Judicial Review and Constitutional Disputes in Afghanistan - A Brief Discussion

This paper explores the role of judicial review in Afghanistan post adoption of 2004 Constitution, focusing on the Supreme Court’s authority under Article 121 of the Constitution and the limitations that impact its function. Although the Constitution grants the Court exclusive power to interpret and resolve constitutional issues, frequent contestation by the Afghan parliament and executive has fragmented constitutional oversight. The emergence of the Independent Commission to Supervise the Implementation of the Constitution has further complicated this landscape, creating a “weak commission-judicial review” model that undermines judicial coherence. The Foreign Minister Spanta case illustrates this conflict, as the parliament bypassed the Supreme Court’s decision by appealing to the Commission, effectively reducing the Court’s authority. Afghanistan’s judiciary remains fragile, constrained by political influence and lacking a clear statutory framework for binding constitutional interpretation. This paper argues that establishing a stronger, independent judiciary with enforceable authority, akin to the U.S. model, could enhance procedural transparency and public constitutional awareness. Such reforms are critical for embedding constitutional accountability and supporting the judiciary’s role in safeguarding democratic principles in Afghanistan’s evolving legal system.