on the day of her party to repair herself and to minimise the damage she does to others.

Clarissa’s attempt at reparation is a feature of her melancholic pathology, a feature which I discussed in the previous chapter. Judith Butler analyses subjectivity as performative in *The Psychic Life of*
Power, arguing that the regulatory powers which form and perform our psyches through the mechanism of melancholy are turned into our own voices, and thus we assume an agency as ours which has the capacity to exceed the terms of its creation. I suggest melancholy is the process which enables human performativity and creativity. The film productively performs its melancholy, firstly to create a nuanced depiction of character which eschews manicheism, so that its feminism is not the product of anger, but of rationality. 

*Mrs Dalloway* also enacts a melancholic reparation of the world and it is this reparative performance which is able to transcend the oppressive terms of patriarchy, to “turn” its regulatory discourse into an unexpected, inclusive and celebratory feminism.

**Patriarchy as the oppressive discourse in *Mrs Dalloway***

In my analysis of the opening minutes of the film (see Part I of this chapter), I argued that poetic montage creates associations between the scene in the trenches with Septimus and Clarissa preparing for her party which imbricate the personal with the political, Clarissa’s calm and seemingly trivial home life with the catastrophe of the First World War. The juxtaposition avoids clear narrative links between the characters but sets up the thematic questions which are explored in the rest of the film. As their day proceeds, Clarissa and Septimus both confront the demons of their pasts: Septimus’s in the shape of Evans, and Clarissa’s in the form of her memories of Bourton. Clarissa and Septimus thus suffer from trauma, their differences in life circumstances subsumed by a political analysis, in novel and film, which places them both as victims of society. Yet their differences suggest a more complex political social causality, inferring links between oppression, individual responsibility, class and gender. Clarissa’s problems stem from her oppression as a woman in a man’s world, nevertheless she comes from the ruling class which forces Septimus into the war and creates the conditions for his mental illness. Both Clarissa and Septimus are victims of the patriarchal oppression which forces them into gender roles which are harmful to them and which they cannot sustain: Clarissa’s as society wife, Septimus as warrior. However, Clarissa is also a beneficiary of the class system which oppresses Septimus, even whilst she herself is a victim of that system’s patriarchal oppression. The film places Clarissa and Septimus in the context of the ruling class of the time, represented by Richard as an MP, and his associates Lady Bruton, Hugh Whitbread and Sir William Bradshaw, whose political ambitions are seen in their different manifestations during the day and at
Mrs Dalloway: The Oppressors and the Oppressed.

Rezia "Like a Flowering Tree"

Lady Dalloway

Sir William Bradshaw

Miss Kilman

Dr Holmes

The drawing room at Bourton
the party. The film establishes these characters as emblematic of a narrowly hierarchical and unrepresentative society where social and political power resides in a small group of upper class (predominantly) men.

The film presents what I will call "patriarchy" as the bullying of a ruling elite which places its class and sex interests and values above those of others. It is transmitted by individuals who abuse their social agency through insensitivity or malignancy. The film dramatises the relations of some of the characters through an inequality which I will argue is "patriarchal". The instituting of this inequality can be seen in Septimus's treatment by Sir William Bradshaw, through the juxtaposed story of Lady Bruton and her attempt to encourage young people to emigrate, and through the often painful romantic relationships at Bourton between Clarissa, Sally, Peter and Richard. I will further argue that the film dramatises the discourse of patriarchy operating through a set of norms defining men and women, defining class. The polarisation of patriarchy creates rigidity and repression, and by equating compassion with weakness and femininity oppresses the male and female characters alike. These repressions can be seen not only in the dilemmas of Clarissa and Septimus but also in the related tragedy of Peter's romantic life, as well as in Miss Kilman's desperate attachment to Elizabeth. The following analysis explores how the film's narration links the discourse of patriarchy to the characters and their actions, and shows how the film itself argues the case against patriarchy as a bullying and restrictive disciplining through gender and class.

Septimus's and Rezia's awkward consultation with Sir William Bradshaw is a dramatisation of the complex dialectic between individual agency and collective responsibility, and as such exemplifies the film's dislike of bullying. In this scene, whilst Sir William appears to be trying to help Septimus, his abuse of his position as a doctor and his lack of empathy actually make Septimus more hysterical, forcing him to 'act out' his disturbance, to become helpless against patriarchal oppression and thus to ensure his own committal to a mental hospital against his will. Both Rezia and Septimus go to see Sir William voluntarily, but once in his surgery they are caught in a trap from which it is impossible to escape. The difference in status and power between the young foreign woman, alienated from her home environment, her shabby traumatised husband, and the grand Harley Street doctor with his embossed brass plaque and plush wood-
lined consulting rooms, is immediately apparent, although Sir William genuinely seems to want to help, and
extends towards the couple the perfect manners of an English gentleman. Furthermore, Sir William really
listens to Rezia and Septimus, showing his sympathy when Septimus confesses his crime against humanity,
and commiserating with him - “We all have our moments of depression”. He recognises the seriousness of
Septimus’s illness, and its origins in the war, as delayed shell-shock, and states that he never uses the word
“mad” of a patient like Septimus. Nevertheless, he is a pernicious influence. As Clarissa says of him, he is
“obscurely evil”. He abuses his agency as a doctor, an abuse which is shown simultaneously to be both
personal and institutional. On the doorstep, before going in, Rezia warns Septimus “You won’t tell the
doctor you tried to kill yourself. You mustn’t. They will take you away from me”. And yet, almost as soon
as she has been seated in front of Sir William, the doctor has managed, through gentle probing and
sympathy, to elicit from her that Septimus has suicidal tendencies. A torrent of words emerges from Rezia,
describing Septimus’s recent behaviour, as if she is relieved to be finally confiding in this doctor who seems
so understanding. Although she tries to make Septimus seem less suicidal, less desperate, by describing
him laughing and having moments of joy, Sir William’s carefully nuanced glances, his silence, draws her
beyond what she originally intended to say towards an emotionally charged confession: “he said ‘We will
kill ourselves’, and then he held my hand and said he was falling into the flames and he cried and cried”.
Sir William immediately uses this confession to decide to send Septimus for a rest cure, and to separate him
from Rezia. His attitude does not appear to change. He is still affable, but his use of language betrays a
patronising disdain: “My dear Mrs. Warren Smith. Sometimes we have to separate such people from their
loved ones for their own good”. Septimus is no longer an individual, but “such people”; and Rezia is put in
her place by the repeated use of “My dear Mrs Warren Smith”. Sir William Bradshaw has power over
them. He has made up his mind, and the rest of the interview will just reinforce it. He takes no notice of
Rezia’s request not to send Dr Holmes to collect Septimus. Neither Septimus nor Rezia now has any rights
whatsoever. Sir William leans heavily upon the law to support his action, whilst also stressing the
enlightenment of his own approach to treatment: “Your husband has threatened to kill himself. There is no
alternative. It’s a question of the law. It’s a beautiful home in the country, the nurses are admirable...”.
However, in forcing a rest cure on Septimus and in separating him from Rezia, which in itself the law does
not demand, Sir William exceeds the demands of the law in order to enforce his cruel professional
approach. In 1923 suicide was still a crime, strongly condemned by the established church. The law and mental health were still inextricably bound together, and the committal of a potential suicide would therefore have been as much for moral reasons as for the protection of the patient. Septimus recognises that Sir William is in effect punishing rather than treating him ("But I've confessed my crimes. Why won't you let me off?")

Although he misrecognises the actual crime of which Sir William finds him. Septimus's crime against humanity and himself, - taking part in the war and destroying human life - does not concern Sir William. Instead, Sir William is concerned with Septimus's "lack of proportion", which is really Septimus's inability to obey the rules set by his social superiors without displaying signs of trauma or rebellion. Septimus's distress appears both charmless and rebellious. He sits in the consulting room, sweaty, screwing up his face with the effort of articulating his ideas, miming in a mildly hysterical manner (turning off an imaginary light switch in the way that Dr. Holmes is able to "switch off from his patients onto old furniture") and gesticulating. This contrasts profoundly with Sir William who shoots his cuffs with aplomb, and places a perfectly judged hand on the shoulder of his patient, both to reassure him and to enforce his command. Septimus's overt rebellion against doctors also arouses Sir William's ire when Septimus describes Dr Holmes' "blood red nostrils" and refers to him as a demon about to claim Septimus's soul. When Septimus cleverly sneers at going into a home by punning on "one of Holmes' homes", Sir William reacts firmly, establishing his rule. In the terms of Lacan's Four Discourses, Sir William employs the Master Discourse to rule Septimus, and thus produces Septimus's hysteria as a consequence. Yet the film makes plain that Sir William has choices other than to dismiss the young couple's wishes. In the dialectic between individual agency and collective responsibility, between being spoken by discourse and speaking it, Sir William both acts out a class position, representing the colonising discourse of medicine. However he also chooses his stance, enforcing a conservative and retrogressive form of mental health treatment - separating Septimus from Rezia, enforcing a "sense of proportion" - when these choices are not legally prescribed and there are other medical options available. The viewer may therefore infer that he chooses his stance from a perversity, a will to power.

The scenes at Lady Bruton's lunch party parallel those of Septimus's meeting with Sir William. They reinforce the subtle associations between social agency, class position and personal choice, and the
link between these positions both in wartime and in peacetime. A comic counterpoint to Sir William
Bradshaw is provided by Lady Bruton’s comic self-aggrandisement: the picture of her father the General,
with whom she obviously still identifies, her hair-brained scheme to help young people emigrate, even
though she has no idea of what they themselves actually want. Even her bossiness, her offhand treatment of
her maidservant, waving her away imperiously, shows Lady Bruton’s similarity to Sir William in her
dismissal of the subjectivity of those lower in the social hierarchy. The juxtaposition of Lady Bruton and
Sir William creates an implicit link between people like Lady Bruton, Sir William Bradshaw, Dr Holmes
and Hugh Whitbread, uniting them into a single group, a privileged section of the population who have the
power over other people’s lives but not the background, imagination or generosity to defer to other people’s
real desires. What unites this group, apart from their alienation from those they perceive to be weaker than
themselves, is their thirst for and worship of power. The Prime Minister’s arrival at Clarissa’s party causes
a reaction of hushed awe before the guests try to angle their way into his presence. In his command of
power he appears a magically phallic figure. Hugh, Lady Bruton, and Sir William crowd around him, trying
to touch the hem of his garment. Peter describes them - “Lord what snobs the English are. How they love
dressing up and doing homage. Listen, I’d rather hear baboons chatter and coolies beat their wives”. It is
significant that Peter’s analogy of “coolies beat[ing] their wives” as another society’s misogyny and
sexism, mirrors his own society. This worship of power is the hysterical discourse in operation, as is the
attempt to grab power for oneself in order to become phallic, and the discourse of the hysteric is also the
discourse of colonialism which denigrates the other of race, nationality and sexual difference. Peter’s own
aversion to this “toadying” to power is itself the distaff side of this hysterical equation. Peter, in Groucho
Marx’s terms, “refuses to join any club that will have him”. He is also reacting to Clarissa, who rather than
pay attention to him entertains the Prime Minister and is “intoxicated by it all, thinking she’s brilliant”.
Peter’s salutary sense of social injustice - his self-imposed exile to India where he nevertheless continues to
uphold the Empire - and his inability to control his personal life through his possessiveness and jealousy,
are all symptoms of his hysteria.

Peter’s relationship to patriarchy is contradictory - he is a figure of both empathy and critique. His
rebellion against the snobbery around him is, as I have suggested, tainted by a tacit acceptance of the class
and sex hierarchy: it is he who suggests disparagingly that Hugh has "less life in him than a stable boy", and who sees the ambulance (ferrying away the dead Septimus) as an emblem of all that is good about modernity. Nevertheless, Peter sees through the system, refuses the inner sanctum of power, and seeks instead a romantic solution to his life which can never be fulfilled. Lady Bruton sums him up succinctly: "Dear Peter. So very sharp and clever. Should have made a name for himself. But he was always in trouble with women". Peter's frustration with patriarchy is his saving grace but also his downfall, his inability to mould the world into his own image being also an inability to flourish within his own social world and keep the love of Clarissa.

The film implicates Clarissa and her friends in the discourse of patriarchy in different ways. Peter, Hugh and Richard link the world of power and politics to the private world of Bourton, and they reflect different aspects of Clarissa's own performance of patriarchy. Richard performs a benign form of patriarchy. As a public servant, with the attributes and flaws that his kind of liberalism brings, he manages and facilitates consensus, and his personal kindness means that he mitigates the abuses of power suffered by the weak. He is the only character who talks to poor "weaponless" Ellie Henderson, and he certainly takes Lady Bruton's plans with a pinch of salt. He protects Clarissa, shielding her with his "copy of The Times", and he tolerates Clarissa's friendship with Peter who, as a former rival, could easily threaten him. Richard does not use his agency to challenge the status quo, but in his political and personal life he attempts to improve people's lives. Clarissa's feelings of impotence and desire not to impose her will on others creates her agency as a version of Richard's, but it is exercised in the private rather than the political sphere. Hugh, however, represents the unreflecting snobbish class and gender attitudes which Clarissa, as a young woman, inherits from her family. At tea at Bourton, Clarissa snobbishly describes a former housemaid who had married above her station and who had previously been invited to tea: "she was absurdly overdressed, and she looked like a cockatoo, and she never stopped talking". In support of the woman, Sally tells Clarissa and the assembled company that the girl had a baby before she was married. Universal shock ensues: Clarissa does not know whether she can speak to the girl again, her father refuses to receive the girl again, and Hugh pronounces: "If you start to receive women like that you don't know where it will end". Sally responds with an outburst against Hugh: "You snob. You represent all that's detestable in British
middle class life. It's men like you who are responsible for prostitutes in Piccadilly"; then she runs from the room. It is significant that, sitting on the garden wall later with Peter, Sally refuses to blame Clarissa for being snobbishness. Clarissa's snobbishness is inherited and, later in life, her sensitivity mitigates its effects, whereas Hugh's is a product of willful ignorance, of what Peter recognises as a lack of insight or curiosity: "When he plays tennis his hair doesn't move...An imbecile. He thinks of nothing but his clothes...He's never read anything. Never thought anything. Stable boys have more life in them than Hugh". Nevertheless, what unites Hugh and Clarissa is their kindness. As Clarissa's says of Hugh: "He's sweet and unselfish and he's very good to his mother". However, this generalised kindness does not stop him oppressing other people in the pursuit of power. Hugh is a "toady", a hanger on to the coat-tails of power. In his attempt to insinuate himself with Lady Bruton, he thoughtlessly suggests forcible emigration for young people. Thus oppression is not only perpetuated through wickedness, as in Sir William's case, nor through self-aggrandisement (as in the case of Lady Bruton), but also through Hugh's ignorance.

The portrayals of Sir William Bradshaw, Lady Bruton and Hugh Whitbread show the abuse of power in the ruling elite, but it only hints at paternalism. The Bourton sequence and the fate of Miss Kilman shows this bullying as also a distorting discourse of gender. By juxtaposing Clarissa's story with Septimus's, the film implies that the laws which stop Clarissa having her own money and marrying for love, and Miss Kilman from having her own career, are the same as those responsible for the war and for the bullying of Septimus. Septimus's treatment can also be seen as the enforced imposition of destructive codes of masculinity. The multi-stranded narrative in which Septimus's story is paralleled with Clarissa's and Peter's not only illuminates their psychological states but also links the discourses which appear to oppress them. The poetic narration of the film precisely enables the inference of a patriarchy which is not merely individual bullying but systematically pervades the society as a discourse, a set of beliefs and norms of behaviour. The snobbery of Clarissa's family restricts her freedom through a gendered discourse, inhibiting not merely action but feeling, the capacity to behave spontaneously, a discipline similar to the military obedience Septimus would have been trained to obey in the army. When Clarissa runs out to the garden, her aunt admonishes her: "Don't run Clarissa. Young ladies don't run"; and the link is made between social convention, patriarchy and bodily policing.
older generation, so that Sally’s table display of floating sweet peas, Peter’s appearance, late, at the dinner table, and Ellie Henderson’s presence at Clarissa’s party when she is clearly not of the upper class but “only the old vicar’s daughter”, all receive the opprobrium of Aunt Helena. The film voices, through Sally, an implicit socialist analysis of this snobbery as the repressive norms of the class system when she declares, in Marxist fashion, that she wants “to abolish private property, and do away with it for ever and ever”, seeing it as “what causes all the problems”. Clarissa responds anxiously - she asks if she will lose her family property, Bourton. Her desire for rebellion, for social justice, and her love for her home are in conflict. Her ambivalence displays her complicity in the class system. Her class oppresses her and she would like to rebel, but she is bound to Bourton and to her privileges in a bond of love: her subjectivity, formed through and around Bourton, is not easily cast off, even for a freer and fairer future. When Clarissa and Sally walk through the gardens at Bourton, they discuss the difficulties of marriage for women:

Clarissa: The men lead such exciting lives, but their poor wives don’t seem to do so well.
Sally: Marriage is a catastrophe for women.
Clarissa: But it is inevitable, isn’t it? ...Sally, will we always be together?
Sally: Always, always. We’ll change the world.

Both women accept the catastrophic inevitability of marriage, and their vow to stay together and change the world is a wish held in the face of social reality. We see the older Clarissa and the older Sally, married and surrounded by material comfort, having chosen to accept their alloted roles. Clarissa does have a choice: marriage is not “inevitable” to the extent of being the only meaningful existence available to women, but the alternative appears to Clarissa, and is shown by the film, to be the insupportably dull and tragi-comic life of Miss Kilman. Miss Kilman, the blue-stocking in love with Clarissa’s daughter, is shown as yet another alter-ego for Clarissa. Miss Kilman is by her own definition “plain” and “unhappy”. She struggles to attain financial independence, her career as a would-be historian thwarted by gender inequality, her love for Elizabeth unrequited, her place in society marginal.

Clarissa’s love for Sally is, I have claimed, a love of Sally’s freedom from social convention, her bodily and emotional courage - encapsulated in the image of Sally running to the bathroom in the nude - a love of the rebel. The impossibility of Clarissa’s love, shown in the juxtaposition of Clarissa’s memory of Sally’s sweet-peas floating in water with Septimus’s traumatised face at the florists (see previous chapter),
can, however, be read as an impossible rebellion against patriarchy. The kiss through which Clarissa and Sally express their love is immediately destroyed by Peter’s jealous intervention. In this he therefore comes to represent the force of patriarchy, setting a rigid norm for heterosexuality, for what men and women are permitted to be, and the film shows these as intricately tied up with property rights and capitalism. Clarissa and Sally’s love for each other is shown as invisible to patriarchy while it does not threaten the unspoken assumption that women are the property of, first their fathers, and then their husbands. Female friendship poses no threat for patriarchy in *Mrs Dalloway*, it is when that friendship turns into passion, when Clarissa kisses Sally arousing Peter’s jealousy, that the women fail to function “as looking glasses possessing the magic and delicious power of reflecting the figure of man at twice his natural size.” It is not certain that Clarissa’s love for Sally is lesbian. Rather, it is an expression of emotion and passion in a kiss which is beyond the sexual. Peter interrupts the scene constructing the significance of the kiss as threatening to him, and as potentially homosexual - the film shows his point of view of the two women kissing in close up, followed by his horrified reaction. Peter’s jealousy thus exemplifies Foucault’s repressive hypothesis - that enforced heterosexuality, patriarchy, produces homosexuality as its effect, making it visible, although for Clarissa it is an expression of a rebellion and a love which cannot be articulated within the patriarchal framework, something that cannot be legislated for or against, or vocalised.

In an interview about the writing of her cinematic adaptation, Eileen Atkins stressed the importance of the interrupted kiss scene.

I put in as much as I could put in from the novel about that relationship [between Clarissa and Sally], and with Marleen [Gorris] - who is an openly gay woman - I did say to her, “There’s only one thing I would beg - that you don’t take the kiss any further than is absolutely clear in the book.”

But I didn’t expect it to be shot the way it was shot. They were right outside the house, there was the dancing, and they were immediately outside. Whereas I had imagined that they had got down by the fountain, and it was extremely romantic.

*Int:* You see Peter approaching long before she does, when you’re watching the movie.

Yeah, So maybe I don’t make it clear enough in the script. But if you got them well away, and you suddenly had these two girls just look at each other a moment, and that terribly gentle kiss - and then in the midst of that sort of stillness, the two men, loud and mannish - then I think it would have just added a bit more.
No man does. Well, they might these days, as we've had a quiet revolution, but I think any man, even today, is utterly stunned that any woman should prefer another woman.\textsuperscript{10}

The complexity of Atkins’s thoughts on the subject, her wish to have the kiss explicit but not explicit, romantic and gentle, and yet have the interruption as more powerful than she perceived the staging of the film made it, indicates the burden which the scene needs to bear. The nuance of Clarissa and Sally’s love being sensual but not phallic, and therefore incomprehensible and threatening to any man has to be communicated by the staging. What the film seems to achieve is precisely this articulation of Clarissa’s and Sally’s kiss being misinterpreted in the context of the social/sexual community of the film. The presence in the back of shot of the heterosexual the couples on the dance floor, the light spilling from within the ballroom to palely illuminate Sally and Clarissa, convey their transgression of the heterosexual norm, their exile from acceptability. Atkins’s troubled musings on the way that Peter interrupts the scene, shows her concern with point of view and the desire to make sure that the point of view belongs to Clarissa rather than Peter when he interrupts the kiss. The staging ensures that suspense is created on behalf of Clarissa: we see Peter before she does, and therefore are worried on Clarissa’s behalf, whereas Atkins wants us to feel Clarissa’s shock as she feels it. However, the case for the film inhabiting Clarissa’s point of view more effectively than Atkins believes it does, is quite strong. Edward Branigan’s\textsuperscript{11} thesis that point of view depends on two levels of perception, one from within the character and one from outside, is demonstrated by the staging. If we did not see Peter coming, we might not be as concerned as we are for Clarissa, or able to read her shock when she does finally realise. Nevertheless, what is clear about the staging of the scene and Atkins thoughts on it, is its importance, its symbolic weight in making the figure of Peter carry both the oppressive character of the sexual mores of the time, and also what the film characterises as a male responsibility for enacting that oppression.

Lady Bruton, Sir William, Hugh Whitbread, Clarissa’s family, and through them, Clarissa herself, are shown as implicated in a structure of bullying relating to gender and class, and yet these characters are far from untouched by the inequalities and the cruelties of patriarchy. The laws and social mores, such as
the laws of marriage, the laws of personal property, and the practices of psychiatry, are shown enacting
fundamentally similar patriarchal oppressions, and these oppressions thwart the personal lives of Clarissa,
Peter, and even to some extent Richard and Lady Bruton. However, whilst the juxtapositions which create
Septimus's shell-shock act as a metaphor to indicate the various personal traumas of the other characters,
they also contribute to the references to the Great War itself as the ultimate negativity, a powerful signified
beyond the text that can have no adequate signifier to indicate its obscenity, but which is patriarchy's
logical outcome. The war is linked to patriarchy through inference, and becomes the "result" of bullying on
a grand scale, yet the sacrifice of those who fought in the war is unacknowledged by the characters. The
war scene, appearing at the beginning of the film, never to be returned to, except through Septimus's
hallucinations, acts as a repressed moment of memory or history for the characters who cannot
accommodate themselves to it. As Clarissa crosses the road into Regent's Park, morning, she passes,
without turning around, in the background of the shot, an injured veteran on crutches. Later, in the park,
Septimus, brought back to images of war through his hallucination sees a real wounded soldier sitting
opposite him, alongside the nannies looking after children. Otherwise, the war is barely spoken of, except
to acknowledge the loss of Lady Bexborough's sons. The placing of Septimus as outside Clarissa's
immediate society, someone she merely glimpses, his death reported at her party, and then as an anonymous
soldier, further creates the impression that it is upon the sacrifice of young men like Septimus, that Clarissa
and her friends are able to thrive and throw parties. The cause of the war as some kind of battle for empire
or for capital is not mentioned, but the inference that war is an extension of the social bullying of an entire
class is made by showing Lady Bruton's deference to her military antecedent, her inherited "backbone", the
quality which, Septimus and Clarissa lack, and which condemns them to social failure. Lady Bruton also
condemns feminism, and is portrayed as a phallic woman whose very stern outlook stems from a denial of
her femininity. When Dr. Holmes comes to take Septimus away to hospital, the narration places him in the
place of Evans in Septimus's hallucinations (detailed in Chapter Six: Appendix D), Holmes embodies
Septimus's his death drive, for the viewer, becoming figurally responsible for his death. Subsequently,
when Clarissa, in her voice over, blames Sir William for causing Septimus's death by "forcing his soul", the
skein of connections lead to a wholesale condemnation of bullying as an enforced masculinity in whichever
context this occurs, whether in war, peace, or in the oppression of women.
Subjectivity as Performative

The operation of patriarchy as I have described it straddles all the narrative strands of *Mrs Dalloway*, both as a set of regulatory norms which control behaviour, and through characters who promulgate oppressive patriarchal practices. In my reading of the film, I have sought to show how patriarchal discourse pervades even the most private aspects of life. As Clarissa’s relationships with Sally and Peter demonstrates, and within the psyches of the characters - in Septimus’s shell-shock, Peter’s hysterical jealousy and his romantic replaying of the past, in Clarissa’s fear of life, the effects of patriarchy are pervasive and negative. Nevertheless, the film shows that where oppression is not conquered institutionally it may still be fought psychically, and that individual agency in withstanding oppression is a kind of bravery which works towards liberation. Clarissa, despite, or perhaps because of, her apparent fragility, has a voice of sense and sensibility which has a civilising effect on those around her. I would like, now, to explore the performance of discourse as a psychological phenomenon, to look at *Mrs Dalloway* through the mechanism of melancholy, as a portrayal of the creativity of human performativity and its capacity to surmount the obstacles created by oppression.

Judith Butler offers an account of human beings as neither determined, ruled by discourse, nor independent and free-willed, but as imbricated in language, and I shall call what I take to be her account “performance theory”. Performance theory is a theory of the exercise of subjectivity where the iteration of discourse by and through individuals creates the possibility of agency. Butler, like Joan Copjec in *Read My Desire* argues for a psychical agency, in the interstices of discourse where the terms of discourse can be changed and where rebellion against oppression can be recast in socially and politically radical ways. Repetition enables the psychic changes to be made manifest in either changes of context or changes of statement. It is this linking of the personal and the political, the psychic and the social which will be central for my account of *Mrs Dalloway*’s own vision of the connectedness of human beings. Butler’s theory of performativity derives from the linguistic concept of a performative sentence or a performative utterance, terms which indicate that “the issuing of the utterance is the performing of an action”, so that, in “saying”, the speaker actually “does” something. J.L. Austin analysed language in *How to Do Things with Words,*
only to find that performatives are heavily context dependent. For example, when the Vicar pronounces "You are now Man and Wife", he "performs" a couple as married, but he is only enabled to achieve this through the context of the marriage ceremony which pre-exists him and creates the context for his agency. This kind of agency is thus a purely institutional agency, something granted to him by his position in discourse, and Austin's analysis returns the human subject to being merely a passive participant in discourse where agency is bestowed from elsewhere, a performing "monkey" obeying rules already set out for him/her. In order to for agency to become politically possible and not determined entirely by context, subjects who are not enabled by discourse must become so enabled. They must seize an agency which their inequality in society does not seem to grant them. Butler theorizes such an agency neither as a sovereign act of human will, nor as the random articulations of language, but as the 'performative' imbricated actions of the human subject within discourse.

