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Photography and the Falklands Conflict
Homer's Heroism in Modern Warfare

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Preface

The Falklands Conflict has always loomed large throughout my adult life. As a young man of 19 years old, I watched the television and read the newspapers with the same degree of excitement and fascination as most of the British population. In the following year, as a direct result of the passion and glory that surrounded the war I joined the British Army as a Royal Military Policeman. It quickly became apparent to myself, if not the military, that this was a poor career choice and that I was never cut out to be a soldier. After a military career lasting no more than a few weeks I went to college and started life as a photographer, joining the Ministry of Defence in the late 1980s. Since then, I have made numerous visits to the Falkland Islands to publicise the work of the soldiers who now defend the islands from any threat of re-invasion.

Looking back, it seems that the war was over remarkably quickly, and by modern standards, where the war in Afghanistan is projected to last anything between 10 and 20 years, it was. It has often been described as Britain's last colonial war, the last in a long line of small conflicts that expanded and defended the British Empire. Attitudes to war in the South Atlantic developed in a bubble of patriotism and jingoism that has not been seen since and such attitudes now seem to be forged in imperialism, in a time long past and no longer available to representatives of British culture.

However, on a wider stage, the representation of all wars and the men who fight in them has a long history. Each culture has its own way of coming to terms with conflict and death, but in the western world, the origins of the representation of the warrior can be traced back to the Ancient Greeks in general, and Homer in particular.

Dr. Jonathan Shay, a psychiatrist with the United States Department of Veteran Affairs has made a compelling argument that breaking the Greek covenant has had lasting implications for the veterans of the Vietnam War. (Shay 1995) This psychoanalytical work has helped provide a model of representation that explains why soldiers are portrayed in the way they are. Without the work of Dr. Shay, I am sure that this thesis would not have taken the course that it has.

In pursuing this thesis I have had to accept that there may be implications, perceived or real, for my ongoing work as photographer with the Ministry of Defence. The MoD has in various measures supported this research and to date has made no attempt to direct its course or influence the findings; in fact, at the point of submission, they are unaware of its contents. It is clear, that in this type of research, not all the findings will
reflect well on the MoD's past or current working practices, but I believe it is possible for it to learn from the results. My position as an MoD photographer has on the other hand had a positive benefit on the research: I have been able to gain access to archives that have remained closed to others.

Hilary Roberts, Head of Photography Collections at the Imperial War Museum, has been very influential in this work and has given me more co-operation and trust than I could have hoped for. She has also allowed me more time to present this work than I could have dared asked for given the nature of the images found in the IWM archive, and that the research spanned the 25th anniversary celebrations. I remain grateful to Hilary for her unstinting support.

Finally, I would like to thank Dr Ian Walker for his support and supervisor expertise over far too many years. He has read and re-read this work more times than I care to remember and has remained perennially patient with my inabilities to either type or spell, a problem that has made his job all the more difficult. The research and the writing faltered on several occasion, some more serious than others, but without his skill in getting me to do things that, quite frankly, I really did not want to do, this project would never have been completed. It is to Ian that I hold the deepest debt of gratitude.
Notes on the Text

Translations.

A number of different versions of Homer's *Iliad* and *Odyssey* have been used in the writing of this thesis. Both books have been translated many times in both verse and prose, but a number of texts stand out as authoritative, though not singularly so. Where Homer has been quoted I have done so using the verse translation of Richmond Lattimore, Professor Emeritus of Greek at Bryn Mawr College, Pennsylvania. His translations of the *Iliad* in 1951 and the *Odyssey* in 1967 have not yet been bettered as complete works. However the prose translations by Robert Fagles provide valuable and easy to read versions.

The derivation of *kudos*, *timē* and *kleos* have been extracted from a number of texts. An excellent single source is available from Bartolo Natoli (2006).

Ranks.

Wherever possible I have used the military ranks held by individual soldiers during the conflict. A number of later texts quoted as part of this study use the ranks held by service personnel at the time of interview or publication. For the sake of clarity I have avoided using these later ranks and apologise if any have been used.

War or Conflict?

The events that took place in the South Atlantic in the first half of 1982 have variously been referred to as a crisis, a conflict and a war. I have avoided using the term Falklands War purely for technical reasons, as war was never actually declared between the two nations. For this reason, I have used Falklands Conflict to refer to the events that took place on and around the Falkland Islands. Falklands Crisis has been used to describe the political and diplomatic events surrounding the conflict.
The Greek Meme

Kudos
Victory on the battlefield measured in terms of glory. A warrior who fights unworthy enemies, those with considerably less skill than his own is not likely to obtain kudos. The Ancient Greeks believed that victory in battle was a gift of the gods, and therefore, whether a warrior obtained kudos or not was a matter for the gods.

Timē
Warriors who obtained sufficient kudos could gain timē (pronounced tee-may). This was individual fame based on the degree to which victories were talked about by others and is closely aligned to the modern ideas of respect and honour. There was a finite amount of timē and it was a facet of a warrior's existence that it was in permanent flux; as one warrior gained timē another would lose it.

Kleos
The ultimate aim of a warrior was to gain kleos aphthiton. This was similar to timē, but was greater by an order or magnitude. To gain kleos a warrior must be remembered after his death. The first sign of a warrior's kleos was to be mentioned in poetry: this could have been a simple inclusion in the works of local story tellers, or in the work of epic poets, such as Homer. Kleos, unlike timē, would outlive a warrior, giving him everlasting glory and remembrance down the generations, which in the Greek mind was the basis of immortality.

Nostos
Homecoming, or nostos, was not linked to kudos, timē and kleos, other than to say that the more glory, honour and respect a warrior obtained, the better his homecoming would be. However, unlike modern ideas of homecoming as an event, for the Greeks nostos was a process, the successful outcome of which was reliant upon the favour of the gods. Nostos is mentioned in the Iliad, but the Odyssey is dedicated to the nostos of Odysseus.
Introduction.

The Falkland Conflict stands as a high point in British nationalism that now seems rather embarrassing in a nation not given to such emotional outbursts. The steady stream of media outbursts in favour of the war quickly built into a frenzy that often drifted into jingoism and xenophobia. These reports were tempered with anti-war campaigning by left-wing and liberal politicians and by a very small minority of newspapers, but this did nothing to temper the national mood. That the British should be keen on a distant colonial expedition just seven years after the end of the Vietnam War and in what seemed an ever increasing sense of Cold War doom seemed to be counter-intuitive.

The Government, led by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, was already in trouble with a deepening recession, spiralling unemployment and looming industrial disputes that threatened to cripple large areas of the public sector, particularly the rail network. The cost of the nuclear deterrent was putting pressure on the rest of the defence budget and large cuts in the Royal Navy were expected imminently. Anti-war campaigners claimed that the Argentine invasion was encouraged by the British Government's neglect of the islands and that responding with military action would be inappropriate and foolhardy.

Having committed to send a task force, failing to recapture the islands would have been terminal for the Thatcher government. The geographic and financial divisions in society polarised political opinion and the dogmas of left and right, north and south, were probably never greater and there would have been little public forgiveness for a military catastrophe. Thatcher believed that the Falklands Crisis was a turning point for British pride and British moral supremacy amongst the world's nations, but more than this, it was the saving of her Government.

The rapid response of the military, especially the Royal Navy, allowed Thatcher to take a hard line in negotiations with the Argentine junta and it was clear that she would settle for nothing less than total and unconditional removal of all Argentine forces from the islands before calling off the threat of a military response. The initial construction of the task force was mired in a failing relationship between Government, the military and the media, with the Royal Navy initially refusing to allow any journalist or press photographers to sail on any of the task force vessels, either Royal or Merchant Navy.

In researching the representations of the Falklands Conflict Gotcha! The Media, The
Government and the Falklands Crisis (Harris 1983) is an essential early step, but, written so close to events, this book is little more than story-telling. Although Harris provides good background information he offers little in the way of analysis. This was inevitable given the temporal proximity to the events and the number of other authors vying for attention in late 1982 and 1983. As Harris himself points out, “Never in the field of human conflict has so much be written by so many so quickly” (Harris 1983: 148). The speed at which many publication were produced meant there was a surfeit of information based of press information and contemporary accounts that lacked the time to conduct detailed research and analysis. These accounts also suffered high degrees of bias as authors attempted to justify their own actions, frequently at the expense of others.

Although the Government and the media appear from the outside to be on opposite sides of a representational divide (the reporter and the reported) there is a symbiotic relationship operating between the two. During the Falklands Conflict the military joined this relationship when the media became dependent on them for sustenance, access to information and the means of getting material back to the UK. This tripartite relationship worked for the benefit of all involved, but did little for journalism as an objective profession. This relationship was brought in to focus when the Defence Committee investigating the conduct of the Government and the media during the conflict discovered the existence of the tape recordings of the departments of the record briefings. After consulting the defence correspondents, who voted by nine to seven to maintain the relationship with the Ministry, the MoD decided to withhold the tapes (Harris 1983: 150).

The number of historical commentaries on the Falklands Conflict can make it quite difficult to discover anything new, but the paucity of material looking specifically at photography and the conflict means that the subject is ripe for investigation. Only two press photographers went with the Task Force; however, a number of military photographers were also present. The difficulty in separating the press from the military images in most publications leads to the conclusion that the only meaningful way of examining the images is as single body of work, one carrying the mark of state authorship (Brothers 1997: 208).

Looking past media commentaries at the reason why the military are represented in the way they are requires an understanding of the way the military see themselves and how they want, and need, to be seen by others. Initial reading on this subject requires an assessment of texts and ideas that contributes to the generation of military culture.
and ethos. While the work of Miyamoto Musashi (The Book of Five Rings), Sun Tzu (The Art of War) and Machiavelli (The Prince and The Art of War) provided early manuals of warfare, Prussian soldier and military academic Carl von Clausewitz provided the most thorough treatise on the convergence of strategy, tactics, technology and society. *On War* was written over many years spanning the 17th and 18th centuries and continued to be worked on up to Clausewitz’s death in 1831. It was Clausewitz who famously wrote that war was simply a continuation of policy by other means (Clausewitz 1989: p87), an apparently simple statement that underpinned his belief that war could not be separated from politics. He wrote that “Fighting .... is a trial of moral and physical forces through the medium of the latter” (1989: 127) and described the political and social structures that were necessary for a nation to wage and win wars.

Clausewitz was heavily influenced by his predecessors and studied wars predating the Napoleonic period, which defined his own military career, and his highly influential work is still taught at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst. Although the majority of his text deals with the strategy and tactics of warfare, his description of state enmity and the martial spirit of the general populace continue to be important to contemporary discussions of military effectiveness. Writing before the industrialisation of the battlefield and before the modern concept of total war, Clausewitz believed in the dignity of the battlefield and honoured those who risked and lost their lives as one nation forced its will upon another (Ignatieff 1998: 116)

The Falklands Conflict is often described as the last colonial war and much of the rhetoric follows this belief. The descriptors used are of unbearable physical hardship, of superior tactics over a barbarian enemy. The paradigms echo those of the Second World War and the early days of the Vietnam War. They are without doubt the last time a western nation fell almost unconditionally behind its government in time of war.

The last few years of the 20th century saw a fundamental shift in the representation of conflict. The Gulf War of 1992 was followed by numerous accounts of what became known as post-modern warfare. Most famously, Jean Baudrillard claimed that the Gulf war did not take place (Baudrillard 1991). The nature of the gulf war along with the control over information exercised by the American and British governments changed the way war was viewed by the public at home. The long air campaign was illustrated in the media by images sent back from smart bombs; still images showing the enemy in the seconds before impact, video images following the bombs from the aircraft to the target and cutting in to white noise at the moment of impact, denying the viewer the chance to see the reality of explosives interaction with the human body. Baudrillard's writing was
philosophical and conceptual, generating bemusement from some more regular war commentators, but it was the beginning of a new dialogue on an alleged new kind of war. The main principles of post-modern war are that technology shields the western soldier from the realities of war and that western armies are no longer prepared to risk the lives of their own soldiers on the battlefield.

In the five or six years spanning the turn of the 21st Century, writers began to proclaim the death of the western warrior and the end of the western way of warfare. Michael Ignatieff coined the term "The Warrior's Honor" for the morality and principles by which soldiers conduct themselves. He argued that this idea was universal across international boundaries, different civilisations and different historical periods. The Bushido code of Japan and the Christian Chivalric code have much in common and delineate what is acceptable behaviour in mortal combat. The idea that there is honour in war dates back to the origins of visual and textual representations of war and clearly existed before the manufacture of any surviving art work or book. Ignatieff subscribed to the idea that the west was losing it appetite for traditional military values, an argument that reached its culmination in his book *Virtual War* (2000).

In the context of the world before 9/11, Ignatieff argued that in the Kosovo campaign the western allies were not prepared to commit ground troops to the battle until the Serb forces, particularly air defences, had been completely destroyed. The morality of the British and Americans was declared bankrupt when they were prepared to kill, but not die, in pursuit of their objectives. Ignatieff claimed a fundamental loss of the warrior ethos and that the war in Kosovo was the last traditional war, that future wars would be fought through the physical and psychological shield of the computer interface. The replacement of the moral warrior with the professional soldier would remove both risk and the existential experience of combat. In Ignatieff's view this process was irreversible and terminal to the ethos of the warrior spirit and created the post-modern soldier.

Writing in the same period, Christopher Coker made a more detailed examination of the status of the warrior in western society and came to similar conclusions. His main argument was that on the modern battlefield death ceased to have meaning and became purely utilitarian. The first manifestation of this was the First World War, where soldiers were killed by an unseen enemy using machine guns and long range artillery. It reached its technical zenith with the dropping of the atomic bomb, *Little Boy*, on Hiroshima on the 6 August, 1945. The sole purpose of industrialised warfare was to deny life to the enemy, resulting in a dehumanisation of combat.
Critics of the Western way of warfare are on stronger ground when they see how it has abandoned the existential dimension. The Greeks offered warriors the realisation of their own humanity. They found in war a master text by which they came to know themselves better. It defined their humanity by distinguishing a free man from slave, a man from a woman, and a Greek from a barbarian. It is this idea of war that now seems obsolete in the Western world.

(Coker 2002: 58)

Coker described the Greek way of warfare in two separate spheres, the instrumental and the existential. The instrumentality of war is concerned with the weapons, tactics and strategy required to be successful. The Ancient, pre-Hoplite Greeks were less reliant on instrumentality than later Greeks. However, the organisation of the Hoplite battle increased the need for tactical decision making as well as for uniformity of certain aspects of weaponry, particularly the Hoplite shields that were required to lock together. The existential realm deals with the reasons individual warriors fight, kill and risk their lives. While Machiavelli described the political reasons for warfare, Coker believes that the existential, the thing that a warrior gains from war beyond material reward, was best exemplified by the Ancient Greeks.

Coker (2004: 54-55) argues that Roman soldiers had risen above the Homeric tradition in that conflicting emotions, anger and pride had been removed from the warrior ethos, that Romans lacked the psychological dimension of their predecessors. He argued that Homeric warriors fought for themselves and not out of social responsibility or a sense of common good. However, pre-classical Greeks warriors, the Homeric heroes, fought the Trojan War from a sense of duty, obligated to them when they swore an alliance to defend the agreement governing the marriage of Helen. Although, some tried to avoid the obligation: Achilles attempted to hide from the war by pretending to be a village girl and Odysseus feigned madness in pre-echoes of responses to the Vietnam draft. Coker's idea that Homeric warriors live in the moment ignores the larger story surrounding the Iliad and that the poem is not an historical account. Retold over many generations before being committed to the written word it is essentially a series of metaphors designed to glorify the warrior ethos to Classical Greeks, rather than provide news reporting for the pre-classical society who actually fought on the plains of Troy.
In the traditional western war ethic, one nation forces its will on another. Ignatieff's post-modern warfare this is no longer possible and morality rather than will-to-power has become the major philosophical trend. It is true that in European wars, or in wars between Christian nations, opposing moralities are ostensibly similar, but these wars still require factions willing to die to impose minor difference. In theories of post-modern warfare soldiers are not willing to die to impose their will on another. However, Coker describes another new form of warfare, post-human. In this scenario, war is not only stripped of all existential value, it is also stripped of risk. In post-human warfare, the warriors death lacks of all sense of sacrifice and is ultimately meaningless. While this may appease civilian morality with its inability to accept risk or impose its will on others, it does nothing for those who kill and risk their lives for their society.

Where Ignatieff and Coker identified the decline of the western warrior ethos and went as far as to predict its terminal demise, Dr Jonathan Shay was working with Vietnam veterans and saw the metaphors of the *Iliad* in a different light. In two seminal works Shay examined the relationship between modern combat stress and epic poetry. The earlier work, *Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character* (1994) constructed a value system around what is and is not acceptable for warriors to do on the battlefield. The mixing of psychoanalytical terminology and Homeric story-telling with the experiences of combat in Vietnam provides a valuable insight into the metaphors used by Homer in the *Iliad*. The second book, *Odysseus in America: Combat Trauma and Trials of Homecoming*, (2002) looks at Vietnam veterans in the post-war period and their attempts to successfully re-integrate into civilian society. The Greek metaphor for this, *nostos*, or homecoming, is the basis of the *Odyssey* and Shay makes direct correlations between Odysseus' attempts to physically get home and the Vietnam veterans' attempts to psychologically return home, to re-establish normality.

Viewing the importance of the Homeric stories in allegorical terms, Shay constructs a military morality that is narrower and more clearly bounded than contemporary civilian society and one which is dependent upon the social space occupied by the warrior. In the context of psychoanalytical research, morality is nothing more than a shared system of values and in the context of warfare it is difficult for the lay-person to understand and come to terms with values that are shared by warriors and which may be antithetical to 'normal' social rules. For Shay, this impacts on the warrior ethos in that the breakdown of shared values between warriors, or between warriors and civil society, leads to increased incidence of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.

The greatest gulf between the value system of modern society, particularly when
dealing with post-modern or post-human warfare, and the warriors' morality is in the understanding of honour and dishonour. Outlined by Ignatieff in *The Warriors' Honor*, civilian society often fails to understand the importance to the warrior of both honouring his comrades and not dishonouring his enemy. While honouring comrades, particularly the dead, may seem obvious and a pre-requisite for a Clauswitzian martial culture, honouring the enemy is more problematic. For Homeric warriors victory on the battlefield was the primary basis for honour and glory and was directly proportional to the value of the enemy; a higher value enemy, one with greater *kudos*, generates more *kudos* for the one who defeats him. Therefore, dishonouring or devaluing the enemy, or holding him in contempt, reduces the honour that warrior could expect to receive from his comrades. Although this has ramifications for post-combat mental health, it is also highly important in representational paradigms. The honour and respect a warrior receives within his society for his victories is entirely dependent upon communication, and although in pre-Homeric society this would have been achieved using verbal 'war-stories', in an age of mass-communication text and imagery become the medium for acquisition of glory, honour and fame.

Analysing the belief systems of Homeric warriors, Shay identifies themes that are present in both ancient and modern warriors and argues that it is the destruction of faith in the warrior ethos that creates combat trauma. Warriors, or soldiers as we now prefer to call them, operate in a restricted social space that becomes even more restricted in times of war. The warriors idea of 'what is right' are summed up in the Greek idea of *thēmis*. Translated and codified simply as justice, and represented by the goddess Thēmis, the idea runs deep in the warrior psyche. Shay's Vietnam veterans describe a fiduciary relationship between themselves and their commanders, where those in charge are held responsible for those they command, that they will always work for benefit of others, rather than for their own. The failure of this relationship manifests itself as a sense of injustice in those being led. The importance of *thēmis*, however, has a wider meaning than the modern perception of post-event justice; for the warrior it encompasses every sense of what is right and wrong, it is in essence the sharing of risk and reward.

The basic need of the warrior in combat is physical and moral victory over the enemy and it is this that provides the meaning of death. However, this has a number of complications. In terms of psychological injury, the victory must fall within the realm of *thēmis*, that is, the warriors must believe that what they are doing is 'right'. The many cases of failures in Greek *thēmis*, or Ignatieff's warrior's honour, in Vietnam are extreme
(for example, the Mai Lai massacre) and as a result provide a considerable workload for psychotherapists working with veterans. But Vietnam is complicated by veterans' understanding that the war was lost. Events such as Mai Lai have always been part of war, but the right and wrong of such activity is ultimately judged in the light of victory. While not wishing to make light of Nazi atrocities during the Second World War, there is no doubt that crimes were also committed by soldiers fighting on the allied side. The judgement base for these activities is largely based on who won. In this sense, the death of allied soldiers is generally held in higher esteem than that of axis soldiers, while the Vietnamese deaths are often viewed being of equal, if not greater value than the American GIs.

Shay claims that the final judgement of themis, resides in a state of limbo until the war is either won or lost. He supports this argument with the evidence that cases of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder increased after the Vietnam War was lost, and not in proportion to the rate at which soldiers returned to normal life. Describing this post-combat phase as 'The Void', he argues that the meaning of death cannot be determined until the phase has passed and themis established.

Veterans habitually talk of the grief that follows combat. On the surface veterans believe they must keep faith with the fallen, that forgetting them dishonours and is morally degrading to the living (Shay 1994: 192). While it may seem natural for soldiers to grieve fallen comrades, there is also an undertone of personal melancholic grief for the loss of personal innocence. This is highly important for war narrative.

Veterans construct narrative around a set of personal and shared values that dictate the content and tone of individual 'war-stories'. Such stories are tailored to specific audiences, locations and time-frames, with the most intimate and graphic details withheld for those who understand the warrior ethos and for those who share the combat experience. In this way there is a distinction between open and personal narrative. Open narrative is often couched in terms that will be understood by the general population; it uses common language and when created by warriors themselves is devoid of criticism of the dead. Where warriors publicly question the value of another warrior, particularly in terms of honour, glory and over-inflated fame, they are themselves highly likely to be denigrated in return. Personal narrative is more likely to be filled with black humour and self-doubt, and in particular, regret and grief, which are missing from more open narratives.

Redefining the judgement base of Achilles and Odysseus into a world of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, Shay created a new analysis of the Homeric grand poetic
epic that allows modern warriors suffering similar problems to view their own experience as akin to that of the great warriors. The destruction of the warrior ideal is particularly damaging to mental health and modern soldier-narrative has definable emotional content that allows them to deal with regret and grief in much the same way as Homer's heroes. Ancient Greek warriors who had experienced such things as the Peloponnesian and Persian wars would have understood this aspect of Homer better than the writers from the Romantic period, who misunderstood the life-affirming nature of war and the need for the warrior to contextualize his action and emotions. The Romantics looked to downplay the horror, blood and guts of the *Iliad* in favour of the emotional and sensual aspects of the *Odyssey*.

The influence of the Romantic period continues to act upon modern writers, with Classics scholars still consumed by the relationship between gods and men. Michael Clarke (lecturer in Ancient Classics at the National University of Ireland) has written that: “It is Achilles' godlike and passionate nature that drives him to such extreme anger at Agamemnon's insult” (Fowler et al 2004: 82). While this much used argument may seem reasonable it does not fit with Shay's psychoanalytical account of Achilles character. The idea that the anger of Achilles is destructive of character is mistaken in that it is combat that damages character, creating anger. In essence, the modern version of the 19th century ideal continues to ignore the existence of combat trauma.

The relationship between Homeric warriors and their gods provides a running theme throughout the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. Although the idea that the lives of men are governed by the gods' preordination is rare and usually only applicable to greater elements of specific characters lives. For example, agreement between the gods meant that Achilles could have had a long and meaningless life at home, or a glorious but short life, leading to death on the battlefield and eternal remembrance (*kleos aphthitori*). It is pertinent to the idea of the warrior's honour that Achilles returned to the battle and to certain death after the fall of Patroclus. The constant intervention of the gods, who can be argued with, cajoled and bargained with means that preordination can be set and re-set on a very short time scale.

The predetermination of human acts by the gods does however provide a release mechanism for combat stress. The multitheistic tradition with gods allied to cities and individual warriors is a precursor of the modern blame culture. Greek gods are by turn heartless, inconsistent, unreliable, inattentive, distractible and vengeful and warrior's frequently lament lives lived at their whim. Defeat and victory on the plains of Troy is by the will of the gods and it is important to Greek warriors to have powerful Olympian
gods on their side. However, given that Greek gods change sides, bargain away allegiances and surrender the victory of favoured warriors at every turn, they can never be relied upon.

In the modern context, generals, unlike warrior kings, fight their battles from the rear. They undertake their work surrounded by a host of staff officers and support troops. In Vietnam, where the ratio of non-combatants to fighting troops was greater than ever before, the term REMF (Rear Echelon Mother Fucker) was coined. In a Christian society, where God cannot be believed to abandon or punish the righteous, the REMFs have taken the place the Greek gods. In the ancient world, gods were blamed for defeat as much as they were praised for victory and blame was apportioned not just on the gods’ antagonism towards armies and individuals, but on their personal failings as well. Unlike Abrahamic gods, Greek gods are endowed with human frailties; their lust, anger, boredom and indifference are the cause of death of many Homeric warriors.

The fragile relationship between Homers gods and his warriors seems to put the warriors at immense risk that even the greatest of heroes cannot negate. But Homer also tells us that the Trojan War was won through the skill of Achilles and the guile of Odysseus. This paradox leaves us wondering why any man would want to go to war:

The Homeric warrior is driven to action by a need for social validation: status, respect, honour in the eyes of other men. At first sight this suggests a sense of human identity which is social rather than existential; but it turns out that mortality is the cornerstone of this ethic, because the most urgent need of all is to perpetuate one's status in the form of continuing fame after death.

(Clarke. In Fowler et al 2004: 77)

Homer uses the Greek principles of kudos, timé and kleos throughout the Iliad and nostos is the major theme of the Odyssey. It is the balance of these linguistic themes of glory that give the reason for fighting, killing and risking death. Material reward in the form of war prize was important to Greek warriors and the anger and resentment over the spoils provides the starting point for the Iliad as Achilles and Agamemnon argue over women taken as booty. However, this is not an argument over ownership of material wealth, it is about the partition of kudos and the acquisition of timé. It is an argument that discloses the humanity at the heart of warfare as experienced by the ancient Greeks through glory, respect and honour.
A Greek warrior's self-worth and his value to society was formed in victory on the battlefield and each victory, small or large, brought a reciprocal amount of *kudos*. Killing a minor enemy would provide a little *kudos*; while killing a high status warrior, such as Achilles or Hektor, would bring vast amounts. Often translated simply as glory, but more literally, glorious victory, *Kudos* was something that was a far more subtle idea than a single English word could convey. Vengeful Greek gods, the arbiters of victory and defeat, often changed sides during a war and sometimes during a battle, such that an individual warriors' *kudos* would ebb and flow over time. The pursuit of *kudos* through war is the mark of an intensely competitive society with each warrior striving for both military and social success, their *kudos* rising and falling with the ebb and flow of victories.

Although this would seem a straightforward exercise in military superiority the Greeks believed that *kudos* was granted by the gods, who had their favourites; leading to the conclusion that it is not just conduct in battle that creates victory, but it is the principle and action of a warrior's life that is rewarded with victory and glory. With sufficient *kudos* a warrior would acquire *timē*.

*Timē* was deep-seated in Ancient Greek society. In essence, it was fame, an oral rendering of *kudos*: The more *kudos* a warrior had, the more he would be talked about and the more *timē* he would have. *Timē* was a reflection of the position a Greek warrior held within military and civilian society. It encompassed the respect he received from others and the respect he showed for the social position of others (van Wees 2004: 22). We can therefore see that *kudos* (victory in battle) generates *timē* (fame) and both fall within the greater concept of honour and glory; for ancient Greeks victory and fame were glorious things that gave them immortality.

The final and most important aspect of Ancient Greek glory is *kleos*. If *timē* was a measure of how much a warrior was talked about by his contemporaries, *kleos* was a measure of how much he was talked about in posterity. Again this is not a simple matter. First reading would suggest that *kleos* is a positive thing within the epic tradition, that is, the poets tell stories of the great heroes, those who amassed huge amounts of *kudos* and *timē*. But this is obviously not the case. Agamemnon is not remembered in history as a great possessor of *kudos*, but he is spoken about by his contemporaries and by Homer and other poets in great detail. We can assume he has little if any *kudos* when we hear him berated by Achilles at the beginning of the story for his lack of heroism:

"You wine sack, with a dog's eyes, with a deer's heart. Never"
once have you taken courage in your heart to arm with your people
for battle, or gone into ambuscade with the best of the Achaians.
No, for in such things you see death. Far better in your mind
is it, all along the widespread host of Achaians
to take away the gifts of any man who speaks up against you
(Iliad. 1.225-230)

The conclusion here is that since Homer makes Agamemnon a key player in the Iliad
and Odysseus visits him in Hades in the Odyssey his remembrance is guaranteed, but his
kleos is negative. He is remembered with infamy for his deeds on the fields of Troy and
with shame for the manner of his death, murdered by a woman; his treacherous wife,
Clytemnestra and her lover. Kleos is remembrance in poetry and history, in life and after
death; it is to some degree familial and inheritable, but not always positive.

An important aspect of kleos is that it could be shared by a warrior with wider society.
This could have been a military unit, such as the Myrmidons, a city state or a family,
and measured in respect and honour, kleos was under constant threat. The seduction of
Helen by the Trojans was in some texts a response to the Greek seduction of Medea.
Both events showed a lack of respect and were an insult to honour. Medea helped
Jason steal the Golden Fleece from her father, King Aeëtes of Colchis, and murdered
her brother to divert Aeëtes attention so that she and Jason could escape. The story
ends with Jason's final betrayal of Medea in his pursuit of power and wealth in Corinth.
Medea murders Jason's lover and sons and escapes riding a chariot drawn by dragons,
which were provided by her grandfather, the sun god Helios. Paris seduced Helen in the
belief he was redressing the balance of kudos and timê for Medea and Jason's betrayal of
Colchis, starting the ten year siege of Troy. The murder of brothers and sons in both
these stories is an attack on inheritable kleos, but without a son a fathers glory would die
with him. Murder of an heir was one of the worst crimes that could be committed
against a warrior.

Ancient Greek warfare was as demanding, physically and emotionally, as warfare in
any other period. Homer describes men crying, paralysed with fear in the face of the
enemy. Any culture that requires men to continue to fight when death is close and
terrifying must provide a reason for the continued struggle. This reason was Kleos;
everlasting fame and glory, which provided the basis of Greek metaphysical beliefs.
Victory on the battlefield would bring glory, glory would result in fame, and fame would
generate a name that would last for generations, and in the Greek mind a name that
remained alive after death meant immortality. Greek warriors did not therefore fight with just personal *kudos* at the forefront of their minds, they also fought for the greater glory of their comrades, their family, and their society.

Using a different taxonomy, these principles have abided across generations, cultures and battlefields, not just in the west, but across the world, in theistic cultures, in humanism and atheism, from the Samurai of Japan to the knights of the European Middle Ages. From the western perspective the genesis of these principles seems to be in the Homeric tradition, but this is to discount the lack of cultural and social connections between many of the groups and societies in which they are endemic. It is not just the difficulty of discovering the method of transmission between cultures that questions the origins of the beliefs. The Scandinavian warriors of the Dark Ages would have been as equally unaware of the siege of Troy as the Samurai warriors of Japan, even though there are proven migratory links between the Mediterranean and northern Europe.

Looking for a methodology in which to analyse the origins of the culture surrounding the warrior leads us to the new theory, or theories, of memetics. First established by evolutionary biologist, Richard Dawkins in *The Selfish Gene* (1989), the existence of memes and their nature and impact on mankind has proved a controversial subject. Although this debate still rages and there is a great deal of argument about whether memetics is a science or not, I intend to largely ignore this and concentrate on memetics as a philosophical and metaphorical tool to analyse the persistence of the Homeric tradition of representation within western warfare.

The theory of memetics suggest that there is a unit of culture that can be replicated and passed from person to person in what has become known as a “mind virus” (Blackmore in Aunger et al 2000:30). For this hypothesis to work each virus must have a method of replication and transmission, which, as Dawkins points out, makes them directly analogous to genes. The scientific claim is that the human brain developed through genetic and memetic co-evolution, or 'Universal Darwinism'. The Darwinian approach to culture has proved a powerful concept and it is this that will be useful in looking at representational ideas of the military that have lasted for more than 3000 years.

For Blackmore's scientific approach to work there must be a system of cultural transmission that allows an individual or society using a valuable meme to transmit it to one that is in need (Blackmore 1999: *The Meme Machine*). The transmission of the memes *kudos, timê, kleos* and *nostos* across Europe would seem straightforward and would
not require the Scandinavian warriors to have direct knowledge of the ancient Greeks, but the transmission to the far east, to the Samurai and warrior monks of China, seems more improbable.

It seems more probable that these ideas developed as protocultures, ideas discovered on a once only basis by individual early warriors and not replicated or transmitted to others. The analogy here is that the human race developed from a single genetic strain, whereas the wheel must have had many points of invention until its use was endemic across the world; the wheel began as a protocultural tool and became fundamental to humanity with many phenotypical uses. The transfer of *kudos, kleos, timē* and *nostos* into mainstream Greek culture would have occurred before Homer began reciting the *Iliad* and continued in the centuries of recitation before being committed to the written form, otherwise they would have had little currency within his epic poetry, which would not have become the ancient Greek cultural icon it evidently was.

The advance from protoculture to full culture requires that the individual involved developed beyond the confines of invention, regeneration and self-discovery. It is believed that replication is demonstrated by some higher order primates, but is only fully functional in humans. For a cultural idea, or meme, to pass from one individual to another, individuals must be capable of learning from one another. The most simple form of memetic transmission is observational learning, which easily accounts for the manufacture of tools, farming practice, combat skill, and any other memes that have a direct and tangible benefit to society. The Greek ideas of *kudos, timē* and *kleos*, aligned to *nostos*, operates as a belief system within ancient Greek society and, as with all religious or metaphysical beliefs, a complex system of transmission and replication is required for the ideas to survive and flourish. These terms are so closely intertwined that they can be gathered together as a single concept.

Belief in the Abrahamic God provides its adherents with many benefits, not least comfort, companionship, mutual understanding and stability. In short, it is possible to see religious belief as a mental survival mechanism, an idea reinforced by the fact that organised religion flourishes under the most traumatic of situations. Other religions offer many of the same benefits, therefore looking at them as a group means we can view each religion as a phenotype of the religious meme. This idea allows us to view variations in military codes as phenotypical if we can provide the meme linking them as larger group.

Looking at the construction of the warrior in western representations, Michael Ignatieff and Christopher Coker argued that the West has lost its warrior tradition and
replaced it with that of the professional soldier. Their argument concluded that in future we will fight enemies out of the past, enemies we will be uniquely unqualified to face, and that future wars will between 'our' soldiers and 'their' warriors. Both men were writing at the turn of the millennium and before the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Following years of peace-keeping operations throughout the 1990s and the asymmetric Gulf War of 1992, these arguments seemed quite plausible. But following the close quarter infantry battles that have raged across Iraq and southern Afghanistan they now seem a little less convincing. I believe it is the re-emergence of the Greek Meme that has collapsed their arguments. If this is the case, these memes will endure, even with several generational gaps in their manifestation. It is through the understanding of the foundation and use of the western representational paradigm that we can begin to look at the way the Falklands Conflict was communicated to the British public.

To suggest that there are representations of war that are cultural is, in essence, misleading in that we must accept that all representations of war, and of the soldiers who fight them, are cultural. In western society the cultural paradigms stretch back to pre-Hoplite warfare in early Greece and it is possible to draw a straight line from Homer to modern warfare and current models of representation. Exploring relevant historical representations and their parallels in modern warfare allows us to begin to look at the cultural value of photographic representations of soldiers, a nomenclature itself (following the work of Ignatieff and Coker) now loaded with cultural connotations.

In the west we now refer to our fighting men as soldiers and often refer to our enemies as warriors, inferring a fighting spirit and ethos different from that of the professional, technology dependent, soldier. Referring to men as warriors now implies an otherness that belongs to men of the Zulu nation, native Americans, Japanese Samurai and Taliban fighters, an otherness that implies ancient ways of fighting and a lack of modernity. However, this is to discount the fact that many fighting men from other cultures still see themselves, and are proud to operate, as warriors; the West Side Boys in Sierra Leone, the rebels in Chechnya and numerous Islamic groups fighting against western 'imperialism' (Coker 2002:95). Using Nietzsche's *Genealogy of Morals* it is possible to construct an argument that sees a professional soldier carrying a higher moral value than a warrior, simply because 'soldiers' come from societies that are wealthier than those that still have 'warriors'. Nietzsche (2003) argued that morals are dictated by the aristocracy and that the aristocracy enjoy their position in society because their ancestors won wars. Extending this to modern international relations, the winners of the Second World War, who carry sway over the United Nations Security Council and
who have apparently moved to the moral paradigm of the professional soldier, command the high ground on international morality.

Using the ideas of warriors and soldiers to look at the way the British military chooses to represent itself provides an analysis at the point of interaction between military and civil culture and gives an interpretation of the way soldiers see themselves. The Ministry of Defence uses both military and civilian photographers to record operations and to inform the public about these activities and events. Whether they are soldiers with cameras or photographers trained outside the military environment they cross the line between military and civil cultures, and although they do so from differing perspectives, this duality has at various times and to varying degrees affected the images they produce.

We must also accept that images produced by the military of themselves are presented to the public in many forms and the press officers and newspaper editors who are circulating and publishing these images are adding another layer of interpretation. Within this complex arrangement, representations of British military operations are firmly rooted in British cultural identity, an identity that is sometimes overt and obvious, sometimes covert and subtle, but always vital to the analysis and interpretation of what we are being shown.

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Famously, only 202 photographs were transmitted back from the Task Force during the crisis. This number first appeared at the House of Commons Defence Committee inquiry into the handling of press and public information during the conflict (HCDC Session 1982-83 HC 17-1) and has been repeated as a damning indictment in many subsequent publications. The transmission process included making prints on board ship, hand writing captions on the prints and then 'wiring' them back to the Ministry of Defence headquarters in London. Very few of the original prints from the fleet have survived and the original wire machine printouts from the MoD have been destroyed. However, the Imperial War Museum has, unbeknown to themselves, been holding a set of copy negatives from the wires. These have been stored for over 20 years in the IWM's cold store at their Duxford archive and had not been previously examined since being deposited sometime in the 1980s.

Following the conflict many images were released to the media that had not previously been available. This was in part due to the lack of variety and depth in the
wired images and partly because of the explosion of interest that followed the victory. One particular photographer did exceptionally well in the post-conflict euphoria. Paul Haley of *Soldier Magazine* had a large quantity of his photographs published in newspapers, magazines and books. Sent to the Falklands purely to produce pictures for the British Army's in-house publication, Haley's is a unique record of the war, one that was intended for internal propaganda. There were a number of other military photographers with the Task Force, but their work has failed to provide them with the personal prominence that Haley has derived from his. *Soldier Magazine* made a particular effort to get his pictures out to a wider audience, and although this was done with the intention of raising money to support the magazine the knock-on benefits for Haley are clear.

Haley's work is also more accessible as a public record as all his negatives and a large quantity of colour slides are still in storage at the magazine's archive. Other photographers, particularly those working with the Royal Navy, have had their images spread across a number of archives, or moved between them, and it is now impossible to identify all the images shot by any individual photographer. Again, this has increased the value of Haley's work in that his is the only complete record still in one place.

Falklands Conflict photographs came together in a number of publications that began to appear immediately after the war. This is an interesting period given that much of the nationalism and jingoism of the conflict period had subsided and a more circumspect view was possible. However, balanced views of a conflict that was represented in such a subjective manner are still difficult to obtain. The cultural paradigms that affected its representation while it was still news did not disappear over night and in some cases continued for many years, helping to build myths and ideologies that surround the conflict and the men who fought it.

Looking back at war from a military viewpoint, with a desire to remember the conflict, the glory and those who gave their lives, has produced a genre of painting that manifests the Greek Meme in an unparalleled fashion: Mess Art. Art, from the very earliest times has produced works that portray the events of conflict and war, but the images that decorate modern military buildings are a relatively recent addition to this repertoire. With foundations in the Victorian tradition, modern military painters are commissioned by the armed forces to produce idealised versions of historical events. Artists pay a great deal of attention to detail in uniforms and equipment and often visit battlefields to get aspects of geography correct. But this does not negate the need to idealise and glorify the events they paint. There is every reason to believe that Mess Art
would fit within the Greek representational paradigm of *kudos, kleos, timé* and *nostos*.

That these ideas are as important to the military mind today as they ever have been is not in question. Today we no longer use Greek terminology and military academics prefer the idea of the Warrior's Honour. However, as useful as this new term is, I believe that it is a simplification of a much grander ideal. Throughout 2008, the Chief of the General Staff, Sir Richard Dannatt, demanded that society welcome home its fighting men with pride, that there should be parades through market towns and cities alike. A great many people responded to this demand and lined the streets with Union Jacks and banners made from old bed sheets, the Royal British Legion turned out in force and school children took time from their studies. The call by Dannatt for an outward show of gratitude appears to be bringing out the martial spirit in the British people, but only time will tell if the returning soldiers really have received a Greek welcome.

*Nostos*, or homecoming, is the final part of the representational paradigm of ancient warfare that we will look at. *Timé* and *kudos* on a battlefield far from home are all well and good, but they need to be transported home and kept safe, such that the next generation may inherit the *kleos*. Greek warriors needed recognition at home to validate their successes, but the term *nostos* covers more than just the event of coming home. Homecomings themselves, like the journey of Odysseus and Agamemnon's return to Mycenae, were fraught with danger and tragedy. There was a belief implicit in *nostos* that a warrior can never return to the place he left, that things will always have changed, meaning the fight for *timé* and *kleos* are an ongoing, almost permanent state of affairs and generate the tragedy that is endemic in Greek literature.
Chapter One: War and the Western Tradition.

In both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, Homer echoed the culture of heroism and tragedy that permeated Greek society for well over 500 years. They believed that war did not belong in the realm of the arts or sciences, but formed part of man's social existence, that through war men acquired self-esteem and found their place in society (van Wees 2004 p38). For Homer, war was humanistic, in that it had both instrumental and existential dimensions, a subjective interaction with the experience of combat and an inter-subjective relationship with the enemy. Homeric warriors sought honour, dignity and virtue in the face of the enemy; war was life affirming. However, in Homeric warfare, the individual was inseparable from his actions and although individuals sought honour and glory in battle, morality, as we would understand it, was not a key aspect.

Warfare in the *Iliad* was a brutal, bloody affair. The Greeks and the Trojans would meet face-to-face on the battlefield and cut each other to pieces with bronze swords and spears until one or other managed to make a ‘tactical withdrawal’ from the scene. Decisive victories were rare and often the source of legend and myth. The field would be covered with tattered corpses and the victors would be wading in the blood of their enemies and comrades alike. For Homer’s heroes, who fought the great pre-Hoplite battles of the Trojan War, the gods were responsible for man’s victories and defeats, but unlike later Christian and Islamic cultures, there was no promise of a glorious afterlife within this tradition. Greek immortality lies within remembrance, and when war brought both glory and fame, these in turn brought the immortality of remembrance.

Homer’s pre-Hoplite, pre-Classical warriors talk constantly of the beauty and craftsmanship of their weapons, but this is not instrumentality and reliance on military technology in any way similar to modern warfare. Greek weapons were a reflection of the warrior who carried them; they were a mark of the superiority of the warrior’s skill and his place in society, not his technological advantage or moral superiority. High value weapons were a mark of a warrior’s *timé*, the fame that he could expect to achieve, with comrades in particular and society in general. Regardless of the weapons carried, for the Greeks, war was an intensely subjective human activity, reliant on honour, courage and dignity. This has much in common with the Samurai warrior code of Bushido and their reverential relationship to their swords, weapons believed to have a spirit of their own, akin to a Christian soul.

It was not until 5 century BC that morality and classical humanism were placed in the
context of warfare. It was a feature of pre-Hoplite war to treat non-Greeks as barbarians, not worthy of the protection offered by the warrior's code of honour, which was applied selectively, depending upon who they where fighting, the code of conduct only being applied to fellow Greeks. When Achilles drags Hektor's body around Troy behind his horses there is little time shown for the dead warrior. In the Classic, Hoplite period, Plato questions the morality of Homer, particularly the blaming of gods for the predicaments of men. In *The Republic* he places the blame squarely on the shoulders of men and goes on to raise doubts about the heroic deeds of Homer's warriors.

"...don't you think there is something low and mean about plundering a corpse and a kind of feminine small-mindedness in treating the dead body as an enemy when the fighting spirit which fought in it has left and flown away? It's like the dogs habit of snarling at the stones thrown at it, but keeping away from the person who's throwing them."

(Plato 1987 p197)

Plato attacks Homeric warfare, but strengthens the moral aspects of the warrior's code by arguing that Greeks should treat barbarian enemies as Greeks, that they should not devastate the enemies lands or burn their dwellings, but limit their actions to the guilty few responsible for the quarrel, and not the innocent majority. However, it must be said that the Homeric model had greater strength in Greek society than Plato's, which would take articles of war and military regulation to enforce, laws designed to protect post-war profitability as much as battlefield morality from the cruel excesses of a victorious army. The first written account of this regulation was *The Rights of War and Peace* by Grotius at the end of the Thirty Years War in the 16th Century.

In the Homeric and Platonic models, war provides a metaphysical experience and although the two authors disagree on some details they generally speak together on the meaning of war in the life of the state and the individual. War was a male experience that is devalued by the presence of women. Men dominated Greek society and women were seen as inferior, with base attitudes that prevented them taking part in heroic endeavours. For Homer and Plato only men could fight wars with calm logic, in search of heroic fame and immortality.

For the Greeks it was important to separate the guilty from the innocent, the combatant from the non-combatant, right from wrong, the honourable from the dishonourable, something that remains a tenet of modern warfare: "The decisive restraint
on inhuman practice on the battlefield lies within the warrior himself, in his conception of what is honorable and dishonorable for a man to do with weapons.” (Ignatieff 1999:118). However, this idea clearly puts the warriors' honour in the hands of the individual, individuals fashioned by the society from which they originate.

For a man to become a successful warrior, both Homer and Plato believed that he must have his roots in a martial culture. Homer described soldiers drawn from society, who return to their wives and their farms after the war. Many Greek societies, Sparta in particular, were steeped in the military spirit and warriors would acquire the respect of their societies in battle. Honour and courage were at the centre of a warrior code that demanded strength, stamina, and enthusiasm.

In 1796, the French painter Jacques-Louis David started work on an enormous, 13 x 18 feet, painting titled *The Intervention of the Sabine Women* (figure 1). For David this was a return to the genre of history painting after a turbulent period of portraiture and painting of contemporary events during the French revolution. Initially he had chosen a subject based around Homer's *Iliad*, but soon abandoned this idea in favour of the Roman story of the Sabine women. During the foundation of Rome, the Romans sacked their neighbours land and abducted the women to ensure their own stability and population growth. It took the Sabine men three years to mount a counter attack to retrieve the women. David's painting depicts the subsequent battle. However, he decided to paint this Roman subject in a ritualised Greek representation of warfare.

The men are painted naked in what was thought to be the Greek tradition, even though Greek warriors would never have actually fought a battle in such an perilous state of undress. Homer goes into great detail about the greaves, cuirasses and helmets that his warriors wear into battle. The posture of the men in David's painting was taken from an earlier English illustration by John Flaxman, *The fight for the body of Patroklos*, and the smooth form of the male bodies was taken from Greek sculpture and life study.

The description by David that accompanied the work gave the viewer a good idea of what happened during the battle.

Battle was joined: both sides attacked. The two chiefs (Romulus and Tatus) met in the centre of the mêlée and made ready for single combat according to the custom of those heroic days. But what may not conjugal and material love together accomplish? The Sabine women, who had been kidnapped by the Romans suddenly rushed upon the scene of battle; their hair streaming in the wind, carrying their naked children at their breasts, they passed the piles of the
dead and the horses frenzied in their combat. They called loudly to their fathers, their brothers, their husbands, addressing themselves now to the Romans, now to the Sabines, calling them by the sweetest names known to man. The combatants, softened by pity, gave place to them. One of them, Hersilia, wife of Romulus, to whom she had borne two children, came forward between the two chiefs. ‘Sabines, what are you doing below the walls of Rome?’ she cried. ‘There are no longer daughters whom you would restore to their parents, nor ravishers whom you would punish. We should have been dragged from their arms while we were still strangers, but now we are bound to them by the most sacred ties; you would tear wives from husbands, mothers from their children’…. Some women who accompanied her laid their children at the feet of the soldiers, who let their bloody swords fall from their hands. Others lifted up their nurselings in their arms and held them like shields against a forest of lances which dropped when confronted by them. Romulus holds back the javelin which he is about to hurl at Tatius. The general of the cavalry puts his sword back into its sheath. The feelings of conjugal, fatherly and brotherly love spread through the ranks of both armies. Soon the Romans and Sabines embrace to form a single people.

This description made no mention of the allegories present in the painting. It was put on show in Paris in 1799 at a time when the French were beginning to settle their differences and return to normality after the revolution and the painting was a metaphor for this process. It appeared to make reference to the peacemaking powers of women, their ability to mediate between warring parties and reconcile differences. However, contemporary male viewers did not see women in this mediatory role, but saw them acting emotionally out of divided loyalties, taking the only action possible when their fathers and brothers were fighting their husbands.

The action takes place in front of the Tarpeian Rock, the south-west corner of Rome's Capitoline Hill, which had been occupied by the Sabine men before the battle. The occupation had only been possible with help of Tarpeia, the wife of the Roman garrison commander. She had opened the way for the Sabines and betrayed the citadel in return for the ‘what the Sabines wore on their right arms’, by inference, precious gold armbands. However, after the occupation, the Sabines made payment with the shields that they also wore on their right arms, and crushed her to death. This idea of female treachery and unsuitability to warfare is common in the traditional western warrior code.
and the representations of it.

Modern critics have described the women in the scene as acting on anything but feminist ideals. However welcome their intervention may seem to 21st Century eyes, the women can be seen as slaves to their emotions; spontaneous and disorderly, where the men are seen as proud and heroic, and logically risking their lives for women and children, for possessions, for virtue and honour; for kudos, timē and kleos, for the Greek Meme. The women hold their children high in the air and weep at the feet of their men; other children play in the middle of battle, preventing the men from engaging in combat. That peace and reconciliation must follow female intervention was a powerful message in the years between revolutionary and Napoleonic France.

David had chosen to paint the *Intervention of the Sabine Women* in a ‘Greek’ style because this, he claimed, was the purest form of art, without taint from other representational imagery. This gave it a moral superiority over Roman, and subsequent forms, but in a modern context the morality is questionable. The Greek tradition, of which Homer was a founding father, was a tradition of masculine superiority, a world where vengeful and spiteful gods were the determinant of history working through, for the benefit of, and often to the disadvantage of men. This was a world of favoured men and societies.

Women were not held within the heroic or warrior codes and were seen as antithetical and antagonistic towards it. Whether it was Calypso’s imprisonment of Odysseus, sirens tempting men to shipwreck, Circe turning men to swine, Agamemnon’s murder at the hands of his adulterous wife, Achilles’ heel, or Helen’s shameful involvement in the whole Trojan legacy: After Menelaos and Paris fight a dual for her possession and to end the war, Paris is rescued and dishonoured by Athene and Helen takes to Paris’ bed, even though she had wanted to return to Menelaos before the battle. If David was painting in the ‘Greek’ style, he must have been aware of the duplicitous reputation of women in Greek society, bringing into question the role of women in the painting and reinforcing the warriors’ position in a martial society.

The year after the completion of the *Intervention of the Sabines*, David moved to a contemporary hero and under commission from Charles IV of Spain, painted *Napoleon Crossing the St Bernard Pass* (1800) astride a fiery horse (figure 2). There are two notable aspects to this image. Firstly, Napoleon refused to sit for the painter, stating that Alexander never posed for the Greek artist Apelles and said “No one knows if portraits of great men are likenesses: it suffices that genius lives.” (Lee 1999 p231). David went on to add the names of the great men who had led armies across the Alps, Hannibal,
Charlemagne, and Bonaparte, at the foot of the painting. This was part of the constructed 'heroism' that David assigned to Napoleon. Secondly, the image is a complete falsification of the real events. Napoleon did not lead his troops across the Alps, he actually crossed a few days after the advance party, and did so riding a mule. This less than heroic scene was later painted by Paul Delaroche in 1848 (figure 3).

