Well-being and self-interest: Personal identity, Parfit, and conflicting attitudes to time in liberal theory and social policy

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

    3 Downloads (Pure)

    Abstract

    Orthodox liberal accounts of well-being recommend temporal neutrality when pursuing individual self-interest. For Derek Parfit these accounts are inadequate as having a bias attitude to time consistently reflects the human condition and a reductionist view of personal identity. However, his position conflicts with contemporary understandings of well-being, as these are frequently based on non-reductionist views of personal identity which are opposed to Parfit’s reductionism. The alternative proposal here is to resist committing to an either/or proposition concerning personal identity and our attitudes to time, to make better sense of well-being promotion in liberal theory and social practice.
    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationRoutledge Handbook of Well-Being
    EditorsKathleen T. Galvin
    Place of PublicationAbingdon, Oxon
    PublisherRoutledge
    Chapter22
    Pages222-229
    Number of pages8
    ISBN (Electronic)978-1-315-72496-6
    ISBN (Print)978-1-138-85010-1
    Publication statusPublished - 14 May 2018

    Keywords

    • Well-being
    • social policy
    • self-interest
    • liberalism
    • derek parfit
    • disability
    • old age pensions
    • adam smith
    • john rawls
    • henry sidgwick
    • rational choice
    • rationality
    • time
    • Identity
    • distribution
    • welfare state

    Fingerprint

    Dive into the research topics of 'Well-being and self-interest: Personal identity, Parfit, and conflicting attitudes to time in liberal theory and social policy'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

    Cite this