In *Excitable Speech*\(^1\), Butler argues that, in repetition, performativity is made political, not because performance is context dependent but because repetition has the potential for change. Using Derrida's concept of the "mark" inherent within the "very structure of the written text" which is nevertheless "a force that breaks with its context"\(^15\), Butler argues that it is this very "break in context" that enables human 'agency'. In the inevitable reiteration of language the context of performance and also the referent of a speech act or act of writing as well as its signification change. It is impossible simply to repeat or reiterate language or, as Butler argues, other forms of discourse, (for example the discourse of the arts: music painting, or the discourse of knowledge: medicine, science, law) without change. There are therefore two forms of agency in discourse, one of which would be the authorisation granted by context to speak the established discourse, whether this be a ritualised form like the words of the wedding ceremony, or an institutionalised discourse of power such as the medical discourse of Sir William Bradshaw. This agency is enabled by the successful interpellation of the individual into their social and political context. The other form of agency arises in the failure to repeat discourse fully, and this agency is driven by the inevitability at some level of a failure in interpellation of the individual within discourse. Interpellation creates repression of desire - the individual cannot be fully interpellated, and therefore the 'remainder' of their subjectivity forms the repressed structuration driving the unconscious of the subject. Political agency would then
function to bring the repressed desire into speakability, to change the terms of interpellation through failed iteration. It is this form of agency which is potentially political in its destabilisation of established subject positions and consequent questioning of power; and it is the phenomenon of the “excluded” of discourse which forms what Butler calls the psychic “turning” of the subject. This is the unexpected and complex way that social norms and regimes of power go to form our “voices” as our own through repression, identification and desire. Our own psychic “turning” and our inability to repeat discourse enables us to engage with power as political and creative subjects.

Social discourse wields the power to form and regulate a subject through the imposition of its own terms. Those terms, however, are not simply accepted or internalized; they become psychic only through the movement by which they are dissimulated and “turned.” In the absence of explicit regulation, the subject emerges as one for whom power has become voice, and voice, the regulatory instrument of the psyche. Butler argues that “voice”, that quality which defines us as individuals and as agents able to iterate discourse, is formed – “turned” into our own speech - through the regulation of social discourse. To the extent that our voices are stable and self-identical, and we have some “core” of recognisable social and sexual identity and personality, then our voices must be successful and repeatable iterations of this “turned” discourse. Butler finds certain iterations of personality, particularly those on the borderlines of the speakable, the borderlines of the rules performs in us, as potentially radical. As she argues in *Gender Trouble*:

What remains “unthinkable” and “unsayable” within the terms of an existing cultural form is not necessarily what is excluded from the matrix of intelligibility within that form; on the contrary, it is the marginalized, not the excluded, the cultural possibility that calls for dread or, minimally, the loss of sanctions. Not to have social recognition as an effective heterosexual is to lose one possible social identity and perhaps to gain one that is radically less sanctioned. The “unthinkable” is thus fully within culture, but fully excluded from *dominant* culture.

Butler argues that the performance of the “unthinkable” in culture may act as a parodic performance of the very regulatory norms which form and police performance and it is the parody which is potentially radical. In *Gender Trouble*, she celebrates the performance of “drag” as just such a critical parodic performance of sexual difference. However, in *Bodies that Matter*, Butler reconceptualised what she realised was a rather voluntaristic position towards the performance of “drag” and towards the production of sexual identity through choice. She wrote humorously of the critical problems arising out of her original formulation of gender to clarify her own objections to such voluntarism:
For if I were to argue that genders are performative, that could mean that I thought that one woke in the morning, perused the closet or some more open space for the gender of choice, donned that gender for the day, and then restored the garment to its place at night. Such a willful and instrumental subject, one who decides on its gender, is clearly not its gender from the start and fails to realize that its existence is decided by gender. Certainly, such a theory would restore a figure of a choosing subject - humanist - at the centre of a project whose emphasis on construction seems to be quite opposed to such a notion.¹⁸

Instead, in *The Psychic Life of Power*, she argues for conscience as “performed” by discourse, and therefore, our ethical frameworks becoming able, somehow, to recast the regulatory frameworks which rule us differently. Butler argues that our conscience, our super-ego, which Freud argues is formed by the process of identification characterised in melancholy, creates our inner topography¹⁹. Thus, she says we have forever, an ambivalent relationship with the discourse that forms us:

Some psychoanalytic theorists of the social have argued that social interpellation always produces a psychic excess it cannot control. Yet the production of the psychic as a distinct domain cannot obliterate the social occasion of this production. The “institution” of the ego cannot fully overcome its social residue, given that its “voice” is from the start borrowed from elsewhere, a recasting of a social “plaint” as psychic self-judgment.

The power imposed upon one is the power that animates one’s emergence, and there appears to be no escaping this ambivalence. Indeed, there appears to be no “one” without ambivalence, which is to say that the fictive redoubling necessary to become a self rules out the possibility of strict identity. Finally, then, there is no ambivalence without loss as the verdict of sociality, one that leaves the trace of its turn at the scene of one’s emergence.²⁰

Butler, here, cannot be accused of voluntarism. Societal pressures form our consciences, our super-egos, as self-regulation from outside. We cannot step aside from these regulatory powers. However, we do reformulate our conscience, our attitudes to life. Discourse enables our speech and our thought and the relationship therefore between the discourses which regulate and form us and our performance of them is one which I shall call sublimation. Freud wrote of sublimation as the activity which changes libido into creative human endeavour.²¹ I wish to shift Freud’s usage away from the transfer of sexual feelings into thinking and towards a broader and less obviously sexualised definition. Sublimation I shall use here to mean the psychic process whereby discourse becomes voice, where the different facets and regulations of discourse become available to creative combination and recombination to create a meaningful iteration, which is nevertheless a changed iteration. Butler does not explicitly state or explore this process, but I believe it to be implicit to her study which is, after all, a study of how the human subject becomes reflexive and self-reflexive through discourse:
The more a practice is mastered, the more fully subjection is achieved. Submission and mastery take place simultaneously, and this paradoxical simultaneity constitutes the ambivalence of subjection. Though one might expect submission to consist in yielding to an externally imposed dominant order and to be marked by a loss of control and mastery, paradoxically, it is itself marked by mastery. The binary frame of master/submission is forfeited by Althusser as he recasts submission precisely and paradoxically as a kind of mastery. In this view, neither submission nor mastery is performed by a subject; the lived simultaneity of submission as mastery, and mastery as submission, is the condition of possibility for the emergence of the subject.22

For Butler, the emergence of the subject is the sublimation of discourse, and is a creative as well as a performative act. It consists of both a mastery, a 'fort-da' with the play of discourse, and also a submission to discourse which nevertheless makes it at the service of the subject. Furthermore, to the extent that our voices are not single, unitary, that they are full of internal conflicts, that they might change over time, or through the context of our interpellation, then our voices, become the relational performatives, the different iterations which reflexively perform us and which can perform change.

The "subject" is produced in language through an act of foreclosure (Verwerfung). What is refused or repudiated in the formation of the subject continues to determine that subject. What remains outside this subject, set outside by the act of foreclosure which founds the subject, persists as a kind of defining negativity. The subject is, as a result, never coherent and never self-identical precisely because it is founded and, indeed, continually refounded, through a set of defining foreclosures and repressions that constitute the discontinuity and incompletion of the subject.23

The subject, traversed by a plurality of discourses is Lacan's notion of "ex-timacy", where discourse pervades the body giving rise to conscious and unconscious speech and structuration. It is in the very plurality of discourses, and in the psychic turn, that Butler argues for a set of identifications and desires. It is this process I call sublimation.

Butler argues that performance consists of context, unconscious and conscious agency, and the iteration whereby the qualities of these variables changes. In Mrs Dalloway there are moments when the characters are threatened or obliterated by the oppressive power of discourse: Septimus is driven to suicide, Clarissa and even Peter succumb to moments of despair. Clarissa is “thinking of Bourton all day”, and her memories can be said to “perform” her attitude to the present. Likewise, adverse events in the present like the news that Richard is dining with Lady Bruton, “perform” Clarissa's memories, forcing into consciousness Clarissa’s unhappy memories of loss. Yet equally, there are moments of performativity when Clarissa, and to some extent Septimus, are able to recontextualise their lives, to find some creativity, some
agency which changes the terms of interpellation for themselves and possibly for those around them. In helping Rezia to make the hat for “Mrs Filmer’s married daughter”, Septimus is able, for a moment, to see Rezia as “a flowering tree”, “a sanctuary”. The making of the hat by Septimus and Rezia enables Septimus to fight Dr Holmes and Sir William Bradshaw, to make him “fear no more”. This act of performance is an interpersonal one: it is the collaboration between Septimus and Rezia that creates a bond between them and enables them, if only temporarily, to believe they have the courage to stand up to Dr. Holmes and Sir William. Clarissa’s moment of creative performativity whilst thinking on the balcony at her party is more personal and imaginative. Her agency lies in her ability to find an empathetic connection to Septimus, even though she does not know him, and to use this connection to recontextualise her memories around Bourton and to feel better about herself and her history. She then extends her good feeling to those around her by holding a party and organising it. She performs the context of the party, extending love and forgiveness as she extends her arms toward Peter. Both Septimus’s and Clarissa’s ‘moments’ of creativity are moments of repair for themselves which enable them to perform themselves differently for others and therefore create agency for themselves, a political context for change.

Clarissa’s ‘moment’ on the balcony acts as a moment of reparative thinking, and, I shall argue, an allegory of the creative process. In writing *Mrs Dalloway*, Virginia Woolf had a need to feel better about herself - why else would she go through what for her was the evident torture of writing, which often led to her mental collapse? 24 Woolf writes about using writing “to bring the severed parts together”, 25 and after writing *To the Lighthouse* describes the process of portraying her mother as Mrs Ramsey in terms which I would want to call reparative performativity:

I suppose that I did for myself what psychoanalysts do for their patients. I expressed some very long felt and deeply felt emotion. And in expressing it I explained it and then laid it to rest. 26

If Woolf felt that writing *To the Lighthouse* was an act of psychoanalytic working through, then it seems likely that her representation of Clarissa’s ‘moment’ of creativity is likewise a moment of psychoanalytic performance and a self-conscious trope of the writing process. In *Mrs Dalloway* she created a performance of feminist literature which was reparative for her reader as well as herself, and which breaks with the context of the patriarchal literature which preceded it. The film likewise is a performance, a collaboration
between women film-makers which breaks with the context of patriarchal film-making. Through Butler’s theory of performativity, one can articulate the writing and thinking process as an iteration which changes the context of discourse and which is therefore political. Linking these moments of creativity to the psychic processes of melancholy, identification, desire, empathy and even hysteria, enables creativity to be conceived as a fragile but necessary weapon against oppression. If, patriarchy is the oppressive discourse in *Mrs Dalloway*, then the interpellations which Clarissa and Septimus cannot refuse are, in Butler’s terms, “turned” in Septimus into psychic destruction, but in Clarissa into a creativity and sublimation that enables her to rise above the bullying which threatens to destroy her.

How does Clarissa’s “turn” on the balcony create a catharsis for herself and the viewer? Why is Septimus not robust enough to fight his demons and survive? The film does not answer these questions and even allows Clarissa to voice astonishment at the mystery of human subjectivity and at our capacity to withstand the traumas of life: “Your parents just hand it to you, life, to be lived right through to the end...What makes us go on? What sends roaring up in us that immeasurable delight to surprise us? Then nothing can be slow enough, nothing lasts too long. You want to say to each moment, stay, stay, stay”. Instead, the film performs the experience for us, so that we share with Septimus the panic at the entrance of Dr Holmes, and with Clarissa her delight at her hard won enjoyment of life. Nevertheless, in showing us Septimus driven by the spirit of Evans, and Clarissa able to identify and empathise with Septimus, the film does actually dramatise the process leading to Clarissa’s moment of psychic creativity. What we see is how her psychic processes enable Clarissa skillfully to master discourse, even though her moment of sublimation still remains a mysterious aspect of the human experience.

In order to further explore Clarissa’s moment of “sublimation” on the balcony, I want to return here to the psychoanalytic variables deployed throughout this thesis to investigate the gendered voice and agency thriller in novels and films. I have looked at hysteria both as a question, in response to trauma (“What Sex am I?”, “Am I Alive or Dead?”) and as gendered identification (the hysterical identification with the desire of the Other who is “presumed to know” the answers about existence and sexual difference). In *Mrs Dalloway*, however, I am arguing that trauma, hysteria, identification, all of which cause death in the
psychotic protagonists of thrillers, work creatively in Clarissa to allow her to empathise with others, to sublimate her own hysteria and to counter the forces of oppression around her. Thus, our neuroses can be deployed to positive as well as to negative ends and can be used in the service of the social, political and psychic agency of the individual. I return to these concepts through the work of Elisabeth Bronfen and of Juliet Mitchell, to explore how what I shall call “psychic performativity” is at play in Clarissa’s creativity, enabling her to “work through” her trauma, whereas Peter and Septimus are not able through their performativity to surmount or to come to terms with their hysterias.

Elisabeth Bronfen coins the term “the Knotted Subject” to explain the unique performative characteristics of the individual subject. Rather than using the phallus as unitary signifier of the Lacanian symbolic, Bronfen looks at the navel (the “omphalos”) as the remnant of our links with our mothers’ bodies. The navel provides a comic site of mystery on our bodies as a redundant opening to the world which is no longer open, i.e. the umbilical cord has been tied off. Bronfen uses the figure of the omphalos as a saturated metaphor for the human condition through its connection with trauma: it is a remnant of the most primal trauma we suffer - birth, by its lost connection with the mother - and our mortality. It is also a scar which is a reminder of how we are fed through the umbilical cord and receive our existence from outside, thus reminding us of not only our biological heritage but also of our cultural heritage. We owe our existence to the other. Finally, it is a nothing, it has no function after birth, and Bronfen considers it a metaphor: a symptom of trauma which is not symbolisable but a site of fantasy. From this “nothing” - this knot of navel - we become knotted subjects: the discourses of society, our family history, our sexuality, forming what I call voice and agency, a skein of threads which perform our lives.

The metaphor of the individual as knot is the transformation from emphasizing how a subject is inscribed by multiple codes and understands the self as a result of this inscription, with each individual subject to the symbolic discourses and representations of a given cultural context to an emphasis on the subject’s particularity, to the very specific individually differentiated form of knotting the subject. The pun contains the seminal ambivalence I am concerned with in regarding the navel as a critical category for cultural analysis, namely, the enmeshment between connection, incision, bondage and negation, that is the bond constructed over naught. To speak of the knotted subject emphasizes not that the subject is split and multiple but how this multiplicity offers a new means of integration. The metaphor of the knotted subject yields an image for the condition of being culturally determined, with identity resulting from the inscription of cultural representations. At the same time this metaphor calls into question the specificity, particularity, or uniqueness of each cultural determination, ultimately favoring a notion of
an individual who integrates fantasies of coherence with an acknowledgement of fallibility.  

The metaphor of the knotted subject conveys the psychoanalytic as well as the discursive “enmeshment” of the subject. The characteristics which make us individuals cannot be easily separated from each other: we are not exactly a tangle of various threads - the knots give us some coherent form - but neither can we be undone into our separate components. Thus, gender, hysteria, identification, trauma, are part of the same process of being human, and cannot easily be thought about separately.

In a clear and simple way, Juliet Mitchell formulates how our psychic performativity is set in motion, how our psychic survival depends on all the processes of our lives, from thought and communication to hallucination and fantasy, identification and empathy. Firstly, she explains how the unconscious is formed through the process of “primary repression”:

The suggestion is that some effraction, or breaking in, of the neonate’s protective shield is the condition of this primary repression. This effraction is an energetic force that sets up a vortex within the individual and then draws chaotic and primitive representations to it. Wilfred Bion calls this nameless dread; another term is “primal anxiety, which the helpless, prematurely born human infant feels when its existence is threatened on a failure of the provision of its needs.  

What is established is that trauma, the threatening of the infant’s existence, is a creative and productive force, for it sets in motion the unconscious, the process of fantasy, and the process of communication:

Primitive identifications with what is needed start to fill this hole, which is the first condition of our psyche - a baby will start to mouth the sucking and will dream or “hallucinate” the breast it needs, an infant will make the faces and sounds of its caretaker. But the caretaker, probably because it has the same source for its own psychic being, will do the same - milk flows in relation to the baby’s need, smiles, and grimaces; sounds and words match each other across the divide of infant and caretaker. This is the simple mimesis found in all higher mammals. The effraction caused in the protective shield is likewise probably markable on some evolutionary scale. So we have a gap followed by a fantasmatic and an identificatory filling of that gap. We might call this a model of human or mammalian protodesire.

Within one process, the “gap” opened up by the failure of the carer to feed the child on demand creates the child’s nameless anxiety - trauma. This, however, enables both the child’s representation of its unsatisfied needs, as fantasy, as identification, and as communication. The creation of the child’s unconscious is necessarily also the creation of their consciousness, their ego boundaries, which are then associated with
their identifications as well as being a description of "human or mammalian protodesire", Mitchell's example thus demonstrates human or mammalian "proto-personality" or "proto-ego system". Once the unconscious is established through "primary repression", then subsequent losses, large and small, are performative of the individual who becomes, through this process, a subject: a subject of language, a subject of the unconscious, a subject of the laws of sexual difference, a subject of the various discourses in which they are interpellated. The Oedipus complex is then a representation of accumulated performed moments in childhood, realised as a single drama or a single instant. The subject's induction into sociality through this process is ambivalent because this induction is always through a perceived or actual loss: first in the disciplining of the body which is experienced as loss of food and loss of love, in the loss is the mother as sole love, when she is seen to have desire elsewhere, in the loss of the illusion of total power and autonomy which comes with parental discipline, in the assumption of gender and in the loss of the object which comes with the learning of language.

If every identification is a lost love object, then identity, including gender and sexual identity, can be said to be formed and performed through love and loss. Mitchell's example indicates that this process begins at the very earliest stages of life. However, not all the formative moments of loss in life are traumatic, or remain so for the individual. Whilst identification - love and loss - and fantasy and repression, are common to all of us, and psychoanalytically essential for us to become people, melancholy and hysteria are maladjustments that we all suffer to some extent and from time to time. Returning to Mitchell's example of the infant, what would happen if the mismatch between the infant's need for food, and the caretaker's providing it were such that the infant lived in intermittent or constant anxiety? Or if anxiety were intrinsic to the child as product of some genetic predisposition? First, the child cries, becomes hysterical, and its crying represents their demand for love even, perhaps, when it no longer needs food. If caring and food are withdrawn more completely, the child fails to thrive, takes its aggression inward and becomes depressed. The child may even lose the ability to "hallucinate" its objects, to identify with and symbolize its needs, and withdraw into mental and physical silence. Thus the child is unable to "work through" its experience, or to begin to sublimate its drives. Thus this early example of parenting bears out how discourse itself - in this case the schooling that goes with feeding, with potty training, with infancy - can
become inconsistent or even cruel, bearing the marks of the failure of human process. If trauma, experienced as anxiety, intrudes too consistently or too strongly into a child's life, this will have an adverse effect on its capacity to sublimate - to accept identifications and to symbolize creatively - and will turn it into a nervous or damaged adult. Thus it is possible to see how the knots of individual subjectivity become structured differently through careful or careless parenting.

**Trauma and Hysteria**

Bronfen's metaphor of the knotted subject postulates trauma as birth trauma, as the knot of the subject emanating from the omphalos in the same configuration throughout life. However, this metaphor fails fully to account for the structural effect of this originary trauma which is always with us as a gap in representation and therefore can never be adequately interpreted. Laplanche's concept of the "enigmatic signifier" enables us to understand what I propose to call the "performativity of trauma", the way it is a variable: a gap which, as Mitchell says, becomes filled with contents, whether melancholic or hysterical, and also a variable which becomes interpreted differently throughout our lives. Laplanche situates this "enigmatic message" by defining it in relation to deferred action (*Nachträchtlichkeit* translated as "belatedness"), the process of our actions simultaneously being influenced by earlier traumas, and by re-interpreting those earlier moments through the perspective of the present:

I want to account for this problem of the different directions, to and fro, by arguing that, right at the start, there is something that goes in the direction of the past to the future, from the other to the individual in question, that is in the direction from the adult to the baby, which I call the implantation of the enigmatic message. This message is then retranslated, following a temporal direction which is, in an alternating fashion, by turns retrogressive and progressive (according to my general model of translation-detranslation-retranslation). The "enigmatic message" or enigmatic signifier enables us to see trauma in terms of discourse, to see that trauma, "nameless anxiety" arises through the unconscious messages of the other, whether that other is an individual, an institution, or a society. It through the communication of the enigmatic message that the subject is threatened by the death drive. This fundamental negativity makes the subject repeat destructive patterns of behaviour which, in the case of the fictional characters of this study, invariably end in death. However, a danger of thinking about trauma as a variable in subjectivity which is inflicted from outside is again to reduce subjectivity to a determined rather than a performative effect of discourse. It is in the
performative interpretation of the enigmatic signifier, its hysterical effect in “plugging” the gap in discourse, that the individual “translates” and “retranslates” the message.

Mitchell argues that primal trauma is by no means the only trauma we suffer during our lives. The small and larger traumas that we suffer in the course of our lives become understood in terms of our originary trauma, and become inflected by our histories and performed by them in ways we do not necessarily understand. A common feature of the psychological thriller as it has developed in a post-Freudian age has been the time-scale of the drama, where an earlier traumatic situation becomes the motivation for events occurring in the text’s present. The plays of Ibsen developed the technique of retrospective exposition, where during the course of the play, the past traumatic event is revealed in the present and shown to have dreadful consequences. Thus Hedda Gabler has the roots of her hysteria in her parenting by her father, the General, and the dreadful illness of Oswald Alving in *Ghosts* is revealed to be the result of a dreadful legacy, syphilis. Steve Neale describes a genre of film - the psychotraumatic thriller - which explores the previous traumas of the characters as a retrospective exposition which has further traumatic effects in the present.32 These thrillers became commonplace in the late 1940’s as a result of Hollywood’s familiarity with Freud’s work, and some of the most well known examples can be found in the work of Hitchcock: in *Vertigo, Marnie,* and *Spellbound.* In my discussions of *Don’t Look Now, Live Flesh* and *Strangers on a Train,* I have looked at the damage inflicted upon the heroes by trauma specifically experienced as the “enigmatic message”. However, in these films and books, trauma is dramatised as a past event resolved in the present, thus fixing the traumatic event in time, as the “hero’s” fatal flaw, a psychological rather than a political characteristic which fixes his or her destiny.

In *Mrs Dalloway* the process of trauma is allied to the discourse of patriarchy and oppression of Peter, Septimus and Clarissa. As in psychotraumatic thrillers, the characters inhabit different time frames: Bourton and the present by Peter and Clarissa, the War and the present by Septimus. However, these time frames are interpreted differently by the narration, to show how “enigmatic messages” can finally never be turned into dramatic or personal resolution, but become translated and retranslated throughout life. The film infers rather that past and present are places on a continuum where trauma is always being invoked by
the action of patriarchy. The interpretation of the “enigmatic message” evoked by patriarchy, however, varies in the degree of negativity the characters bring to it. For Septimus, the death of Evans opens up a gaping hole which Septimus can only interpret negatively, the enigmatic message of Septimus’s big Other spelling only hostility, threatening Septimus’s very survival. When Septimus is hystericised by the discourse of Sir William Bradshaw and Dr Holmes, he performs his powerlessness through suicide. Peter’s hysteria is of a different and lesser order than Septimus’s. Clarissa’s rejection of him “colours everything”, and he “can’t love like that twice”. His moment of rejection where he is left crying in the rain as Clarissa runs into the house is one of the key moments when the film is focalised through him, both as his reminiscence and also as a moment of his private emotion which no one else in the story witnesses. His love affairs post-Clarissa are self-destructive relationships with unavailable married women or flirtations with the youth he no longer has, as exemplified by his smiling look at the young lady on the bench in Regent’s Park. He treats Clarissa as the Other whose guarantee of safety for his psychic health is not forthcoming. He needs Clarissa’s reassurance and her validation, so that he almost bursts into tears when relating the details of his life to her - she has the power to reduce him and his life to nothing, so he must protest “I’m not old you know. My life isn’t over. Not by any means, though you think me a failure, which I am according to all this”. Nevertheless the film cleverly shows, through his possessiveness, his playing with his penknife, his wanting them “to be everything to each other”, that his hysteria is not a response to the trauma of Clarissa’s rejection but a performance which leads to her rejecting him. His behaviour is an indicator of a hysteria which precedes, as well as follows, his love of Clarissa. It is here that the film’s imbrication of the personal and the political become implicated in a critique of patriarchy as trauma-producing. Peter’s patriarchal stance, his inability to give Clarissa space, his interruption of her kiss with Sally, lead to her rejection of him. Thus the discourse of patriarchy performs a damaging masculinity in Peter as a response to trauma which is itself patriarchally related.

Peter and Septimus perform hysterically, their repetitions and hysteria a response to a message produced by patriarchy. Clarissa’s trauma has a different effect: her performance of life is timid, but not irrational. Her act of sublimation, of creativity on the balcony does not alter her capacity for social agency, but constitutes a moment of reflexivity where she understands her past and comes to accept her limitations.
Her capacity to suffer from fear, to believe that "life is very dangerous", is a quality she has at the beginning of her life at Bourton.\textsuperscript{33} The traumatic events placed in the past of the narration do not function literally, as they might in a thriller, to produce an active hermeneutic resolved in the present. Rather, the drama at Bourton comes to figure the very openness of trauma, the mystery of our sexual difference, and our ability to cope with the traumas of life. I have argued earlier that the Bourton sequence carries a symbolic function, as a kind of Oedipal metaphor mapping out Clarissa's sexual feelings, referring back to the past, to Clarissa's infancy as a drama of the unrepresentable in Clarissa's love for Sally, to the lack of a place or even a definition for their kind of love in that society: a social drama showing the hystericising effects of the social mores, the unfair rules about marriage and property and careers on women. The events at Bourton can be seen to dramatise both an originary trauma, in the form of an Oedipal journey not performed satisfactorily, an adolescent/youthful experience which repeats or performs this trauma, and also the effect of looking back at the experience from maturity and assimilating it. Clarissa's trauma therefore seems to be overdetermined, both something mysterious and something caused, or at least triggered, by psychological or social factors, which themselves seem to be interrelated. The film thus dramatises trauma as achronological, a feature of Clarissa's subjectivity rather than a developmental phase in her infancy. Yet the interrupted kiss with Sally and then Clarissa's rejection of Peter for Richard, are the dramatic, defining events of Clarissa's life - and of the film - moments when Clarissa makes choices which set consequences for the rest of her life. They can be seen as performances where Clarissa institutes the kinds of iteration she will repeat for the rest of her life. Clarissa herself perceives these moments as foundational, questioning whether she has made the "right" choice, during the day of the film and during her life. The flashbacks show Sally and Peter offering Clarissa an opportunity to change the context of her performance, yet she does not take advantage of them, paralysed by her intrinsic fear, a fear triggered by her failed Oedipal resolution. The scenes at Bourton can be seen, precisely, as performed, so that Clarissa's "fearful" iterations are shown in a context where it might have been possible for her to change - to iterate differently. Her failure to change, to become brave, is the subject of her later reflections about Bourton. The scenes at Bourton act as deferred action where Clarissa's working through comes to terms with her timidity, and realises the joy of those memories at Bourton.
As a drama of the unrepresentable love in Clarissa's life, I return to look at the Bourton sequence through Lacan's structural rather than chronological understanding of sexual difference. Lacan's analysis in Seminar XX argues that woman are not completely subject to the laws of the phallus, and that a remainder, a supplementary jouissance, exceeds their subjection.

