PACE: Reputation-Driven Hierarchical Incentive Mechanism for Trusted Healthcare Transactions in Model Marketplace

Jianfeng Lu, Xiaochi Dou, Bharati Rathore, Rutvij H. Jhaveri*, Abegaz Mohammed Seid*, Aiman Erbad

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Federated learning-based model marketplaces have the potential to securely leverage healthcare data for efficient healthcare transactions. However, the willingness to participate in this marketplace is severely hindered by self-interested model sellers, who maximize their personal gains via distorting the quality of their models. To this end, we propose a reputation-driven hierarchical incentive mechanism, called PACE, which combines contract cooperation and game pricing to motivate model sellers to be honest, thereby improving the sustainability of the model marketplace via two-layer cooperation. Specifically, at the training layer, we design a reward payment rule based on multidimensional contracts, while at the trading layer, we use a competitive market pricing game to develop the accuracy pricing rule. In particular, the above rules cleverly combine the fine-grained model sellers’ reputations with the willingness of healthcare devices to indirectly affect the model sellers’ utilities. Theoretically, we prove that PACE can effectively incentivize model sellers to truthfully report model quality while satisfying both individual rationality and incentive compatibility with a fairness guarantee. Experimental results conducted on four real-world datasets show that our PACE improves the global performance by up to 12.85% and reduces the global loss by at least 19.23% compared with the state-of-the-art baselines.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1571-1583
Number of pages13
JournalIEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics
Volume71
Issue number1
Early online date4 Dec 2024
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 12 Jun 2025

Cite this