The main argument in this paper is that 'first-order' empathic imagination, which accesses objective knowledge about a person's experience, and then imagines what it is like to be that person, is a necessary but not sufficient condition for relating to others as agents. A 'disposition of surprise' should also be encouraged responding to a person's subjective and highly unexpected engagement with her life, disrupting any epistemological settlement concerning the nature of her experiences and their imagined affects. This disposition accepts that making fundamental mistakes in empathic imagination is inevitable, but recognising these as mistakes, a person is more open to appropriately view and relate to 'disadvantaged others' who are agents too. So, being open to 'second-order' empathic imagination, recognising a person's subjective ability to have a life and to view her life as qualitatively rich and valuable - that is, contrary to what is normally and reasonably expected derived from 'objective knowledge' about this person and her experiences and circumstances.
|Statws||Heb ei gyhoeddi - 10 Chwef 2010|
|Digwyddiad|| Politics of Misrecognition conference, School for Policy Studies, January 2010, University of Bristol - Location unknown - please update|
Hyd: 1 Ion 1990 → 1 Ion 1990
|Papur||Politics of Misrecognition conference, School for Policy Studies, January 2010, University of Bristol|
|Cyfnod||1/01/90 → 1/01/90|