In *Mrs Dalloway*, Clarissa's love for Sally does encompass this "supplementary jouissance". Her love for Sally is only implicit, symbolised through the kiss; but this kiss is only an indicator of a much more dispersed sexuality and love. This dispersed sexuality is communicated through the poetic image of the flowers, through the link with Sally and the garden, through the image of Sally united in the mirror with Clarissa, and through the musical theme which links Sally with love. Peter cannot understand this kind of love, and when he approaches Sally and Clarissa to interrupt their relationship, the kiss retrospectively becomes a phallic kiss, a lesbian kiss which Peter cannot tolerate and which Sally and Clarissa do not want to acknowledge. The kind of love that Clarissa has for Sally has no place within the phallic world that Peter at that moment represents.

The events at Bourton can be seen, therefore, to dramatise both an originary trauma, in the form of an Oedipal journey away from an idealised mother figure to an ambiguous father figure, and an adolescent/youthful experience which repeats or performs this trauma in the impossible love that Clarissa and Sally feel towards each other but cannot have represented in society. However, the film's imbrication of the social/political with the personal condenses in Peter's interruption of the kiss, a patriarchy which then is both political and psychological. The question the film poses is whether Peter's interruption is the interruption of "all men", a masculinity which is essential and forever and which, when writ large, creates the domination of men over women and the ridiculous tragi-comedy which is the political life of *Mrs Dalloway* or; whether the political oppression of patriarchy creates Peter as hysterical and his interruption as an oppressive feature of the political landscape of patriarchy. Thus, the film dramatises precisely the performativity of patriarchy as formative of the individual gendered subject and as projection of the individual subject onto society.

**Identification and Loss**
Juliet Mitchell shows how when an infant “introjects” the image of food, the infant also initiates the process of communication, of subjectivity, and of sublimation. Identification is a more mature process than introjection, but it also leads to the setting up of an internal topography, the building of the ego structures. Identification starts with a disciplining of the self, the forbidding of satisfaction through socialisation, through the Oedipus complex. When we adopt language, we do so at the expense of the “real” objects we desire. The concepts of the objects become attached to language as signifiers and to our internal worlds as thinking, our inner voices. We also gain a super-ego as the voice of discipline, and through our forming ego we come to develop our knotted subjectivity, our attitude to the world. Thus, a “good enough” upbringing will ensure our voices are capable of performing the discourses which speak us, and of developing our personalities and enriching them. We mourn our lost objects, taking them into the psyche, but we also let them go to become part of us. A failure in this process produces hysteria which we all suffer from to some extent; but more seriously it may also produce a propensity to melancholy. If our relationship to what we mourn is ambivalent - if we are angry with our loves for rejecting us or dying - then our anger is turned inwards, impoverishing our inner lives. Thus we are crippled psychologically through our punitive super-egos; but also through our phenomenological awareness. The world becomes dull as our perception is dull. The manifestation of trauma as melancholy can still be seen as the operation of the death drive, but now the self is turned against itself and the world as representation, as phenomenological experience. Hamlet expresses melancholy as ‘Oh God, how dull, flat, stale and unprofitable seem to me all the uses of this world’, and the same phenomenon can be seen in Septimus’s sitting in his winter coat in the sunny park looking not up and around, but at the pigeons.

In *Mrs Dalloway*, a major consequence of melancholy is the loss of the voice, or its integration as a communicative tool. Septimus no longer talks sense or can be understood by Sir William Bradshaw, and Clarissa is silenced at the party by Sir William and Lady Bradshaw talking of Septimus’s death. The voice is silenced - Kristeva, for example, talks of her depressed patients not being able to find words. Melanie Klein, treating troubled children, decided that inherent aggression was constituted from the same fundamental negativity that lay behind Freud’s own concept of the death drive. Our losses are inevitable, and therefore our anger is also, and whether it is projected outward or absorbed inwards it is a feature of
human life. Unlike Freud, Klein believed that there was no difference between mourning and melancholy; that we never let go of our attachments, but oscillate between attempting to destroy our objects through our aggression and anger and then trying to reconstitute them, to restore them so that we may survive psychically. For Klein, "working through" meant the process whereby the oscillation between aggression and restitution, the "performance" of this oscillation, comes ever closer to understanding the loved object and asymptotically approaches reality. The more we accumulate love relationships then the more chance we have to phenomenologically comprehend the world, to "perform" it truly. However, it is possible to see how both Freud's ideas and Klein's ideas have been integrated in Lacan's ethic of desire. Desire comes from outside, in the process of identification, of ex-timacy. When Lacan says that "we should not give way on desire", what he means is not that we should do as we wish, but that through our desire, our love, we manifest our aggression and restitution more accurately towards others and towards the world - which then falls more easily into our phenomenological understanding and appreciation.

Both Freud's concept of the death drive and Klein's idea of reparation can be seen in relationship to war. Freud formulated the death drive as a response to the First World War and particularly to the phenomenon of shell-shock and the nightmares and hallucinations which could no longer be accounted for by the pleasure principle. The death drive was also a response to the incomprehensibility of the war as the horrific modern manifestation of society's self-destructive and destructive urges. Klein worked throughout the Second World War, and her idea of reparation and "group feeling" - that society should offer the support and comfort to the individual that the mother provides for the child - is more in tune with the sense of justice and of community of that war. It is perhaps not surprising that Virginia Woolf was also concerned with these ideas, and manages to dramatises them in their complexity and overdetermination in Mrs Dalloway.

In Mrs Dalloway Clarissa veers between depression and elation, her aggression and her attempts at restitution in constant play until she manages to "perform" her moment on the balcony and come to terms with her past. This portrayal of Clarissa caught in the Kleinian mode of melancholy and restitution is different from the way the film portrays Septimus's trauma. Septimus's hallucination of Evans can be
described as an exemplary act of Freudian identification, where restitution and reparation are unable to
defend Septimus from his own aggressive urges. Evans no longer exists in the outside world, and Septimus
creates him as an inner object. However, the ambivalence of Septimus’s loss - his inability to prevent
Evans’s death - creates Evans as a terrifying figure, a figure of “internal beratement”. I have analysed the
way that Septimus internalises Evans and then projects that internalisation onto the outside world,39 and
there is a linearity and simplicity about the way that Septimus is driven merely by his hallucination of
Evans. Clarissa is portrayed with more complexity than Septimus, her internalised selves being the
flashback memories of Bourton and of all her friends, and also her loss of Sally/hers mother. Melanie Klein
believed that our continued experience of oscillating between aggression and repair and our experience of
further losses in our lives is a reality principle whereby we come to a more nuanced and accurate
understanding of the outside world. Can Klein’s reality principle be applied to Clarissa’s own losses and
ambivalences? Certainly, she becomes less anxious, through her contemplation of her past, of her
performance in the present, and through knowledge of her own suffering is able to empathise and
understand others. Her understanding is not just of Septimus, but also of Ellie Henderson, empathising with
Ellie’s submissiveness - “it must be her poor weaponless state” - and particularly of Peter, to whom she
holds her arms out at the end of the film. This act of generosity is not a pure repetition of the same gesture
at Bourton: her statement “Here I am at last” carries a different, and unequivocal tone of generosity to the
tone she adopted in her earlier meeting with Peter in the library. Here Clarissa hovered on the threshold,
her ambivalence over Peter and over their quarrel inferring for the viewer that she is performing the gesture
as much from guilt as from love. Even during the day of her party, her multiple identifications and
associations dramatise her fluctuating understanding and appreciation of Richard, an understanding which is
nuanced and paradoxical. For example in the early moments when the news of him lunching with Lady
Bruton is juxtaposed with the Dalloways’ empty bedroom and her own “tower” Clarissa believes that
Richard has trapped her - “The doctor said you must get your rest. You must sleep undisturbed”.
Whereas at the end of the film Clarissa in her voice over, pays tribute to Richard, to his calmness reading
“The Times” and allowing her to “revive”. Clarissa then watches Richard dancing with Elizabeth with
evident pleasure, and Richard passing Elizabeth to another partner. The older couple stand united,
watching. Clarissa’s range of thinking and appreciation of Richard is thus nuanced according to a highly
developed reality principle. Although the narration has shown Richard from other narrational points of view during the film, the viewer comes to appreciate Clarissa’s view as authoritative.

Just before his death, Septimus sees the figure of the old man in the window opposite yet he still jumps out of the window, showing himself unable to identify or connect with life. And yet Clarissa is able to identify with the older woman opposite her window, and see the possibility of her own old age. It is, however, Clarissa’s melancholy, her oscillation between aggression and repair that provides the motivation not only for her repair of herself - by looking and internalising the old woman opposite - but also of the world - through her throwing of the party. Thus melancholy provides a motivation towards destruction or creation, but it also is imbricated with empathy, the capacity for understanding others’ feelings through having them oneself.

**Empathy and Sublimation**

I have discussed how trauma, hysteria and identification are variables in the process of psychic performativity. Finally, I would like to explore empathy and sublimation as aspects of psychic performativity, and as the synthetic “turning” of what is otherwise performed negatively into a positive response towards living and surmounting life’s difficulties. Juliet Mitchell’s example of childhood trauma imbricates empathy and sublimation as intrinsic to the very process of feeding and nurturing. She writes that the mother and child become symbiotically linked through the process of the child’s identification and mimicry. The child also becomes aware of the mother and her separateness over time, able both to empathise and separate from her. This, in Lacanian psychoanalysis, is the effect of the Oedipus complex: the father (other) taking away the mother and introducing the child to culture, through the word and through the prohibition. Careful enough parenting, with neither parent acting in primal ways to create enigmatic messages, will create identification with both parents, and also empathy. The child has to learn what the parents want - desire comes from the other - and in that process must be able to imaginatively place itself in the parents’ position. Sublimation - the “turning” of drive into creativity, or, in my definition, the “turning”, through the “working through” of trauma, of disciplinary discourse into creativity - is more mysterious. Nevertheless, a condition of sublimation, as shown in *Mrs Dalloway*, would appear to be the ability to
empathise. Septimus, making the hat with Rezia is, for the only time in the film, able to think about another person, to decide that the hat is too small for Mrs Peters, that “she will look like a pig at the fair”. His ability to come to rely upon Rezia -“You’re a flowering tree” - and to express his love through making the hat is sublimation. Clarissa is able to use the story of Septimus’s death to feel “that immeasurable delight to surprise us. Then nothing lasts too long. You want to say to each moment, stay, stay, stay”, and she does this by identifying with Septimus, seeing his death as a sacrifice - “I’m somehow glad he could do it, throw it away. It’s made me feel the beauty, somehow feel very like him, less afraid”. As an inner object, a part object, Clarissa is able to use Septimus to symbolise her own death. His death acts as her liberation from her death drive, and this creative and unexpected conjunction is made through her ability to empathise and identify. As with the film’s performance of character voice as an emergent quality of “montage”, the creativity of Clarissa’s connections, her psychic “montage”, are emergent qualities, but they can only happen upon condition of her capacity to empathise:

A path leads from identification by way of imitation to empathy, that is, to the comprehension of the mechanism by means of which we are enabled to take up any attitude at all towards another mental life.40

Empathy requires us to identify with another person, but to put their interests first. In other words we must respond to other people with generosity, in the same way as that when, as babies, we respond to our caretaker with a love that supports and reinforces their giving. It is through empathy that the world comes to be acknowledged as other, and phenomenally we are able to appreciate it as something outside ourselves. Something of Clarissa’s excitement at the world of sensation, of flowers, of Regent’s Park on a summer’s day, is caught through her party, and through the final still image at Bourton of Clarissa, Peter and Sally in shimmering oscillation, their lives no longer merely Clarissa’s identifications but part of an emergent performance which encompasses them all.

Gender

I would like, finally, to return to Judith Butler’s ideas of gender melancholy in order to look at *Mrs Dalloway* in its performance of sexual difference and to ask how it creates different possibilities for such a performance. Butler’s argument hinges upon a belief that the binaries of gender and sexuality (male or female, gay or straight) are a set of organising categories covering a range of biological/psychological
sexual attributes which are themselves diverse and polymorphous. Everyone’s desire is unique, but we all still have to become gendered to go through doors marked “Boys” and “Girls”, “Men” and “Women”.

Butler’s argument is that when doing so we retain an unacknowledged identification, and therefore melancholy, for the gender we are not. She argues this by asserting that the homosexual taboo precedes the incest taboo in the Oedipus complex and that we establish our genders through this homosexual taboo.

Girls reject their mothers through a repudiation of homosexual attachment while boys reject femininity per se, and therefore install femininity in their psyches as an unacknowledged identification:

...the girl becomes a girl through being subject to a prohibition which bars the mother as an object of desire and installs that barred object as a part of the ego, indeed, as a melancholic identification. Thus the identification contains within it both the prohibition and the desire, and so embodies the ungrieved loss of the homosexual cathexis. If one is a girl to the extent that one does not want a girl, then wanting a girl will bring a girl into question; within this matrix, homosexual desire thus panics gender....

...Becoming a “man” within this logic requires repudiating femininity as a precondition for the heterosexualization of sexual desire and its fundamental ambivalence. If a man becomes heterosexual by repudiating the feminine, where could that repudiation live except in an identification which his heterosexual career seeks to deny? Indeed, the desire for the feminine is marked by that repudiation: he wants the woman he would never be. He wouldn’t be caught dead being her: therefore he wants her...

Both the homosexual taboo and the taboo against incest are behavioural norms which, according to Foucault’s repressive hypothesis, produce homosexuality and incest (or incestuous desire) as necessary for their effectiveness as societal laws. Thus, homosexuality, as the negative resolution of the Oedipus complex becomes an equally melancholic repudiation of heterosexuality, enforcing an unnecessary barrier between homosexual desire and heterosexual desire, and reinforcing rigid identity positions which Butler would like to demolish, in order to create a less homophobic and sexist society.

The performativity of Butler’s analysis lies in the paradox she creates between being interpellated into a position - being called and identified, and yet not being a subject until one is interpellated:

To the extent that the naming is an address, there is an addressee prior to the address; but given that the address is a name which creates what it names, there appears to be no “Peter” without the name “Peter”...If there is no subject except as a consequence of this subjection, the narrative that would explain this requires that the temporality not be true, for the grammar of that narrative presupposes that there is no subjection without a subject who undergoes it.42
The consequences of this paradox when it comes to the interpellation of sexual difference is, for Butler, the ability for us not only to recognise our gender before we actually attain it but also to recognise the gender of others, our interpellators, before we are interpellated. Thus, Butler’s thesis invokes Abel’s nostalgic pre-Oedipal moment and Lacan’s structural analysis of sexual difference as asymmetrically signified through the phallus. If, as Butler argues, sexual difference is achieved cumulatively through a series of performative moments and is also a set of norms in constant operation, then gender melancholy may account for melancholy loss of the mother figured in *Mrs Dalloway* and the asymmetry which causes the daughter-mother relation to be disavowed in patriarchy. However, Butler’s conception of sexual difference is perhaps truer to an older myth of sexual difference, the myth of the Divine Androgyne who is both male and female and whose heads face in opposite directions, and when split by Apollo into separate genders is always searching to reunite.  

Freud returned to a consideration of bisexuality just before he died in 1938:

> At this point [that is at the point of the Oedipus moment] we must give separate accounts of the development of boys and girls (of males and females), for it is now that the difference between the sexes finds psychological expression for the first time. We are faced here by the great enigma of the biological fact of the duality of the sexes: it is an ultimate fact of our knowledge, it defies every attempt to trace it back to something else. Psycho-analysis has contributed nothing to clearing up this problem, which clearly falls wholly within the province of biology. In mental life we only find reflections of this great antithesis and their interpretation is made more difficult by the fact, long suspected, that no individual is limited to the modes of reaction of a single sex but always finds some room for those of the opposite one, just as his body bears, alongside of the fully developed organs of one sex, atrophied and often useless rudiments of those of the other. For distinguishing between male and female in mental life we make use of what is obviously an inadequate empirical and conventional equation: we call everything that is strong and active male, and everything that is weak and passive female. This fact of psychological bisexuality, too, embarrasses all our inquiries into the subject and makes them harder to describe.

Butler’s theory returns to this later Freudian theory of bisexuality, but she uses Freud’s theory of mourning and melancholy to show how in our conscious lives we live according to very strong gender roles and compulsory sexual identities, whether those be heterosexual or homosexual. Butler’s idea of unresolved and ambivalent melancholy leading to a harmful reification of identity is one which allows for a degree of “working through”. If we can only come to terms with our melancholy identifications, Butler argues, then we can be freer of the problems of identity as such and can move more fluidly between gender positions, identifying and empathising with the range of sexual possibilities and following our desires:

This raises the political question of the cost of articulating a coherent identity position by producing, excluding and repudiating a domain of abjected specters that threaten the
arbitrarily closed domain of subject positions. Perhaps only by risking the incoherence of identity is connection possible, a political point that correlates with Leo Bersani's insight that only the decentred subject is available to desire. What cannot be avowed as a constitutive identification for any given subject position runs the risk not only of becoming externalized in a degraded form, but repeatedly repudiated and subject to a policy of disavowal. 45

The ambivalent process of identification entails the possibility of empathy and disavowal/repudiation.

Butler's post-modern solution - to learn to move more fluidly between identifications, to somehow "grow" more identifications - cannot, within her concept of performativity, be delivered through voluntaristic human agency and can perhaps only be achieved through a more psychoanalytically aware societal framework, a changed and more pluralist set of behavioural norms.

How far can Mrs Dalloway be seen as a work of art, a work of sublimation, which performs pluralist sexual and gender norms? It is here that I believe the film struggles with its own perhaps incompatible internal conflict. Whilst it shows the mobility and fluidity of Clarissa's sexual object choices and also infers a character doubling between herself and Septimus which is crosses gender and hints at a fluidity in the film's identification of gender and sexual roles, it nevertheless performs a sexual timidity which can be equally interpreted as a retreat from sexuality, a retreat into the virginity it portrays through Clarissa "always dressed in white". Whilst the book retains Clarissa's love for Sally as having a sexual component, expressed through the famous description of Clarissa's "rapture" brought on by "yielding to the charm of a woman", the film only has the rather chaste kiss between Clarissa and Sally, and the more generalised and less sexual metaphor which likens Sally, and sometimes Clarissa, to flowers. There is nothing in the film which compares to this passage in the book, and which explains Clarissa's virginity in the light of repressed sexual feelings:

...yet she could not resist sometimes yielding to the charm of a woman, not a girl, of a woman confessing, as to her they often did, some scrape, some folly. And whether it was pity, or their beauty, or that she was older, or some accident - like a faint scent, or a violin next door (so strange is the power of sounds at certain moments), she did undoubtedly then feel what men felt. Only for a moment; but it was enough. It was a sudden revelation, a tinge like a blush which one tried to check and then, as it spread, one yielded to its expansion, and rushed to the farthest verge and there quivered and felt the world come closer, swollen with some astonishing significance, some pressure of rapture, which split its thin skin and gushed and poured with an extraordinary alleviation over the cracks and sores. Then, for that moment, she had seen an illumination; a match burning in a crocus; an inner meaning almost expressed. But the close withdrew; the hard softened. it
was over - the moment. Against such moments (with women too) there contrasted (as she laid her head down) the bed and Baron Margot and the candle half-burnt.46

The condensation of this passage, the metaphors of crocus buds and cracked skin, convey the unconscious bisexuality of which Freud writes. Yet it is equally clear that the psychic mobility that Clarissa expresses at this moment, her ability to empathise and imagine the masculine position - what men feel during sex - as well as her own feelings for men and women, is only released, for Clarissa, in her relationship with women, and particularly with Sally. Clarissa’s preference is for women, and her relationship with men is either passionless (with Richard) or fearful (as with Peter and his phallic penknife).

In the film, Clarissa’s relationship with Sally is not conveyed in such directly sexual terms, and therefore her virginity is a turning away from both Sally and Peter to the parental embrace of Richard. The kiss shows, rather, a potential relationship, a relationship where Clarissa wonders “whether she has lost the thing that mattered”, and not an actualised love. The effect of this is to show Clarissa being ruled by discourse, being unable to even explore her sexual possibilities or discover performatively what might be her happiest iteration. In addition, in the book Clarissa is paired with Septimus, not only through her trauma but also through her sexuality - Septimus’s friendship for Evans is akin to love:

> It was indeed a case of two dogs playing on a hearth-rug; one worrying a paper screw, snarling, snapping, giving a pinch now and then, at the old dog’s ear, the other lying somnolent, blinking at the fire, raising a paw, turning and growling good-temperedly. The had to be together, share with each other, fight with each other, quarrel with each other.

In the film, Septimus’s relationship with Evans is not developed and the hallucination of Evans becomes merely a signifier of Septimus death drive. Thus, the book conforms to Butler’s concept of the melancholy of gender roles, with Clarissa having internalized and absorbed the memory of her dead sister and mother and subsequently the memory of Sally, in order to turn finally and ambiguously towards heterosexuality; and Septimus having absorbed the memory of Evans, but having turned towards Rezia. The book dramatises the cost of this melancholy, the cost of identification, in the characters ambivalent relationships towards their own sexuality and in their vulnerability to the powers of compulsory heterosexuality which force this endless mourning upon them. Nevertheless, although the film does not set out such a clear pattern of gendered identifications amongst the characters, it still embraces the idea that love, identification and
empathy are possible and necessary across genders and across sexualities, between friends and between lovers. It therefore argues for a sexual mobility which is still rarely portrayed and which, although part of a gendered and sexual politics, is very far from a rigid identity politics:

Clarissa’s empathetic use of Septimus in order to create her own sublimation is an identification across gender. If, as I have argued, Clarissa is able to see Septimus as her double, Septimus’ death drive as her own, and the film continually compares them structurally as parallel figures, then this is itself an unusual filmic device. In *Mrs Dalloway (F & N)* this doubling is achieved across genders, part of the film’s depiction of gender as performative, non-essential, and capable of change. The cross-gendered doubling in *Mrs Dalloway (F & N)* can thus be seen as non-hysterical, especially in contrast to the thrillers studied in this thesis, where in *Strangers on a Train*, Bruno and Guy are doubles, inferring a masculine doubled consciousness, in *Don’t Look Now*, the dwarf doubles for the little girl, creating female doubles.

**The performance of the film.**

I have looked at Clarissa’s moment on the balcony as a dramatisation of the creative process. I would now like to look at the film as a performative “speech act” made collaboratively by the film cast and crew. This entails looking at the regulatory norms of the film, and seeing how these are “turned” or sublimated into artistic choice, and I will cite a few examples of where I believe this creativity happens and fails to happen within *Mrs Dalloway*. If it is difficult to determine how the ex-timacy of the individual performs them as a subject (the relationship between the outside influences of an individual and their performance), then this is also true for the collaborative subject (the film-makers). The film-makers are deeply imbricated within the institutional, political, aesthetic and reception frameworks which regulate their agency. Furthermore, as with the multi-causal, montage of the film, it is difficult to determine simple cause effect chains in the making of the film due to the degree of complexity involved in the film-making process.

I will briefly outline some of the enabling constraints of *Mrs Dalloway*. Firstly, as a classic adaptation of a classic novel, and as a film “produced” by two eminent British actresses, it seems not to
have been subject to much editorial influence outside the production team. In an increasingly insecure British Film Industry extensive script doctoring is usually a prelude to financing any film, yet Eileen Atkins wrote only one draft of the script, showing a highly unusual lack of interference in the writing process.

Secondly, as another consequence of the involvement of Eileen Atkins and Vanessa Redgrave, the film has the agency of four prominent female auteurs: Atkins and Regrave themselves, but also Virginia Woolf as writer and Marleen Gorris as hired director. The effect of this remarkable female and feminist collaboration is not just felt in the emphasis on female writing and a strong central female character, but is carried through in the film’s non-virtuoso reliance on collaborative working, on freedom for actors, and on the role of sound and language. Thirdly, the film, produced as a BBC television film, further foregrounds the writing and dialogue as values which television stresses rather than the virtuoso effects of camera, design, or sound of highly cinematic films. The film was beset by budget problems, running out of money in the middle of the shoot, and the film had to be shot for three weeks using Atkins’ husband’s private money. The budgetary constraints can be seen in the exclusive location shooting, the relatively small numbers of actors, the sparseness of the World War One setting. Atkins describes in her interview with Todd Pruzan how budgetary constraints changed the nature of several scenes and, although this makes interesting reading, where these changes cannot be perceived in the final film they become irrelevant in the consideration of the film’s performance. Thus they are part of the “unspeakable” of the institutional cinematic discourse of this particular film. However, where the budgetary constraints can be seen to be affecting the film in adverse ways so that repression causes symptoms of inconsistency in the text, the constraints can be seen to provoke the film’s “hysteria”. Elsewhere the solutions to the budgetary and pragmatic problems are creative by their creation of further thematic richness and these solutions are thus examples of the performativity displayed in the story of Mrs Dalloway

An example of a budgetary and location problem cleverly overcome through the use of lighting lies in the mismatch between exterior and interior locations. Some locations clearly did not have matching exteriors and interiors. For example: Clarissa’s town house which does not necessarily look out on the beautifully dressed Georgian square which the film establishes as its exterior, her balcony where she looks out on the opposite house (which we have seen early in the film, on the afternoon of Clarissa’s party,
looking out on trees), and Sir William Bradshaw's consulting room (the windows looking out without indicating any exterior). The solution found to creating matching interiors and exteriors was for the camera work to create a consistency of style: shots out of windows are almost exclusively medium close, or close direct point of view shots, and therefore could have been taken from any location. Where the interiors match the exteriors, such as at Bourton where Clarissa rushes out of the French windows, or in Septimus’s flat where he throws himself out of the window, these scenes are often shot in the same way lending consistency and believability to those “cheated” shots from elsewhere in the film (e.g. Clarissa’s balcony and her bedroom) However, many of the windows are also lit from outside, illuminating the net curtains, so that the exteriors cannot be seen anyway. The effect of this is to match the summery atmosphere we see outside in Regent’s Park when the camera catches the windows in the interior locations. This, moreover, has a metaphoric effect as the light softly illuminating the rooms from outside implies a freedom that the characters cannot find. Thus, Rezia and Septimus in Sir William’s office sit in the shadow whilst the room floods with light from the window.