Although David's painting of Napoleon lacks some of the immediacy and action of the 'Intervention', it nonetheless has an exceptional power. This power is in part due to the recognisable heroic model, based on long standing ideas of the warrior, martial honour and the western way of warfare that extends from the Greeks. David's painting was a manifestation of Napoleon's time, while Delaroche attempted to destroy both glory and respect for the Napoleonic myth, his painting was direct attack on Napoleon's kleos and is analogous to Achilles verbal attack on Agamemnon.

The epic poem Beowulf, written in Britain sometime between 750 and 1000AD in Old English, told the story of a Scandinavian prince. It deals with the life of the Geat's warrior king and his destruction of Grendel, the monster that plagued the lives of the Danes. The poem is the earliest written example of the beginnings of the northern European warrior code and bears comparison with Homer. Like the Iliad, there are spiritual tones to this epic, for example the heroes are constantly aware of their own mortality; before the fight with the dragon, Beowulf goes so far as to predict his own death. This is done with Christian overtones, although they are Old rather than New Testament; it is a tale of vengeance and human tragedy rather than forgiveness and redemption. This is a manifestation of omnipotence in the same manner as Achilles and Oedipus having their own tragedies predetermined by the Gods. Throughout the poem, the author reinforces the existential and spiritual nature of the warrior, whether it is Beowulf's sixth-sense about his own demise, the weeping of women for fallen warriors, God's abandonment of the Danes, or Grendel's magical dulling of the Geat warriors' weapons. After death the souls of the warriors go to the ‘destined place amongst the steadfast ones.’ The Geats had a phenotypical Christian afterlife, but it was in large measure fame that they sought, remembrance after death of glorious deeds, providing the warrior with kleos.

Whilst the poem is concerned with heroism in battle, it does not neglect the spiritual nature of life between wars:
Thus Beowulf bore himself with valour; he was formidable in battle yet behaved with honour and took no advantage; never cut down a comrade who was drunk, kept his temper and, warrior that he was, watched and controlled his God-sent strength and his outstanding natural powers.

(Heaney 1999: 69, lines 2176-82)

After the defeat of Grendel, Beowulf rules his people in peace and prosperity for fifty years, confirming the warrior code and the value of the warrior to society. This is a fine example of nostos with Beowulf being granted *kleos* and *timē* on his homecoming, something that Odysseus strove for throughout the *Odyssey*. It is only when a dragon emerges to threaten the Geats themselves that the old warrior-king comes forward to meet the threat and slay the beast. This is the culmination of the poem and of Beowulf’s life, he follows the ‘steadfast ones’ in a manner befitting a true Homeric hero.

In 1595, William Shakespeare wrote *Henry V*, which explored the mythology of war in a similar way to Homer, that is, a warrior king leading a brave and glorious people to victory in a just and noble cause. Although there are factual inaccuracies within the play the warrior virtues that it expounds have helped sustain the British people in crises from Tudor to post-modern times.

The warrior ethos and code appears throughout the play, but is most explicit in the run up to, and in the period following, the invasion of France. Exeter’s request to the French king to give up his throne is followed by threats of force and invocations of God; Henry will come in ‘fierce tempest’, ‘in thunder and in earthquake, like a Jove’ he will force the crown to be handed over. But, in the tradition of a warrior king, Henry, through Exeter, pleads with the French to take mercy on the ‘poor souls’ for which the impending war will ‘open his vasty jaws’ and to surrender.

Henry’s concern for the men’s blood, for fathers, brothers, betrothed lovers, widows and orphans is met with a faux-warrior response from the Dauphin who ‘desire[s] nothing but odds with England’ insulting Henry’s ‘youth and vanity’. In the end it is the Dauphin’s inexperience and vanity that are cruelly brought to light.

In the first battle scene, at Harfleur, Henry again demonstrates the warrior ethic; being fierce in battle and magnanimous in victory. In the middle of the battle Henry
rallies his troops with the famous "Once more unto the breach" speech. He calls on them to re-enter the breach in the town walls or repair the damage with the bodies of their fallen comrades. In the Homeric warrior tradition, the king is asking his troops to fight for the dead, an immediate awareness of immortality in martial honour, or turn and go home, dishonouring themselves and their fallen comrades. He then calls on them to hide their peacetime persona and present the enemy with the rage of war. He draws comparisons to their warrior fathers, who he in turn compares to Alexander the Great and calls on them to honour their mothers, prove they are their fathers' sons and surpass them in battle. The Harfleur speech deals with victory (kudos), fame and honour (time) and glory that lives beyond the the grave (kleos) in much the same way as Homer. In the final passage of the speech he realises that his words have given the soldiers renewed vigour and gives them a battle cry that in an earlier age could easily have been Cry Zeus for Hector, Troy and Ares.

Outside Harfleur, Captain MacMorris, an Irishman, returns from the breach and enters into conversation with the Welshman, Fluellen, who accuses him of having no more understanding of the true nature of war, of the "Roman disciplines", than a puppy. The conversation then swings around Roman virtues in war and harsh, even racist, words are exchanged about the Irish national character before the French sound a parley.

Henry steps forward and lays down an ultimatum to the French. Either they yield the city or bloody vengeance will be brought down on the inhabitants. Henry directly threatens to burn the city to the ground, killing old men, defiling women and spitting babies on spikes. Whilst making this threat he makes it clear that if the French continue to fight, after the battle he will have no control over his soldiers, who will rampage through the burning city. He calls on the men of Harfleur to yield and save the townspeople from such horrors. Again, this falls within the stricture of the Greek warrior code, although Henry is operating Platonic code, while his soldier appear to be more Homeric; in return for surrender Henry guarantees mercy. After the surrender Henry realises that although the battle has been won the war is proving far more difficult. Before the retreat to Calais, Exeter is left to fortify the town, but told to have mercy on the people.

The warrior code that is operating within the English ranks is further highlighted when Bardolph commits an act of theft from a French church. Fluellen explains to Henry what has happened and when it becomes clear that Bardolph is to be hanged the King does nothing to save his friend. Henry then explains that all such transgressions
will be punished is the same manner.

We would have all such offenders so cut off: and we give express charge, that in our marches through the country there be nothing compelled from the villages, nothing taken but paid for, none of the French upbraided or abused in disdainful language; for when lenity and cruelty play for a kingdom, the gentler gamester is soonest the winner.

(Act III.6.103-110)

After the hanging of Bardolph the English are cornered by the French whose envoy, Montjoy, asks for their surrender. In a Homeric spirit King Henry refuses. As the final battle nears Henry makes a rousing pre-battle speech, calling the men to arms extolling the warrior code. He speaks of honour in battle and in death, of individual worth and the ephemeral nature of possessions. Henry brings the English soldiers together as a “band of brothers”, speaks of all his men, regardless of status, as his own brothers, and, of those who are not there;

We few, we happy few, we band of brothers:
For he today who sheds his blood with me
Shall be my brother, be he ne'er so vile,
This day shall gentle his condition;
And gentlemen in England now abed
Shall think themselves accursed they were not here,
And hold their manhoods cheap, while any speaks
That fought with us upon saint Crispin's day.

(Act IV.3.60-67)

The Shakespearean myth of Henry V has become ingrained in British society and has reoccurred in at least two significant points in recent history, Laurence Olivier’s film version in 1944 and Kenneth Brannagh’s 1989 reworking. There are distinct differences between these two films that are products of the period in which they were made, Olivier’s during the Second World War, while Brannagh’s went into production after the Falklands Crisis and at the apparent height of Margaret Thatcher’s premiership.

At the beginning of the Second World War the government quickly reformed the Ministry of Information (MoI), which defined the criteria for British propaganda aimed at the UK and abroad, particularly in the USA. In 1939, the International Propaganda
and Broadcasting Enquiry sponsored by the Royal Institute for International Affairs set out the basic parameters for the MoI: "Trappings and pageantry inherited from the past form valuable propaganda for stability" .... "A particularly effective means of propaganda is the idealisation of national heroes" (Chapman 2005).

The Olivier production was first conceived at the beginning of the war with the MoI guidelines firmly in mind. For example, the treachery of the three English conspirators, Lords Scroop, Cambridge and Grey, and the behaviour and subsequent hanging of Bardolph were removed from the production purely to accord with the propaganda aims of the MoI. As Chapman points out, Olivier had been released from the Fleet Air Arm to appear in and direct the film and this was a sure sign that the film had received official approval. She goes on to point out that:

[Olivier's] Henry V also exemplifies the key ideological imperative of wartime cinema: asserting national unity and social cohesion in support of the war effort. It was for this reason that all references to internal dissent were excised from the film. The film has no room for the play's suggestion of revolt by 'the weasel Scots' or for the treachery of the 'three corrupted men'.

(Chapman 2005: 134)

It is the social cohesion that is presented in the Olivier version that is the most important propagandist message of the film. The removal of all interpretations of internal dissent was intended to unify the people behind the national war effort. The film is carefully shot and edited to reinforce the idealisation of national heroes.

The Brannagh film uses these dissenting voices as well as the less than flattering references to Scottish, Irish and Welsh character. Released in 1989 the film was conceived and produced in at the height of Thatcherite Britain. Both Brannagh and Olivier include the murder of the baggage boys by the French but only Brannagh includes the slaughter of the French prisoners in retaliation. Where it was not possible to criticise British national character during the Second World War, by 1989 we had had the Belgrano Affair and the unsuccessful prosecution of civil servant Clive Ponting for releasing government documents about the sinking, as well as numerous other affairs critical of government policy. In the age of Spitting Image criticism operating at a cultural level was much more acceptable.

Shakespeare's Henry V is a warrior king in the same tradition as Homer's
Agamemnon, Menelaos, and Odysseus as well as the Old English hero Beowulf. Within these stories can be gleaned the basis of the western warrior code: honour, valour, fortitude, courage, moral strength, mercy, and a perception of individual humanity through warfare. From the beginnings of western history, these concepts have kept soldiers sustained in battle, from the Greeks, to the Romans, to the wars of the middle ages, to European revolutions and the expansions of empires.

In 1832 the first edition of Clausewitz's *On War* appeared, giving Europe and the West its first treatise on the conduct, strategy and tactics of war. He was the first westerner to look at the organisation of war in a systematic way, but the book also gave the reader an insight into the metaphysical nature of combat. It was Clausewitz, a Prussian intellectual and soldier, who stated that war was merely a continuation of policy by other means (Clausewitz 1989: p87) and it was his understanding of the relationship between policy makers, war fighters and society that is particularly interesting. He presented the idea that there exists a trinity that allows wars to be fought and won; primordial violence, hatred and enmity.

Clausewitz argues that the first of these belongs within the realm of the society, which must have a predisposition to primordial violence in order to raise an army and stomach the resulting war. In the Clausewitz model, unless a society has a martial spirit it cannot successfully wage war. The second idea, hatred, belongs to the formed army. The soldiers and commanders must hate their enemy if they are to face them on the battlefield, to kill and potentially be killed. Enmity is a part of governance, the leadership of a nation state or social group are the only ones who can make enemies with sufficient power and resources to wage war. From this trinity we can see that the participation of the government, the army and the people are equally necessary to be successful in war, an idea as resonant to the ancient Greeks as the Napoleonic French.

Having defined the primary social requirements for war, Clausewitz also defined the instrumental and existential necessities. Much of the book is given over to the instrumental in what Clausewitz called the "maximum use of force". This covers the effective use of technology, strategy and tactics and falls within the realms of military command. The existential aspects of war are dealt with when Clausewitz discusses "maximum use of strength", by which he means willpower, that is, having the moral and emotional strength to succeed, and this must exist within the trinity of the government, the people and the army. He argues that the instrumentality of war lies with the higher command and that the lower ranks must rely on martial spirit in order to survive and do well in battle:
Fighting .... is a trial of moral and physical forces through the medium of the latter. Naturally moral strength must not be excluded, for psychological forces exert a decisive influence on the elements involved in war.

(Clausewitz translation Howard & Paret 1989 p127)

The moral strength that Clausewitz discusses can only operate within a system of moral values that are determined by society and therefore war cannot be waged solely against the material forces of the enemy but must simultaneously attack the opposing moral forces. For Clausewitz it is through victorious wars and the 'exertions of an army to utmost limits of strength' that soldiers can turn a society's moral strength into military virtue and martial spirit.

An army that maintains its cohesion under the most murderous fire; that cannot be shaken by imaginary fears and resists well-founded ones with all its might; that, proud of its victories, will not lose the strength to obey orders and its respect and trust for its officers even in defeat; whose physical power, like the muscles of an athlete, has been steeled by training in privation and effort; a force that regards such efforts as a means to victory rather than a curse on its cause; that is mindful of all duties and qualities by virtue of the single powerful idea of the honor of its arms – such an army is imbued with the true military spirit.

(Clausewitz 1989: 187-188)

This summing up of the formation of the martial spirit within an armed force is as close as we will get to the warrior code in a single source. Clausewitz provided a well-formed idea of a warriors code of battle, but this complicated by the issue of the 'warriors' honour', which is a more difficult concept to tie down than a mere code. A code can be more easily communicated than honour, a code is something by which we judge each other, honour is something by which we judge ourselves, a code is based on social morality while honour is based in personal morality. Although personal morality is formed within social morality it is much more fluid. Social morality is based on group understanding of what is right and wrong and therefore has an inertia that is commensurate with the size of the society that created it. Personal morality, and therefore honour, is founded on expectation and experience, and whilst the expectation to conform to societal norms is reasonably constant, experience on the battlefield is
individual and dynamic, a warrior's honour is therefore formed in the light of experience. In recognition of timé, 'Of all the passions that inspire a man in battle, none, we have to admit, is so powerful and so constant as the longing for honour and renown' (Clausewitz, 1984: 105). And it is this that ties men to their society and the decencies prescribed by it.

During the 19th century, as in previous periods, the dominant force on societal morality was religious belief, but this was not necessarily the case in warfare. The ancient Greeks and Romans classified enemies as either civilised or barbarian; civilised people were due the protection of the warrior's code, barbarians, or non-Greeks, were not. Similarly, in Christian and Islamic society, followers of different faiths were classified as infidels, particularly during religious wars, and were not entitled to the protection of the warrior's code, articles of war or other military laws. This would make the control of soldiers more difficult, such that military commanders would have to apply the strictures of the military law and warrior's code to their own men. The hanging of Bardolph was one such event. However, the benefit of applying religious belief to war lies beyond mere discipline. If soldiers are to risk their lives it is helpful if there is something greater than life upon which they can draw strength. The belief in a greater good and an afterlife have made it easier for warriors to lay down their lives for millennia. Eternity with Homer's immortals, Beowulf's 'steadfast ones', a place in heaven, paradise or nirvana have enabled warriors to live with honour, long after their deaths.

The challenge to such belief came during the 19th century when Nietzsche declared 'God is dead' and Darwin outlined the Origin of Species. Nietzsche claimed that the value of human life is to be found purely in human terms. His ideas were largely ignored during his own lifetime, but for the warrior his warning was to find new ground in the fields of northern France.

On War, which dealt mainly with the instrumentality of war, could only have been written in the period following the industrial revolution and the mass-production of the means of killing. However, Clausewitz could not have foreseen the level of destruction of the two world wars. When war broke out in 1914, it was to the sound of long-range artillery and the splutter of the rapid-fire machine guns. The industrialisation of war depersonalised death.

During the First World War, it was not only the scale of the killing that increased but also the distance at which it occurred. The cavalry charge was no longer effective and the war horse made its last appearance on the battlefield, the trenches and barbed wire
kept the enemy out of sight and soldiers were killed by an unseen enemy. The warriors' honour demands that he respects his enemy but it is very difficult to have respect for a land mine, machine gun bullet or artillery shell. The First World War was the turning point for the western way of war and the beginning of the end of the warriors' honour in western society.

From 1914 onwards there was a steady shift in the balance between the instrumental and the humanistic elements of war; for the first time the instrument became more important than the human. This in turn gave rise to mass military service where the entire national effort went to support the war. Men who had never contemplated becoming warriors and who had no understanding of the warrior's honour were drafted into military life to become soldiers. For the first time we can see a distinction between the existential warrior and the utilitarian soldier. Death in combat became functional, a manifestation of servitude rather than service. Soldiers were asked to lay down their lives on an unprecedented scale, often dying during their first few minutes of combat. This was, and still remains, destructive of the warrior's honour, which, by its very nature, requires a level of self-service. Warriors are seeking something personal on the battlefield, honour, glory, fame, respect, self-respect, but these are denied when death is industrial and comes unseen and at terrifying speed.

In the Homeric warrior tradition that has fed western understanding of what it is to be a warrior, warriors act as moral agents within their societies. When a soldier lays down his life with something less than the warrior's honour his death is devalued and has little meaning to other warriors, society or the dead themselves. The tomb of the Unknown Soldier brings into sharp focus the demise of the western warrior; honour being given to the nameless dead, the instrumentality of war made war life denying rather than life affirming.

By the Second World War, it was clear that all that was left in war was killing. Soldiers did not enter combat to find their own humanity, but to destroy the enemy. The Second World War was about survival and death, to kill and to survive, which is why allied soldiers and sailors failed to understand Kamikaze pilots. The term Kamikaze refers to the 'divine wind' that sank the Mongol invasion fleets of Kublai Khan in 1274 and 1281, saving the Japanese nation. In 1945 the Japanese were still fighting by the warriors code of Bushido. No Kamikaze pilot was conscripted and none were nameless in death, but the west still saw the Japanese as barbarians. For western soldiers, Kamikaze was the ultimate meaningless death.

This utilitarian view of war reached its climax on the 6 August 1945 when, at 08.15,
Enola Gay dropped Little Boy on the Japanese city of Hiroshima, immediately killing 80,000 civilians, 20,000 more than were killed in Dresden by more than 1500 bombers, and almost 40 times more than the total German dead at El Alamein, while the number of deaths caused by the Hiroshima bomb would double in the following years (Gilbert 1990: 712-714). From this moment the western way of warfare was fundamentally changed. In the late 20th Century, civilian casualties would outnumber military, death would be wasteful and war purely functional.

Ironically, the Second World War was the last, and possibly one of the few genuinely moral wars, a war to save humanity that had to be fought, at least from the point of view of one side. Although the threat to British nationhood was greater than at any other time, arguably even during the Roman and Norman invasions, it was this high moral value that made it possible for the civilian populations to sustain the war effort, an effort greater than at any other time. The Second World War also gave rise to one of the world's great moral 'crusades'. Post-war anti anti-Semitism has taken on such a high value that it has transcended idealism and become tenet of modern society.

In the years following the Second World War, the changing ideas about the nature of the soldier appeared in print in such books as Norman Mailer's *The Naked and the Dead* (1949) and Joseph Heller's *Catch 22* (1961). *The Naked and the Dead* tells the story of an American infantry reconnaissance platoon and its patrol through the Japanese held jungle on the Pacific island of Anopopei. The story swings between the lives of the soldiers before they were drafted, their dreams of returning to the States and the privations and fears of life in the jungle. Once the soldiers start their patrol behind enemy lines it becomes apparent that each of them has his own fears and inadequacies, each one has his sights set purely on surviving to the end of the patrol and, in various measures, have little concern for their comrades. *The Naked and the Dead* is not populated by Homeric warriors, there is no King Henry, there is no Beowulf dying for the greater glory of his people, just drafted soldiers with a fear of death. For Mailer's soldiers, their mission behind enemy lines is to survive, and not to win glory and respect through victory over a worthy enemy.

In *Catch 22* the desire to survive becomes the only concern for the book's anti-hero, Yossarian, who tries to have himself certified crazy so he can avoid anymore dangerous bombing missions over German held Italy. But, when he is told that you have to be certified crazy to be taken off flying duties, but only crazy men want to fly missions, and sane men would ask to be taken off active service, then if he asks to stop flying he must be sane and therefore, fly more missions; "That's some catch, that catch 22" responds.
Yossarian (Heller 1995: 57) The book is about the absurdity of war from the viewpoint of a group of drafted airmen fighting the Germans from the fictitious Italian island of Pianosa. The very idea that you have to be crazy to want to fight is the antithesis of the Homeric and the western warrior tradition: “McWatt was the craziest combat man of them all probably, because he was perfectly sane and still did not mind the war.” (Heller 1995: 74).

Yossarian had a growing paranoia that ‘they’ were trying to kill him. After all, strangers shoot at him every time he takes his plane up to bomb them and his senior officers keep extending the number of missions needed to go home; the list of potential killers gets longer throughout the novel. Yossarian “decided to live forever or die in the attempt and his only mission each time he went up was to come down alive” (Heller 1995: 36). The logic of survival plays bizarre tricks on Yossarian, who on one mission fails to properly target a bridge his unit has been trying to destroy for a week, so rather than dump the bombs and go home, and contrary to standing orders, he decided to go round for a successful second run. This attracts much more antiaircraft fire and one of the planes is lost. This presents us with another example of Heller’s absurdity of war. The commanding officer should court-martial Yossarian for going round twice and losing an aircraft, but he cannot punish the airman who destroyed the bridge and put an end to the bombing missions: To punish him would discourage bravery, rewarding him would encourage wilful acts of disobedience. The colonel decides to “act boastfully about something that we ought to be ashamed of. That’s a trick that never seems to fail” (Heller 1995: 173). Yossarian, the crazy man who does not want to fly, is promoted and given a medal.

The book is a black comedy full of irony and absurdity that gets worse as it progresses. In an insane and over-enthusiastic desire to be in the newspapers the Commanding Officer, Colonel Cathcart, decides to emulate the public relations success of an officer stationed in England who has prayers in the operations room before each mission. Having instructed the chaplain to keep water, death and God out of the prayers:

Your job is to lead us in prayer, and from now on you’re going to lead us in prayer for a tighter bomb pattern before every mission. Is that clear? I think a tighter bomb pattern is something really worth praying for. It will be a feather in all our caps with General Peckem. General Peckem feels it makes a nicer aerial photograph when the bombs explode close together.

(Heller 1995: 239)
For the colonel there is no concept of glory, honour, no mention of the enemy, or famous victories. The attempt to use a priest for public relations and to please his boss backfires when the chaplain explains that God may actually give him a worse bomb pattern if he doesn't allow the non-commissioned ranks into the prayer meeting. At which point the prayers are cancelled.

_Catch 22_ marks an apparent literary end of the western warrior tradition that started with _Homer_. For _Homer_’s warriors, war was existential and life affirming, death on the battlefield brought humanity and they were prepared to die for it. Yossarian was not prepared to die on a mechanical and utilitarian battlefield, "History did not demand Yossarian’s premature demise, justice could be satisfied without it, progress did not hinge upon it, victory did not depend upon it. That men would die was a matter of necessity, which men would die, though, was a matter of circumstance, and Yossarian was willing to be the victim of anything but circumstance."

If Clausewitz took the western warrior from the ancient to the modern, Joseph Heller took him into the post-modern.

Moving from a modern to a post-modern world had profound implications for the warrior. On the modern battlefield the heroic warrior became the nameless soldier. Death came from a faceless machine, "It reduced war to butchery, robbing it of romance" (Coker 2001 p19). Modernity removed individuality and heroism from the warrior. Post-modernism has failed to restore the heroic to the soldier, but in its place a new kind of individualism has created a new kind of warrior. Post-modernity was been placed at the centre of military reasoning, Machiavelli decried the use of mercenaries and spoke of citizen-solders, now we have soldier-citizens, entitled to the protection of the state, even in battle (Coker 2001: 94). At the centre of this protection lies the soldier-citizens relationship to war, war’s relationship to the state, and the state’s relationship to the condition of humanity.

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Within post-modern society the concepts humanism and humanitarianism often merge into one, but for the soldier they have contradictory implications that often exclude each other. Post-modern humanism has broken with the past and no longer seeks a place in history, this is Baudrillard’s end of history (Butler 1999: 150). The close proximity of events to the history that interprets them means that satisfaction for injustice must be sought in the realms of the immediate, while post-modern heroes demand recognition within their own lifetime, and sometimes within the lifetime of the
events themselves. This eliminates the heroic death as an act of history, survival itself has become heroic, however, enemies of post-modern armies do not see things this way. As Coker has argued, "for the Hizbollah militiamen, war is life affirming in every respect. It provides the most intense experience life can offer" (Coker 2002: 59). We can therefore see that humanism is not a product of western liberalism, but has deeper roots and is dependent upon the society and the culture that breeds it. In the west we now invest humanism in the rights of the individual, the right to life being the primary concern. Other cultures place the intersubjectivity of relationships at the core of humanism.

The NATO intervention in Kosovo has been claimed as the first humanitarian war and in the 1990s it was believed to have changed the western way of war for the first time in 350 years. Following the end of the 30 years war in 1648 the rules of war were rewritten and reasons for going to war, as prescribed by the Westphalian conference were seen as either the defence of princely honour, the defence of national interest or to defend virtue. Even though these ideas survived into the 20th century, for example Archduke Franz Ferdinand's assassination in relation to the First World War, none of these is imbued with the contemporary humanitarian ethos. We no longer go to war to protect aristocratic or individual honour, overt wars of commerce disappeared with the age of empire, loss of life can no longer be justified in terms of national interest and virtue is a vague concept that we can no longer agree upon as a society.

Now we go to war for others. In a complete reversal from Westphalian chivalric honour, which only really applied to the upper echelons of society, humanitarian war is undertaken in defence of the defenceless, even those within other nation states. The down side of humanitarian 'intervention' is that in trying to apply post-modern western humanism to modern and pre-modern ways of war it often does little more than compound past crimes. Michael Ignatieff writing the The Warrior's Honor reminds us "the reason the UN failed in Bosnia was that it wanted peace not justice..... peacekeepers, by their very presence on a demarcation line, effectively ratify the conquest of aggressors and impede attempts by victims to recapture lost ground." (Ignatieff 1998: 103) The humanitarian may be virtuous, but it is a virtue that often clashes with culturally based humanism, and given the West's apparent retreat from the existential, the face of the battlefield has turned in a new direction.

Mechanised, technologically advanced and utilitarian warfare destroyed all instrumental symmetry on the battlefield, but the shift to humane warfare more significantly destroyed the symmetry of the existential. Contemporary warfare became increasingly asymmetrical as western powers drew away from Homeric and
Clauswitzian ideas of the warrior’s honour. The increasing distance at which battles were fought meant that enemies of the west were no longer able to engage effectively in combat, but even in close quarter situations the odds were, and remain, heavily stacked in favour of the west. Western nations now seek to make war as risk-free for their own soldiers as is ‘technically’ possible. The very notion of risk-free war, however, would have been offensive to the traditional warrior code, for it is in risk that warriors can exercise courage and find their own humanity. Risk-averse war makes courage redundant on the post-modern battlefield.

Force protection has become a primary concern for western military commanders and this further adds to the asymmetry of warfare. Excessive force protection conforms to the ideals of risk avoidance, but again erodes the warrior’s honour. Force protection and reduction of risk has reached such a point that the greatest danger to post-modern warriors is often their own comrades. The risk of blue-on-blue (soldiers killed by their own side in ‘friendly fire’ incidents) has almost certainly decreased in recent wars, but the reduction in deaths by enemy action has drastically increased the significance of ‘own goals’. For many soldiers now the mission is not merely to survive, but to not get hurt and where there is little risk of injury, courage and hatred of the enemy, both of which Clausewitz identified as being intrinsic to war, diminish. After speaking to Serbians about the NATO bombing campaign Michael Ignatieff wrote:

“...We weren’t even prepared to risk our own soldiers in battle, ‘They were ready to risk the life of my wife and my children but not their soldiers’ lives.’ If we had really fought them, face to face, he was implying, and if we had faced death, as they had done, then we might have had his respect. There was real bitterness in his voice, at the hypocrisy of our willingness to kill in the name of our values, but not to die.”

(Ignatieff 2000: 150-151)

Coker has identified that the West’s future enemies will be enemies out of the past, enemies that will still fight by the warrior’s honour, where risk, courage, hatred and death are part of life, and life affirming, all of which are now alien to the western way of war (Coker 2002:95). This is the asymmetricality of the existential nature of war; post-modern western soldiers prefer to fight other soldiers, not warriors. In this sense warfare has become post-human, that is, the human is no longer at the centre of the western
way of warfare. Soldiers are not expected to gain anything existential from war, combat is a merely a job.

Following the end of the Vietnam War it was clear that the judgement base of warfare had changed, individual suffering, loss of life and risk aversion became the creed by which the west fought its wars. On the Vietnam battlefield the individual was expected to risk his life but not allowed to obtain life affirmation from the experience. Instrumental and utilitarian warfare has created a new military virtue in western civilisations; life preservation, but in the eyes of our new enemies western warfare has been devalued. We no longer hate our enemies, rather we pity their barbarism and attempt to save them from themselves.

The changing character of the battlefield has precipitated this. Post-modern warfare has denuded the concept of the frontline and has emptied the ‘battlefield’ of soldiers. Post-modern armies avoid meeting their enemy in a single geographic and temporal arena and warriors become increasingly marginalised as governments strive to minimise the risk to human life with smart weapons and superior technology (Ignatieff, *Virtual War*). Modern and pre-modern armies would meet each other across a field of battle and slug it out, the victor taking everything and the losers running for their lives. Wars used to be long, battles were short, often restricted to the daylight hours of a single day. Post-modern wars are short, the land campaign of the 1992 Gulf War famously lasted just 100 hours.

The loss of life in modern warfare has taken over western military planning, which sets a hierarchy of value on the lives of those affected by conflict. Within the western nations the primary concern is for their own military casualties, which are no longer acceptable to political leaders, who fear the loss of public support for overseas expeditions. This is apparent when casualty figures are analysed – in Vietnam 58,000 dead Americans, 200,000 dead South Vietnamese soldiers, 1,000,000 dead North Vietnamese soldiers, 1,000,000 civilians killed across the country, in Kosovo no allies were killed but 500 Serb civilians died (Human Rights Watch: http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2000/02/07/new-figures-civilian-deaths-kosovo-war)

Second in the hierarchy are civilian casualties within the enemy population. Post-humanist western nations will always seek to justify loss of life, and tied in with a humanitarian post-Christian philosophy, will be thrown into crisis when the morality is questioned in terms of the humane, as happened with the Amiriya shelter in Iraq and the civilian convoy and train attacks in Kosovo. It is taken for granted that there will be no western civilian casualties as post-imperialist, post-modern conflicts are fought as
wars of liberation and are not concerned with national defence or foreign conquest.

The final group are the enemy soldiers. Although western philosophy still demands some level of demonisation of the enemy before conflict can begin (Herman & Chomsky, 1988) this is always balanced against post-war requirements for the stabilisation and rebuilding of an enemy state. Contemporary demonisation that is used to fuel public support is invariably aimed at the leaders of ‘rogue’ states and not the enemy soldiers, who are themselves seen as victims of the enemy state. This may be a political necessity in the aftermath of conflict but creates a crisis of morality when targeting enemy troops – ‘turkey shoots’ like the Basra Road from Kuwait in 1992 are becoming increasingly difficult to justify in asymmetric warfare (in the Iraq War of 2003 enemy soldiers were given “every opportunity to surrender” by coalition forces).

There has also been a fundamental shift in the construction of western armies. As Coker has argued (2001), western armies can be seen as post-traditional, post-modern themselves as they adopt low risk, civilian, humanitarian and feminine ideologies and this has created a crisis of representation as they struggle to determine how they see themselves and how they wish to be seen by others.

The warrior no longer seems acceptable to western populations who like to see their fighting men and woman as soldiers, as technicians, unleashing technology against enemy infrastructure, not as a warrior caste willing to fight and die in the cause of nationalism and tribalism (Coker 2001: 107). Post-modern soldiers are no longer separated from their civilian counterparts by the metaphysical experience of combat – they no longer look the enemy in the eye and face death themselves, as exemplified by the lack of coalition casualties in Kosovo and the failure of the Royal Marines to engage with the enemy in Afghanistan. Post-modern contact with the enemy is experienced through the ‘shield’ of computer screens, thermal imagers and video relays from missile and bomb nose-cone cameras. The view from inside a modern battle tank is much the same as the view from inside the tank simulator used for training, a simulacrum that denudes the reality of combat when the soldiers engage in the real thing (Baudrillard 1996: 47).

Further devaluation of the traditional warrior code has followed feminisation of western society, which has led to an increasing feminisation of the military. This change within the military is as much related to the changing nature of military operations as it to the physical admittance of woman to combat roles, which in the case of the British Army post-dated many of the metaphysical changes. The move towards risk-averse warfare and the increased predominance of humanitarian, if not humane, operations
has required soldiers to adopt typically feminine roles of caring, compassion, sympathy and social interaction. This does not mean that the typically masculine roles of work, combat, physical protection and code-based morality have been abandoned, rather the post-modern soldier has to become metaphysically androgynous. Only within the special forces and those units practising 'niche warfare' has the traditional warriors code been allowed to continue unchallenged (Coker 2001: 110). This may explain why 'elite' units such as the Parachute Regiment and the Royal Marines have been largely kept away from peace-keeping duties in places such as Bosnia and Kosovo.

Civilian organisations now encompass the battlefield. NGOs perform relief work, de-mining and reconstruction and there is a military-civilian crossover of ethics and metaphysics that is contributing to the destruction of the warrior's honour. It is alleged that the professional soldier is now replacing the warrior and taking on civilian ways of thinking and working and that war has now become a trade rather than a vocation, even for those who volunteer to fight.
Chapter Two: Photography and the Warriors' Honour

It was during the First World War that the British government made its first serious attempts at using photography to record warfare. The photographers were sent to the operational theatres by the War Office Press Bureau, but there was a tripartite system of usage and control in which the photographers had to work. The Press Bureau had overall control, which they exercised from London, while in the field, the War Propaganda Bureau, the government department that targeted friendly foreign governments in order to gain international support for the war, took day-to-day control. The third control element was the military, which operated its own system of censorship.

Initial efforts at using factual information and photography to influence morale and opinions at home were not particularly successful and the government situation gradually got so bad that the government itself collapsed. In December 1916, Asquith resigned and David Lloyd George took over as Prime Minister, initiating major changes in the information and propaganda campaigns. In early 1917 the War Propaganda Bureau became the Department of Information, with the job of increasing morale within both the military and civilian populations. However, it still failed to gain the confidence of the media and was reorganised again in 1918, being given full ministry status, with media mogul, Lord Beaverbrook as its new boss. During his time in charge Beaverbrook got more photographers to the front and a greater variety of images returned to London for dissemination to the media.

The photographers operated without detailed instructions and generally relied on their own professionalism to produce images that would be published by the media (Carmicheal 1989: 52). According to Carmichael, their images generally fell into four categories; those that would meet accepted press requirements; those that provided reassurance about success on the battlefield and the spirit of the troops involved; the supply of armaments and munitions; and the capture of prisoners. Such categories do not fit well with normal journalistic practices in the separation of factual reporting and opinion forming, and it is this, rather than the more usual criticism of excessive ‘taste and decency,’ that is important in the First World War photography.

The judgement of taste and decency is usually used to assess whether photography provides an accurate representation of war that fits within the dominant national conscious. In the west there has been a traditional fear of showing pictures of the dead,
which stems from a number of issues. As far as the military are concerned there is a fear that such images may appear in newspapers before the next of kin have been fully informed, but this would have been less of an issue during the First World War. From a government's point of view, there is a fear that images of their own soldiers post-mortem would demoralise both the fighting forces and, more importantly, the public at home. Governments want positive images of conflict and it is difficult to find circumstances in which pictures of dead British soldiers would be uplifting for the British public. From the newspaper editors' point of view there is a dangerous risk that their readers will be offended and alienated by images of their own dead. In such circumstances sympathies are extended to the families of the deceased and removed from the newspapers, resulting in a loss of readership, as well as political and advertiser support. These three elements have varied across newspapers at different points in time, but it is a brave newspaper editor who can discount any of them in times of national crisis.

More importantly, criticisms of the representations of the First World War should be levelled at the overall system of reporting, with each element having its own failings. There was a tacit agreement between the military, the propagandists, the press and the photographers about what types of images should be produced and shown to the public. Although the photographers sent to the front by the Press Bureau were professional press photographers, they were commissioned into the army before being sent and what little instruction they did receive came from government officials. Journalists and non-military photographers were assiduously excluded from the front lines and all press reports sent for publication were cleared by military and government censors before release. The result of this working methodology meant that press reports continually failed to give the public an accurate view of the progress of the war.

It was not until after the war was over that more detailed and horrifying reports began to build the national understanding of the conflict and change the view of the images from the front. For example, during the war images of the destruction of the landscape caused by artillery bombardment were read as successful destruction of the enemy. It was not until after the war that these images began to stand for the pointless destruction and catastrophe that we now accept as being the defining element of the war. Further spin is evident in images of German prisoners. If they were smiling, this was read as a lack of unity within German forces and, if they were glum, this was a sign that the Germans were facing imminent collapse (Carmichael 1989: 56-57).

The final change to the photographic record of the First World War came in 1917 with the formation of a national archive. In March 1917 the government gave the go
ahead for the National War Museum to be established in London (after complaints of exclusion by the members of the empire the name was changed to Imperial War Museum) and the photographers were given the job of producing images for the national record. However, firm directives were still not given and they continued to rely on their own initiative to produce appropriate images, essentially carrying on in the same vain, doing what they knew best. Throughout the war the photographers never attempted to produce a narrative of the conflict, only to satisfy the voluminous thirst of the media for images that supported their constructed and censored stories of life of the front line. This was a situation set to be repeated when military photographers accompanied the Falklands task force 65 years later (see Chapter Four).

When the war drew to a close in 1918, the government closed the Ministry of Information and the photographic branches that had operated on the frontline. The First World War had failed to move the visual representation of conflict forward and the authorities had struggled to use photography to effectively construct narratives that were understood and valued by the general public.

As Fascism began to consume the rest of Europe, the British government again had to decide how it was going handle the media and the images that would be produced of British soldiers at war. The Ministry of Information was hastily reformed two days before the declaration of war and again found itself on the back-foot in responding to German propaganda in the international press. The British initiated a total clampdown, not just on all media reporting, but on all communications leaving the country, while on the other hand, foreign correspondents in Germany were given much greater access and allowed to send reports uncensored. Although, if reports unfavourable to Germany appeared in print, the correspondents would be subjected to increasing levels of harassment that could eventually lead to arrest and imprisonment for espionage. The result of this was that at the beginning of the war it was hard to get information about the allied war efforts whilst the international media was full of German propaganda.

In 1939 the British did not have a single photographer in uniform and it was not until 1941, and in reaction to German propaganda, that the services established a film and photographic unit. The Army Film and Photographic Unit (AFPU) based at Pinewood studios, employed professional photographers who were placed in uniform and initially given the rank of sergeant. This was partially in response to the First World War experience, where it was believed the troops found it difficult to talk and relate to photographers of officer rank. At its height the unit had up to 400 members; this included dispatch riders, sound-men, directors, laboratory staff and numerous other
people required for the whole production process as well as photographers and cameramen.

Some of the unit's most famous early work was done in North Africa with the 8th Army. This was partly because before the invasions of Sicily and Normandy it was impossible to make pictures on mainland Europe and communications with other theatres were difficult, and partly because the nature of the North African campaigns fitted well with cultural ideas of clean and honourable warfare. The Second World War is regarded as the last great moral war, the last war where the whole nation was in no doubt about the necessity and the validity of the effort, and sacrifice, required to win. This enabled the AFPU to fall back on traditional metaphors of the warrior, honourable combat, killing and dying for the greater good, and British ideas of Britishness. Many of the images produced by AFPU in North Africa have since been proved to be recreations of combat and dismissed as fakes, but there is no doubt that they were taken up in large quantities by the press. They appealed to national feeling and when viewed alongside press images it is difficult to tell which are fabrications and which are honest documentary or journalistic images.

Because the North African battlefields were so widespread and battles difficult to follow, the photographers and cameramen had a tendency to recreate their images after the battles had finished. Whether dressing locals up as Germans or setting light to petrol and old tyres inside already destroyed enemy tanks, they put a lot of effort into their images. This has, in the long term, brought the validity of their work as historical documents into question, but this is in itself too shallow a view. Although some of the images are 'fake' in that the events depicted did not actually occur, other than for the camera, they tell us much more about social history and the view the British had of themselves at the time. Whether it was Churchill's Speeches, Olivier's Henry V, or the AFPU's pictures, mass communication in the 1940s was entirely dominated by propaganda and this is how the AFPU work should be viewed at this point in the war.

The ultimate photograph has been described as a magic window, showing us a reality that would otherwise be denied us (Taylor, Source, Issue 44: 21). This idea is crucial in the interpretation of the AFPU's work. This window is never a pure one and the reality we see is always reliant on the selective interpretation of the photographers, censors and picture editors, as well as the knowledge and cultural base of the viewer. To dismiss the AFPU images as fake is to accuse the photographers of lying with the intention of deceiving, which is a harsh and unjust response. Some of their work was fabricated, but the images were recreations done with the intention of informing, not misleading.
Photography in the Second World War took a giant leap forward in terms of presenting the realities of war to the people at home. As with the Spanish Civil War, the use of hand-held 35mm cameras allowed the photographers to be right at the point of contact with the enemy, indeed in many battles the enemy himself could be photographed. But, regardless of whether the images were produced by government or press photographers, a new aesthetic was developing that was pro-war and unashamedly partisan. During the Second World War it was clear to everyone how desperate the situation was and what the consequences of losing were. Media coverage of British forces and British allies was positive and upbeat.

After the First World War there had been anti-war books produced, most notably Ernst Friedrich's *Krieg Dem Kriege* (War Against War) first published in 1926. The book presented a chronology of images showing destruction and death in the First World War along with scathing captions and juxtapositions; proud soldiers with rotting corpses, laughing soldiers with enemy dead, royalty at leisure on both sides of the conflict opposite invalided proletarian workers (figure 4). During the Second World War such sentiments would have been unthinkable, almost treasonable, and such graphic images did not make it into the press until the liberation of the concentration camps.

Good examples of the World War Two aesthetic and narrative can be found in the pages of *Picture Post*. In one typical issue, November 1940, the magazine ran war features on a Nazi prison camp, arms for the Home Guard, the Fleet Air Arm and on why Italy was being beaten. Like many editions of *Picture Post* there was a mix of the warrior code, the stoicism and professionalism of the British, the superiority of British war technology, the generosity of allies, and a slight touch of xenophobia.

The International Red Cross provided an article on a German prisoner of war camp. The text explained the workings and ethos of the Red Cross in ensuring the fair treatment of prisoners of war. The images show the prisoners in various outdoor situations including working, exercising, marching and eating. All the images are designed to show that prisoners attempt to keep life as normal as possible during their captivity. The series shows that the traditional warrior code of respect for the enemy is functioning within both the Germans and British; a tradition that would provide comfort to those viewing the Red Cross images (figure 5). The article concludes by asking the readers to look for people they recognise, for family and friends who may be in a POW camp.

The technology of war was addressed in two articles, the supply of privately owned American weapons to the Home Guard, and the aircraft of the Fleet Air Arm. In 1940
the Home Guard were seriously under-equipped with a crippling lack of weapons. An American newspaper editor, William Allen White of the Kansas *Emporia Gazette*, who set up the *Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies*, initiated a series of events that would see thousands of Americans hand in their personal weapons and ammunition to be sent to the Home Guard. The story, like many *Picture Post* stories, was heavy on historical detail and lacked information that would inform either the readers or the enemy. The six pictures showed the key players in the supply of weapons and the men of the Home Guard appeared in one shot. The story as a whole reinforced the Anglo-American relationship and stayed away from the lamentable state of the Home Guard as a fighting force (figure 6).

The article on the Fleet Air Arm took a similar tack (figure 7). The emphasis in the text was on the history of the organisation stretching back to the origins of military flying, but stayed away from the kind of detailed exploration of capability that would be expected in the modern media. The images were slightly anodyne in that they depicted the aircraft in flight and isolated against plain backgrounds in a fashion that is still appreciated by the military but now of little use to the media. They lack the excitement and drama that is present in modern aircraft images, but the most telling part of the article comes in the final paragraph.

One of the most attractive features of the Fleet Air Arm's striking power is that it is designed with a single eye to hitting the target with precision. Should the torpedoes or dive-bombers' bombs miss their mark, civilians do not suffer, as ours suffer so cruelly at the hands of German pilots. The Navy, true to its great tradition, strikes fiercely at its enemy's armed forces, but spares non-combatants.

*(Picture Post, Nov. 1940)*

These comments serve to bolster the ideas of British fair play set against German aggression and can only be seen in propagandist terms. The article was written by an ex-Naval officer and his words would have gone down well with the Admiralty and the Ministry of Information, and they would surely have been forgotten when the Royal Air Force began carpet bombing German cities. It is also worth pointing out that warfare at sea between battleships is always without civilian casualties, but the British people would have seen these comments in relation to the U-boat campaign waged by the Germans where many merchant sailors and civilian passengers were killed.
More xenophobic comments appeared in an article on why Italy was losing the war. 'Why Italy is Being Beaten' was by-lined to 'an Italian journalist' and discussed the character traits of the Italian people that made them unfit to fight a war against an international power as great as Great Britain (figure 8). The article begins;

It would be futile to look for any motive in Italy's war aims which spring out of the nature of her people and her national traditions. There is none. And this moral weakness is of much greater importance than any deficiency in the military field or in the realm of economics.

(Picture Post, Nov. 1940)

The article continues with a series or "eight reasons why the Italians are failing to hold their own." Each reason is accompanied by a photograph and covers such things as the lack of a sound industrial base with which to fight total war, poor educational standards, the Italian love of Pope over state and their lack of 'heart' in the 'struggle.' The final image in this series shows a group of captured Italian submariners, described as being "glad to be out of the struggle..... Only German influence drives them on." This article plays on British stereotypes of the Italians, but forgets that Italian city-states played a leading role in the development of the western world, and were engaged in inter-city wars for long periods of their history. To dismiss the nation that gave us Machiavelli as lacking the moral strength to fight may seem a little absurd.

Picture Post is representative of the propaganda that routinely appeared in British newspapers, but the Second World War saw a rise to new heights of iconic war images and of famous photographers. Probably the most iconic image of British endurance under extreme duress was Herbert Mason's 1940 picture of St Paul's Cathedral, shot from the roof of the Daily Mail building and showing the dome rising above the smoke and flames of burning London. The people on the home front were captured sleeping in tube stations and the bombed out buildings and blacked out and deserted streets were photographed across the country. All this fits well with British ideas of their own stoicism in difficult times and has fed modern beliefs about the past.

The themes that were expressed in the contemporary media have echoed down the decades and continued to appear in comic book form into the 1980s. The Victor ran war stories under the banner "A true story of men at war" that were based on cultural ideologies that have their basis in media stories and propaganda of the Second World War. However, the comic book format allows for greater freedom in interpreting the facts.
The stories are more mythological than factual in that they are devoid of many aspects of combat. The heroes never show fear, their loses are always staggering less than the enemy's, the enemy are fearful and always outclassed. A story run on the 10 October 1981 told of the exploits of a platoon of the Suffolk Regiment, led by Captain D Lee Hunter, and their raid on a Japanese occupied village (figure 9a - 9b).

On the 7th May 1944, during World War II, men of the Guerrilla Platoon, 2 Battalion the Suffolk Regiment, approached the Jap-occupied village of Sebang in Burma. The platoon was commanded by Captain D Lee Hunter.

_Victor Issue 1077 10 October 1981:1_

The phraseology could be described as xenophobic, the term Jap is no longer acceptable, but has only just fallen out of favour. Shortly after the story was published Britain sent a task force to the Falkland Islands and the British press were referring to Argentines as Argies. The images of the Japanese soldiers show them unprepared and attacked whilst preoccupied, there is fear and panic on their faces as they attempt to flee. Just as the British think the battle is over one of them is shot in the back and the platoon go to work again to finish clearing the village. Captain Hunter was awarded the Military Cross for outstanding leadership on this and other patrols. The reality of war is missing from this and other _Victor_ stories. To raid a Burmese village under Japanese control, with their fearsome reputation for never surrendering, would have been a truly terrifying experience for those involved, which is not communicated in the story.

The rhetoric of the Second World War has stayed with us and become part of British cultural identity. The language has been used and reused in most conflicts in which Britain has been involved since 1945, but other nation's wars have added to and complicated the photographic discourse.

The Vietnam War had a long and complicated history beginning with the French campaigns to keep Indo-China in their empire. The true free-roaming press was born in Vietnam as the Americans believed that the media were on side and would remain so through out. This was true up to the Tet Offensive (Chomsky 1988). In the early days of US involvement media criticism of the war was entirely based on the implementation of US policy, not the policy itself. The media were 'on-side' in as much as they were themselves products of the Cold War and believed in the domino effect, and that the spread of communism had to be stopped before it was too late. However, this criticism
of action rather than intent set an antagonistic tone with the South Vietnamese
government of Ngo Dinh Diem and the US military in Vietnam that was set to rumble
on to the end of the war and beyond. "News Management" became the driving force
of both South Vietnamese and US governments who wanted to control, but not censor,
the information that was printed by the US media, who were only too willing to co-
operate.

The escalation of the war from a communist insurgency in the south to overt
operations against the north was a product of CIA and government news management.
The claim by the Americans in 1964 that the USS Maddox had been fired upon by
North Vietnamese forces whilst in neutral water was a CIA embellishment that was
entirely believed by the media, who were, as ever, more than happy to follow the
government line. In fact the Maddox had incurred into North Vietnamese waters,
challenging and firing on NVA patrol boats, who fired back, hitting the Maddox with a
single bullet. The media failed to report the facts and the support they offered to the
government continued until pacification programmes finally led to the Tet Offensive,
when elite opinion in the US finally decided the cost of the war was too high (Chomsky
1988: 228). Media support that had survived a series of pacification programmes as well
as the first reports of the My Lai massacre then began to crumble.

The images produced during the Vietnam War now stand as some of the greatest
icons of combat photography and photo-journalists have been attempting to live up to
the perceived high standards ever since. The Vietnam War also propelled photo-
journalists into stardom in a way that has never been equalled. In previous wars
photographers had acquired celebrity status, but the focus of interest for the general
public remained with the fighters. During Vietnam the balance shifted such that the
photographers became household names across the world, exceeding the fame of the
soldiers as they represented. The names of Larry Burrows, Don McCullin, 'Nick' Ut,
Tim Page, Eddie Adams and Philip Jones Griffiths stand above the unnamed soldiers.
Lax accreditation rules that were easily circumvented meant hundreds of photographers
worked in Vietnam throughout the war, including many freelancers and rank amateurs
without a market for their work. The majority, even the dead, remain unknown to all
but those with a specialist interest. It is the small minority of celebrity photographers
that have given most people their current understanding of the war.

Larry Burrows, Don McCullin and Philip Jones Griffiths are probably the most
contentious of the Vietnam photographers and it is no coincidence that they are all
British. Photographers had considerable difficulty getting hard-line images printed in
the USA and had to find other outlets for their work. European newspapers and magazines, particularly the British Sunday supplements, provided an outlet for their work, but it was Griffiths who finally presented shocking images of war to the American public at home.

Philip Jones Griffiths, one of the few photographers to concentrate on portraying what the war did to Vietnamese civilians, had difficulty finding an outlet for his work in the United States. "I was told time after time that my photographs were too harrowing for the American market." When, eventually, a book of his photographs, Vietnam Inc., was published in the United States, the South Vietnamese government banned his return to Saigon.

(Knightley 2003: 428)

The leaking of the Pentagon Papers, the US Department of Defence report into the conduct of the war, to the New York Times opened the door to the American public for Griffiths' Vietnam Inc. with its harrowing images and text. The book did not go down well with journalists who were critical of the writing, although they did acknowledge the quality and impact of the images. The book shocked the American public, who were being given a more critical truth than they were used to, and opinions about the war changed from the belief that it was, on balance, a mistake, to one that described it as "fundamentally wrong and immoral" (Chomsky, Introduction to 2001 edition of Vietnam Inc.).

