Abstract
Orthodox liberal accounts of well-being recommend temporal neutrality when pursuing individual self-interest. For Derek Parfit these accounts are inadequate as having a bias attitude to time consistently reflects the human condition and a reductionist view of personal identity. However, his position conflicts with contemporary understandings of well-being, as these are frequently based on non-reductionist views of personal identity which are opposed to Parfit’s reductionism. The alternative proposal here is to resist committing to an either/or proposition concerning personal identity and our attitudes to time, to make better sense of well-being promotion in liberal theory and social practice.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Routledge Handbook of Well-Being |
| Editors | Kathleen T. Galvin |
| Place of Publication | Abingdon, Oxon |
| Publisher | Routledge |
| Chapter | 22 |
| Pages | 222-229 |
| Number of pages | 8 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 978-1-315-72496-6 |
| ISBN (Print) | 978-1-138-85010-1 |
| Publication status | Published - 14 May 2018 |
Keywords
- Well-being
- social policy
- self-interest
- liberalism
- derek parfit
- disability
- old age pensions
- adam smith
- john rawls
- henry sidgwick
- rational choice
- rationality
- time
- Identity
- distribution
- welfare state