If the lighting is an example of sublimation and creative performance in the face of constraint, an example of what I will call “hysterical” performance might be seen in the casting of the young and old Clarissa, Peter, Richard and Sally. Of the younger characters, only Clarissa, played by Natascha McElhone, looks remotely like her older self, played by Redgrave. Old Sally, played by Sarah Badel, looks nothing like Lena Headey who plays her younger self, but this act of casting is, for me, and for Atkins, successful, allowing the viewer to share with Clarissa, Sally’s change from beautiful and daring rebel to matronly and overweight middle aged woman.

Int: But the difference in casting is so sudden, the audience could interpret that as her going back on her socialist views –

Atkins: The expansive life. Well, she is rich, she is eating well now, she’s got five boys. That was another thing I thought - in those days, if you had five boys, unless you were very poor, you were probably rich and fat.49

However the casting of the men is nowhere nearly as successful. The young Richard and Peter are much taller than their older versions and look nothing like them. The film quickly establishes a convention: the older Clarissa turning into the young Clarissa on opening the french windows at Bourton, thus establishing a
relationship between the older actors and the younger. Nevertheless, this convention is not totally adequately fulfilled by the casting of Peter and Richard and the repression of the height and appearance differences of all the actors returns at the end when we see Vanessa Redgrave towering over Michael Kitchen, as Peter, when dancing in a way which does not adequately show the equality of the friendship between Peter and Clarissa in the book. The imperfect casting of Peter and Richard might be seen as an inattention to the men’s roles and therefore as a symptom of the hysterical discourse when performed by the female crew. However this disparity of heights can be seen in another light as a statement of the film about representation, an ethic that allows women to be beautiful and loved regardless of the conventionality of their appearance or their height.

The film thus performs within its enabling constraints. Its creative solutions can be considered as sublimations which “turn” discourse and its creative failings - even though that these are subjective values decided by the viewer - act as its traumas and hysterias. However in the film of Mrs Dalloway the power structures of filming are democratised. The value Mrs Dalloway places on minimising bullying and inequality are carried out through the staging of the film. To end this chapter, I propose to demonstrate, through the analysis of the staging of a single scene, that the film’s scripting and direction is particularly enabling for the actors. I will also look briefly at how the film-making of Mrs Dalloway is attentive to sound and music, enabling the effective weaving together of speech and music for poetic and musical effect.

The scene where Peter comes to visit Clarissa on the morning of the party consists entirely of the couple talking in Clarissa’s drawing room, discussing their past and Peter’s present unhappy love affair with a married woman. The scene lasts five minutes, very long for a dialogue scene, and this is itself liberating for actors, particularly English actors with a tradition of stage acting. The scene’s length enables them to develop their pacing and gestures within a longer context. The craft of directing usually entails the following regime when directing scenes on the day of filming: First, the scene is rehearsed in the space - perhaps there has been rehearsal time in advance for actors and director to meet in a rehearsal space and go through the whole film, but this depends on budget and on the director’s ability and desire to fight for such rehearsal time. The scene is blocked, i.e. rehearsed, and set in the space to the actors and director’s
Mrs Dalloway: Peter visits Clarissa at home.
Mrs Dalloway: Coverage.

SECTION ONE:
Clarissa: Peter Walsh
(Clarissa puts down cushion and gets up)
Peter: Clarissa
Clarissa: Peter...but you're in India
Peter: No, no didn't you get my last letter. I said I'd be here in June
Clarissa: Oh your last letter said you might be back but I never suspected it.
Peter: Ah
Clarissa (VO): It's extraordinary how Peter can get me in this state just by coming here. He looks awfully well.
(Clarissa crosses over to Peter)

SECTION TWO:
Clarissa (aloud): It's heavenly to see you again Peter.
Peter: I arrived last night.

SECTION THREE
Clarissa (VO): Playing with his knife
Peter: How is everything. how are you?
Clarissa (VO): So like him.
Peter: How's Richard?
Clarissa: Richard's with some committee or other. Something to do with his constituency.
Peter: What's this, what's all this here?
Clarissa: I'm mending my dress. It's for my party tonight which I shan't invite you to Peter, my dear.
Peter: Why, why, wont you ask me?
Clarissa: It's extraordinary that you've shown up this morning. I've been thinking about Bourton all day.
Peter: I heard about your father. I should have written to you of course. But I never really got on with him.
Clarissa: But he never liked anyone...

Peter: ...who wanted to marry you.

Clarissa: Herbert has Bourton now. I never go there. And what happened to you?

Peter: Millions of things. Shall I tell you. Shall I make a clean breast of it? I'm in love. I'm in love with a girl in India.

Clarissa: And who is she, a younger woman of course?

Peter: Well I'm not told you know. My life isn't over. Not by any means, though you think me a failure, which I am according to all this.

Clarissa: But who is she, tell me?

Peter: A married woman unfortunately. She's the daughter of a Major in the Indian army. She has two young children, a boy and a girl, and it's a bit of a mess...And I'm here to see the lawyers about a divorce...She's called Daisy.

Clarissa: Yes, but what shall you do.

Peter: Lawyers and solicitors are going to do it.

Clarissa: For Heavens sake leave that knife alone.

Peter: I know what I'm up against. I know what I'm up against...

SECTION FOUR:

Peter: ...Well it's all up. Here am I behaving like a fool, weeping being emotional. Probably annoyed you turning up at this hour. I've told you everything as usual...Are you happy Clarissa. Is Richard?

Lucy: Excuse me, Madam. The gentlemen are here from Rumplemeyers.

Clarissa: Oh thank you Lucy.

Peter: Good bye Clarissa

(Peter leaves through downstairs hall)
DIAGRAMS OF SHOTS.

SECTION ONE:

1. Pull out from CU on hands sewing to MS front on, Clarissa.
2. Pull out from Clarissa putting down cushions to two shot, Peter coming in room.
3. MS Peter
4. Matching MS Clarissa.

SECTION TWO:
5. Clarissa leaves sofa and walks into two shot, over shoulder Peter, favouring her.

6. Reverse two shot over Clarissa's shoulder, of Peter.

SECTION THREE:

7. WS Clarissa moves around to sit on sofa. Peter follows. Develops into two shot Peter standing over Clarissa at sofa. Clarissa pulls Peter down to sit on sofa.

8. MCU Clarissa over Peter's shoulder

9. CU Peter, reverse

10. MCU Peter over Clarissa's shoulder (from similar angle as 9, but wider)

11. Front two shot, equally on Peter and Clarissa sitting on sofa.
12. Peter walks to window in LS. Clarissa in foreground. Clarissa gets up and joins him as the camera reframes to follow her.

13. CU Clarissa and Peter.

14. MS Lucy entering through another door, and interrupting Peter and Clarissa.

15. MS Peter leaving, as shot 3.

16. Peter exiting through hall. (not drawn above).
satisfaction. With the camera-person the shots are decided, the editing thought about, the lighting planned. Breaks in the scene are planned so that the scene may be split into sections which get filmed at various moments - these sections are frequently planned for different lighting setups so that rooms are lit first for one direction of shooting and then for another. The scene is run in front of the rest of the crew who then plan their own details, e.g. sound, design, etc. work around these plans and communicate their needs back to director and cameraperson. Actors then rest, get into costume, make-up etc., whilst the crew lights and sets the scene. Finally, when the lighting and scene is set the actors return and each section is shot, covered from the different angles needed to cover that part of the scene. Thus the advantage of a long scene, even if broken down into sections and shots, is that the actors have probably rehearsed it for performance in continuity and in one go and are able therefore to build their performance in collaboration with the director. They are not mannequins whose every gesture is determined from elsewhere, controlled for the camera and for each shot.

The accompanying diagrams and stills show the probable sections for the scene between Peter and Clarissa: Section 1 covers Peter’s arrival, his entrance through the door, Clarissa getting up from the sofa to greet him. In section 2, Clarissa goes to Peter to welcome him and they talk by the door. Section 3 follows Clarissa and Peter as they come around and sit down on the sofa. Section 4 covers the end of the scene, where Peter goes and stands by the window, conversing with Clarissa still on the sofa, and she eventually gets up to join him at the window and they kiss. The advantage of these sections is that they cover discreet periods of time and space and within each section the actors have very clearly demarcated areas of acting within which they are free. Each section is filmed in a very conventional way, according to the classic Hollywood ideas of “coverage” from static camera positions, with wide shots, mid-shot reverses, and over the shoulder reverses (see diagrams for shot positions and descriptions). These shots are filmed for the entirety of each section so that the actors’ performances are covered from different angles so that the editor has plenty of choice, but also so that the actors have freedom to act and react knowing their reactions will be captured even if these might end up on the cutting room floor. The sections are linked merely by actors exiting from shots and entering other shots so that there is no reframing and no need for elaborate and precise actor choreography. For example, when Peter walks to the window he is captured...
on a wide shot. Michael Kitchen has a degree of freedom as to how he walks across and where he ends up near the window and the same freedom of movement is given to Redgrave as Clarissa. The simplicity, even dullness, of the shots, allows for a fast shooting schedule and minimum waiting for the actors. The shots do not draw attention to themselves but to the actors and the interaction between them.

I have already discussed (Chapter Six: Part One) how this scene follows a flashback where Clarissa and Peter are seen quarreling as young people. The juxtaposition between the two scenes enable the viewer to make inferences about the characters' inner thoughts. For example, the repeated use of Peter's penknife in both scenes to show his emotional discomfort enables the viewer to reflect on Peter's inability to change and on Clarissa's continuing exasperation with him. Nevertheless, this technique of montage actually relies on the subtlety of the acting in the scenes to create such juxtapositions. The viewer is aware of what might be termed the characters' "backstory" and the actors, particularly Redgrave and Kitchen, are required to convey the effect of this backstory in both gesture and dialogue. Thus, when Peter breaks down and cries the camera stays on him relying on his performance to produce an authentic and truthful experience as there is nothing else which will convey his feelings at this moment. Similarly, when Clarissa touches Peter on the shoulder as she has done, with concern, in the earlier scene, it is through her body language and speech that the viewer gains a sense of what this gesture means. Thus, the shooting method not only gives the actors freedom, it also bestows responsibility upon them.

Finally, I would like to return to the very end of the film and Clarissa's epiphany on the balcony in order to show how carefully Redgrave's delivery is supported by the music and how her beautifully modulated speech is given a counterpoint to the music which "performs" in the context of her voice. Chapter Six: Appendix E shows a chart of the relationship between the music and the dialogue. The music is thematic, the "Tosca" thematic motif and themes (a) and (b) over which the characters talk, consist of two bar phrases, and these are carefully timed to start or end with the end of characters sentences. Particular vocal rhythms, for example the "thud, thud, thud" that Clarissa uses to describe Septimus's heartbeat, are echoed fractionally later by the music. In addition, a sinister low drone is added to Clarissa's morbid thoughts about Septimus, and drums which echo World War One gunfire. When Clarissa's voice gets more
excited and rises in pitch at the end of her speech “Why, why, why did he do it. Why did the Bradshaws talk of it at my party...” the music rises by a tone, matching Clarissa’s voice. The subtle mixing of the musical themes in what becomes an almost “through composed” segment, blends with the actors’ voices, their rhythms, their phrasing, and the leitmotifs relate back to earlier moments in the film. The relationship between the dialogue and music becomes almost that of “singspiel” (speaking singing), a synthesis of music and voice, which could only be enabled by particularly generous directing, enabling space for a collaboration in post-production between the actors’ voices and the composer’s. Thus, performativity is carried on throughout the production and post-production process and is shown as a collaborative social process so that even in the film-making agency is shown only to be enabled by others.

**Conclusion**

The speaking subject makes his or her decision only in the context of an already circumscribed field of linguistic possibilities. One decides on the condition of an already decided field of language, but this repetition does not constitute the decision of the speaking subject as a redundancy. The gap between redundancy and repetition is the space of agency.  

This chapter has explored creative voice and agency through an analysis of *Mrs Dalloway (F & N)*. Both novel and film have provided a conceptual framework for discussing issues of voice and agency within the context of trauma and oppression. Therefore this chapter has not merely subjected *Mrs Dalloway* to a psychoanalytic and political reading but has also used the text as a theoretical and creative source for my argument. *Mrs Dalloway (F & N)* is itself an intervention, creating its own feminist argument which may contribute to our understanding of female authorship and creative agency. The example of Clarissa, her oppression and trauma, her hysteria and its overcoming, has acted as a model for the creative process within the hystericising discourse of patriarchy. On her balcony, Clarissa manages to speak in the “gap between redundancy and repetition”. The chapter has investigated the various psychoanalytic processes concerned with Clarissa’s memories and her ability to use them to sublimate her traumatic experiences creatively. It has explored the relationship between trauma, identification, sexual difference and empathy in order to discuss the process of sublimation dramatised as Clarissa’s moment of epiphany. Although not coming to any hard and fast conclusions about the psychological and psychoanalytic process that we witness Clarissa experience, I have nevertheless established how our memories and our relationships with other people come
to form our voices. Our voices do come to us through discourse but this should not be thought of only as abstract language and cultural acquisition but as the concrete associations which make up our lives and make us self-identical characters with voices recognizable by others. And our agency, the "gap between redundancy and repetition" arises, as Joan Copjec and Judith Butler argue, from our repression and thus from the failures in the processes which make our associations and memories. I have used Juliet Mitchell's argument that trauma is intrinsic to our lives and provides a motivation for us to learn to speak in the first place and I have developed this thesis in order to see Clarissa's moment of performativity as motivated by her desire to come to terms with trauma and overcome it. However, trauma may silence and hystericise as well as enable us to talk and it is this space which Septimus fails to find and that Clarissa successfully negotiates at the end of the novel and the film. Trauma is experienced as the "enigmatic message" but it is caused through the hysteria, neglect or oppression of others, and I have used Mrs Dalloway to argue that for women, part of the oppression which prevents them from achieving agency and using their voices has been patriarchy. Mrs Dalloway is a subtle and nuanced depiction of patriarchy and I have shown the various ways in which the film (and novel) have dramatised it as a bullying discourse of people with no empathy and too much power. Patriarchy enforces codes of gender, class and ethnicity which are too rigid and do not allow for the inevitable mismatch between the individual and the code. Patriarchy therefore also causes a crisis in sexual difference and consequent hysteria. Thus, the case histories which I investigated in the early part of this thesis are products of patriarchy in their hysterical discourse and the structure of patriarchy within the film industry also privileges the hysterical discourse of the male writers and directors above those of the women. Yet the women writers have not been silenced. Their voice and agency is clearly visible in their work. Like Clarissa they have managed to sublimate their trauma and produce it as creativity. In the case of the thrillers, the work has been mainly generic (i.e. following the space of repetition in speech), although the women writers have made interventions by representing female characters as positive creatures of instinct and enigma rather than embodiments of the death drive. In the case of Mrs Dalloway (N & F), the authors have managed to sublimate their hysteria to a greater extent and have managed to create interventions in their chosen media of novel and film which have placed women at the centre of imaginative experience and as fully psychological, social and creative agents. Where hitherto the language of repetition
embodied the codes of hysterical masculinity, *Mrs Dalloway* sets out a framework where repetition and genre lead instead to a female symbolic discourse.

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1 Butler, Judith *Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative*. (Routledge, 1997), and Butler, Judith *The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection* (Stanford University Press, 1997)

2 In her essay, “Woolf’s feminism and feminism’s Woolf”, Laura Marcus outlines Virginia Woolf’s lifelong commitment to feminism, made through her various writings. Marcus demonstrates that Woolf’s views are explorations of feminism, ‘questions rather than answers’ (p212), and are therefore sometimes contradictory and paradoxical. Marcus argues that Woolf’s fiction is inseparable in its address, from her essays and overtly feminist articles *A Room of One’s Own* and *Three Guineas* (p217). Woolf supported female authorship, her polemic being that only women are able to describe their own lives, and should be facilitated to do so. Woolf wrote in “Professions for Women” (first given in a lecture in 1931)

> What is a woman? I assure you, I do not know. I do not believe that you know. I do not believe that anyone can know until she has expressed herself in all the arts and professions open to human skill.

It is Woolf’s conviction that women should have voice and agency that informs her portrayal of Clarissa in *Mrs Dalloway* and which I explore in this chapter.

Marcus, Laura “Woolf’s feminism and feminism’s Woolf”  *The Cambridge Companion to Virginia Woolf*, edited by Sue Roe and Susan Sellers (Cambridge University, 2000) 245 - 272


4 See Plate XIV: The Oppressors and the Oppressed.

5 See Chapter Six: Appendix B for an account of the variations in treatment of mental illness at the time.

6 See Chapter Six: Appendix B which demonstrates how Virginia Woolf herself linked the discourses of medicine with the discourses of the army, and with patriarchy, and through her own history of mental illness, and her familiarity with the Report of the War Office Committee of Enquiry into “Shell-Shock” (1920-1922).

7 Michel Foucault, in *The History of Sexuality: I. The Will to Knowledge*, trans. Robert Hurley (Penguin, 1996), and *Discipline and Punish: the birth of the prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan, (Allen Lane, 1977), demonstrated how the means to form and discipline our bodies through discourse, through creating our bodies as ever more visible and subject to discourse. His example of the Panoptican, the prison architecture inspired by the ideas of Jeremy Bentham in the mid-nineteenth century, where in the spirit of a “humane” enlightenment ideal, prisoners were no longer chained, but subject to being overlooked at all moments by the prison guards who could see into a circumference of cells from their central tower. Habitus is a term used by Pierre Bourdieu, to encompass the whole range of bodily and lifestyle choices to which we accede, not through conscious submission, but through a performative choice which makes of regulatory disciplines, acts and styles of living which become our own.

> “All symbolic domination presupposes, on the part of those who submit to it, a form of complicity which is neither passive submission to external constraint nor a free adherence to values. The recognition of the legitimacy of the official language has nothing in common with an explicitly professed, deliberate and revocable belief, or with an intentional act of accepting a ‘norm’ [Language and Symbolic Power, trans. Gino Raymond and Matthew Adamson, (Harvard University Press, 1991) p50 - 51]

8 Woolf, Virginia, *A Room of One’s Own* (Flamingo Modern Classics, 1994) 45

9 Foucault, Michel in *The History of Sexuality: I. 11.


11 Branigan, Edward *Narrative Comprehension and Film* 115
12 See chapter four for my discussion on Copjec’s argument.


14 Butler, Judith Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative. (Routledge, 1997)


17 Butler, Judith, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (Routledge, 1990)

18 Butler, Judith Bodies that Matter: On the discursive limits of “Sex” (Routledge, 1993)

19 I discussed the quote Butler uses to demonstrate melancholy as creating the topography of the psyche in Part I of this chapter.

20 Butler, The Psychic Life of Power

21 Laplanche and Pontalis in The Language of Psychoanalysis (Hogarth Press, 1973) define Freudian sublimation thus:

Process postulated by Freud to account for human activities which have no apparent connection with sexuality but which are assumed to be motivated by the force of the sexual instinct. The main types of activity described by Freud as sublimated are artistic creation and intellectual inquiry

The instinct is said to be sublimated in so far as it is diverted towards a new, non-sexual aim and in so far as its objects are socially valued ones.

22 Butler The Psychic Life of Power 117

23 Butler, Bodies that Matter 190

24 Woolf was often mentally ill, most seriously in 1904, 1913, 1915, and 1945. See Dowling, David, Mrs Dalloway: Mapping Streams of Consciousness (Twayne’s Publishers, 1991), 25


26 Woolf, Moments of Being, 81

27 At the conclusion of this chapter I look at the film as a performative “speech act” made collaboratively by the film cast and crew which enables a similar space of agency within film-making. I look at the regulatory norms of the film and see how these are “turned” or sublimated into artistic choice. As with the individual human subject, whose ex-timacy is hard to determine - what is outside performing the person, and what is their internal rendition - the collaborative subjects (the film-makers) are deeply imbricated within the institutional, political, aesthetic and reception frameworks which regulate their agency.


30 Mitchell, Juliet “The Vortex Beneath the Story” 48


32 Neale, Steve, Genre and Hollywood (Routledge, 2000)

33 In the novel, there is a stronger motivation for Clarissa’s fear, and her depression. Her mother died when she herself was young, and her sister died, falling from a tree, witnessed by Clarissa. [Woolf, Mrs Dalloway, 37]. These traumatic deaths are close parallels to the significance for Septimus of the death of Evans, symbolically dramatising the death of Clarissa’s double as her own death, the death of Evans as Septimus’s psychic death.. These deaths can be seen as foundational, instituting traumas as they threaten Septimus’s and Clarissa’s survival. Nevertheless, in the film, no such death is mentioned, there is a kind of mystery about the nature of Clarissa’s parent figures - it is quite possible to confuse Aunt Helena and her husband for Clarissa’s parents throughout the film, and assume that Clarissa still has living parents, even at the party.

34 See Chapter Four for discussion of Lacan’s theories of sexuation.
35 Shakespeare William, *Hamlet* Act 1, Sc II.


39 See Chapter Six: Appendix D

40 Freud, Sigmund, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (S.E. Vol XVIII), 110.

41 Butler *The Psychic Life of Power* 136 - 137

42 Butler *The Psychic Life of Power* 111 - 112

43 Kozusko, Mathew “Hermaphrodites: Gender Transgression, or Gender Transcendence?”, Department of English, University of Georgia. 10 Jan. 2003 http://parallel.park.uga.edu/~mkozusko/634/hermo.html

> "The Greeks (sic) concept of the hermaphrodite and how the sexes were created and separated is described in Plato's writing, *Symposium*. In it, the character Aristophanes describes two humans joined as one, which Zeus decides to split in half. Each of these beings was globular in shape, with rounded back and sides, four arms and four legs, and two faces, both the same, on a cylindrical neck, and one head, with one face on side and one the other, and four ears, and two lots of privates, and all the other parts to match."

44 Freud, Sigmund, “An Outline of Psychoanalysis” 1940 [1938] (SE XXIII .188)

45 Butler *The Psychic Life of Power* 149

46 Woolf, Virginia, *Mrs Dalloway* 36

47 see Chapter Six: Appendix A for a detailed cast and crew breakdown.


49 Ibid. 190.

50 See Plates XV and XVI.

51 Bruce Kawin defines “coverage” thus:

1. The process of shooting relatively tight views of a scene, from a number of setups, after the master shot has been taken; 2. the process of making sure that every aspect of the scene has been covered, or rendered in a usable shot, so that the editor has a relatively high number of options (i.e. a variety of shots to work with); by shooting in this manner, the director “covers” himself or herself against the need to reshoot.


52 Robert McKee defines backstory (a common Hollywood term) thus:

> Backstory is the set of significant events that occurred in the characters’ past that the writer can use to build his story’s progressions.

McKee, Robert *Story: Substance, structure, style, and the principles of screenwriting.* (Methuen, 1999), 183.

53 Butler, Judith *Excitable Speech*: 129
CONCLUSION

This thesis has posed the question of whether women write and direct films differently from men. Although it has found no definitive answer to this question, it has nevertheless explored issues of gender, sexuality and authorship in ways which have sought to illuminate these issues and to explore their inter-relationship.

An important part of my agenda in writing the thesis was to address the reasons why there are very few successful women working as “authors” in the film industry. The answer to this question is in one sense obvious: the film industry is a traditionally male industry and patriarchy also ensures that where there is power and money there will be men. However I sought to uncover the reasons men might give to reject women’s work and refuse them places as creative agents - as film-makers. Women’s inability to gain access to what Judith Butler names as the “speech acts of power” have psychoanalytic as well as economic determinants and I have sought to investigate these. If Irigaray is correct and the male Imaginary does indeed masquerade as a neutral Symbolic, then women’s work will be rejected on so-called neutral grounds, e.g. “bad” script-writing, “poor” visual skills, “inability to manage large numbers of people”, “inexperience”. Whilst the film industry may acknowledge its own institutional sexism and call for more women to be admitted to its ranks and trained, it is difficult to see how this aim is to be achieved if women’s work is rejected on a case by case basis for the reasons cited above. In order for women’s creativity to be enabled therefore, I have attempted to discover what different strategies men and women deploy in their texts and how these may come into conflict. By looking at the thrillers Don’t Look Now, Strangers on a Train and Live Flesh, and Lacan’s “Theory of the Four Discourses” I discovered that the hysterical discourse is spoken differently by men and women and that the hysterical discourse of women is likely to be rejected by the hysterical discourse of men. This rejection which is manifest in the films of the books where the hysterical discourse is “turned” away from a critique of men by the male directors may be a reflection of a symptomatic rejection of women as film-makers by patriarchy. Thus what can be seen as the hegemony of male power within patriarchy can also be seen to be the hysterical symptoms of individual men reacting against the implied criticism of female writing either by slapping it down and rejecting it or by deforming it until it no longer bears the marks of female struggle, which I have described as the
"feminine, hysterical voice". Equally, the corollary of the position of men as directors in a patriarchal film industry can be seen in the "feminine, hysterical voice" of the women writers of the novels. Daphne du Maurier, Patricia Highsmith and Ruth Rendell, are not necessarily feminist writers and their writing is therefore not necessarily informed by feminist rules governing the genre of their writing or their characterisation of their female and male characters. Nevertheless, it could be argued that by living in the twentieth century they are inevitably writing from within a feminist episteme. The *episteme* is a term coined by Foucault to define the governing rules of how each era views the world:

I am attempting to bring to light (...) the epistemological field, the *episteme* in which knowledge, envisaged apart from all criteria having reference to its objective forms, grounds its positivity and thereby manifests a history which is not that of its growing perfection, but rather that of its conditions of possibility; in this account, what should appear are those configurations within the *space* of knowledge which have given rise to the diverse forms of empirical science. ²

The feminist episteme would therefore be those rules governing our knowledge which permit feminism and produce the forms of feminist knowledge. The women writers in this study could be seen as writing from such an episteme, their voice and agency determined by the conditioning rules of knowledge. The writing would therefore be a product of a contestation of power relations between feminism and patriarchy - itself produced through the same episteme, and thus their writing could be explored as a social or historical phenomenon. However, whilst Foucault’s insight into how individual agency must operate within the contested space of discourse is indisputably useful, what I have demonstrated is that there is an overdetermining psychological, symptomatic agency working within this space too. A common criticism of psychoanalysis is that it is frequently employed trans-historically with scant regard to the cultural moment and it thus clashes with Foucault’s insight. Hysterical agency may, according to this criticism, be presumed to be trans-historical and I have certainly drawn on the theories of Irigaray, Kristeva and Alice E. Jardine to argue that the “battle of the sexes” is “age-old”, although it may be manifest in very different ways in different eras. Although I have not strayed outside the twentieth century in my analyses, I have explored hysterical agency as intrinsic to the genre of the Gothic and can therefore trace back the validity of my readings to the origins of the Gothic in the late eighteenth century - which may, indeed, be the start of the feminist episteme. Thus I have shown that the feminist episteme may be due to the visibility of women’s writing in the modern era - their agency as writers - whereas hysterical agency may be best thought about in terms of “voice” - in what women actually choose to write about, and how they write in
similar ways about sexual difference even in different eras. In addition, by analysing the relationships between the men and women in the books and films, and the attitude of the narration itself, I have also analysed the power relations existing between women and men within the film industry. The psychoanalytic reading of the film adaptations has also functioned as a social and political analysis of how power relations are manifest in the lives of individual men and women and their work.