Early criticism of the press began to catch up with the media who were relentlessly blamed for the failures in Vietnam. By the time Saigon fell in 1975 the American right were convinced and vocal about the media's responsibility for the defeat. Writing in 1986 Richard Nixon said

Ten years later the same distortions about the war that made antiwar activists into heroes on the campuses are still accepted as fact on television, in the newspapers, and in college classrooms. Before we can cure ourselves of the Vietnam syndrome, we must purge our diet of the intellectual junk food that helped make us sick to begin with.

(Nixon 1986: 23)

Although liberal opinion in both Europe and the USA think that Nixon's views are
discredited by his political history, his views are by no means unusually extreme. The Vietnam syndrome haunted American foreign policy for thirty years and has been crucial in every operation the US military has undertaken abroad. From the Balkans to Panama and from Grenada to Somalia, America has feared the quagmire associated with expeditionary warfare and peacekeeping. In 1997 I asked an Apache pilot in Bosnia why the US Army travelled everywhere in body armour and Kevlar helmets when the situation was so benign and the British were wearing berets and shirt sleeves? His explanation was that President Clinton had instructed the military to take part in the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) operations in the Balkans, but they were not to lose a single man. This may be anecdotal, but it is symptomatic of the political fear that lingers in the wake of the Vietnam syndrome.

The images produced by the small number of influential photographers have been interpreted and reinterpreted by historians, academics and politicians to suit their own particular beliefs about the war. For example, Hung Chong “Nick” Ut’s photograph of napalmed children running screaming down the road was one of two pictures he shot at the scene (figure 10). The image we are used to seeing shows the children in the foreground and what appears to be South Vietnamese soldiers walking uncaringly behind, making no attempt to intervene or help. On the left, largely unnoticed, there is a photographer who looks like he is changing film. We have no way of telling if he is a military or press photographer, but the assumption is that since he is in uniform he is part of the military machine responsible for the destruction, although this is by no means certain. The image succinctly captures the liberal view of the war, destruction and death meted out by a heartless military on life’s most innocent and defenceless. However, in the second image, the children have run further down the road and are joined in the shot by press photographers and cameramen. This image shows that the press are more willing to produce harrowing images than to intervene to help the defenceless. This position is reinforced by the usual crop of the first frame that removes the photographer changing film, thereby obliterating the media from the scene. This brings in to sharp focus the morality of the press in war and allows conservatives like Nixon to criticise their motives.

The work of the three most important British photographers of the Vietnam War stands as testament to the differing styles and practices of the photographers and their newspapers. Larry Burrows worked in Vietnam from the early stages of the war and was generally supportive of US intervention. He was there before the Marines went ashore in 1965 and assisted in government efforts to keep secret the fact the US troops
were directly involved in the fighting when it was claimed that they were there only as advisors. Captioning a photographic essay in 1963 he wrote:

> Important: The Pilot in this picture, the man who actually fired these rockets, is an American pilot. But since, publically [sic] at least, Americans are only there as advisors, it would probably do considerable harm if we publish the fact, although it has been hinted at before. It is probably better to refer to the man as a Vietnamese pilot, since there's nothing in the picture that would give him away, we hope.

(Moeller 1989: 399-400)

Whether Burrows supported the war or not is hard to confirm, but there is no doubt that he did toe the government line for most of his career in South East Asia. His highly influential work is rightly considered as some of the most important photography of the war and has been used extensively to support the myth that the war was lost on the pages of the morning newspapers.

His photo-essay *Yankee Papa 13* is probably his most famous work (figure 11a, b, c). The image of Crew Chief James Farley shouting over the bodies of two wounded comrades is both a landmark and benchmark in combat photography. Burrows had been working on a day-in-the-life article, shot over the period of a month, that turned into hot news when the helicopter he was working with, Yankee Papa 13, went to the aid of another downed helicopter, Yankee Papa 3. James Farley had managed to rescue two crew members, but had to leave a third behind. The importance of this image lies in the shift of emphasis from World War Two photography. It was the first time that a photograph had shown not just dead, but dying American servicemen. Previously, soldiers had been photographed after death and their bodies were shown in isolation from the living. Burrows managed to photograph the process of death, shifting the sympathy of the viewer to the living (Moeller 1989:395).

Crew Chief Farley is shown as the heroic rescuer of the fatally wounded (one of the men died during the evacuation). This has a direct correlation to Homeric heroism in that this image gives us a modern view of Achilles recovering the body of Patroclus. When this was first published it would not have been seen as an anti-war condemnation of pointless sacrifice, but as a celebration of the heroic valour of the American soldier. Time has subverted the meaning of this photograph, particularly when it is taken out of context of the original essay, which follows Farley from the initial loading of weapons on
to the aircraft, to the rescue mission, and culminates with him weeping, alone in a supply shack, as Achilles wept for Patroclus.

Don McCullin arrived in Vietnam at the beginning of the Tet Offensive, with his most famous images produced during the battle for Hue. Although McCullin arrived late in the war and stayed a relatively short time compared to the likes of Burrows and Griffiths, his Vietnam work is amongst the finest combat photography ever produced. McCullin has always been at the heart of the compassionate school of photography; he repeatedly claims that his images are made with his conscience as much as with his camera, and that he does not make pictures of people who do not want to be photographed. In Vietnam he followed the US Marines as they began an operation to reclaim the city of Hue from the North Vietnamese. An officer told him that this would last twenty four hours, but 12 days later and with 70 members of the marine unit dead, the battle finally ended.

The images show the marines fighting in the streets and bombed out buildings for control of South Vietnam's second city. They are shot at close quarter and like all McCullin images they are sympathetic to the subject. Although they show the horrors of war they are not horrific. The soldiers are seen as fighting men, warriors, pushing home the fight with all their physical and moral strength. The soldiers in McCullin's photographs are heroic in the traditional sense. His aesthetic has more in common with Robert Capa's Second World War images than would be expected for the late 1960's: marines carrying old ladies to safety, corpsmen treating wounded men, soldiers keeping low to avoid sniper fire. However, he does occasionally touch on the less seemly side of the war.

A picture of two US Marines searching a dead Vietnamese for souvenirs is particularly compelling (figure 12). The dead man is prostrate on his back, his eyes almost closed, his teeth clenched, hands relaxed and one arm resting across his neck. One marine is picking something up, oblivious to the camera, while the other, in typical McCullin style, has turned and confronted the camera. He knows the picture is being taken. The look on his face is hard to decipher, but it is not one of well-being, we cannot tell and never will know what this marine was thinking but the look he is giving the camera is one of guilt or shame, the look of a child caught doing something wrong, but before an adult interjects with harsh words and punishment. Where Plato describes the baseness of stripping an enemy corpse and dishonouring the dead, McCullin shows sympathy for the man conducting the low act. We can see ourselves in the eyes of this marine.
McCullin's images do not represent the broad nature of the Vietnam War only a short interlude of more conventional combat. Even when he shows "American soldiers humiliating a Vietnamese civilian" in Hue, all we see are three marines, with weapons raised, stood looking at a man blindfolded on his knees with his hands tied behind his back (figure 13). The marines do not look threatening or intimidating; they have the look of a group of tourists who have stumbled across a piece of street theatre. The scene is benign, no condemnation is offered of either side of this confrontation and this is typical of McCullin's compassionate photography.

The third important British photographer in Vietnam was Philip Jones Griffiths. His book, Vietnam Inc. is the single most important indictment of American policy and action in Vietnam and was the product of three years work. From the very beginning Griffiths took an anti-American standpoint and in complete contrast to McCullin he was willing to be unsympathetic to the people he saw as responsible for the bad things that were happening. The book begins with the history and importance of the village and the strength of Vietnamese society. A description of the difficulties of the Vietnamese language and the reasons why the Vietnamese have problems understanding each other explains why foreigners will never be able to fully get to grips with communicating with the people. The stories and captions that accompany the pictures clearly point the finger at the Americans and their abuses of the Vietnamese. Where McCullin was an uncritical compassionate photographer, Griffith's aesthetic was one of advocacy. This is a stark difference in attitude that is often overlooked when analysing images of the Vietnam War. Griffiths is the exemplar of the many photographers who went to Vietnam believing the war to be wrong.

The power of Vietnam Inc. is not within any individual image, although many of the images are some of the most disturbing of the whole war, but within the combination of text and images that builds a narrative of US involvement in South East Asia. This combination drew professional as well as political criticism. He was accused of excessive left-wing liberalism by the political elites, and of incompetence by journalists; when reviewing the book, journalists tended to comment that the pictures were OK but he should stay away from writing (Moeller 1989). This may have been professional jealousy, or, more likely, professional protectionism, but it is a comment on how the book was seen by his contemporaries.

Although Griffiths avoids obvious juxtapositions, the book has numerous subtle examples of the third effect. Whether Vietnamese civilians are placed on the same page as relaxing GIs set against a burning village, or women with US supplied pigs placed
with pictures of Vietnamese men captive behind barbed wire. However, Griffiths' greatest strength is in placing the 'third effect' within single images. This effect allows the viewer to relate two or more elements, giving greater dramatic effect than if the elements were viewed separately, in this way Griffiths conveys the double standards of American action with devastating impact. 'Protected' women cowering behind the guns that have destroyed their lives, a GI taking aim through a window with a naked doll lying, as if dead, on the floor, naked children chained by the ankle to their beds all serve to condemn US military action. One of the finest spreads in the book has just two photographs. The first shows an horrifically burnt Vietnamese man, the second is a simple head shot of a US pilot, his mouth obscured by his mouthpiece. The composition draws the viewers' attention to the pilot's eyes, which are staring off camera and to the menacing cartoon skull emblazoned on his flying helmet. The caption draws the readers attention to the lengths the American technicians went to ensure that napalm was made more effective. The combination of these two images and the text is one of the strongest indictments of US military doctrine in Vietnam and contributed to one of the most persistent myths about the Vietnam War.

Televisiion brought the brutalities of war in to the comfort of the living room. Vietnam was lost in the living rooms of America - not on the battlefields of Vietnam.

(Marshall McLuhan Montreal Gazette 16 May 1975)

Many people still believe McLuhan's assertion that the Vietnam War was lost by the media not by the military, but this is to misunderstand the nature of the visual image. Although television brings pictures into the living room, it does not give the viewer the ability to analyse over a longer period of time and to any great depth. The moving image is transitory and lacks the intimate detail that is present in the still image. Whilst television has the power to subvert political policy, the still image has the power to subvert cultural ideology.

The cultural paradigm that was operating amongst the military in Vietnam and the politicians who sent them there was not one that was associated with the western understanding of the ways of war. There was a deep-seated racism operating at the time that described the Vietnamese as Gooks, Dinks, Zips and Slopes, and this was prevalent at all levels of the military and political hierarchy (Shay 1994). In Vietnam there was a need to dehumanise the enemy, but this has not always been an integral part
of war. Clausewitz describes the need for a soldier to hate his enemy, but did not require his dehumanisation. Where soldiers fought each other face to face, with spear and sword, there was more respect for the enemy. Homer's Greeks and Trojans, who shared a common language and common gods, repeatedly spoke of each other with honour and admiration and the greatest glory was achieved by fighting the greatest warriors. For Homeric warriors, there was moral and psychological advantage in glorifying the enemy; dishonouring the enemy and viewing them as sub-human would have debased their own humanity as well as reducing their *kudos* and in turn their own *kleos*.

Dehumanisation of the enemy in Vietnam does have roots in other wars: The wars against Native Americans, the Japanese in World War Two, North Koreans and Chinese during the Korean War, to some extent, all relied on dehumanisation. In fact, the term *gook* is a hang over from the Korean War and is a derogatory shortening of *hon gook*, Korean for 'Korean people'.

This cultural dissonance between the accepted ways of treating the enemy and civilian populations was played out throughout the Vietnam War and was destructive of soldiers' characters (Shay 1994). While the American Declaration of Independence stated that all men are born equal, General Westmoreland was saying "The oriental doesn't put the same high value on life as the Westerner — life is plentiful, life is cheap, in the orient". Such language, combined with Westmoreland's military tactics (not least the Phoenix Programme and Free Fire Zones) meant that the men on the frontline did not feel they were killing human beings, but something less than human, something less than themselves. The charges levelled at Lieutenant William Calley, the officer in charge during the My Lai massacre, did not include the word murder, or mention innocent men, women and children, but described the "killing of oriental human beings" - language specifically chosen to devalue the lives of those who died and lessen the indictment. *Kudos, timé* and *kleos* (the Greek Meme) and *nostos* were destroyed after the war for many veterans, leading to severe Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (Shay 2002).

The work of photographers such as Philip Jones Griffiths served to subvert the prevailing military culture, but this is not to say that the media were responsible for losing the war. This culture has been described as a "value-simple" model in comparison to the "value-rich" system of the western way of warfare with its roots in the Homeric tradition. In Vietnam a number of terms and acronyms became increasingly important to the military. SNAFU, *situation-normal-all-fucked-up*, came to symbolise the soldiers experience of war, while REMF, *rear-echelon-mother-fucker*, demonstrated their contempt for the command structure. In the Homeric tradition
there were many Gods who may or may not be on your side and could switch allegiance at any time, in the Vietnam War the Christian tradition provides only one God, and if God is your side then someone else must be to blame for things going wrong. In Vietnam, soldiers blamed the command for things going badly in the way that Homer’s heroes blamed angry, annoyed and inattentive gods, and in turn the commanders and politicians blamed the media. In truth the Vietnam War went badly because of the cultural dissonance experienced by the elites of America, a dissonance that was brought sharply in to focus on the pages of *Vietnam Inc.*
Chapter Three: Kudos
Images Transmitted from the Fleet

The Falklands War offers a unique opportunity to evaluate British attitudes to warfare, concepts of Britishness and the symbolism surrounding a culturally narrow representation of war. It is remarkable, and possibly unique in the history of photography, that a war was photographed only by photographers from the protagonist nations. The Royal Navy had initially attempted to stop any members of the press from sailing with the Task Force and a press party was only put together under pressure from the Ministry of Defence and the Cabinet Office. However, the press party was made up entirely of British citizens working for British newspapers, agencies and broadcasters and included only two press photographers, Tom Smith from Express Newspapers and Martin Cleaver from the Press Association.

The relationship of these two photographers with their military hosts was a particularly tense one that was marginally commented on in *Gotcha!* (Harris 1983) and *The Fog of War* (Mercer et al 1987). Both photographers had problems gaining access to their subjects, Smith in particular had difficulty in getting ashore after the San Carlos landings, and both had trouble transmitting their work back to the UK. Communications problems during the Falklands Crisis have historically been blamed on the Ministry of Defence, who were accused of failing to provide either the appropriate technology or the will to enforce access to Royal Navy systems, but this is not entirely fair. In 1982 the Press Association was in the habit of putting its photographers in the field with self-contained wire machines, but failed to do this during the Falklands Crisis. They had requested a place in the Task Force for one of the machines, but were refused an extra place for the operator that was demanded by the union. They then failed to send a machine with Cleaver, when under any other circumstances they would have sent the machine and sorted out any labour relations problem afterwards (Freedman 2005).

This limited complement of poorly equipped press photographers was accompanied on the Task Force by a number of official photographers, most notably Paul Haley of *Soldier Magazine*, Sergeant Ron Hudson from the Army’s Headquarters United Kingdom Land Forces (HQ UKLF) and three members of a Royal Marine News Team, as well as a number of ships photographers who were mainly engaged in producing images variously for ships records, intelligence reports and engineering work. During the course of the war this small group of photographers wired back to the UK a seemingly
amorphous body of work that could be viewed as a vernacular representation of war, since the selection, transmission and release of images was performed by those being represented, that is, the military, their colleagues, and to some degree, the press themselves. Those selecting images for transmission were also in many cases amateurs in the field of photography and this would have affected the selection process.

The embedding of the press within military units raised serious ethical questions for the press during the Iraq War, but this stemmed purely from modern methods of formalising arrangements. There has always been some level of embedding during war. Roger Fenton was reliant on the military during the Crimean War for both transport to the area and sustenance while he was there. The photographers of the First World War were civilian photographers who received King’s Commissions and were controlled by the Government’s propaganda machine (see Chapter Two). During the Falklands Crisis the press were embedded and reliant on the military for their daily existence in much the same way as Fenton, but they were also dependent on the military for access to the soldiers and the action, and ultimately, for the release of their material to their employers and the public. The amount of time photographers spent in isolation with the military and the degree of antagonism and co-operation between them indicates a relationship that must have affected their output, such that the released images became vernacular self-representations of the military.

"... with so few pictures from the scene of hostilities emerging in the press and with such heavy controls, every one that did must be read as a sign of deliberate government intent. They acquired the illusion of independent vision from their place of publication in an ostensibly free press, and they occasionally carried the by-line of the individual photographer. But given the military controls over the photographers and the censorship it exercised over their work, they must been seen as authored by the state.

(Brothers 1997: 208)

A major characteristic of the transmitted images is that as a complete body they seem ordinary. As the artist Jeff Wall has explained, “One of the essential things about the vernacular is that it is unimpressive, it is ordinary, worse than ordinary.” (Howarth et al 2005: 121). Many of the 202 images that we are led to believe are depictions of war, are, in reality, descriptions of the ordinary and commonplace life on military operations. Admittedly, military operations in themselves are not generally considered part of the commonplace
and ordinary, but even within the confines of war everyday events still take place and are photographed. It is a theme of British military visual self-representation to depict the heroic actions of combat and a whole genre of art has arisen to decorate mess walls throughout the armed forces (see Chapter Six), but photography has never been embraced in this role. This is an indication that photography, and in particular, vernacular photography, of military operations generally shows the commonplace and ordinary, and not the heroic.

Given their ordinariness, the transmitted images stand as a constructed narrative of warfare and, within the western military tradition, they can be seen as a visual ethnographic study of the military during the three months of the Falklands War. Pink (2001: 55) suggests that photography as an ethnographic requires a high degree of collaboration between the photographer and the subject tool, meaning that subjects are shown as they want to be seen by others. She goes on to argue that photographers, both professional and ‘lay’, do not produce images within the randomness of their own imagination, but through the internalisation of cultural regularities and within the context of social relationships, both pre-existing and temporal to the image making process. Within the confines of the Task Force it is clear that this would be the case with the military photographers. However, being in such close confines for an extended period of time, and with the pre-existing cultural common-ground of British identity and cultural history, the press photographers work would also be affected by their relationships with the military, leading to the conclusion that it is safe to assess the transmitted images as a single body of vernacular imagery. 

The House of Commons Defence Select Committee enquiry into media handling and press relations during the Falklands War stated that 202 images were wired back to the UK during the course of the war. It has previously been impossible to verify this and to assess the images, given that the ships transmission logs and the records of the Defence Press Office are no longer available. However, on investigation of a series of archival boxes at the Imperial War Museum at Duxford, a number of 5x4 copy negatives came to light that had not been catalogued or investigated before. Each of these 202 negatives had each been placed in a glassine bag with a hole-punched strip of gaffer tape attached, giving the appearance that they had at some point been in a ring binder. The adhesive from the tape had broken down and a number of negatives were infected and stuck to their bags. The poor state of the negatives was easily rectified when it became apparent that they were copy negatives from the original Fleet transmissions.
A number of prints from these negatives are available in the Imperial War Museum and Royal Marine Museum archives, but the copy negatives at Duxford are the only remaining set. The importance of them in evaluating the cultural significance of systems of photographic representation during the Falklands War cannot be overstated. With these images, we are not looking at a representation filtered through the photographer's eye, or by the military's degree of co-operation, or the censor's obfuscation, but a representation filtered through all three. They provide us with a full historical record of how British military society saw itself and how it wished to be viewed by outsiders during May and June 1982.

The 202 transmitted images span a period from late May to the 14th June, when the last Argentine prisoners were repatriated through Puerto Madryn, Patagonia. The wire machines joined the Task Force at Ascension Island and were distributed through the Fleet. The cataloguing system used on the images reflects this distribution of hardware with each image having a ship's identifier and sequential number. This follows a logical pattern except for those wired back from SS Canberra, where the sequence used on the ship is restarted at number one several times, although they remain a single sequence in the London records. The Canberra machine seems to have passed between ships during the war, arriving in HMS Fearless during the San Carlos landings and finishing in the SS Uganda at the repatriation of prisoners. The London records show the following number of images wired from each ship, or wire machine.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RFA Bedivere</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS Canberra</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFA Engadine</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFA Olna</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFA Stromness</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The majority of these images were wired back without dates and with only single sentence captions, and although it is tempting to view them as a large picture story, this is unhelpful. By 2004, Leading Airman (Photographer) Alistair Campbell, Falklands Conflict photographer with the Royal Marine News Team, was Lieutenant Campbell in charge of the Defence School of Photography at RAF Cosford. At an MoD conference he suggested that all that was needed to produce a picture story was to shoot enough material. This working methodology is endemic and problematic in most military photography, but is particularly evident with the Falkland's transmitted images. There should be more than enough material to provide several picture stories, but there is
insufficient cohesion to illustrate anything other than the vernacular and ordinary. They do, however, provide an historical insight into the instrumentality of the Falklands war, British military propaganda methodologies, and the western military tradition. But this is always going to be the case when images are collected in this random manner by many different photographers using many different working methodologies.

Instrumentalism

In the abiding instrumental and humanistic polarities of war, it would seem that the easiest thing to photograph would be the instrumental, but this type of image does not make up the majority, or the most important, of the Falklands wired images (see Missing Images at the end of this chapter for an important anomaly). On the 11 June two images of *HMS Invincible* (CNBR65/66 – Plates 77/78) were wired back to London. *Invincible* and *Hermes* were the ultimate symbols of instrumentality in the British armed forces and were the lynchpin of the war effort; without these ships the campaign to retake the Falklands would have foundered and as such the images were intended to demonstrate the technical superiority of the British over the invaders. To reinforce this superiority the decks of *HMS Invincible* were lined with Sea Harriers, an aircraft used extensively in the media to symbolise British engineering excellence, an idea reinforced by the sale of Harriers to the United States Marine Corps in the 1970s. The Americans rarely buy foreign weapons systems and the logic followed that they must be the best when they do. Another image of shipping (CNBR5 – Plate 17) shows an unnamed frigate ploughing through heavy seas in the South Atlantic and is reminiscent of cinematic representations of Atlantic Convoys during the Second World War. The unknown frigate adds the mythological glamour of the high seas to the drama of the impending war and operates as a cultural stereotype appealing to the British national ego about seamanship.

The limited scope of technology presented to the public during the war centres around very few pieces of equipment. The Sea Harrier remains the most potent symbol of British aggressive power during the Falklands war, but apart from the aircraft on the decks of the two carrier shots, there were only four images of the Harriers wired back. *Stromness 29* (Plate 199) shows a ground crew team from 801 Squadron, Fleet Air Arm, working on the engine and cockpit of a Sea Harrier. The shot is dated 10 June but the caption only lists the names of the crew, we cannot be sure which ship they are on, or who took the photograph. *Stromness 28* (Plate 198), a similar shot of a ground crew
working on Sea King helicopters, is captioned in the same sparse manner. The style of
the pictures and the lack of journalistic captions suggest that the pictures were publicity
images shot by the photographic section on board either HMS Hermes or HMS Invincible.
Although the men could be working in the photographs, the Harrier shot in particular
looks posed, producing a combination of technological and humanistic elements of war.

The men in the pictures are clearly fighting men in that they serve in the Royal Navy,
but they are not warriors as would be understood before the industrial revolution. In the
Iliad, the only men mentioned by name are the higher status warriors, or 'officers', and
no mention is made of the manufacturers of arms and armour. The Greek heroes view
their weapons in a reverential manner and the weapons are inseparable from the men
who use them in battle. In modern warfare, the warriors are no longer able to service
many of their own weapons and technicians are a vital part of any war effort. The
Greeks would not have acknowledged technicians as warriors and their presence in these
images reinforces the instrumentality that is now part of war. In later wars, the
helicopter pilots themselves have become technicians as cockpit cameras provide
evidence of the scientific distribution of death.

The other images of the Harriers carry less humanistic overtones and are
celebrations of pure instrumental power. All three of these images show the Harriers in
relation to the decks of carriers, Stromness 32 (Plate 202) shows a pilot climbing out of the
cockpit aboard HMS Invincible with HMS Hermes in the background. Olna 020 (Plate 167)
shows a Harrier on the decks of the landing ship HMS Fearless during a fuel stop. Like
many other images of the instrumentality of the Falklands war it is an image of the
everyday and commonplace. It can hardly be seen as a public relations image since the
aircraft is seen from the tail with the ship's fo'c'sle in the background. An arranged
publicity image would have been framed in the same way, but would have had the nose
of the aircraft in view rather than the tail. The image, as it stands, carriers the overtones
of a snapshot, a vernacular image shot by a crew member for a scrapbook, for personal
history rather than the public history that it has become.

The final Harrier shot depicts a jump-jet landing on HMS Hermes framed by the ships
fo'c'sle and cockpit of a Sea King (Canberra 20 – Plate 32). The Harrier hangs in the air
and all else is still. This is not an action shot of war but a peaceful moment of calm as a
warplane returns home. Without the caption the image is ambiguous since we are
looking at an aircraft flying away from the camera; the jet appears to be going
somewhere rather than coming home. The paradox is only resolved by the Harriers
position in relation to the flight deck; it would only be airborne after it was beyond the
ski-jump seen in the distance. The image has the symmetry of a planned shot but is unusual in that we expect, possibly through moving image representation, for returning aircraft to be photographed coming towards the camera. This lack of reliance on convention again suggests a type of vernacular imagery produced as part of a personal history, even though it was shot by Sergeant Ron Hudson, a professional army photographer.

The combination of 'Harriers and Carriers' was a constant theme throughout the war and, as such, it is surprising that they contribute so little to the quantity of transmitted images. A representational paradigm based on instrumental superiority would have made more of the weapons systems perceived to be more technologically advanced than those operated by the enemy. The system of representation operating during the Gulf War of 1992 did exactly that. However, the Gulf War was one of the first large technologically asymmetric wars, whereas the Falklands Conflict had technological symmetry between two industrialised and westernised nations.

A further set of what appears to be images of the instrumentality covers the landings from Falkland Sound. Many of these images are reminiscent of the Normandy landings of 1942 and show landing craft ploughing through the sea towards San Carlos. Canberra 17 (Plate 29) shows three landing craft leaving HMS Fearless, the landing ship shrouded in mist. It is impossible to tell if this is fog or smoke, but this is irrelevant. Although we are looking at warships heading into combat this is not the theme of the image. The images of the D-Day landings of 1942 have become embedded in Western European and American cultural identity and the Falklands landing images have to be viewed within this cultural frame. The pictures of landing craft ploughing into action echo the landings of 40 years earlier and brings to mind the work of photographers like Robert Capa. Although we being shown landing craft, the inference is Capa's blurred images of the dying men on the Normandy beaches. Although we are looking at landing craft we are thinking of the men inside them and the ordeal they are likely to face at the end of their short journey. The landing craft images are full of cultural connotations and are intensely humanistic in nature. They describe the build up to combat, the bravery of the fighting men and spirit of the western way of warfare.

The analogy to the Normandy beach landings was not lost on the newspapers. On the 24 May the Daily Mail ran three pictures of the Landing ships, Stromness 8, Canberra 14 and Canberra 17 under the strap line, "IN WAVE AFTER WAVE, THE TROOPS GO IN TO STAY." The image of landing ships heading ashore with HMS Fearless in the background carries an original caption written in a typically dry military language:
“Landing craft speed ashore in the Falklands from the assault ship HMS Fearless” (Plate 29). The caption, rewritten for publication took on a more heroic tenor and concentrated on the men rather than the instruments, “Amid the smoke of war, fearless men from Fearless: Clattering through the skies, lurching through the water.” It is clear that traditional western heroism is present in the minds of the pressmen.

There are images of men packed like sardines, 8 wide and 25 deep, into the landing craft. They show the intensely personal nature of warfare, the closeness of military comrades as they enter the battlefield. The comparison to the wooden ships of Greece as they arrive on the beaches of Troy is easily made, since it is hard to ignore that in both cases men were arriving by sea; they were approaching a foreign land, foreign to the British in the sense that few had heard of the islands and, excepting a handful of Royal Marines, none had been there before; they were there to avenge a national insult; they had the backing of an aggrieved, angry, and powerful nation; they were sent by a charismatic leader, although the British fighting men were only metaphorically led in to battle by theirs. They were out on a limb and success was by no means sure. This easily made analogy has deep cultural roots and it shows us the nexus of instrumentality and humanity.

The most impressive images of the instrumentality of war are those that show the attacks on the shipping and beachheads at San Carlos and Port San Carlos. Argentine Skyhawk and Mirage jets attacked shipping in the Falkland Sound throughout the landings and had some dramatic and impressive successes, most notable the attack on HMS Ardent, which was photographed by Martin Cleaver. There were nine images of the battle for Falkland Sound wired back; one shows a Mirage jet passing in front of hillside and coming under anti-aircraft fire from an unnamed ship, while the other eight show jets passing close by ships, or ships coming under attack. The single image of a Mirage being attacked is one of the very few images of British offensive action in progress and was used extensively in the media (Stromness 18, Plate 188). The image is full of drama and is a superb example of the instrumentality of modern warfare that still manages to capture the humanity on either side of the battle. The juxtaposition of the Mirage jet and the air-burst shell seem at first glance to be purely instrumental, but the proximity of death brings into the viewers' imagination the men behind the weapons. However, the imagination of the viewer is based in culture and identity, and reflects the humanity of war. British, Argentine and non-partisan viewers will view this image differently, and their sympathies for the men involved will fall accordingly.

This evocation of attack, defence, enmity and sympathy is reversed in the images of
ships being bombed. None of the captions carry dates, so we do not know when they were wired, although we can work out when they were shot. The four images of Argentine jets passing close by British shipping have little, if any, humanistic implication. There is no direct evidence that these are pictures of war other than the veracity of the captions and, like all the wired images, they carry the barest possible information; the ships are either unnamed or the names are deleted by the censors. It is impossible to tell from the negatives whether the captions were censored before or after transmission but the images remain an important contribution to the coverage of the war.

The few images of instrumentality that show us the land warfare systems are poorly framed and anodyne. We are shown only a handful of British weapons and they do not present an adequate description of instrumentality that would be recognised by either Homer or modern day critics of war photography. Homeric warriors were reliant on their weapons in a manner that was not part of the propagandist paradigm during the Falklands war, where there were serious concerns over issues such as poor quality boots and uniforms that were leading to trench foot and other cold weather injuries. It is hard to say whether the Ministry of Defence's equipment concerns filtered down to affect the work of the photographers on the ground, but as we have already said, the transmitted images were collectively produced cultural propaganda and, as such, these issues cannot be discounted when viewing the transmitted images as a body of work.

In the Kosovo campaign and the Gulf War, the depiction of the instrumentality of combat took a different turn. The use of weapons systems cameras for the production of propaganda during these wars is well documented. It was used as the mainstay of government news output, shocking the western world into believing that the wars were clean and free from 'collateral damage'. In this sense the cultural representation of the Falklands War stands as the antithesis of the representation of the Gulf War as a technical conflict without civilian casualties.

The image Bedwere 10 (Plate 10) is typical of the instrumental land warfare images produced during the Falklands Conflict in that it appears to be poorly framed; the 105mm light gun occupies only the top half of the image, the muzzle is out of frame and the marines occupying the gun are clearly posed. We can be sure that the photographer mediated the scene to show us the gun and the gunners in their working environment in much the same way that Fenton photographed *A Quiet Day at the Mortar Battery* in 1855. Fenton's images, however, were intended to show that life in the Crimea was quiet and dull, and were made in response to negative press reports, particularly from William Howard Russell. Peter Holdgate's picture was produced to show that the
British were well armed, powerful and ready for combat. Fenton's soldiers sleep on the mortars, whilst Holdgate's man the guns and are ready for action.

Although the image is meant to be a representation of the power of the Royal Artillery the intention is spoiled by the composition. The caption, *A gun crew of a 105mm light gun of 29 Commando, Royal Artillery pound Stanley*, claims that this is an action shot, an image of war, with the pounding taking place as the image is produced, even though we know that Stanley was never shelled. But there are inconsistencies that challenge this. The shell casings on the floor in front of the gun would usually be behind the gun immediately after being fired. These shell casings are either the result of earlier action or from another gun. The soldier sat on the floor to the left of the gun would almost certainly not be sat there if the gun were in action; the noise and recoil make it very uncomfortable to be so close. Also the soldiers to the rear of the gun are too relaxed and in the wrong positions to be firing it.

The figure of a Royal Marine entering the frame from the right grabs the viewers' immediate attention and is the final nail in the coffin of the idea that this gun is in action. The caption talks of the gun crew, but we cannot know if this man is part of the crew or not. His demeanour suggests he is a bystander to the main action and either watching the image making processes or moving through the scene. Either way, both this man and the photographer are not in a good position if the gun were to fire; both would almost certainly be injured and possibly killed by the explosive discharge and muzzle flash. This soldier is watching us watching the gun crew and in doing so draws us away from the very thing under examination. He is the centre of attention and the ambiguity at the heart of this image, bringing the humanity back into the instrumentality of war.

The final set of images of the instrumentality of war depicts the destroyed weapons and detritus of the battles for Grytviken, Goose Green and Port Stanley. Royal Navy photographer Jim Fletcher went ashore after the recapture of South Georgia and made numerous pictures, some of which were wired back to the UK. Prime Minister Thatcher had made it a political as well as military goal to regain the islands and it is not surprising that images were wired back as soon as possible. *Canberra 38* (Plate 50) shows the remains of the Santa Fe submarine in Grytviken harbour. All that can be seen of the boat is the conning tower sticking out of the water at the side of harbour wall. This image has the air of a tourist picture in that there are no people in the shot, but we can see the town in the background, locating the submarine in the battlefield rather than the scrap yard.
Tom Smith, Martin Cleaver, Ron Hudson and Paul Haley all made pictures of the battlefield at Goose Green soon after the surrender, and like the Santa Fe image some of them have an appearance of vernacular tourism. It is not surprising that these images were taken, but it is curious that they were wired back to the UK as part of the propaganda campaign. The pictures of destroyed Puccara aircraft show us the destruction dealt out by the British on the airfield and garrison at Goose Green, but since no cameras were present during the battle all that was left to photograph was the damage. There are four images of the Puccaras and each shows either military or civilians posing with, or examining the damage. Evidence that these images lie within the domain of military tourism is confirmed by two images taken by Sergeant Ron Hudson from the Army's United Kingdom Land Forces press office and Paul Haley from Soldier Magazine, who photographed each other in front of the aircraft. Although these images were not wired back, they are now part of the Imperial War Museum Archive.

The images of burnt out, scrap yard aircraft show the destruction at Goose Green, but they do not really depict the defeat of the enemy in any humanistic way that the viewer could relate to. The two press photographers with the Task Force, Martin Cleaver and Tom Smith, photographed the equipment dumped by the surrendering Argentine forces and both had images wired back to the UK showing a line of helmets, rifle magazines, ammunition and water bottles stretching out into the distance, but the more interesting of the two photographs is Martin Cleavers (Canberra 40 Plate 52). Shot from a much lower angle the density of equipment appears to be increased and the line is made to extend to the horizon. Tom Smith included three people in the middle distance and although they are in silhouette they appear to be walking towards the camera (Canberra 52 Plate 64). The distance between them and the photographer gives some sense of scale, but Cleaver included only a single figure in the far distance, almost on the horizon. This reinforces the immensity of the line, each helmet representing an enemy soldier disarmed and imprisoned; the personalisation of the defeated mass, the token of the individual in the deconstructed army.

This amount of personal equipment in such close proximity gives the impression of hand-to-hand fighting, of two armies slugging it out face-to-face. We know from the captions, and from historical records, that a large number of Argentines surrendered at Goose Green and that this is the equipment dropped by them as part of the surrender process. However, it also represents the line of confrontation between the two opposing forces, the last point at which they were at war, the moment of defeat and victory frozen.
in time. This type of scene has been photographed as long as the camera has been on
the battlefield and the Goose Green images stand comparison to Felice Beato's images
of the Secundrabagh Palace after the Indian Mutiny and the Taku Forts after the defeat
of the Chinese in the Second Opium War, as well as the Union Dead on the Battlefield at
Gettysburg by Timothy O'Sullivan.

However, in the Goose Green images, there is a sanitisation and inversion of the
normal representational model, of which Beato and Sullivan are exemplars. Beato, who
made a living by selling individual images and albums to British military officers,
photographed the skeletal remains of mutineers in Lucknow and the bodies of the
Chinese soon after the battle for the Taku Forts, while Sullivan photographed the sun
blistered remains of soldiers after Gettysburg. The dead that litter the battlefield are
often photographed and are part of the concentration of humanistic systems of
representation. The Goose Green images sanitise and invert this paradigm by not
including the dead, but showing us the equipment dumped by the survivors. We are
made aware of the scale of human commitment, risk, and heroism in battle by being
show the scale of the remains, something not evident in the images of the Puccaras.

Vox Populi Vox Dei.

In 1976 the Army published Public Relations Photography (Army Publication Code
71099), a booklet designed to assist public relations staff in producing photographs for
publication in newspapers. It contained a series of do's and don'ts of public relations
photography, with such comments as "DO organise the people involved into the sort of picture
YOU want. Continue to organise them until you are satisfied." And, "DON'T hesitate to ask people
to move about or for equipment to be shifted around if the result will be a better picture." The booklet
is illustrated with 16 examples of good and bad PR pictures, but the concentration (11
bad, 5 good) is towards showing how not to do it. It defines the style and standards of
photography and caption writing required for images sent to the media and how
military personnel should go about putting them together.

The underlying precept of the book is to give a voice to the common soldier, in the
belief that the common people will more easily relate to these voices. The vehicle for
getting this voice across is the local newspaper, local rather than national, and the term
used by the Army in 1976 to describe this work was the 'Local Boy Story'; a term used
up to the mid 1990s when it was changed to 'Home Town Story'.

The main points of the booklet are that the subject's face must be large enough in the
frame to be recognisable by family and friends and that everyone in the picture should be from the same town. In this light it is easy to see that a number of human interest Local Boy Story pictures were produced during the Falklands Crisis, by both military and press photographers, and that these images were public relations based. However, given the nature of the Falklands War, and the obvious interest of the national newspapers, the home town aspect of the stories was less important as people from different parts of the UK were placed in professional rather than geographic groups for distribution to the national media. And once again, the argument stands that although press photographers shot some of the pictures, the pictures were censored, wired and released by Ministry of Defence staff, both with the Task Force and in London. As such they should be assessed together with the other wired images as propaganda.

A number of images were wired back to the UK that fall firmly in this genre of Local Boy Stories, both individuals and small groups. Some were intended for particular newspapers, for example, Tom Smith wired back several pictures specifically for the Daily Express, but they were still made available to other media outlets through the pooling system. The wider circulation of work through the pool was part of the agreement for all press accompanying the Task Force.

In peacetime, Local Boy Stories are part of a system of propaganda designed to engender understanding and goodwill towards the armed forces through the medium of the press. The received wisdom is that taxpayers have a right to know what the army, as a public service, is doing, and that disseminating this information at a local and easily understood level is a good way of achieving this. Given that most people do not have, or wish to have, an in-depth knowledge of the military it is believed that human interest stories are a good way to communicate with the public and foster goodwill towards the armed forces. In recent years this theory has come under pressure from changing political attitudes to the warrior concept and there has been an increasing reliance on human interest stories about charity work and sporting excellence, rather than military superiority.

In warfare the civilian population has always been vital to success on the battlefield. The Greeks spent ten years away from home during the Trojan War and Odysseus spent another ten years trying to get home. The Greek army was also made up of kings, farmers and tradesmen who went back to their civilian occupations after the war. They did not have an organised standing army, although within the city-state of Sparta all men were expected to undergo formal and prolonged military training. The Greeks had a martial culture and the civilian population were part of the system. Carl von
Clausewitz was equally categorical on the involvement of the populace in the conduct of war. The trinity that he describes places the general population as one of the elements that are required to wage war successfully (see Chapter One). He argues that a society must have a moral strength and a predisposition to violence for the nation to be successful in war. From these arguments, the conclusion that a society needs a cultural, if not factual, understanding of its armed forces is clear and it is this cultural understanding that should be at the heart of the Local Boy Story.

In peacetime the genre mutates in response to perceived cultural changes in the populace and changes in political climate, but within the group of images wired back from the Falklands Conflict there are number of shots that use the personal to address a cultural understanding of the military. The difficulty we have in assessing the Falklands human interest stories and their cultural significance is that the textual information is largely missing. Some of the captions are just long enough to give a flavour of the stories the pictures illustrate, but this is barely enough. Others have no caption at all, not even the soldiers names. However, the cultural analysis of these images can be separated from the larger story.

The first image to be wired back from *SS Canberra* was a group-shot of the ships Merchant Navy medical team (Plate 13). It is interesting that this first picture is of civilian crew members and this could be explained by Tom Smith's desire to get something shot and back to the UK quickly. Both Tom Smith and the wire machines joined the ship at Ascension Island and the 'civilians' would have been an easy target for the press photographer, that is, it was easy to get access to photograph them and easy to get the pictures past the censors. However, the image has deeper meanings within traditional western representations of war. This is the manifestation of the other within the warriors' world. The medical team is made up of three women and two men. The central figure, Doctor Peter Mayner, is the surgeon in charge of the team. Stood square to the camera and with arms folded, he dominates the group and sets the gender roles for the team, the society from which they come and the military society in which they are working. The three women are all in physical contact with the surgeon, the two at the side of him have one arm behind him, while the third is resting her chin on his shoulder. On either side of the image, a hand rests on the shoulder of each woman. Disjointed from the owner, the hands serve to frame the group in exclusion from the fifth, male member of the group.

The hands logically belong to the two people who make up the back row of the group, but the illusion is of something else. There is no problem with the hand on the
right, but on the left it seems to be in the wrong place for both possible owners. The man seems twisted the wrong way and too far back to put his hand there. He is the only one with his shoulders turned away from the camera and he seems almost removed from the group by the strong social bond that seems to be present between the others. The woman with her chin on the surgeon's shoulder is the other possible owner of the stray hand, even though she seems too far away. But, with her chin on the surgeon's shoulder, she has the body language to be the owner of the mysterious hand. She seems to be placing a protective belt around the other women and their boss, keeping out the other member of the team behind them.

We could also say that the four are separated from the fifth by profession. They are the medical practitioners, he is the dispenser, but surely dissecting the team in this manner would leave a professional colleague tangibly excluded from the group. But the dispenser is smiling and we really know that his hand is on the nurse's shoulder. There lies a deeper explanation to this apparent division, through composition and body language, of the medical team.

*The Iliad* begins with arguments between men and gods for the possession of women: Apollo demands the return of Agamemnon's war prize, Chryseis, to her father, one of Apollo's priests, and brings down plague and sends fiery arrows at the Greeks until they comply. Agamemnon hands her back but takes Achilles' prize, Briseis for himself. This is to prove to Achilles, and the rest of the warriors, that he was better than them all, that he alone amongst the Greeks should not go without a war prize. This argument about *kudos* and *timé* sets the tenor for the whole epic, the relationships between men, between men and women and between the mortals and immortals. The picture of the P&O medical team sums up the Iliadic discord over the possession of women and is a fitting opening to the representational paradigm of the Falklands war.

The feminine connection to war is repeated in two images of individual 'warriors'. *Oba 03* (Plate 150), shot after the landings at St Carlos, carries the caption "Picture to tie in with feature by Alistair McQueen, D Mirror on young marine (for pool). Picture by Pete Holdgate. 04 Jun 1982." The image is of a young Royal Marine, almost certainly named in the story, taking time to write something in a large note pad. It is fair to assume that he is writing home since he is not using a military notebook. The evidence of war is in his rifle leaning against the timber fence and the bergen (military rucksack) and webbing he is sitting on. The cultural understanding that the viewer would have of this image is the young soldier reaching out to his home.

We don't know if he is writing to his mother, girlfriend or wife, but the implication of
otherness, the other away from the front line, is a feminine other. The marine is connecting back with the civilian society that sent him to war and with those left at home. Lieutenant David Tinker RN famously wrote a series of letters up to the point of his death on board *HMS Glamorgan*, published by his father after the war. The letters were sent to his mother and father, friends and, most importantly, to his wife, Christine. Tinker's letters are poignant, thoughtful and sensitive, and in the picture of the young marine we can see the warrior laying down his personal thoughts and feelings for someone at home; thoughts and feelings he may well not be sharing with his warrior comrades. The feminine centre of the picture is reinforced by the marines knitted white gloves. They are not military issue and they could have been bought by the marine himself, or equally given by a mother, girlfriend or wife. Either way they connote the comfort of home, the comfort of the civilian, and the feminine other.

The connection to the feminine other is further explored in *Canberra 24* (Plate 36). The picture shows *HMS Ardent* survivor Eric Samson finding a picture of his wife and new-born baby in the *Daily Mirror*. The sailor is giving the thumbs-up and holding the paper with the picture of his wife and child, but the headline story on the same page is about last minute negotiations. The censor with the Fleet saw this as fit for release and sent it back to the MoD, however, the wired page was marked “NOT FOR RELEASE” when it arrived in London. It is hard to see why this image was withheld, but there is a mixed message that would be difficult to reconcile. Eric is a survivor of *HMS Ardent* and is smiling and giving the thumbs up, but pictures of his wife and new baby do not outweigh the fact that he is smiling even though twenty two of his comrades died when the ship was attacked. It is possible that bereaved families would see his happiness as incongruous with their loss. This is one situation where the cultural connection of the warrior with the feminine other is easily misunderstood. The image provides *timé* for Samson, but shows him giving very little respect and honour for other sailors.

Tom Smith of the *Daily Express* shot a number of culturally propagandist images, particularly immediately after joining SS *Canberra* at Ascension Island. He was responsible for the shot of the medical team as well as pictures of soldiers training on board ship, naval commanders posing with Bofors guns and even a honeymoon couple. Some of these are inexplicable in the narrative of combat and even within the preparation for war. For example, the circumstances in which a ship's captain and senior officers would be manning anti-aircraft Bofors guns is quite unimaginable. However, this does have cultural significance within the western representations of war. The two senior officers were demonstrating solidarity with the junior ranks, that they were
fighting alongside them and taking the same risks. This was an appeal to the masses, showing that British officers were one and the same as the men, but for officers to be part of the *vox populi* they had to be shown in situations that belonged to the common people. Glory in battle traditionally belongs to those who engage the enemy and although officers in command of ships take the same risks as everybody else on board they do not actually fight the enemy in the same way as the Greeks leaders. The Bofors image shows two Royal Navy Officers staking their claim on the *kudos* and *timê* that comes with direct action against an enemy in combat.

**Heroes and Villains.**

The history of photography is littered with images that have changed their meaning over the course of time. Meaning within a photograph is dependent on interpretation, and interpretation is dependent on many things, including culture, experience, knowledge and time-scale. As John Taylor reminds us “Photography never had a stable meaning, but has always moved along a scale from plain fact to unreliable evidence” (Taylor *Source* 2005 Issue 44: 20). This is particularly the case with war. The interpretation of actions taken in combat and the status of a warrior or soldier after the war will be dependent on the outcome of the war. Shay (2003) discusses at length the state of mind of American Vietnam War veterans in relation to the outcome of the war. His theory, based on long term psychoanalytical work with the veterans, is that many of the cases of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder came to light after the war was lost, leading to conclusion that if the war had been won the mental health history of his patients would have been better. He describes a state of limbo that exists between the events that caused the trauma and the point when the trauma manifests itself. This only ends when history makes a judgement on the events and the soldier is hailed a hero or a villain; a conquering hero or a marauding villain.

This period of limbo also manifests itself within photographic images of war. Take for example Larry Burrows essay *Yankee Papa 13*. Originally shot as a pro-war piece, its current meaning as an anti-war polemic only came to the fore when attitudes to the war changed. In essence, this is a question of waste, that is, pain and suffering becomes worthwhile only in the winning, as the vanquished become the guilty; guilt leading to PTSD, knowledge of which generates the meaning of the photographs. The desire by the British armed forces and government to keep the press away from the Falklands battlefield can be seen in this light. As the troops went ashore there was no certainty
that they would win and a state of limbo would surround the images until the outcome was determined. Press access was never assessed in this long term way, but the desire of the military command to protect its personnel from a media inquisition and politicians to protect themselves from attack is a fear manifest in Shay's limbo.

The images that are most affected by this fear are those of actual combat. A real problem during the Falklands war was the ability of photographers to make pictures of combat at all, as most of the fighting took place under the cover of darkness. This is the main reason given by photographers who were there for their lack of combat images. However, there are some images depicting the aftermath of combat on the soldiers, particularly the battle for Mount Longdon and the attack on the British ships Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram at Bluff Cove.

The Bluff Cove images were shot by Martin Cleaver, and although there are no pictures of the attack or close ups of the efforts to save the men on board the ships, there are two shots of helicopters flying around the ships and one shot of life boats coming ashore. Although the images show the heroic efforts to save the men trapped on board burning ships they do not delve into heroism in any kind of Homeric way. The men of Yankee Papa 13 made their rescue attempt under enemy fire and were photographed at close quarter. Their status as warriors and their heroism, as opposed to those rescued, is plain to see. At Bluff Cove the heroism was different. Here the heroes were the victims: a paradigm of representation that has been repeated consistently in recent years, whether at the Hillsborough disaster, 9/11 in New York, 7/7 in London or the Asian tsunami. To merely survive is to be heroic.

At the battle for Mount Longdon a number of the injured were photographed, of which a single image forms part of the wired record of the war. However, the caption reinforces the limbo status of such images:

\[\text{CNBR 44 LAST CASUALTIES FROM MT LONGDON ON EVE CEASE FIRE. BRIT. PARA. POOL PHOTO: TOM SMITH} \text{ (Plate 96)}\]

The battle for Mount Longdon took place on the night of the 11-12 June and the injured would have been photographed on the morning of the 12, but the picture was not wired until after the cease fire on the 14. It is not possible that the injured would still have been receiving treatment in the field on the eve of the cease-fire (13), but this mistake in the caption is probably just a mix up. It is also possible that an image shot so close to the cease-fire would not have been available for transmission until after the
fighting had stopped since it would have taken time to get the film to Canberra for processing and wiring. However, the end of hostilities changed the status of this image. It would have remained in Shay's limbo while ever the fighting continued and it is possible that it would never have been transmitted if the fighting had continued for another week.

A related image, Canberra 43 (Plate 55), from the battle for Goose Green was wired during the conflict, however, this showed Argentine prisoners carrying a wounded comrade from the battlefield and would not have suffered from the same conflict of time. Limbo only exists in the photographic image for the pictures of the viewers' own side as they do not assess the value of loss or sacrifice in the forces they are trying to defeat. The image bears a remarkable compositional comparison to one of the best known photographs of the First World War. John Warwick Brooke photographed British stretcher bearers carrying a wounded man through the mud of Passchendaele on the second day of the battle (Carmichael 1989: 64). The significant difference in detail, however, is that in the Goose Green image the face of the stretcher bearers are all hooded and in deep shadow. There is no evidence of a conscious decision to hide the identity of the prisoners within the modern interpretation of the Geneva Convention, that prisoners of war should be protected from all public scrutiny. Later images of prisoners clearly identify them. The hooded faces and dark shadows represent the shame of defeat and guilt following the unjustified aggression of invasion that would be applied by a British viewer. The image is a denial of honour and shows little respect for the photographed soldiers; it is a denial of timêt. The British soldiers who fought at Goose Green speak with respect for their enemy in a battle that could so easily have been lost, and the fact that they still talk about the abilities of the enemy with respect grants them kleos, if not the kudos of victory.

