Electoral cost of the European Union promoted norms: Erdogan’s counter-terrorism impasse

This article examines the electoral cost of the EU promoted norms over a candidate country where political risks associated with countering terrorism have an impact on the popularity ratings of an incumbent government. It analyses Turkey as an exceptional case that is the only candidate country and developing economy having a systematic terrorism problem among other accession states. The core argument of this article is twofold. First, complying with EU-promoted peaceful solution run the risk of upsetting the dominant nationalist-conservative cluster, and the incumbent government may lose its voter popularity. Second, political risks associated with non-compliance may cause economic instability, which again triggers losing voter popularity. In both choices, neither full compliance nor defiance may backfire to gain the support of the nationalist-conservative electorate. A moderate decision between the two may be the safest option for a candidate country government to diminish the electoral cost of counter-terrorism policy.