Having explored the different performances of sexual difference presented in the thrillers Don't Look Now and Strangers on a Train, the thesis then considered what effect the hysterical discourse of patriarchy and the silencing of the female voice has had on the women disempowered by this process. The case study of Mrs Dalloway enabled me to explore the effect of oppressive discourse on its victims and was thus a very different analysis from the preceding case studies of thriller adaptations. The film itself shows its characters hystericised and silenced through the effects of patriarchy. Its equation of the trauma suffered by Septimus as a consequence of "shell-shock" and the patriarchally induced trauma suffered by Clarissa has enabled the thesis to reframe the concept of trauma and hysteria as important in the silencing of voices. Thus, not only do men and women write differently, their writing informed by their hysterias, but when discourse is too oppressive they may be silenced or even destroyed. Mrs Dalloway addresses the effect of discourse on the individual as a destructive force. Yet even here, my analysis demonstrates how oppressive discourse is implicated with a threat to the subject in their performance of sexual difference. Patriarchy threatens Clarissa and Septimus by imposing codes of gender that neither character can accept: Septimus's fails to live up to the stoical and aggressive codes of manhood required by the war and the subsequent peace, Clarissa struggles with codes of femaleness which disempower her, and with enforced heterosexuality to which she accedes unwillingly. Oppressive discourse thus threatens the successful performance of sexual difference and a vicious circle ensues whereby hysteria and oppression grow in reaction to each other until patriarchy succeeds in silencing the hysteria of the weak by defeating them.

However, the analysis of Mrs Dalloway also demonstrated how this oppression might be countered, through creativity, through sublimation which creates its own healing and a new context for
speech. Thus, Clarissa's moment on the balcony is a "speech act of power" and enables her to come to terms with trauma and to go on living and engaging in the battle for speech. She goes back to the party she has organised and creates the context for a series for speech acts for other people - Hugh and Lady Bruton, Richard and the PM - and a speech act for herself, her final reconciliation with Peter. However, Clarissa's moment of performativity whilst being primarily about her personal battle against trauma is also an allegory of the writing process: the act of writing or creating is the sublimation of traumas induced by the abuse of power. It is through the artistic process that women come to terms with the oppression of patriarchy and it is through such creative acts that resistance is constituted. The performativity of creativity is essentially mysterious and *Mrs Dalloway* dramatises the creative process as a "gift" which emerges through the process of human empathy. Thus there is a move in *Mrs Dalloway* away from individual expression and will and towards a collaborative battle against oppression. This is not only dramatised within the text itself but manifests itself in the film adaptation itself as an example of the collaborative speech act. Thus, the film of *Mrs Dalloway* draws upon Woolf's original novel in order to create a collaborative screenplay which depicts a similar performance of sexual difference in novel and film. In Chapter Six: Part One I showed how the formal structure of the film and its poetic montage enabled a portrait of its central character as female and as an agent in her own life. I argued that the women film-makers forged a pathway into film through using Woolf's novel which itself set out a textual strategy for creating a feminist and female centred drama. Thus, the strengthening of the feminist episteme can be seen in the collaborative working processes of the film-makers and the original novelist. Woolf's novel, itself a sublimation of Woolf's own emotional and spiritual troubles, enabled the women who collaboratively made *Mrs Dalloway* to create a "signifier of femaleness" within a mainstream cinematic context where there was very little precedent for this form of agency and enabled a form of speech act where there had been silence before.

The concept of sublimation has been used in the thesis to accomplish two things: firstly to establish that oppressive discourse need not be overpowering and may be resisted, and secondly, to establish that although we may be "spoken" by discourse we can, and perhaps must, inflect it in different ways in our speech acts and in our subjectivities. The idea of the unconscious, repression, and even the
super-ego which I discussed in relationship to the ideas of Joan Copjec and Judith Butler, enables a
conception of subjectivity ruled by discourse but nevertheless also enabled by it. I have sought to show
how our performance of ourselves, as agents in discourse, is neither voluntarist nor determined, but subject
to complex psychoanalytic determinants. However, this does not mean that we have no way of affecting
our behaviour, and are subject to our neurotic and unconscious repressions, rather than our clearly thought
out intentions. I believe this thesis has shown a path between these two extremes, demonstrating how
intentionality is psychoanalytically inflected, but that creativity is actually enabled by the psychoanalytic
process whereby discourse becomes speech.

In order to articulate and explore the argument expressed above, the thesis has had to engage in the
problematics of authorship and authorship theory. I would like briefly like to revisit the debates around
authorship in order to discuss what has been achieved through the discussion and the case studies.

In Chapter One, I introduced the idea of the “implied author” and Foucault’s theorisation of the
author as the position in a statement which “can and must be occupied by an individual if he is to be the
subject of it.” I have also framed my analysis around an analysis of the speech acts which presents any
speech act as the product of three factors: the agent, the recipient and the context. This has very helpfully
simplified questions of authorship because the agent in a book or a film must be an embodied person or
group of persons. Obviously, the collaborative or joint authorship of a film must be considered as different
in nature from the solo authorship of a novel but this difference may be one of degree and not a completely
different kind of authorship. When considering the speech act of a film it may be possible to see all the
workers on the film as agents or, equally, to see the film through the filter of a particular contributing
individual - writer, director, or cameraperson - in which case the other individuals become part of the
context of the speech act rather than the agent. Looking at a film’s authorship in this way is akin to looking
at the writing of a novel by an individual author, but taking into account that author’s context in terms of
institutional, historical, and cultural conditions. The case-studies of the adaptations have mostly
conformed to Foucault’s own position. I have analysed the speech act and determined the agent as implied
author without linking that author to the bodily agents working on the films. Through an inductive method using psychoanalysis I discovered that the performance of sexual difference by the "implied author" nevertheless correlated with the genders of the delegated authors (directors) of films and books. I have not produced a causal link or a definitive equivalence relationship between the implied author and any actual authors of the texts. Nevertheless, the case-studies do also draw upon the argument set out above: that it is possible to isolate speech acts by individuals working on films and novels by separating their contributions from those of their collaborators. Through this conceptual filter a film becomes more than one speech act and comprises a series of speech acts performed by individuals during the writing, pre-production, production and post-production of the film. By gaining access to Hitchcock's other films or books about Patricia Highsmith, or production details about Mrs Dalloway, I have been able to frame certain aspects of the analyses in ways which do attempt to distinguish the speech of one individual from the other. The complexity of the case-studies relies on using this double frame of reference: the implied author as ascertained from the text, and that part of the implied author which can be traced to individual effort. In addition, the choice of Mrs Dalloway as a case-study where the embodied authors are female becomes a sensible solution for looking at individual female authorship and implied female authorship in a context of film-making in Hollywood as predominantly male.

Acknowledging the complexity of author as "discourse" does not mean the same thing as denying the individual author their agency within discourse. In this study I have attempted to articulate this relationship. The subject of psychoanalysis, the subject of discourse, the subject of history: all of these are concepts of the subject which are incompatible with the traditional idea of an author unified in mind and body and able to articulate his/her Descartian subjectivity in their writing or film making. I have not adopted this traditional idea of the author but have tried to show how individuals inflect discourse in particular ways in their creative acts. In this way, my conception of authorship is nearer Peter Wollen's which he expressed in Signs and Meaning in the Cinema. Wollen created a very helpful distinction between implied author and embodied author through his judicious use of quotation marks. Thus the

\[1\] Foucault, Michel *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences*, trans. Alan Sheridan (Tavistock, 1970), xxii.
implied author can be determined through their complete oeuvre in their texts and distinguished through the addition of quotation marks from the actual embodied author (no quotations) who worked on these texts. Thus “John Ford”, or even “Ford”, is the implied author of the films directed by John Ford the man. Wollen argued that “Ford” is a generic quality and can only be determined over the complete works of Ford and that, furthermore, “Ford” emerges as a complete construct only when the atypical works of Ford are also taken into account. “Ford” can thus be any coherence of reading across the whole oeuvre, including symptomatic readings, thematic readings, stylistic readings etc. and it is consistency and well determined oppositions that create “Ford”. I believe this is a concept of authorship very similar to that adopted in my own study, although my thesis has taken the concept in a different direction. By looking at adaptations for coherences and differences I have indeed used the material generically. My discussions of the speech act as iterative - a repeated act with transformation - creates it as equivalent to the study of genre. Thus the original novel forms a generic springboard for the film. The similarities between novel and film can be seen in terms of their joint authorship - i.e. the writer and the film-makers in concert pursuing the generic demands of the script. The differences, however, may be due to any number of different circumstances: the inflection of the individual “auteurs” as part of their individual signatures, according to Wollen’s helpful definition, different institutional or historical frameworks - the Spanish inflection of Live Flesh (F) as opposed to its Thatcherite novel. Even the influence of other agents working on the film may change it textually and inflect it with their own hysterias and sublimations - the collaborative authorship of Mrs Dalloway (F). Thus it was simpler in the early case studies to examine films which had strong “auteurs” - Nicholas Roeg, Alfred Hitchcock and Pedro Almodóvar - as directors because it was possible to establish their individual functions with reference to the discourse surrounding their oeuvres. These directors also had institutional power in a way denied most other directors. However, this merely begs the question as to what, if any, were the other contributions to the films and how were they inflected in the performance of sexual difference. If the continuity person or “script girl” was female, as was frequently the case in Hitchcock’s era, could she have influenced the film in a way which would show her “authorship”? What would the effect of the cameraperson be on conventions of gender in filming sexual difference - e.g. have they refined or altered the rules of discourse which might require a leading lady to be filmed behind gauze

2 Wollen, Peter Signs and Meaning in the Cinema (Secker and Warburg in association with the British Film
whereas a hero is shown in harsh lighting and shadows, warts and all? It has not been possible in this study to investigate all these aspects of authorship but, again, there has been an implicit understanding of the performative nature of the speech act and of discourse. Where the codes within the work have been conventional I have assumed that there is no performative authorship at work or that the authorship has been collaborative, building on conventions of the past. In *Mrs Dalloway* the female crew built on Woolf’s original novel in an iterative way but their authorship was nevertheless more collaborative than the normal Hollywood pattern as the primary agents were the writer (Eileen Atkins) the star (Virginia Woolf) and the hired director (Marleen Gorris). I have also considered the actresses performances as part of the “authorship” of the films and considered them in the overall performance of sexual difference. Thus Julie Christie in *Don’t Look Now* acts Laura in a hysterical manner. She is directed by Nicholas Roeg and her performance gives a shape to a character who in the novel was narrated as absence and enigma. It is even possible that Julie Christie’s hysterical discourse was “subverted” and “turned” by Roeg in his own hysterical discourse, in order to implicate her femininity as guilty and responsible for John’s death. In *Strangers on a Train* however, a different pattern of authorship emerges in the acting of Patricia Hitchcock. As Alfred’s daughter she has a privileged visibility in the film and is able to “speak”. “Hitchcock” the implied author places her as his surrogate and she gains a castrating power which is symbolised in the glasses through which she sees Bruno’s crimes. However, she is acting a character and her freedom to create an act of performative “authorship” and inflect her own performance of sexual difference is therefore minimal. Nevertheless as a presence on screen she definitely contributes, as do all the other actors, to the polysemic text in ways that may be enabled through the figure of “Hitchcock” but for which Hitchcock cannot be personally responsible.

The case study of *Live Flesh* pursued the concept of the Bakhtinian “dialogic” text further by looking at a film which changes genres, country of setting and characters from its originating novel. It is in this analysis that I believe it is possible to see that whilst the discursive structure of any novel or film is indeed dialogic, nevertheless there is a coherence in a symptomatic psychoanalytic reading. Is this not entirely similar to the psychoanalysis of an individual patient who reveals the unconscious logic within a

daily life where their actions are informed by many diverse dialogic contexts? Thus a text has its own “desire” as does a person. The reading of Live Flesh demonstrated how desire is portrayed in both the novel and film and showed how "Almodóvar" preserved elements of abjection from the novel whilst changing its function in the film. In showing how the film preserves an element from the novel, even whilst changing many other elements: generic, cultural, tonal, even psychoanalytic - the analysis demonstrated the primacy of desire above other textual characteristics. Desire is the motor for agency and, as I showed in my analysis of The Sixth Sense desire and agency can be attributed to an individual or individuals engaged in the speech act. It is not unreasonable to assume that in the case of Live Flesh the desire and agency belonged to Almodóvar as well as “Almodóvar”. Almodóvar the person can be looked at generically in a similar way to “Almodóvar”, the implied author. He engages in speech acts throughout his life, some of which are creative and happen to be films. He has a structure of desire which, as Lacan demonstrates can be foregrounded - as in the discourse of the Hysteric - or can remain in the background - as in the case of the other three discourses: of Mastery, of the University and of the Analyst. It is through the context of his speech act that it becomes visible and it is possible to determine his voice. Thus, my theoretical analysis of subjectivity undertaken in Chapter Four: The Four Discourses, and later in Chapter Six: Mrs Dalloway, begins to connect the embodied author to the implied author as overlapping in their contribution to the text. The hysterical agency of the “implied author” may coincide with the hysterical agency of the embodied author engaged in producing the text. The embodied author’s speech act within the film making process is then a partial expression whereas the “implied author” is the total expression of all the embodied authors contributing to the film. The hysterical agency of the “implied author” and the hysterical agency of the embodied authors within that text must be isomorphic and come together in the making of the text. In the case-studies I looked at the patterns of desire in the texts symptomatically in a way which led to an overall coherent performance of sexual difference in the texts themselves. This performance could then be attributed, via Lacan’s discourse theory, to the hysterical discourse of the text. However, another way of looking at hysteria in the text is through a Freudian dream analysis where what is brought to light is inconsistency and the place where desires conflict and cannot be brought into consciousness. It is this level of hysteria which enables me to trace different and conflicting desires to the contributing workers on the text and the textual result as an example of the hysteria of the film production.
Thus, in my analysis of the production of *Mrs Dalloway* I have looked at how the making of a film can implement the well-worked iterations of discourse and therefore show the conscious intentions and desires of the makers. It can also betray the clashes of the individual members of the crew amongst themselves or clashes between the script's demands and the institutional and financial and practical constraints of the film-making process. This I have called the hysteria of the film production process and have drawn attention to several examples. Finally I have looked at the sublimated speech acts of individual members of the crew where they surmount what seem to be the impossible demands of the adaptation process through their own creativity. Thus, in the case-studies, I studied the patterns of unconscious desire which led to a coherence in the reading attributable to the implied author and to the partial desires of the real authors, whereas in the short analysis of the production of *Mrs Dalloway* I broke down the production into numerous individual speech acts and traced their origins as a dream analysis would trace the incompatible desires of a dream to its ever receding kernel. I looked at aspects of the film where responsibility can clearly be seen to belong to certain individuals and observed how textual problems have been surmounted or merely problematised through the creativity or hysteria of the individuals working on the film.

In looking at the writing and directing of men and women, I have discovered that some aspects of women and men's writing do indeed differ. The hysterical agency of men and women does differ due to their asymmetrical relationship to sexual difference. This difference is only part of what I have shown as the dialogic play of discourses in all novels and films, but it is one governing structure and meaning. If there is a resistance to women's critique of men in their writing, then women writers will not achieve a visibility which they deserve and their other ideas will therefore not be heard. In addition, if novels that fall within a known feminist genre are the only ones recognised by publishers within the feminist episteme, then women writers of popular literature or film-makers of popular films will continue to be discriminated against whilst their politically correct sisters are increasingly prescribed to create within an ever narrower frame of feminist reference. The importance of the hysterical discourse and the discovery of women writing under its influence is that it throws a light on the straitjacket of the creative female ghetto and enables women's writing to be conceptualised as possible outside it.
What emerges from this discussion about authorship and desire within films and books still points to a difficulty in the attribution of agency which this thesis has not solved. Rather, it has problematised the issue and drawn attention to the necessity of thinking in individual or gendered terms about authorship even whilst accepting the complexity of discourse and how it speaks us as human beings. The acknowledgement of this difficulty appears as the subject of my penultimate chapter (Chapter Six: Part Two) and it is here that I investigate, using Virginia Woolf’s novel as itself a theoretical framework, the relationship between discourse and the individual. Like Woolf, Judith Butler and Joan Copjec, I argue for the primacy of human creativity as an organising agency of discourse which has political potential. Clarissa’s moment on the balcony is a surprising moment. There is no precedent for it elsewhere in the film and it enables her to change her mood from suicidal to accepting. I argue that this is through her creative manipulation of discourse. I chose to explore Clarissa’s moment on the balcony to show how Clarissa’s moment of performativity emerges from her restructuring of her memories and thoughts. The portrayal of Clarissa shows us that we are not merely Foucault’s “productive bodies” producing responses determined by discourse, but have a complex, psychoanalytically inflected, intentionality. However, Virginia Woolf and the makers of the film also show how this intentionality can be positive only through an empathetic response. Thus, the thesis returns to a consideration of collectivity as agency and an important statement about the importance of others to the individual, even in the speech act. The act of “working through” theorised by Melanie Klein, which is explored in *Mrs Dalloway* shows how we constantly re-build ourselves through considering our relationships with others. Our interrelationships are vital in this process and how we care for the other. Films and novels can be seen as part of this process, albeit performed with imaginary characters and actions. The films of *Mrs Dalloway*, *Live Flesh*, and *The Sixth Sense*, while displaying very different forms of working through, can in this sense be seen as such sublimations. Yet only *Mrs Dalloway* offers a differently gendered approach to such working through, dramatising a feminist creative performativity which can be used by all of us, as part of living as well as writing, to minimise the oppressive discourses which speak us, and to help us speak with our own voices.
1 Butler, Judith *The Psychic Life of Power*, 197.
Chapter One Appendix A: Forms of Enunciation in Novels and Films

1. Tense - Connections between story and narrative

Book

Genette looks at the temporal relations between the narrative and the story and characterises three orders within the novel whereby time can be organised. These are Order, Duration and Frequency.

a) Order - the sequence whereby cause-effect events of the narrative are related. Narrating events in the past, present or future. The possibility of narrating events backwards, i.e. is it narrating the past, present or future. How do temporal gaps - ellipses - or overlaps, filter information so as to withhold information from the reader, and convey the judgement of the implied author.

b) Duration - the relationship between story event and narrative event. How long it takes to tell a particular set of narrative events - are they shorter or longer than the events in the story.

c) Frequency - How often a particular narrative event or set of narrative events is related. The relationship can be the following: - one - one (reporting), one - many (repetition) many - one (precis), many - many (rhetorical repetition). In this way, the importance of the events for the characters can be indicated.

Film

a) Order - flashbacks, action in the present, flashforwards. The narrating of film is always rendered in the present, although the events portrayed have previously been filmed in a remote location in the past. Christian Metz identified the disavowal whereby the viewer accepts the virtual presentation of absent events projected on a screen as if they are present and naming the cinematic apparatus, famously, as the “Imaginary Signifier”. Thus, time of narrating in the cinema is always constant, even though flashbacks relate the narrative past, and flashforwards the narrative future. Ellipses and overlaps, as in novels, filter information organising the viewer's understanding of the story. In addition, continuity editing contains minute ellipses which organise events on screen for minimum visual disruption - for example when a character rises from a chair and leaves the room, ‘dead’ or ‘ugly’ time is edited out for
a smooth continuity edit. Whilst continuity editing is to some extent a generic and historical style, nevertheless, all editing can thus be considered in the light of the distance created between the characters and the viewer, and the perspective of the characters to the narrating.

b) Duration, and c) Frequency - as in novels, although again there is a primary correspondence between duration of narrative and duration of narration within the unit of the shot - it takes the same time for a person to cross a room within a shot as it does for that person to cross the room in the pro-filmic event. Nevertheless, through editing, similar relations can be evoked on cinema to the ones narrated in a novel. Editing on action creates a greater sense of pace than editing from static frame to static frame; a 'bracketing syntagm'\(^2\) will show a group of events linked by an implied simultaneity in time, and this might imply a slower, faster or equivalent passing of time in the narrating and in the narrative (a good example of this is the various close ups of the onset of rain which render its effect in time in *Partie De Compagne* (Renoir, 1936); slow motion or speeded up motion renders time condensed or expanded in a special effect cinematic mode; the 'alternating syntagm'\(^3\) or parallel action, renders screen time as an accelerating time of suspense; the repetition of similar events filmed differently (for example, the repetition which creates sight gags in comedy - the banana skin which needs to be avoided twice in order for its collision with the foot to be funny on the third occasion) renders the many-many relationship which can be narrated in novels, and the repetition of the same event, filmed once, creates an effect of subjective time for the character who is 'remembering/seeing' this event, or for the viewer, if the repeated shot is not motivated by character point of view.

II. Mood - Connections between story and narrative

**Book**

Genette defines mood as the 'regulation of narrative information'\(^4\) and distinguishes two modes of regulation *a*) **distance** and *b*) **perspective**.

*a*) **distance** - Genette's spatial metaphor for conveying the degree of closeness the narration allows between the reader and the characters. A screening which in the novel is labile, may change from moment to moment, but is part of the general style of the narration. The narration may directly quote from the character's speech, but otherwise restrict themselves to the character's actions (direct
discourse), or may report the character’s thoughts (indirect discourse), or may deliver the character’s thoughts as if the character were thinking them (free indirect discourse). These different modes of discourse enable the narration to establish the reader’s closeness or remoteness from the character. However, the control of narrative information also regulates our closeness/distance from the characters, and this can be expressed thus:— Narrator knows more than character = suspense, narrator knows the same as character = mystery, narrator knows less than character = surprise.\(^5\)

b) perspective - A filtered screening whereby the reader is brought closer to some characters than others. The operation of this filtered screening is called focalisation. Focalisation may be absent if the narration views a character without following their story or entering into their thoughts and emotions. In a story with an internally focalised central character, their story will be narrated focalised through the feelings and emotions of the central character. Internal focalisation enters a story via the viewpoint, the thoughts, and emotions, of the character. Some of the subsidiary characters will be unfocalised and we will not know their thoughts or feelings, or their narrative trajectories. External focalisation narrates a character’s actions from a point outside their story, for example through a narrator, but does not convey the thoughts and feelings of the character. The analysis of focalisation in a novel would ask whether there are any inconsistencies between focalisations, or between a focalisation and the narrative, and what this indicates about the attitude of the “implied author” to the character or narrative. For example “narrative paralepses” are moments where the limits of the focaliser’s knowledge is exceeded, and the narration cheats by giving us the feelings and thoughts of a non-focalised character. “Narrative paralipses” are moments where the narration cheats by depriving us of thoughts and feelings of focalised characters which we would otherwise be provided.

Film

In film, enunciation is very different, relying upon pictures and sounds rather than words. The technological delivery of cinema entails a narration which is very rarely personalised - that of a narrator as character, but is an omniscient recorder of what is on the screen. However, this omniscience does not preclude the evocation of textual mood, the creation of distance and perspective, although created in different ways. George Wilson in *Narration in Light*, nominates three modalities of what he defines as
'point of view', *epistemic distance, epistemic reliability, and epistemic authority,* which correspond broadly to Genette’s distinctions, and which I incorporate below.

a) *distance* - as in novels. How far or close we are to the characters? However, there is usually no personalised narrator within a film - the possible exception being first person narration through voice over. First person narration within film is still less complete than first person narration within a novel, because although the spoken voice over gives us the characters thoughts, the visual image frequently exceeds their thoughts and memories through the more objective presentation of the photographed image. Also, conventionally, voice-over is used sparingly, to introduce a character’s narration and to conclude it, in accordance with the dominant power of the image over the soundtrack in classic Hollywood films. *Distance* then, in cinema, cannot typically rely on the position of a narrator figure, but has to be communicated through the more dispersed techniques of cinematic enunciation: performance, camerawork, mise en scène. For this reason, George Wilson uses the term *epistemic distance* as a way of indicating the non-perspective relationship between the narration and the viewer, conveyed through various aspects of film style and narration.

b) *perspective* - Focalisation is obviously rather different in films because the only way to directly represent a character’s thoughts is through voice over, and this is a little used device (see (a) above). Also every character is always embodied on film (except in the very rare case of a voice over which is never matched with a body) and this embodiment, through the person of the actor, their performance, the angles at which they are shot, means that films invariably exceed the focalisation or thoughts of one particular character. However, this does not mean that films are narrated neutrally, without focalisation. Even though a conversation between characters may be shot in a series of reverses, giving both characters priority when their reactions are called for, the camera invariably stays with one of them when entering and exiting the room. Whose story we follow, whose look sutures the text, these are indications of where the focalisation of the film lies. Many films are primarily externally focalised through one character, but have digressions where the camera follows the story of other characters, and the narration works in the interrelation between these different focalisations and their hierarchies. Dream sequences, flashbacks and subjective figuration gives enables a more direct
internal focalisation of any one character. However, here again, the enunciative techniques of film as performance, camerawork, mise en scène, work to increase or decrease our alignment with characters. Character gestures, narrative figures, ways of externalising character feelings through the mise en scène, through colour and sound, can skillfully evoke the characters’ feelings without the necessity for these to be expressed in spoken words.

George Wilson divides perspective into two categories, epistemic reliability and epistemic authority. Epistemic authority covers the differences in alignment, focalisation, described above, whereas epistemic reliability, covers the cases of narrative paralepses/paralipses and other cases whereby the narration withholds information or delivers misleading information, as in novels, so as to guide the viewer to certain judgements about the narrative and the characters.

III. Voice⁷ - Connections between narrating and narrative, narrating and story.

Books

Genette equates voice with “person” as the category which refers to ‘a relation to the subject (and more generally with the instance) of the enunciating’⁸ Thus, voice is more than merely whether the novel is narrated through the first or third person, but also concerns the character of first or third person narration. This is a much more flexible and varied category in the novel than in films, and Genette subdivides it into a) time of narration, b)narrative levels c) person, d) functions of the narrator and e) the narratee.

a) time of narration - whether the narration takes place in the past, present or future, what relationship the instance of narration has to time - i.e. the length of time to tell the story. This category is not appropriate in film, as film is always narrating in the present (see above section on order).

b) narrative levels - Genette notes that any story must be narrated from a level which transcends the events of the story itself, and he expresses this law of narration thus:- ‘any event a narrative recounts is at a diegetic level immediately higher than the level at which the narrating act producing this narrative is placed’.⁹ Novels may embed narrations within each other - for example letters in the epistolatory novel - and the embedded narrative may either explain events in the meta-narrative, or influence the outcome of the meta-narrative - in Genette’s example, Scheherazade in A Thousand and One Nights holds off death through the successful telling of stories. Genette terms the moments of
transition between different levels of narrative, *metalepses*, and these are often accomplish by *meta-diegetic* interruptions, where the meta-diegetic narrator interrupts the embedded narrative, and *pseudo-diegetic* interruptions, where the narrator of the embedded narrative interrupts himself/herself, thus revealing the narration to have always been at a *meta-diegetic* level.

c) *person* - whether the narrator is first or third person. How they are related to the story i.e. *heterodiegetic* (outside the story) or *homodiegetic* (within the story), and how they are related to the narrative level, i.e. *extra-diegetic* (outside the narrative level) or *intra-diegetic* (within the narrative level). Thus, the *person* can be an omniscient observer, a slightly connected character in the narrative, the hero or heroine.

d) *functions of the narrator* - whether the narrator is relating the story with minimum intervention. What kind of elaboration the narrator provides, the part the narrator takes in the story and his/her attitude to themselves.

e) *the narratee* - whether the narratee is a projected presence, an actual character, as in some first person narration. The narratee usually matches the narrator in terms of narrative levels, an intra-diegetic narrator will address an intra-diegetic narratee, and an extra-diegetic narrator will address an extra-diegetic narratee.