Attitudes to Argentine soldiers were further explored in a number of images of prisoners taken captive before the ceasefire. Canberra 44 (Plate 56) shows a British soldier standing guard over a group of prisoners sat on the floor. They look cold, dejected, and defeated with hands in pockets and the hoods of arctic parkas pulled over their heads. Only two prisoners have their faces up and only one is looking up. There are several images of Argentines from Goose Green and Mount Longdon already in captivity, giving themselves up, or being escorted into custody, as well as the famous pictures of an Argentine wearing a Royal Marine sweater. All these images are intended to show the superiority of the British over their enemies, to show the later as cowards and thieves, and demonstrate the inevitability of their defeat.
The Parachute Regiment fought a long and fierce battle for Mount Longdon during the last few days of the war and pictures of prisoners conform to these ideals of British superiority. *Canberra* 91 (Plate 103), with a position in the sequence that suggest the image was wired after the ceasefire, has an Argentine being led off the mountain by a Paratrooper. The British soldier, with weapon, helmet, and broad smile, towers above the bemused, cloth capped prisoner, who he holds by the elbow. This is a scene reminiscent of a policeman taking a young tearaway home; a man and boy in the act of correction. Another Longdon image shows another cloth capped Argentine coming down the mountain alone, with his hands raised (Plate 101). Both these images conform to the propaganda paradigm of the inferior enemy. Once again, this image is a denial of the Argentines *timé*. The defeated enemy appears as a Platonic barbarian, a unworthy enemy not worthy of respect.

*Stromness* 11 (Plate 182) and *Canberra* 85 (Plate 97) show Argentine prisoners confronting the camera. Only in these two images are the prisoners allowed to retain their dignity. *Stromness* 11 shows the prisoner wearing the Royal Marine sergeant's sweater, probably looted from Moody Brook Barracks, and stands in contrast to *Stromness* 10, a picture of the same prisoner. In *Stromness* 10 the prisoner is represented as culturally and diametrically opposite to his escort. The Argentine is portrayed as a thief, a disempowered vagabond under arrest, but also someone who is worthy of our sympathy, since the image and caption reinforce the stereotype and widely held misconception that the entire Argentine force was made up of poorly equipped conscripts, forced to loot clothing just to stay warm. However, *Stromness* 11 (Plate 181) gives back dignity and the status of warrior to the Argentine. Instead of a captive looter we are engaging at a highly personal level with a true man of war. Instead of a looter we now have a man straight out of Homeric and Classic legend. In the Homeric vision this man has taken the armour of his defeated enemy in just the same way the dead were stripped on the fields of Troy. In the Classic period, Plato described the low and base nature of stripping the dead as the final insult to a vanquished enemy. The Argentine looter can be seen within both these arguments, but the most prominent vision is always culturally partisan to the viewer. Either way, he is not the ill-equipped amateur of *Stromness* 10, but a physically if not mentally defeated enemy.

Representations of British warriors are harder to find within this propagandist collection of wired images. *Olna* 17 (Plate 164) is the only shot that questions the belief that there are no images of combat. A three man mortar section is about to drop a charged round down a mortar barrel. The team is well dug in and surrounded by both
full and empty mortar tubes. Attempting to get a picture from this angle could lead to muzzle flash injury to the photographer, but it is possible that this is a real action shot. The marines are in the right places around the mortar to be in action and the round appears ready to fire. The rain has soaked the men, who have their hoods pulled over their heads, and the reflections from the wet waterproofs increase the contrast giving an undoubted impression of men under fire. This image is unique in the canon of wired images and is difficult to place in the genre of propagandist paradigm evident in most of the other images. It has the distinct feel of a combat image.

The single most iconic image of the Falklands war was shot by Petty Officer Peter Holdgate of the Royal Marine News Team. The picture of a company of Marines walking away from the camera with the Union Jack flying from the radio antenna has been used in countless newspapers, books, book covers and has even been made into a statue outside the Royal Marine Museum in Portsmouth. After arriving back in the UK the original negatives have had a chequered history. Using two cameras, Holdgate made the image in both black and white and colour, and all the negatives were returned to the Fleet Photographic Unit immediately after the war, before finally ending up in the Royal Marine Museum archive. They were lent out to numerous people over the following years and poor record keeping now means that they have been lost to the public record and all published versions we now see are duplicates made from just a few original prints.

The caption for Canberra 98 (Plate 110) reads: "With Stanley in the distance, 45 Commando advance on the capital after marching right across East Falkland." The image and the caption gripped the public imagination as the yomp (Marine slang for route marching) from San Carlos to Stanley played well with the British social ego in respect to the superiority of its armed forces over an inferior enemy. In terms of propaganda the Marines were endowed with an almost god-like strength and determination that they mustered during the journey and this was set against the perceived weakness of the conscript army waiting for them. However, many veterans tell of their shock at the ability and strength of the opposition and the close run thing that many battles were, but this was not part of the contemporary discourse.

In an interview with Peter Holdgate, now working as picture editor on the Plymouth Evening Herald, I was told that the image was shot on the 14 of June as the Marines were walking between Two Sister and Mount Tumbledown on their way to Port Stanley (Personal Interview Bingham/Holdgate). It was the last image of British soldiers at war to be wired back from Canberra and was marketed heavily by the Ministry of Defence.
and used by the media as a symbol of national identity, national pride, and nationalism. Clausewitz said "Fighting .... is a trial of moral and physical forces through the medium of the latter" (1989: 127) and for the British, this image acted as a metonym to prove that they had both moral and physical superiority over their enemy. The image has remained an icon for military and civilians alike. For the military, with their love of tradition and their reverence for past glories, the icon is still alive and valid, but for the non-military viewer this is an icon of the military ideal, of what they want, and expect, their military to be, but not necessarily what they believe them to be.

The most significant piece of rose-tinted cultural propaganda is Canberra 12 (Plate 24). A Paratrooper enjoys a cup of tea over the garden fence with a group of Falkland Islanders at San Carlos. Guaranteed to appeal to the British public, the cultural significance of this image cannot be overstated. The picture was wired back from the islands almost as soon as it was shot and was used to reinforce the British identity of the islanders. In propagandist and Clausewitzian terms the argument is simple; the people will be more willing to accept sacrifice if they view those they are fighting for as part of their group. The Islanders famously have a strange accent, often unrealistically described in the press as Devonian, but in reality more antipodean and easily mistaken for New Zealand. It was necessary to break any illusion that the southern hemisphere history of these people made them any less British and to many people, of many different nationalities, there is nothing more British than a cup of tea. But the construction of this image not only reinforces the Britishness of the civilian population, it also reinforces the status of the British soldier in society. He remains firmly outside the fence while the people stay inside, he is the outsider, the other, but still retains his essential normality, an internal other. The soldier in British society, as seen in this image, is the warrior who protects society from the external other, the things that are outside the fence and beyond the realm of the bounded photograph.

In the garden fence image it is impossible to tell if the Paratrooper is a soldier or an officer, but the impression given is that he is either a senior soldier or an officer. This impression is partially generated by the other images of civilian interaction where soldiers are seen digging trenches with local children, while Major General Moore is seen shaking hands with a baby and attending a church service. There is a morality operating in these images that expresses the hierarchical nature of the military and the levels at which different warriors function. In the Iliad, the officer ranks have status and names while the lower ranks are never mentioned as individuals (for example, Achilles and his Myrmidons) which accords with the genealogy of morals discussed by Nietzsche.
who defined a difference between good and bad. He argued that there is no pure form of good or evil, their definitions depending on cultural normality and social superiority (Nietzsche 2003).

He argued that good belongs to the higher race, the aristocratic, the winners in society, while bad belongs to the lower race, the proletarian. The picture of the soldier drinking tea over the garden fence demonstrates that Nietzsche's genealogy is not fixed, that it is mobile and dependent upon perspective. In this single image, the soldier could be either master or worker; indeed there would be a temptation to assume that he is a worker given the cultural link between the British worker and tea drinking. But put into context with the other images, where workers are seen working and in the presence of children, he begins to take on the air of an officer. The officers converse at a higher level, with adults and especially adult outsiders, while the workers are left to dig holes and entertain the children. In the Homeric model, where the officers are the heroes, status is a vital part of heroism, but applied to the Nietzsche model and photography the sense of heroism is a question of viewpoint and otherness. The application of heroism as a moral code is hierarchical when applied to the military. Heroism for officers can reside in words, for soldiers it is in action, as if the Homeric model of heroic orator and fighter has been split. For example Lieutenant Colonel Tim Collins who led the 1st Battalion, The Royal Irish Regiment during the Iraq war was famously heroic for his eve of battle speech, not his actions in combat.

The portrait of Major General Moore wired on the 8 June (Plate 165) and the picture of him with the surrender document places the General in the sphere of warrior hero, he is the Odysseus of the Falklands war. He is not the King, he is not Menelaos, but he is the man whose tactical genius won the war. This is Nietzschean philosophy in that his rank and his place in the hierarchy make him good, and thus a hero.

The final pictures of the war that place the lower ranks in the realm of the heroic are a series of images of flag raisings after the surrender. Alistair Campbell and Peter Holdgate of the Royal Marine News Team photographed groups of Marines raising Union Jacks in Port Stanley. It was fitting that this honour should be given to the Marines as they were the ones who had lost the Islands in the original invasion and they were the ones who wanted to be seen taking them back. The importance of these images to the propaganda campaign was clearly evident at the time since five of the pictures were wired back. One shot of a group of Marines was wired from two different ships while another scene was photographed twice. Stromness 2 (Plate 174) and Stromness 04 (Plate 175) show the same small group of three Marines raising a Union Jack on a
white flagpole. In the first shot they are alone and looking at the flag, but in the second they have been joined by a number of local civilians. In this shot the Marines all engage the camera while the civilians are left to look at the flag. This is not simply a matter of the warriors reclaiming lost land, but is another statement of moral superiority over both the vanquished and the liberated. Where tea over the garden fence is a statement of British inclusiveness, the flag raising is an imposition of British authority.

Nemesis

After the surrender had been signed, a surprising amount of prisoners of war pictures were made and wired back to the UK. In total, 48 out of the 202 transmitted images were of the disarmament process and the repatriation of Argentine prisoners. Combined with the prisoners that were photographed after the San Carlos landings and the battles for Goose Green and Mount Longdon, more than a quarter of all the images received in London were of POWs. The post conflict images include shots from the streets of Port Stanley, the barbed wire fenced camps and the repatriation and hospital ships. The final wired images, and those that conclude the Falklands Conflict were shot at Puerto Madryn, when the prisoners were repatriated. This collection of images would be impossible to produce in more recent conflicts as current interpretation of the Geneva Convention protects prisoners of war from all public scrutiny, including photographs. This only adds to the importance of the Falklands POW pictures and their uniqueness in post-war western photography.

Paul Haley, Ron Hudson and Tom Smith all made it into Port Stanley before the ceasefire and managed to make pictures before the Royal Military Police put a cordon around the town (interview with Paul Haley). One of Tom Smith's pictures, Canberra 87, was wired with the clear statement in the caption that it was shot before the ceasefire (Plate 99). It shows three Argentine soldiers leaving Stanley with cases of food. However, the pictures of Port Stanley after the ceasefire concentrate on lines of prisoners handing over weapons, being searched by British soldiers and the stacks of personal weapons taken from them. In the 21 Century it is possible to criticise these pictures for both their morality and legality. However the moral argument relies on purely legal convention and not on any other social or religious code. It is not within Nietzsche's genealogy of morals that the prohibition lies, but within the Geneva Convention, which has in recent years prevented images of prisoners of war from making it into the public domain.
The idea that prisoners should be free from public scrutiny has done much to prevent them from being photographed, but this has only happened in recent conflicts, particularly the Levant, where the increasing influence of lawyers on the battlefield and the politicisation of combat decisions was being felt (Coker 2002). A less legalistic view of the convention would link 'public scrutiny' to a kind of fairground side-show. The general populace should not be allowed to gawk at the defeated, destroying the dignity and self-respect that all those who have seen combat should be allowed to keep. The Falklands prisoners of war keep their dignity throughout and the photographic process shows that they are a defeated army, but not defeated men. They retain their self-respect and this destroys the idea these men are undergoing any form of public scrutiny. Even after the battle for Goose Green, where the prisoners were photographed behind barbed wire, they still retained their dignity.

In Canberra 45 (Plate 57), "A dejected Argentine prisoner sits alone surrounded by barbed wire in a compound near to the British beach head on the Falkland Islands. He was captured together with over 1200 others at Goose Green and Darwin". The prisoner does look dejected, but he does not appear to be alone, there is another figure inside the wire and between the prisoner and the camera. Dejection would be a reasonable emotion following defeat and imprisonment, but there is no suggestion that this arises from the scrutiny of the camera. The representation of the defeated Argentines places them within the greater paradigm of western representation, but not within the Homeric model, where the defeated would be slaughtered. The Argentines have more in common with the French of Harfleur, in that their representation says as much about the victor as the defeated.

On a superficial level the pictures depict the situation of a defeated army, but they also represent the moral attitudes of the captors. After the defeat of the Trojans the Greeks, typical pre-Classical warriors, slaughtered their enemies, killing the men and taking the women into slavery. They were also inclined to strip armour and weapons from the battlefield dead and to defile the bodies. It was Plato who questioned Homeric and pre-Hoplite morality and cast a shadow over the total destruction of the enemy after defeat (see Chapter One). The large quantity of images wired back from the Falklands show that the British were operating a wider Platonic view of morality.

The pictures that show the surrender of weapons represent the final defeat of the invading army. The huge piles of weapons are as high as the prisoners, and the lines of men waiting to be disarmed stretch into the distance and over the horizon. But the pictures of the prisoners in and around Stanley do not show men in a state of dejection similar to those taken at Goose Green and Darwin. The reasons for the difference in the
state of the prisoners' minds could be easily put down to the phase of the war. The emotions of soldier who feels he has let the side down by losing a battle and being taken prisoner are different to those of prisoners who have been taken at the end of the war, for them there is comfort and anonymity in numbers and the knowledge that they will soon be going home. In total defeat there is no dissonance between collective and personal *timē* and *kleos*. However, the wired images are not intended to show the prisoners' actual state of mind, but a simple propagandist representation of it. The collection of post-surrender images, which build from the scattered remains of war to the joyful repatriation at Puerto Madryn, demonstrate that both sides, who were complicit in the image making process, were Platonic rather Homeric, Classical rather than pre-classical warriors.

The Missing Images.

Of the 202 images wired back from the Fleet, there are two that appear twice. The Royal Marines raising the Union Jack at Port Howard was wired back from both *RFA Olna* and *RFA Stromness*. There are distinct differences in the two negatives, particularly the masking tape used in the copying process, so the explanation for the duplication must be that either captioned prints were passed between ships or a mix up took place in London. Within the image area of the prints, the caption writing is identical, but the reference number has been written by two different people. This leads to the conclusion that the same captioned print must have passed between *Olna* and *Stromness* and been chosen for wiring by two different people.

The inclusion of the two cooks from *HMS Invincible* is a little more mysterious. It appears as both *Stromness 26* (Plate 196) and *Stromness 27* (Plate 197) and the negatives are identical, the masking tape that held down the wire print, the orientation of the print, the caption writing are all the same. The conclusion here is that both the 5x4 negatives held by the Imperial War Museum were produced at the same time in London and one of the negatives must have replaced something else.

The one print that is missing but was wired back from the Falklands was the shot of *HMS Ardent* exploding. This was shot by Press Association photographer Martin Cleaver and according to Peter Holdgate, this was taken from the decks of *HMS Fearless*. The two men had been in the darkroom in *Fearless* when they heard explosions outside. Clever was the first one on deck and managed to get one shot, while Holdgate arrived too late, just as the *Ardent* exploded. Back in the darkroom the film was processed and
the print was wired back to the UK with both men present (interview with Peter Holdgate). The disappearance of the copy negative requires explanation, but I doubt the truth will ever be known. The first possibility is that the Ministry of Defence deliberately suppressed the image, but we know that is not true. The image became one of common currency at a cultural level and it would have been impossible to suppress such a dramatic and important image. The only other option is that someone deliberately replaced the image. Simply removing the negative would have left a hole in the records that would have attracted attention, possibly quite quickly, while replacing it would have disguised the disappearance. It is unlikely that this exchange would have been done for personal gain, but the negative could have been switched shortly before the negatives were boxed up for dispatch to the museum and the Ardent negative would have made a wonderful souvenir. Therefore we cannot trace the missing image and replace it in the files. Whether the Ardent image was part of the RFA Stromness record is equally difficult to determine given that the wire machines and their records passed between ships.
Chapter Four: Time
The work of Paul Haley and Soldier Magazine

On the 12 May 1982 a rather ill-prepared photographer from Soldier Magazine boarded the Queen Elizabeth II along with soldiers of 5 Infantry Brigade. Paul Haley had been to Southampton the day before to photograph the ship being prepared for deployment as a troop carrier and only on his return to the magazine's office in Aldershot was he asked to sail with the ship. The editor put the suggestion to him at around 5 o'clock in the afternoon, telling him he would have to be on board by 10am the following day. Given clearance to accompany the Brigade only as far as Ascension Island, he took very little personal equipment with him and certainly nothing that would allow him to survive living in the field during a war in the South Atlantic winter.

Haley was the only civilian Ministry of Defence photographer with the Task Force, which gave him a unique perspective hovering between trained soldier and the professional photographer. His snapshot aesthetic and his position on the periphery of military life brought a strong element of vernacular self-representation that could not have been produced by any other professional photographer with the Task Force. Although he had worked for Soldier Magazine for eight years he had no experience of journalism beyond this; he also had no formal military training. His vision was neither truly journalistic nor truly military. Nevertheless, he still managed to produce one of the most vivid and widely used records of the war.

This was simply because Soldier Magazine heavily marketed his work, making it the most accessible collection of Falklands War images. Most other military pictures disappeared into various archives after the war and it was very difficult for the media to gain access to them. However, Soldier Magazine made a particular effort to market their images and Haley's pictures made it into countless publications in the months and years that followed the conflict. But, given its intended use for internal propaganda, the most important publication of Haley's work remains Soldier Magazine, where it was printed in a series of articles between May and August 1982.

John Bull and other Myths.

As the soldiers boarded their ships in Portsmouth harbour in readiness for war, they were joined by many well-wishers, including family, friends, celebrities and members of
the military hierarchy. Amongst these was an unknown man, dressed as John Bull, mingling with the soldiers onboard an unknown ship (figure 14). His presence on such an occasion was hardly surprising, given that since his creation by John Arbuthnot in 1712, John Bull has frequently appeared in cartoons and satires, and been a mainstay of political and cultural propaganda, acquiring a symbolic and mythic quality, somewhat at odds with the original character. John Bull has come to stand for much that the British, and the English in particular, believe about themselves. He was originally an English country gent, a plump yeoman, keen on the quiet life with a love of fairness and roast beef. The eighteenth century Gillray version of John Bull stood against government corruption, financial irresponsibility and for the down-trodden English gent. He was fiercely anti-continental with a particular distaste for the French. However, the mythology of John Bull has not been static over the last 300 years and he has been used for both domestic and international propaganda. He acquired his current costume of low-topper hat, tail coat and Union Flag waistcoat in the Victorian period and is now most often associated with Victorian and imperial nostalgia.

As much as John Bull stands for the defiance within the British spirit, onboard ship in 1982 he also drew attention to the humiliation of the British people and Thatcher’s conservative government at the hands of Argentina and General Galtieri’s military junta. He represented British steadfastness in the face of foreign aggression and the nation’s indefatigable resolve to never give in; their determination to regain the Falkland Islands and rediscover British identity (Hamilton in Aulich et al 1992: 129). There are parallels to the Trojan War. The ‘theft’ of Helen by the Trojans not only humiliated Menelaos, but threatened the global position of the Greeks. Like the Greeks, the British sent ships to restore national pride and both were stretching their armed forces to the limit. In this sense John Bull masks, but cannot hide, the national humiliation brought about by the invasion. His own future seems firmly shackled to the soldiers he is sending off, for failure on their part would herald his demise. There would be no place for John Bull in a Britain defeated by a bankrupt fascist dictatorship. Victory in the Trojan war brought an extended period of Aegean domination for the Greeks and although a British victory would not bring such tangible benefits it would prevent the temporary, and possibly permanent, demise of a national character.

The man dressed as John Bull is photographed posing and smiling at the camera in what must have been a momentary pause in his carnival style interaction with the soldiers. Wearing traditional 19th Century John Bull costume, he personifies the British national identity with which he is traditionally imbued, but this is confused and
moderated by the Cross of St George. Waving the English flag distances him from Britishness and reinforces his English overtones. John Bull is not widely accepted as a figure of national identity by the Scottish, Welsh or Irish and this creates a paradox in the mythic identity of this 'national' figure. His presence at a national event, like the departure of the Task Force, was likely to be misread and misunderstood by a significant proportion of the population, since those present at the event and the viewers of the photographs would understand the symbolism of the character, but not necessarily agree with it and even possibly be alienated by it.

John Bull posing for the camera, maintains his persona as the picture is taken, as would be expected with press photography, but the soldiers are not taking part in this way; they are holding back and allowing the interloper to take centre stage. The whole image is built on the snapshot aesthetic: The background is muddled and confusing, the subject is posing for the camera, but he is not arranged by the photographer; the framing is haphazard with the subject low in the frame with people hanging around in shot when they are not part of the narrative. The soldier on the right, smiling at the event taking place in front of him, but not at the camera further reinforces the ordinariness of the image.

The essence of the image is the interaction between John Bull and the soldier on the left. He has his hand on the soldier's back in a gesture of comradeship and paternalism performed for the photographer, the viewer of the image and for history. This is not an attempt by the unknown man to be part of military society, but an attempt to associate the soldiers with the spirit of John Bull, to impart the soldiers with the mythic spirit of Englishness. The soldier who has John Bull's hand on his back is also the only soldier carrying a weapon. Leaning on the ship's rail and away from John Bull, he grasps the muzzle of his Self Loading Rifle while the butt stands on the floor. He is smiling benignly at the camera, his body posture accepting of the manifestation of Englishness, but refusing to connect with John Bull, refusing to be active in the scene in which he is involuntarily entangled. It is impossible to say what this soldier's attitude to John Bull might have been, but it is clear that neither he nor anyone else in this snapshot is happy with the presence of Bull, or the nationalistic carnival that he brings on board a Royal Navy ship.

In exploring the myths of Paul Haley's Falklands images, we are not looking for stories in the sense of ancient mythologies, or contemporary mythic stories with a meagre relationship to reality (although these abound in written texts about the war). What we are looking for is mythic meanings within a system of communication. Myths
are built on shared knowledge, on history, ideas and beliefs, but weak myths can be reinforced and even imposed by strong signs. Looking for myths allows an exploration of photographic meanings that builds an understanding of intended and accidental narratives.

Haley had begun to make pictures almost immediately following the Argentine invasion of the Falklands Islands and some of his first images were of the Gurkhas training and preparing for the conflict. Nepalese soldiers have been part of the British Army and fought alongside them since 1816, developing a fearsome reputation as warriors. Even in modern times, where western soldiers have been more valued as technicians (Coker 2002: 76), the Gurkhas continue to be seen as a traditional warrior clan, a mythology encapsulated by the khukuri, the famous knife carried by all Gurkhas. Haley photographed a group of them standing around a grinding wheel while two of them placed their blades on opposite sides of the spinning stone (figure 15 - Z001N239). A common myth surrounding the khukuri is that if a Gurkha draws the blade from the scabbard he is honour bound to draw blood and that they will cut themselves rather than break this code. Although this is completely untrue it helps to build the greater myth that surrounds the Gurkhas as a whole. Haley shot this image to communicate the Gurkhas expected presence within the Task Force to other soldiers, but from a semiotic viewpoint the image is codified in a way that communicates the myths to a much wider audience.

As with all myths, a certain degree of pre-existing knowledge and shared culture is required to decode this image. At the time Haley shot it a larger proportion of the general public would have possessed a factual, cultural and mythic understanding of the Gurkhas and their khukuris than is the case now. In 1982, National Servicemen and many World War Two veterans were still part of the British workforce; politically and socially active, they helped make this image easily accessible to a large proportion of the civilian population. The khukuri stands as a metonym for all the British weapons being prepared for deployment to the South Atlantic. While one is being sharpened another has its edge tested by an expert thumb; other soldiers stand patiently waiting to sharpen their blades in the same way that they are patiently waiting to fight for Britain. Throughout the British Army soldiers were sharpening and testing their weapons and the khukuri was an easily understood metaphor.

At a time when the country was undergoing political and social unrest (skinheads rioting at the English seaside, serious industrial unrest on the railways and race riots in Liverpool, Birmingham and London the previous summer) in the battle between the
new right and the old left, these foreign soldiers in British uniforms represented national and international unity behind the conflict with Argentina. But as America seemed to be wavering over which side to take, this was a thin veneer and Britain would have to take refuge in old ideas of empire to reinforce stereotypes of British invincibility and righteousness. Within this, the British public could feel confident in the fight to come and take comfort in traditional warrior ethics that would be frequently contrasted with the qualities of the Argentine conscripts occupying the Falklands Islands. The Gurkhas as warriors stand in opposition to professional British soldiers. Within the warriors' honour of modern western armies the Gurkhas are diminished, for example, Israel has soldiers, while Hizbollah has warriors.

The Gurkhas were also photographed on a training area undergoing a series of weapons drills and combat scenarios. The situations seem contrived and were possibly organised for the benefit of the media, since they have the aesthetic feel of a press facility. Soldier Magazine photographers and writers often attend such facilities and these images are typical of the genre. The soldiers posing on short grass with Carl Gustav anti-tank weapons, snipers spotting scopes and rifles seem poorly located, and ill-dressed in jumpers and berets, to be performing effective training. However, one image in particular stands out as unusual. Five Gurkhas charging across a field (figure 16 - Z001N237), wearing lightweight clothing and closely packed together, seem to be out of place with military tactics prevalent both then and now. The soldiers seem bored with the whole process, with all but one pointing their weapons at the ground and not at the enemy we are meant to imagine them attacking. Within the military other soldiers would have viewed this as a staged shot, constructed by the mass media as propaganda for the general public and bearing little resemblance to real life. The codification of this image for the general public lies in First World War stories of going over the top, making this a piece of historical and cultural propaganda.

British audiences recognise the self-sacrifice of the mass charge, of bayonets against machine guns, hope in the face of hopelessness, the idea that courage wins over all else. Although the British use self-sacrifice and courage to distinguish their own national identity, the reliance on such myths is universal and fundamental to human nature. In 1915 the 2/14 London Scottish Regiment were photographed doing a very similar bayonet charge (Carmichael 1989: 122, IWM negative reference Q53753 - figure 17), but these soldiers have their weapons raised and smiles on their faces. The similarities between the two images are remarkable given that they were shot 67 years apart. Both seem to be propaganda constructions designed to show cheerful soldiers ready to go into
battle, but give no hint of the warrior ethos required to win kudos and timē.

As Haley sailed south he continued to photograph the soldiers and their preparations for war. The images were shot as the soldiers trained, but no longer seem to be posed. The backgrounds are clear and contribute to the foreground subject in a meaningful way; the framing contributes to the narrative, which is often descriptive of a moment in time; and they build upon the myth of the British soldier within the western tradition of warfare. A single soldier taking aim on the deck of a ship (IWM: Z001N187 – figure 18) is photographed from the side; wearing combat uniform, complete with webbing, but without a helmet, this soldier, unlike the Gurkhas back in the UK is undergoing much more intense and genuine training. This is a typical position from which to photograph soldiers with live ammunition and the photographer would not have been able to go any further forward without risk of being shot. However, this is not a typical snapshot. The wide view with the soldier framed in the centre of the image positions the soldier in his environment, but without additional information it would be impossible to say what this environment was. We know it is taken on a ship, but there is little evidence in the frame to support this; all we have to go on is the flat deck, the collapsed rail, and the presence of the sea. The image is so simple that it is even difficult to place it within a given time period. The weapon, a Self Loading Rifle, and the puttees place the image before the mid 1980s, when both were taken out of service, but this all we have. Far more interesting is the codification of semiological signs and myths that the image uses.

There are only five things in this photograph; the sky, the sea, the ships deck and rail, the soldier and the rainbow. The soldier is pointing the weapon out of frame to the right in the normal direction of western reading, drawing attention to the right and out of frame. The weapon and its handling connote the war that is to come and are used to signify the precision and skill of British soldiers; this soldier metonymically representing all the British soldiers preparing to fight in the South Atlantic. When the Falklands were invaded most of the British public had no idea where the islands were, or the logistical difficulties involved in fighting a war so far from home. The Royal Navy, with the aircraft carriers already up for sale, were under threat of further cuts as the invasion took place and, in part, the Navy used the invasion to demonstrate that they could react quickly to international threat and that ships were essential to national defence. The vastness of the ocean denotes the remote position of the Falklands Islands in the South Atlantic, but in 1982, the connotation of the soldier, the empty ships deck and the open ocean was also of the importance of the Royal Navy in getting fighting men into operational theatres. The rainbow is the most surprising element of the image. It is not
immediately obvious in black and white, but arching in from the left and landing on the soldier's shoulder it is as if the soldier is the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow, but in reading this image left to right the rainbow extends to the soldier, to his rifle and on to the imaginary target at the end of his sight. The connotation of the image as whole is of the rescue party, well armed and well trained, and of the sunlight after the storm.

Port San Carlos

Having cross-decked from the QE2 off South Georgia, Paul Haley went ashore from the SS Canberra on the morning of 2 June (Haley Interview 1982). 5 Infantry Brigade had begun to go ashore the day before, but Haley was not part of the first wave. On the narrow beaches and hillsides of Port San Carlos, he began his adventure through the land war. Arriving a full ten days after the first landings, Haley's involvement in the battle was to last only two weeks, ending with the fall of Port Stanley on the 14 June. By the time Haley got ashore, the battle for Goose Green was over, the famous long march across East Falkland had been completed, and 42 Commando were on top of Mount Kent and in sight of Port Stanley.

At San Carlos he photographed troops in landing craft, coming ashore and digging in. Although the brigade benefited from a secure beachhead defended by the Royal Marines, they did come under air attack, but this was not as severe or prolonged as the initial Argentine attacks on what was known as 'Bomb Alley'. Following an air raid alarm, Haley spent four hours sheltering in a dug-out with a Gurkha officer, but he was largely free to explore the beachhead and take photographs as he wished. However, the images made by Haley around San Carlos lack the immediacy and urgency of the pictures made by the photographers from the Royal Navy news teams that were present at the first landings on the 21 May. The war had largely moved on by the time Haley arrived at San Carlos and his pictures are not from the same mould as beachhead pictures from Normandy, Sicily or Gallipoli. They are less chaotic, less passionate, but they do have a particular darkness.

As the soldiers of 5 Brigade came ashore, Haley stood above the jetty and made pictures of the new arrivals. But within these pictures there is no evidence of contact with the enemy, no urgency, no panic or threat, just a calm and orderly procession from ship to shore. Images of men walking up the pier and onto the fields of San Carlos are concerned with the passing of war and the coming battle and are easily misunderstood as the beginning of the land war. We must not forget that as these men come ashore, the
The battle had moved on from San Carlos and had already been taken to the enemy. These men are not the vanguard, they are reinforcements for an existing war. Seeing them in this light puts a different emphasis on the images and explains the lack of urgency. In an attempt to illustrate the war, Haley photographed machine guns pointing at the sky with motionless and relaxed soldiers watching others arrive rather than searching for airborne threats (figure 19 - IWM: Z100N197). The arriving soldiers are not wearing helmets and seem to be milling around at the drop off points.

In one image, soldiers are making their way up a dirt track away from the jetty (figure 20 - IWM: Z001N196) and, like many of Haley’s images, this appears to be a snapshot, but it does not easily fit within the standard snapshot aesthetic. It is part of a series of images taken from the same standing position looking out on to San Carlos water. With Haley’s notebooks either lost or destroyed it is impossible to tell from the image which military unit this is, but it is probably either the Welsh or Scots Guards. The series of images appear to be grabbed as the soldiers make their way ashore and all of them have an informal composition similar to many tourist pictures. However, tourists usually photograph themselves posing and seldom photograph random strangers at such close quarters. But in this image the randomness permeates the image, soldiers walking up the jetty, others standing around doing nothing, all carrying their personal equipment and generally seeming to be making their way up hill. Amongst the relative normality of soldiers disembarking from a landing craft the thing that sets this image apart from the others is the presence of a safe sitting on the floor surrounded by three soldiers. Major General Jeremy Moore came ashore with 5 Brigade to take over as Commander Land Forces from Brigadier Julian Thompson and we can assume that the safe is his.

If this is so, this rather dull image of soldiers walking on a dirt track suddenly becomes a rare moment in time, possible the moment when orders governing the future conduct of the war arrived on the islands. This small safe carries a strange mythic power, the power to dictate life, death and honour on the battlefield. Within this small steel box lies the future of every soldier on the islands. Bicheno (2006: 198) claims that 5 Brigades involvement in the war was motivated by politics and inter-service rivalry, with the Army initially refusing to commit more than two parachute battalions to a Naval operation that seemed like it was not going to end in a land battle. Once they were ordered to send more resources, they demanded equal participation with the Royal Marines in any conflict; a demand that stalled the Commando Brigade's momentum and cost the lives of fifty four men at Fitzroy. It is intriguing to wonder if the orders
that caused this were indeed inside this safe.

A broad view across San Carlos from high ground shows three soldiers standing on the end of a pontoon wharf, surrounded by the remains of the beachhead (figure 21 - IWM: Z001N211). The power of this image lies in its melancholic resemblance to much of the British coast. From Cornwall to the shores of western Scotland, British people are familiar with narrow beaches, rocky inlets and coastal cottages and farms. The low brooding sky and the grey sea dominate the picture but it is the human elements that demand attention. The remnants of the invasion litter the foreground and the cove, but it is the settlement that gives meaning to the picture. Standing high on the hill shrouded in bushes, it is set apart from the beachhead, the incarnation of domesticity and industry, of Britishness, a symbolic icon of the reason for war.

The image presents a kind of rural 'terrain vague' (Walker in Seawright 2000: 123), an ambiguous landscape that speaks of a British rural and coastal idyll, complicated by the out-of-place machinery. It is a landscape in between events that carries the indeterminate scars of the past, a vacated no-mans land. It is a landscape understood and accepted by a British public who had for the most part never heard of the Falkland Islands before the war; many soldiers and sailors arriving at San Carlos described it as being like “Pembroke” or the “part of Scotland” they went on holiday to as a kid. It is this undetermined origin that creates the paradox of the image, we know where it was taken, we know what events are portrayed, but there is still ambiguity; this is not what we expect from a battlefield beachhead.

This sombre atmosphere around San Carlos in early June lies between the battle for Goose Green and the disaster at Bluff Cove and is marked by the absence of fighting men. The power of this image lies in the depopulation, but scouring the landscape the presence of men becomes apparent. The three men on the wharf are joined by a fourth sitting in the tractor, by three on the landing craft moored at the San Carlos pier, and the undoubted presence of the men piloting another making its way across the cove. The stillness of the image is a perfect calm on the edge of the war, a benign beauty on the edge of chaos and destruction.

Six men digging in on the hill side above San Carlos (figure 22- IWM: Z001N164) is another image that portrays the war as a sedentary affair. The image lacks raw emotion or excitable activity, it simply shows six men (the head and spade of the sixth can be seen protruding out of the trench) digging, walking and watching. One trench is well advanced while three of the men seem to be starting work on another, each one hunched over a spade.
The distant view is of the Sussex Mountains with the grey and soulless expanse of San Carlos Water inbetween. Apart from the grass visible around the men working in the foreground the mise en scène is a desert. The hillside, the water, the mountains merge into a bleak canvas onto which the human elements have been dropped: The six men digging, the settlement, the line of men hidden in the fence line. Running from the beach on the left and exiting the frame on the right these men seem to be marching past the settlement and on to another event. But this is not the case. Each man lacks the necessary equipment to either march or fight. Close inspection shows they too are digging in, leaving us to ask why our six men are so isolated, what is it about them that puts them on the hillside, exposed and apparently alone.

The Snap Shot War

On shore, Haley made many images that used codified signs to reinforce mythic understanding of the Army. He shot a number of groups and individuals posing for the camera in a way that would not necessarily be expected on a battlefield. The aesthetic of these images belongs to the vernacular snapshot. As King (1984) argues, snapshots of groups are used to mark big events in peoples’ lives and in the lives of families. Soldiers are no different in this respect, making pictures of groups from as small as two or three up to several hundred. Large group photographs are often organised events and usually need a good deal of planning, but small groups are always impromptu events and usually shot by the soldiers themselves. Haley could not have photographed the small groups without the co-operation of the individuals, and it is probable that some of the soldiers initiated the image-making process themselves. Following King’s argument, we would expect the aesthetic of group photographs to be vernacular or professional, depending on who was in charge of the image making process. This ‘authorship’ would have depended on the relationship between the photographer and the soldiers, with Haley’s position spanning the divide between the two leaving him more likely to create to this type of imagery. In Haley’s group photographs the aesthetic is vernacular, leading to the conclusion that he was asked to take the pictures by his subjects and merely snapped the pictures when asked.

At Goose Green, a group of Gurkhas forming two rows around a captured anti-aircraft gun posed for Haley’s camera in a typical military fashion, with three standing and three kneeling (figure 23 - IWM: Z001S014). The standing men are making the ‘V for Victory’ sign above their heads while two of the kneeling men present pieces of their
weapon for inspection by the viewer, one is holding an ammunition chain while another holds a spare barrel. Close inspection of the image reveals a seventh man in this picture, hidden behind the central standing soldier; it is possible to see a partial face jutting out from the face of the man in the foreground. We can't say why this man did not take part in the photograph, in the celebratory event, the historical marker, that a group photograph represents. Was there some circumstance that created a social separation between the six and the one, or was there some official duty that prevented him joining in, or was he simply not keen on a celebrating a victory that these soldiers did not take part in? It is also impossible to know why the picture was taken. If we accept that this type of image marks a point in a social group's life that requires celebration and remembrance, there are only two logical conclusions. They are either marking a battle won, or staking their claim on the impending battle. Either way, this is a vernacular tourist shot that simply says 'I was there' for the men in the picture. The danger for the warriors' honour encapsulated in this image is that unearned kudos brings about negative timē, the tourist snap on the battlefield can easily degrade respect and honour. In a much more damaging way, Agamemnon's claim to Briseis brings negativity to his timē and some argue his dishonourable death at the hands of his wife.

Another group shot that has better documentary provenance was taken at the top of Mount Tumbledown on the 14 June (figure 24 – IWM: Z001S077). A few minutes after the final surrender in Port Stanley and while Haley was making pictures of the clear-up on Tumbledown, soldiers from 7 Platoon, G Company, Scots Guards posed for Haley's camera. This time it is not really possible to surmise who initiated the image making process, but it is clear why the picture was taken. Although the image was shot by a professional and used widely by the media after the war, appearing in newspapers, magazines and books, it remains a vernacular group photograph. With a single thumbs-up and only one weapon raised in the air, all fourteen men are smiling at the camera in a very reserved celebration of a battle victory, of the Greek Meme, of kudos, timē and kleos. All these group photographs serve a common purpose in that they are there to support the social and cultural paradigms of the warrior. The groups resemble family groups and reinforce the social interdependence between the soldiers; they connote the otherness that is the civilian world. Like family photographs, they fix relationships within the group and mark the boundary between them and the external other.

There were a number of cultural differences used by the press, and British society in general, to separate the Argentines from the British so that one society could hate, fight and kill the other (Clausewitz 1989: 137). Headlines like “Stick it up your Junta” (Sun
20 April 1982) played on the political differences between democracy and dictatorship, while cartoons were littered with moustachioed, sombrero wearing gauchos, demeaning the Spanish origins of the Argentines. There were also religious differences (Protestant and Catholic) but these were not used in anti-Argentine propaganda. The presence of a Madonna and Child taped to the stock of a rifle handed in at the end of the war is therefore a surprising image that has several readings depending on the cultural connotations that an individual may draw from the Catholic symbolism (figure 25 - IWM: Z001S049).

Protestant viewers may be surprised to find such iconography fixed to weapons of war, but this is by no means unusual, indeed this is not the only image of this type from the Falklands War. From a post-Christian perspective, the presence of the Mother of Christ is disturbing; the superstitious use of icons to protect from the risks of battle is seen as futile at best and delusional at worst. Even within practising Protestant society, the use of such icons may seem irrational, if not counter productive. The modern professional soldier relies on training and technology to win battles, not the protection of God, while iconography is frowned upon by Protestant society. This conforms to the British public's belief that the Argentine army was made up of poorly trained conscripts who relied on superstition rather than training to stay alive. When the image appeared in The Falklands War (Marshal Cavendish 1982: 391) it carried the caption: "History does not record whether the Argentine soldier who taped this Madonna to his rifle butt survived". The writer could have in fact been sure that the soldier survived as the weapon was photographed on a stack of weapons handed in by the Argentines after the fall of Port Stanley. The writer's intention was to suggest to the reader the idea that the Argentine soldier who carried this weapon believed he had nothing more than God between him and death, a desire for God to grant kudos, victory and survival. Without the caption, the image connotes the defeat of Catholicism, a regular theme in English mythology since the establishment of the Church of England, but it relies on Protestant myths of Catholic idolatry to function in this way. As Roland Barthes argues, images can impose their myths on the viewer, an idea that seems to be supported by this image (Barthes 1993).

However, this post-Christian mythology is not congruent with the Homeric tradition. Greek warriors were spurred into action by a desire for social status in this world, but without the invocation and support of a beneficent God death would be the likely outcome of violence. Greek Gods were subject to the same emotions as mortal men and could be seduced, bribed and manipulated (Lattimore 1961: 54). It is inescapable that,
in many respects, Homeric Gods were endowed with human nature, while the warriors were depicted as God-like. On the beaches, on the plains and in the city the warriors of the Trojan War openly and fervently rely on the intervention of one God or another for success in battle and the attachment of a Catholic icon to a rifle stock is answering the same human need for mythological explanation of life and death, and supernatural support in both. The Haley image is successful in that it encapsulates the mythological difference between Catholic and Protestant nations at war.

In some way, all these photographs raise questions of survival, but this is an easy statement to make when talking about images of war. However, it is not always the soldiers in the photographs whose survival is in question. As we have already seen, the picture of the soldier taking aim on the ships deck connotes the Argentines who will soon be in his sights. How many men, if any, will this man kill in the next few weeks? The weapon is in an aggressive position, and is a symbol of power that projects death away from the holder. The Gurkhas training in the UK benefit from the myth of the khukuri and the warrior in ensuring their survival in our minds. Those posing around the anti-aircraft gun do not enjoy the same protection. Relaxing and smiling at the camera, they look young, inexperienced and part of our world, not that of the warrior, we cannot help but wonder how many of them are still alive. The group photograph that breaks the mould is the Scots Guards on top of Mount Tumbledown. Taken in the moments after the surrender, it is a celebration of victory, but for the Gurkhas there was no victory, and again, unearned kudos has its dangers.

Post-Combat Photography

Late on 2 June, Haley remembers making an abortive attempt to get to Darwin by helicopter, returning to San Carlos, where he spent the night. The following day he was airlifted to Darwin, arriving on the morning of 3 June, a full five days after the end of the battle. This was a post-combat situation, with prisoners taken, Falkland Islanders released from captivity and the battlefield clear-up in progress. This was to be a mark of Haley's time on the Falklands. Given the difficulties of keeping up with the troops moving between battlefields with no information about the next engagement, he usually arrived after the fighting and was left to make pictures of the aftermath. A certain measure of bad luck also seems to have dogged some of his attempts to get pictures.

What is significant about Haley's time at Goose Green and Darwin is that, when he arrived, the clean up was well under way and the bodies of the dead were ready for
burial. He photographed the prisoners in the farm sheds and general scenes of the battlefield, and, in one particular image, he photographed drips hanging on a gorse bush and discarded bandages lying on the ground (figure 26). This image of a dressing station was one of only two negatives shot at this Argentine Regimental Aid Post and was made in preference to other more obvious images of war; Haley’s explanation for this is that he was looking for something “symbolic” rather than graphic (personal interview).

At first glance it is difficult to see where the symbolism resides in such a simple image and how this could be more symbolic than the explicit, culturally significant and evocative images of death and destruction. The picture appears to be taken from a normal standing position and 45 degree angle from the gorse bush that occupies the top left of the image. It has the appearance of a snapshot and not something you would expect from a professional photographer mediating war for a viewer who has no experience of such things. If we are to distance this picture from any pre-existing expectations of professional war photography and look for something more meaningful, we need to look for the symbolism intended by the photographer rather than the conventions applied to public images of war.

This was essentially a personal image for Haley and one that has rarely been seen by others. However, we must remember that he was making pictures for Soldier Magazine, pictures that were to be viewed by soldiers and intended to convey a message to them about the war in the South Atlantic. In Camera Lucida Roland Barthes described the studium and punctum of images. He states that for a photograph to be a “true image” it must in some way excite, it must describe and inform at a cultural level. This is the studium. He adds that, “… cases occur where the photograph leaves me so indifferent that I do not even bother to see it ‘as an image’.” (Barthes 1993). For the average viewer it seems the dressing station image would generate this indifference, but Barthes’ studium is a cultural phenomenon and we must look at this image within the culture of its manufacture and that of its possible viewing.

Paul Haley claims that he did not photograph the battlefield dead because the Ministry of Defence had told him not to, and that he agreed with that advice. A Press Officer told him that they had “been issued with a directive that no bodies are to be photographed on either side because it would cause grief to the families”, adding, “I sort of agreed with that” (personal interview). There is no doubt that this was true and begins to explain Haley’s choice of subject at Goose Green. If images of battlefield dead would have caused grief to their families and comrades, it is also conceivable that it would have disturbed their enemies too. Homer described the methods by which the
bodies of Patroklus and Hektor were defiled by Trojans and Greeks and the levels that both sides descended to in order to anger and insult their enemies. Plato decried Homeric insults to the dead as base acts that should not be carried out on barbarian enemies let alone when fighting worthy Greek opponents. However, during the Falklands War, the media and politicians lambasted the Argentines as unworthy enemies, an army made up of ill-trained, ill-equipped conscripts who were the pawns of dictators. There is much evidence though that British soldiers saw their enemies in a very different, more professional and honourable light.

The Warriors’ Honour, founded in the western way of warfare (Ignatieff 1998) was a code shared by both sides of the Falklands War and if the dead were to be photographed, they must retain dignity in death. It is acceptable within the warriors’ code to pity the dead and share their pain, but it is not acceptable to dishonour them with images that show them as disgraced and pointless victims. British soldiers fighting another traditional western army would have wanted the enemy dead honoured in the same way they would honour their own fallen. In this light, Haley was right to respect the Ministry of Defence directive. It explains why Haley attempted to produce something symbolic rather than graphic at Goose Green, but does not explain the choices of the dressing station image.

For this image to elicit a meaningful ‘studium’ amongst its intended audience there must be some cultural connotation that would be understood by soldiers. The image has an echo of a past event that took place within the frame, an event that can be decoded by those who have knowledge of the objects in the image. Arriving four days after the battle, Haley could not photograph the dressing station in use, but had he been there the ethical questions would have almost certainly made it too difficult for him. So he photographed drips and dressings hanging from a gorse bush and scattered on the floor. If he was searching for something more meaningful at the time he shot the image, he must have believed that those who saw the image, that is, the readers of Soldier Magazine, would have been able to decode what they saw. The objects must have cultural connotation for them, such that they would recognise something in the image that the ordinary viewer would not.

Barthes describes ‘studium’ as an order of liking, the magnitude to which the image is “alright”. But, for the ordinary viewer, it is difficult to see how this image could be described in this way. Indeed, most would have trouble working out what they were looking at. To the uninformed eye the image shows a gorse bush, a patch of grass and bits of litter and rubbish. Studium, operating at a cultural level, is not invoked for the
ordinary viewer. However, those with a shared cultural perspective do not see litter, but drips and bandages, the echoes of battle, injury and death. Soldiers connecting with this image, who have fought in any battle, will understand the fight for life that occurred in this place. They will appreciate the stillness of the scene, the calm after the storm, they will wonder how many men passed through here, how bad were their injuries, and how many died. Soldiers have the pre-existing knowledge to decipher this image.

As a photograph, the dressing station has a vernacular grammar similar to that found in holiday snaps. The picture may have been made as a photographer's record of places visited in the same way that tourists snap boring scenes outside hotels and churches, on beaches and in parks. It proclaims that the photographer was there, even if there was nothing to photograph when he arrived. As a documentary photograph, this image is a record of a past event that went unrecorded and would otherwise be forgotten. For Haley, it is a statement of attendance, a badge to join a club, a token to gain entry into the world of the warrior, in the same way that holiday snaps are used as proof of membership of the tourist clubs of sun worshippers, hill walkers and thrill seekers; it grants societal memberships. Haley’s photograph offers little in terms of personal vision, but instead conforms to cultural norms of vernacular mediation both within and external to military society.

This is perfectly understandable for a photographer who, although working for a magazine, was not working as a journalist. The confines of a military publication do not create the vehicle for explanatory or critical photography.

“Because the ethos inspires behaviour more than it controls it, subjects are not consciously aware of the rules which it objectively imposes, even when they objectively refer to them in their conformist or deviant behaviour; various different values may be communicated and perpetuated within a group without any need to encouragement or call to order.”

(Bourdieu 1990: 43)

This helps to explain why Haley co-operated so willingly with the request not to photograph dead bodies, but it also explains the studium of the dressing station. The dominant ethos within the military would have steered him towards the warriors' honour and a desire to represent their pain without dishonour, while the ethos of western vernacular photography would lead him to make statements of attendance.
more than critical appraisals of death on the battlefield. Non-military viewers may be capable of generating their own studium within this image, and although it may be very similar to military understanding, they require additional information to make judgements and are unlikely to reach the same depth of understanding. They have to be educated in order to understand what they are looking at and what it means. It is possible that someone without military experience would be affected by this image, but without an educated understanding of the meanings involved, it is difficult to see how.

The 'punctum' of this image is more difficult to define; something that wounds the soul, something uncodified and instinctive, as Barthes describes it, is unique to each viewer, meaning we need to imagine who would find this image both fascinating and disturbing. It is possible to conclude that you would need to have been there, you would need to have passed through this scene, or experienced very similar events to the one referenced here. In 1966 Larry Burrows photographed a dressing station in Vietnam, but he had the opportunity to depict wounded and possibly dying men, and to record the emotional connection between injured comrades, one reaching out to the other, who lies slumped in a cruciform posture (figure 27). The 'punctum' of Burrows' image lies in extreme emotion; it strips away the exterior granite from the fighting men revealing a spirit normally hidden from public and photographic scrutiny. Anyone who has suffered traumatic loss would understand this image and would connect with it in a way that generates a degree of punctum. However, Haley’s Dressing Station relies on a deep understanding of the events that took place, but given that few people would have been in such a situation and that the image does not depict the event it tries to communicate, the number of people who would be ‘wounded’ by this image seems very small. In comparison to the Burrows image, Haley’s image is banal, but it is banality that provides the key to understanding its power.

The Dressing Station is ordinary, it seems to tell us something we already know, something we think we understand. The image is calm and still, it belies the frantic activity that must have taken place as injured soldiers were brought from the battlefield. It redefines the world portrayed by Larry Burrows by diluting the shock that we expect to see in images of war. It represents war by showing us something we know, bandages and drips, in a setting we know, a gorse bush, but in a conjunction and with a simplicity that we do not expect. If this image has a punctum, it is the acceptance of the dichotomy, the realisation that the superficial representation is not all it seems and that someone has chosen to keep the shock of the real from our eyes.

After five days at Goose Green, where he stayed with a local family, sleeping on a
camp bed, Haley set off to walk to Fitzroy, which he had heard was the next point forward. Whilst walking, helicopters were regularly seen flying over head and he made several attempts to marshal one down. Eventually he was picked up and given a lift to Fitzroy, but quickly took another flight to join the Scots Guards at their form up point at Bluff Cove. It is not clear when Haley arrived at Fitzroy, but the evidence would suggest he arrived at Bluff Cove on the morning of the 8 June. He talks about having seen the Royal Fleet Auxiliary ships Sir Tristram and Sir Galahad attacked at Fitzroy and this holds true with other accounts of the incident (Middlebrook 2001). From Bluff Cove he attempted the 15 mile walk back to Fitzroy to cover the action and five or six hours into his walk, he was lucky enough to be picked up by a passing helicopter.

On arriving at Fitzroy the action was largely over and he made a few images in the later stages of the incident. He then rejoined the Scots Guards at Bluff Cove and moved with them to Goat Ridge as they prepared to attack Mount Tumbledown. During his short time there, they came under heavy artillery bombardment, which injured three soldiers. Haley then made the decision to take a ride on the evacuation helicopter back to San Carlos in order to process some film from the previous eight days in the field and to replenish his dwindling film stocks. He spent a rather miserable night onboard HMS Fearless using the darkroom, getting prints ready for the wire machines and packing up films and notes to fly back to Soldier Magazine. He remembers being disappointed by the attitude of some on board who claimed to be having a difficult war, and remembers with annoyance a press officer who complained about the lack of potatoes.

His next move was back to Goat Ridge where he waited for the attack on Mount Tumbledown. He decided that there was no point in going forward to the battle line as the attack would be at night. He spent the night of the battle for Tumbledown sitting under artillery fire on Goat Ridge with the Scots Guards padre, Angus Smith. It was on the 14 June that he went forward onto the battlefield and began to make pictures of the mopping up process, during which news of the cease fire came through. His final move of the war was to walk down into Port Stanley to cover the taking of prisoners and the handover of weapons.

Haley's photographic progress through the Falklands War is distinguished by his presence on battlefields after the battle. His first post-combat images were made at Goose Green and Darwin during the clean-up activities and it is here that confusion begins to creep in. All his images cover the clean-up and the prisoners in and around the cow shed at Goose Green. He remembers arriving on 2 June, but if this were the
case he would have been there during 2 Para's airborne deployment to Fitzroy. It is hard to believe that had Haley been at Goose Green when the battalion departed on board a Chinook and two Scout helicopters he would not have photographed it. His late arrival at Goose Green is confirmed by the lack of Parachute Regiment soldiers in his photographs.

It does not seem to have been Haley's style to produce portraits of soldiers, something he did not do on any of the battlefields beyond the already discussed 'I was there' vernacular snapshots. He did not engage in the practice of doing 'Local Boy Stories' (pictures of soldiers for their local papers), a job undertaken by the Public Information Branch at the time and never done by Soldier Magazine. This type of photograph, shot in a way that makes individuals the purpose of the image is a staple of all newspapers and its absence in Haley's work is noticeable. As a work pattern this may explain the lack of portrait type images from Goose Green, but it does not explain the overall lack of Parachute Regiment soldiers in the rest of the images, which are mainly populated by Gurkhas, Royal Marines and Royal Engineers. The available information and Haley's description of events leads to the conclusion that he must have arrived on 3 June.

The battle for Goose Green rapidly acquired mythical status in the English speaking world with exaggerated claims of British military prowess in the face of a weak and corrupt Argentine military system. Claims about the number of Argentine prisoners were equally exaggerated with some sources claiming 1600 prisoners and a further 250 dead. The most reliable source (Fitz-Gibbon 1995) puts the Argentine dead at no more than 45 and the total garrison strength at 1083, considerably less than all the contemporary reports. Within the Greek Meme we have a paradox at work here. Those in favour of higher Argentine numbers are generally those in favour a describing the Argentines as an unworthy opponent. While the high numbers of enemy troops would appear to increase the kudos of the Parachute Regiment, fighting a weak and feeble enemy would have the opposite effect. In reports that followed the battle a great deal of kudos was heaped upon Lieutenant Colonel Jones from many different directions (positive time), but there was also a great deal of discussion about the validity of awarding a Victoria Cross to a man who should not have been leading from the front (negative time).

Fitz-Gibbon's (1995) account of the battle goes into great detail over the numbers and abilities of the Argentines forces at Goose Green and Darwin and although this has received criticism from those who wish to maintain the myth of the battle, it does go a
considerable way to redressing the balance of kudos and time for those who took part.

Haley photographed the Parachute Regiment burying its dead, piles of Argentine ammunition and weapons, destroyed Pucará aircraft, napalm supplies and some of the damage to the town, but his most impressive work was made in and around the cow shed where the prisoners were being kept. Outside he photographed a line of Argentines queuing for water (figure 28 - IWM: Z001N144). Each has two jerry cans and we can assume the line was moving slowly, probably towards a single tap, since each man has both cans on the floor. Behind the prisoners there is a mixed scene of war and post-war activity. The pile of mortar round casings and ammunition boxes shows some of the ferocity with which these men defended their ground, but the farm shed with POW written large in white wash defines their current situation. The prisoners have a variety of pose and body language. Some are subdued with heads lowered and backs turned to the camera, others seem to have not noticed that their picture is being take, which seems ridiculous and surely they must have chosen to ignore the photographer. The two soldiers who attract the viewer's attention are the ones who chose to confront the camera. Looking straight into the lens these men offer defiance and a demand not to be ignored. These men are mature soldiers and the one fourth from the left with his head down seems the oldest man in the line; there does not seem to be an ill-prepared conscript amongst this group. This is a complex image that has rarely been seen in print; it challenges preconceptions and stereotypes built up during the war. British publications prefer the images from inside the cow shed, (such as figure 29 - Z001N142) which are less flattering to the enemy forces.

An Argentine prisoner sits alone in the cow shed with a makeshift cooker between his legs. He has meagre rations of just two small tins of food and is holding a large, clean mess tin on the lip of the box containing his small fire. The soldier looks young, scruffy and painfully thin. He is the archetypal soldier portrayed in the British media and fits the visual bill perfectly of a conscripted boy who was not capable of resisting the might of the British Army and in particular the prestige and professionalism of the Parachute Regiment (see description in Chapter Five of the battle for Goose Green in the Marshal Cavendish part work published in 1983). This view of Argentine soldiers did not fit well with the mythology and the degree of glory vested upon the Parachute Regiment after the battle when they were often quoted as facing three battalions of professional infantry and outnumbered by as many as four to one.

This generated a duality of representation where the enemy were viewed as ruthless professional soldiers, honed in the Dirty War waged by the Argentine Junta against their
own people, and equally as conscripts given little training and little equipment before
being thrown before an invincible enemy. This would become even more important after
the fall of Stanley when the prisoners were photographed en masse. But this soldier
remains a symbol of a corrupt regime sending ill-trained boys to do the work of men
and die in an unwinnable and pointless war. In reality this soldier was probably one of
the air force personnel manning the airfield at Darwin or one of the many army
administrative staff located at Goose Green and Darwin.

Another image shot by Haley at Goose Green has also been used to fuel British
mythology about the Argentine armed forces. Figure 30 (SM Ref: Z001N206) shows a
Argentine military manual resting on a fence post outside a farm building. Between the
fence and the building the ground is filled with discarded clothing. It is difficult to tell
whether this is military or civilian clothing, but there are stories of Argentine soldiers
destroying and looting the homes and property of the Falkland Islanders and we can
assume that these garments belong to the residents of Goose Green and Darwin. The
image was constructed by Haley, who found the manual and placed it on the fence, and
it is the juxtaposition of the Spanish text with the discarded clothing that helps build the
mythological baseness of the Argentines by paraphrasing similar images from the relief
of concentration camps towards the end of the Second World War.

After Goose Green, Haley moved on to Fitzroy and Bluff Cove. His images included
trenches being dug around the Bluff Cove settlement and machine gunners watching the
sky. At Goat Ridge, he sheltered with the Padre while the night attack made its way up
Tumbledown, and on Tumbledown he made pictures of the clearing up operations and
the jubilation of the Scots Guards when the surrender was announced. He then made
his way into Port Stanley, arriving before road blocks were put in place and spending
some time taking photographs with an Army photographer, Sergeant Ron Hudson from
Headquarters United Kingdom Land Forces, before finding his exit from Stanley
prevented by a road block and that the ceasefire had not yet been signed.

Whilst in Port Stanley, Haley made a number of images around the town shooting a
total of 20 rolls of black and white and an unknown, but a lesser number of colour
slides. Like all the other photographers he made a series of images of Argentine
prisoners being processed into captivity and in particular handing in weapons. He made
images that show the prisoners looking cheerful, resigned and defeated (Soldier Magazine
archive negative sheet numbers 227-238/20a). On the road out of Port Stanley, he
made an image of disarmed prisoners walking to the POW camp on Stanley airfield
(figure 31). The line of soldiers is strung out along a straight piece of road that
disappears into the distance and a pall of smoke rising from a fire hidden behind a low
ridge; they have kit-bags and are still wearing their helmets. Where other images of
smiling soldiers depict a defeated and conscript army Haley managed to make these
men look like professional soldiers; although they were beaten they also retain an air of
distinguished honour and not that of a defeatist and unworthy enemy. In contrast to
other images of prisoners of war, this one is notably more respectful of the enemy.

Within representations of Greek warfare, the smiling prisoners, with connotations of
conscription and ineptitude, would have been seen as barbarians, literally, those who
babble, those who do not speak Greek, an unworthy enemy destined for ransom or
slavery (van Wees 2004: 148). Plato argued against ill-treatment of prisoners of the type
depicted in the Iliad, but only for Greek enemies. In the Homeric period non-Greek or
barbarian enemies were open to ill-treatment in the form of murder, sale into slavery or
debasement of the deceased's bodies on the battlefield, but it is the Platonic principle
that is illustrated in the images made after the surrender of the Argentine forces. On the
modern battlefield, under the latest interpretation of the Geneva Convention, which
states that prisoners must be free from public scrutiny, photography of prisoners of war
has been largely banned. But Haley's images from a less complicated period show how
culturally weighted such images can be.

The Falklands War was a symmetric war with both sides facing each other with very
similar weapons and capabilities. British soldiers would have seen the Argentines as a
worthy enemy, while some sections of the media portrayed them as unworthy, as the
Greeks saw their Barbarian enemy, without honour or dignity. The Greek model of
representation makes it clear that the enemy, even in defeat, should be treated with equal
respect to British soldiers and pictures of happy prisoners seem to defy this convention.
A picture showing two very happy Argentines (figure 32 - IWM: FKD 295 - Soldier
Magazine negative sheet numbers 227-230/23) fits within contemporary representations
of conscription and lack of willingness to fight, but falls short of the Platonic ideal. We
would not expect British soldiers to be happy in defeat and captivity, and would be
outraged if they showed the lack of heroic dignity demonstrated by these individuals.
This theory is amply demonstrated by the captivity and exploitation for propaganda of
years after the Falklands Conflict, the British public showed immense distaste for TV
footage of the Tornado Crew apologising for their actions and the criminality of the
allied war effort. Pictures of smiling Argentines after the final surrender are not
dissimilar in that they deny heroism and warrior status to the subjects. However,
following this analogy, we cannot forget that what Haley achieved by accident was actually the intent of the Iraqi captors and the two differing methodologies have consequent affects on the *time* of the perpetrators.

The Magazine.

In 1982 *Soldier Magazine* was a fortnightly publication produced by the MoD for consumption by serving soldiers. It has always enjoyed a certain degree of editorial independence in that the editors are not told what stories to cover, or what editorial position to take. However, it cannot be ignored that the magazine was, and still is, a government publication with an overt propagandist agenda. In recent years the magazine has on occasion taken a stance against the MoD or Army policy, but this has always been in response to negative campaigning by external media organisations; they have never been the initiators of negative material and have never sustained a anti-Government campaign to conclusion. Also, unlike external media, they do not publish material that portrays the soldiers themselves in a negative way. It is therefore clear that the style of journalism and photography employed in the magazine is self-representational and is likely to be covering different stories from different angles to external media outlets. In essence *Soldier Magazine* was, and is, a tool of internal propaganda.

The coverage of the Falklands Conflict was spread over fourteen weeks and seven issues of the magazine, starting on 3 May and ending on 8 August. The first issue after the invasion carries the cover date of 5 to 18 April and with tight deadlines it was impossible to get Falklands crisis coverage in that issue. The following issue (19 April – 2 May) still did not cover the crisis and it was not until the 3 May that coverage began to appear in the magazine, when they showed images of 2 Para training on Canberra. These images could not have been wired from the ship since the wire machines did not come into action until the fleet arrived at Ascension Island. The film, shot by the *Daily Mirror* and the Press Association, would therefore have been flown back from Ascension Island, which would explain the delay. Haley managed to get some of his film flown back to the UK, but this was not enough to keep the magazine going. To supplement the flow of images, they also used the pictures wired back from the fleet to MoD headquarters in London.

The issue covering 17 to 30 May was the first to cover the crisis in any detail when
Haley's images of the Gurkhas training and preparing for departure under the headline "Mountain men prepare to show their steel". Describing them as "those fearsome and famed mountain men fighters from snow-capped Nepal", the article described in laymen's terms what the soldiers were doing to prepare for conflict. It described the inclusion of the "prize winning" Bisley shooting team and the weapons being tested and packed. In common with many Soldier Magazine articles, this one does not rely on the passage of information that the reader is unlikely to know, but rather uses their pre-existing knowledge to reinforce cultural beliefs about the society to which the reader belongs. This is the case with most specialist magazines, but is unusual in Soldier Magazine in that it is taken to an extreme level. The reader of a car magazine would reasonably spend little time with other car enthusiasts and as a group they are likely to be both geographically and socially disparate. Soldiers on the other hand are in constant contact with each other, developing cultural and social norms to a greater degree than would be expected in other groups of magazine readers.

The Gurkha article is typical of many Soldier Magazine articles in that it reinforces the military's beliefs about both the smaller societies that are contained within each unit and the greater society to which they belong. In the same issue an article on Exercise Welsh Dragon, 5 Infantry Brigade's preparations for the war follow the same principle. Military life, especially in times of war requires a degree of self-belief that can be quite extraordinary, and often exposes a traditional British reticence and understatement.

Lieutenant-Colonel Roderick Duff-Gordon QOH, Deputy Chief of Staff at South East District told SOLDIER: "I must say how incredibly good we are at cobbling things together. We came out here less than a week ago. One of the units has come straight here from the forecourt of Buckingham Palace. They hardly had time to park their bearskins. It has been a very testing exercise and has been prepared without rehearsals or skeleton exercises beforehand.

(Soldier Magazine, 17-30 May 1982)

However, this type of statement, with a terrifying degree of bravado and amateurism, plays on the British Army's belief in its front line soldiers and their ability to cope with whatever is thrown at them. Lt Col Duff-Gordon's words are formed in an era that is far removed from modern semantics, but the sentiment is still prevalent in the British Army today. The use of such words would be deemed inappropriate on modern operations, but only because of the ramifications for the military leadership and
After the end of the Falklands War, newspapers began to analyse the performance of military commanders, politicians and equipment. While front-line military commanders remained largely, but not completely, free from criticism, the government had a very hard time, most notably over the Belgrano affair. Moreover, they took the blame for deficiencies in military equipment; poor quality boots leading to trench-foot was the prime example. The idea that the military "cobble" things together is no longer an acceptable public face but they still openly exploit their ability to react to the unexpected in imaginative and creative ways – in other words, cobble things together.

The following issue, 31 May to 13 June, began Soldier Magazine's coverage of the land war. The first war report, "Task Force Troops Secure Bridgehead", appeared on page five as a news item, the information only being confirmed as the magazine went to press. The cover story and lead article concerned the departure of 5 Infantry Brigade onboard the Queen Elizabeth 2 cruise liner. The direction taken by the article was one of men going to war while sexy wives and girlfriends performed their duties by waving them good bye.

Singing telegram girl Linda Goodrick, 22, from Aldershot, turned up in scanties, opera stockings, suspenders and high heels to see her brother, Gunner Alan Goodrick, on his way. But hit of the day was 22 year old Army wife Dawn Leyman who found a place on the viewing platform exactly opposite husband Lance Corporal Peter Leyman. Then she whipped off her blouse and bra to give him and pals a farewell treat.

(Soldier Magazine, 31 May – 13 June 1982)

Such language and imagery was common in the tabloid press at the time and, as Soldier Magazine is aimed at young, generally working class soldiers, it is to be expected that they would have followed a similar path to the tabloid press. Although it is easy to dismiss this as a facile 1980s tabloid attitude to women, the connection of women to war is more deep seated and has a longer history than tabloid journalism. The picture being painted by Soldier Magazine in this article was present in almost every historical military society. The notion that men fight while women wait is an ancient one; whether it is Helen of Troy, Penelope wife of Odysseus, the Sabine women or the topless wives of Aldershot, success in war has been linked with women who wait and reward those who
come home. A further article in this issue described how Debbie Torr waved good bye to her husband, Gunner Antony Torr, as he set sail on the QE2 and then immediately dashed 45 miles to hospital to give birth to their daughter.

The opening photograph of this issue was the image of Warrant Officer Laurie Ashbridge of 3 Para drinking tea and chatting over the garden fence with local Falkland Islanders at San Carlos (figure 33). This image has achieved notoriety given the speed with which the Ministry of Defence released it to the media while holding back less favourable images for a considerable period of time (Aulich 1992: 15). As already discussed in Chapter 3, drinking tea over the garden fence is a culturally significant event for the British and while censors would have been keen to delay less favourable images, they would have been equally keen to ensure a symbol of the re-establishment of Britishness on the Falkland Islands was quickly released to the public domain. Soldier Magazine added to the story by publishing a message from Ashbridges's wife, Mandy, in an article about Sarah Kennedy and British Forces Broadcasting Service. Her words, "Of course we miss our men but the girls are bearing up very well", are simply another form of stockings and bare breasts on Portsmouth dock. That is, men fought wars, the women waited, they coped on their own and they rewarded their men according to traditional masculine representations of femininity. This representational paradigm would be repeated both in the military and external media when the Task Force returned.

The magazine covering the period 14 to 24 June ran a four page spread on the battle for Goose Green. All the images published were part of the set wired back from the fleet and all came through Canberra. After making pictures at Goose Green, Haley moved on to Fitzroy and Goat Ridge before returning to San Carlos and wiring some of his images. Martin Cleaver of the Press Association and Tom Smith of Express Newspapers both made work at Goose Green, almost certainly before Haley got there, and immediately returned to San Carlos to process and wire. Consequently all the images that appeared in Soldier Magazine were shot by Cleaver and Smith. The lack of material sent back from the conflict is made clear as the images carry the sequential Canberra reference numbers between 40 and 46. Five of the seven images show prisoners of war, while the other two show helmets littering the field where the Argentines surrendered and their weapons after they had been collected by the British.

The short report that explains these images runs to mere 150 words, again demonstrating the lack of information that was being released by the Ministry and is a spectacular piece of propaganda.
In the aftermath of the brilliant operation by 2 Battalion The Parachute Regiment to recapture Goose Green have come pictures of dejected Argentine prisoners, huge piles of discarded weapons and the infamous hoard of napalm.

The operation itself brought a glowing tribute from General Sir Edwin Bramall, Chief of the General Staff. It was, he said, a feat of arms and gallantry probably unsurpassed in the glorious history of the British Army.

In his special message to the Regiment he said: "Greatly grieve the loss of Colonel Jones, his adjutant and the other 13 dead and 30 wounded of the gallant second battalion. But [sic] wanted you to know how immensely highly I and my colleagues on the Army Board rate the performance of the Battalion against the enemy."

The Argentine Forces lost 250 men killed, with 140 wounded and 1400 taken prisoner. And two Pucara aircraft were captured virtually intact.

(Soldier Magazine, 14-24 June 1982)

The battle to recover Goose Green appeared in the national press on Saturday 29 May, but these reports did not carry casualty figures, names of those killed, or any factual detail beyond speculation and hearsay. On Sunday 30 May the death of Lieutenant Colonel Herbert 'H' Jones was on all the national front pages and this was accompanied by much more accurate reports of the battle. Much of the detail was still inaccurate, but given that most of the reports were written 8000 miles away from the action it is difficult to see how this could have been avoided. Indeed, given the need for operational security, a similar situation would no doubt arise in a modern conflict situation. However, newspapers attempted to flesh out their reports with colour and to provide accurate numbers. Both The Observer and the Sunday Mail reported 900 Argentine prisoners being being taken, a figure very close to the current accepted figure of just over 1000, but casualty figures were still not released. Almost two weeks later Soldier Magazine was reporting 1400 prisoners of war, very near the figure of 1600 used in some post-war journals, whilst the number of killed and injured was equally extreme with more than five times the real number of dead reported. The number of Argentines taken prisoner, wounded and killed at Goose Green and Darwin has become the stuff of legend and it is clear the hyperbole started almost immediately after the battle.
Such was the speed of the war that the next issue (25 June – 11 July) reported “Victory in the Falklands” as the sole cover story. But the paucity of images meant the magazine had to use a rather inept montage of a picture by Tom Smith (Express Newspapers) and a crudely drawn Union Jack flag and flag pole (figure 34). The image shows soldiers from the Parachute Regiment shortly after the landings at San Carlos on the 21 May. The magazine was, like every other publication in the UK, desperate to show the British flag flying over the Falklands, but was possibly unique in its use of such a manipulative graphic device. The leader page carried a photograph of Royal Marines raising the Union Jack outside Government House in Port Stanley, but this was not really a cover shot. However, on page 11, there was an image of Royal Marines crowded round a Union Jack that was wired back from RFA Engadine and it is hard to see why this image was not used on the cover. Again this image was shot early in the war, being wired back shortly before the cover shot, and had the minimal caption, “Flag in West Falkland”. With a viable alternative image available with very similar semiological interpretation, explaining the graphic is quite difficult.

The image used had two soldiers in a dug-out with a General Purpose Machine Gun (GPMG) and a belt of ammunition hanging from the firing mechanism. Apart from mortars and rockets, this is the largest weapon used by infantry soldiers and therefore has a semiological impact greater than the standard infantry weapon, the Self Loading Rifles (SLR). The GPMG is a support weapon used by only a few soldiers, whereas the SLR was the standard infantry weapon carried by all soldiers. Including the GPMG on the cover image represented the strength, accuracy and power of the British infantry and their ability to strike at great distances; the GPMG has an accuracy that can extend to almost two kilometres and a fire rate of 750 rounds per minute, making it a potent weapon. The graphic on the other hand, falls within the paradigm of the seaside postcard. It is overly simplified, vaguely ridiculous in scale, and designed to appeal to old fashioned ideas of British nationalism.

On the inside of this issue they ran five pages and 31 photographs covering the whole of the war, from embarkation in Southampton and Portsmouth to the landings at San Carlos; from the disaster at Fitzroy to the taking of prisoners in Port Stanley (figure 35). The early pictures were taken either by Soldier Magazine photographers or supplied by the Press Association. The later images from the war were mostly returned to the UK by wire but it is clear that some film must have been making it back as several images do not appear in the wire record. The five pages are constructed in the way that a traditional family album is put together, with a snapshot aesthetic and the occasional
separation of image and caption, masking journalistic intent without diminishing provenance. Most of the images have captions positioned within the frame, drawing the viewers attention to information that confirms the journalistic and documentary purpose of the image as well as passing on vital information required by the viewer to interpret what they see. The final set has the captions removed from the image frame and placed collectively in the centre of the page, where the story or feature text would be normally be situated.

The captions are close spaced to look like a story, further reducing the connection between text and image. The overall effect is to generate a family album of war images. Family snaps carefully stored in albums rarely have detailed captions and usually have nothing more than names or locations and vague dates attached, the aesthetic relying on the ambiguity of anonymity (King 1984: 58). This effect is compounded by the composition in many of the images in this issue. As well as ambiguity the snapshot aesthetic on display in the Victory article uses what King describes as a main event photograph, one showing a group celebrating by having their picture taken; unconventional cropping, a soldier who is the subject of the image being partially out of frame; and banality, images that seem to be commonplace and nondescript in terms of the events they portray. In this way Soldier Magazine becomes a vernacular representation of war, even though all the images were shot by professional photographers.

The following issue marked the end of the war with an interview with Paul Haley. The article contained many of the images already discussed, with at least one image that would only have been available after his return to the UK. A group of soldiers setting out from Goose Green, probably for Fitzroy, was not part of the wire record and was shot too late to have returned to Soldier Magazine by hand-of-pilot. According to Haley, the last images to be returned this way were sent from Freetown, Sierra Leone, while the QE2 was off shore on its way to the Falklands. On board the ship, Haley met a priest who agreed to take the film to the airport and hand it to a British Caledonian pilot for hand delivery to the UK. The Goose Green image was simply captioned “Tabbing across the peat” leading to the conclusion that even at this early stage after the war Haley's caption information had become separated from his photographs. His notebooks have long since disappeared and he is not sure what happened to them. The best guess is that they were returned to the magazine offices and then misplaced or destroyed by someone who did not understand their value. This idea is sustained by the captions used immediately after the war.

Soldier Magazine's coverage of the Falklands war ended with the issue dated 28 July to
8 August which included an eight page pull-out supplement (figure 36). This was essentially a photographic scrapbook of the war. There was no accompanying article and the captions ran to no more than a dozen words or so. Like the preceding issue this one was constructed along the aesthetic values of the family album. All the images in this supplement were new to the magazine and many were in colour, something that was only possible after Haley returned to the UK with the transparency film. Presenting the pictures in this way not only met the magazine's need to mark the end of the war, but also performed a social function within the wider society of the British Army. In discussing family photography, Bourdieu (1990) explains this in terms of the solemnization of high points in family life, such as weddings and holidays. Regarding the Army as a family makes it easy to see the social function of the photographic retrospective.

"the fact of taking photographs, keeping them or looking at them, may bring satisfaction in any one of five areas, 'protection against time, communication with others and the expression of feelings, self-realization, social prestige, distraction or escape'. More precisely, it could be argued that photography has the function of helping one to overcome the passing of time, either by making up for the failures of memory, acting as a mooring for the evocation of associated memories, in short, by providing a sense of the conquest of time as a destructive power; secondly, it encourages communication with other by enabling people to relive past moments together, or show others the interest or affection that one has for them"

(Bourdieu 1990: 14)

The Soldier Magazine pull out souvenir conforms to these principles. Its primary overt purpose was to communicate the history of the war but it also functioned as a celebration; it confirmed the memories of those who were there, it provided memories for those who were not and it allowed the whole 'family' to view the war with the same rose tinted glasses that families view their own histories. For the same reasons that mothers tend not to photograph their babies crying, in the final scrap book Soldier Magazine ignored the trauma of the landings at San Carlos and the disaster at Bluff Cove. They showed only the high points that reinforced the British Army's ideological understanding of itself, it contributed to the heroic understanding in an escapist and propagandist paradigm.
The Greek Meme gives us an insight into the reasons for this. The successful homecoming of the British forces took the representational paradigm beyond the realms of *kudos* and *timé* and into nostos and *kleos*. The final *Soldier Magazine* article was a representation of *kudos* (glory in victory) and manifestation of *kleos*, immortal glory in the words of those who were not there. In a metaphorical lineage from the oral poets of the Homeric world to the photographers and journalists of the late 20th Century, *Soldier Magazine* spoke of the positive *kleos* that was badly needed by those seeking a successful nostos.
Chapter Five: Kleos.
Post-War Representation and Construction of Stereotype.

During times of war it is often difficult to tell the difference between myth and reality. This will always be the case while ever gifted propagandists use selective truth and cultural beliefs to persuade the public. In such circumstances it will often appear that the propagandist is working in collusion with the media, but in Britain this has rarely been the case. The media normally follow their own agenda, either pro or anti-government, left or right wing, tabloid or broadsheet, and occasionally there is an upswell of public feeling that the media find hard to ignore. During the Falklands Crisis a rising tide of nationalism that covered every aspect of the military operation and much of British society in general led to a model of representation that was overtly reliant on mythology and stereotype.

Whilst stereotypes are often seen in a negative context, when allied to cultural mythologies they become strong metaphors and icons of identity. Writing in the *Daily Mail* on the 23 June 1982, just one week after the Argentine surrender, Christopher Booker discussed a series of events that he believed had given Britain back its values and vision. It is interesting to note in a historical sense that he began with the “heartwarming glow of the Pope’s nationwide tour.” He followed this with the visit by the President of the United States of America and then:

> Last week came the seemingly almost miraculous conclusion to the Falklands war – with the most dramatic victory won by British Arms since World War II producing a surge of national relief and pride that was almost tangible.

*(Daily Mail 23 June 1993: 6)*

With Britain now at war in Afghanistan it is difficult to see how this 'surge' could have resulted from military success alone. But this was a rhetorically simpler war with a beginning, middle and, what seems rather elusive in modern wars, an end. Booker's arguments encompassed “outbursts of national rejoicing” at the birth of a Royal Prince and the pride the nation felt when a Vatican official reported that on no previous Papal visit abroad had the police been more discreet or the crowds better behaved. He sincerely believed that traditional British values were back for good.
He dismissed as "small and utterly unimportant" the activities of union leaders he believed were working against the national interest and contrary to his understanding of British pride. He believed that three million unemployed, riots in Brixton and Liverpool, and rising inflation were things from another era, something a resurgent British identity would banish from the islands forever. With hindsight and knowledge of the miners strike of 1984-85, the expanding north-south divide, rising interest rates and the late 1980s property crash, his words seem hollow. But in more polarised times, viewpoints had a habit of being black and white.

Although Booker cited a few examples of the things that generated the surge of national pride, it is hard to see how any of this would have taken place without the Falklands war, which brought "a surge of national relief and pride" as the nation united behind its armed forces. All this took place in an atmosphere of propaganda and misinformation that withheld bad news, rapidly pushed out good news and relied on stereotypes and cultural mythology to get the message across. The Falklands war stands as a testament to the art of propaganda based on cultural paradigms.

Newspapers were willing participants and often the creators of cultural propaganda, with the tabloid press in particular contributing to the 'surge' of national pride. On 1 May, under the headline "We Back You" and a story about the United States of America's provision of fuel tankers for the Task Force, the Daily Express ran a full page image of the Winston Churchill statue standing guard over Parliament Square. His unmistakable figure hunched over and watching the clock on Big Ben as it struck noon on 30 April, the moment of the final deadline for the final peace plan. The British made their first attack on the islands the following day when, under Operation Black Buck, a single Vulcan bomber dropped twenty one 1000lb bombs across Stanley airfield. The use of Churchill as a metaphor for determination, steadfastness, resistance to tyranny, and all that is good about the British under pressure pushed the idea of national pride to its most obvious limit.

The coverage of the war itself took a similar path of overt nationalism, something not present on the coverage of other late 20th and early 21st century conflicts. Each time the conflict escalated, the media presented British aggressive actions as a response to some previous action by the enemy. For example, the attack on HMS Sheffield was presented as an Argentine escalation by the media, who significantly forgot about the sinking of the ARA General Belgrano two days earlier. The Daily Express even went as far as to suggest that the Task Force's 'minimum force' rules of engagement would have to be changed. It is hard to see how the sinking of a cruiser outside the maritime exclusion
zone whilst she was sailing away from the islands by a submerged nuclear submarine could be seen as "minimum force". Reports also denigrated the cruiser's escorts for abandoning the survivors floating in rafts. This was a veiled attempt at blaming the Argentines for the massive number of deaths that occurred during this incident. No mention was made of the most probable reason for the escorts departure, the need to avoid being stalked by a nuclear submarine capable of attacking from 20 or 30 miles away.

The concept of the warrior's honour (Ignatieff 1998) was ruthlessly applied to the British military, whilst the Argentines were seen as the "raggle taggle army, ill-equipped" and made up of "schoolboy soldiers" (Daily Express 7 May 1982). Throughout the war, and even in very recent publications, much has been made of the conscript nature of the Argentine forces. As discussed earlier, the Argentines were mainly portrayed as untrained and ineffective soldiers, with the general impression given that they would be lambs to slaughter at the hands of the professional British military. This was a difficult principle to maintain once the conflict started and British casualties began to mount. Within the concept of the warrior's honour and the Greek Meme, it is difficult to reconcile professional warriors killing schoolboys, whether they are soldiers or not, and even more difficult to put a propagandist spin on the death of British soldiers, killed by an unworthy enemy made up of schoolboy conscripts.

This was amply demonstrated by the Daily Express (29 May 1982) coverage of the retaking of South Georgia, during which an Argentine sailor was shot dead onboard the captured Argentine submarine, ARA Santa Fe. The story in the paper was that he was probably special forces and the impression was given that he was attempting to sabotage a British submarine. In reality, Chief Petty Officer Artuso was shot by his Royal Marine guard when the guard thought he was about to open a valve and scuttle the Santa Fe. The basis of the story must have been provided by the Ministry of Defence, but it is impossible to say whether the spin was provided by the MoD or the newspaper. However, this is irrelevant. The story exploited the myth of the warrior which accepts that there is honour in killing only worthy enemies. The death of an unarmed ordinary seaman at the hands of anelite marine would have pricked the public conscience, as well as diminishing the time of British forces.

There was, and still is, a distinct vocabulary used by the British media for describing the men and women of their own armed forces. They are usually described as either lions or bulldogs, they are supermen, with hearts of oak, they are humble, tough, patient and unflappable. On the 14 June, the Daily Mail (p16) ran a two page article covering
the battles for Mount Longdon and Two Sisters. Mount Longdon in particular was a
ferocious fight against a well dug-in professional army and, with 23 dead and 47
wounded, the Parachute Regiment had an extremely difficult time dislodging the
defenders. The pooled reports from Patrick Bishop, Charles Laurence and John Shirley
give little away in terms of military dispositions, but do describe the scene with various
munitions crashing into the mountains. However, from the report, the fire seems to be
all one way, with little being sent back by the Argentines.

This report would have been edited by the censors before being sent back to the
Ministry of Defence in London, where it may well have been edited again before being
given to the media, who would have sub-edited it before going to print. The final
version, having passed through many hands, some collaborating, some working against
each other, was a piece of propaganda, not just for the military organisation, but the
soldiers themselves. It contrived to work with the presiding British cultural belief that
the British soldier was not just unbeatable, but unstoppable, that nothing could prevent
their victory. This is a mythology based on 250 years of colonial self-belief.

The article was illustrated with a piece of black and white artwork by David Ace that
depicted a group of ten British soldiers charging into a Argentine position with the
enemy unprepared for battle, no helmets, no weapons and either waking from sleep or
holding their hands over their heads (figure 37). As a work of art it stands firmly in the
tradition of comic book illustration, war as portrayed by the *Victor or Commando*, folk-tales
of heroism and courage. By repeating the mythology exploited in the text and using
imagery from the boys-own genre, it makes sure that every reader understands the
message that they are being given.

The *Victor* was a war and sport comic for boys published between 1962 and 1992. It
always had “A True Story of Men at War” on the front page, with the catch-line
embedded in either a hand grenade, flying wings or anchor graphic denoting that the
story was either about the Army, the Royal Air Force, or the Royal Navy. Issue number
1077, on the 10 October 1981, told the story of Captain D. Lee Hunter (figure 9a/9b):

> On the 7th May 1944, during World War II, men of the Guerrilla
> Platoon, 2 Battalion, the Suffolk Regiment, approached the Jap-
> occupied village of Sebang in Burma. The platoon was commanded by
> Captain D. Lee Hunter.

*(Victor No 1077 10 October 1982)*
The graphics are remarkably similar to those created by David Ace for the *Daily Mail*. For example, the second panel shows two soldiers bursting through the door and machine gunning sleeping Japanese soldiers. This was a familiar theme for both the *Victor* and *Commando* comics and demonstrates the cultural identity that has built up around the British Army: Their superiority, their super-human determination, and their unflappable bulldog spirit. The soldiers attacking Sebang raided the village twice, returning when the Japanese defenders knew they were going to be attacked again. The only British soldier to die in the incident is shown in panel 10, being shot in the back. Hunter is seen saying ‘They’re still acting nasty, clear the village.’ The implication is that the British are fighting by a code of honour, while the enemy is not, the British have courage whilst the enemy do not; the Japanese are pictured looking terrified and shooting heroic British soldiers in the back. The story ends with a text box that reads:

This successful raid accounted for thirty Japanese for the loss of one
British Soldier. For this exploit and his outstanding leadership on
previous patrols, Captain Lee Hunter was awarded the Military Cross.

(*Victor* No 1077 10 October 1982)

The media like to blame the Ministry of Defence and its public relations department for the misinformation surrounding the Falklands war, but with art work from people like David Ace it is clear that the media were themselves complicit in the manufacture of the propaganda that so successfully fed the 'surge' in national pride.

Ace produced other artworks to fill the gap in the available photographic record illustrating other important events in the campaign. On 17 May he illustrated the attack on Pebble Island (figure 39). This was a special forces raid on the third Argentine airfield on the Falklands, of which there is no photographic record. Again, the information can only have come from the Ministry of Defence and there are several serious errors. The most obvious is that the article claims the raid was undertaken by members of the Royal Marines Special Boat Service, when in fact it was undertaken by D Squadron of the Special Air Service. This is a small point, but indicative of the MoD’s desire to use a successful raid for propaganda, whilst concealing the movements of the special forces. It seems an odd decision to replace the SAS with the SBS in this instance, but this can be the only explanation and is in keeping with other similar acts of concealment by the Ministry. Like the Longdon image, it shows British soldiers at the cusp of victory, breaking cover and in full charge. It shares the same mythology: tough,
unstoppable men, lions with hearts of oak, British bulldogs.

On 31 May, Ace turned his hand to the battle for Goose Green, where he illustrated the surrender of weapons by the captive Argentine soldiers (figure 40). It is a composition remarkable similar to the illustration used the following day to depict the British captives in the village hall at Goose Green (figure 41). Both images show a soldier, with his back to the viewer on the left of the image, and both use the military mythology of the comic strip to make their point. The surrender of weapons plays on the already discussed British beliefs about their own fighting men, while the village hall image uses the same codification as the Victor when it depicted the enemies of World War II. Although this is the Falklands war, it is easy to see the parallel with Japanese soldiers guarding civilian women and children in any one of a number of Victor picture stories.

Photographs from the front-line that appeared in the media during the war were products of the propaganda machine, in that, even when they were shot by press photographers, they had to be cleared by Task Force censors before transmission back to the UK. They were then released to the media after being cleared by the Ministry of Defence press office. Some images arrived in the UK, and were given to media, remarkably quickly. Where this happened, the images had a strong cultural propagandist message, the most widely discussed being WOII Ashbridge drinking a cup of tea over the garden fence with a Falklands family at San Carlos (figure 33). This image has already been discussed in terms of the transmitted images and its use in Soldier Magazine, but when the image was sent to newspapers it was taken up with great enthusiasm. Many papers, right across the political spectrum, immediately spotted the iconography of the image and put their own slant on it.

It appeared in the media on Sunday 23 May. On page three of the Observer it was "THE CUPPA THAT SAYS IT ALL", while on the front page of the Daily Mail it was "FREEDOM". There was some disagreement about who the family in the picture was, some papers claimed it was the Berntsen family, while others claimed it was the Short family. The caption attached to the wired image gives no information on anyone in the picture and the media must have done their own research to establish who the liberated islanders were. All this is fairly irrelevant to the iconic or mythological status of the image. The most important thing is the cup of tea. The British stereotypically mark almost every event, celebration or tragedy, lottery win or family death, by putting the kettle on and having a good cup of tea. To the viewer of this image, the cup of tea reinforces that the Falkland Islanders are British. The Observer stated that this "could be
a lonely croft in Scotland, or a hill farm is Wales; a hard life made harder by the Argentine invasion and the weeks of waiting for the war to begin." The image was almost a cultural answer to the political left who were still campaigning against the war.

Platonic attitudes to morality in war were reflected in a wired image that appeared in the media on the 24 May. An image showing a Royal Marine and an Argentine soldier being treated equally on board SS Canberra was under the headline "After the battle...mercy knows no sovereignty" (Daily Mail 24/05/1982: 16-17 – figure 42). Following Plato's Rules of War in The Republic (1987: 193) there is a distinction between worthy and unworthy enemies. There is honour, glory and fame, kudos and time, only in fighting worthy enemies and these should be treated like Greeks after the battle. In ancient Greek writing there is little commentary on post-battle medical care, although it certainly did take place. However, the treatment of enemy dead does attract a considerable amount of discussion. Plato derided the stripping of enemy corpses as cowardice, a way of maintaining aggressive contact with the enemy, without the risk of the enemy actually fighting back. The British treatment of Argentine wounded followed this philosophy and made the case for the western, as opposed to barbarian way of warfare.

Appearing as a centre page spread, it was placed considerably further inside the paper than the more usual war stories. In a headline reminiscent of the Great War claim of 1914, Victory by Christmas, The Daily Mail had already proclaimed "Victory in a Week!" on page 1. Following with articles on the D-Day landings, a split in the Argentine Junta, attitudes of Margaret Thatcher, and the bomb squad defusing bombs on HMS Antrim. The first eight pages made the case for the military and political strength of the British and the weaknesses of the Argentines, whilst the centre page hospital ship image made the case for the moral superiority of the British.

The mythology that surrounds this particular aspect of western traditions is an ancient one. Newspaper reports of western armies providing medical treatment to enemy wounded are readily available from almost every conflict, while stories of armies from western democracies shooting civilians and wounded or captive enemy soldiers are few, repeated with horror and result in ostracism, if not prosecution of the culprits. However, these incidents are more common than the myth would have us believe and they did take place during the Falklands war.

The media, both during and after the war, extensively reported the alleged Argentine double cross at Goose Green, when troops waving a white flag shot three British paratroopers coming forward to take their surrender. There is much confusion over
what actually took place during this incident with the mainstream press claiming the soldiers were shot while responding to the waving of the white flag. Some military historians (including Hastings 1983: 247), and eyewitnesses from the Parachute Regiment claim that the soldiers were shot while coming away from a failed surrender negotiation (the Argentines thought the British were trying to surrender and were shocked when they were asked for their own). A lone voice (Fitz-Gibbon 2001: 158-62) claims that British soldiers from another section broke the local ceasefire, causing casualties amongst the Argentines, who responded by opening fire and killing the three retreating paratroopers. It is interesting that the popularity of each version of this story coincides with the western myth of honour on the battlefield, the more popular versions ignoring the possibility that the British prematurely broke a ceasefire, thereby indirectly causing the deaths of three of their own men. The popularity of each story may be based in its effects on kudos, it being very difficult to talk with positive timé about a soldier who may have responsibility, no matter how small, for the deaths of their comrades.

The hardest battle of the war, Mount Longdon, has also been the source of much myth making around the subject of the warrior's honour. Close-quarter battle between two highly skilled professional armies is the type of combat that is likely to produce a surfeit of Victor style 'true stories of men at war'. However, it is also the type of battle that is going to produce regrettable incidents that do not fit within the western code of honour as presented by the media. Many Argentine soldiers left behind after the retreat from Longdon decided it was better to fight to the bitter end, rather than attempt to surrender, a decision that proved prophetic given that one prisoner, attempting to get his pistol, was shot while medics were still trying to save his life; another was shot for grabbing a paratrooper's leg and yet another was shot attempting to surrender (Bicheno 2007: 278). These lapses in the warrior's honour were blamed on the Argentines, who were not trusted following the white flag incident; an interesting argument, given the most likely, but least popular account of events at Goose Green (see above).

The maintenance of the myth of the warrior code of honour is sometimes more important than the actual honour itself. The soldier responsible for shooting a Argentine attempting to surrender is plagued with memories of the event, saying that he knew that Argentines had waved the white flag and then killed people at Goose Green, and, if he had to do the same thing again he might do things differently (Bicheno 2007: 279). Researching Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) in Vietnam veterans, Jonathan Shay (1994) made the case that it was breaches of the code that caused mental health issues. He used the Homeric representation of war, and in particular the exploits
of Achilles, to explain how soldiers felt they should behave on the battlefield, contrasting that with their actual behaviour, and the guilt that followed dishonourable actions. Whilst there have been many severe cases of PTSD from the Falklands war, with their own peculiarities, it is on the home front that the representation of the warriors' code is crucial.

In 1982 the government propaganda machine was highly successful in maintaining public support for the war. The country was racked with social division and the case has been repeatedly made that Margaret Thatcher's government was saved by the invasion and her response to it. The media often claim that the government and the Ministry of Defence waged a war on the home front, using censorship and misinformation to cover up political failings and military disaster. However, although the government attempted to answers these questions at several inquiries, they had little to fear from a media that was complicit in the use of mythology to construct cultural propaganda, something taken over after the war by the publishing industry.

The particular post-war period in which books and periodicals are published in large measure governs the content. Immediately after the Falklands Conflict a number of books were published very quickly, and without the degree of analysis that would have made them more factually accurate. These were soon followed by a number of more accurate and less flamboyant texts, such as Martin Middlebrook's 1985 book, *The Falklands War 1982*. Books continued to be published at a fairly steady rate until 2006 when a number were published to mark the 25th anniversary of the war. This event allowed a new, more historical and critical perspective, for example, *Razor's Edge* (Bicheno 2006). Looking at these publications requires that they be placed within the context of the period during which they were published. It is only by doing this that it is possible to understand the intent of the author and the publisher.

The Second Draft of History

It is often said that journalism is the first draft of history, and if this is the case, then the second draft is surely the books and magazines that are hastily produced soon after the events. These books are often produced from a historian's perspective, but lack the time between events and writing necessary to give a true historical perspective.

Following the war, the Centre for Journalism Studies at University College, Cardiff produced a report on the relationship between the media, the military and the
Government during the Falklands war. The authors quoted Washington Post proprietor, Phil Graham, that journalism is “the first rough draft of history.” (Mercer et al 1987: 3). The books that were printed immediately after the war by journalists and publishers were the beginnings of the second draft.

The Falklands war was quite unique in this regard as a number of publications went to print before the end of the year. Newspapers attempted to make up for poor reporting during the war, salvaging damaged reputations amongst the media and setting the record straight on a number of quite serious episodes of misinformation. The Sunday Times, Express Newspapers and Robert Fox of the BBC all produced their books in 1982, just a few months after the war. Books that give first-hand accounts are usually produced to satisfy some emotional need in the authors or to cash in on interest generated by immediacy. In the case of the former, Hugh Tinker compiled a book of his son's letters from the Falklands, written before his death onboard HMS Glamorgan (Tinker 1982). Other publishers and authors rode the tide of popular interest and went to print quickly in anticipation of high sales. These were produced mostly by journalists and, so close to the war, it is almost impossible to separate the historians view from the journalists.

These were followed by a quite remarkable publication that appeared in newsagents early in 1983, which presented a mix of popular history, cultural propaganda and guide book of military technology. Marshal Cavendish produced The Falklands War: The day by day record from invasion to victory as a 14 piece part-work. It lacked the detail that would have been unearthed in a more thoughtful history, but more importantly it maintained the cultural mythology generated by Government propaganda and press mediation during the war. Each of the 14 magazines covered a key period in the war and each had a “Weapon File” occupying the centre four or five pages. These articles gave details of the origins and capabilities of the weapons systems used by both sides. They were essentially spotters' guides to the technology of war. The war stories, which were given an air of authenticity by numerous first-hand accounts, were largely image led.

The publishers gathered together hundreds of images from many different sources. The series begins with images of Royal Marines surrendering and being taken into captivity on the day of the Argentine invasion. Other images from Argentine sources included both news and vernacular photographs. Pictures from news agencies of the Argentine military on the islands, preparing for war on the mainland and political figures were supplemented by a few images that seem to be from private Argentine sources. These images are not credited and it is now not possible to identify the original
sources. However, there are relatively few Argentine images in the complete work, with the vast majority of pictures showing the British side of the war.

As well as official photographs (the Ministry of Defence was a major contributor) there was a good selection provided by news agencies and individual members of the military: Lieutenant Duck, Royal Marines, providing a number of images from the front line. Images provided by various Ministry of Defence establishments were credited to either the MoD, the establishment (e.g. Soldier Magazine) or the individual photographer (e.g. Paul Haley). This was not always a uniform system with images by Haley being credited to a number of different organisations. This almost certainly crept in because it was very difficult to accurately identify original sources in any kind of consistent way.

The photographers shipped their negatives back using a number of routes, such that they ended up in a number of different establishments and archives in the UK. For example, in the case of the Royal Marines, some negatives went to the Fleet Photographic Unit while others went to the Royal Marine Museum. The museum then compounded the authenticity issue by loaning negatives to people without keeping records of who was holding which images. The negative of what is possibly the most famous image of the war, and certainly the one that is most often used to evoke the land war, Petty Officer Peter Holdgate’s shot of marines walking away from the camera with a Union Jack flying from their radio aerial, is now lost.

The Marshall Cavendish part-work also included a number of artworks covering events for which no photographic images are available. This included articles on the special forces, the battle for Goose Green and the signing of the final surrender in Port Stanley. These artworks are interesting in that some were commissioned by the publishers while others were provided by artists specialising in military art. For example a number of paintings by David Cobb, who produced paintings for the Parachute Regiment, were included. These works not only provide a visual representation of things we could not otherwise see, they provide a vital link with the mythology of the military.

Although The Falklands War provided a second draft of history and a more balanced viewpoint than earlier publications, it still followed the same narrative principle as the earlier works. As John Taylor argues (Aulich et al. 1992: 13), the Falklands war provided a classic narrative of good winning over evil.

The Falklands campaign makes a simple story because the events follow each other in a connected series: The Argentines invade the
islands; the British send a fleet to recover them; the opposing nations clash at sea; the British land and fight battles which they swiftly win; they return home to quayside celebration.

(Aulich et al 1992: 13)

This simple story is perfect for popular history and was followed by Marshall Cavendish, who added very little extra in terms of the already well used narrative. They employed classic journalist techniques by adding historical perspectives, background articles and regimental profiles such as "The Pride of the Paras" (pp 243-246, see figures 64-67). The inclusion of a number of "One who was there" features provided the human interest element. Some of these were first-hand accounts, while others were journalists reporting their own experiences. But all were part of the greater narrative identified by Taylor, who went on to discuss realism in the media during the war:

The Defence Committee treated the media as united by realism and was interested chiefly in the threat to morale. It paid no attention to the use of realism in both broadcasting and newspapers, where pictures deepen the truth-value of verbal reports. Photographic realism authenticates storytelling in the printed news because experience cannot be described, or in the attempt the words fail. Experience is then said to 'beggar belief', and the deficient account shored up by photographs. These are accepted as 'the things itself', forgetting that photographs are also representations.

(Aulich et al 1992: 15-16)

The importance of the underlying message here is that photographs are authored documents and when used in conjunction with text to support a deficient account, that authorship becomes muted or devalued. In the case of the images that appeared in the media during the war, the media were reliant on the Ministry of Defence for their release. This creates a situation where the final mediation and representation that appears in the media is a 'committee' affair; the photographers, the censors with the fleet, the releasing authority in London, the press agencies and the newspapers around the world, were locked in a loose committee of mediation, each reliant on the other to conduct their business. In Barthes' explanation of myth as a tiered system of signifiers and signified producing signs, where the second tier of signs represents myth, each layer in the process of getting information to the public applies its own mediation on the
signifier, producing their own signified, creating a mythology for which all those involved in the process have contributed (1993: 115). Brothers argument that Falklands images were state authored stands true during the conflict, but breaks down in post-conflict publications where greater freedom was possible (Brothers 1997: 208).

Marshall Cavendish's *The Falklands War* was possibly the first to make the break from this collaborative system, though as already stated, they were still using the same narrative paradigm. In looking at how they used photography to exploit and develop the myth of the British warrior it is necessary to concentrate on their coverage of the land war and the way the images supported the text. This coverage began with the retaking of South Georgia, moved on to the special forces raid on Pebble Island, the D-Day landings at San Carlos and each of the individual battles thereafter. It finished with the retaking of South Thule, six days after the surrender in Port Stanley.

The battle for South Georgia, Operation Paraquet (an archaic spelling of parakeet) could not have been a better piece of epic mythology if it had been written by Homer himself. A small island is invaded and captured by a hostile nation. 22 marines are captured along with the island, but a number of civilian scientists, including two women film makers, remain at large. Heroic elite soldiers attempt to recapture the island and are nearly killed when they are forced back by bad weather, but notably, not by the enemy. They are rescued by more elite heroes who go on to subdue the invaders and release the beautiful film makers. When the heroes take control of the invaded island, they find that the man in command of the enemy is a notorious killer, responsible for the torture, murder and disappearance of hundreds of people in his home country. The narrative had a clear beginning, middle and end, with a smattering of innocent women and a host of heroes.