**Film**

Film, as I have suggested, has a very different set of functions under this category, as it does not have a meta-diegetic narrator.¹⁰

a) *time of narration* ceases to be appropriate in film, *person* relates primarily to the quality of embedded narrators in a film, in flashbacks, flashforwards, etc. and thus can be elided with internal focalisation in some instances.

b) *levels of narration* - operate as in novels, but the operation of narrative levels in film is both more transparent and subsumes the concept of focalisation. Edward Branigan *Narrative Comprehension and Film*¹¹ categorises eight levels of narration - which match eight levels of narratee. These levels are: historical author/historical audience, extra-fictional narration/extra-fictional narratee, non-diegetic narration/non-diegetic narratee, character (non-focalised narration)/character, external
focalisation/observer, internal focalisation (surface)/identification, internal focalisation (depth)/identification. Thus, in film, the relationship of viewer identification to the characters on the screen is determined through narrative levels, whereas in the novel other factors such as distance e.g. the use of free indirect discourse, may create reader identification.

c) person - applies only to embedded stories within the narrative. The narration of a flashback, for example. Thus, person in film is actually part of focalisation rather than narration proper.

d) function of narrator - as c) above.

e) narratee - as in novel.

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3 Metz, Christian

4 Genette, 104

5 Taken from Branigan, Edward, *Narrative Comprehension and Film* (Routledge, 1992), 75

6 Wilson, George M. *Narration in Light: Studies in Cinematic Point of View* (John Hopkins University Press, 1986), 3 - 5

7 Please note that Genette’s definition of voice is different from mine, being more limited to the specifics of the aspect of the novel, the relationship of narrator to characters and to reader, whereas my definition covers all aspects of the implied author, and is nearer to Wilson’s definition of cinematic ‘point of view’.

8 Genette, 12

9 Genette, 228

10 Whether or not film has a narrator is actually subject to some disagreement. Branigan uses the function of narrator as a ‘convenient label, as if the camera is a personification of someone narrating (85), although Wilson discards the anthropomorphised narrator completely, as a distraction from the complex operation of enunciation in film (126 - 134)

11 Edward Branigan *Narrative Comprehension and Film* (Routledge, 1992), 87
Chapter Three: Appendix A

*Carol* by Patricia Highsmith

The plot is externally focalised through Therese, and the reader gains access to the other characters' feelings through their letters, and through the technique of free indirect discourse which enables the narrator to convey Therese's interpretation of others' emotions and attitudes. The story conforms to that of the transgressive melodrama where the central female characters are punished for their illegitimate deeds/past actions, in this case, their lesbianism. However, in *Carol*, Carol and Therese transcend the oppressive forces trying to split them up, and the happy ending shows them living together.

Therese, an impoverished would-be stage designer has just started working as a sales assistant in the dolls department of a department store during the pre-Christmas rush. Depressed and tired by the long hours she is befriended by an ugly older woman, Ruby Rubichek, who invites Therese home to her bedsit and offers her some cast-off clothes. Therese, feeling ill, accepts the gift of a red dress which she does not really like. She feels feverish, and Ruby sits her in a chair and covers her with a blanket. Therese, overcome with dread that she might fail to escape from the poverty of her life and turn into Ruby, waits until dark and then escapes silently from Ruby's flat.

Therese wants to consummate her relationship with her boyfriend Richard, although she does not love him, and he wishes her to wait. Richard brings around to Therese's room his friends, Phil and Dannie. Phil works in the theatre and Dannie is a physicist. Phil sees Therese's stage models and offers to help her get a job in theatre. Therese rings the telephone number that Phil gives her, and lands her first theatre designing job on a play Phil is acting in.

At work Therese cannot take her eyes of a female customer who wishes to buy a doll. The woman is tall, fair and wears a fur coat. Therese takes in the woman's perfume, wishes that the woman would initiate a conversation, feels that she has just made an unforgettable encounter. The woman walks off but has omitted to take with her a slip of acknowledgement of delivery. Therese, admonished by a senior member of staff, rushes after the woman and gives her the delivery slip. The woman is worried about the safe delivery of the doll but she commiserates sympathetically with Therese about "her rotten job". The woman leaves. Later in the day, Therese thinks of sending the woman a Christmas card inscribed with her
admiration/worship, but thinks better of it, and just signs it from the department store, with her job identification number.

Therese receives a phone call at work from the woman who thanks her for the card. Over the phone, the woman arranges to meet Therese for lunch. At lunch Carol gently draws Therese out in conversation. Therese finds Carol, who is about 30 - 32, beautiful and is thrilled when Carol invites her to her home in the country on the following Sunday.

Richard invites Therese over to his family on Sunday and Therese refuses without telling Richard about Carol. Therese tells Richard that she likes him without loving him, but she does not want to break off with him. Therese tells Richard that she does not want to go to Europe with him as planned, because she does not want enjoy sleeping with him - they have now consummated their relationship but she does not really enjoy making love to him. Richard laughs and tells her he loves her.

On Sunday Carol picks up Therese and drives her out to her home. She shows her all the rooms including her bedroom and Therese finds out that Carol is married with a little girl. They have lunch, Carol asks Therese to play the piano to her. Therese starts playing, but overcome with the sensations of the day and the knowledge that Carol must be a better pianist, quickly retreats into a silence. Carol lightly kisses Therese on the back of the head, asks if Therese is tired, and puts her to bed in her bedroom. Carol brings Therese a drink of milk and enquires about life story. Therese spills out her unhappiness, her lack of a family, and cries freely in Carol’s sympathetic presence. Carol receives a phone call and Therese hears a tense conversation and the person on the other end of the phone hanging up. The phone call, it emerges, was from Carol’s husband, Hargess, who returns to the house shortly. Therese has got dressed and Carol introduces her to Hargess. Therese realises that Carol and Hargess are on the verge of a divorce, as the conversation she overhears is cold and unpleasant. Therese realises that she ought to leave and Carol agrees to drive her to the railway station. At the railway station Therese asks if they will meet again and Carol replies “Au revoir” thus reassuring Therese.
On Christmas eve, Therese pawns the St. Christopher given to her by Richard in order to buy a present for Carol. Carol leaves a message at the shop arranging to meet Therese after work. She drives Therese back to her home and arranges for Therese to stay overnight in the children's room. In the middle of the night, Therese hears a car draw up, and the laughing voices of Carol and another woman. She goes downstairs, joins them, and is introduced to Carol's friend Abby. She realises with envy that Abby can make Carol laugh in a way that she, Therese, cannot. Next morning Abby drives Therese home. When they reach Therese's apartment, Therese runs upstairs, fetches the present she has bought for Carol. She asks Abby to give it to Carol that evening when she sees her. Therese senses a rivalry in Abby for Carol's affections.

Therese spends Christmas with Richard and his family. Richard's mother measures Therese for a dress which she is making her, and Richard and Therese go outside to fly a kite Richard has built. Therese questions Richard about whether he has ever been in love with another boy. When Richard asks Therese whether she has ever been in love with a girl, Therese replies "No", very hesitantly, and hopes that Richard has not noticed her equivocation. Richard cuts the kite loose from its string, being held by Therese, and Therese bursts into tears when the kite floats away into the sky.

Carol arrives at Therese's apartment with a present of an initialled leather suitcase. Therese reveals to Carol that she is a stage designer, and Carol, delighted, offers Therese a loan to pay her union dues. Therese refuses but is grateful. Carol likes Therese's work and congratulates herself on having already judged Therese as interesting. Carol mentions going on a trip. Richard arrives and is introduced, and Carol leaves. Therese shows Richard the suitcase, and Richard is slightly suspicious of such an expensive gift. Therese refuses to go out with Richard that night and tells him she is seeing Carol that night and going to a cocktail party. Richard wishes to stay for the afternoon, but Therese tells him she has work to do.

Therese starts her job at the theatre. Mr Donohue, the director, is pleased with her work. Abby rings Therese up and meets her for lunch. Therese wonders if Abby is in love with Carol too and senses a
rivalry. Abby warns Therese off Carol, who she says is going through an emotionally difficult period. Abby says she wants neither Carol nor Therese to get hurt. Then Abby says that Carol told her she wants to go away with Therese on a trip. Therese knows nothing about it, but Abby reassures her that Carol will ask her. After Abby and Therese part, Therese feels low and phones Carol arranging to meet her later. Carol will pick her up. Just as she finishes the telephone conversation with Carol, Therese sees Dannie in the street, and goes back to his apartment. They have an easy conversation, talking about Richard and relationships, whilst Therese realises silently that she loves Carol. As she is going, Dannie kisses her, and although she likes it, she runs away.

Therese tells Carol about her meeting with Abby and how she thinks Abby is jealous. Carol thinks this is Therese's imagination. Carol invites Therese away with her for three weeks. Therese feels hurt that Carol has already told Abby what she was intending to do, that their relationship is not private, and says that she cannot afford to go. Carol tells Therese that her daughter, Rindy will be staying with Harge for the next three months. The divorce will come in a year, and Carol will then have custody of Rindy for the 9 months a year and Harge for three months. Carol hints at Harge's machinations with his solicitors and her precarious position in relationship to the divorce proceedings. Carol tells Therese how possessive Harge is. Therese then agrees to go with Carol on the trip because she feels Carol genuinely cares for her. Therese stays overnight at Carol's and later that night overhears a telephone conversation where Carol tells Abby that she is going away with Therese. Abby asks to speak to Therese, apologises for her previous behaviour and tells her that she really does like her. Therese is intrigued about Carol's relationship with Harge and observes his male possessions around the house. Carol gives Therese a cheque for the trip, but Therese again refuses, but hides the cheque under a cloth on the bedside table.

In January, Mr Donohue asks an experienced stage designer, Mr Baltin, to look at Therese's work. Mr Baltin is impressed, and gives her the name of an important theatrical contact, a stage designer, Mr Harkevy, who she admires. Richard finds out that over Christmas Therese had spent an afternoon in Phil's flat, had brought him beer and sandwiches, and gets mildly jealous, but does not believe Therese capable of infidelity. Therese tells Richard about the trip with Carol. Richard wishes to meet Carol, and one
afternoon they all meet. Therese is privately disappointed that Richard seems to find Carol ordinary and does not see the qualities that Therese sees in her. Whilst the three are having tea, Therese sees Harge enter the teashop with another woman and Carol, in angry reaction, “mash” out her cigarette. When Harge has gone, Therese draws Richard aside and explains that she wishes to meet someone with Carol that night. Richard suggests that Therese “would rather see her than me, wouldn’t you”. Richard hangs around waiting for Therese, and Carol suggests that Therese should see him that night, and says goodbye. As they walk along, Therese tells Richard that she does not want to go to the concert they had planned for the evening. Richard loses his temper and walks off.

Richard accuses Therese of having a “crush” on Carol, and Therese, angry with Richard at reducing her emotions finishes with him. However, he does not accept her rejection and comes around to her apartment a week later, and they row, breaking Therese’s wooden Madonna. Richard storms out. When Therese tells Carol who she is now staying with, Carol is sympathetic with Richard and tells Therese that she “is not used to thinking of other people’s feelings.” Carol is annoyed that Therese has broken up with Richard over her. Therese tells Carol that she has not got the job which she was hoping for, Carol commiserates. Harge arrives at the house, and although friendly, seems to be trying to find out whether Therese spent the night, and makes her aware that he knows how close she is to Carol.

Therese receives the dress that Richard’s mother made for her, and a telegram from Richard saying he loves her. Carol makes Therese try on the dress which she feels very uncomfortable about, but Carol adores it and makes Therese wear it that evening. Suddenly Carol is in a bad mood, and irritable with Therese which Therese attributes to Harge. Carol wants Therese to phone to thank Richard and his family. After Carol speaks to Rindy on the phone, Carol and Therese leave for their trip. Therese remembers that she has left a book at Carol’s with a love letter in it, and had forgotten to tear up the cheque hidden under the cloth. Carol reassures her that it was not important.

Carol and Therese set off on their driving holiday. They drive and stop at a delicatessen where Therese admires a model of Holland displayed in the window. Carol is irritated with Therese and tells her
that she likes all her experiences second hand. Therese is reminded of Mrs Rubichek, and encouraged by Carol, sends Mrs Rubichek a sausage and a gift card. That night, Carol and Therese share a tourist cabin. Carol asks Therese to find her white slacks, but when Therese looks in Carol’s suitcase she finds a wrapped gun with a white handle. Therese gives Carol a towel, and briefly sees her naked in the shower, an image that lingers in Therese’s memory. Therese asks about the gun, and Carol tells her that it is loaded and belongs to Harge. Therese is disturbed and thinks about the gun going off accidentally. Carol has some photos of Therese and Rindy which she places in her wallet. Therese collects letters from Richard and Dannie which have been forwarded to her in Chicago. Richard’s letter is hopeful and sentimental, and Therese determines not to keep up a correspondence with him, and to finish with him. Carol reminds Therese of the mother that she never had but would have liked - the blonde haired woman who lived across the way from her when she was a child, and realises that she is totally alienated from her own mother, and that Carol does not really know her.

Therese declares her love to Carol, and asks to sleep in her bed. Carol kisses Therese on the lips. They sleep together in the bed, and in the morning they share a moment of passion.

Therese asks Carol about Abby. Carol tells Therese that she was in love with Abby for two months, and then the passion died. As a married woman with a daughter, Carol had no time to find out if the love she had for Abby would last. Therese is shocked and threatened by Carol’s cynicism. Carol reveals that she has told Harge about Abby, and although this revelation did not cause the divorce, Harge was disgusted and jealous. Carol and Therese decide to go on together to Washington. Therese reveals to Carol that she no longer intends to write to Richard, and sees that Carol will now stop pushing her towards him. When they get to Salt Lake City, Carol receives a telegram from Abby, telling her of another telegram waiting for her at The Belvedere Hotel. Carol will not tell Therese what the contents of the telegram are, but decides that they must not stay in Salt Lake City that night. Carol cancels their room reservation and leaves a forwarding address in Denver for anyone who wishes to contact her over the next week.
As they drive away from the town, making sure no one is following them, Carol tells Therese that they are being followed by a private detective hired by Harge. If the detective can ascertain whether they are having a lesbian relationship, Carol will lose custody of Rindy. Carol and Therese spend the next day looking around, uneasy, to see if they can spot the private detective. Carol asks if Therese wants to go home, and Therese refuses. Carol decides to take Therese with her to Denver. In Denver, Therese and Carol again share a bed, and Carol, to Therese’s alarm, sells her engagement ring, reassuring Therese that raising money by selling the ring is quicker than wiring her bank for money. After Carol has searched their room to make sure that the detective has not followed them, Therese realises that going to Denver was, for Carol, a deliberate tempting of fate, as the forwarding address in Denver was originally intended to deceive the detective. Carol and Therese spend some days in Denver, befriending an older lady, Mrs French, who they take out on day trips with them. Carol receives letters from Rindy and Abby, and Therese receives a letter from Dannie, telling her about a forthcoming theatre job with Harkevy, the designer who had previously admired her work.

At dinner, Carol and Therese spot the detective sitting by himself behind them. Therese recognises him from earlier in the trip. They try to ignore him. Later they find a dictaphone hidden in their bedroom, which the detective has been using to record their conversations. They set off and stay at a tourist camp, yet find the detective has followed them there. They identify his car, and decide to get moving themselves, checking out in the middle of the night. Carol notices a car trailing her and slows down to let it overtake them. Therese identifies the driver as the detective. Carol stops the car and confronts the detective demanding he leave them alone. The detective warns Carol that he has information about her relationship, and that she is in danger of losing her child. He suggests she returns to New York. Carol angrily refuses, but after the detective drives on, she bursts into tears. Carol then decides to confront the detective again, and they drive until they catch the other car. Although at first thinking of threatening the man with her gun, Carol decides instead to bribe him to give her the incriminating evidence he has on her and Therese, including the recordings made in the bedroom. He asks for $500 but tells her he has already forwarded recordings to New York and Carol is too late. Carol nevertheless pays the $500. Carol and Therese burn the tape. Therese realises that the detective was malicious, his desire to expose Carol and
Therese was personal, a hatred of their relationship, and she realises "the whole world was ready to be their enemy". Therese and Carol also remember the cheque and the love letter Therese left hidden at Carol's house, and how it would be discovered in any search. They throw the rest of the detective's evidence into the river. They stop at Omaha, and Carol writes to her lawyer. Carol tells Therese she has to return to New York. Abby is going to find the hidden check and letter and try to protect them. Carol tells Therese to stay: she will return in a week, and they can continue their travels. Therese wants to go back with Carol to New York, but Carol makes clear that she does not want Therese with her, and Therese is hurt at Carol's coldness, but decides to stay in Arizona, keep the hired car, and wait for Carol to return. Although their holiday ends sadly, they share last a shower together.

Therese continues to travel on her own, thinking about Carol throughout. In Sioux Falls she picks up her mail from Phil and Dannie. Phil writes that Richard is angry with her, and tells her more about the theatre job. Dannie is taking up a job in California, and wishes to meet Therese in Colorado before he heads west. Therese rings Carol - Abby has found the cheque, but the letter is missing from the book and Therese realises that somebody has probably found it. Therese feels melancholy without Carol. Therese takes a room in a house, the public library, and a small cafe nearby, and settles down to make the theatre models she intends to show Harkevy when she gets back to New York. Therese finds contact with Carol difficult - Carol is often out when Therese telephones, and she does not write. The following Wednesday Therese receives a letter from Carol telling her that Harge has found the letter and is blackmailing her, trying to make her give up Rindy without a fight and without going into court. Carol has to stay in New York and cannot return to continue the holiday. She is full of fear of what might happen; her friends and Harge are keeping information from her. She asks Therese to ring her, but just as Therese is about to call, she receives a telegram from Carol warning her not to telephone at all costs, and that she will explain later.

Therese lingers in Sioux Falls, lonely and isolated, spending her time in the library. She buys Carol a beautiful hand made candlestick holder from an antique shop. A letter from Richard arrives. He writes that he is disgusted with Therese and her relationship with Carol - that her love of Carol is "sordid and pathological" and like living on "lotus blossoms and candy instead of the bread and meat of life". He
wants no more to do with her. She writes to Carol telling her she misses her, and the next day a cheque arrives from Carol so that Therese can fly to New York, and have the car driven back. Ruby Rubichek has also written, a very grateful thank you letter for the sausage which she lived on for many days. Therese waits another day and rings Carol. Carol warns Therese that the telephone is tapped, but Therese still wants to know what is happening and Carol cannot tell her, although she says she sent a letter. Carol finishes the call abruptly. Therese goes back to her room and finds the letter Carol had sent, which had got mislaid. Carol has “surrendered”, stopped fighting for custody of Rindy. She will tell the court that she will stop seeing Therese in return for the court allowing her to see Rindy for a few weeks a year. Carol writes that she will always love Therese.

Therese realises that Carol loves her child more than she loves Therese. Carol has surrendered and Therese is desolate. Therese reads Carol’s letter further, and Carol declares a belief that the love of two men for each other, or the love of two women is purer than that between the sexes. Therese goes to the library, puts her head into her hands and is overcome with grief and fear. She leaves her lodging and goes to stay in a Hotel in the same town. The next day she buys a postcard of Lake Michigan and sends it to Ruby with a falsely cheerful message. She gets a job in a lumber mill working for a Mr Zambrowski. After some time she is telephoned by Abby, who has been trying to find her. Abby asks when she will be returning to New York. Carol has been sick and is now resting in Vermont away from Abby. Therese tells Abby that she will return with the car in ten days. Abby tells Therese not to ring Carol, and they quarrel. After the phone call, Therese tells the Hotel not to put through any more long distance calls. Two days letter an apology letter arrives from Abby with a cheque for $250 which Therese knows was not prompted by Carol, and a message saying that Therese can write to Carol. Therese writes back thanking Abby, but saying she will not and cannot write to Carol.

Dannie comes to visit Therese at her Hotel, surprising her. They go for dinner. Dannie asks if Therese could care about him. Therese confesses that she loves Carol and would do the same thing with her again, even though their relationship ended up as a fiasco. Dannie thinks that Therese will change. He
insists that he is not like Richard - that he believes “a person’s life is their own”. He gives Therese three months to think about a relationship with him.

Therese returns to New York. She arranges to see the theatrical producer of Harkevy’s next show, to ask for an apprentice job. Mr Bernstein has not got a job but suggests television and gives her some names. She is worried about running out of money. She telephones Harkevy and as well as inviting her that day to show him her models, he invites her to a cocktail party the next day. She telephones Abby and arranges about the car, but does not want to talk to Carol. Abby says that Carol would like to hear from her. Abby says she will call back in a few minutes. Therese waits outside the phone booth and then Carol calls. Carol asks to see Therese. They arrange at 4.30 the following afternoon in the Ritz Tower.

Carol is quarter of an hour late, and Therese waits for her. Carol appears wearing the clothes that she first wore when Therese met her, but looks thinner. Carol remarks on Therese becoming “grown up”. Therese gives Carol the present she bought for her in Sioux Falls. Carol tells Therese she loves her, and asks her whether her feelings are reciprocated. Therese replies that she does not know. Carol tells Therese that she has lost Rindy completely. Rindy will probably visit a couple of afternoons a year. Carol tells Therese that she had refused in court rather than submit, and Therese is pleased that Carol had been proud. Carol and Harge have sold the house and Carol has bought an apartment. She asks if Therese would like to come and live with her. Therese’s heart jumps, she is thrilled - it was once the thing she most wanted - but now she replies “No”. The two women part awkwardly, as if for ever, although Carol tells Therese she will be at the Elysee Hotel that evening.

Therese goes to the Harkevy party. Harkevy tells Therese to go to his apartment the next morning at 11.30. Therese starts talking to the lead actress, Genevieve Cranell, in the play which Bernstein and Harkevy are mounting, and realises that she “like Carol” i.e. gay. Genevieve talks to her as if she is already engaged as the stage designer on the play, and Therese realises that she has already been employed. Genevieve flirts with Therese, finding out she is only twenty one, but Therese realises that Genevieve could never replace Carol for her. Genevieve invites her to a later cocktail party for her “inner circle”. Suddenly
Therese remembers that she has to be somewhere else and declines the offer to join the party. She crosses the street to the Elysée, sees Carol sitting talking to a man, and sits nearby. When the man gets up to leave, Carol sees Therese and greets her with an eager wave Therese has never seen before.
Strangers on a Train

Bruno kills Miriam.

Continuation of sequence (not segmented in Appendix B)

Bruno bursts boy’s balloon
Plate IV: 2
Bruno appears at strong-man game
Miriam on fairground ride
The tunnel of love
Plate IV:

Reflection in Miriam's spectacles
CHAPTER THREE: Appendix B.

Shot breakdown for glasses sequences.

Figure 1. Bruno sees Miriam at ice-cream stand.

1a. Establishing shot of fairground. Bus pulls up from screen left. In midshot Miriam and her friends alight and leave frame right to be followed by Bruno who looks towards the fair.

1b. Camera tracks back to reveal Bruno looking at fairground entrance as bus pulls away right, separating Bruno from Miriam and her friend. When the bus clears, Bruno hesitates, then moves towards entrance of fairground where Miriam is.

2. Bruno stands slightly inside fairground entrance, lighting a cigarette. Long shot.

3. Bruno’s POV of Miriam and her friends, with their backs to camera, at ice-cream stall. Wide shot. Couple come through frame in foreground, left to right.

4. Slightly low angle mid shot Bruno, from nearer him but same axis as 2.

5. Closer shot on mid shot Miriam and friends from same axis, but nearer than 3.

   Miriam: I thought I was going to have a hot dog before this.

   Friend: A hotdog!

   Miriam: Satisfy my cravings a little better.

   Friend: Craving for what?

6. As Miriam begins to lick her ice-cream and look towards Bruno, the camera cuts in on same axis, cutting on action to her close-up as she turns to look at Bruno.

   Friend2: Why I never saw a girl eat so much in all my life!

   UP TO NOW SENSE OF BRUNO’S EMOTIONAL AND OPTICAL POINT OF VIEW. HE IS LOOKING AT MIRIAM.

7. As 2. Bruno longshot. Looking back at Miriam. NOW MIRIAM’S POINT OF VIEW.

8. As 6. CU. Miriam continues to eat as she looks away and back at Bruno.

9. As 7 & 2. Bruno looks down and up, and then holds Miriam’s look.

10. As 8 & 6. Miriam looks at Bruno, then turns back, screen left, to her friend.

11. As 5. Midshot on Miriam.

   Miriam: Hey, are we going to go to the tunnel of love

   Friend: The tunnel of love. Come on!

   Camera pans round with her and friends as they move screen right and walk away from camera.
12. As 4. Bruno, low angle MS looks after Miriam and then walks out of screen right. BRUNO'S EMOTIONAL POINT OF VIEW.

Figures 2a and 2b: After the tennis match, where Bruno sees Miriam for the first time.
Strangers on a Train: The Tennis Match.
Barbara calls Guy over to an adjacent location and they talk briefly about the detective assigned to Guy and his theories of murder. They then join the table.
Strangers on a Train: The Tennis Match. To accompany Appendix B, Figure 2b.

Plate V:

Shot 7a
Miriam standing where Guy was before.

Therefore Anne's literal pov from Bruno's emotional but Anne's literal pov.

Shot 7c (contd.)
Miriam from Bruno's emotional but Anne's literal pov.

Shot 8
Reverse intercut throughout conversation.

Shot 8a
Quotations reversed intercut throughout.

Shot 9
Anne's pov of Bruno.

Shot 10
Anne's pov of Bruno.
In order to demonstrate that the shot of Miriam, where Bruno sees the cigarette lighter reflected in her glasses, and hears the music from the fairground, is not from his optical point of view, I have broken the sequence into shots. This is to establish that Bruno's later POV of Barbara is shot from nearer where Anne is sitting.

Figure 2a shows the party - the d'Arvilles, Anne, Bruno, and Guy from the first part of the scene, where the geography of the table is established.

Figure 2b shows the party after Guy has left the table to talk - in an aside - to Miriam, where she asks who Bruno is, and then she returns to the table to resume the position that Guy originally held, standing next to Mrs d'Arville.

1. Guy moves up steps away from tennis court. MS. He looks left off screen. (not in diagram)
2. Guy's POV of the table where the D'Arvilles, Anne and Bruno are sitting. WS (not in diagram)
1a. (As 1). Guy walks up stairs and exits frame left. (not in diagram)
2a. (As 2) Guy walks into edge of frame right as Anne introduces him (see diagram 2a)

Anne (Offscreen Voice): Guy darling...

3. MCU Anne. Anne looks slightly right of camera and very close to axis of action

Anne (Offscreen Voice): This is Mr Antony, a friend of Mr and Mrs D'Arville
4. Bruno gets up in frame to shake hands. Camera pulls out with him to reveal three shot - Bruno, Mrs D'Arville, Guy (on edge of frame).

Anne (Offscreen Voice contd.): Guy Haines...

Bruno: I've been a fan of yours for a long time...

5. CU Guy listening.

Bruno (Offscreen Voice contd.): ...Mr Haines. In fact I follow everything you do...

4a. (As end of 4) Bruno laughs with Mrs D'Arville. Guy on edge of frame.

5a. CU of Guy's reaction

4b (As 4, 4a). Bruno laughing conspiratorially with Mrs D'Arville

Mrs D'Arville: Est-ce-que vous connais l'histoire du propre mort?

Bruno laughs maniacally.

3a. (As 3). Anne CU alarmed as Bruno laughs

Bruno: Oui, je la...

6. CU of Bruno, from Anne's point of view. He continues to laugh.

Bruno (Offscreen Voice contd): ...connais

3b. (As 3, 3a). Anne looks down at Bruno's tie.

6a. (As 6.) The camera tracks down and in from Bruno's laughing face to his tie, as Anne's POV.

Barbara calls Guy over to an adjacent location and they talk briefly about the detective assigned to Guy and his theories of murder. They then join the table.

Fig. 2b.
7. MCU Barbara, enters frame left standing where Guy was standing before. Looks around, ends up looking at Bruno.

*Barbara:* Bonjour Mesdames, Monsieurs. How are you?

8. MCU Bruno’s reaction. Matching reverse, so he is looking right at Barbara. He stops smiling.

*Mrs. D’Arville (Offscreen Voice):* Delightful to see you Miss. Barbara. How sweet you look.

7a. (As 7) Barbara looks towards extreme right to answer Mrs. Darville, and then back to Bruno.

*Barbara:* I hope you aren’t forgetting our little party on Thursday Madam?

8a. (As 8) Bruno, still looking at Barbara.

*Mrs. D’Arville(Offscreen Voice):* We’re planning on it.

*Mr. D’Arville(Offscreen Voice):* But, of course.

7b. (As 7, 7a) MCU Barbara. MIRIAM IS LOOKING STRAIGHT INTO CAMERA, AND HAS THEREFORE CHANGED HER EYELINE. The camera placement is exactly the same as shot 5 of Guy. Accompanied by Anne’s voice, so that it appears to be Anne’s point of view.

*Anne(Offscreen Voice):* This is my sister Barbara. Barbara this is Mr. Anthony.

*Barbara:* How do you do.

The camera position 3, is near or at Anne’s position, and this, together with the dialogue gives the impression that Barbara is being seen from Anne’s POV.

8b. (As shot 8, 8a) Reverse Bruno. Bruno nods in acknowledgement of introduction to Barbara.

7c. (As shot 7, 7a) Guy’s emotional POV shot. Tracking from mid-shot to close-up. Cigarette lighter reflected in both eyes of Barbara’s spectacles, whilst accompanied by the music of “Strawberry Blonde” on soundtrack, and echo of Bruno’s voice.

*Bruno(Memory):* Is your name Miriam?

This is now Bruno’s P.O.V. of Barbara, however, it is shot from the same angle as the shot which seemed to be Anne’s P.O.V. introducing Miriam.

8c. (As 8, 8a, 8b) Bruno’s reaction to Miriam. Accompanied by the “Strawberry Blonde” Music.

9. Mid-shot Anne’s reaction. From same position as shot 3, 3a, 3b, earlier in the scene, when Guy was standing in Barbara’s place. Looking slightly right. She looks at Bruno with recognition. The “Strawberry Blonde” music still over the shot, as if Anne can hear it.

10. Mid-shot Bruno from Anne’s point of view. As shot 6, 6a. Very profile. Looking sharp right. Still accompanied by “Strawberry Blonde”.

9a. (As 9, and 3) Anne reacts to looking at Bruno, with “Strawberry Blonde” still playing. She knows something is amiss with him. Scene fades down on Anne’s knowledge.
Strangers on a Train: Bruno faints at the party.
Figure 3. Bruno sees Barbara whilst strangling Judge's wife.

In this scene, the Bruno's eyeline is cheated when he sees Barbara, enabling the camera to cross the line of action, and finishing the scene, with Bruno and the Judge's wife facing opposite directions to their original screen direction at the beginning. This makes Bruno's POV of Barbara stand out.

1. Camera position showing two society women over Bruno's left shoulder. From this set up are shots in various sizes.

2. Reverse MCU of Bruno, shot from between the two ladies. Straight on to Bruno.

3. As 1. Miriam appears out of focus in the background. Bruno looks up at her, to the right of the Judge's wife.

4. In Bruno's CU, he is still looking right of the judge's wife, although Barbara is on her left. THIS IS AN EYELINE CHEAT.

5. MCU of Miriam, shot from axis of action, she is looking straight out of camera, as Bruno's POV. The camera tracks in, to BCU of her face, with reflection of cigarette lighter in spectacles, and fairground music.

6. CU Bruno's reaction. Shown from below. He looks up and left.

7. CU on woman's throat, with Bruno's hands strangling her. Other hands come to rescue, and camera pans left (having crossed the line) to find Bruno MCU looking right, and about to faint.
Chapter Four: Appendix A

Lacan's Four Discourses applied to Don’t Look Now and Strangers on a Train

Summary: John’s discourse is turned through the emotions during the story. Initially, John’s discourse is that of the Obsessional Neurotic, where he relies on his rationality and projection of emotions onto Laura, in order to protect himself from feelings of panic. However, his sixth sense turns his discourse into that of the Hysteric, where he panics and is at the mercy of dark forces he does not understand.

Lacanian’s Four Discourses

Lacan’s Four Discourses

1. Discourse of the Obsessional Neurotic
   - John’s discourse is turned from that of an obsessional neurotic who relies on his rationality and projection of emotions onto Laura, in order to protect himself from feelings of panic.

2. Discourse of the Hysteric
   - When he realizes his sufferers, John’s discourse turns into that of the Hysteric, where he panics and is at the mercy of dark forces he does not understand.

3. Discourse of the Master
   - After seeing Laura with the twins, John’s discourse turns into that of the Master, looking for her, trying to find out what has happened.

4. Discourse of the University
   - Finally, John gets lost in Venice, projects his emotions through the Hysterical Discourse, and follows the dwarf.

Short Story

John’s discourse is turned through the emotions during the story. Initially, John’s discourse is that of the Obsessional Neurotic, where he relies on his rationality and projection of emotions onto Laura, in order to protect himself from feelings of panic. However, his sixth sense turns his discourse into that of the Hysteric, where he panics and is at the mercy of dark forces he does not understand.

Summary: John’s discourse is turned through the emotions during the story.
Don't Look Now Contd.

Film John Discourse of the Master and Discourse of the University. We rarely see John suffering any form of anxiety, or projecting his emotions on to anyone else. Instead he goes about his job, and his investigations into Laura's disappearance with efficiency, the only symptoms of his panic and discomfort displaced onto the mise-en-scene, and onto Laura.

John’s exceptions where he does not adopt the above discourses, occur firstly when Christine drowns. This trauma is conveyed through the mise-en-scene. There is no discourse, but John is plainly overwhelmed with grief. The other exception is his reaction to the Cardinal, where he behaves like a child, following the Cardinal, but not believing him - the Discourse of the Hysteric. It is when he is with the Cardinal that he falls off the scaffolding, a traumatic experience which heightens his hysteria.

Laura uses the Discourse of the Master in regard to Christine and Christine’s death. Christine’s existence in the after life provides a Master signifier for Laura to go on living. Nevertheless, in the film, she symptomatically displays signs of hysteria through her actions and her voice, particularly when she is taken to hospital and can see the children playing in the next door ward.

She also uses the Discourse of the Master in regard to Christine and Christine’s death. Nevertheless, in the film, she symptomatically displays signs of hysteria through her actions and her voice, particularly when she is taken to hospital and can see the children playing in the next door ward.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discourse</th>
<th>Character</th>
<th>Film</th>
<th>Novel</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hysteric</td>
<td>Guy</td>
<td>Anne</td>
<td>Miriam and Barbara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master</td>
<td>Bruno</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>Guy</td>
<td>Anne</td>
<td>Miriam and Barbara</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Strangers on a Train**

Ch4: Appendix A 271

Strangers on a Train

Guy

Bruno

Anne and Miriam

Text

Discourse

Guy

Bruno

Anne

Miriam and Barbara

Guy

Bruno

Anne

Miriam and Barbara

Guy

Bruno

Anne

Miriam and Barbara
Virginia Woolf's *Mrs. Dalloway* was adapted into a film in 1997. A co-production between Dutch television (N.P.S. Television) and the BBC, it was given both a theatrical and a television release in the U.K. and unusually for a British film, it had a predominantly female creative team. Marleen Gorris was the first woman director to win an Oscar, awarded to *Antonia's Line* (1995) for Best Foreign Film. All her films have addressed feminist concerns: her first, the feminist classic, *A Question of Silence* (1982), is about three women who kill a male shopkeeper in an apparently motiveless murder, who are investigated by a female psychiatrist, who develops a feminist consciousness, *Broken Mirrors* (1985), and *The Last Island* (1990) which were both very popular films with their Dutch audiences.¹ Eileen Atkins, who wrote the screenplay and Vanessa Redgrave, who first suggested making a film of *Mrs. Dalloway* in 1989, celebrated and award winning stage and screen actresses in their own right, have built up a collaboration based on the adaptation of Woolf material. Atkins adapted and performed *A Room of One's Own* (1929) as a one woman show in 1989 and then turned the letters between Woolf and Vita Sackville West into a stage play, *Vita and Virginia*, which she performed with Redgrave. More recently, Atkins' radio version of *To the Lighthouse* (1927) was broadcast on BBC Radio Four on 26th March, 2000, directed by Cherry Cookson, with Redgrave playing Mrs. Ramsay. In addition, *Mrs. Dalloway*, was crewed by a female cinematographer, Sue Gibson, and composer, Ilona Sekacz, and half the producing team was female (producers: Lisa Katselas Paré and Stephen Bayly).

**Crew and Cast List**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CREW</th>
<th>CAST</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Vanessa Redgrave</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Producers</td>
<td>Natascha McElhone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Screenplay</td>
<td>Michael Kitchen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director of Photography</td>
<td>Alan Cox</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editor</td>
<td>Sarah Badel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production Designer</td>
<td>Lena Headley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Music</td>
<td>John Standing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production Companies</td>
<td>Robert Portal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Eileen Atkins, who wrote the screenplay and Vanessa Redgrave, who first suggested making a film of *Mrs. Dalloway* in 1989, celebrated and award winning stage and screen actresses in their own right, have built up a collaboration based on the adaptation of Woolf material. Atkins adapted and performed *A Room of One's Own* (1929) as a one woman show in 1989 and then turned the letters between Woolf and Vita Sackville West into a stage play, *Vita and Virginia*, which she performed with Redgrave. More recently, Atkins' radio version of *To the Lighthouse* (1927) was broadcast on BBC Radio Four on 26th March, 2000, directed by Cherry Cookson, with Redgrave playing Mrs. Ramsay. In addition, *Mrs. Dalloway*, was crewed by a female cinematographer, Sue Gibson, and composer, Ilona Sekacz, and half the producing team was female (producers: Lisa Katselas Paré and Stephen Bayly).
presents a Bayly Paré production in association with Bergen Film and Newmarket Capital Group BBC Films presentation. With the participation of The European Co-production Fund (CoBo), The Dutch Film Fund, Oliver Ford Davies, Rupert Graves, Amelia Bullmore, Margaret Tyzack, Robert Hardy, Richenda Carey, Katie Carr, Selina Cadell, Hugh Whitbread, Septimus Warren Smith, Rezia Warren Smith, Lady Bruton, Sir William Bradshaw, Lady Bradshaw, Elizabeth Dalloway, Miss Kilman.

Reproduced from *Sight and Sound* (Autumn, 1997)

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1 Humm, Maggie *Feminism and Film* (Indiana University Press, 1997) 92-93
Septimus and Post-traumatic Stress Disorder.

The symptoms of shell-shock that Septimus suffers from are accurately described and are fairly typical of what would now be described as post-traumatic stress disorder. The terminology for describing Septimus' condition has changed whilst the condition itself seems to have remained fairly constant, so that Septimus fulfils the criteria of diagnosis both for the American Psychiatric Association’s classification in 1987, as a typical shell-shock victim of the First World War. He also answers to a pre-war definition of hysteria, albeit anxiety neurosis (phobia) rather than conversion, which allies him not only with Clarissa, but also with Virginia Woolf’s own mental sufferings and her treatment at the hands of doctors. Below I reproduce the American Psychiatric Association’s chart, filled in for Septimus to show how far he fulfils the clinical criteria for post-traumatic stress disorder. Septimus’ symptoms are outlined in bold typeface.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Septimus’s symptoms of Post-traumatic Stress Disorder.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. The person has experienced an event that is outside the range of usual human experience and that would be markedly distressing to almost anyone, e.g., serious threat to one’s life or physical integrity; serious threat or harm to one’s children, spouse, or other close relatives and friends; sudden destruction of one’s home or community; or seeing another person who has recently been, or is being, seriously injured or killed as the result of an accident or physical violence. Septimus has experienced the violent death of Evans and been through the war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. (3) sudden acting or feeling as if the traumatic event were recurring (includes a sense of reliving the experience, illusions, hallucinations, and dissociative [Flashback] episodes, even those that occur upon awakening or when intoxicated). Septimus experiences flashback/hallucinations of Evans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma or numbing of general responsiveness (not present before the trauma), as indicated by at least three of the following criteria:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) markedly diminished interest in significant activities (in young children, loss of recently acquired developmental skills such as toilet training or language skills). Septimus’ lack of interest in his environment, in Regent’s Park. His looking down towards the pigeons, rather than up at the bi-plane, his unsuitable winter clothes on a bright summer’s day.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) feeling of detachment or estrangement from others. Septimus’ lack of responsiveness to Rezia’s unhappiness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) restricted range of affect, e.g., unable to have loving feelings. Septimus guilt over feeling nothing about Evan’s death (expressed to Sir William Bradshaw during the consultation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) sense of a foreshortened future, e.g., does not expect to have a career, marriage, or children, or a long life. Septimus commits suicide, thus fulfilling prophecy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Persistent symptoms of increased arousal (not present before the trauma), as indicated by at least</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
two of the following:

(1) difficulty of falling or staying asleep. Septimus naps in the afternoon, back at the flat, but he doesn’t appear to be sleeping. He also tells Rezia he “must rest”

(2) irritability or outbursts of anger. Septimus loses his temper with Rezia about going to see the doctors. - “No more doctors”

(3) exaggerated startle response. Septimus’ reaction to the car backfiring, to seeing Clarissa in florist’s window, to bi-plane, to sound of child crying, to Peter Walsh walking past. etc.

(4) physiologic reactivity upon exposure to events that symbolize or resemble an aspect of the traumatic event (e.g., a woman who was raped in an elevator breaks out in a sweat when entering any elevator). Events as above, car backfiring reminds Septimus of shell-fire, Peter Walsh reminds him of Evans, etc. He appears sweaty, shaky and frozen to the spot, “I’m rooted here, and don’t know to what purpose”.

Septimus’ symptoms would have been called shell-shock at the time, a term used at first to describe the physical trauma thought to be brought on by the effect of a shell exploding in close proximity to a soldier, but later on in the war, changed to cover all forms of response to battle or the fear of battle which psychologically undermined the soldier to the extent of him feeling unable to take part in battle. The symptoms of shell-shock ranged from suspected malingering, through hysterical mutism, deafness or paralysis, usually suffered by ordinary non-commissioned soldiers and conscripts, to the depression or anxiety states presenting in officers, and presenting in Septimus. Approaches to treatment, likewise, varied from the semi-Freudian counselling of Dr. W.H. Rivers, at Craiglockhart, the doctor who treated Wilfred Owen and Siegfried Sassoon, and who is dramatised in Pat Barker’s trilogy of war novels, *Regeneration*, the pragmatism of Lieut-Colonel Charles Myers, who became the Consultant Psychologist to the British Expeditionary Force, and recommended treating soldiers near to the front, in order to humanely re-prepare them for battle, without them having to suffer the failure of having had to return home, to the brutal attitude of such eminent doctors as the senior physician of the Maudsley Neurological Hospital. “Cowardice,” he said “I take to mean action under the influence of fear, and the ordinary type of shell-shock to my mind was chronic and persistent fear”. In the British army early in the war, and in France and in Germany throughout its duration, electrical shocks were part of the treatment, administered to make soldiers find returning to their regiments and fighting less horrific than being treated. In addition, the more entrenched Commanding Officers did not recognise the condition of shell-shock, or the authority of the Medical Officers, and as a result, by the end of the war a total of 346 men had been sentenced to death and executed,
266 of them for desertion and 18 for cowardice. The last execution took place on 7 November, 1918, four days before the armistice, of a soldier who had claimed in defence that both his mother and father had died in lunatic asylums, and that he himself had suffered from mental trouble. No adjournment was made by the Court to hear medical evidence or to inquire further, before the soldier was shot at dawn. The growing public awareness of the wholesale slaughter of the war, the incompetent battle command happy to waste millions of lives in offensives such as the Battle of the Somme, the scandalous number of executions, and the growing number of soldiers returning home mentally wrecked, as well as the recognition that the House of Commons had repeatedly been lied to, including by the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Douglas Haig, and told, quite falsely, that Medical Officers were always present at courts martial, and that their evidence was always responded to, led to the War Office Committee of Enquiry into “Shell-Shock” (1920-1922).

Sue Thomas, in her insightful article “Virginia Woolf’s Septimus Smith and Contemporary Perception of Shell Shock” demonstrates that Woolf was probably familiar with the contents of the report, and that aspects of Mrs. Dalloway clearly correlate with aspects of evidence given to the Committee. Septimus’ symptoms match those described in the report, and his treatment by Dr. Holmes and Sir William Bradshaw echoes with great detail the medical therapies recommended to the Committee. Thomas further demonstrates that Woolf’s comments, in the novel, on the goddesses of domination, Proportion and Conversion, attributes to them in the novel, the same qualities of imperialist imposition that can be implied from the recommendations of the Report. Thomas reads the report as representing and promulgating the same repressive ideals of heroism criticised by Woolf, when she puts into Septimus’ mouth the comment that the war was a “shindy of schoolboys”, and the ethos responsible for the debacle of the war in the first place.

The manner in which the Report validated and entrenched British public school ideals of character, the efficacy of which was challenged by the experience of the First World War, is apparent in The Times coverage of it. One article naively equated capacity to control emotion with strength of character and courage: “That men are to be distinguished not so much by their emotions as by the control they exercise over them is a truism...men can be trained, and train themselves, to despise danger and to seek the ways of courage. That is the positive achievement of all discipline [The Times, 2 Sept. 1922].

Furthermore, Thomas links Woolf’s own symptoms and breakdowns in 1913 and 1915, both with the treatment of Septimus in Mrs. Dalloway, known to be based on Woolf’s own medical history, and the Report thus showing that Woolf’s portrayal of Septimus and his treatment is accurate both as a depiction of shell-shock victims, and of women suffering from mental illness, whose problems were attacked in the
same way by the medical establishment, and who, in addition were subject to scorn and trivialised
compared to the suffering of men.

Witnesses before the War Office Committee of Enquiry drew the parallel between shell
shock and what one witness summed up as “the usual feminine outbursts of hysteria
(RWOC, p34); doctors had, in fact, adapted existing therapies for hysteria to treat shell
shock. An awareness that this parallel had been drawn may have given Woolf the
confidence to utilise her own experiences of mental breakdown in conjunction with
details of the Report in portraying a shell-shock sufferer. 13

In addition, awareness of the Report might have been responsible for the parallel that Mrs. Dalloway
dramatises between Septimus and Clarissa, the way that trauma is shown to be more than a personal
psychological symptom, but intimately implicated with social dis-ease, a trauma at the level of culture,
whether that be the First World War, or the inequality of women.

from Binneveld, Hans, From Shellshock to Combat Stress, A Comparative History of Military Psychiatry
Translated by John O’Kane. (Amsterdam University Press, 1997)  191
2 Barker, Pat, Regeneration (London, 1991)
3 Babington, Anthony, Shell-Shock. A History of the Changing Attitudes to War Neurosis. (Leo Cooper
(1920-1922)
During the Great War, (London, H.M.S.O., 1922)
5 Babington, Anthony, Shell-Shock. 118
6 Babington, Shell-Shock. 115. A letter, was read out by the Under-Secretary of State for War, on 14th
March, 1918.
When a man has been sentenced to death, if at any time any doubt had been raised as to
his responsibility for his actions, or if the suggestion has been advanced that he has
suffered from neurasthenia or shell-shock, orders are issued for him to be examined by a
Medical Board which expresses an opinion as to his sanity, and as to whether he should
be held responsible for his actions. One of the members of this board is always a medical
officer of neurological experience. The sentence of death is not carried out in the case of
such a man unless the Medical Board expresses the positive opinion that he is to be held
responsible for his actions.
7 Thomas, Sue, “Virginia Woolf’s Septimus Smith and Contemporary Perception of Shell Shock”, from
English Language Notes. December 1987.
8 Thomas “Virginia Woolf’s Septimus Smith and Contemporary Perception of Shell Shock” 50
Thomas cites Septimus’ war history, related to Sir William Bradshaw by Rezia, his
hypersensitivity to sound, his “sudden thunder-claps of fear” p 96 and his imagined voices,
and relates them to very similarly worded evidence to the Committee from Miss
Cockerell who testified that shell-shock sufferers apparently behaving quite normally
could be thrown into a fearful panic by “a clap of thunder...Something which occurred
suddenly would upset them” (RWOC, p. 83). These are nearly identical symptoms to
those listed in the later definition of post-traumatic stress, and rendered in equivalent
terms in the film through Septimus’s fragmented point of view shots when the baby cries,
and through the repeated image of Evans.
9 Thomas, Sue, “Virginia Woolf’s Septimus Smith and Contemporary Perception of Shell Shock”, 52
Thomas explores in detail the way that the details of Holmes' and Bradshaw's treatment of Septimus, mirror the "Persuasion", "Rest" and "Conversion" cures recommended in the report, and demonstrates that Woolf's comments, in the novel, on the goddesses of domination, Proportion and Conversion, attributes to them in the novel, the same qualities of imperialist imposition that can be implied from the recommendations of the Report.

11 Thomas, Sue, "Virginia Woolf's Septimus Smith and Contemporary Perception of Shell Shock", 52
13 Thomas, Sue, "Virginia Woolf's Septimus Smith and Contemporary Perception of Shell Shock", 50
Mrs. Dalloway

The Balcony Sequence

...Old Lady opposite, who offers Clarissa holds out her arms to Peter...Peter storms away in disgust...Clarissa looks across to...

Clarissa greets Clarissa in the library

Clarissa looks out of her window.

Clarissa remembers the kiss imagining Septimus' fall.

Peter remembers Clarissa holding out...Clarissa holds out her arms to Peter...Peter storms away in disgust...Clarissa looks across anxiously at Peter.
Plate XIII:

Clarissa holds out her arms to Peter.

The final still frame of the film.
Appendix C is a detailed script and shot list of the end of the film, starting just after Clarissa has learnt about Septimus’s suicide. These scenes could be described as alternating syntagms, demarcated through their geography, for example a) Clarissa at the window, b) Peter and Sally in the library, c) Flashbacks at Bourton, d) Richard and guests in the ballroom. I have labelled each location, but I have divided it into further numbered scenes, which represent each instance of a change in location. Scenes 1 - 4 already begin to build up an image of Clarissa, this time from the outside, as ill, and as suffering from a parallel sickness to Septimus. The talk about Septimus’s death and about shell-shocked soldiers that Clarissa leaves to go to the window, is immediately evoked by her standing at the window. The image of the window which has accumulated associations throughout the film:- as a threshold for Clarissa to return to her youth, an image of freedom, but also an image of imprisonment, the window where Clarissa hallucinates Septimus’s image and becomes his spiritual double, the windows through which Clarissa must escape Bourton, the backlit flooded windows at Sir William Bradshaw’s, above all, the window out of which Septimus throws himself - these resonate as Clarissa goes to the window. The narration returns to the party with Hugh planning to introduce Lady Bruton to Sir William Bradshaw, and their further talk of shell-shock becomes associated with Clarissa as well as with Septimus - she was shocked enough to feel unwell and leave her party, a sign of her “mental disturbance”. The association of Clarissa with mental illness, or sickness of the soul is then reinforced by Peter saying he “didn’t know she’d been ill”. Thus, when the film cuts to scene 5 and Clarissa looking out of the window thinking about Septimus’s death, the viewer brings the parallel between Septimus and Clarissa into this scene. Clarissa becomes embued with Septimus’s frailty and her musings on his suicide become thoughts directed as much to Clarissa, thoughts she herself recognises by her remark about the Serpentine, and her weaker attempts not to live. Clarissa’s exception capacity for empathy with Septimus is here conveyed, not just by her onomatopoeic narrating of his death, but the direct point of view shot of the railings, which she looks at in horror.
Scene 6 picks up a different association from scene 5, the idea of the well-lived life or the life wasted through suicide, as Sally asks about Peter's failed life as a writer, and Peter becomes for this moment, a failure as a man through his failed ambitions. The implied author is producing in us connections between the scenes of which the characters themselves are unaware. Returning, (Sc 7), to Clarissa, this idea reverberates through her thoughts, and becomes reversed as she envies Septimus his untouched innocence in death. In parallel with Peter and Sally, she begins to think about the past, and her vocalised thoughts, make a commentary on Peter's failure as a writer, although she is not aware of Peter's previous conversation. The next two scenes, 7 and 8, further elaborate on the theme of lost innocence. A reprise of Clarissa and Sally kissing precedes Clarissa's thought, prompted by Septimus's youthful suicide, that she "has lost the thing that mattered? Let it get obscured, gradually, everyday in corruption, lies and chatter". The kiss becomes, in retrospect, the high point of Clarissa's life - her most positive moment, and through the repetition of exactly the same shot as appeared earlier, the moment of the kiss appears to condense Clarissa's whole relationship with Sally. The kiss becomes a symbol of Clarissa's youth and vitality, as Septimus has become a symbol of her death drive.