The retaking of South Georgia was an operation beset with difficulty with helicopters crashing in glacial storms and assault boats drifting out to sea with failed engines, but the textual narrative maintains all the elements necessary for the myth of the warriors' honour to survive. Marshall Cavendish blame each failure by the British on external forces, the weather, unreliable engines, soft skinned boats, and however bad things get nothing dampens the spirits of the men. Even when marines are stranded on the extreme end of the island they wait five days before making their presence know to their own side, for fear of putting others at risk. The final British assault is made up of an ad hoc group of 75 soldiers and marines that includes administrators and headquarters personnel. But even this is free from critical analysis. One of the British helicopter pilots is described as "The Heroic Ian Stanley RN" while Major Guy Sheridan is described as
an arctic explorer and ski racing champion. The reference to 'arctic explorer' is an overt pointer to Ernest Shackleton, the famous explorer who gripped the nation with his exploits in the early 20th Century and was buried at Grytviken whaling station, the main Argentine stronghold on the island. Such simple statements about personal history and qualities are designed to invoke cultural understanding, to ensure that the reader links the current military contingent with the heroes of the past. To reinforce this, the article points out that the prisoners taken on South Georgia were held in Shackleton House.

The Argentines were spoken of in an altogether different way. After their submarine was disabled, they were said to be shocked, confused and demoralized. Given that the 156 Argentine military personnel at Grytviken, including Lieutenant Commander Astiz, had made their names in the Dirty War it would be unwise to take these comments at face-value. One possible reason for the premature collapse of the Argentine forces was the persistent rumour in Argentine newspapers that *HMS Splendid*, an atomic powered submarine, was in the area. The media claimed that the attack on South Georgia was a dupe designed to bring the Argentine fleet out into the open on the high seas and in to the sights of a submarine that could travel faster under water than the Argentine ships could on top (Chauvel 1996: 96).

Disdain for the enemy is pervasive throughout the text. One headline even describes the weather as "enemy number one". The Argentines, who were seen as less of a threat than snow and wind, simply collapse in the face of superior skill, something which seems to be borne out by the lack of casualties on both sides. The Argentines had been on the desolate island for 30 days and it seems probable that their experience had removed the will to fight, rather than the sudden realisation that they were facing the SAS. This viewpoint is supported by the fact that they had failed to prepare any kind of obstacle that could have impinged the progress of the enemy, something that had been done by the small detachment at Leith, who, knowing that the main force had surrendered, still had to be threatened with naval gunfire to make them give in.

The only casualty of the battle was Petty Officer Felix Artuso, shot by a Royal Marine on board *ARA Santa Fe*. The *Falklands War* version of the event reads as follows:

The only fatality was an Argentine petty officer who was shot dead in error while the submarine was being moved under supervision. A skeleton crew of Argentines had been on board, each with a Royal Marine guard who had instructions to prevent the boat being scuttled. Commands were to be passed down in both Spanish and English so that
both could understand. The particular order to blow tanks reached the petty officer and his guard only in Spanish. As the Argentine sailor complied with the command, the Royal Marine thought he was about to scuttle the boat and so he shot him. Booby traps and mines which the enemy had laid were removed by them under the watchful eye of the British. (p37)

It is a quite remarkable piece of propagandist myth making to couch the killing of an unarmed man in such terminology. Whilst it was a most unfortunate mistake, the authors finished the paragraph by saying that the the Argentines then had to remove booby traps, which is now known to be untrue. This is an attempt to excuse the killing of Artuso and prove the barbarian status of the Argentine forces, that the British professional soldiers fought and won a battle without taking lives, which were only lost by mistake, while unworthy Argentines fought by underhand and unworthy methods.

An alternative viewpoint on the Santa Fe incident is presented by Bicheno (2006: 123-124) who points out that the submarine was attacked eight times on the surface by Royal Navy Helicopters, who still failed to sink it, allowing it to continue to manoeuvre. Contrary to The Falklands War text, it was by luck rather than judgement that the British avoided casualties on South Georgia, and although some personnel did attempt to prompt a surrender without casualties, this situation would not have continued had the Argentines actually opened fire.

The images used to illustrate the retaking of South Georgia support the mythological status of the battle in the popular imagination. The first picture (Marshal Cavendish 1983: 33, figure 68) shows Lieutenant Commander Alfredo Astiz standing in front of the camera with eight of his men lined up behind him; the line suggests that there are more, but we can only identify eight. Both Astiz and his men look tentative, slightly ill at ease with the photographer. We cannot know, as the caption suggests, if they are posing for the picture, but this seems unlikely as only one of the men behind Astiz is looking at the camera. Astiz himself has a nervous look on his face, but we would expect him to look more relaxed and self-assured if the purpose of this event had been the making of a photograph. The caption imposes further ambiguity when it claims that the picture was taken in the “heady days of Argentine 'triumph'”. There is nothing heady or triumphalist about the picture of Astiz and his men. The mythological point that is being pushed forward is that even at the height of the occupation of South Georgia they could not muster a smile, a straight back, or a stiff upper lip. The point of the image is
to cast the Argentines as the 'other', as something less than a warrior and certainly not as professional soldiers, and it does its job very well.

The subsequent pages show a large black and white image of a Wessex helicopter lying on its side, after crashing on the Fortuna Glacier, and shots of ships and equipment. There is a picture of the Santa Fé submarine, half sunken with just the conning tower jutting out of the water by the Grytviken quay. In the background, white houses, with corrugated iron roofs, under rocky hills, gives the scene an ambience of Scotland or Wales. The article goes on to compound the visual mythology by using photographs taken by Major Guy Sheridan, the Royal Marine commander in charge of the final mission. This added element of the vernacular amateur photographs give an authenticity to the account. They are used to lend credence to the article by associating the text with Sheridan, a visual variant of the “one who was there” pieces that are used extensively in The Falklands War.

The article closes with a inset piece detailing the life, times and crimes of Captain Alfredo Astiz (he was promoted from Lieutenant Commander during the occupation). This is crowned with a photograph of Astiz signing the document of surrender aboard HMS Plymouth. It is a famous photograph, often used in association with criticism of Major General Moore's refusal to allow the final surrender in Port Stanley to be photographed. Moore's argument was that a photograph would be humiliating for the Argentines and counter-productive to the peace. This is an interesting take on time; Moore's argument supporting the idea that negative time would decrease the likelihood of an honourable and successful peace. In the image of Astiz it is possible to understand Moore's point of view. The surrendering Argentine is bearded, long-haired, hunched over a document, while his British captors are clean shaven, in spotless uniforms, sitting straight-backed with their hands under the table. Astiz seems to be placed halfway between a naughty school boy and Nazi U-boat commander; caught between humiliation at the hands of bigger boys and the threatening menace he was expected to exude.

It must be noted, that in common with most other post-war publications that looked at the retaking of South Georgia, Marshall Cavendish omitted a rather important image. After the Santa Fé incident, Chief Petty Officer Artuso was given a military funeral at Grytviken. Several images of this event were easily available, but the one most often used in later publications shows British sailors lined up either side of the grave with two officers conducting the service. This is a sign of the western way of warfare, of the Platonic belief that enemies should be treated with honour, even after
death. But maybe the problem with the image is that in the early and mid 1980s the Argentine enemy, and certainly those under Astiz, were presented as a barbarians, and the media myth makers did not want to perpetuate an honour that did not fit easily with their simplistic mythology. Some publications pursued the accepted and popular myth by showing a pair of marines visiting Shackleton’s grave in the same grave yard.

Whether the battle was on the fields of Troy, in the jungles of Vietnam, or in the submarines of the South Atlantic, every warrior seeks to be remembered after death (kleos). For the men of the Homeric poems, remembrance is everything, while absolute and meaningless death lies in anonymity. On his return to Ithaca, Odysseus finds himself amongst the ghost of Hades, first meeting an old comrade, Elpenor, who died accidentally on Circe’s islands. Elpenor pleads with Odysseus to return to the island:

... my lord, I ask that you remember me
and do not go and leave me behind unwept, unburied,
when you leave, for fear I might become the gods’ curse upon you;
but burn me there with all my armour that belongs to me,
and heap up a grave mound beside the beach of the grey sea,
for an unhappy man, so that those to come will know of me.

(Odyssey 11:71-76)

The image of the Argentine funeral shows British sailors fulfilling these rites, giving honour and memory to a vanquished enemy. The images marks a point in the war for those who are there as well as the viewer; for the dead sailor it marks his passage into realm of remembrance and ensures he is forgotten, buried alongside Shackleton. For the British sailors and marines, it is atonement for the needless death, and as Shay (2002) argues, a pivotal moment on the road to either post-combat stress or recovery. For the British viewer, it is an image whose meaning mutates according to usage. For Marshall Cavendish, it was a step too far in the acknowledgement of the Argentines as a worthy enemy. For later authors, it represented the western warrior tradition, reiterating the high moral status of the British warrior.

The land war moved on to the Falkland Islands when marines and soldiers went ashore at San Carlos on the 21 May. The Falklands War dedicated 20 pages to the landings and establishment of the beachhead. Each page was heavily accented towards photography with the text giving a mundane, journalistic account of the landings, which were unopposed by the Argentine land forces. In terms of the myth of the British
military and the warriors' honour, the whole thing was a bit of a damp squib. The soldiers came ashore in the morning light from a calm, if unnerving sea. The picture series begins with two marines applying camouflage cream to each others faces, a scene of mutual support that, within the terms of the myth we are exploring, is a demonstration of brotherhood, of military camaraderie, showing professional warriors preparing for battle (p.161, figure 69).

The next page is a large double page spread of San Carlos bay with a single Argentine soldier standing in the foreground looking out to sea (figure 70). It is a picture of calm, with a generic caption that falls short of saying that the picture was actually shot at San Carlos. It could be from anywhere on the islands and is used to demonstrate the stillness of the morning. This lack of commitment in the caption is the first real clue that this image has nothing to do with D-Day on the Falklands, but the real problem is that, with the sun low and shining in the soldier's face, it appears to be shot not long after dawn, by which time the British had many troops ashore and the scene would not have been anything like this. The next four pages show landing craft and Gemini assault boats speeding through San Carlos water and troops coming ashore. Again there is an feeling that this is a calm and benign environment. The landings at San Carlos give very little of the popular mythology, but Marshall Cavendish attempted to bring things back on line by comparing them to previous amphibious landings. A two page article, “Latest in a line of heroes”, looked at landings in Quebec, Dieppe, Madagascar, Normandy and Suez. This “epic history” was used to prove, in the face of images that seemed to say otherwise, that the men who went ashore on 21 May were in fact warrior heroes.

Marshall Cavendish covered the battle for Goose Green across 13 pages. There are numerous versions of the Goose Green story, many based on war time propaganda, but the most controversial part of the battle was the death of Lieutenant Colonel Herbert 'H' Jones, the Commanding Officer of the 2nd Battalion The Parachute Regiment. Lieutenant Colonel Jones was shot in the back by an Argentine machine gunner while attempting to destroy an enemy position. As the Marshal Cavendish text acknowledges, the debate centres around whether his actions in assaulting an enemy position were foolish or brave. The official military line is that this was an outstanding act of bravery, so much so that he was awarded the Victoria Cross. The alternative view is that, as Commanding Officer, he should not have been leading his men from the front and should never have been in a position to be shot in the back by the enemy. Fitz Gibbon (1995) gives an analytical and balanced view of Jones' leadership style and the reasons for his death, but does not look at the motives behind the various versions of this story.
Shay (2002) discusses a value system that accurately gives reasons for the various representations of the death of Lieutenant Colonel Jones.

The heartlessness with which the poet [Homer] treats the loss of these “non-heroic” lives is the first example in the Western narrative tradition treating the doings of the “great” as all that matters. Ever since, the lives of all those “little people” have been treated as just so many stage props sometimes necessary, and sometimes clutter to be rid of because they’re in the way of the story. We could easily charge this to an aristocratic bias, if it were not for the Iliad, where there is an inclination to treat each and every death as significant, and not a mere plot device.

(Shay 2002 p62)

Although Shay was talking about Odysseus as the sole survivor from a fleet of 12 ships, the equivalent of Lt Col Jones losing his entire battalion and walking away unscathed, it is the relative importance of the individual in the story that creates the paradigm; Jones, like Odysseus, got good press, regardless of his misdeeds. The argument that Shay is making is that a society needs to celebrate the heroic for what it is, not for the result that is achieved. The representation of Jones’s death falls within a value system that is centuries old, a system that leaves no alternative but to represent it as an heroic act of self sacrifice. As Shay goes on to argue (2002: 80), veterans pour emotion and energy into keeping the faith with their dead comrades, because to do otherwise would dishonour the living. Jones represented a high profile death that British society would have been dishonoured by, had it not paid appropriate homage.

The visual representation of the incident within the Marshall Cavendish part-work taps into another system of representation, that of military artwork. The lack of photographs of an incident normally precludes it from journalistic visual representation and denies the event the truth value bestowed by the visual, but the death of Jones is far too important an event to be denied this. The publishers chose a painting by artist Michael Turner showing “H’ checking the magazine of his submachine gun before charging the gun post” (figure 71) Jones is hunched over his SMG watched by another soldier, presumably his body guard, Sergeant Norman, with a wide valley disappearing into the haze and low cloud. Unusually, for what could be classed as regimental art, it is painted from a combat photography viewpoint, that is, from behind the subject. Paintings that celebrate the derring-do of the military more usually show their subjects
from the front, from the viewpoint of the enemy. They also more usually show their subjects at the height of the action, not in the moments before (see Chapter Six).

The Turner picture is unrepresentative of the situation immediately before Jones's death, both in atmosphere and geography. The incident took place in a small gully and around a spur, not in a wide valley or a position where Jones and Norman could have been easily killed by long-range direct fire. Jones had arrived in the position from which the assault was made after he ordered 28 men to go over the top of the gully. These were forced back by a barrage of small arms fire. Jones then went round a spur into a very tight re-entrant, a position from which he was looking up hill in three directions. The painting shows a calm, almost relaxed situation, one that cannot have been the case given that the Jones, a hot tempered man, had just arrived at a failed assault and the near death of 28 men. Fitz-Gibbon (1995) recounts stories from Jones's men who describe him as abrasive and inclined to publicly reprimand his officers if he felt they had not carried out his orders; a man short of tolerance and not given to listening. Immediately before the event Jones had been lying on the ground shouting at his men. Although none of those present can remember Jones organising an assault, he was just telling them to get forward; he then got up and charged. So it is clear that Michael Turner's painting is not representative of the real events. Its purpose was to shore up the Homeric representation of Jones as a thoughtful, intelligent and charismatic leader, a member of the warrior class who died in a valiant, but unlucky assault. Using the Homeric epics as a metaphor there is a tendency to see Lt Col Jones as Odysseus, a commander full of bravery and guile. However, Odysseus survived his war. Evidence would suggest that Jones had more in common with Achilles; hot tempered, prone to public denigration of others, a leader from the front, who did not survive (Fitz-Gibbon 2001:20).

Michael Turner painted several other illustrations for Marshall Cavendish, including four illustrations for a general article on the SAS (figures 72-74). In 1982, Turner had a reputation for aviation and motor sport paintings, but it is difficult to describe his work as high art. In some respects the images used by Marshal Cavendish conform to Turner's trademark style of accurate and fine detail, but in others they are poorly researched and seem to have been done in a hurry. As with the Jones painting, the SAS ones have been included to fill gaps in the visual record. However, this time the intent is considerably more propagandist. Images showing soldiers HALO (high altitude – low opening) parachuting, running with large and heavy backpacks, swimming rivers with machine guns on floatation packs, and controlling air attacks with laser target
designation devices are designed to feed the myth of the special forces as super-human, super-warriors.

The article includes two photographs, one showing two special forces soldiers climbing out of a submarine escape hatch, while the other shows two more soldiers paddling a sea canoe (figures 76-77). There had been a number of books published on the special forces before 1982, many of them heavily illustrated with photographs shot by the SAS and SBS themselves. Competent research at the Imperial War Museum archive would certainly have produced enough photographs to illustrate this article. But any number of photographs would not have satisfied the psychological need to prove to the viewer that the special forces were unique; the paintings reinforce and are the visual equivalent of the verbal 'no comment', which builds the mythology of the special forces anonymity, used to achieve a military advantage. In this way, Marshall Cavendish were engaged in military propaganda and myth-making.

Another picture by Turner illustrated the battle for Top Malo House (figure 78). This was a minor skirmish between the British marines and Argentine special forces, a skirmish that lasted no more than fifteen minutes and had only 19 and 16 soldiers on each side respectively. In many histories of the Falklands Conflict this episode is only mentioned in passing, but it provides an ideal opportunity for mythology. The Marshall Cavendish account is written by Sergeant Derek Wilson as a "ONE WHO WAS THERE" piece, a straight forward report of the fighting used to increase truth value of this version of events. The sergeant's account would not have been published unedited and it is likely that it was drafted by Wilson and sub-edited to meet the needs of the publication. There are no photographs of the battle for Top Malo House, but the publishers illustrated the article with three images from elsewhere; one showing the Royal Marine Mountain and Arctic Warfare Cadre training with helicopters in a unnamed location (probably Norway) and two showing Argentine prisoners being prepared for interrogation at Teal Inlet. Turner provided the only visual representation of the battle in the form of a painting.

Like the other painted illustrations in the book, this is a celebratory piece, a mythological vision of war. As with so many stories from the Falklands War, the battle for Top Malo House is often used to prove the worth of the British Forces. The boys-own story goes as follows: British elite forces discover Argentine special forces in a well defended position, the British launch a surprise attack, several of the Argentines die as they are defeated by the British, who suffer only minor injuries, which are only inflicted because they are fighting the best Argentina has to offer. Removing the mythology from
the battle makes the story much more prosaic; an alternative would view would be that
16 Argentine soldiers got themselves trapped inside a building made of wood and
corrugated iron and were flushed out by enemy soldiers using high calibre machine guns
and rocket launchers. In their valiant attempt to defend themselves, they manage to
inflict serious injuries on five enemy soldiers before they were forced to surrender when
their 'stronghold' went up in flames.

Turners paintings, in a tradition going back to Lady Butler in the 19th Century, are
representations of the accepted mythology and make no acknowledgement of any
alternative view. During her life Butler was described as a Pre-Raphaelite and although
not traditionally seen as part of that movement, she upheld the beliefs of romanticism
and realism (see Chapter Six). Although these beliefs would seem to be at odds with
each other when applied to scenes of battle, the application of the western mythology of
war gives them a less awkward juxtaposition. Turner applied these beliefs to his work,
making them realistic and romantic within the accepted mythology, applying the
received wisdom of the engagements he painted to reinforce the belief system.

Another myth that was exploited heavily during the Falklands War was the idea that
'men go to war while women wait at home'. In total, only 27 images of women
appeared on the 448 pages of the Marshall Cavendish part-work and 20 of these
showed women waiting in some form.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Waiting</th>
<th>10</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Falkland Islanders</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentine Women Waiting</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Margaret Thatcher</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Queen</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politicians</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>2</td>
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The women who wait fall into two categories in these figures: The wives of service
personnel in the UK and Argentina and the women of the Falkland Islands waiting to
be rescued or liberated from the invasion. This means that out of the 27 images of
women, 20 are bystanders to the conflict. It is surprising that Margaret Thatcher only
appears in the publication three times given that she was one of the principal characters
in the conflict. The image of the sole female politician is used to illustrate an article on
anti-war sentiment in the UK, while the image of the Queen is used in an article on
diplomacy. The two images showing female service personnel conform to the myth of women who wait, since one shows a group of nurses with a caption that gives no information as to their military status. Simply described as nurses aboard the hospital ship *Uganda*, they are possibly merchant navy nurses who sailed with the merchant ship. The other image of female military personnel shows four women in army uniform, with their backs to the camera, looking at a moored ship as returning troops disembark at the end of the war. We can therefore say that both these images show women waiting for men; one waiting for injured troops to arrive in hospital and the other waiting for them to come home. In total, 22 of 27 images from 448 pages show women waiting.

In the early 1980s, women were not allowed in the fighting formations (teeth arms) of the British Army and they constituted not allowed to sail aboard Royal Navy ships. However, they were present on merchant ships and they were allowed in other army units such as the Royal Signals, but they were a very small minority of personnel with the Task Force. But this does not explain the absence of women in the work of photographers and publishers. Women in the armed forces would have played a vital role in the UK in the deployment and maintenance of the Task Force, but do not feature in representations of the conflict.

There still exists in modern representations of war a genre of photography and propaganda that has its origins in the Falklands Crisis and depicts soldiers returning to their families. While this now encompasses female as well as male service personnel, the propagandists and the media are still looking for men returning to the excited and loving arms of women and children. The images produced at the end of the Falklands War still feed this desire for images of returning warriors. The first image in the Marshall Cavendish work that explores this paradigm shows women and children photographed behind the windows of the arrivals lounge at RAF Brize Norton anxiously looking at the runway waiting for the survivors of *HMS Sheffield* to arrive home (p.107). The press did not get images of wives greeting husbands on this occasion and would have to wait for the survivors of *HMS Coventry* a few weeks later.

Captain Hart-Dyke, Commanding Officer of *HMS Coventry*, was photographed arriving back in the UK surrounded by women and small children (figure 79). Hart-Dyke carries the facial scars of burns received in the attack on *HMS Coventry* and he stands close by, but apart from those surrounding him, walking forward and through the crowds, which he ignores with the air of a man who has somewhere else to be. The children look up at his face with a degree of benign interest and bewilderment at something they don't really understand. A woman with her hand placed protectively on
the shoulder of the smallest child looks at him with a mixture of sympathy and worry. She may be waiting for her own husband, and father of her children to arrive, and we cannot tell if she knows the degree of his injuries. Biting her bottom lip between her teeth, she is either thankful that he is either less badly injured, or she is has yet to find out how badly and is praying it is not too bad. She is an exemplar of the paradigm of women who wait at home, wait to see if their men will return, and if they will ever be the same again.

The penultimate episode in the 'women who wait story' appeared on page 414, where they were shown hugging returned soldiers with relief. These images were commonplace at the end of the war and used in every newspaper across Britain. These images were the product of press facilities organised by the Ministry of Defence as a piece of propaganda to reinforce the value and worth of the British warrior. The actions and reactions of the women are the prime motivators of these images and it is the emotions they display that are important. In terms of political propaganda, they are used by the government to demonstrate a happy ending in the belief that this proves the fight was worthwhile. They are still used in this way by the government who organise press facilities for soldiers returning from Iraq and Afghanistan. In exactly the same way that they did in 1982, the smiling faces and hugs in these images are used to prove that families honour and respect the sacrifice their men have made, which many propagandists believe can be extended to demonstrate familial and public support for the operation. This relies almost entirely on the model of social propaganda exploited after the Falklands War.

Images shot at RAF Brize Norton and on the quaysides of Portsmouth and Southampton were generated and used by a media that was voracious for material that provided a solid end to a fairy-tale war. As already discussed, the Falklands War had a clear beginning, middle and end that was used to paint a rosy picture in the simplified terms loved by the press. The quayside reunions provided the visual stamp that ended the conflict. However, the 'women who wait' story was finally concluded in the last section of the part-work. Marshall Cavendish printed a Roll of Honour listing all the medals awarded to members of the Task Force. A number of these were illustrated with photographs of the medal recipients. Two of these pictures showed the men with their wives and families proudly showing off their award.

Once again, these images were used to demonstrate the worth of the warrior in western society, linking this to the value of the family. Wives, fiancées and families in these images are positioned such that they become possessions of the medal recipient.
The 'warriors' stand behind the medal and their families, presenting both to the camera in a demonstration of ownership and authority. While the quayside images marked the end of the conflict narrative, the medal images marked the return to normality of the warriors, the true end to the story. However, for many veterans this is not the end of the story and their post-war struggle with physical and, particularly, psychological injury would be largely ignored by the media. For the media, homecoming is an event, whereas for the military, *nostos* is a process (see Chapter Six).

In the same year that the war took place, Express Newspapers published *War in the Falklands*, a coffee table book that followed the accepted narrative of the war more closely than any other. The book ignored the political build up to the war and any accusation that the British Government held any responsibility for the situation that led to conflict. It began by describing the Falkland Islands as being “amongst the loveliest places on earth” and then explained that the islands had been in decline before the war. This, according to *Express Newspapers* was because the Falklands Islands Company had been extracting profits from the islands and not reinvesting. This, along with the British Government's failure to rule out negotiations on sovereignty, was given as the trigger for Argentina's invasion of the islands. Following this brief, one page synopsis of the pre-war situation, the *Express* fully embraced the narrative of beginning, middle and end; invasion, war, victory.

The majority of images used in the publication were of military origin, although the single largest category of contributor was the press.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Newspapers and Press Agencies</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military - Amateur Photographers</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military - Professional Photographers</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attributed to unknown photographer</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unattributed</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auto image (MoD cockpit camera)</td>
<td>1</td>
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Although there seems to be a reliance on military supplied images, the majority are not Crown Copyright and were not sourced through the Ministry of Defence. The number of images supplied by the media is slightly skewed in that all the images covering the political and domestic situation in both Argentina and the UK were supplied by the media, meaning the military, in some form, provided the majority of the war coverage. It would be reasonable in these circumstances to assume that the MoD
was setting the agenda, either overtly or covertly. But this is not the case. As the book follows a narrative built up during and immediately after the war it is clear that the production team were more reliant on this than any input from the military. As Bourdieu (1990: 43) explained, ethos inspires behaviour and it is hard to believe the authors were not swept up in the wave of national pride (see Chapter Four).

The use of amateur photographers from within the military, just like those used by Marshall Cavendish, served to exploit the realism and authenticity of the first hand account. Although the Sunday Express publication did not use text in the same way as Marshal Cavendish, it did use the same principle with images. The proliferation of amateur photographs was used to build the coherence of the narrative within the limits of the mythology constructed during the war. The addition of images, created by the likes of Major Guy Sheridan on South Georgia and Surgeon Commander Rick Jolly at the Ajax Bay field hospital, lend not just a first hand account, but an authoritative account. The images by Rick Jolly (figure 38), one across two pages showing surgeons at work, with small insets of a field station and soldiers on the wards, are sandwiched between battle reports from San Carlos Water and Goose Green. All four pictures were shot by Rick Jolly, the Surgeon Commander from HMS Hermes, who set up the hospital at Ajax Bay. He was prominent in the media during and immediately after the war, being mentioned and often quoted in many media and historical texts. By using his pictures of the war the publishers are attempting to irrefutably prove their version of events; the version of events whereby they honourably treat the enemy in the same manner as their own wounded, the version of events where the British forces are the more skilled and the more caring.

The technique of using vernacular images to produce a professionally mediated narrative goes into overdrive when the Sunday Express team tackle the problem of Goose Green. This battle was famously fought mostly at night and in the absence of press photographers, who arrived several days after the end of the battle. An almost exclusive use of amateur photographs was used to plug this gap and produce a 12 page story. The obvious flaw in this methodology is that in battle soldiers are normally too preoccupied to be taking photographs, and this is borne out in the limited view of the battle presented here. Unlike Marshal Cavendish, the Sunday Express team only used one map and made little attempt to convey the complexity of the battle. The main text runs to less than 800 words and with the picture captions adding little additional detail about the battle, the article is low on information. The reader's understanding of the battle is therefore gathered from the images.
All of the pictures show either the build up to the battle, or, more predominately, the aftermath. Most of the soldiers are relaxed and calm, drinking tea, smoking cigarettes, and treating minor injuries. Smoking hillsides and surrendered equipment add to the atmosphere, but convey little in terms of conflict. In the Iraq and Afghan wars of the 21st Century soldiers, are equipped with modern technology (mobile phones, digital cameras and computers) that allow them to shoot quickly, in poor light and with very little thought, producing dramatic moving images that are often presented to the viewer on internet sites such as YouTube. However, in the early 1980s, none of this technology was available, movies were impossible without cumbersome cameras and film stock, and still images required much more effort than is the case with modern mobile phone technology. It is therefore unsurprising that the type of military vernacular photography that we are now used to seeing is not available from earlier wars.

The Express publication explored the Falklands Conflict from a broad perspective, but in general it lacked any real insights. The use of vernacular photography was probably an attempt to add something new to the narrative, something that had not been explored in the media during the war. In 2000 Andrew Lane, in conjunction with the Royal Marine Museum published Royal Marine Commandos in the Falklands War, which constructed a narrative of the war in 136 photographs credited to three Royal Navy photographers attached to 3 Commando Brigade.

The book contains a blanket credit to Petty Officer Pete Holdgate, Leading Airman Roger Ryan and Leading Airman Alistair Campbell as the originators of the photographs, but it is most unfortunate that this is inaccurate. The books opens with an account of the invasion and series of pictures showing the surrender of Naval Party 8901, shot on 2 April following the invasion of Port Stanley. These images were actually taken by Sunday Times correspondent Simon Winchester and smuggled off the Islands by Governor Rex Hunt’s son before Winchester was deported to Argentina (Freedman 2005: 11). There are also questions over the provenance of images taken after the retaking of South Georgia. In all other publications, and according to the wire record, the only photographers present on the island after the retaking were Sergeant Ron Hudson from United Kingdom Land Forces and Royal Navy photographer Jim Fletcher. These two seem to have photographed a Royal Marine patrol through Grytviken, both men producing similar images of the same men. Other instances of poor accreditation include images taken by Tom Smith of Express Newspapers (p60) of the capture of an Argentine soldier wearing a Royal Marine jumper. He had been picked up by members of the Parachute Regiment and it is unconvincing to credit the pictures to Royal Marine
Although these oversights do not cast doubt on the narrative, they do have an affect on the source value of the book and inflate the contribution made by the three-man Royal Navy team to the war record. Like the Express publication, the Royal Marine Commandos in the Falklands War had a vernacular overtone. However, in the later book this is produced by the family album style layout and content. Pictures of parties, group photographs and Marines smiling at the camera combined with a specific captioning style and a graphic framing of each page make the book look like a photo album or scrap book.

The origin of most of these pictures is photojournalistic in that they were shot for consumption by the media, but the time span between shooting and publication of the book means that, like all old photographs, they have achieved documentary value, allowing a highly effective mix of photographic styles to sit well together. The book gathers together pictures from the Royal Marines build-up training, their ship-borne movement to the South Atlantic, their time on South Georgia and the Falklands, their return home and a post-war visit to the battlefield cemeteries of those who did not make it home. There are a number of famous images in the book, including the Royal Marines walking into Stanley with the Union Jack flying from a radio aerial (shot by Peter Holdgate and appearing in the unnumbered colour section). But the book is not designed or built around these famous images.

The main thrust of the book is a series of largely static images of marines going about their daily lives on a military operation. They are shown with island children, cooking field rations, chatting amongst themselves, washing, walking, reading letters and posing in small groups. Rather than a portrayal of conflict, this is a photographer's journey through the battlefield, a record of daily life punctuated by the occasional reference to violence.

By 2000 the kudos and timé granted to the British military for victory in the Falklands Conflict was well established. There was a belief that the campaign was a glorious victory and the timé was unquestioningly positive. The publication of the Royal Marine Museum's book fitted within the Greek Meme at the level of kleos. Whether the Greek Meme is part of a scientific exploration of cultural paradigms, or metaphorical representation of innate human nature, the Royal Marine book sits at a higher level of story telling to those published during and immediately after the conflict. The time span between events and publication and the fact that it was produced by the military themselves place this book in the realm of kleos.
Kleos and the Photographic Image.

In Ancient Greece, possession of Kleos meant being talked about at a societal level, rather than just within the warriors social group, and in the pre-Classical period was largely reliant on epic poetry and storytelling. Kleos of the highest order was remembrance after death. When the spoken word remained the sole vehicle for the communication of heroic stories there was a symbiosis between the warrior and the storyellers. However, the work of great poets like Homer could not encompass every battle and every victory. Ancient Greek society was a great story-telling culture and many heroes would have survived in family and community stories without making it in to the great works. In modern society family and community stories still operate as the backbone of the remembrance; almost every family has its First and Second World War heroes and there is an ever growing movement amongst wartime survivors and their families to have non-military heroes such as the Bevin Boys, the Land Army and the merchant-men of the Atlantic and Arctic Convoys added to the list of the nationally remembered. The National Memorial Arboretum and the Armed Forces Memorial in Staffordshire are outward signs of this modern trend and are physical embodiments of kleos.

Modern western society has abandoned epic poetry as the vehicle for storytelling in favour of literary fiction and cinema, which often struggles to differentiate fact and fiction. There are rare examples of factual war stories, such as Andy McNab's Bravo Two Zero, making it into the best seller lists, but even these are often mired in controversy over fact and fiction. News reporting is equally guilty of misrepresentation and reports often need checking for accuracy and hyperbole, which leads to a degree of bathos that over-compensates and denudes kleos. The arena of communication that attracts the least criticism of content is the well researched academic or historical book, although they are often accused of bias. We should therefore expect to find the manifestation of modern kleos in these books.

Text is historically the primary representation of kleos and the photographic process does not lend itself to perpetuating an individual warrior's battlefield victories. For a photograph to contribute to an individual warrior's kleos it would need to be made in an environment specific to the act of victory. For this reason, artistic impressions have been routinely employed by the military to explore the 'glories' of war (see Chapter Six).
1982, consumers of the photographic image could reasonably have expected frontline images to have been made, but this would have been based on the work of photographers such as Robert Capa in the Second World War and Larry Burrows in Vietnam. Capa's Normandy beach images and *Yankee Papa 13* by Burrows were only possible because the photographers were granted access and taken to the frontline by the military. Both men spent a considerable amount of time in the combat zone, photographing wars that went on for years. The seventy four days of the Falklands Conflict were very different: The military had trouble getting themselves to the battles, which were all fought at night and the photographers had no way of producing images that were not in some way mediated by the military.

The limited number of images that became common currency after the war were used repeatedly by journalists and authors to illustrate their work and some of these became iconic. The most iconic of all Falklands Conflict images shows a line of Royal Marines walking into Port Stanley with a Union Jack flying from the last man's radio aerial. It has been used in many publications and in semiotic terms it is the symbol that stands for the long march across West Falkland. It was used on the cover of Martin Middlebrook's *The Falklands War 1982*, where it stood as the iconic representation of the whole conflict. In line with many other factual books, Middlebrook used a separate section of photographs to illustrate the text. In a rather limited view of the conflict, he used just 31 images to encapsulate events from the departure to the return of the Task Force. This was a rather predictable view with the images sticking to the accepted narrative. The 31 images can be summed up as:

- Preparations on Ascension Island.
- Aerial pictures of Stanley airfield after Operation Black Buck.
- Various ships and aircraft.
- Soldiers and Marines tabbing and yomping across West Falkland.
- Various bodies and funerals.
- Various victory celebrations.
- Soldiers in Port Stanley.
- Task Force arrives home.

Middlebrook's was one of the first historical analysis of the war that had some kind of distance between the author and the events and was published three years after the conflict. In his own words, "I much prefer the dust to settle and some degree of
historical perspective to arrive” (Middlebrook 1985: 12). However, Middlebrook conducted 200 interviews in researching his book and would have started work in a climate that was still engulfed in the euphoria of victory. We would therefore expect his visual narrative to conform to the contemporary theory. In terms of iconic images, he used only one inside the book. The image of the Scots Guards celebrating the cease fire on top of Mount Tumbledown has been discussed in Chapter Four, but in *The Falklands War 1982* it served to provide *kleos* to the men in the image. Most of the pictures chosen by Middlebrook did not do this; his selection was more representative of the images released during the war and constructed a similar visual narrative.

In 2006 Hugh Bicheno published *Razor’s Edge*. This was a controversial book that attracted some negative publicity over Bicheno's plain speaking and was accused of significant factual errors (Fox, Robert, *The Guardian*, April 2006). However, it was received well by the military themselves and was one of the more balanced accounts of the conflict. It is the only book that explains the land battles from the British and the Argentine perspectives, giving equal credence to both. Naming the men on both sides, he writes with sympathy and empathy for those who fought and died on the islands. His style of plain speaking and recognition of heroic action, regardless of which side of the conflict they came from, forms a system of representation that is both Homeric and Platonic. To accept that the Argentines were capable of selfless acts of heroism is to accept them as worthy enemies. Bicheno recognised that the value of the victory on the Falklands Conflict was entirely dependent on the status of the enemy. At the very bottom of the Greek Meme, the level of *Kudos* derived from any victory is proportional to the difficulty of the battle, and likewise, *timē* is increased when battle is harder.

Bicheno's storytelling provides a stark contrast to Robert Fox, his biggest critic, who wrote his book in 1982. Fox wrote a first-hand account of the war, particularly from the battle for Goose Green and Darwin. He did not describe the actions of the enemy, other than with reference to the bombs and bullets that landed in the peat around them. He did not acknowledge the heroism of the Argentine forces as they attempted to defend the islands and gave very little account of the night battles that ended the Argentine invasion. This was only to be expected from an account that is based in personal experience, with its very limited view of the battlefield and little understanding of the strategic level of conflict. Fox, like many of his contemporaries was mired in the euphoria of the victory and lacked the distance, temporal and physical to provide a genuinely balanced account.
Bicheno illustrated his book with a number of images that added to and developed his use of *kudos, timē* and *kleos* as tools for battlefield narrative. The cover of the book was illustrated with an image portraying Margaret Thatcher as a red-eyed pirate. Although the Falklands Conflict is often presented as Thatcher’s war, Bicheno largely ignored her contribution, preferring to concentrate on the soldiers.

Although there is little evidence victory paid an electoral dividend to Prime Minister Thatcher, defeat undoubtedly would have forced her resignation, desire for which led some (mostly anonymous) politicians and civil servants to leak information designed to bring it about. Her refusal to compromise in the face of a gratuitous international crime was indispensable, as was the ability of the British armed forces to cobble together a rapid deployment at the extreme limit of their resources. But the crucial factor was that time pressure forced a normally stolid military culture to take hair-raising risk, dislocating the expectations of an enemy confident they lacked the guts to do so.

(Bicheno 2006: 24)

This passage sets out many of Bicheno’s attitudes; mainly right-wing, moderately respectful of political leadership, very respectful of military endeavour, lacking respect for double-dealing and treachery. He is one of the few writers, Fitz-Gibbon being another, who dared to challenge the received wisdom on the conduct of the war and the battle for Goose Green in particular. For this reason he is described as hard-hitting and plain talking, but his writing does nothing to justify Thatcher’s devil-eyed pirate image on the front cover. He lays the blame for the Falklands Conflict at the door of a number of political and diplomatic leaders in Britain, Argentina and the United States of America, with a chain of events stretching back before Thatcher’s election in 1979.

The devil-eyed pirate stands not as an indictment of Thatcher or her government, but as a post-Christian token of blame. In pre-Classical, Classical and Roman periods gods were blamed for disaster and defeat, while in the Christian period every western army was convinced that God was on their side, whether they won or lost. In the absence of god, or in the presence of a god who cannot be blamed for the disasters of war, demonising political leadership is the typical replacement. Publishing his book while the Iraq and Afghan wars were still being fought, and given that Bicheno did not
partition any particular blame to Thatcher, his publishers must have used this image as a simple short-hand for the redistribution of blame (see Chapter Two).

The illustration on the cover represented some stock opinions on the war, however, inside he used a very different approach. From the captions (Annex D) it is possible to decipher Bicheno's representational model. He ignores the instrumentality of war, concentrating entirely on the human. His first pair of images show Admiral Emilio Massera, member of the junta, and Admiral Jorge Anaya, architect of the Argentine invasion. These two are described by Bicheno as "evil little men" and based on the rest of his text, it is Massera who should have been on the front of the book with an eye patch and devil's eye. As a former British intelligence officer who had worked in Argentine during the Dirty War, Bicheno was firmly on the side of humanity and against the Argentine junta. His final image in the book, Argentine nationalism yesterday, today and forever, confirms that he saw nationalism as the root cause of the Falklands Conflict.

Throughout the captions Bicheno uses language that deprecates the Argentine military system and those in charge of it, while giving honour and respect to the those who actually do the fighting. He provides images of fallen Argentine heroes, giving them equal prominence with their British counterparts, Sub-Lieutenant Oscar Silva who stopped the Scots Guards progress on Tumbledown was shown on a double page spread opposite Sergeant Ian McKay who won his Victoria Cross and died restoring momentum to the stalled 3 Para assault on Longdon. In the pre-Classical world, Homer did not delineate a difference between Greek and Trojan warriors based on which side of the conflict they fought, but on which side of the warriors' honour they acted. Agamemnon and Paris had their time diminished by their dishonourable actions, while Achilles and Hector where afforded kudos, timé and kleos. In the classical world, Plato discussed the value of fighting worthy enemies. In the absence of overall Argentine victory, Bicheno finds examples of individual victories, such as Oscar de Silva's efforts on Tumbledown and Sub-Lieutenant Roberto Estévez, who gained Argentina's highest military award, the Cross for Heroic Valour in Combat, before his death at Goose Green.

Although the British won a conclusive victory in the Falklands Conflict, kudos, in the Greek sense, is not so easily partitioned. Consider the example of Hector. Although he was killed by Achilles and the Trojans eventually lost the war, he had already won considerable amounts of kudos and timé. The same principle stands for the many brave Argentines who fought and died on the Falkland Islands. In any war, many small victories are compounded together to make a final victory, but in the ebb and flow of
battle small victories are won on both sides. Bicheno, unlike Fox, accepts that *kudos* and *timē* where afforded to both sides of the Falklands Conflict and by providing portraits and written accounts of the actions of those who died he provided *kleos* to the warriors of the Falklands Conflict.

**Documentary Art.**

The official commissioner of war art since 1972 has been the Artistic Records Committee of the Imperial War Museum, who in 1982, sent Linda Kitson to record life on the periphery of the Falklands Conflict, rather than actual combat. Kitson, who described herself as a draftsman (Kitson 1982: 10) produced over 400 black and white conté crayon drawings of the Falklands Crisis concentrating on the daily life behind the lines rather than looking for the horrors of war. The images she produced are remarkable in that they give us a view of military daily life surrounding the conflict that in many respects was not equalled by the photographic record. Her works first major appearance in public came in November 1982 when the Imperial War Museum produced an exhibition and book.

Kitson spent most her time with 5 Infantry Brigade, sailing along side Paul Haley on the *QE2* and transferring to the *SS Canberra* of South Georgia. Kitson drew many of the things that Haley photographed, such as machine gun training in shopping arcades (figure 80) and map reading at the hairdressers (figure 81). However, Kitson seemed to have either greater access to the military, or chose to draw things that eluded Haley, such as unit headquarters and operations rooms. The key difference, other than the obvious 'art versus photography' debate, is that Kitson kept detailed records, even including the soldiers names in her drawings. Details of who she was drawing, what they were doing and where they were doing it provide valuable information that is missing, not only in Haley's work, but in the work of all of the official photographers.

It is hard not to view Kitson's work in photographic terms, but within this framework they carry less truth value. Even though published photographs from the Falklands Conflict were mediated not only by the photographers, but by those involved in their dissemination and by the medium in which they were viewed, they still bear a much greater resemblance to their referents than the artwork mediated by fewer people. Kitson drew from life and would return to a particular scene several times in order to finish drawing a group of people in a given situation. She kept several sketch pads on the go in order to do this and we can therefore say that her work stands as an analogue
representation of the things she saw. In the round, her collection of drawings adequately fulfils her brief to record life between the battles. She shows us the quiet calm that often infects soldiers between bouts of momentum and high activity.

... Kitson made over 400 drawings, working swiftly in conté crayon, sometimes in sub-zero temperatures. Her drawings record the experiences of the soldiers in training and briefings on the QE2 and SS Canberra, during disembarkation and behind the lines. She was usually three or four days behind the action and therefore witnessed little of the fighting or its consequences. With hindsight she felt that the 'horrors of war' were best left to the photographers anyway, and that she did her best work recording the daily life of the troops and the conditions in which they had to operate.

(IWM - http://collections.iwm.org.uk/server/show/ConWebDoc.910)

Many of the photographers, by design or accident, managed to do exactly the same thing, but it is judged by many, including many soldiers, that Kitson produced an inadequate record of the war. In open forum, this seems to be mainly because she did not depict scenes of conflict, which it was claimed would have been much easier for her than the photographers, particularly as the main battles were fought at night. However, this is an unfair response given that she, unlike Paul Haley, had a definitive brief, had exactly the same problems in getting around the islands as everybody else and had significantly less access to the war at sea than the male photographers.

Her travels through the land war began when she boarded HMS Fearless in San Carlos Water on 2 June, but was almost immediately disembarked for San Carlos; in 1982 women were not allowed to stay overnight on warships. She remained in the San Carlos area, living with a local family, until 7 June when she was allowed to travel to Goose Green, where she remained for another week before going up to Fitzroy. All her pictures showing the battlefields around Port Stanley were drawn after the Argentine surrender. It would have therefore been inappropriate for her to make pictures of battle scenes when she was never in a position to witness the action. It is also highly unlikely that the military would have made it possible for her to get close enough to see any fighting, even if she had asked. She says that she received considerable support and assistance from both the Army and the Royal Navy during her time with them. This may have been because they viewed her as one of their own (her grandfather was a retired Naval Captain and her cousin was a distinguished army officer), but it may well
have been because she was undemanding in terms of asking for things they could not, or would not have been able to supply, that is, access to the 'frontline' or life on a warship.

Looking at her work with reference to the Greek Meme, Kitson supplied a very limited, but clear contribution to the representation of the military. She did not allow anyone to view her work whilst she was in the Falklands, and specifically thanks people in her book for either not asking to see the work, or not taking offence when she refused to show them the products of her 'draftsmanship'. Her work, therefore, did not contribute to representations of the warriors or soldiers who fought in the conflict in an significant way during the crisis, meaning that it is difficult to see a link between the kudos of those fighting and Kitson’s representations. Her work also struggles to function at the level of kleos given that it is now so rarely used in dialogues about the conflict. To contribute to fame and glory everlasting the images would have to have some form of repeated use. The lack of combat in her images also means that her work struggles to represent the glory of military victory in any kind of way that would be valued by the warriors or soldiers themselves.

Kitson’s work functioned best at the level of timē. When the troops returned from the conflict her work was widely discussed within the context of her exhibition at the Imperial War Museum and a book was produced very quickly after her return to the UK. Kudos is the glory of victory in battle, while timē is fame that warriors obtain from their kudos, but timē does not last forever. As the euphoria of victory died away, so did the interest in Kitson’s work. She was largely ignored by the art community and journalists were critical of her work. There was an expectation that an official war artist would produce paintings and it seems that this disappointment is at the centre of the criticism, rather than a the lack of artistic integrity or ability. It also seems that her reportage style, which was so easily and unfavourably compared to photography, contributed to the dismissal of her Falklands work within the art community.

Kitson arrived back in the UK on 29 July. She flew into RAF Brize Norton with the Welsh Guards at the end of a six week period of military homecomings. The media covered many of these events, seeing them only as events. However, for the Greeks, nostos was a process, it was more than simply the event of arrival. The nostos theme has many of the elements necessary for a great news story; returning warriors, waiting women, and recognition, both of the physical person and their battle glories. In ancient society, where the nostoi formed the greater part of adult male society, homecoming stories were as great as those of combat. The Orestia Trilogy by Eschylus is probably the greatest example of the tragedy that can surround nostos, while The Odyssey remains the
most powerful story of a warrior's struggle to get home. In modern society, where the nostoi are not part of the everyday experience of the majority of the civilian population, returning warriors still share their stories, but like the ancients they do it in an environment where they will be understood and appreciated by the audience.

The media generally ignore the less glorious elements of Greek nostos; meaningless death, suffering, tragedy, and deceit, all key elements of the *Odyssey*. Shay (2002) makes a compelling comparison between the psychological trauma experienced by Vietnam veterans and the nostos of Odysseus.

Odysseus' homecoming and recognition of glory is denied him by Poseidon. Odysseus takes ten years to find his way home to his family from the Trojan War and Shay (2002) makes connections between this journey and that of Vietnam veterans. Although many soldiers from Vietnam had physical returns during or immediately after the war, they went home with trauma that delayed their psychological return for many years, indeed many are still making the journey. A major concern throughout Shay's argument is the need for veterans to keep the faith with fallen comrades, something that is taken so seriously that it often prevents them from forming or sustaining any other relationship.

The families of combat veterans, and sometimes even their therapists, demand in frustration, "Why can't you put it behind you? Why can't you just forget it?" Odysseus' vow, "I won't forget a thing," is the vow of a combat soldier to his dead comrades to keep the faith with them, to keep their memory alive. Bewildered families, hurt and feeling cheated by the amount of energy their veterans pour into dead comrades, apparently do not realise that to forget the dead dishonors the living.

(Shay 2002: 80).

The remembrance and recognition elements of nostos are played out to some degree in all visual representations of war, but art has a particular role to play. Unlike photography, which, according to Barthes, has a very personal effect on the viewer, art has the power to work at a societal level. There is evidence that in the Homeric period, and certainly within the *Iliad*, that kudos, timé and kleos were gained and lost as personal accomplishments, but as Greece developed and extended the city state, or polis, from about 750 BCE onwards, they became increasingly state affairs. Warriors fought not just
for personal glory, but for the time and kleos of their city. Art has the power to distil battlefield glory and present it as a cultural and social emblem. In returning home, modern warriors, just like Hoplite warriors, are not just seeking recognition for their own victories and to establish respect for themselves, but to generate kleos for the society to which they belong. This was very much the case in Greek society where every adult male had experience of war and remains so within modern military society where regiments compete for glory. In the British Army this is evidenced by the inclusion of battle honours on regimental colours.

Societal kleos places heavy demands on the nostoi, those returning from conflict. The battlefield experiences of the nostoi leave them open to psychological trauma if their actions in combat are not accepted and valued by society (Shay 2002). It has long been recognised by modern soldiers that they are both part of and separate from the society from which they are drawn. This leads them to create cultures and sub-cultures of their own that allow them to function on multiple levels as citizens and soldiers, infantry and cavalry. The major support for returning British soldiers comes from their own military unit. Although the general ethos of support and recognition is Army wide, each unit has its own support mechanisms and built in to this is the way they represent and honour the victories and glories of the nostoi.

British military painting of the 19th Century, originating with Lady Butler, provided the yardstick for visual representations of the military and created a style that has become common to all military messes. However, major units commission and buy paintings that depict the heroic exploits of their nostoi with the express purpose of remembrance, Kleos. This award of kleos not only honours those depicted in the paintings, but the regiment as a whole. Mess Art is as much a celebration as a commemoration of past deeds and is used to acknowledge the Greek Meme; kudos, time and kleos. As Shay’s Vietnam veterans point out, to dishonour the dead is to dishonour the living.

In the eyes of the military the work of Linda Kitson is often derided as inadequate, ineffective and not worthy of the men who fought and died in the Falklands Conflict. Within the art community the work was believed to be unfinished and this stems from the expectation that she would produce something originating in Victorian and mid 20th Century military oil painting. The fact that the images lacked colour and detail seemed to damn her work to a greater extent than was really justified. Butler spent a considerable amount of time researching her subjects and went to great lengths to make sure that every detail was correct. Kitson was not afforded this luxury. Moreover, this
was not her style. She had been recruited as the official war artist because of her reportage style of draftsmanship and the speed with which she could work. She also had no experience of military painting, which on one hand meant she was not able to answer the specific demands of the military for representations of the Greek Meme, but on the other she brought a freshness and originality that was not seen in other Falklands artworks.

The importance of the military view of Kitson's work is that they feel it does not keep faith with their comrades and fails to recognise the time of those who fought and the kleos of those who died. For Greek warriors the ultimate form of recognition was epic poetry, the greater the hero's part in the epic the greater their kleos. There is a sense in which mess art fulfils the function of epic poetry, in that there is an expectation by the consumer that formulaic standards will be adhered to and stylisations maintained. Soldiers, renowned for their conservatism, are not looking for challenging or difficult artworks, they are looking for illustrations that honour and respect their combat experiences in a known and understandable representation.
The representation of warriors and warfare has a long history dating back to the very origins of organised combat and, like all these representations, art requires a culturally aware audience who will ultimately determine if a particular representation is valid. *The Standard of Ur* (figure 43) is believed to be the oldest surviving visual representation of battle, and certainly the one most often used as the starting point for academic discussion on art and war. The small box, discovered in a fragmented state at the Royal Graves in the Sumerian city of Ur, dates from around 2600 BC and its original use is not fully understood. It was first thought to be a Royal Standard, carried on a pole, however, later historians believe that it may have been the sound box of a musical instrument (Brandon 2007). The pieces of shell, lapis lazuli and red limestone were found in a highly damaged state, with the original wooden box rotted away. Therefore, the restoration to its current form is not entirely certain.

Each side of the box has three horizontal panels, each illustrated as a two dimensional freeze and read from bottom to top. One side depicts scenes of peace and prosperity; the bottom panel showing the harvest being gathered, the second is a procession of people, goats and cattle, while the top one shows a king's banquet, with servants and music played on a lyre. The panel depicts a society delivering wealth to the king in the form of taxation.

On the other side are scenes of warfare. The bottom panel shows the effects of a cavalry charge on infantry. Each of the four Sumerian chariots is pulled by four horses (four tails, but only eight legs between them) and has a driver and spearman. It is difficult to tell if the enemy dead have been killed by the spearmen, or crushed under the horses hooves, but each of the dead appears to be behind the line of attack and on the other side of the horses from the viewer. The lack of detail in the shell in-lay and the subsequent deterioration make any absolute judgement very difficult.

The second panel shows an infantry engagement. On the left, a neatly lined up rank of soldiers wearing cloaks, helmets and clubs, with swords tucked in their belts. Some of these men even appear to be smiling. In the middle of the panel, the Sumerians engage with the enemy, clubbing and stabbing with short blades, used as both sword and dagger. On the right hand side of the panel, the enemy are all dead and the Sumerians are missing the neat clothing they went in to battle with. The top and final panel shows...
enemy soldiers, some appearing bound and one either blindfolded or bandaged around the eyes, being paraded in front of the Sumerian 'king', who has his chariot waiting behind him. This panel shows the army delivering wealth the king in the form of war prize.

It is difficult to make any real assessment of *The Standard or Ur* given that much of the cultural iconography is lost to antiquity and interpreting the fragments can only provide a partial and imperfect interpretation. However, it is clear that representing war, whether on a royal or military standard, on a musical instrument, for a king, or for the masses, has been an artistic and cultural activity for at least 4500 years.

In the modern period, the generalised term 'war art' has come to signify any art that depicts warfare, but under close analysis this term becomes too vague and amorphous. It is has its origins in painted representations of the Great War with artists commissioned by most participating governments, however, some of this art was distinctly pro-war, while other works were anti-war, either in its contemporary manifestation on the Western Front, or simply as a human activity. John Singer Sargent's *Gassed* (figure 44), painted in 1918 for the Imperial War Museum, where it still hangs, is a perfect visual representation of Wilfred Owen's *Dulce et Decorum est* and in reading and viewing it is impossible to see the glory of battle. And even easier to view representations of the glories of war with contempt. The two lines of blindfolded and gassed soldiers leading each other across the frame, while others are scattered in agony across the the ground on either side of the road, portray nothing but the horrors of war. This is made all the more stark by the football match taking place in the background. Barely visible, this game points out that the gassed soldiers are an everyday occurrence, not even worth a glance from the sportsmen.

Artistic representations of war in the late Victorian period were less problematic for an establishment and society that wished to pursue political aims through violent means. As we have already seen, Clausewitz laid out the criteria by which a society could wage war, and where Sargent highlighted the deficiencies in violence and combat, earlier artists had no such desire. In European empires before the Great War representing the glories of war was by turn, political and cultural, for example the David and Delaroche versions of Napoleon crossing the Alps, but were rarely anti-war in the modern sense. The one exception to this uniformity is Francisco Goya's *Disasters of War*. Painted in the 1810s, but not published until 1863, 35 years after his death, these illustration concentrate on the victims, rather than the victories of war. They were never published by Goya, who feared the backlash from such graphic images that showed atrocities by
soldiers on both sides of the Peninsular War. After publication, the images did not receive universal acclaim and many critics could not understand why an artist would wish to paint such horrific images.

Just 11 years after the publication of the *Disaster of War* a new artist broke on to the British art market that would have a remarkable influence on the representation of war and the military. In 1874, the 23 year old Elizabeth Southernden Thompson, later Lady Butler, exhibited *Calling the Roll after an Engagement in the Crimea* (figure 45) at the Royal Academy to great acclaim. The work was created as a commission for a “manufacturer from the North” and was Thompson's third submission, but first exhibit at the Royal Academy (Meynell 1898: 4). The painting was so popular that a policeman had to be stationed in the gallery to control the crowds. Queen Victoria wished to see the painting, but was unable to make a personal appearance at the gallery; in an act complicit with a more deferential age, the painting was delivered to the Queen for a private viewing. It was also sent to the bedside of a stricken Florence Nightingale, who wished to see the representation of her military comrades from the Crimea. The painting, now known simply as *The Roll Call*, was finally ceded by the Owner, Charles Galloway, to Queen Victoria, who had it hung in her favourite home, Osborne House.

Butler was the first British artist to portray military scenes not just in realistic and fine detail, but as celebrations of British military courage and valour (Usherwood/Spencer-Smith 1987: 13). Although she rarely discussed her influences, there are clear comparisons between Butler's work and that of 19th century French military painters, particularly Jean Louis Ernest Meissonier, who made a reputation painting scenes from French military history many years before Butler began work. Meissonier followed the high art tradition of the Parisian *genre militaire* and made a considerable reputation producing scenes from the Napoleonic wars. His 1864 painting, *1814 Campagne de France*, shows Napoleon and his officers riding along a snow covered, frozen and rutted road returning from a defeat at the Battle of Laon (figure 46). Using tones of grey and brown the artist created a downbeat scene of soldiers returning from the frontline. Unlike David's picture of Napoleon, this was not a masterpiece of triumphalism, but was a romantic and humanistic depiction of men after battle. Throughout her career Butler often commented on this painting and sometimes used it to support her arguments over details in her own paintings (Usherwood/Spencer-Smith 1987: 161).

The great change that Butler brought to British military painting was the amount of research undertaken to get fine detail correct. Art critic, John Ruskin, described Butler as a Pre-Raphaelite painter, partly due to her accurate depiction of detail and partly due
to the lack of artistic and stylistic affectation in her pictures. However, she is not usually
described as a Pre-Raphaelite artist by modern art historians and was never part of the
Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood. But this does not mean that she was not working within
the artistic doctrine of the time, paying great attention to realism and accuracy.

If *The Roll Call* was the shock sensation of the 1874 exhibition, then the shock was
provided by the way in which Butler portrayed British soldiers. While it had been a
feature of the French *genre militaire* for over half a century, the depiction of ordinary
soldiers in a sympathetic and humanistic light was new to the British art movement.
Butler shows an officer on horse-back reviewing a company of Grenadiers in the
moments after battle. Although the officer dominates the picture, he is not the purpose
of the painting. Butler presents a group of men in various post-combat states; some are
roughly stood to attention, some at ease, others are wrapped in blood soaked bandages,
and one man has collapsed in the snow. The only man who seems none the worse for
wear is the officer. The carrion crows circling in the sky, over what we must presume is
the battlefield, gives a sense that these are the lucky ones.

The success of *The Roll Call* was that it provided a system of representation to the
ordinary British soldier, something that had previously been denied them. Butler rapidly
became a favourite of the British Army and was soon given access to large numbers of
troops in order to research her work. When working on *The 28th Regiment at Quatre Bras*
(figure 47), she was invited to Chatham where 300 soldiers were put through numerous
exercises in order for her to make sketches. She also visited the Royal Horse Guards in
London where the riding master tied up a horse by the foreleg, forcing it to come
crashing to the ground so she could understand how a horse falls. The battle of Quatre
Bras was fought just four days before Waterloo (16 June 1815) and took place in a field
of exceptionally tall rye grass. Butler tracked down a field of rye in England and went
there with her mother and cousins, who helped tramp in down so that she could ensure
she painted it accurately. To make sure the uniforms were accurate she had a set made
up by the Army's official uniform suppliers and these were used as templates for the
soldiers in the painting. This, however, led to a minor error as the 28th (North
Gloucester) Regiment, at the time of the Waterloo campaign, was still wearing an older
version of the shako head dress, while most of the infantry had moved onto a newer
pattern. In an uncharacteristic lapse in detail, Butler shows the 28th with the newer head
dress.

However, this does not deter from Butler's mastery of the military subject and her
depiction of soldiers in the midst of battle brought a new perspective to high art
painting in Britain. She claimed that her work did not glorify war, but this is simplistic and, in some respects, a quite modern statement. It is usual in the 21st Century to find newspapers and media commentators saying that while they do not support the war, they do support the soldiers fighting it. Both statements are equally discordant within most social theories of warfare. Clausewitz in particular would have poured scorn on a society proffering support for the perpetrator of the act, but not the act itself, and would have believed victory impossible in such circumstances. Although Butler may have tried to avoid glorifying acts of war, there is no doubt that she showered glory, honour and respect on those she painted.

The Quatre Bras image in particular needs careful reading. Butler painted the image with the help of the authoritative history of the Waterloo campaign written by Captain William Siborne, who had been posted to Wellington’s army of occupation in 1815 and was therefore able to accurately describe the terrain (Meynell 1815: 7). The Gloucester’s square had been subjected to series of simultaneous attacks on three sides by both French and Polish cavalry, who failed to break the formation. First-hand accounts of the battle describe laughter in the Gloucester’s ranks as the enemy was repeatedly repulsed, and Butler shows this in her depiction. The man in the centre of the front rank is in a state of merriment that seems incongruous with the scene of pitched battle. With several of his comrades either dead or dying and surrounded by the carnage of the attacking cavalry, we would not expect such emotion. We therefore have to ask why Butler chose this particular moment.

Within the Greek Meme, Victorian military painting was often not responsive enough to be dealing with glory in terms of kudos and timé. Paintings were often completed long after the battle and frequently after the death of the warriors or soldiers who had survived the battle: Quatre Bras was painted 60 years after the actual battle. This distance meant that the selection of subject was almost certainly based on existing fame, and it seems plausible that a painter looking for commercial success would pick famous battles already endowed with some degree of glory. By the time most of these paintings were finished the fighting men concerned were long gone from the battlefield, such that the awarding or denial of kudos, for both battle and war, was very much a matter of history. The fame and respect of those involved was often fixed within contemporary culture, but repeated retelling of stories, or creation of visual representations, must have had an affect on timé, either positive or negative, of those who were there and still alive. These paintings have traditionally worked in the same
representational paradigm as Homeric epics, in that by immortalising their subjects in permanent representations they provide kleos; undying glory in eternal remembrance.

Lady Butler created a new genre in British military painting and a style that survived up to the Great War. She had many imitators and artists working in her style received varying levels of success. Robert Gibb, Richard Caton Woodville and Charles Edwin Fripp, amongst many others, created work that matched Butler for grandeur and glory, bringing moments of heroism, whether in battle or on its margins, in victory or defeat, to the British public. Robert Gibb's *Thin Red Line* shows the 93 (Sutherland) Highlanders facing a cavalry charge at Balaclava and is remarkably similar to Butlers *Quatre Bra* in composition and style (figure 48).

Although Butler and her contemporaries created many paintings that enhanced the fame of British soldiers and generated respect and honour for them and their regiments, it was still some time before the military themselves accepted the importance of these images.

It is a curious thing how little the English public care for military pictures; there are hardly any in our public or private galleries. And as for the Army, they would much rather hang the latest Gaiety actress in their mess than the finest episode of their regimental history.

(Richard Caton Woodville 1914: 79)

Woodville would be pleased to know that the modern military mess is almost exclusively decorated with images from the finest moments of regimental history, and where no such paintings exist, histories are borrowed from other regiments to ensure that a good military ethos is maintained. Gaiety actresses in the guise of 'lads mag' models have long since been relegated to the soldiers' locker and regiments now routinely commission work to bring the glories of the battlefield into the mess.

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Following the end of the Falklands Conflict, Linda Kitson failed to ignite the passions of the biggest consumers of military art. However, one artist in particular filled the stylistic and representational gap left by her, producing 48 finished paintings of the Falklands war. David Cobb, born in 1921, was a Naval painter of some repute. He had taken part in the 'Little Ships' rescue of thousands of allied soldiers from Dunkirk and
joined the Royal Navy at the earliest possible age in 1940. He spent the rest of the war in auxiliary patrol boats and Motor Torpedo Boats in the English Channel, with a short spell serving as a Sub-Lieutenant in a trawler protecting the Atlantic Convoys. Cobb was a seaman to the core with an artistic passion for all sea-craft, large and small, merchant and military. In 1977 he was commissioned by the Trustees of the Royal Naval Museum to produce a series of 49 paintings covering the Second World War at sea. The final series of paintings included not just the ships, but recognised the increasing value of air power and combined operations. The work was unveiled at the Porter Tun Rooms, Whitbread's London headquarters, in March 1982, just a matter of days before the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands.

This work gave Cobb unparalleled access to senior members of the Royal Navy, who allowed him into the Portsmouth dockyards as preparations for the conflict got under way. He visited the docks making sketches of many aspects of the preparations for war. He drew warships being made ready, stores being loaded and merchant ships being converted and made ready for service as troop carriers. It was while he was working on the dockside that he began to make small (12 x 16 inches) oil sketches, to be used as artistic notes for what might or might not have turned into larger commissioned works. Although Cobb managed to gain privileged access to the preparations for war he was excluded from the war itself. He had submitted requests for passage to the islands immediately after the war and this was finally granted, allowing Cobb to visit the islands in October. He left the UK on the 5, arriving back on the 15, which, given the time it takes to get there and back, left him just seven days to visit and sketch a long list of locations.

He produced 40 oil sketches that mostly became the property of various military museums, particularly the Fleet Air Arm Museum at Yeovilton. Twenty-one were made into larger paintings. Cobb's history as a naval painter meant that more than half of his sketches and paintings were of naval subjects. His mastery of ships at sea is undoubted and the painting of the Junella, a trawler taken up from trade, ploughing through rough seas is typical of Cobb's naval work (figure 49). Major Ewan Southby-Taylor, whose detailed knowledge of the Falkland Islands coastline made him a key officer in the British campaign, commissioned the painting of the Scots Guards being ferried to Bluff Cove. Southby-Taylor had been posted to the Falkland Islands in 1978/79 as the commander of the Royal Marines detachment. He was a member of The Royal Cruising Club and had spent a good deal of his tour surveying the hitherto unsurveyed Falkland's coastline as a spare time hobby. This detailed knowledge proved vital in the
planning of the Falklands landings. Again, the image is typical of Cobb's paintings of ships at sea.

When the 2nd Battalion, The Parachute Regiment made their sudden and unexpectedly quick advance from Goose Green to Fitzroy there was an urgent need to reinforce them before the Argentine troops from the Port Stanley area made a counterattack, which they could have done in significant numbers, threatening the final British push on Port Stanley. With most of the helicopters lost on the sunken **RFA Atlantic Conveyor** the only option to get the Scots Guards forward quickly enough was to send them by sea. They boarded the assault ship **HMS Intrepid** at San Carlos and made the long journey round Lafonia to a point just off Lively Island. They were then embarked on four landing craft and sent the last 35 miles along the coastline under the cover of darkness. The movement had been so secret that other Royal Navy vessels were not informed and the journey turned into high adventure when the flotilla was illuminated under the spotlights of a British warship that was about to attack what it thought were Argentine troops attempting to flank the Parachute Regiment at Fitzroy.

The adventure turned into near disaster when the winds increased to gale force, making the landing crafts radar useless. They were unable to navigate by compass since they had not had time to correct them before setting out and the poor visibility made it too dangerous to navigate by the coastline. It was only through the experienced and expert piloting of Southby-Taylor that the four small vessels managed to make it all the way to Bluff Cove without foundering, and without losing a single man. Southby-Taylor, the landing craft and **HMS Intrepid** then returned to San Carlos, setting in train a series of events that would lead to the disaster at Bluff Cove, when the Welsh Guards were bombed while still aboard **RFAs Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram**.

When the Welsh Guards arrived at Bluff Cove, the fateful decision had been made to leave them on board until Southby-Taylor returned with the landing craft to disembark them in the safest possible manner. This decision had lead to dissent on the part of some soldiers who believed that it was too dangerous to leave them on the ships so close to the enemy, and that the troops should be got off as soon as possible and be allowed to dig into the hill side. Neither RFA ship was capable of defending itself against air attack and the dissenters were proved right when two Argentine Skyhawks appeared from nowhere and bombed both ships. **Sir Tristram** had been carrying mostly stores, which had been taken off, and only two people were killed. **Sir Galahad** was a wholly different affair: forty-eight guardsmen and five other soldiers were killed in the attack (Middlebrook 2001:309).
The events surrounding the landings at Bluff Cove and Fitzroy are inextricably linked with the Welsh Guards disaster, which is a story of far greater interest than the sea voyage of the Scots Guards. Had it not been for the disaster, the Scots Guards and the sailors who delivered them to Bluff Cove, would have gained significant time from their endeavours. Although the painting does not show an act of victory associated with other mess paintings that have a direct link with kudos, the events portrayed were part of the overall victory in the Falklands and are therefore part of the greater kudos. Cobb's painting of a landing craft ploughing through and being swamped by the sea may have been an attempt to gain time, but this idea has serious problem. Being commissioned by Southby-Taylor, the architect of the landings and subsequent sea-borne troop movements, it cannot be a representation of time which requires honour to be remembered and spoken about by others. To make the representation yourself is to risk generating negative time.

The problem with this painting is that, although it runs this risk, Southby-Taylor has never been seen in anything other than a positive light. It was his wise council that lead to successful landings on both sides of East Falkland as well as being of invaluable assistance to special forces raids, including the one on Pebble Island that put the majority of the Argentine ground attack aircraft out of action. It is possible, within the context of the Iliad, to see Southby-Taylor as Odysseus, the single man without whom the attacking forces could not have won. But the painting is a paradox, an Odyssean boast that could lead to loss of well earned time.

This view of the image, however, has never been taken up in any great measure and Southby-Taylor's contribution to the success of the campaign has never been questioned. This may be because his time was so great that it would have taken far more than this to diminish it, or it could be that there is still little appetite within British culture to degrade the value of soldiers who have been honoured on the battlefield, particularly one whose contribution to the overall victory was as great as Southby-Taylor's. The one thing we can be sure of is that Cobb's painting of the Scots Guards' voyage to Bluff Cove has not contributed to the overall representations of the war or the time of those involved. This may be because it did not fit the received narrative of the land war, or it could be because it damaged the time of an honoured and respect warrior.

Cobb's other commissioned works do not present us with the same dilemma. These were all commissioned by regiments, ships, families and companies wishing to commemorate the conflict and those who took part. Of particular importance to a
modern interpretation of Greek influences on the representation of war are those paintings commissioned by military units to hang in their messes.

Many of these, as would be expected from a painter famous for pictures of ships within the seascape, were of military equipment and 'scenes', pictures that could be described as landscape. For example, he was commissioned by 148 Commando Forward Observation Battery, Royal Artillery to paint the view from Fanning Head across San Carlos water. The battery had a Rapier missile site on Fanning Head from the very earliest moments of the land campaign and this played an important role in the defence of the landing forces at San Carlos and the ships stationed in Falkland Sound. Although this is a competent painting showing the impressive view from the top of the headland it cannot really be described as a battle scene and does not really shine the light of glory and honour on the regiment or the soldiers who manned the Rapier site. To be successful as a representation with the Greek meme, we would expect the painting to be of the Rapier site and the men operating the weapon, rather than the view they enjoyed. In the tradition started by Butler, the human elements are at the centre of warfare, but they are missing from this painting.

Almost as scenic is a painting of the 3 Battalion, The Parachute Regiment and the Blues and Royals heading out from Green Beech at Port San Carlos, with Fanning Head in the background (figure 50). The landscape adequately captures the natural beauty and vast openness of the islands and places the soldiers within this context, although, if the sea were removed it would look like the Canadian prairie where training of this type routinely takes place. But the image does not immediately grab the viewers attention as a representation of glory won on the battlefield, it does not depict kudos or timē and it does not really add to the kleos of the soldiers who died in the conflict. This is also true of a painting commissioned by the Welsh Guards, although this is a little more successful for those with an understanding of Falkland's topography. The guards are shown crossing one of the glacial moraines that impede every approach to Port Stanley (figure 51). These rock flows are made up of large jagged quartzite blocks that twist ankles and break legs if they are not treated with the utmost respect. The British soldiers found them difficult to cross in daylight, but when approaching the enemy at night they become terrifying; big enough to break bones, but not big enough to hide behind when being shot at.

Cobb showed the guards crossing a moraine with Mount Challenger in the background and exploding shells from Argentine 155mm artillery in the middle distance. This movement occurred on the 11 June, just three days after 48 of their
comrades had been killed and almost 150 wounded at Bluff Cove. The painting shows some of the remaining guards on their way to fight in the battle for Mount Harriet and the mopping up of Argentine stragglers on Sapper Hill just before the surrender. After such a catastrophic disaster the painting shows that they were able to do the 'honourable' thing and continue to fight. The Welsh Guards did not have a good war, winning very few military awards. In total the battalion received four Mention in Dispatches, three Military Medals and one Military Cross. However, the Military Medals were won for action in the Bluff Cove disaster, while the Military Cross was won by Captain Wight, serving with the SAS. It is therefore possible that without victories over the enemy, within the Greek meme, the Welsh Guards were short of kudos and lacking in timé. The painting suggests that their greatest enemy was the terrain and weather.

3 Commando Brigade's long 'yomp' north of the Wickham Heights to Port Stanley is now firmly embedded in the mythology of the Falklands Conflict. Cobb made an exploratory oil sketch of this event, showing a line of silhouetted figures walking away from the viewer (figure 52). The sketch was not commissioned into a full painting, but was purchased by the Task Force Commander, Rear Admiral John 'Sandy' Woodward. It is surprising that this painting did not come to have a more common currency in representations of the conflict, given that the events are so famous and form an important part of Royal Marine history.

Cobb's paintings of battle scenes did enter into mainstream representations of the conflict, as well as gracing the walls of military messes. Almost immediately after the troops returned to the United Kingdom, the Commanding Officer of the 3rd Battalion Parachute Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Hew Pike was posted away from the battalion and his officers commissioned a painting as a leaving gift. They chose to show the battle for Mount Longdon in the moments before it went 'hot' (figure 53). The battalion had made a long and complicated approach to the mountain trying to surprise the Argentines, who were extremely well dug in. Mount Longdon was the axis around which Argentine defences of Port Stanley were centred. From Longdon it was possible for the Argentines to direct fire at Tumbledown, Two Sisters, Wireless Ridge, the Murrell River approach to Port Stanley, as well as defend the artillery battery at Moody Brook. Consequently, the Argentine commanders had placed some of their most experienced and trusted troops on the mountain; even the reservists had undergone specialist marksmanship training and would prove to be a formidable enemy (Bicheno 2007:211). The successful capture of Longdon was an operational necessity if the whole land campaign was not to founder in the hills around Port Stanley.
Lieutenant Colonel Pike had decided the best way to approach the mountain was under the cover of darkness and in complete silence. Although the battle was the most ferocious of the Falklands Conflict, it is this silent approach under the noses of the Argentines, in some case within feet of the enemy emplacements, that has become mythologised. The usual method of attacking such a well defended and prepared enemy would be to soften them up with artillery and naval gun fire support prior to an infantry assault, but as far as Pike was concerned this would have been no more than a warning of an impending attack and would simply have made the long walk to the hill, which lacked effective cover, even more dangerous. Approaching the mountain, which forms a long spine, capped with rocky outcrops, box gullies and open-ended cuttings, from several directions at the same time, in silence, unable to talk to others in the same party or communicate with those on other approaches is incredibly risky. The plan was conceived in the safety of Estancia House, and like all plans, it was unlikely to survive first contact with the enemy. Once a silent approach has begun there is no guessing when the attackers will be discovered and when the shooting will start. This means that a single mistake by one soldier is likely to cause the entire battlefield to go live terrifyingly quickly and before the attackers have the chance to get into cover.

It was the very end of this tense four hour slow and silent approach that the officers of 3 Para chose to commemorate for their Commanding Officer. The painting shows a number of barely concealed figures walking towards Mount Longdon in the distance. It would have been very similar to the view that Pike would have had from the Battalion Tactical HQ as his men went into battle. The men of 3 Para were granted a huge amount of kudos for the fixed bayonet, close quarter charge up Mount Longdon and the battle will forever remain an important part of regimental history, but without kudos becoming the subject of wider knowledge, the timé would have been limited. Cobb’s painting will help to keep this battle in the living memory of parachutists and will in future help to bring kleos to the warriors who fought on Longdon.

Following the 3 Para assault on Mount Longdon their sister battalion, 2 Para, moved forward to engage the Argentines on Wireless Ridge. 2 Para, who had already taken Goose Green, were the only battalion in the Task Force to fight two separate battles, and are justifiably proud of both engagements. In contrast to Longdon, 2 Para’s new Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel David Chaundler, decided on a more traditional battle plan. The Argentines were subjected to 30 minutes of artillery and mortar bombardment before the infantry assault began. But once the first infantry wave moved forward it became clear that the enemy had not been subdued and 2 Para had to
take cover in the peat while the bombardment continued. However, the Paras were then within the sights of the Argentines and a long range fire-fight began.

It was one of these exchanges that the battalion decided to immortalise in a commissioned painting (figure 54). At around 04.00hrs, on the morning of the 13 June, A and B companies had secured their objectives and are shown in the painting taking shelter behind a line of gorse. In front of them a General Purpose Machine Gun, Sustained Fire (GPMG(SF)) section had moved forward and were firing at the final objective. From the right hand side of the painting D Company are attacking along the ridge line.

The painting of the battle for Wireless Ridge was a long process for Cobb. When constructing the geographical layout and placing the fighting men within the scene, he took advice from the soldiers who were there. The painting was then shown to the Commanding Officer, who helped adjust the features until they appeared to be right. Finally, the unfinished painting was shown to the rest of the officers who were involved in the battle to make sure it was as accurate as possible. This attention to detail is in the tradition of military painting started by Butler, with more than a passing nod to Woodville's desire to have the 'finest moments of regimental history' hanging on the mess wall.

The battalion only lost three soldiers in the battle for Wireless Ridge, which is an uncomplicated story in that it is not surrounded by the political and representational intrigue that became the hallmark of Goose Green. The release of information by the Government without checking if the events had actually gone ahead as planned allegedly put the operation in jeopardy and certainly angered the Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Herbert 'H' Jones. The leadership style of Jones and conduct of the battle before and after his death still generates debate within military circles. The odds faced by the Parachute Regiment at Goose Green and the number of prisoners taken continues to be argued over. The need for the battle to have been fought at all is doubted by some; many believe it was a fought simply to provide Thatcher's Government with a victory that could be used for public relations and that Goose Green and Darwin could have been bypassed and isolated in the advance on Stanley (Bicheno 2006: 57).

The greatest controversy of the battle for Goose Green and Darwin, and excepting the Belgrano affair, possibly the entire Falklands Crisis, was the death of Lieutenant Colonel Jones. The awarding of a Victoria Cross is a rare event, but even more rare is the awarding of Britain's highest military decoration to a commanding officer. It is
awarded for the most exceptional acts of bravery and self-sacrifice in the face of the enemy, acts which would be highly likely to lead to the death of the recipient. There is a quietness of character that pervades surviving winners of the Victoria Cross, and when speaking to those who knew them before the action, humility is a pervasive character trait. However, quietness and humility were never used to describe Jones before his death on Darwin Hill, and awarding him the Victoria Cross could be the subject of a long study, but the Greek meme provides for an interpretation of events that explains both sides of the representational divide.

The first and second drafts of history (see Chapter Five) provide a version of events that attempts to remove the fog of war by shining the light of glory and honour on Jones. Contemporary accounts tell the story of a courageous and well liked commanding officer who was blessed with dynamism and straight talking. The simplest version of the story of his death tells how he had gone forward to the position held by A Company, whose attack on Darwin Hill had stalled in the face of small arms fire from a ledge only metres away, which was covered by supporting mortar fire. A number of men attacked the enemy head on and were repulsed, with the loss of two officers. Meanwhile, Jones led a small group of men round the promontory to attack the trenches from a blind gully. With the battle cry of "Come on A Company, get your skirts off" he lead his men towards an enemy machine gun emplacement. Jones was shot in the back from another fixed enemy position (Bicheno 2006: 177). The citation for Jones' action in the face of the enemy reads:

... In order to read the battle fully and ensure that the momentum of his attack was not lost, Colonel Jones took forward his reconnaissance party to the foot of a re-entrant, which a section of his battalion had just secured.

... As he charged up a short slope at the enemy position he was seen to fall and roll backward downhill. He immediately picked himself up, and charged the enemy trench firing his sub-machine gun and seemingly oblivious to the intense fire directed at him. He was hit by fire from another trench, which he outflanked and fell dying only a few feet from the enemy he had assaulted. A short time later a company of the battalion attacked the enemy, who quickly surrendered. The devastating display of courage by Colonel Jones had completely undermined their will to fight further.
The achievements of 2 Battalion The Parachute Regiment at Darwin and Goose Green set the tone for the subsequent land victory on the Falklands. They achieved such a moral superiority over the enemy in this first battle, that despite the advantages of numbers and selection of battle-ground, they never thereafter doubted either the superior fighting qualities of the British troops, or their own inevitable defeat. This was an action of the utmost gallantry by a commanding officer whose dashing leadership and courage throughout the battle were an inspiration to all about him.

(See Annex F for full citation)

From a civilian, common sense, perspective one could say that the officers and soldiers who were with Jones at the time of his death were keeping the time honoured tradition of not speaking ill of the dead. However, the situation is much more complex than common sense would predict. The death of Jones allows us to assess him in terms of kudos, timé and kles, but these assessments can only be made with the knowledge of the various stories, for which there are essentially two alternative versions; glorious death of an heroic leader, or pointless death of an impatient man.

The first problem comes with the various assessments of Jones' character. Where some see dynamism, others see a man who acted without thought, where some hear straight talking, others encountered intolerance and an inability to take advice. The attack on the earlier position had already cost the lives of Captain Dent, Captain Wood and Corporal Hardman (whose death was frequently depersonalised in contemporary accounts that mention him only in passing as a "corporal"). This assault was carried out under a direct order from Jones, which was given against the advice of those who had already attempted to take the enemy position from the same direction, as well as in a separate flanking manoeuvre that had benefited from cover. Jones took off for the gully before finding out that the attack had failed. Seeing an enemy machine gun emplacement in front of him, a position that had evidently not see him, he checked the magazine of his submachine gun and began his attack with the famous words, "Come on A Company, get your skirts off."

Sergeant Norman shouted to Jones that there was another machine gun position that was now behind him. He either did not hear, or chose to ignore the warning. He was then shot in the back. The account given by Fitz-Gibbon (2001:100) is that the attack was not thought through with any degree of effectiveness and given that Jones had been at the bottom of Darwin Hill for something between 60 and 90 minutes there was no
immediate danger to any member of 2 Para from the Argentine positions. This makes his decision to send such a small force of only 16 or 17 men to attack the first position, when there must have been almost 60 members of the regiment in close proximity, ill-judged and possibly reckless. The fact that Jones was one of the four British soldiers killed in this skirmish seems to have absolved him from responsibility for the errors that so nearly cost the battle.

Citations for military honours are often written in a *Boys Own* style, but in the case of Jones, this was the abiding principle. There are a number of inconsistencies in the brief account of the battle, not least the idea that the top of the re-entrant was secured at the same time as the enemy positions. It is not clear which positions the citation is talking about, but the only one being attacked on that side of the Darwin isthmus at that time was the one on which Dent, Wood and Hardman were killed. The idea that desperate action was necessary is also a fallacy. The small group of Paras had been in position for some considerable time and in were no immediate danger. Rather than “prompt action” being required, there was plenty of time to put together an organised offensive. Both assaults on Darwin Hill were conducted without thought for alternatives that were more likely to succeed and were undertaken with an imbalance of officers and soldiers.

The notion that Jones gave a “devastating display of courage” to the Argentines that sapped their will to fight is a complete fabrication and perfect piece of *Boys Own* story telling. The Argentines in the trench he was attacking only saw him for a few seconds before he was gunned down. Lance Corporal Rios, who shot Jones can't have been in the least bit perturbed by the courage of a man he saw running away from him and could not have known that he had in fact killed the Commanding Officer. Finally, to pin the success of the whole conflict on the demoralisation of the enemy brought about by Jones' act of valour is utterly ludicrous. In battle after battle, the Argentines proved themselves to be a hard, tenacious enemy, more than capable of withstanding direct attack, and worthy of the respect of the warriors honour. The attitude to the Argentines as demonstrated in Jones' citation was endemic in the British media throughout the crisis.

There is no doubt that leading from the front is perceived as an honourable position, however, commanding officers on modern battlefields are not entirely subject to the rules that governed the presence of kings on pre-classical battlefields. Agamemnon was derided by Achilles for not taking the same risks as the rest of the Greek warriors.

... Never
But we cannot view this as providing carte-blanche for modern commanding officers to risk their lives in pursuit of immediate glory. Modern commanding officers have responsibility for the lives of all those who serve under them and for winning battles; getting themselves killed is not part of the pact between them and their soldiers. The death of Jones creates a dichotomy within the balance of *kudos*, *timē*, and *kleos* that was available from the battle for Goose Green and Darwin.

*Kudos* is gifted to Greek warriors by their divinities and can be neither won nor lost by the warrior himself. For the pre-Hoplite Greeks, victory on the battlefield was preordained, and only with victories would a warrior gain *kudos*. Darwin was Lieutenant Colonel Jones' first combat experience and the battle was only won after his death. In the Greek model *kudos* could have been achieved by defeating a worthy enemy in single combat, an idea that is used throughout the Iliad, but Jones did not do this either. We can therefore say that Jones *kudos*, like Agamemnon's, was in doubt.

Agamemnon was not famous for his personal victories on the battlefield, but more for his generalship, being commonly referred to as the 'shepherd of the people'. The Greeks believed that *timē* was a finite resource and, where one warrior gained, another must lose. They also believed that *timē* was not always a positive thing. Jones died without *kudos*, and therefore could not have had any positive *timē*. It is accepted by both sides of the Jones debate that the battle was going badly before his death and that the situation changed immediately thereafter. The charitable version, and the one used in the citation is that his death demoralised the enemy and galvanised his own men, turning the battle at a crucial moment. The less forgiving version is that he was a man unable to adapt his tactics or leadership style to changing circumstances, and that the battalion was able to be more dynamic after his death.

The truth is probably somewhere in between, but the doubts over the validity of Jones' actions are often discussed, meaning that his *kleos*, like Agamemnon's, is not entirely positive. But in the case of Jones, the *kleos* of the dead seems to be impacting on the *timē* of the living. The Battalion Second in Command, Major Chris Keeble and the Company Commanders, Majors Dair Farrar-Hockley (A Coy), John Crossland (B Coy) and Phil Neame (D Coy) collectively recovered from the death of their commanding officer with remarkable speed and prevented a tragedy from becoming a disaster. Before
his death, Jones had shown little trust in his officers, and during the battle for Darwin Hill, had gone as far as barking at Farrar-Hockley, “Don’t tell me how to run my battle.” Although these men were gifted massive amounts of kudos for the ultimate victory at Goose Green, they were awarded a disproportionately small amount of timé. Within the paradigm that is the Greek Meme, this was because the amount of kleos awarded to Jones by the media and the military hierarchy meant that the pool of glory, respect and honour was heavily drained. As Agamemnon stole Briseis and timé from Achilles, so Jones inadvertently stole timé from his men.

But if this is the case, why did the battalion's officers choose to immortalise the death of Jones in a mess painting, thereby increasing his kleos and diminishing the time and kleos of more worthy recipients.

The painting by Terence Cuneo of ‘H’ attacking the machine gun post on Darwin Hill is an odd mixture of myth and reality. The terrain over which Jones is seen attacking is similar to the real gully from which the attack was launched, although the real gully was much narrower and steeper than it would appear in the painting. The eye witness accounts all say that Jones attack came completely out of the blue and was unexpected.

I didn't know what the bloody hell he was doing – I mean I didn't have a clue what was happening! It was just one of those things ... it had never occurred to me for one for minute that he was about to start going round the bloody end of the spur and start running at a trench.

(Captain Worsley-Tonks in Fitz-Gibbon 2001: 117)

Shouting “Come on A company” he ran forward and was killed very quickly. The only person still with Jones as he attacked the trench was his bodyguard, Sergeant Barry Norman, who must be the figure depicted to the rear of Jones.

The series of explosions across the other side of the valley is a piece of pure fiction. Accounts of action in the gully describe a situation whereby the British had been pinned down by small arms for well over an hour and do not mention artillery or mortar fire. Given the actual size of the gully, had indirect fire been exploding on the far side many of the men sheltering in the gorse would have been injured or killed.

In the boys-own genre, the heat of battle always involves an immediate risk of death and heroic action is always in relation to this risk. The Cuneo painting placed Jones’ actions in this frame, that is, his charge was portrayed as an act of self-sacrifice, one
intended to save the lives of his comrades at great risk to his own. There is no doubt Jones went forward with a desire to put momentum back into the battle, but this was almost certainly out of frustration with his men, rather than a selfless desire to protect them. We will never know if the “Come on A company” comment meant that he thought that men were following him, but leading from the front was characteristic. However, the point of the classic boys-own story is to celebrate victory (\textit{kudos}), which Jones did not have, either in the battle as whole or in the assault on Darwin Hill. In commissioning Cuneo's narrative, the officers of the 2nd Battalion, The Parachute Regiment accepted and promoted the \textit{kleos} of their Commanding Officer, but his glory came at great cost to them personally.

In granting \textit{kleos} to Jones, they accepted a reduction in their own \textit{timē}, although the balance of forces in the Greek Meme effectively left them with no choice. In battle, death and killing must always be couched in heroic terms, whether a soldier wins or dies, failure to accept this memetic tenet results in psychological and moral dissonance. The dead must always be remembered with honour. For the men of the 2nd Battalion, The Parachute Regiment, to ignore the \textit{kleos} of Jones, regardless of the degree to which this was positive or negative, would have signified disrespect; to pursue their own individual \textit{timē} would have been such a massive mark of dishonour that it would have been impossible for them retain their own self-respect. The Greek Meme demands that Jones' \textit{kleos} is accepted and celebrated, and to do anything else would have been impossible for those who fought at Goose Green. Regardless of whether Jones' death was the act of a foolish and impatient man, or that of a heroic warrior, who died leading his men to a glorious victory, it has become an irrelevance for the well-being of the men who fought along side him. The painting is a symbol of their patronage of a fallen comrade, it is part of what makes them warriors, something more than soldiers, and even if the painting is a placebo for the present and future battalion, its effect is genuine and tangible.

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Terence Cuneo was a prolific painter with an international reputation for painting steam railways and racing cars, which often masks his contribution to military painting. Born in 1907, Cuneo studied at Chelsea Polytechnic and the Slade School of Art before becoming a magazine, newspaper and book illustrator. During the Second World War he enlisted as a Sapper with the Royal Engineers, but continued as an artist, providing
paintings and illustrations for the War Artists Advisory Committee (WAAC). Cuneo did not rank at the forefront of the WAAC's list of contributing artists, but his use of war images for the purposes of propaganda had its foundations in this period.

The committee worked under the umbrella of the Ministry of Information and was chaired by Sir Kenneth Clark, the Director of the National Gallery. The work of this committee has now been taken over by the Imperial War Museum, who have a much more impartial attitude to war-art, but during the Second World War, war-art was propaganda. The WAAC produced series of small books, War Pictures by British Artist, that presented pictures from both overseas and the home-front, although they stayed away from battle-scenes, which it was believed were the domain of the war photographer:

> The war artist therefore is no longer essential as a recorder, and he finds himself in a position similar to that of the war poet rather than that of a war correspondent.

(William Coldstream 1943: 6)

Following the war, Cuneo began his career as a railway painter and became an accepted member of the establishment when he was commissioned as the official artist to the coronation in 1953. He continued to produce war art, particularly of the Second World War, but an eclectic mix of portraits, landscapes, horses, cars and cowboys, combined with illustrations for government and tourist posters, packaging catalogues for toy trains, posters and jigsaws kept him busy and made him one of the most prolific painters in the country.

The battle for Mount Tumbledown provided fine example of Cuneo's military artwork (figure 55). Tumbledown was the last battle of the Falklands Conflict and was fought between the 2nd Battalion, The Scots Guards and the 5 Marine Infantry Battalion of the Argentine army. Tumbledown was another fierce battle of attrition in which only seven members of the Scots Guards managing to fight their way to the top of the mountain. Described by Bicheno as “the last 'forlorn assault' carried out by a British battalion”, it was fought at close quarter, not just with bayonets, but weapons and ammunition collected from the enemy when British supplies ran out.
I stuck my bayonet into the back of his arm, dug it right in because I had run out of ammunition. He spun wildly on the ground and my bayonet snapped. And as he spun, he was trying to get a Colt 45 out of an army holster on his waist. So I had to stab him to death. I stabbed him and I stabbed him, again and again, in the mouth, in the face, in the guts, with a snapped bayonet. It was absolutely horrific [retrospectively - at the time he recalls crying out 'Isn't this fun?' not long after the incident]. Stabbing a man to death is not a clean way to kill somebody, and what made it doubly horrific was that at one point he started screaming 'please...' in English to me. But if I had left him he could have ended up shooting me in the back. I took his rifle, moved on, shot a sniper, picked up his and moved on again.

(Bicheno 2007:280/281)

There are many writers who claim that the western way of warfare is long dead, but this soldier's experience of horror and terror must have been very similar to that of Hoplites fighting in the front rank of the phalanx (Hanson 2009). The fine cut detail and sharp lines of Cuneo's painting adequately portrays the thick of battle, but in a strictly 'boys-own' sense. The scene includes dead Argentines, wounded Scots, men being shot, bayoneted, blown up, all in extraordinarily fine detail. It is possible to count the rounds in the machine gun belt, you can see the details of uniforms and weapons, the field dressings attached to helmets, and the discarded water bottles, ammunition boxes of the defending forces, and, oddly enough, what looks like a sword. The agony of the soldier blown up in the foreground is shown in fine, draughtsman-like detail, which is easily compared to the cartoon strips of the Victor. Viewing Cuneo's paintings and their 'clean' violence in a cinematic sense, this is John Ford, not Sam Peckinpah.

Cuneo's work shows the influences of both journalism and cinema. In a journalistic sense he is showing what happened, but in a cinematic panorama. Given the amount of detail it is interesting that the artist does not show the true horror of death in battle. There are no dismembered bodies, no blood, nor gore, no twisted limbs, just clean death in the glory of a 'boys-own' war. Some of the most powerful war photography is made away from the front line and communicates the emotion and trauma of combat. Documentary photography (as opposed to photo-journalism) of conflict often requires distance between the events being commented on and the act of documenting. This gives time to contemplate the human condition in relation to war and it is this that is missing from Cuneo's painting of the battle for Mount Tumbledown.
Why this style of painting remains of value to the military is interesting, and the only conclusion must be that the transfer of boys stories told on the covers of comics on to the canvas of an oil painting lends an authenticity to the genre. A logical extension of this may have been the pop art style of Roy Liechtenstein, but this would have failed in other important facets of military painting, such as sincerity, honesty, respect and directness of approach. Cuneo successfully blends the story telling of the comic strip with the gravity of Victorian military painting from Butler, Gibb, Woodville and Fripp.

What is important about Cuneo work, and to a greater or lesser degree, most other contemporary war artists, is that rather than providing an emotional viewpoint that cannot be photographed during battle, they give a physical viewpoint that could never be achieved. From a position often raised above the fray and frequently from behind enemy lines, attempting to get photographs like these paintings would lead to the death of the photographer. Take for example the work of Robert Capa. Shot from low angles, from within the line of soldiers he was with and, in the case of the D-day images, lacking clear definition and hard lines, they are filled with ambiguity. Capa is famed for his emotional approach to photography, while Cuneo is famed for his ability to provide detail.

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Although mess art has its origins in high art of the mid-Victorian period, when the military decorated their messes with Gaiety actress (Woodville 1914: 79), the genre has over the last century been taken up with fervour by every mess in the British army. The critics of high art often describe the artists who paint for the military as 'rivet counters' in a way that denigrates their use of veracious hyper detail at the expense of artistic expression.

Much as Goya's viewer find confirmation of their own views about war, so to do those who participate in re-enactments or paint armies of toy soldiers. The latter find visual support for their dedication – to remembering history factually and accurately, stripped perhaps of any judgement call – in military magazines and web pages.

(Brandon 2007: 6)
In 2006 the 2nd and 3rd battalions of the Parachute Regiment relocated to a new home at Merville Barracks in Colchester, Essex. Most British barracks date from the 19th century and are based on a single battalion occupying a single barracks, located behind their own wall and away from other regiments and battalions. Where barracks were gathered together into garrisons, some regiments would have all their battalions in one town, but this has not been routinely common. It is more usual for a brigade to occupy a garrison and for a regiment's individual battalions to be spread across several brigades.

The Parachute Regiment currently has three regular battalions. The 1st Battalion forms the Special Forces Support Group and has its barracks at RAF St Athan in South Wales. Its specialist role means that it is unlikely to fight alongside the other two battalions, who are part of 16 (Air Assault) Brigade, based at Merville Barracks. The building of this new barracks to house the brigade allowed all its major ground units to be housed behind the same perimeter fence and the unit messes to be located within the same building. The Officers' Mess building has four individual messes served by a central kitchen, with each one being an architectural mirror of the other three. The Sergeants' Mess building is identical to the Officers'.

The construction of four identical messes for two battalions of the same regiment, housed within a single barracks, is unique in the British Army and provides a case study that is free from architecture as a determinant of interior design. That is, it is possible that Victorian architecture could be the basis for Victorian interior design. It is impossible to say that the architecture has no influence on the style of decoration, but when comparing four messes, all housed in the same architecture, it is possible to ignore the structure of the building when making comparisons of visual art.

Each mess consists of private accommodation space where the officers and soldiers live. Each man is free to decorate this space as he sees fit. The 'public' or shared space of the ground floor has a dining room, bar, anteroom and TV lounge. Each of these spaces has a clear function, but the most subtle difference is between the bar and anteroom. In traditional mess buildings, they normally occupy separate rooms, but in the modern buildings of Merville Barracks, the space has become modular, with sliding dividers to separate the rooms. The anteroom (now used as a lounge, rather than a waiting room) has a degree of formality and provides a quiet space, while the bar is more relaxed and often noisy; every mess has its own rules, but as a general guide, jeans and polo shirts may be allowed in the bar, while a shirt and tie may be the minimum requirement in the anteroom (particularly in the evening). The regimentation of mess
standards is part of army life and each mess devises its own rules around a general principle of "traditional values". These rules and standards are often seen from the outside as archaic, Victorian at best, and old-fashioned, while from the inside, the officers and soldiers believe they are maintaining traditional values that have been lost from civilian life. In reality, mess conduct is neither archaic nor based on traditional standards of behaviour, but is an adaptable imposition of order masked by a veneer of Victorian Britishness.

The decoration of the bar and anteroom reflect these different standards of acceptable dress and behaviour. The anteroom is the home of the mess's most treasured possessions, silver, original paintings and Regimental Colours (flags bearing the regiments battle honours), while the bar tends to become a family album of the battalions history. The bar often has photographs and captured equipment from recent operations, cartoons of past and present mess members and prints of paintings from other military messes. There is also a distinction between Officers and Sergeants Messes in that Officers' Messes tend to be more sparsely decorated with a core of commissioned paintings. The Sergeants' Mess tends to have a greater emphasis on photographs and captured weaponry.

The simplistic answer to these apparent differences is one of class and wealth. The often heard argument that the majority of officers are from middle class educated backgrounds, while the soldiers are working class and uneducated, compounds this argument and leads to the even more simplistic view that the Officers' Mess is somehow highbrow, in opposition to the lowbrow Sergeants' Mess. In reality the choices made by these two groups of men have more to do with institutionalisation within the military and its hierarchy, than of any perceived value within the art world.

The officers and soldiers of the Parachute Regiment have essentially similar experiences of combat. Their role as airborne light infantry is in some respects similar to that of Greek heavy infantry; they fight close quarter battles that are designed to be of limited duration, while taking the individual warriors to the limits of their endurance. In the case of the Greek Hoplites, endurance in combat was limited by the heavy armour in which they fought. For modern parachute troops, endurance is normally limited by lack of logistical support when fighting beyond the frontline and in the face of overwhelming odds, before the arrival of supporting armoured infantry and cavalry.

This style of fighting puts the officers at exactly the same risk of being killed as the soldiers and this ethos is evidenced by the number of Parachute Regiment officers killed during the Falklands Conflict, particularly at Goose Green. In pre-classical warfare
kings and generals fought alongside their men in hand-to-hand combat, while in the great Hoplite battles they fought in the front row of the phalanx, putting themselves in exactly the same danger as their men. It is no coincidence that Greek kings and generals rarely survived defeat on the battlefield. The ancient Greeks would have seen the death of Lieutenant Colonel Jones as entirely natural and nothing unusual.

The notion that those in command take responsibility for the men they direct is borne out in the use of art on the walls of the military mess. The Duke of Wellington's famous dispatch after the battle of Waterloo, "Nothing except a battle lost can be half so melancholy as a battle won", seems to fit with the choice of paintings in both the 2nd and 3rd Battalion Officers' Messes. The Falklands paintings occupy the most prominent positions in the anteroom, the space that has the highest levels of physical and behavioural formality. The officers, have in essence, created a museum to the past glories of the battles for Goose Green and Longdon. When viewing the paintings by Cuneo, Archer and Cobb it is possible to stand and stare, taking your time to digest the importance to the nation and regiment of the events portrayed. For the officers who use these messes on a daily basis, they are surrounded by their 'regimental glories' when reading the paper, drinking coffee and quietly relaxing.

The fact that the officers and sergeants of the Parachute regiment have chosen to create an environment for themselves that complies with accepted norms of mess decoration, even though they are in a modern building, is not a product of free-thinking decision making. The creation of a traditional space in a new building is a product of institutional beliefs about the nature of the organisation.

Military organisations are highly codified, self-regulatory bodies that must possess a robust and reliable method of cultural regeneration, given that personnel losses are likely in warfare. How do such organisations maintain a consistent identity over periods that are measured in hundreds of years?

(Finlan in Badsey, Havers and Grove 2005: 195-196)

The answer to this question lies in the training that both officers and soldiers receive in their first few months in the army. Officers are segregated from the other ranks from the very beginning and trained at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst for 42 weeks, and only decide which regiment or corps to join while at Sandhurst. Soldiers receive a rudimentary basic (Phase One) training, lasting just twelve weeks, in an army wide
structure, before being sent to a specialist training facility where they complete Phase Two training in an atmosphere dictated, if not controlled, by the regiment or corps they elected to join before starting their training. This means that officers are institutionalised into the officer corps before they become part of the regimental system, while soldiers are institutionalised into the regiment from the very beginning.

There are four principles of military indoctrination that account for the decision making processes that creates regimental identity and representation in the messing system; isolation, inheritance, inertia and intolerance.

The training regime isolates individuals from society in general, ensuring that recruits do not come into contact with those not involved in the training. In the case of officers, they are isolated not just from civilians, but also from the non-officer ranks. They are trained by a number of sergeants and warrant officers, but these are hand picked individuals, capable of developing the officer cadets as members of the officer corps. From a very early stage, soldiers are isolated from both civilians, and then other soldiers who are not part of their regiment. Isolation is the first necessary element in the institutionalisation of new officers and soldiers.

Having removed external influences, it is necessary to provide a new source of cultural identity. This is done in the form of inheritance. New recruits are provided with a new set of values that must be not only accepted, but believed by those who wish to become full members of military society. Those individuals who fail to accept these new cultural norms are quickly removed from the group and severed from military society. In order for inherited values to be maintained over several generations, and for a cultural identity separate from civilian society and other military units (for example, army from navy and infantry from cavalry) to develop, inheritance must be supported by a high degree of inertia. That is, inherited norms must be highly resistant to change.