The implied narration - i.e. the parallel action - passes across to Peter and Sally for scenes 10 - 12, where Peter and Sally talk in the library about Clarissa, acting as a chorus, asking questions which the viewer is also invited to contemplate. Peter poses the question a "Why wouldn't she marry me, Sally?". The question becomes, in this context, more than a simple question of fact, but presents Clarissa's decision thirty years before as an unfathomable ambiguity. Peter remembers the desolation of being abandoned, and Clarissa coming into the library, her arms outstretched. His flashback, however, stops with Clarissa's entrance into the room, and her hesitant look across at him, which captures the ambiguity of her simultaneous rejection and desire to embrace him. Although we know Clarissa will hold her arms out to Peter, as we have seen this previously in an earlier flashback, and heard Peter describe it, the shot is cut short, we do not see it, her decision seems to be still ahead of her. Sally's answer, that Clarissa was afraid, is thus a possible explanation, one that chimes with Clarissa's present thoughts about suicide. In scene 13, Clarissa's self-reflection, her description of herself as a fearful bird, justifies Sally's analysis. At this point, Sally is expressing the voice of the film, the analysis of the implied author, and Clarissa is echoing it with
her own understanding. We begin to understand from the juxtaposition of images, just what Clarissa has in common with Septimus, and how her fear has affected not just her life but also Peter's. Clarissa's repetition of what the viewer is discovering from Sally and Peter, also creates the immanence of Clarissa's thoughts. Her voice-over becomes an embodiment of the images we have just seen, and is therefore not just a "dead" informative voice-over, but carries with it the skein of memory and affect that the viewer is being subjected to through Sally and Peter's reminiscence.

The film cuts to Richard and Elizabeth dancing (Sc 14), and although this would appear to be a cut away from the centre of the action, poetically it is a continuation of it. Not only do we see an example of Richard's calmness, his ability to take Elizabeth, this time, under his wing and give her confidence, but we infer that his expression of love for Elizabeth is also an expression of love for Clarissa. His touching admiration for his daughter, although unseen by Clarissa, gives motivation for the change in mood in her subsequent voice-over (Sc 16). It is thus not causal but figurative - the viewer must imaginatively project the motivation onto Clarissa, where she refers to Richard "calmly reading the Times", thoughts which the film dramatises for us in Sc 14. Between the two scenes, in Sc 15, Sally again conveys authorial thoughts, that "perhaps Clarissa found life simpler" with Richard, but there is more ambiguity about Sally's more qualified statement this time, as we have just been poetically been presented with quite a complex relationship between Clarissa and Richard, one where Richard's attachment to Clarissa and Elizabeth, albeit simple, is nevertheless felt as a complex kind of love by Clarissa, and by the viewer. Peter's response is equally complex and simple. He does not understand his emotions of love for Clarissa, but he recognises how they have shaped his life.

In scene 16, Clarissa sees the old woman smiling at her from the house opposite. This precisely echoes the moment where, Septimus, before he jumps, sees an old man across the road looking at him impassively. Septimus jumps and Clarissa does not. The film offers no explanation for the difference between them, other than as evoking Clarissa's thought process, that is showing the woman's smile as equivalent to Clarissa's ability to recover from her fear by imaginative thought and by seeking the protection of those people she loves. Clarissa's mood has changed, wanting each moment to stay, and the
old lady, smiling, shows a peaceful old age and death (she draws the curtains), which Clarissa can now see as potentially part of her future. Again, these thoughts are emergent, produced from the juxtaposition of Clarissa’s voice-over with the shots of the old woman, and here, they seem to directly evoke Clarissa’s thoughts for the viewer.

Scene 17 cuts back to Sally and Peter continuing their discussion. Sally introduces the image of Clarissa which for her encapsulates her, the image of Clarissa going around the house dressed in white, her arms full of flowers. The film has shown already shown many similar images of Clarissa, dressed in white, running joyfully down the stairs at Bourton, but these have hitherto been flashbacks of Clarissa’s. Sally remembers Clarissa in similar terms, and she also attributes a meaning to Clarissa’s gestures - that of charm and generosity. The viewer is encouraged by Sally’s reminiscence to see Clarissa the same way, and to sum her up in these positive terms. This is the facet or point of Clarissa as diamond that Sally sees, whereas Peter cannot sum Clarissa up, and can only know how his love for her affected his life.

Clarissa’s moment of introspection finishes in scene 18, and she sums up the poetic meaning of the whole sequence, how thinking about Septimus’s death has actually made her more alive, and how his death has acted for her as a spiritual sacrifice, taking with him those spiritual aspects of Clarissa which weighed her down. The street which before was represented as empty, disfigured by the railings, is now viewed by Clarissa as full of her guests. The complex montage, the contrast between Clarissa’s thoughts and those of her friends, has enabled the narration to convey her thoughts and feelings, to create the impression of a person thinking and remembering, yet what we have seen and heard is a combination of objective, over-heard scenes, and subjective statement by Clarissa, Peter, and Sally.

Clarissa leaves the darkened room, and as she exits in wide shot, her face turned away from camera, the film cuts to another reprised flashback (sc 19), this time of Clarissa coming down the stairs at Bourton. This image refers back to Sc 17, and Sally’s memory of Clarissa, and to the original placing of this image at the beginning of the film, where Clarissa runs out into Bourton - Clarissa as young, generous and free. However, this flashback cannot be attributed to one particular character’s reminiscence. Clarissa
has left the room so it is not specifically her flashback, and although after the flashback, the camera returns to Sally talking to Peter, and she may still be remembering this image of Clarissa, the conversation has passed on to other topics and Sally is filmed in a two-shot with Peter, so the flashback is not marked as Sally’s. Since all three characters are loosely linked around the flashback, it belongs simultaneously to all and to none of them. The particular placing of the flashback makes it become part of Clarissa interiority. She has reclaimed her youth which finally seems to integrated itself within her person, so as Clarissa leaves the room, she “becomes” the young girl within the mature woman. At the beginning of the film, Clarissa emerges from the threshold of her house to turn into young Clarissa, but this is an act of splitting, where young Clarissa becomes symbolic of all the aspects of Clarissa’s life she feels she has lost, now, through Clarissa’s day of memory, and her use of Septimus’s story, the two are again one. Clarissa steps out of the darkened room, and runs downstairs in Bourton. Moreover, Clarissa’s integration of her youth is still a true image of her, it is the image her friends recall of her.

From scene 20, the film starts to broaden out the theme of the sequence, to take it from the particular of Clarissa’s life, her subjectivity, towards the act of living and ageing for all the characters. Peter finishes Sally’s sentence “What does the brain matter...compared to the heart”, and kisses her, showing the closeness of thought which in all these old friends brings them together, and allows them to have people around them who have shared their histories and experiences. It is partly the impenetrable nature of experience, the inability of Peter and Sally to know, for example, whether Richard has made Clarissa happy, that makes this friendship important, because emotions and memories can be shared, even whilst they cannot be analysed. When Clarissa finally finds Peter in the library (Sc 23), she completes, now in the present, the gesture from Peter’s earlier flashback, (Sc 11), of holding out her arms towards him. The repetition of the past in the present shows gesturally, how Peter is still stuck in his past relationship with Clarissa, that his earlier traumatic rejection by Clarissa has stuck with him, and solidified in his relationship with her and Richard, doomed always to be the outsider. However, since Clarissa’s is a generous gesture, it also shows Peter able to recover a positive memory of Clarissa, a positive image of her, which is who she actually is - as she says “Here I am at last”. Clarissa holding out her arms towards Peter is an accumulated poetic image conveying the film’s aesthetic of generosity and empathy, but also its view
of consciousness as formed and performed by interaction with other people. It is in the interpersonal act of offering and receiving, in human interaction, that Clarissa and Peter become themselves. They are reliant upon each other to recognise who they are.

Around this central image of Clarissa holding her arms out to Peter, the dance continues. Richard hands Elizabeth to her new boyfriend to dance (Sc 22), handing all the problems and exhilarations of youth onto another generation. Richard and Sally dance together, any enmity between them long forgotten. In scene 24 we see the couples waltzing, Elizabeth and her partner, Richard and Sally, Hugh and an older woman, and Clarissa and Peter. The camera dissolves to a still frame of an earlier scene outside in the summer at Bourton. Sally, Peter and Clarissa, caught in an impromptu moment, looking in different directions, their expressions unreadable, their future ahead of them. The juxtaposition dramatises the dance of life, the unpredictability of how life turns out, and the endless attempt to try and make sense of our attachments.

### SHOT DESCRIPTION FOR THE END OF MRS. DALLOWAY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scene No</th>
<th>Dialogue and Effects</th>
<th>Shot description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. PARTY: DRAWING ROOM</td>
<td>If you’ll excuse me Lady Bradshaw, Lady Bradshaw I have to.... The problem is that politicians are generally not very interested in shell-shock. This is it. This is exactly it.</td>
<td>MS on Clarissa, widens out as Richard enters frame so that Richard and the Bradshaws appear in the foreground, with Clarissa fading between them in the background.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. EMPTY ROOM BALCONY</td>
<td>CLARISSA GOES INTO EMPTY ROOM AND STANDS BY WINDOW</td>
<td>WS Clarissa enters darkened room with full length windows. Goes to window, pulls aside net curtain and looks out.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. PARTY: DRAWING ROOM</td>
<td>I see that Sir William Bradshaw has just arrived. I think it would be most useful to bring him in on your emigration scheme. I know he's treating many of these fellows for shell shock or whatever. I'm sure he'd think it was a good idea to get some of them off to Canada, the open air life and all that. Excellent for mental disturbance.</td>
<td>Hugh CU wanders over to sofa where Lady Bruton sits with crowd. Camera follows. Two-shot of them on sofa becomes intercut singles at end of their</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lady Bruton:</td>
<td>What a good idea Hugh.</td>
<td>conversation.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>4. PARTY: ANOTHER PART OF DRAWING ROOM</strong></td>
<td>Lady Bruton: She’s disappeared. Do you think she went upstairs. She can’t have gone to bed can she?</td>
<td>In another part of the room. Medium 2 shot. Sally and Peter. Camera moves in to MCU of both of them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter:</td>
<td>Sally: Oh no. She couldn’t leave her own party.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter:</td>
<td>Sally: I don’t know. I don’t know. I didn’t know she’d been ill.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sally:</td>
<td>Peter: Stop worrying Peter.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5. EMPTY ROOM BALCONY</strong></td>
<td>Clarissa (VO) He threw himself out of the window and impaled himself on the railings.</td>
<td>1. Medium shot. Clarissa looking out of window. Framed by window. Clarissa looking screen left and a bit down.</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Clarissa (VO) Up flashed the ground, and through him blundering and bruising went the rusty spike and there he lay with a thud, thud, thud in his brain and then a suffocation of blackness</td>
<td>2. C’s POV of railings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Why, why did he do it. Why did the Bradshaws talk of it at my party. He’s thrown it all away. His life. Just like that...</td>
<td>3. As 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Clarissa (VO) I once threw a shilling into the Serpentine but he’s thrown his life away.</td>
<td>Dissolve to 4. MCU Clarissa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>6. LIBRARY</strong></td>
<td>Sally: You were always going to write something. Have you written anything? Not a word...Not a solitary word.</td>
<td>WS Sally and Peter moving around naturally in library.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter:</td>
<td>Clarissa (VO) But then. He will always stay young. All day long I’ve been thinking of Bourton. Of Peter and Sally. We’ve grown old. We’ll grow older.</td>
<td>MCU Clarissa. Nets behind her.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>7. EMPTY ROOM BALCONY</strong></td>
<td>Clarissa (VO) CLARISSA’S FLASHBACK</td>
<td>Sally and Clarissa look at each other CU and kiss. Clarissa closes eyes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clarissa (VO):</td>
<td>But then. He will always stay young. All day long I’ve been thinking of Bourton. Of Peter and Sally. We’ve grown old. We’ll grow older.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>8. BOURTON, OUTSIDE BALL ROOM</strong></td>
<td>Clarissa (VO): Have I lost the thing that mattered? Let it get obscured, gradually, everyday in corruption lies and chatter?</td>
<td>1. Clarissa MCU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Tosca music, and military drumming - like wartime shells)</td>
<td>2. BCU railings from Clarissa’s POV.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>9. EMPTY ROOM BALCONY</strong></td>
<td>Sally (VO) Do</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
10. LIBRARY
Sally: you remember the night we went boating on the lake?
Peter: Yes, I remember thinking she's abandoned me. And then all of a sudden she was there with her hand stretched out looking utterly beautiful saying, 'Come on come on they're all waiting

1. WS Sally and Peter sitting in comfy armchairs
2. CU Peter

11. BOURTON: LIBRARY
PETER'S FLASHBACK.
3. LS Peter sitting miserably in library at Bourton. Clarissa enters room. (as before, but shot ends early just as she's through the door and stops, looking at him)

12. LIBRARY
Peter: Why wouldn't she marry me Sally?
Sally: She was afraid.

4. As 2. CU Peter.
5. Reverse CU Sally.
6. Reaction Peter.

13. EMPTY ROOM: BALCONY
Clarissa: (VO) Your parents just hand it to you, life, to be lived right through to the end. We must walk it serenely, but in the depths of my heart there's been an awful fear sometimes that I couldn't go on. Without Richard sitting there calmly reading the Times, while I crouched like a bird and gradually revived, I might have perished.

MCU Clarissa at window.

14. PARTY: BALLROOM
Richard: I looked across the room and wondered, 'Who's that lovely girl?' and then I realised, 'That's my daughter'

Richard and Elizabeth dancing, medium shot, with a few people round them.

15. LIBRARY
Sally: Maybe she needed someone who found life simple. She certainly cared for you, more than she cared for Richard. My life isn't simple. My relationship with her wasn't simple. She broke my heart and you can't love like that twice.

Matching CU's Sally and Peter, with dialogue

16. EMPTY ROOM: BALCONY
Clarissa: What makes us go on. What sends roaring up in us that immeasurable delight to surprise us. Then nothing can be slow enough, nothing lasts too long. You want to say to each moment, stay, stay, stay.

1. Medium shot Clarissa in window. Looking right of frame
2. Dissolve to Clarissa MCU.
3. Clarissa's POV of old woman in room opposite. Medium shot Woman
4. As 2. Clarissa looking

(contd).
5. MCU old lady smiling at Clarissa
6. As 4,2. Clarissa
7. WS Old lady draws curtains and leaves

17. **LIBRARY:**
Sally: I cherish the friendship I had with Clarissa. There was something pure about her. She had such charm and such generosity. I can see her to this day, going about the house in white. She always seemed to be in white. And her arms were full of flowers. And I wondered Does absence really matter? Does distance really matter?

You'll think me sentimental, and so I am, but I've come to believe that the only thing worth saying is what you really feel.

Peter: I don't know what I feel. I know that I loved her once, and that it stayed with me all my life and coloured everything.

18. **EMPTY ROOM:**
**BALCONY**
Clarissa: (VO) I must go back to my party. To Sally and Peter.

...That young man killed himself, but I don’t pity him. I’m somehow glad he could do it, throw it away. It's made me feel the beauty somehow feel very like him, less afraid.

1. MCU Clarissa
2. POV street. Now looking down full of people not railings.
3. as 1. MCU Clarissa
4. Clarissa LS leaves room. DISSOLVE TO

19. **BOURTON:**
**STAIRS**
CLARISSA'S FLASHBACK. (Music from young Clarissa at beginning of film)

Clarissa coming down stairway at Bourton. Same shot as earlier, in white, as audience and Sally remember her.

20. **LIBRARY**
RETURN TO SALLY AND PETER IN PRESENT

WS Sally and Peter get up, stand into 2 shot MS as they look out of shot, perhaps at Dalloway.

21. **LIBRARY**
(Song. Reprise of opening scene)

Sally: I have to go.
Peter: Do you think he’s made her happy?
Sally: Who can tell Peter. All our relationships are just scratches on the surface. We thought he wasn’t very bright, but what does the brain matter...

Peter: ...Compared to the heart. (Peter kisses Sally)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scene</th>
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<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td><strong>BALLROOM</strong></td>
<td>(Ballroom music.) Dancing. Richard dancing with Elizabeth. Passes her on to younger man. Passing down the generations. Clarissa is watching Elizabeth from the doorway. So is Richard. Richard: There you are Richard notices her. MCU Richard Clarissa: Peter and Sally haven’t left have they? MCU Clarissa Richard: Don’t know MCU Richard Sally: Clarissa. I couldn’t leave without saying goodbye. Richard: You can’t leaving until you’ve danced with me. Sally: Peter’s in the library. MCU Sally 3 shot. Richard and Sally dance watched by Clarissa. Richard and Sally dance out of shot leaving Clarissa Medium shot.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td><strong>LIBRARY</strong></td>
<td>Here I am at last. Peter CU at window turns round. Peter comes towards Clarissa’s outstretched arms. MS Clarissa and Peter face each other calmly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.</td>
<td><strong>BALLROOM</strong></td>
<td>Theme music. Triple time. Waltz. Like whole film has been waltz. MS Clarissa and Peter dancing. Widens out to wide shot. Other couples:- Elizabeth and her young man, Richard and Sally, Hugh and Lady Bruton’s companion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.</td>
<td>Still frame.</td>
<td>The shot of Sally Peter and Clarissa sitting at Bourton with dog.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER SIX:
Appendix D

This appendix contains an analysis of Septimus' introjection of Evans as death drive, and his subsequent traumatic projection of this death drive onto the characters he meets later in the film, specifically, Peter, and Dr. Holmes.

Septimus is overwhelmed by his memory of the death of his friend, Evans, and this memory comes to interrupt his present day world. He hallucinates seeing Evans walking towards him across the grass at Regent's Park, and then Evans is blown up, and the park returns to normal, abandoned bicycles, loving couples strolling arm in arm. The sequence of shots consisting of intercutting between Septimus's reaction and his direct optical point of view shot is as follows:

1) Medium shot of Septimus on the park bench shows him turning his head left towards the camera as he sees Evans.
2) Septimus's optical point of view shot of Evans as a tiny figure in extreme longshot walking towards camera across the grass at Regent's Park
1A) Septimus stands up from the bench, and the camera follows. He continues to look almost directly into the lens.
3) Septimus's optical point of view shot. Closer telephoto longshot of Evans walking towards camera in slow motion. Evans stays the same size in frame.
1B) The camera slowly tracks in on Septimus until filming him in medium close up - "Evan's for God's sake, don't come!"
3A) As three. Evans comes towards camera.
4) Invisible edit. Smoke in close up clears to reveal Evan's arms and hands rising and falling through frame as he is shown being blown up.
4) Action match wide shot of same explosion showing park in background, bicycle flat on grass in foreground.
5) Dissolve to matching angle, in park, with no sign of explosion and with foreground walking figures and bicycle still in foreground but further from camera.
1C) Septimus's reaction, breathing heavily. Camera tracks in further to tight close up.
The camera allows us access to Septimus's hallucination, as he sees it, i.e. the film becomes

Through the parallel action, and through the inexorably slow approach of Evans seen ever larger by the telephoto lens but not closer, we share Septimus's optical point of view and his feelings - we share his hallucination. Yet through the parallel action (strand 2), we also gain access to Septimus's story, what happens to him during the day. Thus, it is his relationship to Rezia, and to the doctors, juxtaposed with his inner vision, which together gives us Septimus's voice. During his interactions through the day we gain a sense of his attitude towards others, how he is projecting his trauma onto the present, and in turn how
others provoke his hysteria through their oppressive behaviour. The first scene of the film showing us Septimus in the trenches, and the death of Evans is repeated, in variation, throughout the film, becoming a metaphor where other characters successively take the place of the dead Evans. As Septimus hallucinates the appearance of Evans in Regents Park, the point of view structure from the early scene in the trenches is preserved, - a shot of Septimus calling out to Evans, a point of view shot of Evans being blown up, a return to Septimus horrified. We infer, through association, that Septimus feels responsible for Evans’ death, and this has driven him mad. When Septimus suffers from the same hallucination, but a similar point of view shot structure replaces the shot of Evans walking towards Septimus with Peter Walsh walking calmly across the park towards Septimus, this juxtaposition not only shows how Septimus projects his guilt and fear onto the non threatening world around him, but also indicates that there might be something about what Peter represents which threatens Septimus. Thus, although Peter is a complete stranger to Septimus, perhaps his military bearing, his officer class, his obliviousness to Septimus, may be associated by the viewer with Septimus’s fear. The final repetition/rhyme of the death of Evans occurs when Dr. Holmes arrives at the flat.
**Chapter Six: Appendix E**

**MUSIC FOR THE END OF MRS DALLOWAY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scene No:</th>
<th>Dialogue and Effects</th>
<th>Music</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. PARTY: DRAWING ROOM</td>
<td>If you'll excuse me Lady Bradshaw, Lady Bradshaw I have to.... The problem is that politicians are generally not very interested in shell-shock. This is it. This is exactly it.</td>
<td>Party music, diegetic, background</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. EMPTY ROOM BALCONY</td>
<td>CLARISSA GOES INTO EMPTY ROOM AND STANDS BY WINDOW</td>
<td>Continued music, chatter lowered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. PARTY: DRAWING ROOM</td>
<td>I see that Sir William Bradshaw has just arrived. I think it would be most useful to bring him in on your emigration scheme. I know he’s treating many of these fellows for shell shock or whatever. I’m sure he’d think it was a good idea to get some of them off to Canada, the open air life and all that. Excellent for mental disturbance.</td>
<td>Party music contd.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. PARTY: DRAWING ROOM</td>
<td>She’s disappeared. Do you think she went upstairs. She can’t have gone to bed can she? Oh no. She couldn’t leave her own party. I don’t know. I don’t know. I didn’t know she’d been ill. Stop worrying Peter.</td>
<td>Party music finishes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. EMPTY ROOM BALCONY</td>
<td>He threw himself out of the window and impaled himself on the railings. Up flashed the ground, and through him blundering and bruising went the rusty spike and there he lay with a thud, thud, thud in his brain and then a suffocation of blackness Why, why did he do it. Why did the Bradshaws talk of it at my party. He’s thrown it all away. His life. Just like that... I once threw a shilling into the Serpentine but he’s thrown his life away.</td>
<td>Tosca music, non-diegetic orchestrated for strings. thud, thud, thud echoed in music, low drumming Redgrave’s intonation rises, music changes key up a tone. Slight harmonic resolution</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Location/Scene</td>
<td>Narration/Dialogue</td>
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<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>LIBRARY</td>
<td>Sally: You were always going to write something. Have you written anything? Not a word...Not a solitary word.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>EMPTY ROOM</td>
<td>Peter: But then. He will always stay young. All day long I've been thinking of Bourton. Of Peter and Sally. We've grown old. We'll grow older.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BALCONY</td>
<td>Clarissa (VO) Mutates into brass band reprise, from the earlier kissing scene (diegetic in earlier scene)</td>
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<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>BOURTON, OUTSIDE BALL ROOM</td>
<td>CLARISSA'S FLASHBACK Have I lost the thing that mattered? Let it get obscured, gradually, everyday in corruption lies and chatter? (Tosca music, and Tosca reprise, over drone, orchestrated now for harp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sally (VO): Do (Tosca music, and military drumming - like wartime shells)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BALCONY</td>
<td>Sally (VO): You remember the night we went boating on the lake? Yes, I remember thinking she’s abandoned me. And then all of a sudden she was there with her hand stretched out looking utterly beautiful saying, ‘Come on come on they’re all waiting</td>
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<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>LIBRARY</td>
<td>Peter: Why wouldn’t she marry me Sally?</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sally: She was afraid.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>BOURTON: LIBRARY</td>
<td>Peter: Why wouldn’t she marry me Sally?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>LIBRARY</td>
<td>Sally: You remember the night we went boating on the lake? Yes, I remember thinking she’s abandoned me. And then all of a sudden she was there with her hand stretched out looking utterly beautiful saying, ‘Come on come on they’re all waiting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>EMPTY ROOM</td>
<td>Peter: Why wouldn’t she marry me Sally?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BALCONY</td>
<td>Clarissa (VO): Your parents just hand it to you, life, to be lived right through to the end. We must walk it serenely, but in the depths of my heart there’s been an awful fear sometimes that I couldn’t go on. Without Richard sitting there calmly reading the Times, while I crouched like a bird and gradually revived, I might have perished.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>PARTY: BALLROOM</td>
<td>Richard: I looked across the room and wondered, ‘Who’s that lovely girl?’ and then I realised, ‘That’s my daughter’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. LIBRARY</td>
<td>Sally:</td>
<td>Maybe she needed someone who found life simple. She certainly cared for you, more than she cared for Richard. My life isn’t simple. My relationship with her wasn’t simple. She broke my heart and you can’t love like that twice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. EMPTY ROOM: BALCONY</td>
<td>Clarissa:</td>
<td>What makes us go on. What sends roaring up in us that immeasurable delight to surprise us. Then nothing can be slow enough, nothing lasts too long. You want to say to each moment, stay, stay, stay.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>(contd).</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>17. LIBRARY</td>
<td>Sally:</td>
<td>I cherish the friendship I had with Clarissa. There was something pure about her. She had such charm and such generosity. I can see her to this day, going about the house in white. She always seemed to be in white. And her arms were full of flowers. And I wondered Does absence really matter? Does distance really matter? You’ll think me sentimental, and so I am, but I’ve come to believe that the only thing worth saying is what you really feel. I don’t know what I feel. I know that I loved her once, and that it stayed with me all my life and coloured everything.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. EMPTY ROOM: BALCONY</td>
<td>Clarissa: (VO)</td>
<td>I must go back to my party. To Sally and Peter... That young man killed himself, but I don’t pity him. I’m somehow glad he could do it, throw it away. It’s made me feel the beauty somehow feel very like him, less afraid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 BOURTON: STAIRS</td>
<td>CLARISSA’S FLASHBACK.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 LIBRARY</td>
<td>RETURN TO SALLY AND PETER IN PRESENT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. LIBRARY</td>
<td>Sally:</td>
<td>(Music. Reprise of opening scene) I have to go. Do you think he’s made her happy? Who can tell Peter. All our relationships are just scratches on the surface. We thought he wasn’t very bright, but what does the brain matter... ...Compared to the heart. (Peter kisses Sally)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BALLROOM</td>
<td>LIBRARY</td>
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<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>Richard: (Ballroom music.) here you are</td>
<td>Clarissa: Peter and Sally haven't left have they?</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Richard: Don't know</td>
<td>Sally: Clarissa. I couldn't leave without saying goodbye.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Richard: You can't leaving until you've danced with me.</td>
<td>Sally: Peter's in the library.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td>Clarissa: Here I am at last.</td>
<td>Music (b) dimmed, developed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>25.</td>
<td>Still frame. The shot of Sally Peter and Clarissa sitting at Bourton with dog.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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**Filmography**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Film Title</th>
<th>Director</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Don't Look Now</td>
<td>Nicholas Roeg</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strangers on a Train</td>
<td>Alfred Hitchcock</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>USA</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Sixth Sense</td>
<td>M Night Shyamalan</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>USA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Live Flesh</td>
<td>Pedro Almodovar</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>SPAIN</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mrs Dalloway</td>
<td>Marleen Gorris</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Lump in My Throat</td>
<td>Olivia Lichtenstein</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>BBC</td>
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<td>A Lump in My Throat</td>
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