This gives military culture a direct link with memetic theory. Each of the cultural norms that are passed on to new generations of soldiers must be selected from a wide pool of possible norms developed in the light of experience. According to Dawkins (2007) these cultural norms, or memes, are self-selecting and must actively resist de-selection. This generates a culture that is intolerant of dissent from accepted behaviour and belief, and demands that individuals are intolerant of non-conformity. This is so well ingrained in military society that dissent is quickly dealt with, creating individuals who are fiercely loyal to their battalion, regiment, corps and service, who conform to norms to such a degree that it pervades every decision they make.
Probably the most important cultural meme to the military is that of winning. From the sports field to the battlefield, soldiers are inculcated with the need to succeed against all opponents and enemies. It is therefore not surprising that when the Parachute Regiment were given the chance to create new mess facilities, the Mess Committees collectively chose to replicate 19th and 20th Century ideas of the regimental home. For the officers, this indoctrination of interior design as self-representational statement begins when they first enter Sandhurst. The walls of the colleges are filled with paintings of generals, iconic heroes, and the great and the good from the history of the British Army. Constituted shortly after the Second World War, Sandhurst itself is a product of institutionalisation and the four principles that ensure its culture is perpetuated.

The overriding representational paradigm in the Officers’ Mess uses kleos, eternal remembrance of the battalions dead, as the basis of the model. When you stand in the Officers’ Mess anteroom of either battalion and contemplate the Falklands Conflict, it is a melancholic moment. The concentration on the human elements of warfare through representation of the physicality is the contemporary equivalent of the battle-scenes of the Iliad. In the 3rd Battalion mess the paintings by Archer and Cuneo clearly show this. Soldiers in the thick of action on Mount Tumbledown and the last charge of Sergeant Ian McKay VC are fitting events for the commitment to eternal memory. In this mess there is also a map of the Falklands Islands with thumbnail portraits of 34 members of the regiment who were killed during the conflict (although 38 actually died). This again, is a simple act of the granting of kleos.

The 3rd Battalion spread a number of Falklands items across the mess, but they have also created a small area, a single wall, that displays only Falklands material (figure 56). The centrepiece of this display is the painting by Peter Archer of Sergeant Ian McKay storming an Argentine bunker in the act of winning his posthumous Victoria Cross. Next to this is a photograph of Sergeant McKay, mounted along with miniature replicas of his medals. On the other side is a set of four paintings presented to the mess by Lieutenant Colonel Huw Pike, the battalions Commanding Officer during the Falklands Conflict. These paintings are unusual in that they do not conform to the standardised representations of conflict normally associated with mess art. Unlike Victorian genre painting they are not packed with military detail and unlike modern mess paintings, there is no trace of comic strip drama. These paintings, by Roy Perry, are simple but beautiful landscapes that show the military elements as small players in the drama of the South Atlantic land and skyscape.
In many accounts of the war the landscape and weather are portrayed as the biggest enemy, whether this is in soldiers personal accounts of frostbite and trench-foot, or the media's accounts designed to belittle the Argentine military. Perry's paintings represent a view of the conflict that fits with ideas of collective *kleos*. The four paintings show soldiers at Port San Carlos, Teal Inlet, Estancia House and looking at Port Stanley from the top of Mount Longdon (figures 57 - 60). They are similar in atmosphere to Haley's view of San Carlos after 5 Brigade had largely moved out or away from the beachhead (figure 21). Like Haley, Perry has produced a melancholic view of the war, a view of landscape away from the action.

The decoration of the Sergeants' Mess takes a slightly different course, but essentially fulfils the same function. Rather than placing the emphasis of remembrance in the anteroom, the sergeants in both battalions have chosen to dedicate the bar area to the Falklands Conflict. The 2 Battalion have named their bar “The Goose Green Bar”, while the 3 Battalion have called theirs “The Longdon Bar”. The placing of photographs and memorabilia in the mess bar places the act of remembrance in a less formal situation than is the case in the Officer's Mess, and this distinction seems in keeping with the simplistic separation of the two messes into high and low brow. However, the Greek Meme is evident in the displays, particularly in the 3 Battalion's mess, as like their officers they have created a memorial wall dedicated to the Falklands Conflict. This display is immediately inside the door, meaning that visitors to the mess must walk past it to get to either the Longdon Bar or the anteroom. The wall consists of flags, prints from paintings, and a framed roll of honour, while in the bar itself there are more prints from paintings, along with a number of photographs of soldiers in the Falklands.

What is notable about the Sergeants' Mess is that there are photographs of soldiers who survived the war physically unscathed. The officers use paintings of soldiers who survived, but all the photographs are of those killed in action and are used to support *kleos*. The sergeants have created a celebration of participation as much as a memorial to the dead. Having won all their battles, displaying images of the soldiers who took part acknowledges their *kudos*, and in doing so grants *time*, and in the case of those who did not come home, provides *kleos*. The officers' mess representations of the war are mainly *kleos*, while the Sergeants make use of the whole Greek Meme, including *nostos*.

The Sergeants' Mess serves the process of homecoming in a way the officers mess does not. Soldiers in the British Army tend to spend most of their careers with the battalion they join at the beginning of their career, which means spending 22 years in
the company of a stable group of men. Across a unit such as the Parachute Regiment, the soldiers transfer between battalions as they move up the ranks, but still remain fiercely loyal to their original battalion. This limited mobility extends the familial camaraderie across a greater number of men, but still excludes those who are not part of the Parachute Regiment family. This is not entirely the case with the officers.

Officers serve a strictly limited period with their original battalion, and in order to maintain a career they have to complete postings to staff jobs with higher formations. For most officers, their career with the battalion comes to an end by the time they reach the rank of Major, with only the exceptional few becoming Commanding Officer in the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. Many officers, particularly those in command, often leave their battalions soon after operational deployments (this was certainly the case for Huw Pike and David Chaundler), whereas a corporal on operations may be promoted into the Sergeants' Mess, spending 15 years or more as a member. This means that the Sergeants' Mess has a longer, more intense, and often familial relationship with its members. From this it is clear that the Sergeants' Mess plays an important role in the process of homecoming, or nostos. For the nostoi of Homeric and classical Greece, warfare was an experience shared by almost every adult member of society, including the old, the disabled and occasionally the blind (Hanson 2009: 88-95). Moreover, all men from the same tribe or city, between 18 and 60 years of age, would almost certainly have fought in many of the same battles as the nostoi himself.

... the awkward burdensome armour that hung unused and tarnished above the hearth was a daily reminder of both how infrequent and unusually savage those few minutes [of battle] were and would be in the perennial wars still to come.

The number of kin in this personal drama — fathers, sons, grandfathers, cousins, uncles and lifelong friends — also accounts for the general emphasis on war in Greek society: all men were initiates in the most awful of the many rituals in their culture, and the bonds forged during the few minutes of collective fighting gave new definition to the older idea of 'family' and 'friend'.

(Hanson 2009: 220)

Hanson describes a society where every member is fully aware of the rigours of combat. The frequency of war in both pre-classical and classical Greek society and the
need for every adult male to fight for their society meant that there was never any shortage of people with whom a warrior could exchange war stories and reminisce about past campaigns. With the increasing de-militarisation of western civilian populations, veterans find it increasingly difficult to share their experiences with family and friends and although they may have memorabilia from their military careers in their homes they rarely make a show of this material. Soldiers will often refer to framed group photographs of their unit as "another one for the downstairs loo", relegating the most profound period of their personal history to the least used and least public room in the family home.

In the Parachute Regiment messes, personal history is treated with a little more deference, being placed in the most public of spaces. The display of regimental history in the bar, the place where mess members do much of their socialising is the modern equivalent of the Greek armour hanging over the hearth. The representation of war in the environment of the mess could easily be described as pro-army, and even pro-war, and to be expected, but it is much more important than this. Good mess art and the display of regimental histories in the form of photographs provides the nostoi with the honour and respect that allows them to make sense of their combat experiences. Removing such representations, or dismissing them as low brow cartoons, is to dishonour the memories of the living and the remembrance of the dead. This formula of military self-representation also provides young soldiers with a sense of aspiration and generates a hereditary culture that helps them make sense of the things they are asked to do. Inside the Sergeants' Mess of the 2nd Battalion The Parachute Regiment is a silver statue of Sergeant Ian McKay that bears the inscription:

THE McKay MEMORIAL TROPHY
TO PERPETUATE THE MEMORY OF
SERGEANT IAN McKay
VICTORIA CROSS
WHO DISPLAYED COURAGE AND LEADERSHIP
OF THE HIGHEST ORDER
UTRINQUE PARATUS
(Ready for anything)
Conclusion

I began writing this thesis with the idea that I could assess military photographs of the Falklands Crisis as an independent body of work. Coming to these pictures from a personal position within the Ministry of Defence I felt that there would be distinctions between military and press work. However, the difficulty in making this separation became immediately apparent, but largely irrelevant. The processes under which both sets of photographers found themselves working on the islands; the long periods spent in close confines onboard Royal Navy ships; the shared hardships; restrictions on access to the front line and to wiring facilities; utter reliance on others for physical and moral sustenance, means that it is reasonable to assess their images as a single body of work (Brothers 1997: 208). Although the press photographers would argue the importance and validity of their independence, this argument is not supported by the evidence of their images, which are remarkable in their similarity to those produced by the military.

This leads to the conclusion that all the photographs produced during the conflict are part of a system of self-representation, which is particularly evident in the images transmitted back from the conflict, in which it is difficult to discern a journalistic intent or aesthetic in many of the images shot by Tom Smith and Martin Cleaver. This is not to say that as individuals Smith and Cleaver were not working with journalistic intent, but the process of censorship and release to the media meant that they were part of a system that generated images under the umbrella of state authorship. At almost any other time this would have caused conflict between the Government and the media, but with the highest levels of nationalistic euphoria in living memory, the media were prepared, if not entirely happy, to play the game. The influence on the press and government photographers working on the islands was therefore to create a shared ethos that effectively controlled their work:

"Because the ethos inspires behaviour more than it controls it, subjects are not consciously aware of the rules which it objectively imposes, even when they objectively refer to them in their conformist or deviant behaviour; various different values may be communicated and perpetuated within a group without any need to encouragement or call to order."

(Bourdieu 1990: 43)
The close confines in which all of those travelling to the South Atlantic found themselves gave ample opportunity for a shared ethos to develop. As with all military cultures there was a distinct element of competing sub-cultures (Army-Navy, Parachute Regiment-Royal Marines, et cetera) and the press often felt that they were working in opposition to the military officers and press escorts who were hosting and controlling them on their passage to the Falklands. First-hand accounts of this relationship written immediately after the war played heavily on this antagonism and for some there is still a degree of bitterness in their recollections of Operation Corporate. However, when looking at the work that was produced and the way it was distributed to, and used by, the media it is difficult to conclude anything other than that they were created in a single system of representation.

The primary function of any representational model is to construct a version of reality that will stand in for the real thing. In the profound reality of war there are multiple narratives created for a number of 'consumers', both internal and external to those being represented and those creating the representations. The use of photography by the media has been extensively researched and the Falklands Conflict has been the subject of numerous studies, not least Lawrence Freedman's *Official History of the Falklands Campaign* (2005).

My position internal within the Ministry of Defence and on the margins of the army has offered a unique position from which to examine models of military self-representation. Twenty years of working with the British Army on exercises and operations in the UK and abroad has given me an understanding of military society that outsiders rarely get and this has generated a level of confidence that has put me in the privileged position of sharing their lives and their ethos. From this comes my decision to investigate concepts of military self-representation and how the visual image has been used to create and sustain the military's view of itself. All such representations are in some sense manufactured realities, which to a greater or lesser degree are recognised by others. However, the insular environment of the armed forces means that their ideas of self-representation and the realities they construct can be particularly difficult for outsiders to understand. Such systems are also developmental and under constant pressure to change and conform to other, more mainstream, ideas of culture and society. The long-term stability of military society and its ability to resist fashion and changing political ideology produces a system of representation that is particularly stable.

Describing representations as simulacra, Jean Baudrillard presented a world where reflection became reality, where reality ceased to exist (Baudrillard 1994: 6). This post-
modern view was taken up by war theorists such as Coker and Ignatieff, who believed that the existential nature of the warrior had been denuded, or even destroyed, masked by long distance combat, invisible enemies and death dealt through the depersonalising computer screen. In the west, contemporary war studies research leads us to believe that the solution to all combat situations is to pursue robotic and drone technologies, to remove soldiers from the battlefield. The belief that soldiers from Western armies should not face risk, while the enemy's warriors, who are portrayed as no more than a throwback to a less enlightened age, may be subjected to the most destructive and dehumanising weapons of war. To conclude that this is the future of warfare is to accept that the west no longer has a martial spirit and produces a reduction of Clausewitzian theory to such a degree that, in Clausewitz eyes, we face the danger of no longer being able to wage war at all. There are many arguments in academia, in the media, and within the military themselves, that would lead us to conclude that this is the case. But this discounts the nature of man's relationship to combat and the reason individual warriors go to war.

As long as our enemies continue to obtain existential benefit from war we will continue to be unable to defeat them, either physically or morally. In the pre-modern period there would have been no purpose in waging war in order to improve the political situation of a foreign population; in the Westphalian tradition (see page 41) war is fought for princely honour, the defence of virtue or the defence of national interest; all reasons for which it is now difficult, if not impossible, to attack another nation. This was not the case in archaic Greece, where kings routinely fought amongst themselves, but also agreed to defend honour and virtue. The origin of the Trojan war lies in the agreement to pursue, and subject to force of arms, anyone who dare break the agreement over the marriage of Helen, the mortal daughter of Zeus. The violent destruction of what is now known as either Troy VI or Troy VI would have been lost to history had it nor been for Homer.

In the *Iliad* we are given a world of combat subjected to the vagaries of gods and the petty selfishness of warriors and women. But this world was complex, with deep psychological meaning that has been reinterpreted and used by many generations of warriors and political war leaders. Beyond the mere technological, or instrumental, conduct of war, Homer explored the meaning and trauma of combat and provided the first explanation of man's relationship to combat. He set the scale and value of life and death in the ancient world. The metaphysical belief in heroic virtue governed ancient Greek life beyond combat and a warrior's value to society was measured in martial
success. A warrior's place in the afterlife was equally dependent on the success of his actions under arms. With so much reliance upon victory in battle, the recognition of heroic virtue by others was crucial to the psychology of the warrior.

Dr Jonathan Shay has argued that both the characters in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* show many of the symptoms of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder as exhibited by the veterans of the Vietnam War (Shay 2002, 2003). This is a new interpretation of the actions of ancient heroes, particularly Achilles and Odysseus, that teaches us the importance of the reflection without referent, the simulacrum that is the warrior ethos, and the importance of how warriors see themselves within the wider context of society and war. For Homer's warriors death on the battlefield was not a prerequisite of glory and fame, but then neither was survival. Greeks warriors sought a place in the afterlife that was entirely dependent on remembrance, and this did not require that the warrior survived. Sufferers of combat PTSD often question their own survival and contrast the glory bestowed upon them by society with that of the fallen. Death in battle is rarely heroic, but it is important for those who fight that heroic value is placed on sacrifice and death and that the fallen are represented and remembered in heroic terms.

What Shay recognised in Homer was a systematic use of metaphors that allow combat veterans to cope with an extreme experience that is so far beyond normality that it is almost impossible to reconcile with the accepted standards of human behaviour. Fear, guilt, blame, irrationality, pretence, bravado, stoicism, are all potentially negative emotions that lie at the heart of combat and destroy the character of those who fight. In this sense, the purpose of a system of representation is to create a mediated reality that prevents us from having to deal with the unmediated truth. In effect, the warrior ethos is a simulacrum of manhood that keeps combat veterans functioning in 'normal' society.

At its most basic level this requires a warrior to achieve great victories against a worthy enemy. Fighting a lesser warrior, in unequal combat, with little or no risk to oneself, does not yield *kudos*. The soldiers of the First World War who killed tens of thousands with long range machine guns are not to be confused with the Taliban warrior of Afghanistan. Mass infantry assaults on enemy positions on the trench filled battlefields of the Western Front did not yield *kudos* or *time*, there were no great victories and no fame to be had by either side by going 'over the top'. Islamic warriors on the other hand see value and obtain existential meaning from death in combat.

While Machiavelli was extolling the virtues of war and its place in state and princely life, Erasmus was providing the voice against war, *Dulce bellum inexpertise* - war is sweet to those who have not experienced it (Erasmus *Bellum* 1515 - Bietenholz 2009: 73). But
school boys, particularly those of the ruling class, have been inculcated with the honour and heroism of combat, which has overpowered the idea that death in the pursuit of honour and fame is erroneous. Even Wilfred Owen's appropriation of the Horace line, Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori (to die for one's country is a sweet and glorious thing), within his famous anti-war poem failed to provide a permanent rebuttal to the “old lie”.

(Motion 2003: 104)

Fighting the Taliban is an entirely different affair. Those on the front line hunt down their enemy at great risk to themselves. Although modern language, and probably the Clauswitzean principle of hating the enemy, makes it difficult for individual warriors to honour the Taliban, there is no doubt that in the long-term the intense difficulty of fighting this tenacious and resilient enemy will be recognised. I do not think that the British Army will ever acquire a love for the Afghan warrior in the same way it has embraced the Zulu nation, but there will need to be a paradigm shift that allows combat veterans to contextualise their experience within the Greek Meme. This process is just beginning for those who fought in the Falklands war as both sides begin to come to terms with the effect of their actions on the enemy and on themselves.

In 2005 Tristán Bauer directed the first Argentine film of the Falklands war, Blessed by Fire. This harrowing anti-war film begins with the attempted suicide of a Malvinas veteran and uses flash-backs to trace the experiences of three Argentine conscripts during the war. Describing the purpose of the film, the film's author and lead character Edgardo Esteban said:

To be able to live with those ghosts was the constructive perspective we tried to portray in Blessed by Fire. And from that starting point, what I have always tried to do was tell my personal story, but that was also open to certain political perspectives. But the way ahead really has only one objective, and that is to be able to fight against the ghosts which so torment those of us who have been in a war, which was so terrifying to us ... what you would call Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. And the film deals precisely with that, what happens to you 25 years after you've been in a war.

(Edgardo Esteban 2005)

Esteban concludes through discussion with many veterans from many armies that PTSD is created by the imminence, proximity and expectation of death, but his more
telling comments are on the necessity of soldiers talking about their own experiences. In a discussion with British Veterans he describes the cruelty of silence that was imposed on Argentine veterans. Both groups have suffered extreme levels of suicide, with estimates as high as ten times the national average, which peaked more than twenty years after the war and continues almost unabated to this day. In Estaban's words: "Society demanded that we did not talk about the war. This silence is what has been killing us".

What is actually affecting the veterans, and it would seem more so in Argentina, is the lack of recognition for their sacrifice. The impossibility of returning to a life that existed before combat is well documented and whether death was imminent, nearby and expected is largely irrelevant. All returning combat veterans have to some degree sacrificed their previous existence, if not actual life and limb, and using the Greek Meme as the simulacrum of representation, the Argentines must be suffering more than the British. The argument has been made that the expectation of the conscript is that he will not be sent to war and will not face the risks of combat, in effect, that he is not a warrior and will therefore suffer in combat more than the warrior. Estaban argues against this case, but for the wrong reason. If Argentine conscripts are suffering more than British warriors it is because Argentina lost. This is Shay's explanation for the severe levels of PTSD in Vietnam Veterans, who, he argues, would have had better mental health had America won the Vietnam War.

The collective theory of the Greek Meme, victory, fame and remembrance was easily definable in the Falklands Crisis, which had a simple story with a beginning, a middle and an end - an invasion, a war and a victory. The British remember their warriors as heroes and some are celebrated as icons of the warrior ethos; the names of Lieutenant Colonel 'H' Jones and Sergeant Ian McKay will live on in national identity as constructs of heroism.

*

Jean Baudrillard begins his thesis on the precession of simulacra with a quote from Ecclesiastes, the 21st, 25th or 29th book of the Bible, depending on which version of the various Judeo-Christian texts you read.

*The simulacrum is never what hides the truth - it is the truth which hides the fact that there is none. The simulacrum is true.*
The notion that a Hebrew scholar writing sometime before the birth of Christ would have used such modern, even post-modern terminology, is of course ludicrous. And to suggest that this is an error of translation on the part of Baudrillard, or those who transcribed his French into English, is nothing more than clutching at straws by those who wish to believe that the theory originated with the son of King David, or at the court of Solomon, or that Baudrillard wouldn't dream of perpetrating such a dishonesty. The rhetorical 'joke' is of course Baudrillard's way of pointing out that truth does not exist, that everything we base our cultural identity upon is nothing more than an illusion.

Simulation is no longer that of a territory, a referential being, or a substance. It is the generation by models of real without origin or reality: a hyperreal. The territory no longer precedes the map, nor does it survive it. It is nevertheless the map that precedes the territory - precession of simulacra - that engenders the territory, and if one must return to the fable, today it is the territory whose shreds slowly rot across the extent of the map.

At its highest level, the Greek Meme, used as a metaphor to explain models of military self-representation, is a simulacrum that demonstrates there is no longer a reality behind the expression of heroic virtue. This seems counterintuitive given that without extreme action on the part of individual warriors it is very difficult to see how any war could be won. But as we have seen, the construction of the heroic ideal is dependent on many different cultural parameters and those used by the general public are not those used by warriors. It is now common currency for survival to be seen as heroic and, although some individuals do exhibit a heroic fight for survival in extreme situations, this particular metaphor has been extended to anyone who may have been in harms way. In the case of the military, the media now routinely describe all soldiers returning from war zones as heroes. This modern simulacral construction of the heroic soldier has little connectivity with Homer's heroes, who require victory and honour in order to be heroic.

Shay would have us believe that the Homeric ideal of the warrior hero never really existed, that the Iliad and the Odyssey were complex cultural paradigms that allowed
ancient warriors to deal with combat stress. The idea that Homeric heroes were the original genetic link between gods and men would seem to break the link between the real and the represented: the simulacrum. While Shay's argument is highly persuasive, it is just another reinterpretation of Homer made to fit contemporary culture. Homer creates a world where men, just one generation away from being gods themselves, committed great acts of valour in the face of the enemy. Their near godlike status allowed them to do things that were not possible for ordinary mortal men, but their own mortality also gave them the psychological weaknesses of ordinary men. This is what Shay explores when he holds a mirror to the warrior's soul. The reflection of Ancient Greek poetry in the lives of modern combat veterans is highly resonant, but the existence of the profound reality of the Trojan War is more problematic.

For those fighting wars, profound reality is still very much part of their everyday lives, but it is made sense of in a world of hyperreality. The referent of warrior heroism is unknown to almost all involved in the extensive narrative created around modern conflict. But like the precession of the simulacra, the narrative is progressive and developmental, its interpretation dependent upon time, site of discourse and, of course, the reader.

All modern war narrative begins with 'news'. At the interface between non-combatant belief systems and the profound reality experienced by warriors risking death, a narrative of heroism is constructed that operates within the restrictions of a moderated ideal of glory. Ancient Greek heroes believed that there was no glory in fighting inferior and weak enemies and that only victory over a worthy enemy would bring true glory. They encapsulated this idea in the philosophical concept of *kudos*, believing that this was a limited resource, shared amongst warriors, not equally, but according to individual worth. Some have argued that this creates a warrior with a selfish disregard for his comrades and use Achilles, sulking over the loss of his war-prize, as the progenitor of an individualised and flawed warrior loved by the media. Shay believes that Achilles was exhibiting symptoms of PTSD and that this was entirely predictable after ten years on the battlefield. Both these ideas moderate combat glory into their own paradigm, or belief system, and both require temporal and physical distance from the battlefield to be understood.

The modern manifestation of news and its selective propagation by the media bridges the physical divide between the warrior and the consumer of war narrative, and modern technology continues to reduce the temporal divide. Before the Crimean War news reports were written by the military themselves and typically took weeks, if not
months to make it into print. The telegraphed news reports of William Howard Russell for The Times took only a few days to get back to the UK and were often in print before the Government themselves had any proper understanding of events. In the Falklands Conflict, words could be on the editors desk in a matter of minutes, with photographs and video not far behind. This every increasing need for speed could have created a breakdown in the reflection of heroic endeavour, but in what seemed to be the biggest threat to national self-belief since the Second World War, competing forces coalesced into a single representational system.

The news that appeared in the UK used the underlying principles of the warrior's honour and Homeric heroism, and the system that produced it encompassed those who were being represented, the military hierarchy, the reporters, officials at the Ministry of Defence, and journalists and editors producing the newspapers and programmes for broadcast in the UK. The complicity that these individuals had in the system of representation was enhanced by the reaction of the public to what they saw and heard. The Sun's headline, GOTCHA, was soon replaced when it became apparent that the public were not happy with the jingoistic rhetoric and very few people actually saw a copy of the headline first hand.

The images transmitted back from the fleet are the nearest thing we have to a magic looking glass that reflects war in the Falklands. These images are the direct link between the profound reality experienced by those who were there and the events as understood by those who were not. The reflection of the profound reality may be present in these pictures, but its is an incomplete reality and reflects a corporate, propagandist view rather than that of the individual.

The narrative constructed to explain the war to the British Army masks the profound reality in a veil that begins the process of replacing the profound reality with the simulacral and memetic. The construction of self-reflective self-representations is a complex egotistical paradigm aimed at generating and sharing an ethos between members of the social group. This creates a divide between the military and the other, fostering a grand self-belief in the warrior ethic. Military culture is full of social rules that seem archaic to civilians, but acceptance of, and belief in the martial culture is vital for cohesion and success on the battlefield.

From new recruits to seasoned veterans, Soldier Magazine provides a narrative of military life, not just in action, but in ethos. In 1982 it provided a vehicle through which British soldiers extolled their worth as warriors. The telling of heavily mediated war stories fulfils a social necessity on the part of the warriors to accept and respect the
sacrifice of those who fought: The principle of *timé* devalues and dishonours those who do not show appropriate respect. Shay describes the importance of combat veterans 'keeping the faith' with their fallen comrades for the benefit of their long-term mental health, but 'keeping the faith' is all part of a constructed narrative which becomes self-referential, breaking the links between profound reality and explicit memory (Shay 2002: 79). *Soldier Magazine* fails to report the blood and guts of warfare, preferring a cleaner version of events that allows for heroism, but lacks the reality of life lived and lost in violence. Homer describes in great detail the effects of weapons on human flesh, bronze spears ripping through skulls, blood spattering the faces of the victors, bodies crashing to the ground, men gone berserk with the stress and trauma of being surrounded by death. These are the things that Shay believes to be important for veterans to talk about in order to bring combat stress under control, but these are not the stories of *Soldier Magazine*.

The masking of profound reality in self-representational models is fundamental to the construction of self-belief within the Greek Meme. The belief in great warriors, in those who exhibit god-like characteristics, allows a warrior to receive glory, fame and honour in return. But this cannot be achieved where extreme risk is not part of the narrative.

Building on narratives from more immediate and self-representational models, the post-bellum period is marked by consolidation into accepted morality and universalised truth, in the words of Baudrillard, "...it plays at being an appearance - it is of the order of sorcery." (Baudrillard 1997: 6) But this is magic performed on grand scale. The connection between self-representation and conflict is largely broken as the military lose control and influence over the media, who no longer need guaranteed access to information and begin to construct new narratives.

Masked in a veneer of investigation, post-bellum narrative purports to produce new insights, reporting events in greater detail than during the conflict. However, narratives are still framed within the parameters that govern the western way of warfare. In the media aimed at the general public, the western construct of the warrior is used to build easily understood stereotypes that make war understandable to those who do not fight. This understanding is loaded with connotations from previous wars, and in the case of the Falklands Conflict, echoes of the Second World War were common place. If constructing modern ideas of heroism based pre-existing beliefs is sorcery, it is a simply slight of hand that the consumer is prepared to overlook, even the most blatant act of deception is largely ignored, while dissenting voices are pushed to the periphery.
The grand order of magic is therefore, not one of government and media deception, but one of mass self-deception. Clausewitz discussed the importance of the trinity of government, military and society and, for very different reasons, each of these needs heroes to exist, even at the expense of reality.

The construction of war narratives in the warrior’s social space is independent of original profound reality. For veterans, the images in military messes are used to manufacture a social identity based on shared values and experience. For others, these images provide the basic understanding of the warrior ethos. The complex relationships individuals have with these images is part of the process of nostos, or homecoming, the unachievable return to a state that existed before the combat experience.

Images hanging on mess walls are contextualised by veterans using a predefined understanding of victory, glory, honour, fame and eternal remembrance. The purpose of mess art is to help give them this knowledge, which is so deep seated in the psychology of the warrior that it ceases to be based on a profound reality; it is its own reality, the simulacrum that murders the real. For Baudrillard, the reality of war is too traumatic to be remembered unmediated, for Shay combat is too important to forget - the Greek Meme is the simulacrum that allows warriors to both remember and forget, it is a hyperreality, a myth that provides the skeletal structure of ethos. Achilles is the mythic warrior, the progenitor of all warriors, that must be mimicked. Warriors in mess art are the living embodiment of the Homeric myth and the proof that attaining perfection is possible. It is here that the representation of the warrior becomes pure simulacrum.

Modern heroes exist in a world of post-Homeric heroism; we exist in a post-heroic world where our true beliefs about war are created in the simulations of the movie theatre, in art and in photography. Like Achilles, modern warriors need to get something existential from the combat, but to accept that they go to war with this in mind destroys the notion of heroism as an egalitarian act. The great fear for present and future wars is that civilian society will infect the military with a post-heroic culture. Unmasking images of heroism and shining the light of excessive reality becomes dangerous. If warriors become soldiers without a heroic belief system, death will be meaningless, utilitarian, functional; moral value and the sense of a life lived well will disappear, with catastrophic consequences for mental health.

*
The survival of the Greek Meme into the 21st century is not a foregone conclusion, although as a memetic principle it would be expected to resurface on a regular basis. Late 20th century debates on war often ignored the memetic social functions of combat, instead concentrating on technological superiority operating in a post-Christian morality. Writers such as Michael Ignatieff and Christopher Coker proclaimed the end of the western way of war based on a decade of peace-keeping and peace-support operations in the 1990s. These arguments were essentially short term and ignored manifestations of human psychology on the battlefield. For their arguments to stand the test of time it is necessary for soldiers to refuse to die in combat, to mentally and physically back off at the moment of risk. There is still some degree of support for these claims, not least in media and public demands for ever-more combat equipment and for ever-decreasing casualties, which seem to deny the Greek Meme. But this is to replace the morality of the battlefield with the politics of finance.

Claims that society in general, and politicians in particular, place a low value on military endeavour unless they provide the military with everything they ask for is only in part a new argument. For example, not long before the allied invasion of Normandy, Cecil Beaton wrote in a Ministry of Information book on war artists, “After three years of war, the Ministry of Production announces, 'we are making the right kind of tanks now.'” (Beaton 1943: 5) There is no doubt that the military were highly valued during the Second World War, even though they were frequently provided with inferior equipment. The danger in conflating problems with equipment and supply with societal value of the warrior is that victory on the battlefield (kudos) ceases to be the prime objective of soldiers and their commanders. When a warrior seeks acceptance and value within society he does so on the battlefield through victory over the enemy. When a post-modern, post-Christian soldier seeks validation from society he does so in a consumerist fashion, approval directly related to financial commitment to salary and equipment. It is only through acceptance of the possibility of one's own death and of the ultimate death and defeat of the enemy that warriors attain their true social value.

The current war in Afghanistan has put an end to 1990s arguments that the West is no longer able to fight a warrior enemy simply because modern soldiers are not prepared to die on the battlefield. The regular surge in casualty figures from Helmand Province demonstrates that modern soldiers are prepared to risk death and serious injury in close-quarter battles against a tough and resilient enemy.
The language used to describe the Taliban is similar to that used by the Greeks to describe barbarians and not dissimilar to that used by the media to describe the Argentine army in 1982. A serious danger to the military ethos and self-belief lies in excessive denigration of the enemy. Although it is necessary, under the Clausewitzian model of war, for both both society and the military to hate their enemy, it is also necessary under the classical model to respect the enemy as a worthwhile opponent. If the Taliban were deemed to be an unworthy enemy it is impossible for those fighting them to receive any degree of *kudos* or *timē*. Failure to recognise the value of the enemy is also likely to result in high levels of psychological trauma amongst combat troops (Shay 2002).

It must be remembered that the Greek Meme is about the representation of war. Not all battles, campaigns or wars are represented in this way, the worst case being the Vietnam War where the American defeat stripped the veterans of the *kudos*, *timē*, *kleos*, and, most importantly for surviving veterans, *nostos*. The denial of the warrior's homecoming is often cited as the main cause of the high volumes and extremes of combat stress still experienced by Vietnam veterans. The representation of the Afghan War has the potential to create the same trap, particularly where the lower orders of the Greek Meme are ignored.

The current trend in representation that does not recognise individual warrior's *kudos* is failing to provide the backbone on which successful self-representations of combat are based. Outside the military community, there is little fame and honour gleaned from the Afghan war, and even within the military there is little understanding of the need for individual victories to be honoured. The current system of operational honours, as exemplified by the medals system, has broken the connection between the death of the enemy and glory. It is intensely unfashionable to glorify events that resulted in the death of human beings, no matter how bitter the fighting, and without glory it is impossible to see how honour and eternal remembrance can be obtained. The reporting of operational deaths has also to be dislocated from the death of the enemy, which has resulted in a kind of sham *kleos*.

For many non-combatants, there is no honourable death in Afghanistan while, for others, death in the face of the enemy is sufficient for the award of *kleos aphthiton*. As we have seen with the death of Lieutenant Colonel Jones at Goose Green, the awarding of a Victoria Cross is the modern military equivalent of 'undying glory', particularly when the recipient is killed in the act of winning the medal that is the highest of military honours. And, as Jones diminished the *kleos* of his comrades, so the current reporting of
deaths in Afghanistan diminishes the *timē* of the soldiers who fight and win. This is compounded by the media's difficulties in gaining access to the front line, both in terms of remoteness and the dangers from an enemy that does not differentiate between the military and the media. Their failure to routinely report military engagements and low level victories prevents the development of *timē* within wider society, which impacts on *nostos*.

At the end of the Falklands Crisis the extended period of homecoming events started a modern fascination with the reunification of warriors with their families. In 1982, newspaper reports, photographs and television broadcasts were all used to convey the message of the valiant and valued victors, but little attention was paid to the returning warrior once the events had passed. In 2008, the Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Richard Dannatt, inadvertently added to the problem of representing *nostos* as event when he condemned the Ministry of Defence and the general public for their indifferent, dismissive and sometimes hostile attitude to soldiers returning from Iraq and Afghanistan. He claimed that few towns welcomed military parades in their streets and that the public should treat returning soldiers as heroes. Whilst Dannatt was talking about the Army in terms of glory, honour and fame as an aid to homecoming, his words were taken in the literal and more easily understood terminology of *nostos-as-event*, rather than as process.

It is now routine for military units returning from operations to be reunited with their families in front of the media and, in the following weeks, for them to be seen parading through a number of towns in their recruiting areas. The media facilities organised for the reunifications are a clear parallel to the Falklands homecomings, but are low-key and repetitive, diminishing their effect as either representational or even propagandist events. Where the emphasis in 1982 was on the returning heroes and their victories in the South Atlantic, it is now purely about families being brought back together. Without *kudos* and *timē* as the basis of representation these events are simply about survival, which in itself is not sufficient to provide any element of the Greek Meme necessary for a successful homecoming process. After Dannatt's comments, homecoming parades were initially well attended with cheers, clapping and, occasionally, screaming members of the public. Attendance and enthusiasm have now fallen away and very few parades have the streets lined with people from beginning to end. Some parades still have the atmosphere of a hero's welcome, while others are, at best, no more than military spectacle.
The primary problem with representing nostos as an event is that there is no room in which the mythology of glory and honour can develop. As Baudrillard has argued, stripping away mythology creates a world of unmediated reality, one where only the real exists: “Illusions, dreams, passions, madness and drugs, but also artifice and simulacrum – these were realities natural predators.” (Baudrillard 2005: 27). Without the myths of war, those who have not fought cannot possibly comprehend the reality of combat, and those who have cannot cope with the hyper-reality of unmediated risk. The mythology of war gives us the Greek Meme, which is the illusion, the dream, the passion, the madness and the simulacrum of combat, and without which, facing death and trauma for the perceived greater good of society makes no sense.
Annex A.
Operation Corporate Chronology.

March
18 Argentine scarp metal dealer Constantino Davidoff lands on South Georgia.
26 General Galtiere orders invasion of the Falklands Islands.

April
2 Argentine forces go ashore near Port Stanley.
Cabinet authorises Task Force 317.
3 United Nations pass Resolution 502
5 Carrier Group sales from Portsmouth.
8 Haig mission arrives in London.
9 SS Canberra sails with 3 Commando Brigade.
10 Haig Mission arrives in Buenos Aires.
11 First Peruvian initiative for 72 hour truce during negotiations –
   Accepted by Argentina, reject by the UK
12 HMS Spartan enforces Maritime Exclusion Zone around the Falkland Islands.
   Haig Mission arrives back in London.
14 Haig returns to Washington to brief President Reagan.
15 Haig Mission final visit to Buenos Aires.
17 Haig presents diplomatic solution to Junta.
19 Argentine response sent to London.
21 Operation Paraquet begins.
22 Foreign Secretary goes to Washington with British response to peace plan.
25 South Georgia retaken.
26 Force protection measures enforced around Task Force.
27 Operation Sutton presented to War Cabinet.
   Haig’s final peace plan sent to London.
29 Task Force arrives in Total Exclusion Zone.
30 President Reagan declares US support for British and offers material support. British Special Forces go ashore on Falkland Islands.

May
1 Vulcan bombers, Harrier ground attack planes begin raids on Port Stanley. Royal Navy begins bombardment.
   Seven point Peruvian peace plan put to Argentina.
2 General Belgrano sunk.
3 Argentina reject Peruvian peace plan after sinking of Belgrano.
4 HMS Sheffield hit by Exocet missile, first Sea Harrier shot down.
5 British Cabinet accepts Peruvian peace plan.
6 Argentina’s final rejection of peace plan.
12 5 Infantry Brigade leaves Southampton.
14 22 SAS attack Pebble Island.
19 Admiral Woodward given go-ahead for landings.
21 Landings begin at San Carlos.
   HMS Ardent lost and 16 Argentine aircraft shot down.
24 HMS Antelope sunk.
25 HMS Coventry and RFA Atlantic Conveyor lost.
26 United Nations Resolution 502 passed.
28 Battle for Goose Green begins.
   5 infantry Brigade cross-deck from QEII off South Georgia.
30 General Moore ashore at San Carlos.
31 42 Commando arrive Mount Kent.

June
1 5 Infantry Brigade disembark at San Carlos.
2 2 Para head for Bluff Cove.
3 Argentine envoys arrive at, and attempt to surrender to UN. Versailles summit begins.
4 Britain vetoes ceasefire.
6 Scots Guards arrive at Fitzroy.
8 RFA Sir Galahad and RFA Sir Tristram bombed at Bluff Cove.
   51 British dead.
14 Argentines surrender at Port Stanley.
17 Prisoners of War embarked on SS Canberra and MV Norland.

July
6 Final cessation of hostilities and agreement to release last remaining prisoners.
14 Repatriation of last Argentine prisoners.
Annex B.
Political and Military Personalities of the Falklands Crisis.

Prime Minster: Margaret Thatcher
Foreign Secretary: Lord Peter Carrington (to 3 April)  
                   Francis Pym (from 3 April)
Chancellor of the Exchequer: Sir Geoffrey Howe
Home Secretary: William Whitelaw
Secretary of State for Defence: John Nott
Attorney General: Sir Michael Havers
Permanent Secretary MoD: Frank Cooper
Governor Falkland Islands: Sir Rex Hunt
Prime Minister's Press Secretary: Sir Bernard Ingham
Acting Chief of Public Relations (MoD): Ian McDonald
CDS: Admiral Sir Terence Lewin
First Sea Lord: Admiral Sir Henry Leach
C-in-C Fleet: Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse
Chief of the General Staff: General Sir Edwin Bramall
Chief of the Air Staff: Air Chief Marshall Sir Michael Beetham
Director Special Forces: General Sir Peter De la Billiere
Commander Task Force: Rear Admiral John "Sandy" Woodward
Commander Land Forces Falkland Islands: Major General Jeremy Moore
Commander 3 Commando Brigade: Brigadier Julian Thompson
Commander 5 Infantry Brigade: Brigadier Tony Wilson
Commanding Officer 22 SAS: Lieutenant Colonel Michael Rose
Argentine President: General Leopold Galtieri
Argentine Foreign Secretary: Costa Mendez
Argentine Falkland Islands Garrison Commander: General M. Menendez
President of the United States of America: Ronald Reagan
USA Special Diplomatic Envoy: Alexander Haig
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Royal Marines Falklands Coastal Advisor</th>
<th>Major Ewan Southby-Taylor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commanding Officer 2nd Battalion, The Parachute Regiment</td>
<td>Lt Col Herbert 'H' Jones VC (Killed at Goose Green).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commanding Officer 3rd Battalion, The Parachute Regiment</td>
<td>Thereafter: Lt Col David Chaundler</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official War Artist</td>
<td>Lt Col Hew Pike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Linda Kitson</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex C.
Operation Corporate Task Force Press Party

MoD Press Officers
HMS Invincible  Roger Goodwin
HMS Hermes      Robin Barratt¹
                Graham Hammond¹
SS Canberra     Alan George
                Martin Helm
                Alan Percival

Newspaper Reporters
HMS Invincible  Alfred McIlroy    Daily Telegraph
                Gareth Parry     Guardian
                Michael Seamark Daily Star
                Tony Snow        Sun
                John Withrow     The Times
HMS Hermes      Peter Archer²    Press Association
                Richard Savill²  Press Association
SS Canberra     Patrick Bishop    Observer
                Ian Bruce       Glasgow Herald
                Leslie Dowd     Reuters
                Max Hastings    London Evening Standard
                Charles Lawrence Sunday Telegraph
                Martin Lowe³    Express and Star (Wolverhampton)
                Derek Hudson³  Yorkshire Evening Post
                Robert McGowan⁴ Daily Express
                Alastair McQueen Daily Mirror
                David Norris⁴  Daily Mail
                John Shirley⁵   Sunday Times

Radio Reporters
SS Canberra     Robert Fox        BBC Radio
                Kim Sabido       Independent Radio News
Television

HMS Hermes
- Brian Hanrahan: BBC Reporter
- Bernard Hesketh: BBC Cameraman
- John Jockell: BBC Sound Recordist
- Michael Nicholson: ITN Reporter
- Peter Heaps: ITN Engineer

SS Canberra
- Jeremy Hands: ITN Reporter
- Robin Hammond: ITN Cameraman
- John Martin: ITN Sound Recordist

Press Photographers

HMS Hermes
- Martin Cleaver: Press Association

SS Canberra
- Tom Smith: Daily Express

MoD News Photographers

Paul Haley: Soldier Magazine
Sergeant Ron Hudson: United Kingdom Land Forces (Army)
Petty Officer Peter Holdgate: Commando Forces News Team
Leading Airman Roger Ryan: Commando Forces News Team
Leading Airman Al Campbell: Commando Forces News Team

Other MoD Photographers

Jim Fletcher: SS Canberra
Leading Airman Rick Toyer

1. Barratt replaced by Hammond at Ascension Island.
2. Archer replaced by Savill.
3. Lowe replaced by Hudson.
4. Joined at Ascension Island.
5. Had camera and at least one picture wired.
Annex D.
Hugh Bicheno *Razor’s Edge* Picture Captions.

1 Evil little men with delusions of grandeur: Admiral Emilio Massera (left) and Admiral Jorge Anaya (right).

2 Royal Marines gratuitously humiliated: the image that galvanised the British.

3 Alfredo Astiz, 'sworn to die' in defence of South Georgia, surrenders without firing a shot.

4 Full military honours for Petty Officer Félix Artuso, sole fatal casualty of the fighting in South Georgia, tragically killed through misunderstanding.

5 Lieutenant Colonels Hew Pike (3 Para) and 'H' Jones (2 Para) on flight deck of Task Force flagship HMS *Hermes*, with Amphibious Command ship HMS *Fearless* in the background.

6 Rare daylight extraction of a Special Forces patrol from behind enemy lines: the Mark I eyeball once again proved to be the most dependable source of operational intelligence.

7 RI 4's Sub-Lieutenant Oscar Silva, MVC, the outstanding Argentine platoon commander of the war. Until he was killed, the Scots Guards made no progress on Tumbledown.

8 Sergeant Ian McKay, VC, outstanding representative of the NCOs who won the war on the ground. He died restoring momentum to the stalled 3 Para assault on Longdon.

9 RI 25 Sub-Lieutenant Roberto Estévez (left), who died, and Juan Gómez Centurión (right) who survived. Both won CHVCs in the fight with 2 Para for the Goose Green isthmus.

10 Residue of the formal, mass Argentine surrender ceremony on Goose Green airfield.

11 Paras in Argentine 120mm mortar bomb crater on Longdon demonstrate how dense Falklands peat absorbed the energy and shrapnel, making artillery relatively ineffective.

12 Major John Kiszeley leading a patrol of Scots Guards with 'war face' firmly in place.

13 The entirely preventable tragedy at Fitzroy – it could have been so much worse.

211
The wrack [sic] of a defeated army the centre of Stanley on 15 June 1982.

MoD does the buying, servicemen do the dying. The final agony of defenceless HMS Antelope in Ajax Bay.

SIGHTS OF STANLEY Why the Foreign Office failed to sell them out
Above left: Great War gun with 1982 inscription.
Below left: 1914 memorial
Above right: Jubilee Villas on Stanley waterfront.
Blow right: 1982 memorial.

San Carlos yesterday: capture of Platoon Sergeant Colque (left) and Marine Lt Commander Camiletti (right) by 3 Para and 40 Commando on 21 and 23 May 1982.

San Carlos Water today: 2 Para entrenchments in the foreground.

Corporal Matthews of 3 Para standing in Corporal Carizzo's mortar pit. Longdon.

Strongpoint held by PFC Claudio Scaglione on the northern flank of Longdon. McKay attacked up hill on the other side of the crest between two rock formations on the left.

Where Sergeant McCarthy's Milan team died near the crest of Longdon.

One of the most evocative omages of this or any war. Tom Smith's photograph of the bunker where Sergeant Ian McKay fell, with the Murrell River in the background.

Argentine .50-calibre machine gun mount on Harriet still overlooking the long slope which L Company, 42 Commando, attacked during the night of 11-12 June 1982.

The crest of Tumbledown. Three of the six men who stormed it with Kiszeley were wounded at the far side, looking out over Stanley.

The vital Murrell bridges today: ruins of the old bridge in front of the wartime replacement flown from Bluff Cove.

Falkland islanders celebrating their liberation in front of Government House.

Argentine nationalism yesterday, today and forever.
### Annex E.
David Cobb - Falklands Paintings Catalogue.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Scene</th>
<th>Property of</th>
<th>Commission</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 HMS Hermes, The Task Force Flagship</td>
<td>16x10</td>
<td>Oil Sketch</td>
<td>Sea</td>
<td>Fleet Air Arm Museum</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 South Georgia Rescue - 21 April 1982</td>
<td>16x10</td>
<td>Oil Sketch</td>
<td>Sea</td>
<td>Fleet Air Arm Museum</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Replenishment at Sea (RAS)</td>
<td>16x10</td>
<td>Oil Sketch</td>
<td>Sea</td>
<td>Vice Admiral Sir John Woodward</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 HMS Fearless 'Cros decking' en route - 23-28 April 1982</td>
<td>16x10</td>
<td>Oil Sketch</td>
<td>Sea</td>
<td>Fleet Air Arm Museum</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Harriers Attack Ports Stanley Airstrip - 1 May 1982</td>
<td>16x10</td>
<td>Oil Sketch</td>
<td>Sea</td>
<td>Fleet Air Arm Museum</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Bombardment of Port Stanley Airstrip - 1 May 1982</td>
<td>30x18</td>
<td>Painting</td>
<td>Sea</td>
<td>Royal Naval Museum, Portsmouth</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Queen Elizabeth II Sails from Southampton -</td>
<td>16x10</td>
<td>Oil Sketch</td>
<td>Sea</td>
<td>Commander D Joel RN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 RAF Hercules 'Take-Off At Dawn' from Wideawake Airstrip, Ascension Island</td>
<td>16x10</td>
<td>Painting</td>
<td>Air</td>
<td>70 Sqn RAF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 The Pebble Island Raid -</td>
<td>26x18</td>
<td>Painting</td>
<td>Air</td>
<td>Fleet Air Arm Museum</td>
<td>SAS Families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 San Carlos Water from Fanning Head -</td>
<td>16x10</td>
<td>Oil Sketch</td>
<td>Sea</td>
<td>Lt Col KRH Eve</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10a</td>
<td>28x18</td>
<td>Painting</td>
<td>Sea</td>
<td>148 Cmdo Fwd Ob Bat RA</td>
<td>148 Cmdo Fwd Ob Bat RA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 The Landing at Green Beach Port San Carlos Settlement - 21 May 1982</td>
<td>16x10</td>
<td>Oil Sketch</td>
<td>Land</td>
<td>Fleet Air Arm Museum</td>
<td>Blues and Royals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11a</td>
<td>26x18</td>
<td>Painting</td>
<td>Land</td>
<td>Blues and Royals</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Canberra Anchored in San Carlos</td>
<td>16x10</td>
<td>Oil Sketch</td>
<td>Sea</td>
<td>Fleet Air Arm Museum</td>
<td>P &amp; O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12a</td>
<td>30x24</td>
<td>Painting</td>
<td>Sea</td>
<td>P &amp; O</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 The Argentine Air Force over San Carlos - 23 May 1982</td>
<td>16x10</td>
<td>Oil Sketch</td>
<td>Air</td>
<td>Fleet Air Arm Museum</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 HM Ships Antelope and Broadword</td>
<td>16x10</td>
<td>Oil Sketch</td>
<td>Sea</td>
<td>Fleet Air Arm Museum</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Norland Near-Missed - 24 May 1982</td>
<td>16x10</td>
<td>Oil Sketch</td>
<td>Sea</td>
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Annex F.
Lieutenant Colonel Herbert 'H' Jones - Victoria Cross citation.

On 28th May 1982 Lieutenant Colonel Jones was commanding 2nd Battalion The Parachute Regiment on operations on the Falkland Islands. The Battalion was ordered to attack enemy positions in and around the settlements of Darwin and Goose Green. During the attack against an enemy, who was well dug in with mutually supporting positions sited in depth, the battalion was held up just South of Darwin by a particularly well-prepared and resilient enemy position of at least 11 trenches on an important ridge. A number of casualties were received. In order to read the battle fully and ensure that the momentum of his attack was not lost, Colonel Jones took forward his reconnaissance party to the foot of a re-entrant, which a section of his battalion had just secured. Despite persistent, heavy and accurate fire the reconnaissance party gained the top of the re-entrant, at approximately the same time as the enemy positions.

In his effort to gain a good viewpoint, Colonel Jones was now at the very front of his battalion. It was clear to him that desperate measures were needed in order to overcome the enemy position and rekindle the attack, and that unless these measures were taken promptly the battalion would sustain increasing casualties and the attack perhaps even fail. It was time for personal leadership and action. Colonel Jones immediately seized a sub-machine gun, and, calling on those around him and with total disregard for his own safety, charged the nearest enemy position. This action exposed him to fire from a number of trenches.

As he charged up a short slope at the enemy position he was seen to fall and roll backward downhill. He immediately picked himself up, and charged the enemy trench firing his sub-machine gun and seemingly oblivious to the intense fire directed at him. He was hit by fire from another trench, which he outflanked and fell dying only a few feet from the enemy he had assaulted. A short time later a company of the battalion attacked the enemy, who quickly surrendered. The devastating display of courage by Colonel Jones had completely undermined their will to fight further.

Thereafter the momentum of the attack was rapidly regained, Darwin and Goose Green were liberated, and the battalion released the local inhabitants unharmed and forced the surrender of some 1,200 of the enemy.

The achievements of 2nd Battalion The Parachute Regiment at Darwin and Goose Green set the tone for the subsequent land victory on the Falklands. They achieved such a moral superiority over the enemy in this first battle, that despite the advantages of numbers and selection of battle-ground, they never thereafter doubted either the superior fighting qualities of the British troops, or their own inevitable defeat. This was an action of the utmost gallantry by a commanding officer whose dashing leadership and courage throughout the battle were an inspiration to all about him.
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